They became divided into two factions; one of which was headed by Cleisthenes, chief of the Alcmaeonidae; and the other by Isagoras, a man of quality, and highly in favour with the Athenian eunuchs or nobility. Cleisthenes cultivated the people, and endeavoured to gain their affection by increasing as much as possible their power; whilst Isagoras perceiving that the popular arts of his rival would secure him an ascendancy, applied to the Lacedaemonians for assistance; at the same time reviving the old story of Megacles's sacrilege, and insisting that Cleisthenes ought to be banished as being of that person's family. Cleomenes king of Sparta readily entered into his schemes, and suddenly Cleisthenes, probably dreading the old outcry against his family, withdrew from Athens; and when Cleomenes had entered Athens at the head of an army, the people, being without a leader, were so dismayed, that they allowed the Spartan king to act as if he were absolute master. On arriving at Athens, he condemned to banishment seven hundred families, in addition to those previously sent into exile. And, not content with this, he would have dissolved the senate, and vested the government in the heads of the faction of Isagoras; but happily the Athenians were not yet degraded enough to submit to such humiliation. Taking up arms, they drove the Spartan troops into the citadel, where, after sustaining a short siege, Cleomenes surrendered, on condition that Isagoras should depart unmolested with Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonian troops; but their adherents were left to the mercy of the people, and put to death. Cleisthenes and the 700 exiled families then returned to Athens in triumph. This happened in 508 B.C.

The Spartan king, however, had no sooner withdrawn from Athens, than he formed a strong combination in favour of Isagoras; having engaged the Boeotians to attack Attica on the one side, and the Chalcidians on the other, whilst he at the head of a powerful Spartan army entered the territory of Eleusis. But this powerful confederacy was quickly dissolved. The Corinthians, who had joined Cleomenes, doubting the justice of their cause, returned home; the rest of his allies likewise began to waver; and his colleague Demaratus, the other king of Sparta, differing in opinion with Cleomenes, the latter was obliged to abandon the enterprise. The Spartans and their allies having withdrawn, the Athenians quickly routed the Boeotians and Chalcidians, and carried off a great number of prisoners, who were afterwards set at liberty on paying a ransom of two minae a head. The Boeotians, on the other hand, immediately vowed revenge, and engaging on their side the people of Eginia, who had a hereditary hatred to the Athenians, the Eginetans landed a considerable army, and ravaged the coasts of Attica while the Athenians were occupied with the Boeotian war.

In the meanwhile Cleomenes, exasperated by his unsuccessful expedition against Attica, and anxious for an opportunity of effacing the remembrance of his defeat, produced at Sparta certain pretended oracles which he alleged he had found in the citadel of Athens while he was besieged therein, the purport of which was, that Athens would soon become a rival of Sparta. At the same time it was discovered that Cleisthenes had bribed the priestess of Apollo to cause the Lacedaemonians to expel the Peisistratidae from Athens; which was sacrificing their best friends to those whom interest necessarily rendered their enemies. This pitiful jugglery had such an effect, that the Spartans, repenting their folly in expelling Hippias, sent for him from Sigeum, in order to restore him to his principality; but the other states refusing to countenance the projected restoration, the Spartans were forced to abandon the enterprise, and Hippias returned to Sigeum to digest his disappointment.

About this period Aristagoras the Milesian, having stirred up a revolt in Ionia against the Persian king, applied to the war-Spartans for assistance; but the Spartan king either felt no sympathy with the Greeks in Asia, who had been subjected by the Persians, or because the bribes offered by Aristagoras were not large enough, declined to have anything to do with the matter. Aristagoras then proceeded to Athens, where he found willing hearers. The Athenians regarding it as a religious duty to assist their kinsmen and colonists, passed a decree to send a squadron of twenty ships to support them, under the command of Melanthus, a nobleman universally esteemed.1 This rash action cost the Greeks very dear; for no sooner did the king of Persia hear of the assistance sent from Athens to his rebellious subjects, than he declared himself the sworn enemy of that city, and solemnly besought the deity that he might one day have it in his power to be revenged on them. But besides the displeasure which Darius had conceived against the Athenians on account of the assistance they had afforded the Ionians, he was further encouraged, by the intrigues of the ex-tyrant Hippias, to undertake an expedition against Greece. Immediately on his return from Lacedaemon, as above related, Hippias passed over into Asia; proceeded to Artaphernes, governor of the adjacent provinces belonging to the Persian king; and excited him to make war upon his country, promising to do homage to the Persian monarch provided he was restored to the principality of Athens. Apprised of this step on the part of their late tyrant, the Athenians sent ambassadors to Artaphernes, desiring permission to enjoy their liberty in peace. But the Persians returned for answer, that if they would have peace with the Great King, they must immediately consent to receive Hippias; and as the Athenians were by no means disposed to purchase the forbearance of the Persian monarch at the price of compliance, they resolved to assist his enemies by every means in their power. This resolution being made known to Darius, he commissioned Mardonius to avenge him of the insults which he thought the Greeks had offered him; but that commander having met with a storm at sea and other accidents, which rendered him unable to do anything, Datis and Artaphernes (the son of the Artaphernes above mentioned) were commissioned to chastise Grecian insolence and presumption.

War being thus declared, the Persian commanders, fearing again to attempt doubling the promontory of Athos, where invade their fleet had formerly suffered, drew their forces into the plains of Cilicia, and passing thence, through the Cyclades to Euboea, directed their course towards Athens. Their instructions were to destroy both Eretria and Athens, and to bring away the people. The first attempt was made on Eretria; and on the approach of the Persian fleet the inhabitants sent to Athens to apply for assistance. Nor did they sue in vain. With a magnanimity almost unparalleled, considering the crisis, the Athenians sent 4000 men to their aid; but unhappily the Eretrians were so greatly divided in opinion, that, though the danger was urgent, nothing could be resolved on. One party was for receiving the Athenian succours into the city; another declared for abandoning the city and retiring into the mountains of Euboea; whilst a third was base enough to seek to betray their country to the Persians. Matters being in this hopeless state, the Athenian commanders withdrew the auxiliary force, and retiring by Oropus, escaped the destruction with which they were threatened; whilst Eretria, betrayed into the hands of the Persians, was pillaged and burned, and its inhabitants sold

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1 Herodotus, v. 37, 38, 75, 97, 98, 99. Charon Lampasceenus apud Plutarch. Mor. p. 881; Fasti Helladici, p. 20. Aristagoras was slain in Thrace, n.e. 497. for slaves; a fate which their cowardice and treachery richly merited.

On the tidings of this disaster the Athenians immediately drew together such forces as they could muster, amounting in all to about 10,000 men; and these, with 1000 Platæans who afterwards joined them, were commanded by ten general officers, with equal power, amongst whom were the illustrious names of Miltiades, Aristides, and Themistocles, men distinguished alike for their valour, their conduct, their patriotism, and their virtue. But it being generally thought that so small a body of troops would be unable to resist the formidable power of the Persians, a messenger was despatched to Sparta to entreat the immediate assistance of that state. He communicated his business to the senate in the following terms:—“Men of Lacedemon,” said he, “the Athenians desire you to assist them, and not to suffer the most ancient of all the Grecian cities to be enslaved by the barbarians. Eretria is already destroyed, and Greece consequently weakened by the loss of so considerable a place.” The assistance was readily granted; but the promised succours arrived too late for the occasion which required them; and, happily for their own glory, the Athenians were obliged to fight without waiting for their arrival. In the memorable engagement on the plains of Marathon, whither Hippias had conducted the Persian host, the latter were defeated with great loss by the Athenian infantry, under the command of Miltiades, and driven to their ships, 490 B.C. They then endeavoured to double Cape Sunium (Colonna), in order to surprise Athens before the army could return. But in this they were prevented by Miltiades, who, leaving Aristides with 1000 men to guard the prisoners, returned so expeditiously with the main body, that he reached the temple of Hercules before the barbarians had time to commence a serious attack on the city. In the meanwhile the virtuous Aristides discharged the trust reposed in him with the strictest integrity. Though there was much gold and silver in the Persian camp, and the tents and ships they had taken were filled with all manner of riches, he not only forbore taking anything for his own use, but exerted himself to the utmost in order to prevent others from appropriating the spoils of the enemy, which were religiously reserved for the public service of the state.

After the victory of Marathon, the inhabitants of Platæa were declared free citizens of Athens, and Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides were treated with all possible marks of admiration and respect. Miltiades having now reached the highest pitch of power, demanded of the Athenians a fleet of seventy ships, with which he promised to increase their empire, and the people granted his request without even knowing what expedition he wished to undertake. He first attacked Paros, where he had to avenge some private wrong, but being thwarted by the Persians, and having received a dangerous wound in his knee, he returned to Athens without having accomplished the object for which he had induced the people to fit out the fleet. The ill-feeling thus created led some person of high standing to bring an accusation against him for having deceived the people. He was sentenced to pay a fine of 50 talents, and being unable to pay, he was thrown into prison, in which he soon after died of his wounds. This termination of the career of Miltiades has often been referred to as a proof of the ingratitude of the Athenians. But it must not be forgotten that he had really deceived the people by demanding of them a fleet for the purpose of accomplishing some private object, while he made them believe that he meant to employ it in their service. He appears, in fact, to have attempted to set himself above the laws, and to continue in the free state of Athens the same mode of life which he had led as dynast in the Chersonese. Under these circumstances we may indeed pity him, but cannot admit that he fell an innocent victim to the abuse of popular liberty. His colleague Aristides, by his regulation of the affairs of the Athenian allies, and by the reforms he introduced in the constitution during the period subsequent to the battle of Marathon, gained the highest esteem and respect among his fellow-citizens. Although he was descended from an ancient and noble family, and had been in positions in which he might have acquired great wealth, yet he seems to have lived almost in indigence. Such virtue was at all times extremely uncommon at Athens, and procured for him the honourable surname of the Just. This circumstance, however, made him an object of envy with many, and Themistocles, his most powerful opponent, induced the people to send him into honourable exile by ostracism, an institution by which the Athenians were enabled to rid themselves, for a time, of any man whose influence seemed to endanger the safety of their republican constitution. Such an exile, however, was not connected either with confiscation of property or with disgrace. At his trial Aristides is said to have assisted an illiterate rustic in writing his own name on one of the shells that condemned him. After his removal, Themistocles was in the undivided possession of the popular favour, and exerted all his powers to make Athens a maritime state.

About three years after the banishment of Aristides, Xerxes king of Persia sent to demand of the Greeks earth and water as tokens of submission and homage. But Themistocles, desirous to widen the breach with that monarch, put to death the interpreter for publishing the decree of the king of Persia in the language of the Greeks; and having prevailed with the several states to lay aside their animosities and provide for their common safety, he got himself elected general of the Athenian army.

When the news arrived that the Persians were advancing to invade Greece by the Straits of Thermopylae, and that with this view they were transporting their forces by sea, Themistocles advised his countrymen to abandon the city, embark on board their galleys, and encounter their enemies while yet at a distance. But this advice being disregarded, Themistocles put himself at the head of the army, and having joined the Lacedemonians, marched towards Tempe. But intelligence was received that the Straits of Thermopylae had been forced, and that Boeotia and Thessaly had submitted to the Persians; and the army in consequence returned without attempting anything. In this extremity the oracle at Delphi was consulted by the Athenians, and at first returned a very alarming response, threatening them with total destruction; but after much humiliation, a more favourable answer was obtained, in which, probably by the direction of Themistocles, they were promised safety in walls of wood. This being interpreted as a command to abandon Athens, and place all their hopes of safety in their fleet, the greater part began to prepare for embarkation, and money

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1 For an account of the memorable battle of Marathon, with military details of the Greek armies, including the Athenian, see the article ARMY. "The Athenians who fought at Marathon," says Herodotus, "were the first among the Greeks known to have used running for the purpose of coming at once to close fight; and they were the first who withstood (in the field) even the sight of the Median dress and of the men who wear it; for hitherto the very name of Medes and Persians had been a terror to the Greeks." This honest confession seems to have given great offence to Platarch, but it is confirmed by Plato (in Menexen, p. 240) and other writers of the highest authority.

2 The expulsion of Aristides took place B.C. 483, since he was recalled ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀριστείῳ ἐν Πλαταιῇ ἀναστάσει. (Plutarch, Aristid., c. 8.) Some, however, think that it took place the following year; and, in fact, he seems to have been in exile at the time of the battle of Salamis. But ten months afterwards he commanded the Athenian forces at the battle of Platæa; so that his recall must have taken place between those two actions. (Herodotus, ii. 23.) was distributed among them by the council of the Areopagus, to the amount of eight drachmas a head; but this not proving sufficient, Themistocles publicly gave out that somebody had stolen the shield of Athena, and, under pretence of searching for the lost argosy, he seized on all the money he could find. Some, however, still refused to embark, and, understanding the oracle in its literal sense, raised fortifications of wood, resolving to wait the arrival of the Persians, and defend themselves to the last.

The Persians having advanced to Athens soon after the inhabitants had deserted it, met with no opposition except from the few who had resolved to remain; and as they would listen to no terms of accommodation, they were put to the sword, and the city utterly destroyed. Xerxes, however, being defeated in a great naval engagement at Salamis, 480 B.C., was forced to fly with prodigious loss. Themistocles was for pursuing him and breaking down the bridge of boats which he had thrown over the Hellespont; but this advice being overruled, the crafty Athenian sent a trusty messenger to the king, acquainting him that the Greeks intended breaking down his bridge, and at the same time suggesting the propriety of his making all haste in order to prevent his retreat being cut off. This advice, though misinterpreted by some, was certainly a prudent one; as Xerxes, although he had sustained a defeat, was still at the head of an army capable of destroying all Greece; and had he been driven to despair by finding himself shut up or even too hotly pursued, it is impossible to say what might have been the event. "Make a bridge of gold for a flying enemy" is a rule which the experience of war in all ages has sanctioned.

