the grand assembly of the three estates of the kingdom, summoned together by the king's authority, to consider of matters relating to the public welfare, and particularly to enact and repeal laws.

The original institution of parliament is one of those matters which lie so far hidden in the obscurity of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a task difficult in itself, and not likely to be productive of any satisfactory result. The term parliament itself is comparatively of modern date, being derived from a French word, and signifying the place where they met and conferred together. It was first applied to general assemblies of the states under Louis VII. in France, about the middle of the twelfth century. But it is certain that, long before the introduction of the Norman language into England, all matters of importance were debated and settled in the great council of the realm; a practice which seems to have been universal amongst the northern nations, particularly the Germans, and which was carried by them into all the countries of Europe which they overran at the dissolution of the Roman empire. Relics of this constitution, under various modifications and changes, are still to be met with in the diets of Poland, Germany, and Sweden.

In England, however, this general council has been held immemorially, under the several names of michel-synoth, or great council; michel-genote, or great meeting; and more frequently wittena-genote, or the meeting of wise men. It was also styled in Latin, commune concilium regni, magnum concilium regis, curia magna, conventus magnatum vel consilium, assisa generalis, and sometimes communitas regni Anglie. We have instances of its meeting to order the affairs of the kingdom, to make new laws and to amend the old, or, as Fleet expresses it, novis injurias emeritis nova constituire remedia, as early as the reign of Ina king of the West Saxons, Offa king of the Mercians, and Ethelbert king of Kent, in the several realms of the heptarchy. But, after their union, the Mirrour informs us that Alfred ordained as a perpetual usage, that these councils should meet twice in the year, or oftener if need be, to treat of the government of God's people, and how they should keep themselves from sin, live in quiet, and receive right. The succeeding Saxon and Danish monarchs held frequent councils of this sort, as appears from their respective codes of laws, the titles of which usually indicate that they were enacted, either by the king with the advice of his wittena-genotes or wise men, as, Hae sunt instituta, quae Edgarus rex consilio sapientum suorum instituit; or by those sages with the advice of the king, as, Hae sunt judicia quae sapientes consilio regis Ethelstan instituerunt; or lastly, by both together, as, Ha sunt institutiones, quas rex Edmundus et episcopi sui cum sapientibus suis instituerunt. There is also no doubt that these great councils were occasionally held under the first princes of the Norman line. Glanvil, who wrote in the reign of Henry II., speaking of the particular amount of an amercement in the sheriff's court, says it had never yet been ascertained by the general assize or assembly, but was left to the custom of particular counties. Here the general assize is spoken of as a meeting well known, and its statutes or decisions are referred to in manifest contradistinction to custom or to the common law. And in the time of Edward III., an act of parliament, made in the reign of William the Conqueror, was pleaded in the case of the Abbey of St Edmund's Bury, and judicially allowed by the court.

Hence it indisputably appears that parliaments or general councils were coeval with the kingdom itself. How those parliaments were constituted and composed is another question, which has been matter of great dispute amongst our learned antiquaries; and, particularly, whether the Commons were summoned at all, or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly. But without entering into controversies of this kind, it may be sufficient to observe here, that it is generally agreed, that, in the main, the constitution of parliament, as it now exists, was marked out as long ago as the seventeenth year of King John, 1215, in the Great Charter granted by that monarch, in which he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons, personally, and all other tenants in chief under the crown, by the sheriff and bailiffs, to meet at a certain place, upon forty days' notice, to assess aids and scutages when necessary. And this constitution subsisted at least from the year 1266, or the 49th of Henry III., there being still extant writs of that date, to summon knights, citizens, and burgesses, to attend parliament. We proceed therefore to inquire wherein consists this constitution of parliament as it now stands; and, in the prosecution of this inquiry, we shall consider, first, the manner and time of its assembling; secondly, its constituent parts; thirdly, the laws and customs relating to parliament; fourthly, the methods of proceeding, and of enacting statutes, in both houses; and, lastly, the manner of the parliament's adjournment, prorogation, and dissolution.

