a word that has been used so indefinitely that it is difficult to determine its precise meaning. From its resemblance in sound to the Latin word superstes, a survivor, it is evidently derived from it, and different attempts have been made to trace their connection in signification. In the dialogue of Cicero "De Natura Deorum," Balbus says that they who prayed and sacrificed whole days that their children might survive them, were called superstitions. Lactantius censures this etymology, and avers that they were not called superstitions who wished that their children might survive them (for this we all wish), but because they who survived their parents worshipped their images. Others again affirm that superstition is derived from superstes, because it consisted in considering the dead as if they were alive. But these etymologies are solely conjectural, and we consider conjectures as absurd in philology as we do in science; they may mislead, but are seldom of any benefit. The usual meaning affixed to the word superstition, both in the Latin and English languages, is so different from superstes, that its change of meaning must be owing to some accident after which it is in vain to inquire. If we had not known that the word paganus, a pagan, was derived from pagus, a village, because the heathens in a certain period of the Christian history lived in villages, the whims and fancies of etymologists would not have thrown much light on the subject.

Without labouring, from the aid of etymology, to define superstition, which is a word of a very extensive signification, we shall consider to what objects it is applied; and then, by observing what is common to them all, we shall be enabled to fix with some degree of precision the meaning of the term. We apply it to the idolatry of the heathens; we apply it also to the Jews, who made the will of God of no effect by their traditions, and substituted ceremonies in place of the religion of their fathers. We say also that Christians are guilty of superstition; the Romanists, who believe in transubstantiation and in the efficacy of prayers to saints; and those Protestants who esteem baptism and the Lord's Supper, and the punctual performance of other ceremonies, without regard to morality, as sufficient to ensure salvation. Those persons are also reckoned superstitious who believe, without any evidence, that prophecies are still uttered by divine inspiration, and that miracles are still performed. The word is also extended to those who believe in witchcraft, magic, and apparitions, or that the divine will is declared by omens or augury; that the fortune of individuals can be affected by things indifferent, by things deemed lucky or unlucky, or that diseases can be cured by words, charms, and incantations.

Through all the particulars which we have enumerated, there runs one general idea, the belief of what is false and contrary to reason. From this, however, we must not suppose that whatever is false and contrary to reason, may be denominated superstition. Superstition has always a reference to God, to religion, or to beings superior to man. We do not however distinguish all false and irrational opinions in religion by the name of superstition. We do not, for instance, apply this name to the opinions which some of the ancients entertained, that God is the soul of the world, and that men are only portions of him separated for a time; or that the soul after death lives successively in different bodies. If we examine the subject with more attention, we shall discover that the foundation of superstition is ignorance of the moral attributes of God; for we never say a man is superstitious for entertaining erroneous opinions of the natural attributes of God. Some of the Socinians have denied the prescience of God; and a French philosopher has not only rejected the belief that he is a spirit, but has presumed to say that he is composed of a species of crystals. The first of these opinions discovers very imperfect ideas of God, and the second is the height of impiety and absurdity; yet the Socinians have not been accused of superstition, nor can this French philosopher be suspected of it. We do not call every false opinion concerning the unity or moral attributes of God by the name of superstition, as, for instance, the opinion which some sceptics have supported, that God is not good; for, as was mentioned before, superstition always involves the idea of credulity. It does not consist in falsely denying that God possesses any particular moral attributes, but in believing more than what is true concerning them; in forming mean, unworthy ideas of them; in supposing that he is guided by blind passion like mankind, and enjoins upon his creatures commandments which are irrational and absurd.

As superstition arises from ignorance and credulity in the understanding, so it has also a seat in the passions. Fear has been commonly considered as a passion of the human mind, from which it chiefly derives its origin; and there is no doubt that more superstition has arisen from fear united with ignorance and credulity, than from any other passion; yet it would certainly be improper to exclude all other passions. We cannot account for the superstition of the Egyptians, without supposing that much of it arose from gratitude. They worshipped the Nile, because it distributed fertility and abundance over the land of Egypt; and they worshipped some animals, merely because they prevented the increase of other animals which were noxious. Thus they adored the ibis, because it destroyed the eggs of the crocodile.

Having thus endeavoured to analyse the ideas comprehended under the word superstition, we may sum them up in a few words. It respects God and beings superior to man, and extends to our religious opinions, worship, and practices; and may be defined absurd opinions and actions arising from mean and defective ideas of the moral attributes of God. Let us apply this definition to the different species of superstition already mentioned.

