a sect of heretics in Egypt, so denominated from Rhetorus, their leader. The distinguishing tenet of this heresiarch, as represented by Philastrius, was that he approved of all the heresies before him, and taught that they were all in the right. The founder of modern philosophy describes the subject of our present inquiry as being "that science which we call Rhetoric or Art of Eloquence; a science excellent, and excellently well laboured." But Bacon's praise of the science itself, and of its ancient cultivators, has been far from commanding universal assent. The prejudice with which rhetorical studies are regarded by so many, has, it must be confessed, been fostered, if not generated, by the fault of some of its students and expositors. Rhetoricians, like teachers of the kindred science logic, have too often claimed for their art the possession of powers which do not belong to it: their systems of precepts have become most ponderous, and their pretensions most extravagant, in times when eloquence was sunk in the deepest decay; and in the rhetorical writings of the lower empire and the dark ages, it seems to be implicitly assumed that every man who submits to learn and practise certain prescribed rules, will attain skill in speech and writing, as certainly as he would, by an industrious apprenticeship, acquire the mastery of a mechanical trade. Accordingly, in more than one period, and in none perhaps more decidedly than in our own, the very name of Rhetoric has been put under the ban of the empire of literature; and the sentence has been justified by misrepresentations both of the purposes of the art, and of the works which result from it. Its rules have been described as a scheme of petty sophistical artifices, designed to aid in smuggling falsehood into the mind under the disguise of logical quibbles or oratorical ornaments; and, the worst declamations of the worst declaimers being exhibited as adequate specimens, rhetorical composition has been defined to be, that which possesses the forms of eloquence without its spirit. We hear truth, good taste, and eloquence, severally spoken of as the antitheses of rhetoric. Words, to use Mirabeau's paradox, are things; and the subject which we are now to consider is not the only one, nor by any means the most important, in which infinite mischief has been done by the attaching of contemptible associations to terms of neutral meaning; and by the affixing of odious names to objects in themselves innocent or useful.

The truth is, that the uses of rhetoric, as well as of all the other arts or sciences which, in different departments, aim at the training of the human mind for exertions in which it is itself its own instrument, are principally negative. Neither in reasoning nor in oratory can any scheme of rules, logical or rhetorical, nor any study of models however profound, nor any practice however long and intelligent, enable the intellect to perform, even moderately well, a task for which it has an inherent incapacity; and if excellence be the end in view, it will assuredly never be reached, either with the observance of rules or independently of them, unless genius be present to give the primary impulse, and to sustain the mind in its course. Logic, strictly speaking, does not teach us how to reason, but only how to avoid violations of those essential principles on which all reasoning is founded. In like manner, a legitimate system of rhetoric would teach, not what eloquence is, but what it is not; it would disclaim all purpose of qualifying its students to compound an eloquent discourse by rule, as a medicine is compounded after a prescription; and it would occupy itself mainly in discovering, by the immediate study of the mind itself, and by critical examination of the works of genius, those guiding and universal laws of human intellect which the student of eloquence must not disobey, if he wishes to attain, in any shape, the end which he pursues.

It must be that such principles exist: if we apprehend rightly what eloquence is, we may reasonably hope to discover at least some of them; and even if we could discover them all,—which no sound thinker has ever yet pretended to do,—the speaker or writer would still retain ample space for the exertion of his natural powers, which indeed would act with redoubled ease and vigour from his distinct knowledge of the limits of their domain. A chart does not teach the mariner how to navigate his vessel; but it may fare hardly with him if he wants one in a narrow sea, with whose soundings he is imperfectly acquainted.

It is designed, in this paper, not to present a dissertation having any claim to be considered as a complete exposition of the subject in any of its sections, but simply to sketch in outline a plan of rhetorical studies, which the student may not find altogether useless as a clue when he attempts to master the details under the guidance of more ambitious works; and it may be well to state at the outset the view which, in common with those who have thought most deeply on the matter, we entertain as to the means by which rhetoric is qualified to execute the very important task which it undertakes.

In the first place, then, we hold that the systematic view of the principles and rules of eloquence which rhetorical treatises usually offer, must peremptorily be embraced, as an essential part, in the studies of every one who would become really eloquent in speech or in writing. But this proposition must be understood with two cautions. First, in regard to many particulars indispensable towards the attainment of eloquence, every sound scheme of rhetorical precepts, abandoning all claim to primary discovery, contents itself with informing or reminding the student, that he must seek for knowledge elsewhere, from reflection on the phenomena of his own mind, from the best works in philosophy, and from an observation of the world and of human nature. This is true, not merely as to the matter on which eloquence may employ itself, as to which, however, it is true universally; but also as to most of the instruments which the art uses. Secondly, and more particularly, the real usefulness of rhetoric rests, not on its special rules, but on its general principles. As soon as a rule diverts the student's attention from the principle, it for him ceases to be an aid, and becomes a positive hindrance. As soon as a treatise on rhetoric has impressed on the student's mind distinctly and indelibly the great principles on which eloquence is founded, it has given him a talisman to guard him against all seductions into error, and even against the very mistakes which may be inculcated in the book itself. Systems of rhetoric aid effectually in the attainment of eloquence, only so far as they teach the student to reflect on its principles.

But, further, we have called systematic rhetoric a part of the studies leading towards eloquence. It is in of models truth a part which, by itself, is insufficient for the attainment of the end; for we must add to it a critical acquaintance with the best models of literature, extending over as many of its departments as possible, but especially minute in that which the student chiefly designs to cultivate. What is here meant is a study of literary works, not for the knowledge which they contain, but as models; a study directed towards an analysis of the mode in which they communicate knowledge, and of the conformity or disagreement of that mode with the laws of eloquence. Such a study may be said to bear towards the systematic portion of the-