in a general sense, denotes any active power or cause. Agents are either natural or moral. Natural agents are such inanimate powers as act upon other bodies in a certain and determinate manner: as gravity, fire, &c. Moral agents, on the contrary, are rational creatures, capable of regulating their actions by a certain rule.

in Diplomacy, Commerce, and Jurisprudence.—This word applies generally to any person who acts for another. It has probably been adopted from France, as its function in modern civil law was otherwise expressed in Roman jurisprudence. Ducange tells us that in the eastern empire the important officers who collected the grain in the provinces for the troops and the household, and afterwards extended their functions so as to include those of government postmasters, came to be called agentes in rebus, though their earlier name was frumentarii.

In Diplomacy, a class of semi-ambassadors termed agents have been employed generally between states of unequal power. The small community might send an agent to pre-cipitate some powerful government, and secure its protection. A great power would, on the other hand, distribute its agents among the petty states which it kept in clientage, to see that no counteracting influence was at work among them. In this shape our Indian government keep agencies in the protected and other neighbouring states. In countries within the operation of the laws of diplomacy, an agent has the privilege of personal protection, and sometimes that of exemption from direct taxes, but he has not the ambassador's prerogative of communicating directly with the sovereign. See AMBASSADOR; DIPLOMACY.

The law of principal and agent is one of those which have arisen in common practice regulated by jurisprudential theory. It involves nice and subtle distinctions, which are not merely theoretical, but have been found of eminent practical utility in the affairs of active life, for the service of which they have been created from time to time, by sagacious jurists. They had their origin in the subtleties of the law of mandate among the Romans, whence they spread through the different countries of Europe. It is perhaps fortunate that in England the spirit of the Justinian system thus pervades this branch, and that it is but little affected by the conventional peculiarities of the common law. This renders the law of agency almost alike throughout the whole British empire, and produces the farther result, that a branch of the British commercial code, in which it is of great importance that different nations should understand each other's system, differs only slightly from the corresponding branch of the law throughout the rest of Europe. The main features of a general view of the law of agency involve the adjustment of the rights and duties of the principal, the agent, and the public. The agent should not do what he has no authority for, yet if he be seen to have authority, those with whom he deals should not be injured by secret and unusual conditions. The employer is bound by what his agent does in his name, but the public are not entitled to take advantage of obligations which are known to be unauthorised and unusual. The agent is entitled to demand performance by the principal of the obligations undertaken by him within the bounds of his commission, but he is not entitled to pledge him with a recklessness which he would certainly avoid in the management of his own affairs. It is in the regulation of these powers and corresponding checks in such a manner that the legal principle shall apply to daily practice, that the niceties of this branch of the law consist.

Agents are of different kinds, according to their stipulated or consuetudinary powers. The main restraint in the possible powers of an agent is in the old maxim, delegatus non potest delegare, designed to check the complexity that might be created by inquiries into repeatedly deputed responsibility. But in practice this principle is modified. The agent cannot delegate his commission, or put another in his own place; but it is often a part of his function that he is to employ, for the accomplishment of certain objects, persons who are themselves agents. Thus, there is nothing to prevent a commercial agent from sending a portion of the goods entrusted by him to his own agent for disposal. In the general case, the authority may pass from the principal to the agent, either verbally or in writing. The English statute of frauds requires an agent to have authority in writing for the purposes of its 1st, 2d, and 3d clauses relating to leases. "And it is a general rule, that an agent who has to execute a deed, or to take or give livery or seisin, must be appointed by deed for that purpose. Moreover, as a corporation aggregate can in general act only by deed, its agent must be so appointed, though it would seem that some trifling agencies, even for corporations, may be appointed without one; and there is one case in which it was considered that a corporation might, without deed, empower an agent to do acts in the common course of its corporate business, or to make notes for a banking corporation." (Smith's Commercial Law, B. I. chap. v.) It is a general rule, that those obligations which can only be undertaken by solemn formalities cannot be entered on by a delegate who has not received his authority in writing. Agency is, however, often constituted, at the same time that its extent is defined, by mere appointment to some mandatory function—as where one is appointed agent for a banking establishment, factor for a merchant, broker, supercargo, traveller, or attorney. In these cases, usage defines pretty strictly the powers granted to the agent; and the employer will not readily be subjected to obligations going beyond the usual functions of the office; nor will the public dealing with the agent be bound by private instructions inconsistent with its usual character. While, however, the public, ignorant of such secret limitations, are not bound to respect them, the agent himself is liable for the consequences of transgressing them. There is another method by which agency may either be created or enlarged—implication. What the agent has done with his principal's consent, the public are justified in believing him authorised to continue doing. Thus, as a familiar instance, the servant who has continued to purchase goods for his master at a particular shop on credit, is presumed to retain authority and trust, and pledges his master's credit in farther purchases, though he should apply the articles to his own uses. The law is ever jealous in admitting as accessories of a general appointment to any particular agency the power to borrow money in the principal's name, to give his name to bill transactions, and to pledge him to guarantees; but all these acts may be authorised by implication, or by being the continuation of a series of transactions, to the precedents of which the principal has given his sanction. Thus an employer may, by the previous sanction of such operations, be liable for the bills or notes drawn, indorsed, and accepted by his clerk, or other mandatory; nay, may be responsible for the obligations thus incurred after the man- Agent's dismissal, if the party dealing with him knew that he was countenanced in such transactions, and had no reason to suppose that he was dismissed. The unpleasant responsibilities thus created have often suggested the propriety of some system of publishing the cessation of agency, after the manner in which dissolutions of partnerships are gazetted. It is true that every principal has the means of specially warning the public not to confide in the agent he has ceased to employ, but the merely occasional use of precaution makes it inviolable, and sometimes cruel.