But before entering upon this application, it may be proper to observe, that superstition involves the idea of a blameable inattention to reason, or a credulity arising from an indolence of understanding. We generally make a distinction between the imperfect opinions which a savage, from the necessary effects of his situation, forms of the attributes of God, and those which civilized nations entertain. We say the savage is ignorant, and we ascribe his ignorance to his situation; but we call the Roman Catholic superstitions, and we blame him for not having those just ideas of God which he might have obtained by opening his Bible, or by the exercise of his understanding in the favourable situation in which he is placed. Superstition, then, does not originate so much from the natural weakness of the human understanding, as from a misapplication or a neglect of it.

We cannot therefore with any propriety apply the name superstition to polytheism in general; for what all the ancient philosophers, after much study and reflection, concluded to be true, could never proceed from credulity and inattention, but from their situation. We speak very properly, however, when we call idolatry by the name of superstition; because there is no man so devoid of understanding as not to be capable of discovering that a piece of metal, or wood, or stone, can neither hear nor answer petitions. Superstition was a name which the ancient philosophers gave to those who entertained mean opinions of the gods, or did foolish things to obtain their favour. According to Theophrastus, the superstitious man is one who, having washed his hands, and sprinkled himself all round, leaves the temple with a laurel leaf in his mouth, with which he walks about the whole day. Or, if a weasel should cross his path, he will not advance a step till he has thrown three stones over the road. If he find a serpent in his house, he rears a place of devotion on the spot. He often purifies his house, will not sit upon a grave, or touch a dead person. He is anxious about the interpretation of his dreams, will not offer a sacrifice unless his wife go along with him, or, if she is engaged, he takes the nurse and the little children. He purifies himself with onions; and when he sees a mad or an epileptic person, he spits in his bosom. Such was the character of superstition in the days of Theophrastus. All these whimsical ceremonies were performed in order to prevent mischief; and to avert the wrath of the gods; and therefore perfectly correspond with the definition given above.

It is only necessary to consider a little the superstitious opinions and practices among Jews and Christians, to be sensible that they have all arisen from mean and absurd ideas of the moral attributes of God; for they have generally entertained noble opinions of his natural attributes. The Jews considered God as a partial being, who had a predilection for their nation in preference to all others, and preferred external homage and ceremony to moral purity. If the Romanists think consistently, they must esteem God as a being who can be prevailed upon by the opportunity of one dead man to assist another, or as a being whose patience would be fatigued with hearing prayers constantly. Hence their practice of praying to saints. They in effect believe, however they may deceive themselves, that God is unjust, or they could not believe transubstantiation; for it supposes that God can give commands directly contrary to those principles of belief with which he has endued the human mind. They consider a strict adherence to a variety of ceremonies, to forms, pomp, and show, as essential to the worship of God; and thus they evidently betray most inadequate conceptions of the creator and governor of the universe. They thought it their duty to extirpate heretics: this was supposing God a cruel and revengeful being. Even among Protestants, we are sorry to say, a great deal of superstition remains: we have not yet learned to consider God as a spirit, who is to be worshipped in spirit and in truth, as a pure, moral, benevolent being; and hence arise all the superstitious practices which prevail in some Protestant churches.

Besides those superstitious opinions and practices which entirely respect our duty to God, there are others which may be termed vulgar superstitions. These also arise from imperfect and mean ideas of the moral attributes of God. To believe vulgar prophecies, which are always the effusions of madness or knavery, is to suppose that God, who has drawn a veil over futurity, and only delivers prophecies to accomplish some great moral purpose, sometimes gives them for no purpose at all; or to gratify idle curiosity, or to disclose such a knowledge of what is to happen as is inconsistent with the free agency of man and the moral administration of the world. Nor is it less superstitious to believe in vulgar miracles. To believe in them, is to believe that God suspends the laws of nature for the most trivial purposes, or to countenance fraud and worldly ambition; it is to receive the most extraordinary facts upon the most unsatisfactory evidence. The belief of witchcraft, of apparitions, and the second sight, may be resolved into the same principle. To suppose that God would communicate the power of doing mischief, and of controlling his laws, to creatures, merely for gratifying their own passions, is unworthy of God. The belief of apparitions is equally inconsistent with the goodness of God. The same objection rises against the second sight as against the belief of vulgar prophecies, and may also be extended to omens, to astrology, to things lucky and unlucky, and to fortune-telling. As to the different devices and charms for preventing and curing disorders, they resemble in every respect false miracles.

