lowing passage from Chased, a Hindu bard:—"Oh! chief of Gajne, buckle on your armour, and prepare your fire-machines;" the meaning of which is explained in a following stanza, in which the hard states "that the culvers and cannons made a loud report when they were fired off; and the noise of the hall was heard at the distance of 10 coss, or nearly 1445 yards," concludes it "that the fact of cannon balls having been propelled by means of gunpowder in India as early as A.D. 1200, the epoch of the poet, appears to be established," although the use of artillery is not mentioned by any European writer before the fourteenth century." There is no reason to believe that this was the first, or even a very early instance of the use of such projectiles in the East; and it must therefore be considered highly probable that both the knowledge and the use of the explosive properties of compounds of nitre with charcoal and sulphur were of remote origin in a country which yields as a natural product, even to this day, so large a quantity of this important military mineral. Piobert, Napoleon Buonaparte, and other writers, have collected much information on the appearance and progress of artillery in Europe; but it is satisfactory to quote such examples from the work of an English officer of artillery, so highly distinguished as Colonel Chesney, who has shed so much lustre on his profession by the intrepid zeal and persevering energy of his Euphrates expedition, and his great literary and scientific acquirements. "The Moors, according to Condé, used artillery against Zaragossa in 1118; and in 1132 a culverin of 4 lbs. calibre, named Salamonica, was made. In 1157, when the Spaniards took Niebla, the Moors defended themselves by machines which threw darts and stones by means of fire; and in 1156 Abd'almunem, the Moorish king, captured Mohadia, a fortified city near Bona, from the Sicilians by the same means. In 1280 artillery was used against Cordova; and, in 1306 or 1308 Ferdinand IV. took Gibraltar from the Moors by means of artillery. Ibn Nason ben Bia, of Grenada, mentions that guns were adopted from the Moors, and used in Spain in the twelfth century, and that balls of iron were thrown by means of fire in 1331. These, and other examples, render it almost certain that the use of gunpowder became first known in Europe through the Moorish conquests and warfare in Spain, although the true components of gunpowder were known to Friar Bacon, and were made generally known throughout Europe by Bartholdus Schwartz in 1320. Edward III. of England used 'crakeys of war' during his campaign against the Scots in 1327. In 1339 ten cannons were prepared for the siege of Cambrai by the Chevalier Cardaillac. Quesnoy was defended successfully in 1340 by cannon which flung large iron bolts. In 1343 the Moorish garrison of Algeciras, besieged by Alphonsus XI. of Castile, used long mortars, or troughs of iron which threw among their enemies thunderbolts. In 1346, an iron gun, with a square bore capable of projecting a cubical iron shot of 11 lbs. weight was constructed at Bruges. In 1346 Edward III. is said to have used artillery at the battle of Cressy; but this is very doubtful, as the application of guns to field operations appears to be of later date, and no notice of them at the subsequent battle of Poictiers can be traced. In 1347 Edward did, however, use artillery in the siege of Calais, as did the Prince of Wales in 1346 in reducing the Castle of Romozantin. In 1378 Richard II. employed 400 cannons, which fired day and night, in his unsuccessful attack on St Malo; but it is unnecessary to follow further the progress of this most important arm in the attack and defence of fortified places and positions. The French, in the latter portion of the fifteenth century replaced the old cumbrous bombards by brass guns with trunnions, and the heavy stone shot by metal balls; and as the results of these changes were rapid firing and an increased impetus of shot, artillery may then be said to have first become really effective. Though portable guns had been occasionally made, from the earlier half of the fourteenth century, and had been abundantly applied in the wars of the fifteenth, they do not appear to have been reduced to a perfect system of field artillery until the reigns of Charles VIII. and Louis XII., and in 1500 the latter monarch was able to move his artillery from Pisa to Rome, a distance of about 240 miles, in five days, and possessed light pieces which were sufficiently manageable to be taken rapidly from one point to another during a battle. When he recovered Genoa in 1507, he had 60 guns of large calibre for an army of about 20,000 men, and overcame the Venetians on the Adda in 1509 by means of his artillery. Francis I. adopted a lighter construction for field-guns, and had them drawn by the best description of horses. In the defeat of the Swiss at Marignan in 1515, "the French artillery played a new and distinguished part, not only by protecting the centre of the army from the charges of the Swiss phalanxes, and causing them excessive loss, but also by rapidly taking such positions from time to time during the battle as enabled the guns to play upon the flanks of the attacking columns." These extracts, which have been principally derived by Colonel Chesney from the celebrated work of the present French emperor, who, like his illustrious uncle, was an artillery officer, go far to prove that, though the French have no right to claim the invention or even the material improvement of the bastion system in fortification, which was manifestly the work of Italian engineers, they have great reason to claim the first establishment of an efficient field artillery. In 1631 the great Gustavus Adolphus was indebted in great part to his artillery for the victory of Leipzig; and some of his guns were of the remarkable description called cannons of boiled leather, which "consisted of a thin cylinder of beaten copper screwed into a brass breech, whose chamber was strengthened by four bands of iron; the tube itself being covered with layers of mastic, over which cords were rolled firmly round its whole length, and equalized by a layer of plaster, a coating of leather boiled and varnished completing the piece." The carriage and the piece were so light that two men were sufficient to draw and serve the gun, which, however, could bear only a small charge. In the battle of Lutzen, when this truly great warrior, for he was a Christian warrior, closed in death his short but brilliant career, the Swedish artillery was again remarkable for the case with which it was manoeuvred and shifted in position, whilst the less manageable cannon of the Imperialists were comparatively immovable. Colonel Chesney observes, in respect to these two great and glorious battles of the Swedes, that they prove that the artillery of Gustavus Adolphus, although still consisting of too many calibres, was admirably organized, embracing as it did limbers, and carrying canister shot, and other kinds of ammunition, ready for action; and that this distinguished commander was the first who fully appreciated the importance of causing the artillery to act in concentrated masses. Frederick the Great of Prussia further improved upon the system by introducing pieces of ordnance sufficiently light to take part in the most rapid manoeuvres; and since that time it has been admitted by most military men that guns intended to move with an army and take part in field operations, should be divided into two sections, namely: 1st, Guns sufficiently light to move with cavalry, and hence forming what is called in the British service Horse Artillery or Cavalry Artillery; 2d, Guns of larger calibre and greater weight than the former, to act with infantry, but still not too heavy to allow of considerable rapidity in all the changes of position which may be required on the field of battle. These constitute what are called field batteries.
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1 Observations on Fire-Arms, 1852. The great improvement of the field batteries of the British army, and the superior horses attached to them on home service, have led many able English artillerymen to imagine that the distinction between the field battery and the horse or flying battery is unnecessary, and that the former may be readily brought up in speed and efficiency, even when acting with cavalry, to the latter; but it is probable that this opinion has been formed more from the results of field days on a favourable review ground, than on the experience of practice and movement on irregular ground such as must always be met with in actual war; and has been adopted without reference to the importance of securing for the field batteries, which must frequently be required to act as artillery of position in field works, the largest calibre compatible with a reasonable facility of movement. When this subject has been more fully considered and tested by experiments, more assimilated to the varied movements of war, it is believed that the value of the horse artillery will be better appreciated, and steps taken to render it still more effective by actual experience in war, for which the East Indian service, ever pregnant with events of war, is always open.
The horse artillery is indeed too valuable a branch of this most important arm to be allowed to remain idle, or to be looked upon as a mere appendage to military shows. In like manner, such considerations would probably lead to the adoption of the 12-pounder on the other branch, rather than to any further attempts to increase the speed of field batteries, or to make them rival the horse artillery in rapidity of movement.
The difference between the rude guns of early times—formed with iron bars fitted together lengthwise, and secured by iron rings—and the well-proportioned iron or bronze guns of modern times, is assuredly very great; but there can be no doubt that artillery will yet be much more improved and its range increased so as to secure for it that superiority of range over the improved musket which it has hitherto possessed over the old musket.
By the adoption of artillery, the mode of application of propellant weapons has been changed, but not the principles. In war there has always been two forms of offensive action, namely, that carried on at a distance, and that conducted foot to foot or at close quarters; and the object of the first has always been to prepare for the second. The operation, therefore, of any means of offence is analogous to that of artillery. Archelaus arranged his order of battle against the Roman general Sylla in the following manner:—In front he placed chariots armed with scythes, for the purpose of making an impression on his enemy's line; in the second, the Macedonian phalanx for attack; in the third, the armed auxiliaries as a reserve; and in a fourth the light troops, to be able to deploy and skirmish in every direction, whilst his numerous cavalry occupied both wings or flanks of the army. To meet this array, Sylla strengthened his position by wide trenches, defended by forts on his flanks, so as to prevent the enemy from outflanking and taking him in reverse with his numerous cavalry; and having thus restricted the attack within the limits of his centre, he arranged his foot in three lines, broken by intervals for the ready movement of the light troops and of the horse, which, being only a small body, was held back in readiness for a decisive charge at the right moment. Sylla further ordered a portion of his troops to drive palisades into the ground, between which the charge of the armed chariots could be awaited with little risk; and then, as the chariots advanced, they were received with loud shouts, and with showers of darts from the light troops, which threw them into such confusion that they turned and carried alarm into the ranks of the Macedonian phalanx, which beginning to yield, was for a moment supported by the cavalry of Archelaus, when the Roman cavalry suddenly charged, and won the victory. In this battle the armed chariots were intended to perform the office of artillery by first breaking the Roman line before the advance of the Macedonian phalanx; and in like manner, on the Roman side, the darts were propelled in the manner of artillery on the advancing troops. The comparatively small range of darts, arrows, or the bolts of cross-bows, limited the effect of their action so much, that though it was often very destructive when directed on an enemy who was obliged to retain his position, it was soon abated when an enemy was able to advance, or so reduced that its effect corresponded to that of the fire of light infantry. The case is very different with modern artillery, as their fire, commencing at a considerable distance, will continue to be destructive, even on an advancing force, for a considerable time. The objects, however, both of ancient and modern artillery are the same, namely, to make an impression on an enemy's line, and to disturb the stability of its masses before the last effort is made by a charge to overthrow it; and in like manner to break and paralyze an advancing column, so that its shock may be weakened or rendered comparatively harmless; and these objects ought therefore to be kept in view in the distribution and arrangement of artillery.
The value of any system of field artillery may be readily estimated by reference to its efficiency for producing the desired results which have been explained. For example, in the early period of British artillery, guns were allotted to each regiment or battalion as battalion guns; but though this arrangement was so far correct, as it rested on the principle that every body of troops capable of independent action should be accompanied in the field by artillery, it was erroneous when applied to large armies, as it spread the artillery through the line, and caused it to act either against artillery, producing a mere war of guns, or against infantry at so many points as to produce no decided effect at any. It is true, indeed, that such battalion artillery might have been separated, when necessary, from their battalions, and brigaded together; but it is manifest that the movements of an aggregate of so many separate elements which had not been previously trained to act together, must have been rude, uncertain, and very difficult of control; whilst the natural and simple mode of rectifying an arrangement so defective would have been the adoption of a combination of guns based upon some element or unit which represented the least number of guns deemed capable of acting with effect in co-operation with infantry.
To determine the unit or element of battery combination, it should be remembered that the principles of defence by artillery are the same, whether the guns act openly in the field, or covertly from behind a parapet, and that the object should be in either case to secure a cross, converging, or concentrated fire on the line or column of attack, or in front of the point to be attacked. A flanking fire is therefore as essential to an army in the field as it is in a fortress; in which latter case it may be justly said, that perfection depends even more on the efficiency and right arrangement of its active defences than on the solidity and permanence of the passive; as no walls of stone or of earth can be expected to stop an enterprising enemy, unless supported by a well-directed and steadily maintained fire. To obtain such a flanking and cross fire for the smallest number of troops likely to act independently, one gun on each flank or wing is the least possible number; and hence two guns may be deemed the elementary unit of battery combination; the term battery being applied primarily to a number of guns acting together, and secondarily, to the works of defence, or parapet, thrown up to cover them. In most of the armies
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3 Strategematonicon S. Julii Frontini. Artillery of the present day this principle has been acted upon; and the unit having been fixed (on an average) in relation to a body of 800 men (omitting cavalry, the action of which is propulsive or analogous to that of artillery), or of 1000 men, including cavalry, the strength of a simple field battery has been made some multiple of that unit; as, for example, exclusive of howitzers, in France, 4; Bavaria, 6; Sweden, 6; Spain, 6; Holland, 8 and 6; Wurtemberg, 6; Prussia, 6; Russia, 6; Austria, 6; or, taking howitzers into consideration, in France, 6; Bavaria, 8; Sweden, 8; Holland, 8; Wurtemberg, 8; Prussia, 8; Russia, 8; Austria, 8; two howitzers having been in each case apportioned to a battery; so that, when required to be subdivided for action on the flanks of the infantry to which it is attached, each half-battery may be provided with one howitzer. In the British artillery this latter principle has not been attended to; and though the combined battery consists of six pieces, 5 are guns, and 1 a howitzer, not therefore admitting of exact division of either. The duke of Wellington appears to have been sensible of this defect in principle, as he suggested the increase of the number to 8, that is, to 6 guns and 2 howitzers, which would have assimilated the British to the Prussian, Russian, and Austrian artillery, in respect to the strength of its field batteries; the number of howitzers being one-fourth of the whole, rather than one-third, as in the French, which appears excessive.
In conforming to the necessity of so arranging artillery as to ensure a flanking defence, either to the line of troops, or to the position exposed to attack, it must of course be kept in view that the effective range of field battery guns will limit the extent of the line or position to be thus defended; and, therefore, that in long lines as many batteries must be interposed between the flanks as will ensure to each section of the whole line a sufficient artillery defence; or else that there shall be a facility of bringing up rapidly the required guns to the flanks of the actual portion of the line exposed to attack, and at once concentrating a heavy fire upon the ground in front of it. These considerations, as well as the similar necessity of supporting the movements of an attacking column by the fire of artillery on the point of the line to be attacked, and the changes which it may be found expedient to make during a battle in respect to that point, have made it manifest that artillery, to be really useful in the field, must not be too heavy; and, in consequence, the guns of field batteries (properly so called) of all European nations are now comprised between the 6 and the 12-pounder, exclusive of the still lighter ordnance for mountain service. Marshal Marmont observes—“Field artillery is required to follow the troops in all their movements, and to arrive at any given point with promptitude, so as to crush an enemy. It should therefore be light, easily transported, and so handy as to be stopped by no impediment of ground. The 6-pounder, in use throughout Europe, appears to me sufficient; it was the calibre I adopted when at the head of the French artillery; and it was that with which the wars of the empire were waged. A calibre of eight has now been adopted; and though, without doubt, its superior weight has advantages, it has the great inconvenience of increasing by one-third the weight of ammunition and stores, and of requiring more powerful means of transport, which in a war it is difficult to provide.” In addition, however, to these calibres, Marmont recommends the 12-pounder as necessary in silencing the fire of an enemy’s field works, in arming such works, in battering down simple walls, or in defending the passage of rivers, and even suggests a small proportion of short 24-pounders intended to be fired with diminished charges. Such are the pieces which a general so experienced in war recommends for field artillery, and the objects he assigns to each are manifestly those which must be comprised within the Artillery scope of a well-considered establishment. The calibres he names are in English weights equivalent nearly to 6½, 8½, 13 lbs.; so that, on an average, they correspond very closely with those adopted in the British service; but though there is much to say in support of this view of the subject, and specially in favour of the lighter calibre, as possessing such facility of movement, it is time to inquire what influence is likely to be exercised on field artillery in action by the improved musket of the present day. In considering this question, it is right to remember that, whilst it is the office of artillery to act against infantry, and to prepare the way by the disturbing effects of its fire for the ultimate shock or bayonet charge, so is it the office of tirailleurs or riflemen to act against artillery, and check or even paralyze its fire. Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. A. Gordon, in his recent work addressed to the volunteers, states that “the French have not yet adopted any of the new systems (except for trial in a few special corps), nor have they, from what I can learn, any intention of doing so;” and this caution, on the part of men so fully acquainted with military science, ought to be ascribed to the real cause, namely, a conviction, as Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon observes, that the ordinary soldier, from the skill of his commander in manoeuvring, and the selection of positions, will not be exposed to an enemy’s fire, or at least kept standing so exposed at a great distance; and that the full advantage of muskets or rifles, which are capable of shooting with accuracy up to a range of 800 yards, can be only looked for when they are placed in the hands of men of more than ordinary nerve, coolness, activity, and skill. Napoleon, who above all generals understood the importance of a right application of artillery in the field, and who in consequence employed his guns in masses so as to concentrate upon any one point an overwhelming discharge, was also fully sensible of the services to be derived from efficient tirailleurs or riflemen in checking the fire of artillery, and that more especially when the guns were assembled together in powerful batteries. He also knew well how to use riflemen occasionally as artillery, either by directing their fire against ordinary infantry at the point to be attacked, or as a means of protecting the movements of other troops; as, for example, in the campaign of 1807, when his first bridge over the Danube was constructed under the protection of his battalions of tirailleurs, who swept the island of Lobau with their fire.