1. The parliament is to be regularly summoned by the king's writ or letter, issued out of chancery, by advice of the privy council, at least forty days before it begins to sit. It is a branch of the royal prerogative that no parliament can be convened by its own authority, or by the authority of any excepting the king alone; and this prerogative is founded upon very good reason. For, supposing it had a right to meet spontaneously, without being called together, it is impossible to conceive that all the members, and each of the houses, would agree unanimously upon the proper time and place of meeting; and if half of the members met, and half absented themselves, who could determine which was really the legislative body, the part assembled, or that which staid away? It is therefore necessary that the parliament should be called together at a determinate time and place, and it is highly becoming its dignity and independence that it should be called together by none but one of its own constituent parts; but, of the three constituent parts, this office can only appertain to the king, as he is a single person, whose will may be uniform and steady, the first person in the nation, being superior to both houses in dignity, and the only branch of the legislature which has a separate existence, and is capable of performing any act at a time when no parliament is in being. Nor is it an exception to this rule, that, by some modern statutes, on the demise of a king or a queen, if there be then no parliament in being, the last parliament revives, and is to sit again for six months, unless dissolved by the successor; for this revived parliament must have been originally summoned by the crown.

It is true indeed that the Convention Parliament, which restored Charles II., met above a month before his return, the Lords by their own authority, and the Commons in pursuance of writs issued in the name of the keepers of the liberty of England by authority of parliament; and that the said parliament sat till the 29th of December, fully seven months after the Restoration, and enacted many laws, several of which still remain in force. But this was from the necessity of the case, which supersedes all law; for if they had not so met, it would have been morally impossible that the kingdom could have been settled in peace. The first thing, however, which was done after the king's return, was, to pass an act declaring this to be a good parliament, notwithstanding the defect of the king's writ; so that as the royal prerogative was chiefly wounded by their so meeting, and as the king himself, who alone had a right to object, consented to waive the objection, this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of the rights of the crown. Besides, we should also remember, that there existed at that time great doubt amongst the lawyers, whether even this healing act made it a good parliament; and indeed it was held by many in the negative, though this seems to have been too nice a scruple. But, out of abundant caution, it was thought necessary to confirm its acts in the next parliament, by statute 13 Car. II. c. 7 and c. 14.

It is likewise true, that at the time of the Revolution in 1688, the Lords and Commons, by their own authority, and upon the summons of the Prince of Orange, afterwards William III., met in a convention, and therein disposed of the crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that this assembling was held upon a similar principle of necessity as at the Restoration, that is, upon a full conviction that James II. had abdicated the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant; and this supposition of the individual members was confirmed by their concurrent resolution when they actually came together. In such a case as the palpable vacancy of a throne, it follows, ex necessitate rei, that the form of the royal writs must be laid aside, otherwise no parliament could ever meet again. For let us put another possible case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that the whole royal line should at any time fail and become extinct, which would indisputably vacate the throne; in this situation it seems reasonable to presume that the body of the nation, consisting of Lords and Commons, would have a right to meet and to settle the government. But upon this and no other principle did the Convention assemble in 1688. The vacancy of the throne preceded their meeting, without any royal summons, and was not a consequence of it. They did not assemble without writ, and then declare the throne vacant; but, the throne being previously vacant by the king's abdication, they assembled without writ, as they must have done if they assembled at all. Had the throne been full, their meeting would not have been regular; but, as it was really empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. Accordingly, it is declared by statute (1 William and Mary, stat. I. c. 1), that this Convention was really the two houses of parliament, notwithstanding the want of writs, or other defects of form; so that, notwithstanding these two capital exceptions, which were justifiable only on a principle of necessity, and each of which, by the way, induced a revolution in the government, the rule laid down is in general certain, that the king only can convoke a parliament.

And this, by the ancient statutes of the realm, he is bound to do every year, or oftener if need be. Not that he is, or ever was, obliged by these statutes to call a new parliament every year; but only to permit a parliament to sit annually for the redress of grievances, and the despatch of business, if need be. These last words are so loose and vague, that such of our monarchs as were inclined to govern without parliaments neglected the convoking of them, sometimes for a very considerable period, under pretence that there was not need of them. But, to remedy this, by the statute 16 Car. II. c. 1, it is enacted, that the sitting and holding of parliaments shall not be intermitted above three years at the most; and by the 1st of William and Mary, stat. ii. c. 2, it is declared to be one of the rights of the people, that, for the redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently. And this indefinite frequency is again reduced to a certainty by statute 6 William and Mary, c. 2, which enacts, as the statute of Charles II. had before done, that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the determination of the former.

2. The constituent parts of a parliament are, the king's majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity; and the three estates of the realm—the Lords Spiritual, and the Lords Temporal, who sit together with the king in one house, and the Commons, who sit by themselves in another. The king and these three estates taken together form the great corporation or body politic of the kingdom, of which the king is said to be caput, principium, et finis. For upon their assembling, the king meets them, either in person or by representation, without which there can be no beginning of a parliament; and he alone possesses the power of dissolving them.