The law of principal and agent, though of a purely customary character, has, by the sound foresight of great lawyers, been so well adjusted on the whole to the exigencies of society, that parliament has only found it necessary to interfere in one department of it. The law applicable to a mercantile agent's power to pledge, or otherwise dispose of the goods entrusted to him being in an unsatisfactory state, a statutory remedy was applied to it by an act of 1825 (6th Geo. IV., c. 94), which required amendment in 1842 (5th and 6th Vict., c. 39). It is to be regretted that these statutes, intended to regulate merchants in the transaction of their business, should have been framed with all the worst technicalities and elaborate complexities, which are never necessary, but would be less mischievous in acts for the guidance of professional or official men.

The general object of these measures is, to make transactions with an agent in possession of goods as safe as dealing with the owner, to all who treat with him as purchasers or otherwise, in good faith, and in ignorance of his want of ownership. Thus, when an agent ships goods in his own name, the consignee is entitled to a lien on them for any advances to the agent, or liabilities on bills or notes. The presumption in such cases is ownership; and the burden of disproving it, as well as of showing that the consignee was aware of the mere agency, falls on the person questioning the validity. By the statutes, the person in possession of a bill of lading, dock warrant, warehouse-keeper's certificate, wharfinger's certificate, or other delivery warrant, is held the owner of the goods it represents, so as to render valid any transaction for their sale or other disposal to parties ignorant of the limited ownership. Besides their effect in rendering valid, in this more comprehensive manner, operations conducted under the appearance and supposition of absolute ownership, the acts have separate provisions for the security of those who deal with agents knowing them to be such. Any purchase from the agent, or payment of price to him, is declared to be effective against the principal, "provided such contract and payment be made in the usual and ordinary course of business," and that the party, when he made the purchase, or paid the price, was not specially warned, that the agent had no authority to sell or receive money for his principal. By the earlier act, the extent to which an impleadment by an agent was made effective, was only to the extent of covering the amount of his own claims against the principal. The act of Victoria, in the preamble, that advances on goods and delivery orders are part of the usual and ordinary course of business, enlarges the freedom of disposal, and provides that the agent is to be held as owner, to the effect of affording validity "to any contract or agreement by way of pledge, lien, or security, bona fide made by any person with such agent;" although it is known that he is merely an agent, provided it be not also known that he is acting fraudulently, and without authority. The interest of the principal is fortified by severe penal provisions against agents acting fraudulently; but it is provided that no agent is to be held fraudulent, who pledges merely for the amount due to him by his principal, or for which he has rendered himself liable by acceptances.

This necessarily very brief outline applies to the constitution of agency, which, as involving those questions where not only the two parties to the contract but the rest of the public, are concerned, is by far the most important branch of the subject. The others, which may be more briefly noticed, comprehend the mutual and reciprocal rights and obligations of the principal and agent. These can always be regulated by agreement. The obligations on the principal are, to pay the agent's remuneration, and honour the obligations lawfully undertaken for him. The responsibilities of the agent involve greater niceties. He is responsible for the possession of the proper skill and means for carrying out the functions which he undertakes. He must devote to the interests of his employer such care and attention as a man of ordinary prudence bestows on his own—a duty capable of no more certain definition, the application of it as a fixed rule being the function of a jury. In some instances the law interposes to remove him from temptation to sacrifice his employer's interests to his own: Thus, when he is employed to buy, he must not be the seller; and when employed to sell, he must not be the purchaser. He ought only to deal with persons in good credit, but he is not responsible for their absolute solvency unless he guarantee them. A mercantile agent guaranteeing the payments he treats for is said to hold a del credere commission. Doubtful questions often arise as to the extent to which an agent may save expense to his employer, and take credit for the amount. Thus, it used to be said that an agent cannot take credit for home customs or excise dues which he has evaded, but that he may for foreign; but, at the present day, certainly neither claim could be supported.

In Scotland, the procurators or solicitors who act in the preparation of cases in the various law-courts, and all who take out the attorney-license are called agents. See Attorney.

In France, the Agents de Change were formerly the class generally licensed for conducting all negotiations, as they were termed, whether in commerce or the money market. Of late the term has been practically limited to those who conduct, like our stockbrokers, transactions in public stock; and it is understood that it is rather as speculators than as agents that the majority of them adopt the profession. The laws and regulations as to courtiers, or those whose functions were more distinctly confined to transactions in merchandise, have been mixed up with those applicable to agents de change. Down to the year 1772, both functions were free; but at that period, partly for financial reasons, a system of licensing was adopted at the suggestion of the Chancelier l'Hôpital. Among the other revolutionary measures of the year 1791, the professions of agent and courtier were again opened to the public. Many of the financial convulsions of the ensuing years, which were due to more serious causes, were attributed to this indiscriminate removal of restrictions, and they were re-imposed in 1801. From that period regulations have been made from time to time as to the qualifications of agents, the security to be found by them, and the like.