During the campaigns of Napoleon and Wellington, the rifleman was armed with a weapon possessing only a very limited range and comparatively slow in loading; but had it been otherwise, and had he possessed the modern rifle musket, which unites rapidity and precision of fire with a long range, can it be doubted that some of the most brilliant movements even of that distinguished artillery officer General Senarmont would have been impossible? On the 29th January 1807, the corps d’armée of Marshal Augereau advanced on Eylau, and took up a position in rear of that town. Senarmont at first posted the artillery of the first division, consisting of eight 8-pounders, two 4-pounders, and two howitzers on an elevated knoll; but finding that, from this exposed situation, the battery became the mark of all the enemy’s batteries, arranged as they were in a line concave towards the French, and was soon, therefore, greatly cut up, he determined to move forward to some flat ground in front on a lower level, whilst the artillery of the second division took up their first position in order to divide the attack of the enemy. These two batteries were in line, and swept the space between the two armies, so that the Russian infantry and cavalry, as they successively advanced to the charge, were mowed down by the fire of the 19 combined
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1 Esprit des Institutions Militaires. 2 Remarks on National Defence, 1853. Artillery, guns. The nearest of these batteries was about 450 yards from the Russian line, and though then tolerably secure from all but the fire of artillery, what would have been its condition had the Russians possessed the modern musket, and been able to pick off every man and every horse from a distance of 600 or even 800 yards? Again, at the battle of Friedland, June 1807, the French had suffered so much from the fire of the Russian battery on the opposite bank of the Alle, that the troops began to waver, when Senarmont collected together 36 guns from several divisions and brought them up with great rapidity to an eminence about 450 yards from the enemy, and after a few discharges pushed on to another point at only 230 yards from the Russians, when the rapid and well-directed discharge of 36 guns soon silenced the small detached batteries of the Russians, and being then turned upon the closely-packed masses of the infantry, spread destruction and confusion amongst them. The successful issue of this battle is ascribed by General Marion, the biographer of Senarmont, to the admirable manner in which that officer handled the artillery. "It was due," he says, "to the admirable seat of arms of General Senarmont, and the artillery cannot cite one more glorious. Thirty-six pieces of artillery did what Ney and Dupont with more than 20,000 men had been unable to do, and what the three reserve divisions of Victor would probably not have done. Looking at the steady courage with which the Russians, when their retreat had been cut off, resisted the attacks of the triumphant army, it may be well assumed that victory would have been impossible to any other arm than artillery; but Senarmont advanced his guns and obtained the most brilliant success." In this case the artillery acted almost as an independent body, and bold and successful as the manoeuvre was, it may be fairly stated that under present circumstances the repetition of such an act of daring would be attended with the utmost peril.
If the object were to bring into one general point of view the importance of the artillery arm, as illustrated by its achievements in modern wars, numerous examples might be brought forward from the annals of the British army, both in its European and Indian branches, as well as from the exploits of the French and other armies; but at present those cited will be sufficient to point out the peculiar circumstances under which artillery have acted with overwhelming effect, and to suggest the controlling influence which must henceforth be exercised over its movements under similar circumstances. Nor is positive experience wanting on the present state of the question, as the Prussian needle gun was actually in use during the recent contests of the Prussians and Danes; and according to an eye-witness (Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, Royal Marine Artillery), was the instrument by which the Danish artillery was effectually kept in check even at the distance of 800 yards. Such considerations should impress upon the military authorities the necessity of directing their attention to the following points:
1st. The employment of the largest calibre which is consistent with a due degree of celerity of motion.
2nd. The propriety of having 6-pounder batteries for the horse or cavalry brigade, 9-pounder batteries for the ordinary infantry or moving brigade, and 12-pounder batteries for position and reserve.
3rd. The attainment of perfection in the use of spherical case as applicable to ranges beyond the effective fire of the new rifled musket, and the more general use of this excellent projectile.
4th. The formation of howitzer batteries, so as to use the largest possible shell which can be attained without an increase of weight in the gun, and yet to retain a sufficiency of range.
5th. To cover the artillery when possible with light entrenchments sufficiently thick to secure the men from musketry fire, and yet such as can be rapidly opened at the crest for the guns to fire over or through.
6th. The improvement of rockets, and the extension of their use as auxiliaries to guns.
7th. The combined operation of artillery and riflemen.
8th. The still further extension of the principles of ordinary field-work defence to the use of artillery, by a system of supporting or flanking batteries intended to scour the ground in front of those batteries which require to be advanced in order to produce a decided effect on an enemy's line. Such a service could only be done effectually by spherical case, and therefore might be confided to howitzers.
In point of general organization, it may without hesitation be assumed, that the British artillery stands in the first rank of excellence, and yet the improvements which have raised it to a state of such perfection are the work of the present age. At the commencement of the war in 1793, the various ordnance equipments, as well as the whole composition of this branch of our military service, were of the rudest kind, and on the worst organized and most defective plan. The inefficiency of the whole system, indeed, was palpably betrayed whenever a force was required to take the field. The guns being dispersed among the infantry, at the rate of two pieces to a battalion, it was impracticable to employ them for their legitimate purpose of concentrating a powerful fire of numerous guns on any important point. They were also horsed in single team, which needlessly both lengthened the column of march and diminished the power of draught. The drivers were on foot with long whips, as were also the gunners. The ammunition was packed in large rough deal boxes; the waggons which conveyed it were heavy and ill-constructed; and the whole equipment was so cumbrous, that it was impossible for the train to move out of a foot-pace, except for a very short distance; and if increased speed were attempted before the enemy, the men came into action breathless and unable to serve their guns.
But before the commencement of the Peninsular war, that active and able officer, the late Major Spearman, had entirely re-organized this branch of the service; and it is to him that the country owes the present beautiful system of field artillery. The battalion guns were abolished, and the artillery was brigaded, distinct from the infantry and cavalry with which it served, in divisions of six pieces each; so that the fire of one or more of these powerful batteries could be readily concentrated on any given point. A body of military drivers was organized, while, by an ingenious contrivance of the shafts, the power of using single draught in narrow roads, or when any of the horses were disabled, was retained. The drivers were mounted on the near horses; and the gunners themselves, in the proportion of eight to each piece, were carried on the limbers and ammunition cars. The whole of the equipment was simplified and lightened to such a degree that the batteries could move at a gallop; the ammunition, packed in boxes on the limbers and cars, was always up with the guns; and the officers and men, being all mounted or conveyed on the carriages, were sure of being brought fresh into action. Finally, a system of manoeuvres for artillery in the field was introduced, which gave order and precision to their own movements, and established uniformity between them and the troops of other arms.
Such was the general condition in which the artillery was Field Artillery then placed, and it may be fairly stated that no pains have been spared by those subsequently in authority to improve its details and increase its efficiency. Of this arm the cavalry artillery branch is in the British service more especially a horse artillery, as so many of its men are carried on horseback; whereas, in the Austrian service, the men are carried on light spring waggons. The respective merits of these two systems require to be more fully investigated, and no prejudice in favour of our own system, which is certainly the more brilliant in appearance on a field-day, should be allowed to prevent its rejection, if found on comparison inferior. The British system involves the care of a larger number of horses both in the field and in camp, and hence greater trouble and anxiety to the men; the Austrian, the chance of having the locomotive power of the whole gun detachment crippled by the destruction or injury of a single waggon. In respect merely to comparative speed, it is probable that a light spring waggon would be fully able to keep pace with the guns, and to move over any ground practicable for them.
To secure the successful employment of an artillery force, it is necessary that the whole body should be carefully trained, and that the objects to be attended to should be fully understood. General Lewis has therefore exhibited the subjects of artillery in a very simple form, which, with a slight modification, is here given:
**Personnel**
- Horse artillery. - Rocket do. - Foot do. - Invalid gunners. - Master gunners.
**Material**
- Iron - Brass - Rocket - Travelling - Standing - Ground - Platforms - Powder - Ammunition
**Theoretical**
- Mathematics. - Fortification. - History and Geography. - Plan Drawing. - Landscape Drawing. - Languages. - Drills—both Infantry and Artillery. - Sword Exercise. - Gun and Mortar practice. - Repository Course. - Laboratory Course. - Foundry, Proof, and Carriage Department Courses.
**Instruction**
- Elementary Tactics for Non-Commissioned Officers and Gunners.
FIELD ARTILLERY.
When an army is to take the field, several considerations must be attended to in apportioning the number and calibre of the batteries to accompany it; as, the face, features, and general nature, mountainous or otherwise, of the country which is to form the theatre of war,—the state of its roads, and the resources which it can supply for the means of transport,—the force and description of troops composing the army,—the nature of the war, whether offensive or defensive,—and, lastly, the intended plan of operations.
In carrying on offensive operations in a campaign country, with good roads and facility of transport, the artillery should consist of 9-pound batteries, to which 12-pounders, and probably a few 18 or light 24 pounders should be added, to form on occasion batteries of position. There should likewise be one or more batteries of a lighter calibre, to accompany any corps of the army that may be destined by rapid marches to intercept the enemy's convoys or detachments. In mountainous or deep hilly countries, the artillery should not be composed of heavier ordnance than the 6-pounder battery; but an exact topographical acquaintance with the nature of the country is absolutely necessary, and indeed affords the only satisfactory guide for judging of the most appropriate calibres to be employed. When an army is to
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1 Aide Memoire to the Military Sciences. 2 Traité Élémentaire d'Artillerie. 3 D'Antoni. remain on the defensive in a country where the roads are only tolerable, and the probability of being obliged to undertake long and rapid marches is not great; the artillery should be composed of a heavier description of batteries than would be proper to accompany an army acting offensively in the same country. But if this defensive system be carried on in a strong country, where the means of transport are attended with difficulty, and long and rapid marches may become indispensably necessary, the batteries must be so constituted as to adapt them to these several circumstances, otherwise the artillery will retard the army in its operations, instead of contributing to the attainment of the object in view.
From considerations connected solely with the combined action of artillery and infantry, it has been deduced as a rule that a battery should consist of some multiple number of 2 guns, for example of 4, 6, or 8, and that howitzers should be combined with them also in pairs, making therefore a compound battery consist either of 4 guns and 2 howitzers as in France, or 6 guns and 2 howitzers as in Russia and most other European nations. The French battery has the greatest advantage of easy subdivision, as a half-battery would consist of 2 guns and 1 howitzer, and be therefore still complete in both natures of ordnance when called upon to act with the smallest independent force; and, at the same time, be in about due proportion to it. From the following historical examples of the relative proportions of artillery acting with various armies in different countries during the late war, it will be seen that experience has led to about the same proportions; and an officer, therefore, may, with the assistance of good topographical maps, form a tolerably accurate judgment on this important branch of military study.
The Austrian army, under the command of the archduke Charles in the campaign of Aspergne, Essling, and Wagram, consisted of about 75,000 men, to whom were attached 18 batteries of brigade, 13 of position, and 11 of horse-artillery; being nearly in the proportion of one piece of ordnance to 260 men.
The allied British and Portuguese army in the field in Spain, May 1813, consisted of 65,000 men and 102 pieces of artillery, including the reserve; being nearly in the proportion of one piece of ordnance to 622 men.
The grand French army under Napoleon for the invasion of Russia, not including the Austrian contingent, consisted of 400,000 infantry, 60,000 cavalry, and 1200 pieces of artillery; being one piece of ordnance to 383 men.
The French armies united on the Tormes in December 1812 amounted to 80,000 men and 200 pieces of artillery, being in the proportion of one gun to 400 men.
Napoleon in 1813 had 1400 pieces of artillery to 300,000 men, or one gun to 200 nearly. In 1815 his army consisted, as nearly as can be ascertained, by a comparison of several accounts of the campaign, of 130,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 300 pieces of artillery; being one piece of ordnance to 500 men.
The Prussian contingent of the grand French army for the invasion of Russia, under the command of General D'York, consisted of 20,000 men and 60 pieces of artillery; being nearly in the proportion of one piece of ordnance to 333 men.
Marshal Beresford, at the battle of Albuera, had 29,000 men and 32 pieces of artillery, or one gun to 900 men. His opponent Marshal Soult, in the same action, had 23,000 men and 40 pieces of artillery, or one gun to 575 men.
General L'Espinasse, who commanded the artillery of Buonaparte in Italy, supposes a division of an army to consist of 12,000 men, including a regiment of dragoons and another of hussars, to which he allots three batteries of horse and three of field artillery, each consisting of six pieces of ordnance. A battery of horse and another of field artillery are at all times to be up with the army; two batteries, similarly armed with the two in activity, are to remain with the park; and the remaining two, also appointed in like manner, should be in depot in rear of the army. These proportions of artillery to infantry, L'Espinasse states, are precisely those adopted with the approbation of Buonaparte in the Italian campaigns.*
Positions and Movements of Field Artillery.
It has been pointed out that the principles on which the application of artillery should be regulated in the field, are the same as those which guide the engineer in the formation of his lines of intrenchments, his forts, or his fortresses. In fact the offensive action of artillery must be the same in its direction and objects, whether the guns are firing over a parapet, through an embrasure, or in the open field. The necessary exposure in the latter case may indeed render it expedient to rest satisfied with only a portion of the possible effect of the guns, so far as position is concerned, in order to gain for them greater security; but this does not invalidate the general principle.
The commanding officer of artillery, then, in order that he may choose proper positions for his field batteries, should be made acquainted with the effect intended to be produced, with the troops that are to be supported, and with the points to be attacked, that he may place his artillery so as to support, but not inconvenience the infantry, nor take up such situations with his guns as would be more advantageously occupied by the line; that he may not place his batteries too soon, nor in exposed situations; that he may cover his fronts and flanks by taking advantage of the ground; and that he may not venture too far out of the protection of the army, unless some very decided effect is to be obtained by so doing.