It is highly necessary, for preserving the balance of the constitution, that the executive power should be a branch, though not the whole, of the legislature. The total union of them, we have seen, would be productive of tyranny; the total disjunction of them, for the present, would in the end produce the same effects, by causing that union against which it seems to provide. The legislature would soon become tyrannical, by making continual encroachments, and gradually assuming to itself the rights of the executive power. Thus the long parliament of Charles I., whilst it acted in a constitutional manner, with the royal concurrence, redressed many heavy grievances, and established many salutary laws. But when the two houses assumed the power of legislation, exclusively of the royal authority, they soon afterwards assumed the reins of administration; and, in consequence of these united powers, overturned both church and state, and established a worse oppression than any they pretended to remedy. To prevent any such encroachments, the king is himself a part of the parliament; and as this is the reason of his being so, the share of legislation which the constitution has placed in the crown consists in the power of rejecting rather than resolving, this being sufficient to answer the end proposed. For we may apply to the royal negative, in this instance, what Cicero observes of the negative of the Roman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of doing wrong, but merely of preventing wrong being done. The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in the established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses. The legislature, therefore, cannot abridge the executive power of any rights which it now has by law, without its own consent, since the law must perpetually stand as it now does, unless all the powers agree to alter it; and herein consists the true excellence of the British government, that all its parts form a mutual check upon each other. In the legislature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people, by the mutual privilege of rejecting each what the other has resolved; whilst the king is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments. But this very executive power is again checked and kept within due bounds by the two houses, through the privilege they possess of inquiring into, impeaching, and punishing the conduct of evil and pernicious counsellors. Thus every branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest. For the two houses naturally drawing in two directions of opposite interest, and the prerogative in another different from them both, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits; whilst the whole is prevented from separation, and artificially connected together, by the mixed nature of the crown, which is part of the legislature, and the sole executive magistrate. Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itself, would have done; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each separate impulsion, and formed out of all, constituting the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community.

3. The power and jurisdiction of parliaments, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds; and of this high court, he adds, it may be truly said, Si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima. It has sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this being the depository where that absolute power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, which transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new-model the succession to the crown, as was done in the reigns of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land, as was done in a variety of instances in the reigns of Henry VIII. and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments, as was done by the act of Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the "omnipotence of parliament." True it is, however, that what the parliament does, no authority upon earth can undo; so that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom, that such members be delegated to this important trust as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge. For it was a known apophthegm of Lord Treasurer Burghley, that England could never be ruined but by a parliament; and, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, this being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should anyway fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without any manner of remedy. To the same purpose Montesquieu, though we trust too hastily, pressages, that as Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, have lost their liberty and perished, so the constitution of England will in time lose its liberty and perish; it will perish, says he, whenever the legislative power shall become more corrupt than the executive.

To prevent the mischiefs which might arise by placing this extensive authority in hands that are either incapable or unfit to manage it, it is provided by the custom and law of parliament, that no one shall sit or vote in either house, unless he be twenty-one years of age. This is also expressly declared by statute 7 and 8 William III. c. 25. With regard to the House of Commons, doubts have arisen, from some contradictory judgments, whether or not a minor was incapacitated from sitting in that house. It is also enact- ed by statute 7 Jac. I. c. 6, that no member shall be permitted to enter the House of Commons till he has taken the oath of allegiance before the Lord Steward or his deputy; and by 30 Car. II. st. ii., and 1 Geo. I. c. 13, it is provided that no member shall sit or vote in either house, till he has, in the presence of the house, taken the oaths of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, and subscribed and repeated the declaration against transubstantiation, the invocation of saints, and the sacrifice of the mass. Aliens, unless naturalized, were likewise by the law of parliament incapable of serving therein; and it is enacted by statute 12 and 13 William III. c. 2, that no alien, even though he be naturalized, shall be capable of being a member of either house of parliament. But these are not the only standing incapacities. If any person be made a peer by the king, or elected to serve in the House of Commons by the people, yet may the respective houses, upon complaint of any crime committed by such person, and proof thereof, adjudge him disabled and incapable to sit as a member; and this by the law and custom of parliament.