The defeat of Xerxes at Salamis disposed Mardonius, who had been left to carry on the war by land, rather to treat with the Athenians than to fight them; and with this view he sent Alexander, king of Macedon, to Athens to propose an alliance with the republic, exclusively of the other Grecian states. But this proposal was rejected; in consequence of which Athens was a second time destroyed, and the Athenians were forced to retire to Salamis. But they were soon freed from the apprehension of final subjugation by the total defeat and death of Mardonius at Platæa, where Aristides and the Athenian troops under his command particularly distinguished themselves. And, by a singular coincidence, on the same day that the battle of Platæa was fought, another division of the Persians was defeated at Mycale in Ionia, where the Athenians also behaved with more signal gallantry than any of the other Greeks. The Persians being thus disposed of, the troops who had fought at Mycale crossed over to the Chersonesus, and laid siege to Sestos, which they at length captured after an obstinate defence by the garrison; a circumstance which appears to have irritated them so much that they put both the commanders to death in the most barbarous manner. One of them, Oibazus, was sacrificed to a Thracian god; whilst the other, Artayctes, was impaled alive, and his son stoned to death before his face, on the absurd pretence that he had rifled the sepulchre of Proteus.

After the victories of Platæa and Mycale, in 479 B.C., the Athenians, freed from all apprehension respecting the Persians, began to rebuild their city in a more magnificent manner than ever. Throughout the Persian war, the Athenians had been most forward in opposing the barbarians; and their generals, Aristides and Cimon, displayed qualities which formed such a strong contrast with the domineering conduct of the Spartan Pausanias and the Spartan harmosts, that, with the exception of the Peloponnesians, nearly all the Greeks were desirous to place themselves under the protection of Athens, which thus acquired the supremacy in Greece. The relations of the allies, and their annual tribute, which was deposited in the temple of Apollo at Delos, was the work of Aristides, in whom all had the fullest confidence. Athens, in return, undertook the duty of protecting her allies against Persia. The constitution of Athens also underwent some changes at this time, which are ascribed to Aristides. He is said to have removed the barrier which had hitherto separated the highest from the lower classes, by throwing open the archonship and the Areopagites to all the citizens, without any distinction of birth or wealth. This change had been prepared by the circumstances of the time; and the noble exertions of the Athenian citizens had well entitled them to be thus raised to the full enjoyment of the advantages which the state could afford. About the same time Themistocles suggested the necessity of immediately fortifying the city, so as to prevent its being again destroyed whenever the Persians might deem it expedient to invade Greece. The Lacedemonians disdained this project exceedingly, and remonstrated against it, upon the hollow ground, that were Athens to be strongly fortified, and the Persians to become possessed of it, it might be impossible ever to dislodge them. The Athenians were not imposed on by this shallow pretence, which was soon changed into a peremptory command not to raise their walls higher; but, considering the great power of Sparta at that time, Themistocles advised the Athenians to temporize, and to assure the Spartan envoys that the work should not be proceeded with until by a special embassy satisfaction had been given to their allies. Being, at his own desire, named ambassador in conjunction with some other Athenians, Themistocles set out alone. Arrived at Sparta, he put off from time to time receiving an audience, on the pretence that his colleagues had not yet joined him; but in the meanwhile the walls of Athens were being built with the utmost expedition, neither houses nor sepulchres being spared for materials, and men, women, children, strangers, citizens, and servants, labouring at the work without intermission. The truth, however, having at length oozed out, Themistocles and his colleagues, who had by this time arrived, were summoned before the ephori, who immediately began to explain against the Athenians on account of their breach of compact. But Themistocles stoutly denied the charge; his colleagues, he said, assured him of the contrary; at all events, it did not become a great state to give heed to vague rumours of this description; and if they had any doubts about the truth of his statement, the proper course would be to send deputies to inquire into the fact of the matter, whilst he should himself remain as a hostage to be answerable for the event. This plausible suggestion being agreed to, Themistocles engaged his associates to advise the Athenians to commit the Spartan ambassadors to safe custody until he should be released. Soon after Aristides and one other Athenian envoy arrived, informing Themistocles that the walls were high enough to stand a siege. Themistocles, accordingly, now dropped the mask, and bade the Spartans in future to treat the Athenians as reasonable men, who knew what they owed to themselves as well as to their countrymen. The Spartans with their wonted skill dissembled their vexation, left the Athenians to act as they saw fit, and sent Themistocles back to Athens in safety.

The following year, 478 B.C., Themistocles, observing the inconvenience of the port of Phalerum, formed the resolution of improving the Peiræus, and rendering it the principal harbour of Athens. All the three ports, Phalerum, Muschylia, and Peiræus, were fortified by a double range of wall, one on the landside, and the other following the windings of the coast. This wall was 60 feet in height, and of such breadth as to allow two waggonss to pass each other. Peiræus now became a town of great importance, being the residence of merchants, sailors, and foreigners, who established themselves in it for purposes of trade and commerce. By these wise and prudent measures, undertaken

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1 Athens was occupied by Mardonius ten months after its occupation by Xerxes the preceding year, B.C. 480. and carried through with equal energy and address, the naval power of Athens was fixed on a sure basis, and the ascendency in Grecian politics transferred from the Spartans to the Athenians.

The victory of Salamis and his prudent management of the affairs of Athens had raised Themistocles to a giddy height, which made him proud, indiscreet, and rapacious, and drew upon him the charge of perfidy, avarice, and cruelty. His acts of selfishness made many persons his enemies, and the Spartans never forgiving him the manner in which he had thwarted their schemes, were ever active in rousing the jealousy and fears of his countrymen. In addition to all this, younger men were rising and taking his place in popular favour. The people accordingly were easily persuaded to consider him a dangerous person, and condemned him to a temporary exile by ostracism. He went to Argos, where he was still residing, 471 B.C., when the condemnation of the Spartan Pausanias for high treason brought ruin upon the head of Themistocles also. The Spartans charging him with being an accomplice of Pausanias, demanded of the Athenians to put him to death. His enemies at Athens rejoiced at this opportunity of crushing him, and officers were sent out to arrest him. But he fled and reached Ephesus in safety. Thence he proceeded to the court of Persia, where, by his prudence and cunning, he soon became a general favourite. King Artaxerxes at length sent him to Western Asia, where he was enabled by the king's munificence to maintain a sort of princely rank. At length, however, he is said to have made away with himself, because he felt unable to fulfil the promises he had made to the king.

But the war with Persia was not yet discontinued, and about the end of the 77th Olympiad, the Athenians equipped a fleet to relieve certain Greek cities in Asia, subject to the Persians, and gave the command of it to Cimon, the son of Miltiades by a daughter of the king of Thrace. Cimon had already tasted the temper of his countrymen, having been thrown into prison for his father's fine, from which he was released by Callias, whom his sister Elpinice had married on account of his great wealth, procured, it is said, by no very honourable means. But he nevertheless accepted of the command, and gained such immense booty in this expedition, that the Athenians were thereby enabled to lay the foundation of that longitudinal inclosure which united the port to the city; as also to adorn the Agora with palm-trees, and beautify the Academy with delightful walks and fountains. Soon after this expedition, the Persians having invaded the Chersonesus, and made themselves masters of it, with the assistance of the Thracians, Cimon was hastily sent against both. He had only four ships under his command; but with these he captured thirteen of the Persian galleys, and reduced the whole of the Chersonesus; after which he attacked the Thracians, who had made themselves masters of the gold mines situated between the rivers Nessus and Strymon, and speedily obliged them to yield. But Cimon was as wise and politic as he was brave. Many of the Greek states, in virtue of the general tax established by Aristides with the view of providing a fund for the common defence, were bound to furnish men and galleys, as well as to pay for their support. But when they saw themselves exposed to danger from the Persians, most of them evinced an unwillingness to furnish their contingent of men. This exasperated the Athenian generals, who, finding them obstinate in their refusal, were for having immediate recourse to force; but Cimon overruled this proposal, permitted such as were desirous of staying at home to remain, and accepted a sum of money instead of a galley completely manned; by which means he incurred the Athenians, whom he took on board his galleys, to hardship and discipline, whilst the allies, who remained at home, became enervated through idleness, and, from being confederates, dwindled into tributaries or subjects.

Cimon had gained great wealth both to the state and to Cimon himself; but in his public character he had acted with unimpeached integrity, and as a private citizen he had dedicated his wealth to the most laudable purposes. He had demolished the inclosures about his grounds and gardens, permitting every one to enter and take what fruits they pleased; and he had kept open table, where both rich and poor were plentifully entertained. If he met a citizen in a tattered suit of clothes, he made some of his attendants exchange with him; or if the quality of the person rendered such a kindness unsuitable, he caused a sum of money to be privately given him. All this excessive liberality, however, was as degrading to the benefactor as to the benefited, and was nothing but the means by which he endeavoured to win popularity among the people. The nobles, to whose order Cimon belonged, had lost the power of oppressing the people, and now found it expedient to court them in every possible way for the purpose of securing to themselves all the power that yet remained to them. Pericles, his great rival, unable to cope with Cimon's profusion, became the author of a series of measures, all of which tended to provide for the subsistence and gratification of the poorer classes at the public expense. The apparent neglect of Cimon in not conquering a district in the north of the Ægean was the cause of an accusation against him, in which Pericles was requested to take the lead; but he honourably declined doing so, because in his eyes the charge was unfounded. The result of this trial is not certain; for according to some Cimon was acquitted, while according to others he was sentenced to pay a fine of 50 talents. Soon afterwards, however, the aristocratic party, of which Cimon was the leader, became involved in a serious struggle with the democratic party, led by Pericles; the latter having succeeded in reducing the power of the Areopagus, the last stronghold of the aristocracy, it was thought advisable, for the public safety, to remove Cimon for a time from Athens by ostracism.

The Athenian power had now risen to such a height that war with all the states of Peloponnesus looked upon the republic with Sparta a jealous eye, and were continually watching for opportunities of making war upon it when engaged in troublesome affairs, or hard pressed by other enemies. These attempts, however, so far from lessening, generally contributed to increase the power of the Athenians. But in the year B.C. 458, the republic entered into a war with Sparta, which eventually proved nearly as fatal to the state as to the city. The Spartans had sent a considerable army to assist the Dorians against the Phocians; and on their return commenced intriguing with the aristocratic party at Athens. This led the Athenians to the determination not to wait till it was too late. Having therefore engaged the Argives and Thessalians as confederates, they posted themselves on the isthmus, so that the Spartan army could not return without encountering them. The Athenians and their confederates amounted to 14,000, and the Spartans to 11,500 men. The Lacedemonian general, however, unwilling to hazard a battle, turned aside to Tanagra, a city of Boeotia, where some of the Athenians who were favourable to aristocracy entered into a correspondence with him. But before their designs were ripe for execution, the Athenian army marched with great expedition to Tanagra, and instantly made arrangements for the attack. They were however defeated with great loss, in consequence of the perfidy of the Thessalians, who in the midst of the battle went over to the enemy. Another engagement soon followed, in which both armies suffered so much that they were glad to conclude a short truce, that each might have time to recruit their shattered forces. But the scale of fortune soon turned in favour of the Athenians. The Thespians, who had been deprived of the command of Boeotia on account of their having sided with Xerxes, were now restored to it by the Lacedaemonians. At this time the Athenians were so greatly displeased that they sent an army under Myronides the son of Callias into Boeotia to overturn all that had been done. That general was encountered by the Thebans and their allies, who composed a numerous and well-disciplined army; but although the Athenian army was but a handful in comparison to that of their enemies, Myronides gained a victory over the allies, which, in a purely military point of view, may perhaps be considered as more glorious than either that of Marathon or of Platæa. In these battles they had fought against the effeminate and ill-disciplined troops of Persia; but now they encountered and defeated a superior army composed of the bravest Greeks. After this victory Myronides marched to Tanagra, which he took by storm, and afterwards razed to the ground. He then plundered Boeotia; defeated another army which the Boeotians had drawn together to oppose him; next fell upon the Locrians; and having penetrated into Thessaly, chastised the inhabitants of that country for having revolted from the Athenians; after which he returned to Athens laden alike with riches and with glory.

About this time, 457 B.C., Cimon was recalled from banishment by the will of the people, and soon after fell to his old employment of warring against the Persians; having nothing less in view, according to Plutarch, than the conquest and subjugation of the whole Persian empire. But, however this may be, the Great King, finding he could have no rest whilst he continued in a state of hostility with the Athenians, sent instructions to his generals, Artabazus and Megalizus, to conclude, if possible, a treaty of peace; which, after much discussion, was at length effected upon the following conditions: 1. That the Greek cities in Asia should be free, and governed by their own laws. 2. That the Persians should send no army within three days' journey of the sea. 3. That no Persian ship of war should sail between Phaselis in Pamphylia and the Chelidonian islands off the coast of Lycia. Whilst this treaty was pending, Cimon died B.C. 449, but whether of sickness or of a wound which he had received in battle remains unknown. This so-called peace of Cimon is probably a mere fable, which arose out of the recollection of the glorious exploits of that general. All the subsequent history shows that such a state of things as the terms of this peace imply never existed. The story does not appear to have assumed a distinct form until the time of the rhetorician Isocrates.

One thing, however, is certain, that after the death of this remarkable personage, the Athenian affairs began to fall into confusion. It was now the misfortune of the republic to be alike hated by her enemies and by her allies; and hence the latter missed no opportunity of throwing off their allegiance when they thought they could do so with impunity. The Megarians, for instance, who had long been under the protection of Athens, thought proper to disclaim all dependence on their ancient protectrix, and to have recourse to Sparta, with which they entered into a strict alliance offensive and defensive. Exasperated at this proceeding, and determined to punish the ingratitude of their former allies, the Athenians ravaged the country of the Megarians—a step which soon brought on a renewal of the Lacedaemonian war, which had been suspended rather than terminated. But Pericles procured the return of the first Lacedaemonian army without bloodshed, by bribing Cleandridas, the young king of Sparta's tutor; and the Lacedaemonians, finding it was not for their interest to carry on the war, concluded a truce or pacification with the Athenians for the period of thirty years, 445 B.C.