In a defensive position the guns of the largest calibre should be posted on those points from which the enemy can be discovered at the greatest distance, and from which the whole extent of his front may be seen. In an offensive position, the weakest points of the line, and those most distant from the enemy, must be strengthened by the largest calibres. Those heights on which the army, in advancing, may rest its flanks, must be occupied by guns, as also those from which the enemy may be fired upon obliquely.
Artillery should never be placed in such a situation that it can be taken by any enemy's battery obliquely, in flank, or in reverse, unless a position under these circumstances offers every prospect of producing a most decisive effect before the guns can be destroyed, or placed hors de combat. The most elevated positions are not the best for artillery; the greatest effects may be produced from a height of from 30 to 40 yards at the distance of 600, and from about 16 yards high at 200 yards distant. Those positions which are not likely to be shifted, but from whence an effect may be produced during the whole of an action, are to be preferred, and in such positions breastworks of two or three feet high should be thrown up to cover the carriages.
The guns must be so placed as to produce a cross-fire upon the enemy's position, and upon the ground over which he must pass to the attack. It may sometimes be necessary, in order to concentrate a cross-fire on one particular point, to subdivide the batteries, so that whilst the enemy's fire may be attracted to different objects, that of the opposing force is directed to a focus, such as the débouché of the enemy, the head of his advancing columns, or the ground in front of the weakest point in his own line. If the enemy's position is to be attacked, the fire of the attacking force must become direct in proportion as the troops advance, otherwise
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1 British Gunner. 2 Essai sur l'Artillerie, par le Général L'Espinasse. Field Artillery. it will impede them; and when the fire can no longer be directed with safety on the point to be attacked, the guns must be directed on the collateral points.
The guns should be placed as much as possible under cover. This is easily done upon heights, by keeping them so far back as that only the muzzles may be perceived over them. With proper attention, many situations may be found of which advantage may be taken for this purpose, such as banks, ditches, &c., everywhere to be met with. If an enemy's attack is expected, the guns must be posted so as to cannonade him with effect when he advances within 800 paces, and particularly in situations in which his march may be retarded by ditches, defiles, or other natural obstacles.
The position from whence the enemy is to be cannonaded should be kept concealed from him till the moment the batteries are to open. To effect this, the guns may until that time be placed in any other situation. Should there be any small elevations of earth in front of a defile through which the enemy may advance and be cannonaded, the guns must be kept under cover of them until he comes out and begins to form. The guns may also be masked by being covered by troops, particularly cavalry, until the enemy is within the range of case-shot. The covering party must then open right and left, and a brisk fire be kept up.
Artillery should very rarely be placed in front of a line of infantry, or distributed by batteries in the intervals. When the line is of great extent, it may become necessary to place a strong battery in the centre. This should be composed of the guns of the heaviest calibre; and it should be posted in the interval between the right and left wings of the army, by which means a double object is not offered to the enemy's fire. In general, an army in order of battle may be considered as a front of fortification, the infantry forming the curtain, and the lateral batteries the bastions, under the fire of which the troops may manoeuvre freely, and advance with confidence to attack the enemy.
The two following examples will serve to illustrate the preceding remarks; and it may be observed in respect to the first, that had there not been heights in advance of the line of the French army which permitted the batteries to be arranged like flanks at the two ends of the line, the same effect might have been obtained by placing the guns en echelon along the space BE and AK of the following woodcut, and perpendicular to the lines BD and AC. This is indeed the system which the approved or official evolutions of artillery prescribe to be adopted.
Battle of Castiglione, 5th August 1796.—The following diagram shows the disposition of the French under Buonaparte, and the imperialists under Wurmser, in this battle:
A B the French army, G H the imperial army, A C a battery of 12 pieces of foot artillery, sustaining the left of the French on the heights in advance of Castiglione; B D a battery of 20 pieces of light artillery supporting on the right, which extended into the plain. The line of infantry A B being taken for the curtain, the batteries A C and B D may be considered as representing the faces of two bastions, thus forming a complete front, and crossing their fire before the curtain. The troops are consequently covered from attack, and the enemy fired upon obliquely. Wurmser having prolonged his front from G to I with the intention of outflanking the French, General L'Espinasse took some of the guns from C A, and placed them on the other face C K, until others could be drawn from the park for that purpose, thus forming a new battery destined to follow the enemy's movements. Another battery was likewise formed on the right, from D to E, in case Wurmser had prolonged his left from H to F.
Battle of Talavera, 27th and 28th July 1809.—At the commencement of the battle the British artillery were stationed, by batteries of 6 guns each, with the divisions of the army to which they were respectively attached; a temporary redoubt, unfinished, was thrown up at F, in which a battery of 3-pounders was posted; on the hill at A, the most commanding point of the position, two batteries were posted, one of heavy 6-pounders, the other of light sixes, to which two Spanish guns were afterwards added.
The French had a battery of 14 guns at K, the centre of their position; also one at each of the flanks G and H, independently of others which were brought up during the action. On the second day, when the columns at M advanced, supported by artillery, to attack the British right, which rested on the unfinished redoubt, the three batteries, E E E were formed on the oblique line L E, and thus took the advancing columns in flank, whilst the redoubt kept up a direct fire in their front.
It must here be observed, that whenever an oblique line is formed by artillery, as from L to E, it must be directed without the extremity of the enemy's flank, otherwise the guns will be exposed to his enfilading fire.
On considering the more general application of artillery, it is desirable to attend to the peculiarities in the mode of action of the several natures of ordnance, as exhibited in the following classified arrangement:
| Force produced by a sudden development of gaseous bodies in a state of high tension, by the almost momentary ignition of gunpowder. | The progressive velocity of the missiles, shot, musket-balls, fragments of shells, either entirely or mainly depending on the velocity derived from the projectile. | | --- | --- | | Guns, Carronades, Howitzers. |
| Force produced by a gradual development of gaseous bodies in a state of tension, by the progressive ignition of gunpowder. | Velocity of the fragments of the bursting shell, depending principally on the bursting powder of the shell itself. | | --- | --- | | Mortars. |
| Rockets. | An examination of this table shows that guns and howitzers should be used wherever it is desirable or necessary that the missile should possess a progressive movement, or a penetrating power in a progressive direction, as in firing at parapets, or in enfilading a long line of parapet; but that mortars should be used wherever it is required to act in a vertical direction, either for the destruction of a work which cannot be got at by a direct fire, or to assist the enfilade fire, when it is found, from the number of traverses, or the position of the ground on which the work stands, that the fire of the guns and howitzers has not been effectual.
Keeping these points in view, we proceed to the next subject.
**SIEGE ARTILLERY.**
The first duty of the commanding officer of artillery, when it is intended to besiege a fortress, is to prepare an estimate of the quantity of ordnance and ammunition required for its reduction. To enable him to make this estimate with accuracy and precision, he should be master of certain data; that is to say, the commander of the forces, or general charged with the direction of the siege, should communicate to him a plan of the fortifications and environs of the place, accompanied by such profiles and remarks as may enable him, in conjunction with the commanding engineer, to ascertain which front or fronts are most assailable, with the advantages and disadvantages attending each attack, as well with respect to the works of the place as to the nature of the soil where the trenches must be opened, and the several heights and hollows of the vicinity. He should also, if possible, be informed as to whether the place be amply supplied with artillery, ammunition, &c.; if the garrison be sufficiently numerous, and whether composed of veteran troops or raw levies; if the governor be in high estimation for his military talents; if the town be populous, and the inhabitants well affected to the garrison. It will thus be easy to form a tolerably accurate opinion of the means of defence, and the resistance to be expected; for it is not to be presumed that any government would shut up a brave and numerous force in an ill-fortified and badly-provisioned place, at the risk of seeing such a garrison sacrificed after a short resistance.
But should it be impossible to procure information on these several points beforehand, particularly as to the strength of the garrison, the requisite proportion of ordnance and ammunition must be regulated on the general principles of attack. The officer intrusted to prepare the estimate must, therefore, endeavour to ascertain, according to the fundamental maxim of all besiegers, against which front or fronts the attack can be made with the least exposure and greatest expedition. He should examine whether the siege can be most advantageously carried on by regular approaches; by taking advantage of any defect in the situation which may enable him to break ground close to the works to be breached; or by battering them from a distance. By the aid of this investigation and the following general principles, the quantity of ordnance and ammunition required for the siege of a place may be ascertained with reasonable accuracy.
**General Principles for the Attack of Fortified Places.**
1. The number of batteries to be opened against the defences must depend upon the extent of the works to be embraced by the attack, &c., there must be a battery to enfilade every face that can in any way annoy or retard the besiegers in their approaches; but should this render it necessary to extend the parallels to an inconvenient distance from the actual direction of attack, the fire of the extreme faces of the enemy's works may be silenced by direct batteries.
2. The length of the emplacement of these batteries need not exceed the breadth of the terreplein of the works to be enfiladed, unless circumstances should render it necessary to place some of the guns in a situation to take the work in reverse. Each battery will only contain, therefore, five, or at most eight guns, to enfilade the face of the principal work; to which must be added two others to enfilade the branches of the opposite covered way.
3. The situation of the breaching batteries must be carefully determined, as, in a regular attack, they might sometimes interfere with the fire of the first or enfilading batteries. Should this be the case, the same artillery may be transferred from one battery to the other. It must be remembered, that though in the actual breaching batteries the guns should fire as nearly as possible perpendicular to the revetment to be battered down, it is by no means absolutely necessary to fire so nearly perpendicular when the object, as in the earlier direct batteries, is merely to ruin the earthen parapets. In this latter case, convenience may be attended to without scruple, and even some danger occasionally avoided by adopting a more oblique fire.
4. The supply of ordnance must be sufficiently liberal to enable the besiegers to keep up a fire constantly superior to that of the place. This supply therefore must be determined by the construction and extent of the fortifications of the place; taking care that, in addition to the guns required for enfilading batteries, there should be a preponderating number to act against every portion of the fortress possessed of the power of firing directly and effectively against the besiegers. The number of siege guns will therefore have a natural relation to the number adopted for defence.
5. As the ricochet firing may be interrupted while the sappers are completing the third parallel, a supply of royal and coehorn mortars must be provided to harass the garrison from the second parallel, or demi-places of arms, during its cessation.
Having thus ascertained the number of guns required, the following will be their calibres, and the proportions which the remaining ordnance should bear to them.
| Guns—or of the whole number required—suppose 60. | |-----------------------------------------------| | 24-pounders........................................| 3 or 40 | | 12-pounders.........................................| 3 or 20 | | Howitzers—one for every four guns—in this case 15. | | 10-inch................................................| 1 or 5 | | 8-inch..................................................| 3 or 10 | | Mortars—in the proportion of one-twelfth more than the number of guns—in this case 65. | | 10-inch................................................| 1 or 10 | | 8-inch..................................................| 1 or 15 | | Royal....................................................| 1 or 20 | | Coehorn...............................................| 1 or 20 |
In the above proportion of ordnance, it must be observed that the long 12-pounder is proposed instead of the 18-pounder formerly employed, as a gun of this description is conceived to be sufficiently powerful for annoyance and direct fire, to dismount the enemy's artillery, as well as for firing en ricochet. The diminished weight of ammunition attendant on the employment of the smaller calibre is an important advantage; but it is an arrangement which can only be admitted in cases where an adequate number of 24-pounders are provided. In all smaller equipments it would, therefore, be better that all the guns should be of the heavy calibre.
The proportion of small mortars should in no case be less than that of the heavy mortars and howitzers, and this proportion ought to be increased in all equipments of less than thirty pieces of ordnance. Indeed, when sent at all, there should be at least twelve of them, to insure the necessary effect. In many cases a far greater number than is here
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1 *Traité Élémentaire d'Artillerie.* 2 *British Gunner.* 3 *Ibid.* 4 *Ibid.* proposed could be advantageously used; but this must of course depend on the nature of the service on which they have, in the present instance, been taken in equal proportions, and it would be advisable to adhere to this arrangement in all the larger equipments, particularly when their calibres correspond with those of the guns; but in small equipments it would be more convenient to confine the arrangement to one calibre, in which case the royal mortar is the preferable, as it possesses the power of being used at a greater distance than the coehorn. But it must at the same time be observed, that the latter, from its lightness and the small weight of its ammunition, is a more desirable implement for the more advanced parts of the attack.
The proportions per cent. of the ordnance here recommended, stand as follow:
| Artillery Type | Calibre | Quantity | |----------------|---------|----------| | 24-pounders | | 28.6 | | 12-pounders | | 14.3 | | 10-inch howitzers | | 3.6 | | 8-inch do. | | 7.1 | | 10-inch mortars| | 7.1 | | 8-inch do. | | 10.7 | | Royal | | 14.3 | | Coehorn | | 14.3 |
100-0
A park of siege artillery in France consists of—
50 to 58 guns, either 24 or 16 pounders. 12 to 14 howitzers, of 8 inches. 10 to 14 mortars of heavy calibre. 6 to 8 do. of light calibre.
78 to 94 pieces:
Being, per cent.—
Guns—heavy ........................................... 64.1 Howitzers .................................................. 15.4 Mortars—heavy ........................................... 12.8 Do. light .................................................... 7.7
100-0
giving a much larger proportion of guns and howitzers than that proposed by Captain Spearman.
In Austria the park is composed, per cent., of—
Guns—24 and 16 pounders .................................. 40 Do. 12 pounders .............................................. 7.47 Howitzers ..................................................... 13 Mortars—heavy .............................................. 11 Do. light ....................................................... 22 Do. stone ...................................................... 7
100
proportions somewhat nearer to Captain Spearman's.
In Prussia the park is composed of—
Guns—24 and 18 pounders .................................. 48 Do. lighter calibre ............................................ 10 Howitzers ..................................................... 16 Mortars—heavy .............................................. 10 Do. light ....................................................... 10 Do. stone ...................................................... 6
100
proportions approaching more nearly to that of the French army. On the whole, it may be assumed that a satisfactory proportion might be deduced from all these, giving more guns than in Captain Spearman's, and more mortars than in the French arrangement, viz.—
Guns ......................................................... 50 Howitzers ..................................................... 15 Mortars—heavy .............................................. 15 Do. light ....................................................... 20
100
The quantity and relative calibres of the ordnance being determined, the following will be the proportion and nature of ammunition:—
**Gun ammunition—Round shot,**
24-pounder .............................................. 1000 rounds per gun. 12-pounder ............................................... 1200 rounds per gun. Tier shot .................................................... 50 rounds per gun. Spherical case ............................................. 100 rounds per gun.
**Howitzer ammunition—Shells,**
10-inch ...................................................... 600 rounds per howitzer. 8-inch ......................................................... 300 rounds per howitzer. Spherical case .............................................. 300 rounds per howitzer. Carcasses .................................................... 10 rounds per howitzer. Valenciennes composition .................................. 100 proportions per howitzer.
**Mortar ammunition—Shells,**
10-inch ...................................................... 600 rounds per mortar. 8-inch ......................................................... 600 per mortar. Pound shot .................................................. 50 rounds of 100 shot each per mortar. Carcasses .................................................... 10 per mortar. Valenciennes composition .................................. 10 per mortar.