For as every court of justice has laws and customs for its direction, some the civil and canon, some the common law, others their own peculiar laws and customs, so the high court of parliament has also its own peculiar law, called the lex et consuetudo parlamenti; a law which Sir Edward Coke observes, is ab omnibus quæcunda, a multis ignorantia, a paucis cognita. It will not therefore be expected that we should enter into the examination of this law with any degree of minuteness; since, as the same learned author assures us, it is much better to be learned from the rolls of parliament and other records, and by precedents and continual experience, than can be expressed by any one man. It will be sufficient to observe, that the whole of the law and custom of parliament has originated from this one maxim, "that whatever matter arises concerning either house of parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not elsewhere." Hence, for instance, the Lords will not suffer the Commons to interfere in settling the election of a peer in Scotland; the Commons will not allow the Lords to judge of the election of a burgess; nor will either house permit the subordinate courts of law to examine the merits of either case. But the maxims upon which they proceed, together with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in the breast of the parliament itself, and are not defined or ascertained by any particular or stated laws.

The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite; and therefore, when in the 31st of Henry VI. the House of Lords propounded a question to the judges concerning them, the chief justice, Sir John Fortescue, in the name of his brethren, declared, "That they ought not to make answer to that question; for it hath not been used aforetime that the justices should in anywise determine the privileges of the high court of parliament; for it is so high and mighty in its nature that it may make law, and that which is law it may make no law; and the determination and knowledge of that privilege belong to the lords of parliament, and not to the justices." Privileges of parliament were principally established in order to protect its members, not only from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but more especially from being oppressed by the power of the crown. If therefore all the privileges of parliament were once to be set down and ascertained, and no privilege to be allowed but what was so defined and determined, it were easy for the executive power to devise some new case not within the line of privilege, and under pretence thereof to harass any refractory member, and to violate the freedom of parliament. The dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in a great measure preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite. Some, however, of the more notorious privileges of the members of either house are, privilege of speech, of person, of their domestics, and of their lands and goods. As to the first, the privilege of speech, it is declared by the statute 1 William and Mary, st. ii. c. 2, as one of the liberties of the people, "that the freedom of speech, and debates, and proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament;" and this freedom of speech is particularly demanded of the king in person by the speaker of the House of Commons at the opening of every new parliament. So likewise are the other privileges of person, servants, lands, and goods, which are immunities as ancient as Edward the Confessor, in whose laws we find this precept: Ad synodos convocatas, sive summoniti sint, sive per se quid agendum habuerint, sit summa pax; and so too in the old Gothic constitutions, Excludatur hac pax et secuitas ad quatuordecim dies, convocate regni senatus. This formerly included not only privilege from illegal violence, but also from legal arrests and seizures by process from the courts of law; and still to assault by violence a member of either house, or his menial servants, is a high contempt of parliament, and there punished with the utmost severity. It has likewise peculiar penalties annexed to it in the courts of law by the statutes 5 Henry IV. c. 6, and 11 Henry VI. c. 11. Nor can any member of either house be arrested and taken into custody without a breach of the privilege of parliament.

But all other privileges which derogate from the common law are now at an end, save only as to the freedom of the member's person; which in a peer, by the privilege of peerage, is for ever sacred and inviolable, and in a commoner, by the privilege of parliament, for forty days after every prorogation, and forty days before the next appointed meeting, which is now in effect as long as the parliament subsists, since it is seldom prorogued for more than eighty days at a time. As to all other privileges which obstruct the ordinary course of justice, they were restrained by the statutes 12 William III. c. 3, 2 and 3 Anne, c. 18, and 11 Geo. II. c. 24, and are now totally abolished by statute 10 Geo. III. c. 50, which enacts, that any suit may at any time be brought against any peer or member of parliament, their servants, or any other person entitled to privilege of parliament; and that it shall not be impeached or delayed by pretence of any such privilege, except that the person of a member of the House of Commons shall not thereby be subjected to any arrest or imprisonment. Likewise, for the benefit of commerce, it is provided by statute 4 Geo. III. c. 33, that any trader, having privilege of parliament, may be served with legal process for any just debt to the amount of L100; and, unless he make satisfaction within two months, it shall be deemed an act of bankruptcy; and commissions of bankruptcy may be issued against such privileged traders, in like manner as against any other.