Six years after the conclusion of the peace between Athens and Sparta, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, about an insignificant town situated under Mount Mycale, in Ionia. In this war the Athenians took part, their protection having been solicited by the Milesians; and the island of Samos was reduced by Pericles, who established there a democracy, and left an Athenian garrison. He was no sooner gone, however, than the aristocratic party rose in arms and expelled the garrison; but Pericles quickly returning, besieged and took their city, demolished their walls, and fined them in the whole expense of the war, part of which he obliged them to pay down, and took hostages for the remainder. This happened in 444 B.C.

This insignificant contest was almost immediately followed by a war between the Corecyreans and Corinthians, which arose out of the following circumstances. An intestine broil breaking out in the little territory of Epidamnus, a town of Illyricum, founded by the Corecyreans, one party applied for aid to the Illyrians, and the other to the Corecyreans. But the latter having neglected the matter, Corinth was appealed to, as the Corecyreans were originally a colony from that place; and the Corinthians, partly out of pity for the Epidamnians, partly from dislike to the Corecyreans, despatched a considerable fleet to the assistance of the former, by which means the party which had appealed to Corinth gained the ascendency. This being resented by the Corecyreans, they sent a fleet to Epidamnus to support the exiles; but although this fleet began to act offensively on its entering the port, the chief commanders had instructions to propose terms of accommodation. To these, however, the Corinthians refused to accede; and next year the Corecyreans defeated the Corinthians and their allies at sea, took Epidamnus by storm, and wasted the territories of the allies of the Corinthians, 434 B.C. The latter, therefore, began to make great preparations for carrying on the war, and pressed their allies to imitate their example, that they might be in a condition to retrieve the honour they had lost, and to humble the ungrateful colony which had thus insulted the metropolitan city.

When the Corecyreans became acquainted with these proceedings, they despatched envoys to Athens to sue for aid; and these were quickly followed by others from Corinth on the same errand. At first the Athenians inclined to favour the Corinthians, but the next day they resolved to support the Corecyreans; contenting themselves, however, with entering into a defensive alliance with that little state, and furnishing the Corecyreans with ten galleys under the command of Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon. But this determination did not retard the preparations of the Corinthians, who, as soon as the season permitted, sailed for the coast of Corecyra with a fleet of 150 ships, under the command of Xenoclides, assisted by four other Corinthian admirals; each squadron of their allies being commanded by an admiral of its own. The Corecyrean and Athenian fleet amounted to 120 sail; but the Athenians had orders to give as little assistance as possible. A brisk action ensued, in which the Corecyrean right wing broke the left of the Corinthian fleet, and drove some of the ships on shore; whilst the Corinthian ships in the right wing defeated the Corecyrean ships opposed to them. Next day preparations were made on both sides for renewing the battle; but twenty ships arriving opportunely from Athens to the assistance of the Corecyreans, turned the scale against the Corinthians, who therefore declined the combat, 432 B.C.

As soon as the Corecyrean war broke out, the Athenians sent orders to the citizens of Potidea to demolish part of their wall, to send back the magistrates they had received from Corinth, and to give hostages for their own behaviour. The Potideans, however, refused to comply with this demand; upon which the Athenians despatched a considerable fleet against them under the command of Callias, a man celebrated for his courage; whilst the Corinthians, on the other hand, sent one Aristes, with a considerable body of troops, to the assistance of the city. An engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, but their brave general fell in the action. Phormius, who succeeded to the command on the death of Callias, then invested the city in form, and blockaded its harbour with his fleet; but the Potideans, dreading the vengeance of the Athenians, made a most obstinate defence, at the same time warmly soliciting the Corinthians to perform their promises, and to engage the rest of the states of Peloponnese to take part in their quarrel.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians having heard the complaints of the Corinthians and other small states of Greece, against the Athenians, sent ambassadors to Athens, to demand reparation for the injuries done to these states, and, in the event of refusal, to denounce war. The terms demanded were, first, that all Athenians who were allied to the family of Megacles should be expelled from Attica; secondly, that the siege of Potidea should be raised; thirdly, that the inhabitants of Ægina should be left free; and lastly, that a decree prohibiting the Megarians from resorting to the ports and markets of Athens should be revoked, and all the Grecian states under the dominion of Athens set at liberty.

By the persuasion of Pericles, however, these degrading terms were rejected; and while the right arbitrarily claimed by the commonwealth of Sparta to interfere in the concerns of the other Greek states, in the character of a lord paramount, was peremptorily denied, an accommodation was proposed upon the fair principles of equality and reciprocity. In recommending the measure which he suggested for the adoption of his countrymen, this celebrated statesman argued that, whatever the Lacedaemonians might pretend as to the complaints of the allies, the true ground of their resentment was the prosperity of the Athenian republic, which they had always hated, and now sought an opportunity of humbling; and that it must be owing to the Athenians themselves if this design succeeded, because, for many reasons, Athens was better able to engage in a long and expensive war than the Peloponnesians. He then laid before the people an exact account of their circumstances, reminding them that the treasure brought from Delos amounted to no less than 10,000 talents; that although 4000 of these had been expended on the magnificence of their citadel, 6000 still remained in their coffers; that they were also entitled to the subsidies payable by the confederate states; that the statues of their gods, the spoils of the Persians, and other valuable property, were worth immense sums; that many private individuals had amassed vast fortunes; that considering the extent of their trade and commerce, they might calculate upon a certain annual increase of wealth; that they had on foot an army consisting of 12,000 men, besides 17,000 in their colonies and garrisons; that their fleet amounted to 300 sail; and finally, that the Peloponnesians, with whom they might be called to contend, had none of these advantages, and, as compared with the Athenians, were nearly destitute of all those resources which constitute the sinews of war. For these reasons he proposed, as at once the most consistent and most equitable satisfaction that could be given, to reverse the decree against Megara, provided the Lacedaemonians agreed to accede to the principle of reciprocity in favour of the Athenians and their allies; to consent to leave all those states free which were acknowledged as such at the conclusion of the last peace with Sparta, provided the latter state also agreed to give freedom to all the states which were under their dominion; and, finally, to submit to arbitration all disputes which might in future arise between the parties to this arrangement. He concluded by advising them to hazard a war in case these terms were rejected; telling them that they should not think they ran that hazard for a trifle, or retain a scruple in their minds as if a small consideration moved them to it, because on this matter depended their safety, and the reputation of their constancy and resolution. If they yielded in this, the next demand of the Lacedaemonians would be still more extravagant; for having once discovered that the Athenians were to be acted upon by fear, they would thence conclude that nothing could be denied them, whereas a stout resistance in the present case would teach them to treat Athens in future upon terms of reciprocity.

The firm attitude which Athens assumed on this occasion, Peleponnesus under the guidance of her most illustrious statesman, may be considered as the origin of the Peloponnesian war, which makes so prominent a figure in ancient history. The immediate preliminary to general hostilities, however, was an attempt of the Thebans to surprise Platæa in 431 B.C. With this view they in the depth of night sent 300 men to assist those of the Platæans whom they had drawn over to their interest, in making themselves masters of the place. But although the design succeeded very well at first—the Platæans, who had promised to open the gates, keeping their words exactly, so that they instantly obtained possession of the city,—yet the other party, perceiving the smallness of the number they had to contend with, unanimously rose upon them, killed a great many, and forced the remainder to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The Thebans sent a reinforcement to assist their countrymen, but it arrived too late to be of any service, and the whole were ultimately obliged to withdraw. As soon as the Athenians were apprised of this attempt, they immediately despatched a considerable convoy of provisions to Platæa, together with a numerous body of troops for the purpose of escorting the wives and children of the inhabitants to Athens. This attempt leaving no doubt that all hopes of accommodation were at an end, both parties began to prepare in good earnest for war. Most of the Grecian states inclined to favour the Spartans, partly because the latter assumed the character of deliverers of Greece, and partly also because many of the states either had been, or feared they would be, oppressed by the Athenians. Accordingly, the whole of the Peloponnesians except the Argives and part of the Achaean made common cause with the Spartans; whilst, on the continent of Greece, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrans, Boeotians, Arcadians, Leucadians, and Anactorians, declared for the Athenians; as also did the Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, Messenians, Acarnanians, Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, Carian, Dorians, Thracians, and all the Cyclades, excepting Melos and Thera, together with Eubœa and Samos.

The Peloponnesian war commenced in the year B.C. 431. First year. The Lacedaemonian army, consisting of no less than 60,000 men, assembled on the isthmus, and, after a vain attempt at negotiation, the campaign opened. The Lacedaemonian army was commanded by Archidamus, king of Sparta; that of the Athenians by Pericles, with nine generals under him. Soon after the opening of the campaign, the Spartan force entered Attica and committed horrible ravages; Pericles having no force capable of opposing it, and steadily refusing to engage on disadvantageous terms, although prodigious clamours were in consequence raised against him by his countrymen. The invaders, however, had no great reason to boast of the advantages they had gained; for an Athenian fleet ravaged the coasts of Peloponnesus, whilst another infested the Locrans, expelled the inhabitants of Ægina, and repeopled the island from Athens and Attica. Cephallenia,

Attica, and some towns in Acarnania and Leucas which had declared for the Lacedemonians, were also reduced; and in the autumn, when the Peloponnesians had retired, Pericles entered the Megarian territory, which he laid waste with fire and sword, in revenge for the devastation committed in Attica.

But the spring of the second year proved signalily disastrous to Athens; for a dreadful plague carried off great numbers of the citizens, whilst the Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, wasted every thing abroad. In the midst of all these calamities, however, the firmness of Pericles remained unshaken; and he would suffer none of his countrymen to stir from the city, either to escape the plague, which committed horrible ravages within the walls, or to assail the enemy, who desolated the country without. He meditated a deeper game, namely, an inroad into the enemy's territory, which in fact had been left completely uncovered by the attack upon Attica. With this view he caused a large fleet to be equipped, on board which he embarked 4000 foot and 300 horse, and immediately set sail for Epidaurus. This diversion produced the desired effect, in compelling the enemy to withdraw from Attica; but in other respects the expedition failed on account of the plague, which committed so great havoc among his men, that Pericles brought back to Athens only 1500 of the 4300 composing the expedition. By this disaster the Athenians were thrown into utter despair, and immediately sued for peace; but the Spartans refusing to accede to any terms of accommodation, their despair gave place to fury against their great statesman and commander, whom they dismissed from their service, and amerced in a heavy fine. And, as if this had not been enough, at the same time that Pericles experienced the ingratitude of his country, the plague carried off his children and nearly the whole of his kindred, leaving him almost alone in the world, childless and forsaken. This accumulation of misfortunes preyed deeply on his spirits and overwhelmed him with melancholy, in consequence of which he secluded himself for a time entirely from public view. But through the persuasion of Alcibiades and other friends, he was at length induced to show himself to the people; who, ever inconstant, and generally more prompt to pardon than to condemn, received him with acclamations of joy. The first use Pericles made of his recovered popularity was to procure the repeal of the law which he had himself caused to be enacted, whereby all Athenians of half blood were disfranchised of their natural liberty, and reduced to the state of aliens; a measure which was not altogether disinterested on his part, as he was thereby enabled to enrol in the list of citizens his only remaining son by a Milesian mother, whom the operation of the law in question had of course bastardized. But this was destined to be one of the last public acts of the great Athenian statesman and patriot.

The third year of the Peloponnesian war was chiefly remarkable for the death of Pericles, who at length fell a victim to the plague, which had already desolated his house, but who left behind him a name that will never die. Platæa was also besieged by Archidamus, but without success; for although the greater part of it had been set on fire, the Platæans resolved to submit to every extremity rather than abandon the Athenian cause. In the end, therefore, the king of Sparta was obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, and to return to Peloponnesus.

In the following summer the Peloponnesians under Archidamus again invaded Attica, wasting everything with fire and sword; and at the same time the whole island of Lesbos, except the district of Methymna, revolted against the Athenians. In the meanwhile Platæa was strictly blockaded, and its inhabitants being reduced to the greatest extremity from want of provisions, the garrison came to the resolution of forcing a passage through the enemy's lines. When the moment arrived, however, for carrying this design into execution, many of them became intimidated; but the greater number persisted in their resolution, succeeded in their gallant attempt, and above 200 reached Athens in safety.

In the beginning of the fifth year the Peloponnesians sent forty ships to the relief of Mitylene, which the Athenians had invested after the revolt of Lesbos; but this effort proved unavailing, since the place had surrendered before the fleet could come to its assistance. Paches, the Athenian commander, then drove off the Peloponnesian fleet; and returning to Lesbos, sent the Lacedemonian agent, whom he found in Mitylene, together with a deputation, to Athens. On their arrival the Lacedemonians was immediately put to death; and in a general assembly of the people, it was resolved, on the proposal of Cleon, that all the Mitylenians who had attained to manhood should also be put to death, and the women and children sold as slaves. But the next day this cruel decree was revoked, and a galley despatched to countermand the sanguinary order. It arrived just in time to save Mitylene. Only about a thousand of the principal insurgents were put to death; the walls of the city were however demolished, their ships taken away, and their lands divided among the Athenians, who let them again to their former proprietors at a nominal rent. About this time also the Platæans who had failed in the attempt to break through the enemy's lines surrendered at discretion, and were cruelly put to death by the Lacedemonians, who sold their women as slaves. The city was soon after razed by the Thebans, who left only an inn to show where it stood; but the fame of Platæa induced Alexander the Great afterwards to rebuild it on a more extensive scale.