10-inch ...................................................... 100 proportions per mortar.
In the above proportion of ammunition there is an increase of 200 rounds in favour of the 12-pounders, as the facility of working these guns will, at an easy rate, afford the means of firing more rapidly than from 24-pounders. The proportion of one-half common shells and one-half spherical case should always be adhered to for the 8-inch howitzers.
**Arrangement of Artillery at a Siege.**
The first disposition of the artillery at a siege is to the different batteries raised near the first parallel. The object of the besieger in the construction of these batteries is, by a direct and enfilade fire, to dismount the artillery on the front attacked, destroy the embrasures, and harass the garrison in the several points of defence, so that they may be compelled to abandon them, or at least slacken their fire, and thereby enable the besieger to carry forward his approaches with greater expedition and less danger than he otherwise could do. If these first batteries be favourably situated, the artillery may be continued in them during the whole of the siege, or until the besiegers arrive on the crest of the glacis. The garrison must be perpetually harassed along the whole front attacked, with shot and shells fired en ricochet. The batteries for this purpose are erected on the prolongations of the works to be enfiladed, from whence the defenders of the prolonged faces may be fired upon with great precision and effect. It, however, frequently happens, from local and other circumstances, that the besiegers cannot avail themselves of the most advantageous situations for their first batteries. There are four situations from which the defences of a place may be destroyed, though not from all of them with equal facility. The best positions for the first batteries are those before described as perpendicular to the prolongations of the faces of the works to be enfiladed. If these positions cannot be attained, the next that present themselves are on those sides of the prolongations which take the faces in reverse, and under as small angles as possible. If the ground or other circumstances will not admit of either of these situations being occupied by enfilading batteries, the battery to destroy the fire of the face must be without its prolongation, so as to fire obliquely upon the outside of it: the fourth position in point of advantage is directly parallel to the face, or within that degree of obliquity which will allow a sufficient penetrative force to the shot or Garrison shells. The guns must fire en ricochet from the first two positions, and from the last two with full charges.
The second batteries are generally placed on the glacis within 15 or 18 feet of its crest; but if the foot of the revetment cannot be seen from this situation, they must be placed in the covered way, within 15 feet of the counterscarp. The object of these second batteries being to effect practicable breaches in the works, they should be combined two and two together, so that while one batteries in breach, the other may play upon its defences. The breaching batteries shall commence by marking out as nearly as possible, by their fire, the extent of the breach intended to be made; first by striking out a horizontal line as near as possible to the bottom of the revetment; and next, by aiming at two others, perpendicular to and at the extremities of this first line. Then, by continuing to deepen these three cuts, and occasionally firing salvoes at the part to be brought down, the wall will in time give way in a mass. The guns must begin by firing as low as possible in the commencement of the operation, afterwards somewhat higher in the same manner as before, and so continue advancing gradually upwards till the breach is effected; for, should they fire too high at first, the rubbish would cover the lower part of the wall, retard the operation, and tend to render the breach impracticable. When the second batteries are placed on the glacis, or in the covered way, they must be sunk to such a depth that the terreplein of the one, or surface of the other, may coincide with the soles of their embrasures. They are in fact but an enlargement of the sap run for the lodgment on the glacis, or in the covered way, and should contain at least four guns each. If the space between the traverses will not admit of this number at the usual distances, the guns must be closed to distances of fifteen or twelve feet from each other.
The mortars are generally arranged at first in battery adjoining the first gun batteries, or upon the prolongations of the capitals of the works, in which situations they are certainly least exposed; and upon the establishment of the half parallels the howitzers are placed in battery, in their extremities, to enfilade the branches of the covered way. These batteries are in the most advantageous situations, if, while the one bombards the work that the besieger intends to assault and prevents the garrison from throwing up intrenchments within it, or at least retards their construction, the other directs its fire against the defences of the breach, so that the garrison may, from the continual shower of shells, &c., be compelled to abandon them, or, if they persist in remaining, be exposed to great loss. The small mortars are arranged in the third parallel, to annoy the besieged in the places of arms.
Mortars may also, as stated before, be advantageously placed opposite the prolongation of a face, on the same principle as an enfilading gun battery; and in this case they may be arranged one behind the other, being separated by traverses or epaulements.
In the establishment of all these batteries, the great object is to make such an arrangement of them, that they may not mask the fire of each other more than is unavoidable, and particularly that of the first or ricochet batteries. The aggravation of this inconvenience may very well be prevented till the establishment of the attack on the crest of the glacis, when it becomes in some degree unavoidable; however, even the operations of the glacis may be so arranged as not to mask the fire of the ricochet batteries, until the breaching batteries are in a state of great forwardness.
**Garrison Artillery.**
The proportion of ordnance, ammunition, and stores required for the defence of a fortified place depends not only on the particular situation of each individual fortress, and its relations with the surrounding country; the system according to which it is fortified, and the species of attack it may be possible to open against it; but likewise on innumerable minor circumstances, each of which may exert an important influence on the defence. If, for example, one or more of the fronts of a place be covered by an inundation, a marsh, or by any other impassable obstacle, it will manifestly require a much smaller proportion of artillery for its defence than if it were equally accessible on every front. On the contrary, a maritime fortress, which is susceptible of attack both by sea and land, will require a larger proportion of ordnance supplies than if it were assailable from only one of these points.
It will be seen, therefore, from the above remarks and examples, how impossible it is to lay down any general rules upon this important subject. The only satisfactory guide which an officer charged with the nice and responsible trust of arming a fortified place can with security follow, is to examine attentively all parts of the works and of the surrounding country, and then to weigh every other circumstance that can in any way influence the defence. He should consider which of its fronts are most vulnerable, and what measures are best adapted for their security. To effect this with accuracy and expedition, he should, after a few days passed in reconnoitring and studying his position, devote his attention to the preparation of a sketch and profiles of the works and neighbouring country, as far at least as a mile in every direction, and upon a scale adapted to the features of the ground.
With this map and profiles before him, he should recur to those fundamental principles upon which every good attack and defence are based. He should not only be thoroughly acquainted with his own particular branch of the service in all its details, but capable of judging to the fullest extent of all operations in which the other troops of the garrison can bear their part; so that every supply may be adequate to its particular purpose, without deficiency on the one hand or superfluity on the other. Thus two extremes, equally prejudicial, will be avoided; the one, of making a provision insufficient for the defence which the fortress is capable of sustaining; the other, of providing such a quantity of supplies, that, on its capitulation, which, according to the natural order of things, must sooner or later happen, if it be not relieved, a complete arsenal would fall into the enemy's hands.
These observations being held in mind, the following general maxims will be found of essential assistance.
**General Maxims for arming Fortified Places.**
1. The proportion of ordnance, ammunition, and stores should never exceed the quantity absolutely necessary to a brave and resolute defence.
2. Those fronts which are considered susceptible of attack should be completely armed, and the remaining fronts armed only in part.
3. There should be, for each of the faces of the bastions of such fronts as are deemed liable to attack, five or six pieces of ordnance; for each of the flanks of these bastions four pieces; and for the faces of the ravelin from five to seven pieces of ordnance. When there are lunettes, four pieces should be reckoned for each, and from two to three for each of the places of arms of the covered way. Supposing, therefore, one front to be completely armed, the following proportion of ordnance will be required:
- The faces of the two bastions: from 10 to 12 - Two interior flanks: from 6 to 8 - Faces of the ravelin: from 5 to 7 - Five places of arms: from 10 to 15
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1 *Traité d'Artillerie*, par D'Antoni; British Gunner. 2 British Gunner. 3 *Traité Élémentaire d'Artillerie*. 4. In case of the place being liable to attack on two consecutive fronts, the above proportion should be augmented one half; and if on two detached fronts, it should be doubled. The remaining fronts should each be provided with such a proportion of their full armaments as will secure them from insult. It will appear from the above maxims, which are deduced from the best authorities on the subject, that a hexagon, having only one front exposed to attack, requires an armament of from 58 to 68 pieces of ordnance for its defence; and that for more extensive places, from six to eight, or at most ten pieces of ordnance, should be added for each additional front.
The next point to be considered is the proportion which the several kinds of ordnance, and their relative calibres, should bear to each other; and here it must be remembered that the higher rates are not the only descriptions capable of being employed to advantage in the defence of a place. There are many cases in which medium guns can oppose equal resistance with the heavier calibres, and they possess the very important advantage of affording greater facility in manoeuvring and transporting them from one situation to another; an operation of considerable difficulty with the higher natures of ordnance at all times, but particularly during a siege. They also consume less ammunition, and enable the besieged to keep up a more determined and incessant fire.
The following are the proportions of the several kinds and calibres usually adhered to in ordinary cases.
Guns—in the proportion of two-thirds of the whole armament—suppose 60.
- 24-pounders ........................................... 12 or 6 - 18-pounders ........................................... 7 or 12 - 12-pounders ........................................... 7 or 18 - 9-pounders or 6-pounders ........................................... 7 or 24
Howitzers—one for every five guns—in this case 14.
- 10-inch ........................................... 3 or 7 - 8-inch ........................................... 3 or 7
Mortars—in about the same proportion as the howitzers—in this case 16.
- 10-inch ........................................... 3 or 8 - 8-inch ........................................... 3 or 8
The above distribution of guns, howitzers, and mortars, applies equally to all armaments of not less than 60 pieces of ordnance; and such an armament should therefore consist of 40 guns, 8 howitzers, and 12 mortars. The proportions of the several calibres of each kind, except those for the guns, are calculated on a basis of not less than 90 pieces of ordnance; and in all smaller armaments it would be advisable to confine the arrangement to two calibres of each kind only.
The preceding estimate of 68 pieces of ordnance for a hexagon must be taken as the least possible number, as it implies a very partial arming of the fronts not included in the scheme of attack, and a defence limited to a single front. To bring this up to a sufficient standard on the principles of estimate adopted, the following calculation may be given.
- Faces of the centre bastion of the attack ........................................... 12 - Nearest faces of collateral bastions ........................................... 12 - Two flanks opposed to centre bastion ........................................... 8 - Two flanks of centre bastion ........................................... 4 - Adjacent faces of two adjacent ravelins ........................................... 8 - Remote faces of do ........................................... 4 - Four adjacent places of arms ........................................... 12 - Two remote do ........................................... 8
Colonel Timmermans gives 62 guns and howitzers, and 42 mortars, or 104 in all; besides some few stone mortars; and the Fortification Course of the Royal Military Academy 130, namely, 65 heavy guns, 13 howitzers, 39 mortars, and 13 field guns. If then the same proportion be adopted on the total number of 110 for a hexagon, the number of heavy guns will be 55, of howitzers 11, of mortars 33, and of field guns 11, which appears a very reasonable estimate for ordinary circumstances. In carrying it into effect, the number of field guns should, of course, be adopted which corresponds to the ordinary arrangements of field batteries; as, for example, 12; being two batteries of the present establishment, or 1½ of that proposed.
In respect to the calibre of guns used in the defence of fortresses, the remarks of Colonel Timmermans deserve especial attention. He observes,
1st. That the superiority of attack over defence is in great measure due to the improvement of the siege artillery and operations, without a corresponding improvement in the defence, and hence that an improvement in the artillery of a fortress should tend to restore the equilibrium.
2d. That as the besieger is limited by the difficulty of transport to the use of guns of moderate calibre, the besieged should adopt guns of a more powerful calibre, so as to commence an effective contest with the besieger even at the earliest stage of the siege.
These remarks are just, and it would seem assuredly desirable to establish a superiority of calibre in the guns of defence whenever it is possible so to do. The present established table of ordnance exhibits the 8-inch shell gun 8 feet long, and weight 52 cwt.; the 32-pounder 9 feet 6 inches long, and weight 56 cwt.; and the short 32-pounder 6 feet long, and weight 25 cwt.; which seem peculiarly fitted for the armament of fortresses, and are not so greatly different even in weight from the 24-pounder, which weighs 50 cwt., as to render their use difficult. Mortars also should be freely used in the collateral bastions, their fire being directed not against the battery nearly opposite to them, but against the battery opposite the corresponding bastion on the other side, so as to fall as nearly as possible in the direction of the parapet. Spherical case should also be freely used as a most effective missile. It may be added also as an argument in favour of heavy ordnance, that when the fortress has fallen, the guns will not be suitable for transport in the field.
The following will be the proportion and nature of ammunition for each species of ordnance.
**Gun ammunition.**—Round shot,
- 24-pounder ........................................... 600 rounds per gun. - 18-pounder ........................................... 760 rounds per gun. - 12-pounder ........................................... 800 rounds per gun. - 9-pounder or 6-pounder ........................................... 1000 rounds per gun.
**Case shot,**
- 24-pounder ........................................... 40 rounds per gun. - 18-pounder ........................................... 50 rounds per gun. - 12-pounder ........................................... 80 rounds per gun. - 9-pounder or 6-pounder ........................................... 100 rounds per gun.
**Spherical case,**
- 24-pounder ........................................... 50 rounds per gun. - 18-pounder ........................................... 80 rounds per gun. - 12-pounder ........................................... 100 rounds per gun. - 9-pounder or 6-pounder ........................................... 150 rounds per gun.
**Howitzer ammunition.**—Shells,
- 10-inch ........................................... 400 rounds per howitzer. - 8-inch ........................................... 600 rounds per howitzer.
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*Manuel de l'Artillerie; Traité d'Artillerie, par D'Antoni.*
*British Gunner.* Case shot, 10-inch .................. 100 rounds per howitzer. 8-inch .................. 250 rounds per howitzer.
Spherical case, 8-inch .................. 500 rounds per howitzer.
Light balls and carcasses, 8-inch .................. 20 rounds of each per howitzer.
Mortar ammunition.—Shells, 10-inch .................. 500 rounds per mortar. 8-inch .................. 650 rounds per mortar.
Pound shot, 10-inch .................. 500 rounds per mortar. 8-inch .................. 600 rounds per mortar.
Each round of pound shot consists of 100 shot for the 10-inch, and of 80 for the 8-inch mortar.
Light balls .................. 15 per mortar.
The above proportion of ordnance and ammunition for the defence of a fortified place is exclusive of one or more field batteries, which every place should contain, according to its extent, and which should be provided with a double proportion of ammunition; and it is only necessary to alter the calibre from 24 to 32, to reconcile it to the views previously expressed of the advantage of heavier ordnance.
This estimate and arrangement is founded upon the supposition that the place is unprovided with casemated batteries, the armament for which must of course form a separate estimate, calculated, however, upon the same principles as the above.
Arrangement of the Artillery during a Siege.
The instant it is ascertained that the enemy's troops are in motion towards the place,—presuming that it is amply supplied with provisions, ammunition, and stores, and that every precaution has been taken to collect from the vicinity what might fall into the enemy's hands,—the barbette batteries must be established in the flanked angles of the bastions and ravelins, and a proportion of the light guns and howitzers must be placed in the outworks and covered way. Should the body of the place have cavaliers, the heaviest guns should be mounted on them. The following arrangement is usually made for the reception of the investing corps, when it is not known from what point they may advance to commence operations.