The only way by which courts of justice could anciently take cognizance of privilege of parliament was by writ of privilege, in the nature of a supersedeas, to deliver the party out of custody when arrested in a civil suit. For when a letter was written by the speaker to the judges to stay proceedings against a privileged person, they rejected it, as contrary to their oath of office. But since the statute 12 William III. c. 3, which enacts, that no privileged person shall be subject to arrest or imprisonment, it has been held that such arrest is irregular ab initio, and that the party may be discharged upon motion. It is to be observed, that there is no precedent of any such writ of privilege, but only in civil suits; and that the statute of 1 Jac. I. c. 13, and that of William III., which remedy some inconveniences arising from privilege of parliament, speak only of civil actions. Therefore the claim of privilege has usually been guarded with an exception as to the case of indictable crimes; or, as it has been frequently expressed, of treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Hence it seems to have been understood that no privilege was allowable to the members, their families, or servants, in any crime whatsoever; for all crimes are treated by the law as being contra pacem domini regis. Instances have not been wanting in which privileged persons have been convicted of misdemeanors, and committed, or prosecuted to outlawry, even in the middle of a session; proceedings which have afterwards received the sanction and approbation of parliament. To this it may be added, that the case of writing and publishing seditious libels was resolved by both houses not to be entitled to privilege; and the reasons upon which that case proceeded extended equally to every indictable offence. Thus the chief, if not the only privilege of parliament, in such cases, seems to be the right of receiving immediate information of the imprisonment or detention of any member, with the reason for which he is detained; a practice that is daily used upon the slightest military accusations, preparatory to a trial by a court martial, and which is recognised by the several temporary statutes for suspending the habeas corpus act, by which it is provided, that no member of either house shall be detained, till the matter of which he stands suspected be first communicated to the house of which he is a member, and the consent of the said house obtained for his commitment or detaining. But ever since the Revolution the usage has uniformly been to make the communication subsequently to the arrest.

4. For the despatch of business, each house of parliament has its speaker. The speaker of the House of Lords, whose office it is to preside there, and manage the formality of business, is the Lord Chancellor, or keeper of the king's great seal, or any other appointed by the king's commission; and if none be so appointed, the House of Lords may elect their own speaker. The speaker of the House of Commons is chosen by the house, but must be approved by the king. And herein the usage of the two houses differs. The speaker of the House of Commons cannot give his opinion or argue any question in the house; but the speaker of the House of Lords, if a lord of parliament, may do so. In each house the act of the majority binds the whole; and this majority is declared by votes openly and publicly given, not, as in Venice, and many other senatorial assemblies, privately or by ballot. The latter method may be serviceable, to prevent intrigues and unconstitutional combinations; but it is impossible to be practised with us, at least in the House of Commons, where every member's conduct is subject to the future censure of his constituents, and therefore should be openly submitted to their inspection.

5. It now only remains to add a word or two concerning the manner in which parliament may be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved.

An adjournment is no more than a continuance of the session from one day to another, as the word itself signifies; and this is done by the authority of each house separately every day, and sometimes for a fortnight or a month together, as at Christmas or Easter, or upon other particular occasions. But the adjournment of one house is no adjournment of the other. It has also been usual, when his majesty has signified his pleasure, that both or either of the houses should adjourn themselves to a certain day, to obey the king's pleasure so signified, and to adjourn accordingly. Otherwise, besides the indecorum of a refusal, a prorogation would assuredly follow, and would often be very inconvenient both to public and to private business. For prorogation puts an end to the session; and then such bills as are only begun and not perfected must be resumed de novo, if at all, in a subsequent session; whereas, after an adjournment, all things continue in the same state as at the time of the adjournment, and may be proceeded in without any fresh commencement.

A prorogation is the continuance of the parliament from one session to another, as an adjournment is a continuation of the session from day to day. This is done by the royal authority, expressed either by the Lord Chancellor in his majesty's presence, or by commission from the crown, or frequently by proclamation. Both houses are necessarily prorogued at the same time, it not being a prorogation of the House of Lords or Commons, but of the parliament. The session is never understood to be at an end until a prorogation takes place; although, unless some act be passed, or some judgment given in parliament, it is in truth no session at all. Formerly the usage was, for the king to give the royal assent to all such bills as he approved, at the end of every session, and then to prorogue the parliament, though sometimes only for a day or two, after which all business then depending in the houses was to be begun again. This custom obtained so strongly, that it once became a question, whether giving the royal assent to a single bill did not of course put an end to the session. But though it was then resolved in the negative, yet the notion was so deeply rooted, that the statute 1 Car. I. c. 7, was passed to declare that the king's assent to that and some other acts should not put an end to the session; and even as late as the reign of Charles II. we find a proviso frequently tacked to a bill, that his majesty's assent thereto should not determine the session of parliament. But it seems to be allowed, that a prorogation must be expressly made, in order to determine the session; and if, at the time of an actual rebellion, or imminent danger of invasion, the parliament shall be separated by adjournment or prorogation, the king is empowered to call them together by proclamation, on fourteen days' notice of the time appointed for their re-assembling.