In this year also happened the famous sedition of Corcyra, proverbial for the horrors with which it was accompanied. We have already seen that the dispute between the Corcyreans and Corinthians was mainly instrumental in bringing on the Peloponnesian war, one of the most protracted and sanguinary contests of ancient times. At the commencement of this struggle a great number of Corcyreans were carried as prisoners to Corinth, where the chief of them were well treated, and the remainder sold as slaves. The motive of this conduct on the part of the Corinthians was a design they had formed of engaging these Corcyreans to influence their countrymen to join the Corinthians and their allies. With this view the latter treated them with all imaginable lenity and tenderness, endeavouring to instil into their minds a hatred of democratic government; after which they were informed that they might obtain their liberty upon condition of exerting their influence at home in favour of the allies, and to the prejudice of Athens. This the Corcyreans readily promised and endeavoured to perform; and

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1 In this campaign the Peloponnesians remained forty days in Attica, burning and destroying without, while the pestilence was raging within the city, and while the Athenians seemed abandoned to utter despair. For an account of this memorable plague see Thucydides, ii. 47, whose description has been often imitated, but never equalled, far less surpassed. That which approaches nearest to it in horrible truth and pictorial power of delineation is the description of the plague in Egypt, and also in the prison of the Seraglio at Constantinople, contained in the novel entitled Anastasia, or Memoirs of a Modern Greek; a work which displays greater talents, and gives a more vivid and faithful picture of society and manners in the countries of the Levant, than all the books which have yet been written on the subject.

2 Plutarch (Pericl. c. 16) says that Pericles was engaged in public affairs forty years, and performed certain functions during fifteen; but the fifteen are evidently included in the forty. Accordingly, Cicero (Orat. iii. 34) says, "Quadragesinta annos praefuit Athenis;" and from other authorities we learn that he began to appear in public affairs about the year B.C. 469, and to have the sole direction about the year B.C. 444; so that he could not have exceeded fourscore at the time of his death, which took place in B.C. 429. At first the partisans of aristocracy so far prevailed, that, assisted by a Peloponnesian fleet, they murdered such of the opposite party as fell into their hands. But the Athenians having despatched first one fleet and then another to the assistance of their friends, the Peloponnesians were forced to withdraw, leaving the aristocrats at the mercy of the democratic party; who, having thus gained the ascendency, literally exterminated their antagonists with circumstances of horrible atrocity. Nor was this all. For, the example once set, the several states of Greece in their turn experienced similar commotions, which were invariably fomented by agents of Sparta or of Athens; the former endeavouring to establish an aristocratic and the latter a democratic form of government, wherever their influence happened to prevail.

While the Athenians were thus engaged in a contest in which they were already overmatched, they foolishly rushed into a new one, which in the end proved more disastrous than any in which they had yet embarked. The inhabitants of Sicily were, it seems, divided into two factions; the one called the Doric, at the head of which was Syracuse; the other the Ionic, at the head of which was Leontini. But the Ionic faction finding itself too weak to contend with its rival without foreign aid, sent Gorgias of Leontini, a celebrated orator, sophist, and rhetorician, to Athens to apply for assistance; and he by his fine speeches so captivated the multitude, the Μέγας Θησεύς, or Great Beast (as the populace were sometimes contemptuously styled in private, by those who did not scruple to pander to their worst passions in public), that they rushed headlong into a war which they were unable to maintain while engaged in a death-struggle with nearly all the states of the Peloponnesus. Accordingly, bewrayed by the wily sophist, and probably enticed by the hope of effecting the conquest of Sicily, they despatched a fleet to the assistance of the Leontines, under the command of Laches and Chabrias; and this had no sooner sailed than another destined for the same service was begun to be fitted out. In the mean time the plague continued its ravages to such an extent that in the course of this year four thousand citizens, and a much larger number of the lower class of people, fell victims to its fury.

The sixth year of the Peloponnesian war was not remarkable for any great exploit. Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of Sparta, assembled an army in order to invade Attica; but was prevented from doing so by earthquakes, which shook almost every part of Greece, and produced general consternation. The next year, however, he entered Attica with his army; whilst the Athenians, on their part, sent a fleet, under the command of Demosthenes, to infest the coasts of Peloponnesus. As this fleet passed the coast of Laconia, the commander observed that the promontory of Pylos, which was joined to the continent by a narrow neck of land, had before it an island about two miles in circumference, which, though barren in itself; nevertheless contained an excellent harbour, sheltered from all winds either by the headland or isle, and capable of admitting the most numerous fleets; circumstances which led him to conclude that a garrison left here would alarm the Peloponnesians, and induce them to think rather of protecting their own country than of invading that of their neighbours. Accordingly, having raised a strong fortification, he established himself in the post, reserving five ships of war for its defence; and ordered the rest of the fleet to proceed to its intended destination. On the news of this event the Peloponnesian army immediately returned to besiege Pylos, and soon made themselves masters of the harbour, as well as of the island of Sphacteria, which was taken by a chosen body of Spartans. They then made a vigorous attack upon the fort, hoping to carry it before succours could arrive; but Demosthenes and his garrison made an obstinate defence; and an Athenian fleet arriving in the interval, relieved the besieged from all apprehensions on account of the superior force of the enemy. Battle was immediately offered; but as the Peloponnesian fleet declined the challenge, the Athenians sailed boldly into the harbour, and sunk or destroyed most of the enemy's ships, after which they besieged the Spartans in Sphacteria. Alarmed at finding the war carried into their own territory, the Peloponnesians now began to treat with their enemies; and whilst the negotiations were carrying on at Athens, a cessation of hostilities was agreed to, upon the condition that the Peloponnesians should in the mean time deliver up all their ships, but that in the event of the treaty not taking effect, these should be immediately restored. In as far as regards the negotiations, the Athenians, having heard the propositions of the Spartan plenipotentiaries, were at first strongly inclined to put an end to this ruinous and destructive war, all the evils of which had been so greatly aggravated by the dreadful pestilence which at the same time ravaged the city of Athens and part of the territory of Attica. But the demagogue Cleon, a fiery and headstrong man, persuaded his countrymen to insist on the most unreasonable terms; and as the confederates were by no means so far reduced as to suffer the Athenians pacis imponea morem, to dictate terms of peace, the plenipotentiaries withdrew, and by doing so, of course put an end to the armistice. The Peloponnesians then demanded the restoration of their vessels, conformably to the stipulation above mentioned; but the Athenians refused to deliver them up, on pretence that the former had violated the truce. Hostilities, therefore, were immediately recommenced on both sides; and the Lacedemonians attacked the Athenians at Pylos, while the latter attacked the Spartans at Sphacteria. But the Lacedemonians, though only a handful of men, and under every imaginable discouragement, defended themselves with so much bravery that the siege proceeded very slowly; and the people of Athens becoming uneasy at its duration, began to wish they had embraced the offers of the Spartans, and to rail vehemently against Cleon, who had been primarily instrumental in occasioning their rejection. To excuse himself, however, Cleon affirmed it would be an easy matter for the general of the forces which they were then sending to attack the Spartans in the isle, and reduce them at once. Nicias, who had just been appointed to the command, replied that if Cleon believed he could perform such wonders, he would do well to repair to the scene of action in person. Cleon, compelled to sustain his part, rejoined without hesitation that he was ready to go with all his heart; upon which Nicias caught him at his word, and declared that he had relinquished his command. Startled at this renunciation, the speech-maker protested that he was no general; but Nicias tamely assured him that he might some day become one; and the people amused with the controversy, held Cleon to his word. He then advancing, told them he was so little afraid of the enemy, that, with a very inconsiderable force, he would undertake, in conjunction with that already at Pylos, to bring to Athens in twenty days the Spartans who had given them so much trouble. The people laughed at this apparent gasconade; but having furnished him with the troops he desired, he, to the infinite surprise of every one,

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1 Diodorus, xii. 53. See also Pausanias, vi. 17, 5, and Philostratus in Vit. Gorg. This celebrated artist in the dangerous craft of making the worse appear the better reason, would seem to have been a singular specimen of "health and longevity;" for, according to Philostratus, Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ ἀκαδημίᾳ ἔζησεν ἐπὶ ἑκατὸν ἐτῶν, but the sounder opinion seems to be, that he was born about B.C. 485, and died soon after B.C. 350, at the age of 105 or 106. He was in reputation as a sophist and rhetorician for nearly fourscore years. (Fasti Hellendi, p. 63.) brought the Spartans prisoners to Athens within the time he had specified.

In the eighth year of the war Nicias reduced the island of Cythera on the coast of Laconia, and Thyrana, a frontier territory, which had been given to the Aeginaeans when expelled from their own country by the Athenians. In Sicily, Hermocrates of Syracuse, having persuaded the inhabitants of the island to adjust their differences without foreign interference, the Athenian generals returned home; a step which so greatly displeased their countrymen, that two of them were banished, and the third was sentenced to pay a heavy fine. The Athenians, under the conduct of Hippocrates and Demosthenes, next laid siege to Megara; but Brasidas, a Spartan general, coming to its relief, a battle ensued, which, though indecisive in its result, gave the Lacedaemonian faction an ascendency in Megara, and forced many who had favoured the Athenians to withdraw. In Boeotia some commotions were raised in favour of the Athenians; but their generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes being defeated by the Lacedaemonian party, all hopes ceased of the Athenian power being established in this district of Greece.

In the ninth year the Spartans made new proposals of peace, which the Athenians were now more inclined to accept than formerly; and finding their affairs much unsettled by the loss of Amphipolis, which had been reduced by Brasidas, a truce for a year was agreed on, while negotiations were immediately opened for restoring a general peace. But this pacific scheme was soon overthrown by a misunderstanding, arising out of an occurrence purely accidental, and the war was in consequence renewed.

The following year commenced with an attempt by Brasidas upon Potidaea; but this having failed, the Athenians began to recover some courage; and the truce expiring on the day of the Pythian games, Cleon advised the Athenians to send an army under his own command into Thrace. They agreed to this proposal, and immediately fitted out a force, consisting of 1200 foot and 300 horse, all Athenian citizens, embarked on board thirty galleys, of which the demagogue took the command. Brasidas was inferior in numbers to his opponent; but, observing that the Athenian commander was careless, and neglectful of discipline, the Spartan suddenly attacked him, and routed his army with the loss of half its numbers, while that of the assailants amounted to only seven killed and a few wounded. In this encounter, which appears to have been a complete surprise, the commanders on both sides were slain; and although the Athenians might well spare their general, whom impudence and accident had invested with a military command, the death of their brave leader was a serious loss to the Spartans, who, in fact, lamented him more than the Athenians did the loss of the battle. In consequence of this event, however, the latter were now much more disposed than formerly to listen to terms of accommodation. Amongst the Spartans, too, there was a party, at the head of whom was Plistoanax, their king, who earnestly wished for peace; and as Nicias laboured no less assiduously at Athens to bring about this desirable event, a peace was at last, 421 B.C., concluded between the two nations for the period of 50 years.

The conditions were, a restitution of places and prisoners on both sides, with the exception of Nisaea, which was to remain in the hands of the Athenians, who had taken it from the Megarians, and of Platæa, which was to continue in possession of the Thebans, who could not possibly give it up without uncovering the whole of their territory. The Boeotians, Corinthians, and Megarians, refused to be included in this peace; but the rest of the allies acquiesced; and being accordingly ratified, it received the name of the Nican pacification, from that of the general who had been mainly instrumental in restoring the blessing of peace to his country.

But although peace was nominally established, tranquillity was far from being restored. Dissatisfied with the treaty on various grounds, several states of the Peloponnesus, headed by Argos, immediately commenced organizing a new confederacy; even the Lacedaemonians found it impossible to fulfil exactly the stipulations of the agreement; and the town of Amphipolis in particular peremptorily refused to return under the government of Athens; for which reason the Athenians also refused to evacuate Pylos. In the course of the winter fresh negotiations were opened, but nothing definite was agreed upon, and the time passed in mutual complaints and recriminations. At Athens, in particular, the flame of discontent was artfully fanned by Alcibiades, who now began to rival Nicias in public favour, and who, perceiving that the Lacedaemonians paid their court principally to his rival, took every opportunity of incensing his countrymen against that nation. On the other hand, Nicias, whose reputation was concerned in maintaining the treaty inviolate, used his utmost endeavours to bring about a reconciliation, and even undertook a journey to Sparta, in the hope of effecting an accommodation; but, most unhappily, the artifices of Alcibiades, added to the turbulent and haughty disposition of both nations, rendered all his efforts unavailing, and at length satisfied him that a renewal of the war was inevitable. If the intrigues of that remarkable man, however, were mainly instrumental in bringing about a rupture, it cannot be denied that he took the most prudent methods for insuring the safety of his country. With this view he entered into a league with the Argives for the long term of a hundred years; he then marched into the territories of that state at the head of a considerable force; and he exerted all his influence, both at Argos and at Patrae, to persuade the people to connect their cities with the sea by means of walls, in order to facilitate the landing of succour, when it might be necessary, by the Athenians. But, though vigorous preparations were now made for a renewal of the war, nothing of any consequence was undertaken this year; if we except an attempt by the Argives to make themselves masters of Epidaurus, which was, however, defeated by the Lacedaemonians throwing a strong garrison into the place.

The next being the fourteenth year of the Peloponnesian Renewal of war, a Spartan army, under the command of Agis, entered the war, the territory of Argos; but just as battle was on the eve of commencing, a truce was suddenly concluded between two of the Argive generals and the king of Sparta. But it so happened that neither party felt satisfied with this proceeding; and both the king and the generals were very ill received by their respective fellow-citizens. Accordingly, on the arrival of some fresh troops from Athens, the Argives immediately broke the truce; and a battle ensuing soon afterwards, the allied army was defeated with great slaughter by Agis, who thus achieved a victory on the very spot which was afterwards destined to acquire additional celebrity as the scene of one of the most disastrous defeats which the Spartan arms ever experienced. In the winter a strong party in Argos joined the Lacedaemonians; in consequence of which that city renounced her alliance with Athens, and concluded peace with Sparta for the period of half a century. Further, in compliment to their new allies, the Argives abolished democracy in their city, substituting an aristocracy in its stead; and also assisted the Lacedaemonians in forcing the Sicyonians to adopt a similar form of government. Notwithstanding all this, however, the Argives, with a levity natural to the Greeks, renounced their Attica, alliance with Sparta the following year; abolished aristocracy, drove the Lacedaemonians out of the city, and renewed their league with Athens. On the other hand the Athenians, convinced of the bad faith of Perdiccas, king of Macedon, abjured his alliance and declared war against him; preferring, as they said, an open enemy to a treacherous friend. And as Argos was still distracted by adverse factions, Alcibiades in the course of the ensuing year terminated all disputes between them by the expulsion of the Spartan party. He then sailed for the island of Melos, which had shown the greatest inveracity against his countrymen, in order to punish the inhabitants for repeated acts of wanton hostility; but perceiving that the reduction of the island would be a work of time, he left a considerable body of forces there, and returned to Athens. In his absence, however, the capital of Melos surrendered at discretion, and the inhabitants were treated with the utmost severity; all the men capable of bearing arms being slaughtered, and the women and children carried into captivity.