There should be three guns mounted on the barbette of each bastion—one 24 and two 18-pounders, and three 9-pounders on the barbette of each of the ravelins. In the salient places of arms of the bastions, one 24-pounder howitzer, and in those of the ravelins two 6-pounders. The heavy mortars should be placed one in each bastion, and the remainder of the ordnance in reserve behind the curtains, ready to move on whichever side it may be required. As it is always very desirable to have as few calibres as possible, the 9-pounders might be advantageously replaced in all cases either by 12-pounders or by 6-pounders, according to the special circumstances; and the armament consist in general of the 8-inch shell gun, long 32, short 32, 12 feet and 6 feet, besides the field batteries.
By this arrangement the whole of the barbette guns, and of the guns and howitzers in the outworks and covered way, will be in readiness to act in any direction, till it is known on which side the enemy has determined to direct his attack, and, with the addition of the reserve, will enable the besieged to open a fire of thirty-five pieces of ordnance on the enemy, the very first night he begins to work upon the trenches. In the first moments of the investment, however, the artillery of the place should not endeavour, by a useless expenditure of ammunition, to disturb the besiegers in their operations; it is only when they are making permanent dispositions for their establishment that the fire of the place should be opened upon them. It is nevertheless necessary that some guns should be loaded with reduced charges to protect the retreat of the advanced posts, and mislead the enemy as to their range. This is also the moment, if the garrison be numerous, and composed of good troops, to annoy the besiegers by sorties on different points of the line of contravallation, and to retard the works necessary for establishing their communications; care must however be taken not to purchase this advantage by a loss of men and artillery, which would cripple the means of defence.
The day succeeding the night on which the trenches are opened, and the front of attack determined, a new disposition of the artillery of the place must be made as follows:
The 24 and 18-pounders must be removed to the front attacked, and the other batteries, if necessary, supplied with 12-pounders. The barbettes of the bastions on this front must have each five guns, three 24 and two 18-pounders, and the remaining 18-pounders arranged behind the curtains,—two towards each of the extremities of the front curtain, and two at the farthest extremity of each of the collateral curtains. The howitzers in reserve should be placed two in each of the salient angles of the covered way of the bastions of this front, and two in each of those of the collateral bastions, which, with those already there, must fire en ricochet down the prolongations of the capitals. There should also be three 6-pounders in the salient place of arms of the ravelin of the front attacked, and three in each of those of the two collateral ravelins; these guns should fire over the palisading; and, lastly, there should be five 9-pounders on the barbette of the front ravelin. This arrangement will bring fifty-two guns and howitzers and four mortars to fire on the approaches after the first night. This, with a few variations, will be the disposition of the artillery of the place till the besiegers' first batteries are ready to open. The instant they begin to work upon these batteries, the whole fire of the place must be concentrated on them, and the mortars which had previously fired at low angles must now fire with greater elevation, but at all times sparingly.
As soon as the enemy's batteries are fairly established, the guns en barbette must be covered by merlons, and the embrasures occasionally masked. While this work is carrying on, the situations of the guns should be changed, and new directions given to them; as by frequently practising this manoeuvre, the enemy will also be obliged to change his dispositions of attack, and time will thereby be gained by the besieged. As the enemy approaches towards the second parallel, the fire of the place must be spread over all parts of his line of operations; and with a view of contributing to this object, royal and cohorn mortars should be disposed in the places of arms and branches of the covered-way. When the approaches are carried on from the second parallel, and the enemy is about to establish the demi-places of arms, the fire of the place must be concentrated on the débouchés from the parallel, and multiplied with all possible activity.
In proportion as the besieger pushes forward his approaches to the third parallel, the artillery must be withdrawn from the covered way to the ravelins, or to the ditch, if dry, or to any other favourable situation, and by degrees, as they advance, to the body of the place. During this period of the siege the embrasures must be prepared in the flanks, in the curtain which joins them, and in those parts of the faces of the bastions which command the ditch of the front ravelin. All these embrasures must be ready to open, and the heavy artillery mounted in them, the moment the enemy attempts to form a lodgment on the glacis. We have now arrived at the crisis of the siege, and every effort should be made to take advantage of this favourable moment, when the enemy, by his own works, must mask his former batteries, and before he is able to open his new ones.
COAST DEFENCES.
In a preceding paragraph, the opinion of Colonel Tim- Exercises—mermans of the Belgian artillery has been quoted in favour of the use of ordnance of high calibre in the defence of fortresses, and that of Marshal Marmont might be quoted to the same effect. "I come now," he observes, "to the artillery of Paixhaus. To fulfil their object, heavy guns should have a great range, and their missiles a great momentum. Hitherto this momentum has been obtained by the use of a moderate mass projected with a great velocity, on account of the difficulty of moving heavy ordnance; but though this reason is unanswerable in a siege where the guns must be moved in a limited time, and often under circumstances of great difficulty, it does not apply to the armament of ships, of fortresses, or of coast defences; in all of which cases such heavy artillery must possess immense advantages." In respect to coast defences the force of this reasoning has been fully admitted, as the effect even of a 32-pounder shot is small in comparison with that of an 8-inch hollow shot which weighs 56 pounds, and makes a fearful rent in a ship's side, which it would be difficult to stop up or repair.
The armament, therefore, for coast batteries, forts, or towers, includes guns of the highest calibres, viz.:
1. 68-pounder for sweeping channels of more than ordinary length, so as to bring the ship within range as soon as possible. 2. 10-inch shell gun, to defend a point of very great importance, where a more than usually heavy fire is required. 3. 8-inch shell gun and 32-pounder of 56 cwt. as the general armament in the proportion of one shell gun to two 32-pounders. Both these guns can be used for setting fire to shipping, the one by shells and the other by red-hot shot, and therefore fulfil most of the conditions required for coast-battery guns. Lighter guns of similar calibre may be used for very short ranges, but it should always be borne in mind that as the efficiency of defence, since the application of steam as a motive power in ships, rests on the destructive effects of a few shots, and not on the repeated shocks of many, guns of a large calibre ought to have almost an exclusive preference, both from the superior precision and superior destructiveness of their fire. The 24-pounder has still been retained on the Ordnance Lists for protecting shallow beaches; but even in this case the short 32-pounder would be preferable, and the introduction of another calibre might be avoided.
**EXERCISE OF ARTILLERY.**
The several exercises are divided into three classes, as follows:
1. Exercise of field artillery. 2. Exercise of garrison or siege artillery. 3. Exercise of the various machines employed in the manoeuvres of garrison or siege artillery.
**1. Exercise of Field Artillery.**
The complement of men for the service of each gun or howitzer is, one non-commissioned officer and eight gunners.
**Numbering and Telling off the Detachments.**
The several detachments being arranged right in front, are numbered and told off by their respective non-commissioned officers in the following manner:
The non-commissioned officer is invariably No. 1, and is responsible for the proper execution of the duties of the other numbers of his detachment. The right-hand man of the rear rank is named No. 2; his front-rank man No. 3; the second man from the right of the rear rank No. 4; and his front-rank man No. 5; and so on in succession from the right of the rear to the left of the front rank, till the numbering of the whole detachment is completed.
**Formation in Order of March or for Exercise.**
When detachments are formed in the order of march, or for the purpose of exercise, the even numbers are almost invariably on the right or off-side of the gun, and the odd numbers on the left or near side.
**Positions of the several Numbers in Action.**
No. 1 is on the left of the handspike; No. 2 outside the right wheel, in line with the muzzle; No. 3 outside the left wheel, and also in line with the muzzle; No. 4 clear of the right wheel, covering No. 2, and in line with the breech; No. 5 clear of the left wheel, covering No. 3, and also in line with the breech; No. 6 five yards in rear of and covering the left wheel; No. 7 in rear of the limber; No. 8 ten yards in rear of the gun, in line with the heads of the leading horses of the limber; and No. 9 attends the ammunition-waggons.
**Duties of the several Numbers.**
No. 1 points and commands; No. 2 sponges; No. 3 loads; No. 4 serves the vent and primes; No. 5 fires; No. 6 serves No. 3 with ammunition; No. 7 supplies No. 6 with ammunition, and, when firing shells, fixes the fuses; No. 8 assists No. 7, and occasionally relieves No. 2, or, when attached to 54 inch or 24-pounder howitzers, provides No. 3 with shells; No. 9 assists in preparing ammunition.
**Limbering up, or Retiring from Action.**
This manoeuvre may be performed, according to circumstances, to the front, rear, right, or left. In limbering up to the front, the limber drives up to the right of the gun. No. 2 instantly passes his sponge over the axletree to No. 4, who straps on the sponge head; No. 2 and No. 3 go round to the trail; No. 4 and No. 5 man the wheels, assisted by No. 7 and No. 8 with heavy guns. The right wheel is run back, the left forward, and No. 1 and No. 6 throw the trail round in the opposite direction to that in which the limber drives up. The instant the trail is round, No. 1 unships his handspike, and No. 5 straps it on; No. 2 buckles on the rammer-head of his sponge, and the whole fall in close to the wheels. No. 6, No. 4, and No. 2 on one side, No. 5, No. 3, and No. 1 on the other; No. 7 attends the limber, and No. 8 moves up to his place. On the limber coming up square to the front, No. 1 orders, "halt, limber up," upon which No. 4 and No. 5 man the wheels, No. 2, No. 3, and No. 6, lift the trail and place it on the pintail; No. 1 then puts in the key, and the detachment mount, or fall into the order of march. The duties are precisely the same in limbering up to the rear, right, or left, except that in limbering up to the right or left, the trail and limber both go to the right or left; and in limbering up to the rear, the limber drives up rather to the right of the trail, which is not thrown round, and then reverses to the left.
**Unlimbering or coming into Action.**
This is precisely the reverse of the preceding manoeuvre. No. 1 unkeys the pintail, No. 2 and No. 3 raise the trail, and when it is clear No. 1 gives the word, "Drive on;" upon which the limber goes off to the left about, and the trail is thrown to the right about, the other numbers assisting as they arrive, the same as in limbering up. No. 6 at the trail with heavy guns, and No. 4 and No. 5 at the wheels. As soon as the trail is down, No. 5 unbuckles the handspike, and No. 1 slips it; No. 2 unstraps the rammer-head and goes to his place; No. 4 unstraps the sponge, and passes it over to No. 2. When the limber is sufficiently to the rear, it reverses to its left, and halts ten yards in rear of and covering its gun. The ammunition-wagon also reverses to its left, goes off in front of the limber, and again reversing, to its left, halts one horse's length in rear of the gun-limber. No. 1 is responsible for the correct dressing of his gun when it comes into action; and for this purpose, immediately after the trail is in its proper direction he should place himself in line with Exercises, the axle-tree of the gun upon which the formation is made, and dress his own gun with it. This position will enable him to see, not only that his gun is in its true alignment, but also that it is square to the front.
2. Exercise of Garrison or Siege Artillery.
This second branch of the exercises relates to the manner of working and serving guns, howitzers, carronades, and mortars, on batteries. The complement of men for the service of garrison or battery guns is, for the 42-pounder and 32-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and six gunners each; for the 24-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and five gunners; for the 18-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and four gunners; and for the 12-pounder and 9-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and three gunners each. The complement of men, duties, &c., are precisely the same for howitzers and carronades as the above for guns. The 13-inch mortar requires one non-commissioned officer and five gunners; the 10-inch mortar one non-commissioned officer and four gunners; the 8-inch mortar one non-commissioned officer and three gunners; and the royal and cehorn mortars one non-commissioned officer and two gunners each.
All calculations for the daily service of guns on batteries, whether in garrison or at a siege, should be made in three proportions and at three reliefs.
Numbering, Telling off the Detachments, and Formation for Exercise.
The same in every respect as for field artillery.
Positions and Duties of the Numbers.
No. 1, directly in rear of the gun, points, commands, and assists to run the gun up; No. 2, on the right of and in line with the muzzle, sponges, runs up, and elevates; No. 3, on the left of the muzzle, and also in line with it, loads, runs up, and elevates; No. 4, on the right of the gun, clear of the track, and in line with the breech, serves the vent, primes, runs up, and traverses; No. 5, in the same relative position on the left of the gun, fires, runs up, and traverses; the remaining numbers on the right and left of the embrasure, with their backs to the merlons. No. 6 serves No. 3 with ammunition, and runs up; No. 7 assists to run up. The whole of the numbers, when not immediately employed in working the gun, should range themselves in order under cover of the parapet.
In serving mortars, No. 1 is directly in rear of the mortar, and points, commands, and serves the vent; No. 2, on the right of and in line with the front of the bed, sponges, runs up, and traverses; No. 3, in the same relative position on the left of the bed, loads, runs up, and traverses; No. 4, on the right of the mortar, covering No. 2, and in line with the vent, runs up, elevates, supplies shells, primes, and traverses; No. 5, in the same relative position on the left of the mortar, runs up, supplies shells, elevates, traverses, and fires; No. 6, at the magazine, serves ammunition. No. 2 puts the shells into the 8-inch royal and cehorn mortars, and in putting them into the 13 and 10-inch mortars is assisted by No. 3.
3. Exercise of the various Machines employed in the Manoeuvres of Heavy Artillery.
The method of numbering, telling off, &c., is the same in every respect for this branch of the exercises as for the two preceding, except that, in the exercise of the devil-carriage, the odd numbers are posted on the right side, and the even numbers on the left.
Exercise of the Triangle Gyn.
The complement of men for a triangle gyn is usually one non-commissioned officer and ten gunners. The following are the duties in working or carrying the gyn:
Left side.
No. 3 carries at the foot of the left cheek, works the left-hand lever, keys and unkeys the left-hand capsquare of the gun-carriage, and assists to run the carriage up or back.
No. 5 carries at the top of the left cheek, works the left centre lever, and assists to run the carriage up or back.
No. 7 carries the levers and handspeaks, assists No. 6 in passing the fall round the windlass, and holds on next to him.
No. 9 carries at the top of the pry-pole with the slings, fid, trucks, &c., holds on the fall behind No. 8, and coils it up as it comes off.
No. 11 Assists in carrying the blocks and fall, reeves and unrevees the triple block, assists in slinging the gun, and steadies it at the muzzle.
Right side.
No. 2 carries at the foot of the right cheek, works the right-hand lever, keys and unkeys the right-hand capsquare of the gun-carriage, and assists to run the carriage up or back.
No. 4 carries at the top of the right cheek, works the right centre lever, and assists to run the carriage up or back.
No. 6 carries the windlass, passes the fall round it, holds on, makes it fast, and cases off and lowers the gun.
No. 8 carries at the foot of the pry-pole with the slings, fid, trucks, &c., and holds on next to No. 7.
No. 10 assists in carrying the blocks and fall, reeves and unrevees the double block, assists in slinging the gun, and steadies it at the cascable.
Exercise of Bell's Gyn.
This is a light gyn calculated to raise about 30 cwt. When greater weights are required to be raised, the Gibraltar Gyn is used, which is calculated to raise a weight of 50 cwt. with perfect safety. The duties of the Gibraltar Gyn are nearly identical with those of Bell's Gyn, which it has now replaced in the service. The complement of men for working it is one non-commissioned officer and six gunners.
Left side.
No. 3 runs the carriage up or back, assists No. 6 in slinging the gun, turns the winch, assisted by No. 5, or makes fast and hauls upon the rope which is passed round the handles of the winch.
No. 5 runs the carriage up or back, and assists No. 3 at the winch.
No. 7 slings and unslings the gun at the chace, assisted by No. 2, and steadies at the muzzle.
Right side.
No. 2 runs the carriage up or back, assists No. 7 in slinging the gun, turns the winch assisted by No. 4, or holds on upon the rope and makes it fast, the same as No. 3.
