either derived from the French Allegiance, or taken from the same Latin source, has been used to express that duty which a person possessing the privileges of a citizen owes to the state to which he belongs, and is technically applied in law to the duty which a British subject owes to the sovereign as representing the state. It has been divided by the English legal commentators into natural and local; the latter applying only to the deference which a foreigner must pay to the institutions of the country in which he happens to live; but it is in its wider sense that the word is important, as representing a condition attached to mankind, of which it is very difficult in theory, and still more in practice, to adjust the true character and limits. For a state to decide what persons are bound to it by allegiance may be easy, but for a man to know where his allegiance lies when two or more states claim him—and hence for jurists to decide what is the reasonable extent to which any state ought to make such a claim, is often involved in difficulty. In oriental nations caste and tribe seem to have been the barriers of nationality; and when these were once overcome, people seem to have been in general free to choose their allegiance. But in most ancient nations, including Greece and Rome, the absence of the courtesies of war, since introduced by chivalry and feudalism, prevented an opening for the nice questions arising in later days, since the enemy overcome in war, whether he might have been alien or denizen according to our modern notions, was slain or enslaved. Nice as is the question, what should constitute the allegiance which makes war against a state high treason in the soldier, and renders him liable to be punished as a criminal instead of being received as a prisoner of war, British constitutional law has defined it in the broadest manner. By its doctrine every person born within the British dominions, though he should be removed in infancy to another country wherein his family resides, owes an allegiance to the British Crown, which he can never resign or lose. This was found in the case of Ennas Macdonald, tried for accession to the rebellion of 1745, who, though born in Britain, had been removed in childhood, and having been educated in France held a commission in the French army (Foster's Reports, 59). It will not apparently affect this broad principle, then, that the parents are foreigners. But further, according to the strict rule of the law, as the son or grandson of a British subject is entitled to the privilege of a natural born subject (see Alien) he must acquire it with its obligation, and commits high treason if he make war against Britain. The cause of so hard and irrational a principle is that the English law has taken the theory of allegiance entire from the feudal system, where it involved fidelity approaching to bondage due by the vassal to the lord. Hence the great English lawyers have exhausted their eloquence in describing the illimitable character of allegiance. In the celebrated case of the Post-nati, Bacon said, "Allegiance is of a greater extent and dimension than laws or kingdom, and cannot consist by the laws merely, because it began before all laws: it continueth after laws, and it is in vigour when laws are suspended and have not their force." Coke, on the same occasion, said "whatsoever is due by law or constitution of man may be altered; but natural ligance or obedience of the subject to the sovereign cannot be altered."—(St. Tr. II. 596, 652), and in his Institutes he defines allegiance as "The greatest obligation and duty that can be." Though our law counts every one a liege subject who is not an alien, yet it permits aliens to acquire rights without exacting the burden of allegiance [Alien]. In other countries the same classification will be found more or less to apply—aliens will be able to obtain some rights of citizens without coming under the obligations of allegiance, and the rights and obligations of allegiance will be impartable to persons who have not lost a similar position in the country of birth. It would be interesting to possess an account, throughout the civilised world, of the way in which citizenship may be lost to a native and acquired by a stranger in each state. Any attempt to lay down such particulars from law books would incur the risk of making statements which have been superseded; and there is the farther difficulty, that while the practical extent of the law is often to be known only by practice, wherever its principles are invidious or oppressive there is a reluctance to carry it out. No man, for instance, would be put on trial for high treason, for taking service against Britain, because his grandfather was an Englishman. It may be maintained, however, that a great deal of information on the methods of acquiring citizenship in foreign states is to be found in the evidence taken by the select committee of 1843, on the laws affecting aliens (Parl. Pap. No. 307). It will be in questions between European governments and the United States, that the true rule by which citizenship should be lost or acquired will come out in its broadest shape, since it is the principle of that empire to receive and enrol among the citizens owing it allegiance, people from all parts of Europe, without inquiring whether they have lost or can give up their native allegiance. The enactment of naturalisation laws is reserved by the constitution for Congress, and it is a characteristic part of the sys- term that only free white persons can acquire the privilege.

The general tenor of the acts of Congress from 1802 to 1828, regulating naturalisation is, that the person received must be a native of a country at peace with the States, that he be qualified by a five years' residence, abjure any title or order of nobility he may have possessed, and take an oath of allegiance in which he obliges himself to support the constitution of the United States, and abjures his previous allegiance (Kent's Com. 3d edition. i. 63-4).

Oath of, one of the oaths required of people in public office or trust, and which by laws either repealed or in virtual disuse might be tendered to any person. The oath having assumed a servile character was, at the Revolution, modified into a simple engagement to bear allegiance to the sovereign.