In the beginning of the seventeenth year, Nicias was appointed commander-in-chief of an expedition destined to act against the Syracusans, with Alcibiades and Lamachus as colleagues. But whilst the necessary preparations were being made, Athens was thrown into terrible confusion by the defacing of the Hermas or statues of Hermes, of which there was a great number in the city; an outrage equally wanton in itself, and appalling to the people of Athens, who revered these statues both as monuments of art and as symbols of religion. Great efforts were in consequence made to discover the perpetrators of this sacrilege; but although ample rewards were offered, no disclosure was then made. At last, from some cause unexplained, suspicion fell upon Alcibiades, who in consequence received orders to return immediately from Sicily in order to take his trial for this alleged crime. But he knew the temper of his countrymen too well to trust himself to their mercy; and, instead of returning to Athens, he fled to Sparta, where he met with a gracious reception; whilst the Athenians were severely punished by the loss of their army, generals, and fleet, in Sicily; a disaster which the superior abilities of Alcibiades would in all probability have prevented.

The nineteenth and twentieth years of the war were spent by the Athenians in equipping a new fleet in order to repair their losses; but Alcibiades hurt their interests greatly by persuading Tissaphernes the Persian, to league with the Spartans against them, and at the same time stirring up several of the Ionian states to revolt against what he described as the mob government of Athens. Equally restless and profligate, however, this celebrated Athenian had scarcely established himself amongst his new allies when he contrived, by means of a handsome person and an insinuating address, to debauch the wife of Agis the Lacedaemonian commander; and as the latter strongly resented the affront which had been put upon him, the Athenian seducer was obliged to quit Sparta and pass over into Persia. Here, however, he met with a favourable reception from Tissaphernes, who profited much by his advice, which, in fact, was equally shrewd and insidious. "Let the Greeks," said he to the Persian general, "exhaust themselves by their mutual wars; foment discord among them, which you will always find comparatively an easy task; take care never to let one state be totally destroyed, but always to support the weaker party against the more powerful—follow this policy for a time, and the Greeks will themselves spare you the trouble of conquering them. By their incessant contests they will so weaken themselves that their country will become the prey of the first invader."

As may easily be supposed, Tissaphernes readily acquiesced in these counsels; upon which Alcibiades wrote privately to some of the officers in the Athenian army at Samos, informing them that he had been treating with the Persians in behalf of his countrymen, but that he did not choose to return till the democracy should be abolished; adding, that the Persian king disliked a democracy, but would immediately assist them if that was abolished, and an oligarchy established in its stead. On the arrival of Pisander and other deputies from the army with the proposals of Alcibiades, the oligarchical party succeeded in overturning the democratic constitution; in consequence of which Pisander and the deputies received directions to return to Alcibiades, in order to ascertain precisely on what terms the king of Persia was disposed to enter into an alliance with them. But perceiving that Tissaphernes was by no means inclined to assist the Athenians, on account of their recent successes, Alcibiades artfully set up such extravagant demands in the king of Persia's name, that the Athenians of themselves broke off the treaty, and thus enabled him to outwit both parties without offending either. But notwithstanding the failure of the negotiations with Tissaphernes, the democratical form of government was abolished, first in the cities subject to Athens, and afterwards in the capital itself; whilst, according to the scheme substituted in its stead, it was provided that the old form of government should be entirely dissolved—that five Prytanes should be elected—that these five should choose a hundred others, and each of the hundred choose three more—that the Four Hundred thus elected should become a senate with full power, but should nevertheless consult occasionally with Five Thousand of the wealthiest citizens, who alone were henceforth to be accounted The People—and that no authority whatever should remain in the hands of the lower class of citizens. Such was the scheme proposed by Pisander; and although the people were opposed to this change, those who conducted it, being men of great parts, found means to establish it by one of those unceremonious acts of audacity which commonly distinguish revolutions in popular governments.

In the meanwhile the Athenian army having changed their mind, declared for a democracy; and recalling Alcibiades, they invested him with full power, and insisted on for a day's immediate return to Athens for the purpose of restoring democracy, the ancient government. But he peremptorily refused to comply with their wishes; persuaded them to stay where they were in order to save Ionia; and further prevailed on them to allow some deputies, who had been sent by the new governors of Athens, to deliver the message with which they were charged. When the deputies had done so, Alcibiades enjoined them in reply to return immediately to Athens, and acquaint the Four Hundred that they were commanded instantly to resign their authority and restore the senate; adding, that the Five Thousand might retain their power for the present, provided they used it with moderation. By this answer the city was thrown into the utmost confusion; but the party of the new government prevailing, ambassadors were despatched to Sparta with orders to conclude peace upon any terms. This, however, was not so easy a matter as some had hastily imagined; for the Spartans proved intractable; and Phrynicus, the chief of the embassy, was murdered on his return. When the news of his death arrived, Theramenes, the head of the democratical party, seized the leaders of the Four Hundred; upon which a tumult ensued that had almost proved fatal to the city itself; but the people being at last dispersed, the Four Hundred immediately assembled, and sent deputies to the people, promising to comply with all their reasonable demands. A day was accordingly appointed for convoking a general assembly, and settling the form of government; but when it arrived, intelligence was brought that the Lacedaemonian fleet was in sight, and steering directly for Salamis. Thus all was again thrown into confusion; and the people, instead of deliberating on the subject proposed, ran in crowds down to the port, whence a fleet of 36 ships was immediately despatched, under the command of Timocharis, to engage the enemy, who were perceived to be making for Euboea. But this fleet was utterly defeated, 28 ships being taken, and the remainder either sunk or disabled; and this disaster was followed by the revolt of all Euboea, except the small district of Oreus. When the dismal tidings reached Athens, everything was given up for lost; and had the Lacedaemonians taken this opportunity of attacking the city, they would undoubtedly have succeeded in the attempt, and thus put an end to the war by the subjugation of Athens. But being at all times slow, especially in naval affairs, they allowed the Athenians time to equip another fleet, and to retrieve their affairs; while Alcibiades, by his intrigues, so effectually embroiled the Persians and Peloponnesians that neither party knew whom to trust, and mutual distrust at length rose to such a pitch as almost to involve them in open hostility; and several advantages gained by the Athenians at sea tended to revive their hopes and restore their confidence.

During the succeeding years of this celebrated war the Athenians were also in the first instance very successful. Thrasybulus obtained a signal advantage at sea; and in the same day Alcibiades gained two victories, one by land and another by sea, capturing the whole Peloponnesian fleet, besides an immense spoil. The Spartans, humbled by these reverses, were reduced in their turn to the necessity of suing for peace. But the Athenians, intoxicated with success, sent back the envoys without vouchsafing an answer to their proposals; and the Spartans, justly incensed at this insolent and contemptuous conduct, renewed the war with the utmost vigour, and soon after made themselves masters of Pylos. Nor was this the only misfortune of the Athenians. The Megarians surprised Nisaea, and put the garrison to death; an act which so exasperated the Athenians, that they immediately sent an army against that people,—defeated them with great slaughter,—and committed horrid devastations, in revenge for the affair of Nisaea. But these misfortunes were still in some measure counterbalanced by the great actions of Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes. When Alcibiades returned in triumph to Athens, 408 B.C., he brought with him a fleet of 200 ships, together with such a load of spoils as had never been seen in the capital since the conclusion of the Persian war. The people crowded to the port to behold the hero as he landed; old and young blessed him as he passed; and next day, when he had delivered a harangue to the assembly, they directed the record of his banishment to be thrown into the sea, absolved him from the curses he lay under on account of the alleged sacrilege, and created him generalissimo of their forces. But this enthusiasm was too violent to be lasting; and in point of fact a casual reverse which Alcibiades sustained soon after this obliterated all remembrance of his former services, and involved him in disgrace. Having sailed to the Hellespont with part of his fleet, he left the remainder under the command of Antiochus his pilot, with strict orders to attempt nothing in his absence. But the pilot chose to disobey his instructions, and having provoked Lysander, the Lacedaemonian admiral, to an engagement, he paid for his temerity by a total defeat, with the loss of fifteen ships, and that of his own life into the bargain. On receiving intelligence of this disaster, Alcibiades returned, and endeavoured to induce the Lacedaemonian commander to hazard a second battle; but Lysander was too prudent to incur such a risk; and in the meanwhile the Athenians deprived Alcibiades of his command, and named ten new generals in his stead. By this proceeding their ruin was sealed. Conon, who succeeded to the command, was beaten by Callicrates, Lysander's successor; but being afterwards strongly reinforced, he retrieved this disgrace by defeating the Lacedaemonians with the loss of no less than 77 ships. Such a victory might have been supposed to inspire the Athenians with some gratitude towards the generals who had gained it; but instead of this eight of them were recalled, on pretence of their not having assisted the wounded during the engagement: two were prudent enough not to return; and the six who trusted to the justice of their country were all put to death without mercy.

The following year Lysander, appointed commander of Athenians the Peloponnesian fleet, succeeded in capturing both Thasus and Lampascus. Conon was immediately despatched against him with 180 ships; a force so superior to that under Lysander, that the Lacedaemonian declined accepting battle, and was consequently blocked up in the river Egos. While the Athenians lay there observing him, they grew quite idle and careless, insomuch that Alcibiades, who had built a habitation for himself in the neighbourhood, entreated them to be more watchful, as he well knew Lysander's great abilities, and dreaded that they might have reason to repent their security if they disregarded his advice. They replied by expressing their wonder at the assurance of one who was an exile and a vagabond, in pretending to offer advice to them; adding, that if he gave them any further trouble, they would seize and send him a prisoner to Athens. The consequences of such conduct may easily be imagined. Lysander fell unexpectedly upon them, and gained a complete victory; Conon, with only nine galleys, escaping to Evagoras at Cyprus; after which the Lacedaemonian commander returned to Lampascus, where he put to death Phillocles with 3000 of his soldiers, and the whole of the officers except Adimantus. He then reduced all the cities subject to Athens, and artfully sent home their garrisons, that the city, overstocked with inhabitants, might thus be rendered incapable of holding out for any length of time when he came to besiege it.

Nor was any time lost in undertaking this decisive operation. Lysander appeared before the harbours with a fleet; while Agis, at the head of a powerful army, invested it on the land side. For a considerable time the Athenians resisted both attacks; but they were at last forced to send deputies to Agis, who referred them to Sparta; and when they repaired thither they were told that no terms could be granted unless they consented to demolish their walls. They next applied to Lysander, but he also referred them to Sparta; to which Theramenes, with other deputies, was immediately despatched. On their arrival they found assembled the council of the confederates, who all except the Spartans gave their votes for the utter destruction of Athens; but the latter would on no account consent to the ruin of a city which had deserved so well of Greece. The Athenian envoys did all in their power to mitigate the severity of the terms, but without effect; and finally peace was concluded, on condition that the long walls and the fortifications of the port should be demolished, and that the Athenians should deliver up all their ships excepting twelve, receive back such as had been banished for political offences, and consent to follow the fortune of the Lacedaemonians. And these severe terms were punctually executed. Lysander caused the walls and fortifications to be pulled down; established an oligarchy expressly against the will of the people; and thus completed the ruin of Athens in the twenty-seventh year of the Peloponnesian war, and the 404th B.C.

As soon as the Lacedaemonian had demolished the long walls and the fortifications of the Peiraeus, he constituted a council of thirty, with power, as was pretended, to make laws, but in truth to subjugate the state. These were the persons so famous in history under the title of The Thirty Tyrants. They were all the creatures of Lysander; and as they derived their power from conquest and the law of the sword, they exercised it in a manner worthy of its origin. Instead of making laws, they governed without them; they appointed a senate and magistrates at their will; and, lastly, they applied for a garrison from Lacedaemon, that, under the protection of a foreign military force, they might give a freer and bolder scope to the licentiousness of tyranny. Critias and Theramenes, two men of the greatest power and abilities in Athens, were at the head of this odious oligarchy. The former was ambitious and cruel beyond measure; but the latter was of a more merciful and humane disposition. The one pushed on all the bloody schemes framed by his confederates, and carried into execution many of his own; the other always opposed them, at first with moderation, at last with vehemence. In the course of his expostulations he said, that power was given them to rule and not to despoil the commonwealth; that it became them to act like shepherds, not like wolves; and that they ought to beware of rendering themselves at once odious and ridiculous, by attempting to dominate over all, being a mere handful of men, whom the slightest resistance would crush. This hint was not thrown away; for the remaining oligarchs immediately chose three thousand persons, whom they constituted the representatives of the people, and on whom they granted the notable privilege of not being liable to be put to death except by judgment of the senate; thereby assuming by implication a power of sacrificing the other Athenian citizens at their pleasure. Nor were they slow in practically confirming the justice of this interpretation; for as many as they conjectured to be unfriendly to the government in general, or to any of themselves in particular, they put to death, without cause and without mercy. Theramenes stoutly resisted this wantonness of cruelty; and absolutely refusing to concur in such measures, Critias accused him to the senate as a man of unsteady principles, sometimes for the people, sometimes against them, and favourable to nothing except innovation and revolution. The accused admitted that he had sometimes changed his measures, but alleged that he had always done so for the benefit of the people. It was solely with this view that he made peace with Sparta, and accepted of office as one of the Thirty; nor had he ever opposed their measures while they cut off the wicked; but when they began to destroy men of fortune and family, solely for the purpose of confiscating their property, then he owned he had differed with them, which he conceived to be no crime against the state.