No. 4 performs similar duties to No. 5 on his own side.
No. 6 slings and unslings the gun at the first reinforce, assisted by No. 3, places the bed and quoin, and steadies the gun at the cascable.
Exercise of the Sling-cart.
The complement of men for a sling-cart is one non-commissioned officer and six gunners.
Left side.
No. 3 has charge of the left lever, and when necessary assists to skid the gun.
No. 5 assists No. 3 at the lever and skidding, and when the gun is lashed assists in raising the breech.
No. 7 assists No. 3 at the lever, slings and unslings the gun, and lashes it to the pry-pole.
The non-commissioned officer puts in and takes out the pauls, and commands.
Exercise of the Devil-carriage.
The complement of men for working this carriage is one non-commissioned officer and ten gunners. Exercises.
Left side.
No. 2 has charge of a drag-rope, assists in hauling the perch up and down, assists No. 3 in bearing the muzzle down, and, when the gun and carriage are lashed on, puts up the skid.
No. 4 steadies the gun-carriage when raised on its breast transom, and with the long guy-rope lashes its front axle-tree to the devil-carriage.
No. 6 slings the gun, lashes the breech to the perch, assists in limbering up and unlimbering, and slings the gun-carriage.
No. 8 has charge of one of the short guys, assists in unlimbering and limbering up, and in hauling the breech of the gun up to the perch; lashes the hind axle-tree of the gun-carriage to the devil-carriage, and fixes the long guy-rope to the iron eyes at the end of the perch.
No. 10 assists in unlimbering and limbering up, and in hauling the breech of the gun up to the perch; lashes with the short guy-ropes the rear-axle-tree of the gun-carriage to the devil-carriage, and fixes the short guy-ropes to the ring under the perch.
Right side.
No. 3 has charge of a drag-rope, assists in hauling the perch up and down, bears the muzzle of the gun down, and, when the breech is raised, puts the lever into the muzzle.
No. 5. The duties of No. 5 are in all respects the same as those of No. 4.
No. 7. The duties of No. 7 are the same as those of No. 6, only performed on his own side of the carriage.
No. 9 does the same as No. 8.
No. 11 does the same as No. 10.
The several exercises which have been here explained afford but a very faint view of the admirable course of instruction which is assiduously and regularly carried on in the Royal Repository at Woolwich, and through which every gunner and every officer must necessarily pass. When it is considered that artillery men are required to handle heavy ordnance under circumstances sometimes of peculiar difficulty, and to provide for their transport sometimes up inclined planes, and sometimes over broken bridges or other obstructions, it will be readily conceived how important it must be that they should be fully and most carefully trained to the ready and skilful application of mechanical contrivances; and it is in this excellent establishment, now presided over by Colonel Hardinge, that they are experimentally made acquainted with them. All the military machines now in use, Pontons, models of various systems of temporary bridges, including the most simple as well as the more complex, are to be seen in the grounds or in the model-room; and every operation connected with them is taught practically at the establishment. It may then be confidently asserted, that much of the efficiency of the artillery is due to this branch of its instruction.
Rockets.
As this missile, though depending for its movement on the progressive or comparatively gradual combustion of an explosive, or rather highly inflammable compound, has been classed by all modern artillerists rather with ordnance than with the musket, or other more handy weapons of personal conflict, it is necessary to make some further remarks upon its application in war. But before doing so it is right to explain the principle of its movement, as the improvement of the rocket as an efficient projectile will depend greatly on a right understanding of this principle. Mariotte and Nol-
let ascribed the movement of the rocket to the re-action of Exercise, the gas proceeding from the combustion of the powder, produced by the resistance of the air to its escape from the vent. Desaguliers and D'Antoni reject the instrumentality of the air, and consider the movement of the rocket to be solely due to the greater re-active force of the gases on the head of the rocket than on its base. The first theory appears to have been adopted in the Woolwich School of Artillery until very recently; but the latter, which is without doubt the true theory, is now taught by the present able inspector, a professor of artillery, Captain Boxer, R.A., and is fully adequate to explain the motion of rockets, and all similar cases of motion either in animals or in machines. A very few words will make it quite intelligible, and show that motion will be produced under such circumstances in vacuo, as well as in air or water. Let the case of the rocket be first considered as closed on every side; in this instance the gas formed by combustion will accumulate in the case, and exercise a pressure increasing with the increase of quantity, or the degree of compression to which it is subjected; but as the pressure will be equal in all directions, the rocket will be urged backwards with the same force that it is urged forwards, and hence must remain at rest. Let it be supposed, then, that the pressure on the head, and on the base of the rocket case is each equal to \((a + b)\) lb., and that a hole be then made in the base which will relieve a portion of the pressure equivalent to \(b\) lb., by allowing the gas to escape: the pressure now, on the head, will be \((a + b)\) lb., and on the base \(a\) lb., so that the rocket being impelled forwards by a force equal to \((a + b)\) lb., and backwards by a force of \(a\) lb., will be forced into motion by a resultant force equal to \(b\) lb. This resultant force, to induce motion, must be greater than the weight of the rocket, when the projectile is intended to be fired vertically, and greater than a weight equivalent to friction and inertia, when the projectile is intended to be fired horizontally.
The rocket, as an instrument of war, is associated in the English mind with the name of Congreve, although Sir William Congreve was not its inventor. The merit of that very able officer consists in his appreciation of the value of rockets, and in his ingenuity and skill in improving them. It is not improbable, that the Greek fire of the ancients may have been sometimes projected in the manner of rockets; and it is certain that in Asia they were used with other fireworks on days of public festivals at very remote epochs. Mr. de Montgery\(^1\) has collected the following recorded examples of their use in war. By the Chinese in their wars with the Tartars, at the commencement of the thirteenth century; by the Padoans and Venetians in 1379 and 1380; by the French in 1428, in the defence of Orleans; and in 1449, in the attack upon Pont-Audemer, when Dunois threw rockets into the place and took it by assault during the confusion of the conflagration which followed. In 1561, it was stated that careful descriptions of flying and destructive fuses (rockets) were found in an ancient manuscript, and that it was recommended to make their cases of sheet-iron, and to varnish them as a security against rust. Louis Collado, the author of a Manuel d'Artillerie, states, in 1586, that rockets were used to light up the vicinity of besieged places, and to throw cavalry into confusion; and recommends that a petard should be added to them, in order to render them more dangerous, and that they should be projected by means of a long tube, in order to increase their range. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, and during the eighteenth, rockets appear to have fallen into disuse as weapons of war in Europe, although some experiments were made by Ruggieri, both on fire-rockets and on grenade rockets. In Asia they continued to be used, and at the siege of Seringapatam, were
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\(^1\) Journal de Sciences Militaires, 1825-26. Artillery projected against the English troops with considerable effect. They were made of sheet iron, and provided with a stick or tail of bamboo. The idea of using rockets in war first occurred to Sir W. Congreve in 1804; but as he states the fact, that in India they had been already thus used, and that General Desaguliers had some years before made experiments upon them, it is manifest he did not claim the title of inventor, but merely claimed the merit of making them of large size, and bestowing upon them a sufficiently extended range, as he certainly did when he constructed one of 32 lb. weight, having an average range of 3000 yards. In 1806, they were first used by the English fleet against Boulogne; in 1807, against Copenhagen, under the superintendence of Congreve; in 1809, in the Walcheren expedition; and subsequently, with brilliant success at Leipzig, where the rocket troop, under the gallant Captain Bogue, who fell gloriously in the battle, distinguished itself. M. de Montgery remarks justly, that the rockets now called Congreve rockets, though at present looked upon as one of the most recent inventions in artillery, are, on the contrary, one of the most ancient. But at the same time he does full justice to Sir W. Congreve; for, as he observes, "Some persons in England and in France have disputed with that active and ingenious officer the invention of war rockets; but as they had been previously employed in Europe, and were still employed in Asia, he could only reasonably claim the merit of having revived their use and perfected their construction, and that he most undoubtedly did."
Of the importance of war rockets, Sir W. Congreve had the very highest opinion. He preferred their employment with infantry as ground rockets, and pointed out the fearful effects of a shower of 1000 such rockets, ploughing up the ground as they ricocheted along, and never rising for the first 400 yards above the height of a man. He pointed out their peculiar applicability to mountain warfare, and the case with which they might be used by cavalry and in boats. He considered that they were superior to ordinary artillery, and even to shrapnel shells; both from the ease with which they could be transported and managed, and from the greater quantity of missiles which they could discharge in a given time. And, finally, he proposed to use them, not merely in defence, but also in the battery of attack for breaching, stating, that from his experiments, he was disposed to believe that rockets weighing from half a ton to a ton might be made and projected, and that such masses inclosed in cast-iron cases would, by their weight, penetrate into the revetment of a fortress, and by their subsequent explosion effectually destroy it.
Without however concurring in all the expectations of Sir W. Congreve, or undervaluing the objections which have been urged against rockets, many of which may certainly be removed by improved construction, it may be fairly urged that the time has arrived when more attention ought to be paid to the construction and improvement of this valuable description of artillery, which may assuredly be used in positions and under circumstances where no other could be applied.
For the projection of case shot and of all missiles which should possess a penetrative power as well as an explosive force, the rocket possesses an advantage in long distances over the howitzer shell, as its velocity and penetrative force then exceeds those of a shell. M. de Montgery gives the following table exhibiting the velocities and penetrative power of a howitzer shell, 6 inches in diameter, weighing 23 lb., and projected at an angle of 40°, with a velocity of 950 feet per second, as compared with a rocket 3½ inches in diameter, and weighing with its stick 42 lb. in French measure.
This Table, founded on calculation alone, can be only considered, in the present state of knowledge on the subject, of approximate value. It appears from it, that at 700 toises, or about 1400 yards, the velocities of the two projectiles are nearly the same, whilst the penetrative power of the rocket is more than three times greater than that of the shell, so that the rocket might be employed with great advantage in enfilading from great distances. When the distance is small the advantage is on the side of the shell, but at 800 yards the velocity and penetrative power are still quite sufficient to render heavy rockets most effective projectiles for any purpose; and with the knowledge that musketry will henceforth be effective at 600 yards, it is desirable that projectiles capable of fulfilling the functions of both musket and cannon should be brought into action at about that distance.
In Denmark, under the directions of the late Captain Schumacher, brother of the celebrated astronomer, numerous and careful experiments were made with rockets, and it appears that shells, grenades, and case shot were successfully projected in connection with these projectiles, and were deemed so effective that rockets became a part of the recognised armament of the gun boats, and were combined with guns and howitzers in the field artillery used for the defence of the coast of Zealand. It was from information given by Captain Schumacher to Captain Brulard that rockets were for a short time introduced into the French artillery, but they do not seem to have subsequently made much progress in that country. In Austria the manufacture of rockets has been carried to the highest perfection; and it has been considered so important that the government has formed a large establishment near Vienna, Raketendorff, for the express purpose both of making and trying rockets, four companies of artificers organized for this particular duty being regularly trained and exercised within a vast inclosure attached to the establishment, the greatest secrecy being observed, and the public rigorously excluded from the premises.
The experiments of Captain Brulard were made by order of Marshal Davoust, who would have doubtless introduced this projectile into the French artillery, had not the course of military events been changed by the downfall of Napoleon. Marmont, another high military authority, has also given the following opinions in favour of rockets:
"Every day the office of artillery in war is becoming more important, not merely on account of the augmentation of the number of guns, but also from their increased mobility, which enables them to enter into almost every military combination. There is, however, a limit to this mobility, and..." Artillery, the difficulty and expense of moving guns under some circumstances must operate materially to check their use in inordinate numbers. The maximum ought not, indeed, to be placed higher than 4 pieces of ordnance for 1000 men; but rockets form an artillery the possible development of which is so unlimited that they may well form a principal and distinct arm of the service. In fact, when it is remembered that the rocket generates within itself the propelling force, and requires no propellant machine, that it offers no tangible object to an enemy's fire, that it can be fired in any position, and under any circumstances, requiring neither platforms nor other preparation, and that it may be so multiplied as to cover the front of a single regiment with a shower of shot equivalent to the fire of 100 guns, it may be assumed that nothing could resist its destructive action, and that it would be ruinous to expose to its force troops drawn up in parallel lines on the field of battle. To adapt the infantry to the use of this missile, it should be divided into two sections, one provided with rockets and the other intended to act as a covering party, so that the infantry would become a kind of infantry-artillery. This new artillery would become more especially useful in all situations unfavourable to the use of guns, such as mountainous ground, the tops of buildings and churches, producing the effect of a powerful battery without trouble, and in an instant; and it is by its fire and extended use that an overpowering effect can alone be expected, as one or two rockets fired here and there would frighten more than hurt.
"In such considerations as these it is usual that everything should move on in a routine system, and modifications or improvements be so slowly arrived at that it may be long before the real power and value of Congreve rockets will be duly appreciated; but should an able general, endowed with foresight (for example a master-general of the ordnance), take up the subject in all its bearings, and quietly organize such a rocket establishment as will enable the arm to be applied in its fullest development on the field of battle, he will ensure for his countrymen success in succeeding conflicts, which must continue to be unequal until his enemy has adopted the same means of offence.
"I repeat that rockets are destined to effect a revolution in the art of war, and that success and glory will crown the efforts of him who has the genius first to comprehend and apply the advantages to be expected from them."
These observations of so able an officer deserve consideration, and the more so as the brilliant service of the rocket troop, under the gallant Captain Bogue, appears to have been the primary cause of that marked attention which has been subsequently paid to this arm by foreign governments. M. Montgomery, after pointing out the various objects which might be embraced in the use of rockets—and in doing so, he falls little, if at all, short of the expectations of Sir W. Congreve—combats the prejudices of his countrymen in the following terms:—"It is no longer a question as to the adoption of an arm of doubtful utility, as rockets have now been so much improved by the hands of foreigners, that they have acquired incontestibly an advantage over guns, carronades, howitzers, mortars, and ordinary projectiles, and it would be an extreme of fatuity not to make use of them. Great obstacles, however, are likely to be thrown in the way of their general introduction into our armies and fleets, as the soldiers and sailors likely to be consulted on such a subject are high in rank and grown old in a course of service where such projectiles were nearly unknown, and can scarcely be expected to abandon their prejudices against untried novelties, or to recommend their use." Let another result be hoped for the British army, and as Sir W. Congreve revived the use of the rocket in Europe, so let some other British artillery officer—and there are many of them possessed of scientific Artillery, knowledge sufficient to undertake the task—undertake the further improvement of so important a projectile, and place it in its proper rank in British artillery.
An examination of the following table of iron ordnance, will show, that a great advance has been made in one material element of improvement, namely, simplification; as the number of calibres has been diminished by the abandonment of the 66, 42, and 9 pounder iron guns. Including the 10-inch and 8-inch guns, the number of calibres has been thus reduced to 8, and the wants of the marine service met, by adopting a variation in length and width to suit the capabilities of vessels, rather than a variety of calibre. Many, however, of the pieces which still appear on the list may be considered experimental, and will be hereafter replaced by others so adjusted as to meet all contingencies, and yet considerably reduce the number. As a general principle, the rule already laid down should be adhered to, namely, that for long ranges, where great precision of fire is the main object, a long and heavy gun is necessary; and for short ranges, where rapidity of fire becomes indispensable, a short and lighter gun; and, consequently, that the same calibre should be represented in both long and short guns.