A dissolution is the civil death of the parliament; and this may be effected in three ways.

The first is, by the king's will, expressed either in person or by representation. For as the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so also it is a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may, whenever he pleases, prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to its existence. If no one had a right to prorogue or dissolve a parliament but itself, it might happen to become perpetual; and this would be extremely dangerous, if at any time it should attempt to encroach upon the executive power, as was fatally experienced by the unfortunate Charles I., who, having unadvisedly passed an act to continue the parliament then in being till such time as it should please to dissolve itself, at last fell a sacrifice to that inordinate power which he had himself consented to give them. It is therefore extremely necessary that the crown should be empowered to regulate the duration of these assemblies, under the limitations which the English constitution has prescribed; so that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly meet together for the despatch of business and redress of grievances, and, on the other, may not, even with the consent of the crown, be continued to an inconvenience or unconstitutional length.

Secondly, a parliament may be dissolved by the demise of the crown. This dissolution formerly happened immediately upon the death of the reigning sovereign; for he being considered in law as the head of the parliament (ex-put, principium, et finis), when that failed, the whole body was held to be extinct. But the calling a new parliament immediately on the inauguration of the successor being found inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in being in case of a disputed succession, it was enacted by the statutes 7 and 8 William III. c. 15, and 6 Anne, c. 7, that the parliament in being should continue for six months after the death of any king or queen, unless sooner prorogued or dissolved by the successor; that if the parliament, at the time of the king's death, had been separated, by adjournment or prorogation, it should notwithstanding assemble immediately; and that if no parliament was then in being, the members of the last parliament should assemble and be again a parliament.

Lastly, a parliament may be dissolved or expire by mere length of time. If the legislative body were perpetual, or if it lasted during the life of the prince who convened it, as formerly, and were to be supplied, by occasionally filling up the vacancies with new representatives; in these cases, were it once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy: but when different bodies succeed each other, if the people see cause to disapprove of the present, they may rectify its faults in the next. A legislative assembly, also, which is sure to be separated, and its members to become private men, subject to the full operation of the laws which they have enacted for others, will think themselves bound in interest as well as in duty to make only such laws as are good. The utmost extent of time that the same parliament was allowed to sit, by the statute 6 William and Mary c. 3, was three years; after the expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the first summons, the parliament was to have no longer continuance. But by the 1st of Geo. I. stat. ii. c. 38, professedly enacted to prevent the great and continued expenses of frequent elections, and the violent heats and animosities consequent thereupon, and for the peace and security of the government, then just recovering from the effects of a rebellion, this term was prolonged to seven years; and, what alone is an instance of the vast authority of parliament, the very same house which was chosen for three years, enacted its own continuance for seven. As the constitution now stands, therefore, the parliament must expire, or die a natural death, at the end of every seventh year, if not sooner dissolved by the royal prerogative.

We shall conclude this article with an account of some general forms not noticed under any of the preceding heads.

In the House of Lords, the princes of the blood sit by themselves on the sides of the throne; and at the wall, upon the king's right hand, the two archbishops sit by themselves on a form. Below them, the bishops of London, Durham, and Winchester, and all the other bishops sit according to the priority of their consecration. On the king's left hand the Lord Treasurer, Lord President, and Lord Privy Seal, sit upon forms above all dukes, except those of the royal blood; then the dukes, marquises, and earls according to their creation. Across the room are wool sacks, continued from an ancient custom; and the Chancellor or Keeper, being of course the speaker of the House of Lords, sits on the first wool sack before the throne, with the great seal or mace lying by him; and below these there are forms for the viscounts and barons. On the other wool sacks are seated the judges, masters in chancery, and king's counsellors, who are only to give their advice in points of law; but they all stand up till the king gives them leave to sit.