Whilst Theramenes was speaking, Critias, perceiving the impression made upon the senate by his words, withdrew abruptly; but he soon returned with a guard, crying out that he had struck the name of Theramenes out of the list of the three thousand; that the senate had therefore no longer cognizance of the cause; and that the Thirty had already judged and condemned him to death. Theramenes, seeing that they intended to seize him, fled to the altar in the midst of the senate-house, and laying his hands thereon, said, "I do not seek refuge here because I expect to escape death, or desire it; but that, tearing me from the altar, the impious authors of my murder may interest the gods in bringing them to speedy judgment, and thereby restore freedom to my country." The guards then dragged him from the altar, and carrying him to the place of execution, he drank the poison with undaunted courage; reminding the people, with his last breath, that the same tyrants who had arbitrarily struck his name out of the list of the three thousand, might also strike out any of theirs, and that none could say whose turn it might next be to drink the fatal cup which he had just drained. The death of this heroic man was followed by a train of murders such as are to be found recorded only in the annals of republican oligarchies or aristocratic republics. Almost every citizen of any eminence either died a violent death or was driven into exile.

At length Thrasybulus, and such as like him had taken shelter in the Theban territory, resolved to hazard everything rather than remain in a state of perpetual exile from their country; and although he had no more than thirty men on whom he could depend, yet, inspired by the remembrance of the victories he had heretofore obtained in the cause of his country, he boldly made an irruption into Attica, and seizing on Phyle, a castle at a short distance from Athens, numbers flocked to his standard, and he soon found himself at the head of seven hundred men, maddened by cruelty and oppression, and prepared to devote themselves for their country. The tyrants of course had the disposal of the Spartan garrison, which they employed to reduce Thrasybulus and his party; yet he prevailed in various skirmishes, and at last obliged them to decamp from Phyle, which they had intended to blockade. The Thirty and their partisans conceiving it expedient to obtain possession of Eleusis, marched thither; and having persuaded the people to go unarmed out of their city, on the pretence of numbering them, the monsters instantly commenced an indiscriminate massacre. But the forces of Thrasybulus increasing daily, he seized on the Peiraeus, which he fortified in the best manner he could; and although the tyrants came down against him with the utmost force they could raise, he defended himself with so much obstinacy, that in the end they were forced to retreat, having lost before the place not only a great number of their men, but Critias, the president of the Thirty, and other members of this sanguinary oligarchy. By this gallant resistance the fate of the oligarchy was sealed. The people indeed differed among themselves; and the sanguinary monsters, who during their short administration had destroyed more men than had fallen during half the Peloponnesian war, had still a considerable party in Athens. But happily the cause of humanity prevailed; the tyrants were expelled, and withdrew to Eleusis.

But although the citizens had changed the government, Spartans they had made no agreement with those in the Peiraeus; to attempt whilst the tyrants, who had retired to Eleusis, sent deputies to Lacedemon to announce the revolt of the Athenians, and request assistance to reduce them. Nor did their application prove fruitless. Besides remitting them a large sum of money to aid their intrigues, the Lacedemonians appointed Lysander commander-in-chief, and his brother admiral; resolving to send both a fleet and an army, in order to reduce Athens a second time, and, as most of the Greek states then strongly suspected, to add it to their other dominions. Nor is it improbable that this design would have taken effect, had not Pausanias, the rival and enemy of Lysander, resolved to obstruct it by every means in his power. With this view he caused another army to be raised, of which he took the command, and immediately marched for the ostensible purpose of besieging the Peiraeus. But while he lay before the place, and pretended to attack it, he entered into a private correspondence with Thrasybulus, instructing him what propositions to make in order to induce the Lacedemonians, who were suspected by their allies, to abandon the contest, and conclude peace upon equitable terms. These intrigues had all the success that could be desired. The Ephori who were with Pausanias in the camp concurred in his measures; and in a short time a treaty was concluded, by which, amongst other things, it was provided that all the citizens of Athens should be restored to their homes and privileges, with the exception of the Thirty, the Eleven who had acted as their ministers, and the Ten who during the time of the oligarchy had been constituted governors of the Peiraeus; that all should remain quiet for the future in the city; and that, if any persons were afraid to trust to this agreement, they should have permission to retire unmolested to Eleusis. Pausanias then marched away with the Spartan army; and Thrasybulas at the head of his forces entered Athens, where, having laid down their arms, they sacrificed with the rest of their fellow-citizens in the temple of Athena, and then, to the great delight of all, restored the popular form of government, which was afterwards consolidated by an act of general amnesty and oblivion.

Throughout the whole of this transaction the conduct of Thrasybulus was admirable. When he first seized the castle of Phyle, the tyrants privately offered to receive him into their number instead of Theramenes, and to pardon at his request any twelve persons whom he might choose to name. But he nobly replied that he considered his exile far more honourable than any authority could be, purchased on such terms; and by persisting in his design he accomplished the deliverance of his country from a ferocious and sanguinary oligarchy which, as Isocrates informs us, had put 1400 citizens to death without any form of law, and had driven 5000 more into banishment, besides committing a variety of other acts of cruelty and oppression.

But, although Athens was thus restored to liberty by the virtuous patriotism of Thrasybulus, the age of Athenian glory had passed away. From this period till the reign of Philip of Macedonia the republic gradually sunk in energy, though it still continued to enjoy tolerable prosperity; and although many of the great masterpieces of Athenian genius were the productions of a later age, the most splendid of these only serve to prove beyond all question that the national spirit had degenerated, and that, "sunk in its glory, decayed in its worth," the Athenian Demos, which had once been the wonder and terror of the world, was now prepared to receive the law from the hands of almost any master. Philip accordingly found but little difficulty in extinguishing the feeble remains of liberty; and his son Alexander having completed the subjugation of Greece, the history of the Grecian states henceforward ceases to be of almost any interest. With regard to the capital, however, a rapid sketch of its history from this period till the present time will be found under the article ATHENS, to which reference is accordingly made.

Having thus laid before the reader an outline of the general history of Attica, it now only remains to give, as briefly as possible, some account of the character, government, religion, and public economy of the Athenians.

National character may be defined as the aggregate of those qualities or peculiarities, physical, moral, and political, by which one community of men is distinguished from another; in other words, it is a complex result produced by the action and reaction of primary and secondary causes, or the joint effect of all the circumstances, original and accidental, in which a people happens to be placed. But these causes are so various, both in kind and degree,—the operation of one is so much affected and modified by that of another, and direct physical becomes so much blended with indirect moral and political influences,—that, whilst it is comparatively an easy matter to determine in what respects the general characters of nations differ, it is exceedingly difficult, not to say impossible, to resolve that of any one into its constituent elements, and to assign to each its due share in the production of the ultimate result. The instrument of analysis which, employed in the investigation of physical laws, has led to the discovery of the most sublime truths, and extended the knowledge and consequently the power of man over the material world; is applicable only in a very limited degree even to the most complex phenomena of mind. Here we possess no manner of control over the subject of our inquiries; we have no power of placing it in new situations, of trying it by a variety of tests, or of submitting it to a course of skilfully contrived experiments. All that we can possibly do is either carefully to watch its manifestations, where these fall under our own notice, or to apply the principles of a sound logic to such observations as have been recorded by others, and thus to endeavour to make the nearest approximation we can to the truth. In such a method of investigation, however, the liability to error must necessarily be great; for, independently of its own obvious imperfection, the subtle nature of the phenomenon observed, and the constant transitions and modifications they experience, produce continual mistakes upon the part of the observer; whilst the spirit of system or theory, which is generally most active where our knowledge is least accurate and extensive, instead of facilitating the correction of such mistakes, contributes rather to render them ineradicable, and thus opposes a serious obstacle to the progress of sound inquiry. In attempting to form a judgment of the national character of a people, therefore, it becomes us to be equally on our guard against dogmatism in the statement of facts, and rash generalization in the inferences deduced from them. The former, indeed, are but too frequently stated without the qualifications proper to be applied to them; the latter is almost certain to lead into error and mystification. In cases where physical and moral causes are blended together in their operation; where primary results experience endless modifications from the influence of circumstances and the re-active working of positive institutions; and where we are in possession of no instrument of analysis by which the complex whole can be reduced into its constituent parts or elements; it is manifest that no theory which human ingenuity can invent will ever be sufficient to explain all the phenomena of national character, or to account for the varied and often incongruous phases which it assumes. Some writers, for instance, have amused themselves with referring to the influence of climate all the varieties observable in the characters and institutions of different nations; whilst others, again, have ascribed to the joint effect of moral and political causes, operating under peculiar circumstances, the diversities in question. But it must be obvious, on the slightest consideration, that both these theories are equally untenable, insomuch as national character is not the result of one cause or set of causes, but of all the causes and influences, of whatever kind, which act, either directly or indirectly, upon the general mind of a people. Instead of attempting to generalize, therefore, where generalization is from the very nature of things inadmissible, let us endeavour simply to point out some of the leading features in the character of that illustrious nation which in ancient times inhabited the territory of Attica, and filled the world with the renown of their achievements both in arts and in arms.

The Athenians surpassed all the other Greeks in physical conformation no less than in mental endowments. Among this people, indeed, strength and symmetry of body were happily united with many of the rarest attributes of mind. For these advantages they were indebted partly to nature, and partly to a system of education, which, apparently limited and imperfect, was nevertheless singularly calculated to develop their peculiar capabilities. Habitual exercise may not be capable of creating beauty of form originally, but it certainly tends greatly to improve it; and in the human frame elegance and grace are seldom divorced from the free and flexible vigour acquired in the palestra. A similar observation may be applied to the human mind. Admitting that certain tribes or races of men are, taken as a whole, gifted by nature with finer faculties, nicer perceptions, and more acute sensibilities, than others, no one can doubt that these may be prodigiously improved by education; which, in fact, is to the mind what the chisel of the sculptor is to the rude block of marble,—that which fashions it, by scarcely per-

This war lasted ten months. (Xenophon, Hist. Graec., ii. 4, 43.) Attica.

cepsible degrees, into the fairest proportions, and gives animation and expression to that which was originally a rude and inert block. The Athenians were early sensible of this important truth; and although, till the age of Pericles, the three principal preceptors of their youth were the grammarian, the teacher of music, and the master of the gymnasion, yet even this limited circle of instructors was not ill adapted to call forth and keep in exercise the peculiar faculties for which they were so remarkably distinguished, and to prepare them for a more extended range of instruction. To the study of music, indeed, they were enthusiastically devoted, because in that delightful art they found a natural scope for the gratification of those nice and delicate perceptions which constituted a prominent characteristic of their minds; nor will its union with the study of grammar be deemed surprising, when we reflect that it was probably this circumstance, aided by an organic and intellectual sensibility altogether unrivalled, "which gave form to the most harmonious language ever spoken among men, and guided invention to the structure of that verse which, even under the gross disguise of modern pronunciation, is still universally charming." But there were other elements in the Athenian character besides a love of music, poetry, and the fine arts, which both nature and education had contributed to form.

Speaking of this people, Plutarch, after describing them as at once passionate and placable, prone to anger, yet easily appeased, goes on to observe, that their minds were not formed for laborious researches; and that, although they seized a subject as it were by intuition, yet they wanted the patience and perseverance requisite for a thorough examination of its various bearings and ramifications. An observation more superficial in itself, and arguing a greater ignorance of the real character of the Athenians, cannot easily be imagined. That they were remarkable for ardour and vivacity of temperament, quickness of sensibility as well as of apprehension, and versatility of feeling as well as of genius, has not been disputed. But there is nothing in all this which necessarily presupposes or implies an incapacity for the prosecution of subjects requiring patient thought and persevering attention. The French, in point of national character, hold nearly the same relative place among the modern nations of Europe that the Athenians held among the states of ancient Greece; yet it is matter of notoriety, that in the cultivation of the natural and the exact sciences, that is, in the prosecution of those subjects where patience and perseverance are pre-eminently indispensable, they have for a considerable time outstripped all competition, and borne the palm alone. This was precisely the case with the Athenians. A love of profound research and curious speculation seems to have been as inherent in their character, and as congenial to their national temperament, as a love of poetry, music, and the fine arts.

The fire which Thales lighted up was never afterwards wholly extinguished amongst the Greeks. He had kindled his torch at the altar of science in Egypt, and it burned brightly in the propitious atmosphere to which it was transferred by the father of Greek philosophy. The Ionian school, of which this philosopher became the founder, was followed in quick succession by the Italian and Eleatic, where the physical and metaphysical sciences were cultivated with equal success; and in the dialogues of Plato, ample evidence may be found of the zeal and ardour with which the laws both of mind and of matter were investigated in Athens, as soon as the violence of political contention had subsided, and a respite from wars and revolutions gave leisure for the discussion of such subjects. God, the Universe, and Man, at once divided and engrossed the whole of their attention. The question first asked was, What is God? and to this various and discordant answers were of course necessarily given. According to Thales, he is the most ancient of all things, for he is without beginning; he is air, said Anaximenes; he is a pure mind, quoth Anaxagoras; he is both air and mind, contended Archelaus. Democritus thought him mind in a spherical form; Pythagoras, a monad, and the principle of good; Heraclites, an eternal circular fire; Parmenides, the finite and immovable principle, in a spherical form; Melissus and Zeno, one and everything, the only eternal and infinite. But these answers, being all more or less physical, did not satisfy the question; a vacancy was still left; and Necessity, Fate, and Fortune or Accident, were the principles called in to fill it up. The Universe gave rise to another set of disputations. According to some, what is has ever been, and the world is eternal. Others, again, argued that the world is not eternal, but that matter is eternal. And here a multitude of questions arose. Was this matter susceptible of forms, of one or of many? Was it water, or air, or fire, or an assemblage of corporeal atoms, or an infinite number of indestructible elements? Had it subsisted without movement in the void, or had it an irregular movement? Did the world appear by intelligence communicating its action to it, or did the Deity ordain it by penetrating it with a part of his essence? Did these atoms move in the void, and was the universe the result of their fortuitous concourse? Are there but two elements in nature, earth and fire; and by these are all things produced? or are there four elements, whose parts are united by attraction and separated by repulsion? In a word, "causes and essences; bodies, forms, and colours; production and dissolution; the great phenomena of visible nature—the magnitudes, figures, eclipses, and phases, of the two heavenly luminaries; the nature and division of the sky; the magnitude and situation of the earth; the sea, with its ebbs and flows; the causes of thunder, lightning, winds and earthquakes—all these furnished disquisitions which were pursued with an eagerness of research and intenseness of application peculiar to the Greeks." Nor did Man form a subject of less interesting and curious speculation than the universe of which he was considered an epitome. All allowed him a soul and an intelligence, but all differed widely in their ideas respecting this soul or intelligence. Some maintained that it was always in motion, and that it moved by itself; others thought it a number in motion; some considered it the harmony of the four elements; others, again, variously represented it as water, fire, blood, a fiery mixture of things perceptible by the intellect, which have globose shapes and the force of fire, a flame emanating from the sun, an assemblage of fiery and spherical atoms, like those subtle particles of matter which are seen floating in the rays of the sun.