A simplification of a different kind has been proposed by Colonel Timmermans, in the artillery of defence, the object of which is to do away with the distinction of gun and howitzer, by the introduction of a gun-howitzer, the calibre being regulated in reference to the size of the shells. He thus proposes for the armament of a fortress six pieces, namely:
| Mortars of 29 centimetres, or 11½ in. calibre, and weighing 23 cwt. 64 lb. | 11 1/2 in. calibre, and weighing 23 cwt. 64 lb. | |-----------------------------|----------------------------------| | Light do. of 29 do. | 11½ in. | | Howitzers of 29 do. | 7½ in. | | Short do. of 20 do. | 7½ in. |
Gun-howitzers of 13½ centimetres, or 5½ in., being the calibre of an 18-pounder; and weighing 22 cwt. 66 lb., or about the same as an iron 18-pounder of 7 feet in length.
Mortar of 13½ centimetres, or 5½ in., and weighing 9 cwt. 77 lb.; this latter piece being about the calibre of the British cohorns, with the weight of a royal, or 4½ calibre mortar.
These are all bronze pieces, and would reduce the calibres to three, namely, 11½, 7½, 5½, but the system requires the test of experiment; and as it does not include the guns of attack, nor even those guns which would secure the long range necessary for early coast defence, it can only be looked upon as suggestive. In like manner, the Emperor of the French has proposed a gun-howitzer for the field, and General Lewis makes a suggestion in the same direction, when he remarks on one of the inconveniences of the howitzer construction—
"Difficulties," he says, "occur in siege batteries when the howitzer is used, in consequence of the muzzle not entering into the throat of the embrasure; the cheeks are then blown away, and the men exposed after a few rounds are fired. Two expedients might be adopted to remedy this inconvenience; either to provide for mounting the 8-inch howitzer on garrison carriages, or to lengthen the piece to 8 calibres, corresponding with the 68-pounder carronade; but this last plan would involve difficulties in building a travelling carriage of sufficient strength."
The lightness, also, of Colonel Timmermans' guns would produce a very powerful action on the carriages, and lead to an excessive recoil, when fired with tolerable charges; but this evil he proposes to diminish, by using a less rapidly igniting powder; and it may be observed that it does not enter into his scheme to fire with charges exceeding from ¼th to ⅓th, or to attain initial velocities beyond 1300 feet for the solid shot of his 7½ gun-howitzer, or 1381 feet for his 5½ gun-howitzer; the principle he advocates being great momentum rather than great velocity.
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1 Histoire des Fusées de Guerre, 1841. 2 Aide Memoire. ### Table of Iron Ordnance—1853
| Nature of Ordnance | Calibre or weight | Servicable length | Length in inches | Feet & Inches | Number of Calibres | Weight in tons | Calibre in inches | Length in feet & inches | Number of Calibres | Weight in tons | |-------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------------| | Guns, Iron | 10-inch | Sea | 10 ft. | 120 | 100 | 9 | 9.4 | 110 | 10 | 9.4 | 110 | | Do. | 8-inch | Sea & Land | 8 ft. | 96 | 84 | 7 | 7.4 | 104 | 8 | 7.4 | 104 | | Do. | 6-pr. | Do. | 6 ft. | 72 | 60 | 5 | 5.4 | 96 | 6 | 5.4 | 96 | | Do. | 5-pr. | Do. | 5 ft. | 60 | 50 | 4 | 4.4 | 84 | 5 | 4.4 | 84 | | Do. | 4-pr. | Do. | 4 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 72 | 4 | 3.4 | 72 | | Do. | 3-pr. | Do. | 3 ft. | 36 | 30 | 2 | 2.4 | 60 | 3 | 2.4 | 60 | | Do. | 2-pr. | Do. | 2 ft. | 24 | 20 | 1 | 1.4 | 48 | 2 | 1.4 | 48 | | Do. | 1-pr. | Do. | 1 ft. | 12 | 10 | - | - | 24 | 1 | - | 24 | | Do. | 8-inch | Sea | 8 ft. | 80 | 64 | 5 | 5.4 | 72 | 8 | 5.4 | 72 | | Do. | 6-inch | Sea | 6 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 36 | 6 | 3.4 | 36 | | Do. | 4-inch | Sea | 4 ft. | 24 | 20 | 2 | 2.4 | 24 | 4 | 2.4 | 24 | | Do. | 2-inch | Sea | 2 ft. | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 12 | 2 | 1.4 | 12 | | Do. | 1-inch | Sea | 1 ft. | 6 | 5 | - | - | 6 | 1 | - | 6 | | Do. | 8-inch | Land | 8 ft. | 80 | 64 | 5 | 5.4 | 72 | 8 | 5.4 | 72 | | Do. | 6-inch | Land | 6 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 36 | 6 | 3.4 | 36 | | Do. | 4-inch | Land | 4 ft. | 24 | 20 | 2 | 2.4 | 24 | 4 | 2.4 | 24 | | Do. | 2-inch | Land | 2 ft. | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 12 | 2 | 1.4 | 12 | | Do. | 1-inch | Land | 1 ft. | 6 | 5 | - | - | 6 | 1 | - | 6 |
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**Weight of Iron Ordnance—1853**
| Nature of Ordnance | Calibre or weight | Servicable length | Length in inches | Feet & Inches | Number of Calibres | Weight in tons | Calibre in inches | Length in feet & inches | Number of Calibres | Weight in tons | |-------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------------| | Guns, Iron | 10-inch | Sea | 10 ft. | 120 | 100 | 9 | 9.4 | 110 | 10 | 9.4 | 110 | | Do. | 8-inch | Sea & Land | 8 ft. | 96 | 84 | 7 | 7.4 | 104 | 8 | 7.4 | 104 | | Do. | 6-pr. | Do. | 6 ft. | 60 | 50 | 4 | 4.4 | 84 | 6 | 4.4 | 84 | | Do. | 5-pr. | Do. | 5 ft. | 50 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 72 | 5 | 3.4 | 72 | | Do. | 4-pr. | Do. | 4 ft. | 40 | 30 | 2 | 2.4 | 60 | 4 | 2.4 | 60 | | Do. | 3-pr. | Do. | 3 ft. | 30 | 24 | 1 | 1.4 | 48 | 3 | 1.4 | 48 | | Do. | 2-pr. | Do. | 2 ft. | 20 | 16 | 1 | 1.4 | 48 | 2 | 1.4 | 48 | | Do. | 1-pr. | Do. | 1 ft. | 10 | 8 | - | - | 24 | 1 | - | 24 | | Do. | 8-inch | Sea | 8 ft. | 80 | 64 | 5 | 5.4 | 72 | 8 | 5.4 | 72 | | Do. | 6-inch | Sea | 6 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 36 | 6 | 3.4 | 36 | | Do. | 4-inch | Sea | 4 ft. | 24 | 20 | 2 | 2.4 | 24 | 4 | 2.4 | 24 | | Do. | 2-inch | Sea | 2 ft. | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 12 | 2 | 1.4 | 12 | | Do. | 1-inch | Sea | 1 ft. | 6 | 5 | - | - | 6 | 1 | - | 6 | | Do. | 8-inch | Land | 8 ft. | 80 | 64 | 5 | 5.4 | 72 | 8 | 5.4 | 72 | | Do. | 6-inch | Land | 6 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 36 | 6 | 3.4 | 36 | | Do. | 4-inch | Land | 4 ft. | 24 | 20 | 2 | 2.4 | 24 | 4 | 2.4 | 24 | | Do. | 2-inch | Land | 2 ft. | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 12 | 2 | 1.4 | 12 | | Do. | 1-inch | Land | 1 ft. | 6 | 5 | - | - | 6 | 1 | - | 6 |
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**Weight of Iron Ordnance—1853**
| Nature of Ordnance | Calibre or weight | Servicable length | Length in inches | Feet & Inches | Number of Calibres | Weight in tons | Calibre in inches | Length in feet & inches | Number of Calibres | Weight in tons | |-------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------------| | Guns, Iron | 10-inch | Sea | 10 ft. | 120 | 100 | 9 | 9.4 | 110 | 10 | 9.4 | 110 | | Do. | 8-inch | Sea & Land | 8 ft. | 96 | 84 | 7 | 7.4 | 104 | 8 | 7.4 | 104 | | Do. | 6-pr. | Do. | 6 ft. | 60 | 50 | 4 | 4.4 | 84 | 6 | 4.4 | 84 | | Do. | 5-pr. | Do. | 5 ft. | 50 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 72 | 5 | 3.4 | 72 | | Do. | 4-pr. | Do. | 4 ft. | 40 | 30 | 2 | 2.4 | 60 | 4 | 2.4 | 60 | | Do. | 3-pr. | Do. | 3 ft. | 30 | 24 | 1 | 1.4 | 48 | 3 | 1.4 | 48 | | Do. | 2-pr. | Do. | 2 ft. | 20 | 16 | 1 | 1.4 | 48 | 2 | 1.4 | 48 | | Do. | 1-pr. | Do. | 1 ft. | 10 | 8 | - | - | 24 | 1 | - | 24 | | Do. | 8-inch | Sea | 8 ft. | 80 | 64 | 5 | 5.4 | 72 | 8 | 5.4 | 72 | | Do. | 6-inch | Sea | 6 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 36 | 6 | 3.4 | 36 | | Do. | 4-inch | Sea | 4 ft. | 24 | 20 | 2 | 2.4 | 24 | 4 | 2.4 | 24 | | Do. | 2-inch | Sea | 2 ft. | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 12 | 2 | 1.4 | 12 | | Do. | 1-inch | Sea | 1 ft. | 6 | 5 | - | - | 6 | 1 | - | 6 | | Do. | 8-inch | Land | 8 ft. | 80 | 64 | 5 | 5.4 | 72 | 8 | 5.4 | 72 | | Do. | 6-inch | Land | 6 ft. | 48 | 40 | 3 | 3.4 | 36 | 6 | 3.4 | 36 | | Do. | 4-inch | Land | 4 ft. | 24 | 20 | 2 | 2.4 | 24 | 4 | 2.4 | 24 | | Do. | 2-inch | Land | 2 ft. | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 12 | 2 | 1.4 | 12 | | Do. | 1-inch | Land | 1 ft. | 6 | 5 | - | - | 6 | 1 | - | 6 | The improvement of the projectiles used is the next object of importance. The use of solid shot cannot be dispensed with, even when the action of artillery is directed against infantry, as the moral effect of its ravages is very great upon the soldier. Many modes, therefore, of increasing the precision of fire with such projectiles have been proposed, such as rifling the guns, covering the balls with lead or combining that metal with the iron in some other way so as to facilitate the rifling process, oval balls, &c.; and experiments are still in progress for the same purpose. But allowing every possible weight to the effects of solid shot, the shrapnel shell appears to be the most important and destructive projectile which has hitherto been invented for the purposes of war, as it combines the action of small shot with the extensive range of a cannon-ball or shell; and in the larger calibres, the moral effect of the cannon-ball might be secured in combination with its wide-spread action, by such a modification of the shell as would allow the use of large iron balls as in common case. At present, the effect of such projectiles may be understood from a consideration of the number of balls projected in each shell; thus—68-pounder, and 8-inch gun or howitzer, 377; 32-pounder, 204; 24-pounder, 128; 18-pounder, 90; 12-pounder, 63; 6-pounder, 27. One difficulty, however, attends the use of the shrapnel hitherto constructed; namely, the frequent ignition of the bursting powder, from the heat generated by friction between the balls; and the necessity, therefore, of using a diminished charge, with a corresponding loss in the extent of range. This evil it has been attempted to remedy by placing the powder in the centre of the balls; but the result of this arrangement is, that the balls receive an impulse from the bursting powder which may deflect them from their course, or even stop their further progress by neutralizing their remaining velocity. The most natural mode would appear to be a separation of the powder from the balls; a plan which was suggested about four years ago by Captain Boxer, R.A., but not then adopted by the artillery committee, who considered that a reduced charge was the simplest mode of lessening the chance of premature explosion, and did not, at that time, appear to think a great range so essential as it manifestly is. On the continent this plan has also been proposed; and the indefatigable inventor of it in this country has, by perseverance and skill, at length produced a shrapnel shell which may be fired with any amount of charge, and will be effective at any range. By its construction this shell will admit of the use of at least 1-lb. iron balls, and, as it may be fired even from mortars, the vertical fire of Carnot will no longer be an illusion, but will realize in its destructive effects the expectations of that author.
A shell, it will be observed, depends, as to the time of bursting, on the length of the fuse attached to it. The fuse is a short wooden pipe, somewhat like the wooden tap of a beer-barrel, being cylindrical within and slightly conical without; it is filled with a peculiar composition, and being driven or fixed into the fuse-hole of the shell, the priming ignites when the gun is fired, and on the composition burning through, the flame is communicated to the bursting powder within the shell, which then explodes. The time of bursting, therefore, depending on the length of fuse to be burnt, used to be regulated either by cutting the fuse to the required length in the field, or by boring out a portion of the composition; but these very rude systems will now be replaced by the simple but excellent fuse called Boxer's fuse, being another invention of that able and scientific officer. The beauty and simplicity of Captain Boxer's improvement of the fuse will be readily understood from the annexed woodcuts, the first of which represents the common shrapnel fuse, in which the time of burning has to be regulated by boring out a portion of the composition from the bottom of the fuse, and thus reducing the quantity to be burnt, and therefore the time of burning; the second, Boxer's fuse, in which a communication is made between the burning fuse composition and the bursting powder through the auxiliary tube e, by boring through the intervening side of the fuse (which is very easily done) at the proper opening f, corresponding to the required range, and marked on the external covering of the fuse. In this latter arrangement there can be no mistake, no chance of boring too much or too little, and no necessity of wasting time in guessing the quantity.
Combining the improvement of the shrapnel shell and the improvement of the fuse, it may be reasonably expected that bursting in the gun or just beyond the muzzle, bursting at uncertain distances, and blind shells or shells bursting not at all, will cease to be the ordinary accidents of artillery practice.
On referring to the table of brass or bronze ordnance, it will be observed that the number of pieces is still considerable, being at least 12, and indeed sometimes reckoned as 13, whilst the number of calibres is 9, or may be reduced to 7 by classing together those of which the difference is small, and which may therefore be considered applicable for the propulsion of the same projectiles, with different degrees of windage. Such an arrangement renders it necessary to class together guns and howitzers of different calibre in the same battery, a system which, though now unavoidable, must be considered defective; the 24-pounder howitzer being classed with the 9-pounder in the field batteries, the 12-pounder howitzer with the 6-pounder in the horse or cavalry batteries, and the 32-pounder howitzer with the 12-pounder in batteries of position, so that the ammunition, case-shot, &c., of one cannot be used with the other. The present Emperor of the French has, indeed, in reference to these defects, proposed the adoption of a 12-pounder howitzer-gun as the single calibre to be used in the field; the weight being 11 cwt. 18 lb., or 2 cwt. 38 lb. less than the weight of the British 9-pounder. This howitzer-gun, mounted on the carriage of a French 8-pounder, corresponding nearly to a 9-pounder English, would, on account of its lightness, require to be fired. Artillery, with a charge of one-fourth instead of one-third. The simplification thus effected would indeed be very important; but those who are well acquainted with the destructive effects on the carriage of firing from light guns, will at least require very careful preliminary experiments. As yet, in the British service, such experiments have not been considered favourable to the use of guns of diminished weight; but it may be possible that a howitzer-gun in weight between the 9-pounder and 12-pounder, and of the calibre of the 12-pounder, would be found efficient, with a reduced charge, for any service or range required in the field, or in movements of combined infantry and artillery.