The Commons sit promiscuously, only the speaker has a chair at the upper end of the house, and the clerk and his assistant sit at a table near him. When a member of the House of Commons speaks, he stands up uncovered, and directs his address to the speaker only. If what he says be answered by another, he is not allowed to reply the same day, unless personal reflections have been cast upon him; but when the Commons, in order to have greater freedom of debate, have resolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, every member may speak to a question as often as he thinks necessary. In the House of Lords they vote, beginning at the puisne or lowest baron, and so up orderly to the highest, every one answering content or not content. In the House of Commons they vote by yeas and nays; and if it be dubious which are the greater number, the house divides. If the question be about bringing anything into the house, the yeas go out, but if it be about anything the house already has, the nays go out. In all divisions the speaker appoints four tellers, two of each opinion. In a committee of the whole house, they divide by changing sides, the yeas taking the right and the nays the left of the chair; and then there are but two tellers. If a bill pass one house, and the other demur to it, a conference is demanded in the painted chamber, where certain members are deputed from each house; and here the Lords sit covered, whilst the Commons stand bare, and debate the case. If they disagree, the affair is null; but if they agree, this, with the other bills which have passed both houses, is brought down to the king in the House of Lords, who comes thither clothed in his royal robes. Before him the clerk of the parliament reads the title of each bill, and as he reads, the clerk of the crown pronounces the royal assent or dissent. If it be a public bill, the royal assent is given in these words, Le roy le veut. The king will have it so; if a private bill, Soit fait comme il est désiré. Let the request be complied with; but if the king refuse the bill, the answer is, Le roy s'aviseira. The king will think of it; and if it be a money bill, the answer is, Le roy remercie ses loyaux sujets, accepte leur benevolence, et aussi le veut. The king thanks his loyal subjects, accepts their benevolence, and therefore grants his consent.

High Court of Parliament is the supreme court in the kingdom, not only for the making, but also for the execution of laws, by the trial of great and enormous offenders, whether Lords or Commoners, in the method of parliamentary impeachment. As for acts of parliament to attain particular persons of treason or felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or contrary to the common law, in order to serve a special purpose, we speak not of them; they are to all intents and purposes new laws, made pro re nata, and by no means an execution of such as are already in being. But an impeachment before the Lords by the Commons of Great Britain in parliament, is a prosecution of the already known and established law, and has been frequently put in practice; being a presentment to the highest or supreme court of criminal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom. A commoner cannot, however, be impeached before the Lords for any capital offence, but only for high misdemeanors; but a peer may be impeached for any crime. In the case of an impeachment of a peer for treason, the Lords usually address the crown to appoint a lord high steward, for the greater dignity and regularity of their proceedings; and this high steward was formerly elected by the peers themselves, though he was generally commissioned by the king; but it has latterly been strenuously maintained, that the appointment of a high steward in such cases is not indispensably necessary, and that the house may proceed without one. The articles of impeachment are a kind of bills of indictment, found by the House of Commons, and afterwards tried by the Lords, who in cases of misdemeanors are considered not only as their own peers, but likewise as the peers of the whole nation. This is a custom derived from the constitution of the ancient Germans, who, in their great councils, sometimes tried capital accusations relating to the public: Licti apud concilium accusare quoque, et discrimen eopitis intendere. And it has a peculiar propriety in the English constitution, which has much improved upon the ancient model imported hither from the Continent. For although the union of the legislative and judicial powers ought in general to be most carefully avoided, yet it may happen that a subject, intrusted with the administration of public affairs, may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of such crimes as the ordinary magistrate either dares not or cannot punish. Of these the representatives of the people, or the House of Commons, cannot properly judge, because their constituents are the parties injured, and can therefore only impeach. But before what court shall this impeachment be tried? Not before the ordinary tribunals, which would naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser. Reason therefore suggests that this branch of the legislature, which represents the people, must bring its charge before the other branch, which consists of the nobility, who have neither the same interests, nor the same passions, as popular assemblies. The constitution of our island enjoys this vast superiority over those of the Grecian and Roman republics, where the people were at the same time judges and accusers, and where the accused were continually liable to become the victims of popular prejudice, passion, and resentment. It is therefore proper that the nobility should judge, to insure justice to the accused, as it is proper that the people should accuse, to insure justice to the commonwealth. Amongst other extraordinary circumstances attending the authority of this court, there is one of a very singular nature, which was insisted on by the House of Commons in the case of the Earl of Danby in the reign of Charles I., and is now enacted by statute 12 and 13 William III. c. 2, that no pardon under the great seal shall be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons of Great Britain in parliament.

For a more general view of the British Constitution, the reader is referred to the article ENGLAND.