Such were a few of the speculations which science had devised for employing the thoughts of the active-minded men in Greece, particularly in Attica; and when to these we add the ethical and political systems of the Academy, the Lyceum, the Porch, and the Gardens, to say nothing of that of the New Academy founded by Arcesilaus, and ably maintained by Carneades, or of the attention paid by almost all the philosophers to the cultivation of pure geometry, some idea may be formed of the extent of Plutarch's misrepresentation of the Athenian mind when he described

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1 What the music of the ancients ever was, we have now little means of judging, as none of it has been transmitted intelligibly to us; but that the Grecian music, even from the earliest times, had extraordinary merit, we have Plato's testimony in very remarkable words (Musae, 46; Cononius, 333); and Aristotle (Polit. I. viii. c. 5) coincides in judgment with his great master. (Mitchell's Aristotopaeus, pref. disc. p. xxxv. xxxvi.)

2 Mitchell's Aristotopaeus, pref. disc. ubi supra.

3 Ibid. p. ali. et seqq. it as incapable of pursuing laborious researches, and as wanting in persevering and continuous attention. The very reverse of this, as has just been shown, was the truth; and, independently of the exemplification of a similar capacity for deep and laborious researches on the part of a modern nation whose character in many particulars resembles that of the ancient Athenians, it is no more than a sound view of the principles of human nature might, anterior to all experience, have led us to anticipate. For, as travellers often reach the same destination by different routes, so men frequently pursue the same course from different motives or impulses. In the prosecution of scientific investigations, for instance, the Frenchman and the German are each persevering and laborious; but the former is impelled by an ardent curiosity and an overpowering ambition which concentrate the whole energies of his mind on the subject which has powerfully attracted his attention, and merge all his feelings and desires in the attainment of one great object. The latter, without enthusiasm, perhaps with no definite object of ambition in view, pursues a similar career, because it belongs to his nature to persevere in whatever he may have undertaken or commenced. The principles by which these inquirers are set in motion are different, and the rates of advancement consequently unequal; but diligent and persevering labour is nevertheless alike predictable of each. The one travels, so to speak, in a light chariot, and compasses the distance to be travelled over at an accelerated pace; the other trundles it slowly along in a heavy lumbering post-wagon, but in time he also reaches the same destination. This analogy will probably serve to bring out the distinction here pointed at, and which, indeed, it is necessary to keep steadily in view, in order to form a just conception of the Athenian character. The native of Attica may be considered the Frenchman of Greece; quick, lively, sensitive, versatile, inconstant, full of that mercurial spirit which shows itself equally in extreme delicacy of organic perception, and intuitive rapidity of mental apprehension; yet ended with an ardent and unquenchable curiosity, together with an inherent taste for subtle and abstract speculations, under the joint influence of which he was capable of penetrating the most recondite mysteries of science. Much of the excellence attainable in art is doubtless due to superiority of physical constitution and of natural character; but in science, although original genius will always assert its pre-eminence, and distinguish itself by the felicity of its intuitions, unremitting labour is the conditio sine qua non of great and signal success; and it is not a little remarkable to find this condition so strikingly exemplified in the character of a people whose more obvious qualities would seem incompatible with steady concentration of thought, and whom a superficial observer has accordingly pronounced incapable of that intense, resolute application, which, in fact, constituted one of their most distinguishing national peculiarities.

Politically considered, the Athenian character took by reflection the hue of those republican institutions to which it had originally given birth; and this, blending and intermingling with its natural lights and shadows, produced a composite mass, which moral analysis unfortunately has no prismatic power of resolving into its primary elements. Love of liberty, however, as liberty was then understood, formed the ruling principle as well as passion of the people. An equality of political rights, or, in other words, an equal right in all free citizens to aspire to the exercise of political power, constituted the essence of the Athenian form of government. Civil liberty, the benign discovery of modern times, was then unknown, or at least unenjoyed. Political equality was the only species of liberty understood or enjoyed in the ancient republics, and in those of Italy during the middle ages. It was this which had such powerful charms for the citizens of those democracies; it was this of which they were so passionately enamoured; it was this which gave so effective a stimulus to all the faculties of the human mind, and produced those wonders of genius and of art which have exhausted the admiration, and rendered hopeless the rivalry, of succeeding times. The glory of the country in fact formed the glory of every citizen belonging to it; and he felt himself directly participant in all that contributed in any way towards its greatness or renown. For a short time, indeed, an oligarchical usurpation might oppress the people, or the ambition of a fortunate soldier or crafty statesman might prove dangerous to liberty; but a sudden popular explosion might overturn the one, and the ostracism expel the other. The reaction of such a political system upon the national character could not fail to be powerfully marked. Its immediate products were extreme jealousy of those intrusted with power, and an incessant watchfulness over all their proceedings; an intense, passionate detestation of tyrants and tyranny; an ardent and active zeal in defence of public liberty when assailed, whether from within or from without. Factional turbulence, inconstancy, and love of change, may also be numbered amongst the effects of a system of government purely democratical; and, paradoxical as it may seem, these for a time constitute its best if not its only safeguards. Much has been said and written about republican ingratitude, which, indeed, has long been proverbial; but those who declaim on this theme do not reflect, that while the vice in question is not the peculiar reproach of democracy, the essence of that form of government consists in anxiously guarding against the aggrandizement of individuals or classes, and in crushing every aspirant who attempts to raise his head above the common level. Republics have often had occasion to regret their rewards, seldom their punishments.

If we are not greatly mistaken, these observations furnish General results. a key to the right intelligence of the Athenian character, the leading features of which were unquestionably moulded and fashioned by their political institutions. They were fickle, versatile, liable to sudden gusts of passion, but easily appeased; inconstant in their affections, but not implacable in their hatreds; jealous, factious, turbulent, impatient of command, and prone to resent the assumption of superiority; attentive to the information and instruction afforded them by eminent citizens, yet intolerant of dictation, and, in their best days, ready to repress an overgrown and dangerous reputation; fond of flattery, and too apt to lend a delighted ear to the adulation of sycophants or demagogues, but not insensible to virtue, nor unwilling to listen to those honest patriots who proved their sincerity by courageously exposing the vices and follies of their countrymen; brave in the field, and liable to be excessively elated with victory or depressed with misfortunes, but seldom chargeable with dishonouring success by inhumanity to the vanquished, or deepening the disgrace of defeat by humiliating or object concessions to the victor; generous in their sentiments; bold and free in their opinions; invariable in their sympathy with and admiration of genius; constant in their love of liberty and their country; and never backward to repair the errors or injustice committed under the influence of pernicious advice, passionate excitement, or the headlong impetuosity of an ardent and uncontrollable temperament. In their private conduct they were courteous, mild, humane, polished, liberal, and enlightened; simple in their manners, frugal in their habits, and but little addicted to any kind of ostentation or parade, even after their victories had brought them in contact with oriental luxury, and when their riches enabled them to rival in costliness and in splendour the nations whom they conquered. All their sumptuousness and magnificence was reserved for and lavished on those public edifices and monuments of art which made Athens the pride of Greece, the envy of the surrounding nations, and the admiration of the world at large. Such was the Athenian Demos in the days of its glory and independence, when, by the mouth of Aristides, it declared to the ambas- sailors of the Great King, "that it was impossible for all the gold in the world to tempt the republic of Athens, or to prevail with it to sell its liberty and that of Greece," and when public virtue maintained the purity and vigour of public institutions.

During the period which elapsed from the abolition of royalty till the appearance of Solon in the character of a lawgiver and codifier, the constitution of the Athenian government experienced frequent mutations. To the kings succeeded the hereditary archons, who held their office for life, and were in fact sovereigns under another designation. Of this the nobles grew at length tired; and, accordingly, on the death of Alcmaeon (B.C. 752), Charops was raised to the archonship upon the condition of holding it for ten years only. He was followed in succession by six others, who exercised the functions of the office under the same decennial limitation. But on the expiration of the archonship of Eryxias, a further and greater change took place, in 682 B.C. The duration of the office was then limited to a single year, and its duties were divided amongst nine persons, chosen out of the first order of the state, the eunuchs or nobles only. These functionaries all bore the title of archon, but differed in dignity as well as in the particular nature of their duties. The first in rank, called Archon Eponymus, or simply the Archon, represented the majesty of the state, and by his name the year of his magistracy was distinguished; the second bore the title of king, and was the head of the religion of the commonwealth, to the care and protection of which his functions principally related; and the third, or polemarch, was originally a sort of minister at war or commander-in-chief. The six other archons, denominated thesmothites, presided as judges in the ordinary courts of justice, and formed together a tribunal with a special jurisdiction. The nine together constituted the Council of State. The legislative functions remained with the senate or boule and the assembly of the people; but the whole executive powers of the state, political, military, judicial, and religious, were exercised by the archons.

This is the substance of the information derived from the ancient authors respecting the Athenian government at the period to which we refer; but as writing had until then been little practised in Greece, and as laws were promulgated orally and preserved by tradition, it was necessarily scanty and imperfect; nor was it possible, under such circumstances, that the sciences of legislation and government should receive any material improvement, or the rights and interests of the many meet with due respect and attention, when the authority of the state was lodged in the hands of an irresponsible few. The commonwealth was distracted by a perpetual scramble for the sovereign power, which, being open to all the principal families, some who could not obtain it by legal sought to grasp by illegal means. Eacious ambition and lawless turbulence found equal scope for displaying themselves; and while the people or Demos were fearfully oppressed by the nobles, continual alternations of despotism and anarchy, of usurpation and revolution, the intolerable evils of an unsettled government and an uncertain jurisprudence, became deeply felt and almost universally acknowledged. A remedy was accordingly sought for in a written code which Draco introduced in B.C. 624; but the talents of the legislator were unequal to the task he had undertaken, and the indiscriminate severity of his system speedily defeated its own purpose. He made no attempt to reform the political constitution of his country, the real source of the miseries under which it groaned, but established a new penal code, which denounced the highest punishment against the most trivial offences as well as the most enormous crimes, upon the ground that the slightest breach of any positive law deserved death as treason against the law of the state. A system so revolting to the natural feelings and sentiments of mankind could never be reduced into practice, nor rendered productive of anything but evil; for every principle of reason and of humanity conspired to defeat its operation; and whilst its obvious tendency was to provoke the commission of heinous crimes, it at the same time multiplied the chances of impunity in favour of criminals. The laws of Draco, therefore, instead of applying a remedy to the evils of a defective system of polity, served rather to increase them, and to make the people feel strongly the necessity of a more radical and comprehensive reform than that which had been proposed by this stern and inflexible moralist. Nor was it long ere a change was effected in the constitution of the government, which laid the foundation of the Athenian system of polity properly so called, and which, though it subsequently underwent frequent and considerable alterations, may nevertheless be regarded as the basis of Athenian liberty. This was accomplished by Solon, one of the greatest characters that Greece ever produced, and one of the wisest men of whom any age or country can boast. We now accordingly proceed to give some account of his legislative labours, as these were embodied in the constitution which he reformed and remodelled on a plan suited to the circumstances and wants of his country.

By the fundamental law of this constitution the sovereign Legislative power was vested in the general assembly of the people; but an important question here arises, namely, Who were Solon accounted? The People, legally entitled, in their collective capacity, to the exercise of the supreme power of the state, as well as to provide effectually for the exclusion of those upon whom that high privilege had not been conferred? The population of Attica, or, in other words, the component members of the Athenian commonwealth, consisted of three classes, viz., Athenian citizens; resident aliens, or freemen liable to the capitation tax, who had not the rights of Athenian citizens; and slaves in actual bondage; and these classes differed from one another in numbers no less than in rank and condition. The number of citizens has been variously estimated, and, in point of fact, must have differed at different times. According to the census taken in the time of Pericles, they amounted to no more than 14,040 persons. In the first speech of Demosthenes against Aristogiton, they are, however, reckoned at nearly 20,000; Plato, in his Critias, assumes the same amount for the most ancient times, having doubtless transferred the number that was commonly computed in his own day to the earliest periods of the state; and the later Grecian writers, as Libanius, for instance, follow the same statement. But the enumeration made by Demetrius Phalereus gives more precise and definite results. According to this census, which was taken in the year B.C. 309, there were 21,000 citizens, 10,000 resident aliens, and 400,000 slaves; an estimate which, according to the usual statistical rule of taking the adults as a fourth part of the population, would give for the total number of citizens 84,000, and for that of aliens 40,000; whilst the slaves, having no head or status of any kind in the commonwealth, are reckoned absolutely, comprehending under the 400,000 all those in actual bondage, men, women, and children, without distinction of age or sex. But, from various considerations, into which it is unnecessary to enter, Boeckh has shown that this census requires considerable modifications; and, upon grounds which appear to be completely conclusive, he reckons the free inhabitants at 90,000, the resident aliens at 45,000, and the slaves at 365,000, together with women and children, which latter, however, were proportionally few. Assuming this estimate, then, as a pretty close approximation to the truth, it follows that the number of adult citizens was above 22,000, and that The People, in the political sense of the term, consisted of only about a twenty-third part of the entire population of the country. It is of the greatest importance to keep this fact steadily in view, as it has an immediate bearing upon the whole political system of the Athenians, and serves to reconcile many apparent anomalies by which superficial inquirers have been so often perplexed and misled. Nothing indeed can be more erroneous than the notion, which has been repeatedly promulgated, that the Athenian constitution was purely democratical. On the contrary, it was, in the strictest sense of the term, a republican aristocracy,—the whole power of the state being vested in the privileged class called citizens, who, as we have just seen, constituted but a small portion of the entire population; whilst the two other classes had no recognized political existence whatsoever, and that which was by far the most numerous remained in a state of more abject servitude than the villains under the feudal system, or the serfs in Russia and Poland.