Table of Brass or Bronze Ordnance.—1853.
| Nature of ordnance | Calibre, or weight of shot | Service designed for | Length | Nature and Weight of Projectiles | Carriages | Total weight carried by the Field. | |-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|--------|---------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------| | Gun | 12-pr. (medium) | Land | 6 ft. 6 in. | 17 cwt. 42 lb. | 6 cwt. 25 lb. | 13 cwt. 4 lb. | 12 cwt. 14 lb. | 10 cwt. 13 lb. | 8 cwt. 13 lb. | 44 cwt. 17 lb. | 36 cwt. 37 lb. | 30 cwt. 43 lb. | 128 cwt. 97 lb. | | Do. | 6-pr. | Land | 6 ft. 0 in. | 17 cwt. 42 lb. | 6 cwt. 3 lb. | 13 cwt. 3 lb. | 9 cwt. 2 lb. | 8 cwt. 1 lb. | 5 cwt. 7 lb. | 38 cwt. 34 lb. | 29 cwt. 71 lb. | 116 cwt. 13 lb. | | Do. | 6-pr. (light) | Land | 5 ft. 0 in. | 16 cwt. 37 lb. | 4 cwt. 9 lb. | 6 cwt. 8 lb. | 6 cwt. 0 lb. | 5 cwt. 7 lb. | 3 cwt. 2 lb. | 28 cwt. 23 lb. | 33 cwt. 92 lb. | 25 cwt. 82 lb. | 94 cwt. 85 lb. | | Do. | 3-pr. | Land | 4 ft. 0 in. | 16 cwt. 29 lb. | 3 cwt. 10 lb. | 6 cwt. 8 lb. | 6 cwt. 0 lb. | 5 cwt. 7 lb. | 3 cwt. 2 lb. | 26 cwt. 71 lb. | 30 cwt. 33 lb. | 24 cwt. 85 lb. | 84 cwt. 97 lb. | | Do. | 3-pr. | Land | 3 ft. 0 in. | 12 cwt. 29 lb. | 2 cwt. 10 lb. | 4 cwt. 6 lb. | 4 cwt. 0 lb. | 3 cwt. 2 lb. | 2 cwt. 1 lb. | 22 cwt. 55 lb. | 31 cwt. 62 lb. | 21 cwt. 63 lb. | | Do. | 1-pr. (mountain) | Land | 5 ft. 0 in. | 29 cwt. 40 lb. | 2 cwt. 6 lb. | 4 cwt. 0 lb. | 4 cwt. 0 lb. | 3 cwt. 2 lb. | 2 cwt. 1 lb. | 21 cwt. 63 lb. | 31 cwt. 31 lb. | 13 cwt. 31 lb. | | Howitzer | 24-pr. | Land | 5 ft. 3 in. | 10 cwt. 63 lb. | 5 cwt. 12 lb. | 17 cwt. 3 lb. | 14 cwt. 10 lb. | 9 cwt. 21 lb. | 4 cwt. 9 lb. | 39 cwt. 39 lb. | 35 cwt. 48 lb. | 27 cwt. 31 lb. | | Do. | 24-pr. | Land | 5 ft. 0 in. | 10 cwt. 57 lb. | 4 cwt. 7 lb. | 12 cwt. 2 lb. | 11 cwt. 9 lb. | 10 cwt. 13 lb. | 8 cwt. 13 lb. | 29 cwt. 17 lb. | 31 cwt. 69 lb. | 27 cwt. 30 lb. | | Do. | 12-pr. | Land | 3 ft. 2 in. | 10 cwt. 48 lb. | 3 cwt. 5 lb. | 6 cwt. 1 lb. | 6 cwt. 0 lb. | 5 cwt. 5 lb. | 3 cwt. 2 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. | 31 cwt. 75 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. | | Do. | 4½-inch | Land | 1 ft. 10 in.| 4 cwt. 32 lb. | 1 cwt. 4 lb. | 2 cwt. 0 lb. | 2 cwt. 0 lb. | 1 cwt. 8 lb. | 1 cwt. 1 lb. | Bed alone. | 29 cwt. 93 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. | | Mortar, royal | 5½-inch | Land | 1 ft. 3 in. | 26 cwt. 62 lb. | 0 cwt. 11 lb. | 14 cwt. 7 lb. | 14 cwt. 10 lb. | 16 cwt. 94 lb. | 1 cwt. 10 lb. | 29 cwt. 93 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. | | Do., cehorn | 4½-inch | Land | 1 ft. 0 in.| 26 cwt. 43 lb. | 0 cwt. 10 lb. | 1 cwt. 5 lb. | 1 cwt. 7 lb. | 8 cwt. 13 lb. | 0 cwt. 89 lb. | 29 cwt. 93 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. | 22 cwt. 93 lb. |
In a preceding paragraph, the necessity of securing artillery from the effects of the fire at long ranges of the improved musket, by causing the guns to co-operate with riflemen, or with troops armed with this musket, has been strongly urged; and whilst in the press, the system of manoeuvring artillery and infantry together, making the infantry the adjunct of the artillery, and not as heretofore the artillery the adjunct of the infantry, has been tried on a large scale at Vincennes; batteries having been thus formed in combined squares with the infantry, so that the latter could at once support the artillery and be supported by it. Such an experiment is an argument for securing an amount of speed or facility of movement equal to the most rapid movements of infantry, but not for going beyond that speed at the sacrifice of weight of metal; and it is equally an argument for obtaining a large calibre for the efficient use of spherical case. These conditions would probably be satisfied by a gun intermediate between the 9 and 12 pounder; as, for example, an 11-pounder, the calibre of which would be 4½ inches, therefore but little less than the calibre of a 12-pounder or a 10-pounder, the calibre of which would be about 4¾ inches. Before closing these remarks, it may be well to reiterate the principles which have been already laid down as a guide in every attempt to improve field artillery; namely, 1st, that in the field or infantry batteries, the highest calibre consistent with a moderate degree of mobility; and, 2nd, that in horse or cavalry artillery, the greatest speed consistent with a reasonable calibre—should be the objects sought for. All attempts to confound these principles together, will only lead to imperfect designs and ultimate failures in the field of actual service. It has, for example, been again proposed to replace the 6-pounder as a gun for the horse artillery by the 9-pounder; but the propriety of such an arrangement is at least very doubtful, as may be judged from the following considerations:—The weight of the 6-pounder with its limber, ammunition, and stores, is 28 cwt. 23 lb.; and that of the 9-pounder, 38 cwt. 65 lbs., being 10 cwt. 42 lbs. more than the 6-pounder; or, as the weight of the two men carried on the limber will be common to both, the aggregate weights may be stated at 31 cwt. 23 lbs. and 41 cwt. 65 lbs.; the 9-pounder, therefore, exceeding the 6-pounder by about one-third of the whole weight of the former. At first sight it may be supposed that the addition of two horses (the number becoming six) will more than counterbalance this increase of weight, the power being in fact augmented by one-half instead of one-third; and unquestionably, on moderately level ground such as the common at Woolwich it would do so; but results of this kind are delusive when applied to other circumstances. Over rough ground the shocks to the carriage would be greatly increased by the additional weight, and in bad roads would so add to the strain on the horses that speed would often be impracticable. In passing over, also, such ground as must be frequently embraced by military operations, the traction will often fail entirely on the four rear horses, and sometimes even on the last two; and in such cases what must be the result of the increase of weight! Nor is this all, as the more the number of horses is increased, the more must the chances of being crippled by the loss of one or more horses be increased also; and it would, therefore, be better, were it possible to do so, to diminish the number of horses actually attached to the gun, and to keep more in reserve. In the ammunition waggons, also, that of the 9-pounder exceeds by about 5 cwt. that of the 6-pounder; and finally, it may be observed, that though an increase in the number of horses may under some circumstances keep up the required speed with a heavier gun; as a general rule, it will be found that the same analogy exists between the heavy and light gun as between the heavy and light coach, and that additional weight will therefore be moved either with a less velocity, or at the expense of frequent injury and destruction of both carriages and horses.
It is hoped that the perusal of this essay, though addressed rather to the general reader than to the more trained artillerist, will leave an impression on the mind of the great national importance of the arm of the service to which it relates, and of the necessity, as so strongly urged by one of its able members, Lieut. Jervis, in his work on Tactics, of establishing the training of its officers and men on a sound scientific basis. In all nations this has been felt, and schools of artillery and engineering have been established for the purpose of such training; a task confided in this country to the Royal Military Academy at Wool- Artillery was formerly applied in a collective sense to all kinds of offensive weapons; but this use of the word is now generally restricted to poetry.—See 1 Samuel xx. 40.
Artillery Park. This term, introduced into military science, has been derived from the French verb parquer, to separate from others, and keep together in an inclosure. The great number and variety of carriages, horses, and stores of all kinds which must be connected with the equipment of artillery, render it necessary that they should be kept together, and not confusedly mixed up either with the troops or with the stores of other arms of the service; and this expressive term, therefore, at once states a fact, and explains the reason of it. Following up the analogy with a park for cattle or for deer, the artillery park has been sometimes inclosed with a rope-fence; and when in a dangerous position, not entirely free from the chance of surprise or of attack from cavalry, by a row of waggons united together by their drag-chains, or indeed by any other description of protective fence. In a large army the greater proportion of the ammunition and stores, the pontoon establishment, and even the artillery of reserve, may be best brought together in one large depot or park, called the grand park, which should be located in the vicinity of proper roads, and so placed as to be protected on all sides from attack; its natural position is therefore either between the main body of the army and the reserve, or in the reserve itself. From this locality the artillery of reserve, or the pontoons, can be despatched to the division or divisions selected for any forward movement. If the army be of such magnitude as to include several aggregates of divisions, or corps d'armée, the grand park will be located in the rear, so as to minister to the wants of all; and a park of reserve will be formed with each. This park will be located with the reserve of the corps it accompanies, and should comprise a considerable body of reserve artillery, in addition to reserves of every description from the artillery of each separate division. A complete veterinary establishment and a pontoon train should be connected with it, and an ample establishment of artificers. In the grand park, and in parks of reserve, should the army continue stationary for any length of time, every care should be taken to secure the horses from the weather, and a proper infirmary established to receive sick horses from the divisions, or from the corps in advance.
In respect to the divisions of the army, each should be accompanied by two complete field batteries, and at least half a horse battery, provided the division be constituted of 10 battalions of 800 men each, and is supported in its independent movement by a due proportion of cavalry. If not acting independently, the division of infantry will have the two batteries, and the division of cavalry at least one battery. But in addition to the batteries acting in the field with the infantry, there ought to be artillery of reserve with each division. The French system was to divide their artillery into three sections, viz., the guns of the advanced guard, composed of 4-pounders (4½ English); the guns of the field of battle, composed of 8-pounders (8½ English); and guns of reserve, 12-pounders (13 pounders English); and as in the English service the light 6-pounder of the horse artillery may be considered a representative of the French 4, it may be supposed that the horse artillery, supported by cavalry, will move with the advance, and that the 12-pounder will act with the reserve. On this supposition, if two 12-pounders were added to each field battery, making the total number eight, as suggested under the article Artillery, a field battery would consist of four 9-pounders, two 24-pounder howitzers, and two 12-pounders, of which the two 12-pounders ought to be in the divisional park of reserve. This park, placed sufficiently in rear of the division not to be incumbered by the enemy's fire, will contain not only the two reserve 12-pounders of each battery, or four 12-pounders in all, but also the spare ammunition waggons, spare carriages... Artillery and wheels, &c., the forge-cart of each battery, spare horses, and the pontoon train if the division be expected to move forward independently. In the artillery parks of reserve of each denomination the spare ammunition for the infantry should also be lodged; and, for the regulation of all the proceedings connected with the care and issue of such various stores and ammunition, the park is presided over by a regular staff, and should be provided with storekeepers, artificers, and labourers, in each separate department.
It will be observed, that the pontoon train is here supposed to be attached to the artillery as it is in the French army; in the British service it is attached to the engineer department, but the propriety of this latter arrangement is at least doubtful, for although every engineer officer, and every sapper and miner, should be well trained in the construction of pontoons, as well as of all other temporary or service bridges, it is manifest that the transport and care of the pontoons may be best confided to the artillery. In fact, it is very desirable that the pontoons should be put upon a proper footing as to horses and conductors; and that the horses and men connected with them should have been trained to guns, so that on an emergency both men and horses might take their places with the guns, and thus postpone as long as possible any diminution in the efficiency of that most important arm of the service. The pontoon horses could at any time be replaced by ordinary draught horses, but not so the artillery horses in the field. The engineer officer and the sapper and miner might still direct and assist in the construction of bridges, but the gunners and drivers attached to the pontoons should be men fully acquainted with all the details of every operation connected with it, from practical experience gained in the repository course.
The field-park or encampment is the last to be considered, and this should conform to the following general principles of encamping:
1. The different regiments or corps are encamped in the same order as they are intended to fight, whether in the centre or the flanks, the first or second line.
2. The front of the encampment of each regiment or corps should occupy the space which it will require in battle; or, in other words, the line of tents of all the regiments or corps should cover the line of battle, so that on any necessity or alarm, whether by night or day, the troops, when forming in front of their tents, may find themselves in their proper places in the line of battle.
Now, as the relative positions in the field of battle of the troops of different arms must depend on the distinctive peculiarities of the ground to be occupied, the sites of the parks of artillery can only be determined after a careful examination or reconnaissance of that ground; but as a rule to be rigidly observed, it should be stated that artillery should never depend for its protection against surprise on its own men, and therefore should not be placed on the extreme flank. In ordinary ground, the battery or batteries attached to a division, with one ammunition waggon to each gun (the remaining waggons being sent to the park of reserve), should take up their position in rear of the division, each being opposite the interval between two brigades, so that the guns may be moved to the front at a moment's warning.
Several systems of parking have been adopted—1st, Parking to the rear or behind the guns: thus, guns at full distance, as in action, in front row; ammunition-waggons in second; horses picketed in the third; tents, one to each subdivision, in the fourth; tents of subaltern officers in the fifth; and captain's tent in the rear. 2d, Parking to the flanks: guns at half distance in front; horses for the guns picketed in the second row; waggons in the third, and horses for them in the fourth row,—the subdivision and other tents being placed on the flanks in files from front to rear. 3d, Parking to the front and flank, as sometimes practised in the French army, when the tents of the gunners are pitched in front of the guns, so that the men form a guard to the guns, and the tents of the drivers on the flanks. Again, the horses have sometimes been picketed on the flanks; but, generally speaking, all other systems may be considered modifications of the above. In the park of reserve the same rules should be followed, though occasional modification, as to a greater or lesser frontage, may be allowed, provided a due regularity in the classification of stores be preserved.
Between the brigades, or halves of brigades, an interval of about 110 or 120 yards should be preserved, as the proper per-cent for a six-gun battery; and, if possible, the battery should be covered on its flank by at least half a brigade.
(J.E.P.)
ARTILLERY Train, a certain number of pieces of ordnance mounted on carriages, with all their furniture fit for marching.