A judicious history of superstition would be a curious and entertaining work, and would exhibit the human character in a remarkable point of view. Superstition is most prevalent among men of weak and uncultivated minds; it is more frequent in the female sex than among men, and abounds more in the rude than in the refined stages of society. The general features of it have been the same in all ages; but it assumes certain peculiarities, according to the diversity of character in different nations. It gained admission into the science of medicine at an early period. He who was endowed with superior genius and knowledge was reckoned a magician. Dr Bartolo was seized by the inquisition at Rome in the seventeenth century, because he unexpectedly cured a nobleman of the gout. Diseases were imputed to fascination, and hundreds of poor wretches were dragged to the stake for being accessory to them. Mercatus, physician to Philip II. of Spain, a writer of uncommon accuracy and information, appears strongly inclined to deny the existence of fascinatory diseases; but he is constrained to acknowledge them for two reasons; 1st, because the inquisition had decided in favour of their reality; 2dly, because he had seen a very beautiful woman break a steel-mirror to pieces, and blast some trees by a single glance of her eyes.

As the opinions concerning the cause of diseases were superstitious, those concerning the method of curing them were not less so. In the Odyssey we read of a cure performed by a song. Josephus relates, that he saw a certain Jew, named Eleazar, draw the devil out of an old woman's nostrils by the application of Solomon's seal to her nose, in presence of the Emperor Vespasian. Many different kinds of applications were used for expelling the devil. Flagellation sometimes succeeded admirably; purgatives and antispasmodics were other modes of discharging him. Dr Mynsight cured several bewitched persons with a plaster of assafoetida. How the assafoetida was so efficacious, was much disputed. Some thought the devil might consider so vile an application as an insult, and run off in a passion; but others very sagely observed, that as devils are supposed to have eyes and ears, they might likewise have noses.

Nor was it only in medicine that these superstitious opinions were entertained, they also prevailed in natural philosophy. The pernicious effects in mines, which we now know are occasioned by noxious air, were confidently imputed to the demons of the mine. Even Van Helmont, Bodin, Strozzi, and Luther, attributed thunder and meteors to the devil. Chemists were employed for centuries in search of the philosopher's stone, with which they were to perform miracles. It was a common question among philosophers in the seventeenth century, whether the imagination could move external objects; a question generally decided in the affirmative.

Though superstition be generally the mark of a weak mind, such is the infirmity of human nature, that we find many instances of it among men of the most sublime genius and most enlightened minds. Socrates believed that he was guided by a demon. Lord Bacon believed in witchcraft; and relates that he was cured of warts by rubbing them with a piece of lard with the skin on, and then nailing it with the fat towards the sun on the post of a chamber window facing the sun. Henry IV., one of the most illustrious of monarchs, was very uneasy before his assassination, on account of some prophecies. Sully declares, that one of the considerations that kept him faithful to his master in the most unpromising state of his affairs, was a prediction of La Brosse, that Henry would make his fortune. The astrologer Morin directed Cardinal de Richelieu's motions in some of his journeys. The enlightened Cudworth defended prophecies in general, and called those who opposed the belief of witchcraft by the name of atheists; and the predictions of Rice Evans were supported in the eighteenth century by the celebrated names of Warburton and Jortin. Dr Hoffmann, the father of the modern theory and practice of medicine, in a dissertation published in the large edition of his works in 1747, says, that the devil can raise storms, produce insects, and act upon the animal spirits and imagination; and, in fine, that he is an excellent optician and natural philosopher, on account of his long experience. Dr Johnson is supposed to have believed in the second sight.

With respect to the effects of superstition on the human mind, they are indeed deplorable. It chains down the understanding, and sinks it into the most abject and sordid state, and keeps it under the dominion of fear, and sometimes of cruelty. Where once it takes possession, it has a tendency to become extreme, and generally becomes so intolerable, that men of reflection and learning conspire its destruction. The Christian religion gave a violent shock to the heathen superstition; the reformation in a great measure demolished the superstition of the church of Rome; and the superstition which remained among Protestants after their separation from that church has been gradually yielding to the influence of enlightened reason, or to the bold and daring attacks of infidelity and deism. We behold the prospect of its ruins with pleasure, and thank the deists for their zeal; but it is from the firm hope that the religion of Jesus will arise in all its beauty and simple majesty, and be admired and respected as it deserves; for, mean and contemptible as superstition certainly is, we would rather see men do what they reckon their duty from superstitious principles, than see anarchy and vice prevail, even though attended with all the knowledge and liberality of sentiment which deism and infidelity can inspire.