any thing capable of exciting laughter. Ludicrous is a general term, signifying, as may appear from its derivation, what is playsome, sportive, or jocular. Ludicrous therefore seems the genus, of which risible is a species, limited to what makes us laugh.

However easy it may be, concerning any particular object, to say whether it be risible or not, it seems difficult, if at all practicable, to establish any general character, by which objects of that kind may be distinguished from others. Nor is that a singular case; for, upon a review, we find the same difficulty in most of the articles already handled. There is nothing more easy, viewing a particular object, than to pronounce that it is beautiful or ugly, grand or little; but were we to attempt general rules for ranging objects under different classes according to these qualities, we should be much gravelled. A separate cause increases the difficulty of distinguishing risible objects by a general character: all men are not equally affected by risible objects, nor the same man at all times; for in high spirits a thing will make him laugh aloud, which will scarcely provoke a smile in a grave mood. Risible objects, however, are circumscribed within certain limits. No object is risible but what appears slight, little, or trivial; for we laugh at nothing that is of importance to our own interest or to that of others. Real distress raises pity, and therefore cannot be risible; but a slight or imaginary distress, which moves not pity, is risible. The adventure of the fulling-mills in Don Quixote is extremely risible; so is the scene where Sancho, in a dark night, tumbling into a pit, and attaching himself to the side by hand and foot, hangs there in terrible dismay till the morning, when he discovers himself to be within a foot of the bottom. A nose remarkably long or short is risible; but to want it altogether, so far from provoking laughter, raises horror in the spectator. With respect to works both of nature and art, none of them is risible but such as are out of rule; some remarkable defect or excess, a very long visage, for example, or a very short one. Hence nothing just, proper, decent, beautiful, proportioned, or grand, is risible.

Even from this slight sketch it will be readily conjectured, that the emotion raised by a risible object is of a nature so singular as scarcely to find place while the mind is occupied with any other passion or emotion; and the conjecture is verified by experience; for we scarcely ever find that emotion blended with any other. One emotion we must except; and that is, contempt raised by certain improprieties: every improper act inspires us with some degree of contempt for the author; and if an improper act be at the same time so risible as to provoke laughter, of which blunders and absurdities are noted instances, the two emotions of contempt and of laughter unite intimately in the mind, and produce externally what is termed a laugh of derision or of scorn. Hence objects that cause laughter may be distinguished into two kinds: they are either risible or ridiculous. A risible object is mirthful only; a ridiculous object is both mirthful and contemptible. The first raises an emotion of laughter that is altogether pleasant: the pleasant emotion of laughter raised by the other is blended with the painful emotion of contempt, and the mixed emotion is termed the emotion of ridicule. The pain which a ridiculous object gives me is resented and punished by a laugh of derision. A risible object, on the other hand, gives me no pain; it is rendered altogether pleasant by a certain titillation, which is expressed externally by mirthful laughter.