We have already said that, by the fundamental law of the Athenian constitution, the sovereign power was vested in the general assembly of the people. This body consisted of all the citizens, or privileged class, who had attained a certain age; excepting such as had been attainted and rendered infamous by a judicial sentence. Yielding to the temper of the times and the force of circumstances, Solon confirmed to this body an authority universally and uncontrollably absolute; but he at the same time sought to establish a balancing power, capable in some measure of restraining the excesses into which a sovereign multitude is ever ready, on the slightest excitement, to plunge. With this view he made a new division of the people into four ranks or classes, according to the relative value of their possessions or property. The first rank consisted of those whose lands produced annually five hundred medimni of corn, wine, oil, or any other commodity, dry or liquid; and who were hence called Pentacontadimini. The second rank was composed of persons whose lands yielded at least three hundred measures, and who were denominated Hippies; because, although enjoying the same exemption as the first rank from service in the infantry or on shipboard, they were bound to maintain, at their own charge, a horse for the public, and, within the military age, to serve personally in the cavalry. The third rank, or Zeugites, consisted of those whose lands produced upwards of 200, but less than 400 measures, and who were bound to serve in the infantry of the line (δεξάρα), and to be completely provided with arms for the purpose. The rest of the citizens not possessed of lands yielding 200 measures were comprehended under the name of Thetes, and were also liable to military service either in the infantry of the line or among the light troops, according as they chanced to be provided with arms; and when Athens afterwards became a maritime power, it was also from this class that the fleet was principally manned. The diligent researches of Arthmuth show the extreme difficulty, or rather impossibility, of ascertaining, by modern standards, the precise relative value of an Attic estate in the age of Solon; but it seems to be tolerably clear that the object and intention of the Athenian lawgiver in forming such division, was to give to property a preponderance over numbers, whereas hitherto all political rights had been dependent on birth alone; and, accordingly, by his constitution, it was expressly provided that the magistracies should be filled from the first, second, and third ranks, to the exclusion of the fourth. This constitution, generally called a timocracy, made the democratic element so powerful in the assembly, where every Athenian citizen, even the poorest, had a vote, that in the end it overruled every other power in the state. But, in the legislator's opinion, it was checked by two great councils, the senate of the Four Hundred and the Council of the Areopagus.

The former consisted of 100 persons chosen out of each of the four wards or districts into which the people of Attica were divided, or 400 in all, but afterwards raised to 500, when the number of wards or districts was increased to ten, and 50 counsellors or senators allotted to each. This reform was introduced by Cleisthenes, in B.C. 510. The common designation of this senate was the Boule or The Council of Five Hundred, or simply The Fire Hundred. The members were chosen annually by lot from among those who were legally qualified for the office and desirous of obtaining it; but, prior to their admission, they had to undergo, before the existing council, a strict scrutiny, termed Doriastia, concerning their past life, and if anything prejudicial to their character came out in course of the inquiry, they were rejected. The counsellors of each tribe, in turn, for the space of 35 days, enjoyed superior dignity and additional authority under the title of Prytanes; and from them the council hall or place of meeting was denominated Prytaneum. The Prytanes officiated in turn as presidents of the council, each holding the office only one day, during which he had the custody of the public seal, with the keys of the treasury and those of the citadel; and the whole assembly formed the Council of State of the commonwealth. This body, partly deliberative and partly executive, had the initiative of all laws; and, in fact, its peculiar and most important function consisted in preparing business for the assembly of the people, where nothing could be proposed which had not previously received the sanction of the council, and where the whole procedure was regulated by functionaries of its appointment. Any measure sanctioned by the Boule, and thus declared to be fit to be brought before the popular assembly was termed a probouleuma. Attendance at the popular assemblies was made compulsory on the part of the citizens, and four assemblies were held during the presidency of every Prytaneum, or terms of 35 days, for the despatch of public business, which was duly apportioned and subdivided amongst them. The first confirmed or rescinded the appointments of magistrates, received accusations of public offences presented by the thesmothete archons, and heard the catalogue of fines and confiscations for the service of the state; the second enacted laws, and disposed of petitions, public and private; the third gave audience to the ministers of foreign powers; and the fourth regulated such matters as concerned religion. In later times, all citizens who attended in due time received a small recompense or pay from the treasury. The Epistates, chairman, speaker, or president of the assembly, was appointed by lot from the nine Proedri or foremen, who were nominated in the same way from the council, that is, one from the counsellors of each tribe whose representatives sat not at the time Prytanes; and with these functionaries sat the Nomophylaces, otherwise called, from their number, The Eleven, whose duty it was to watch over the laws, and to explain to the people the tendency of any proposal which seemed contrary to the spirit of the constitution, as well as to superintend the administration of justice.

Solon took none of those severe precautions to maintain his constitution which were adopted by some other ancient democratic legislators; neither exacting an oath, like Lycurgus, who by a species of artifice sought to render its obligation perpetual, nor ordaining, like Charondas, that whosoever proposed to abrogate an old law or enact a new one, should come into the assembly of the people with a halter about his neck. On the contrary, aware that regulations, however well adapted to the circumstances of the commonwealth at one period, might prove wholly unsuitable to its circumstances at another, and that time, the great innovator, rendered certain changes and modifications necessary, he even went so far as to enjoin an annual revision of the laws, and to prescribe the form in which this might with most propriety be effected. If the assembly of the people declared alteration in any point necessary, a committee was to be appointed, with directions to consider the change proper to be made; and if a new law was in consequence prepared, five officers were at the same time named to defend the old one before the assembly, which then decided between them. The persons composing such a committee were denominated Nomothetes, and in later times amounted to so many as a thousand; the persons nominated to defend an old law had the name of Syndics. This was the only form in which it was safe, or indeed constitutional, to propose any alteration in the existing law at Athens.

But as the passing of a law by the assembly without the regular formalities of previous publication, or of one couched in ambiguous and fallacious terms, or contrary to a former law, subjected the proposer to penalties, it became usual to repeal the old law before any new measure was brought forward; and the delay occasioned by this double procedure served as an additional security to the constitution, which was equally guarded against rash innovation on the one hand, and the danger resulting from the absence of all improvement or amelioration on the other.

The regular and ordinary mode of enacting a law at Athens may be very shortly described. As the council had the initiative of all laws, so it was their duty to frame the bills which were to be submitted to the general assembly of the people. But any citizen having ought to propose for public consideration, might address it to the Prytanes, whose duty it was to receive all petitions, suggestions, and communications, and to transmit them to the council. When the matter had been there approved and digested into proper form, it became a proboideuma or bill, and being written on a tablet, was exposed during several days for public perusal and consideration. At the next assembly it was read to the people, after which the question was asked by the public crier, "Who of those above fifty years of age chooses to speak?" And these, if any were so disposed, having delivered their sentiments, the crier again proclaimed, "Any Athenian, not disqualified by law, may now speak." The circumstances absolutely disqualifying were flight in battle, a large amount of debt to the commonwealth, and conviction for a crime inferring infamy; but the Prytanes had the privilege of enjoining silence at discretion, although the injunction was not effectual unless ratified or acquiesced in by the assembly. When the debates had ended, the suffrages were taken by a show of hands, which was the ordinary way of voting; but in extraordinary cases, particularly where the question to be determined related to alleged mal-administration on the part of magistrates, the votes were given by casting pebbles into vessels prepared for the purpose by the Prytanes, who, after the foremen had examined the suffrages, and declared the majority, dismissed the assembly. Such was the legislative mechanism of the Athenian constitution.

But Solon hoped to provide a further and more powerful restraint against aberration in the Court of Areiopagus, by improving its regulations, and extending its powers. We have no account of the origin of this celebrated tribunal, which, indeed, the partiality of succeeding ages carried too far back into the fabulous ages to be now discovered. It was composed of those who, having executed the office of archon with credit, and passed the euthyne or scrutiny concerning their conduct while in power, were considered best qualified, by their experience and integrity, for being admitted members of this tribunal; and, in order to place them above being influenced either by fear or favour, they held their offices not for a year, which was the ordinary official term in the Athenian commonwealth, but for life. The powers of the court of Areiopagus were very great indeed. It is said to have been the first which adjudged the punishment of death for murder; and capital offences amongst the Athenians were for the most part cognizable by it alone. It was the only court from which there lay no appeal to the assembly of the sovereign people. It had power to stay execution of all judicial decrees, not excepting those pronounced by the general assembly itself; and to annul an acquittal or to extend mercy to the condemned; it directed all issues from the public treasury; in its censorial capacity it punished impiety, immorality, and all disorderly conduct, and exercised a general superintendence over the morals and behaviour of the people; it required every citizen to account to it annually for his means of livelihood, and to show that he earned his subsistence by honest industry in his particular calling; lastly, it took a fatherly care of the youth of the republic, and provided that all should receive an education suitable to their rank and fortune. For the despatch of judicial business the court of Areiopagus sat only during the night, and in perfect darkness, that the members, it is said, might be the less liable to prepossessions either for or against the accused; and, on the same precautionary principle, advocates were required to confine themselves to a simple narrative of facts and statement of the law, without digressing into rhetorical embellishment, or attempting to influence the understandings by appealing to the passions of the judges. In a word, this celebrated institution formed a sort of State Inquisition, and seems to have been organized for the double purpose of checking that constant tendency to excess which is inherent in all purely popular governments, and of maintaining that public and private virtue which has rightly been pronounced the principle of democracy.

Besides the Areiopagus, which ought properly to be regarded as constituting part of the machine of government, courts there were several courts of judicature at Athens. Before the time of Solon the archons officiated as supreme and sole judges in nearly all manner of suits; but these functionaries being appointed by lot, and often very ill qualified for discharging so important a duty, it had become usual for each to choose two persons learned in the law to assist him; and the latter, under the name of paredroi or assessors, were at length recognized as regular constitutional officers, and appointed with the same formalities as the archons themselves. Solon, however, discerned the inconveniences of this system, and reformed it altogether. "That," said he, "is, in my opinion, the most perfect government, where an injury to any one is the concern of all." The principle from which he set out was therefore to give to all an immediate concern in the administration of justice. With this view he ordained, that all causes should be tried by select bodies of men, resembling modern juries, and called to perform nearly the same functions; the archons merely superintending the preparation of causes, and presiding at the trial of them in the manner of our judges. All questions of law or of practice were judiciable solely by the latter; but in all questions of fact, or in the general issue of guilty or not guilty, the jury were the exclusive judges; and it was the bounden duty of the presiding magistrate to give immediate effect to their decision, whatever it might be. Any Athenian above thirty years of age, and not under legal disqualification, was eligible as a juryman, on delivering his name and condition to the thesmothete archons; but as the attendance in these courts drew the citizens away from their ordinary occupations, it was only fair to indemnify them by a small payment for their attendance; this custom, however, was not introduced until the time of Pericles. From the general list of those who voluntarily tendered their services, the thesmothete archons appointed by ballot juries to their different courts; and these appear to have officiated for a definite period in each, somewhat in the manner of the Roman judices, who were, to all intents and purposes, a species of standing jury. It thus appears that the honour of inventing jury trial is due to the great Athenian lawyer; and that, in his hands, the institution reached a degree of perfection which it has not yet attained among many modern nations, who affect the greatest admiration for the ancient jurisprudence, and boast of having transmuted into their codes its wisest rules and provisions. It is necessary to add, that, in order to save the inhabitants of the country the trouble and expense of resorting to Athens for justice in cases of inferior importance, itinerant judges, called from their number The Forty, were appointed to make regular circuits through the towns or boroughs of Attica, with full powers to judge and determine in all actions of petty assault, and in all disputes about property under a certain value.

In all countries, and throughout all ages, religion and civil government have, with few exceptions, been so intimately, or rather so inseparably connected, that an exposition of the one would be incomplete and even unintelligible without some account of the other. The magistrate has almost everywhere sought the alliance of the priest; and the hopes and fears arising from a supposed dependence on superior power or a belief in a future state of existence have been employed as useful auxiliaries in governing men and managing their affairs in the present life. The possibility of ruling nations by means of their reason alone, and by a due regard to their secular interests, without any reference to their religious opinions or observances, is an idea which seems never to have entered the mind of any ancient legislator, and which even now, when the mighty volume of past experience is unfolded for our instruction, is considered by many as little better than downright political heresy. It was deemed alike impious and impracticable to attempt to establish any form of polity of which religion or the church did not constitute one of the main pillars, or to seek to promote the happiness of men in society without at the same time prescribing by law the mode in which they ought to worship the gods. In the Athenian constitution, as settled by Solon, religion and government, the church and the state, were so intimately connected, and became so indissolubly blended together, that, without any sensible error, we may at will consider the religion as part of the government, or the government as part of the religion, and both as alike the creatures of positive enactment or legislative ordination.

The religion of the Athenians and the Greeks generally seems to have arisen out of a strong sympathy with the various powers and agencies manifested in the visible world. To the imaginative Greek no part of nature was absolutely passive or inert; all the objects around him either impressed upon him the idea of life, or be readily imparted it to them from the fulness of his imagination. "This was, in fact, the popular mode of thinking and feeling, cherished, no doubt, by the bold forms, abrupt contrasts, and all the natural wonders, of a mountainous and sea-broken land. The teeming earth, the quickening sun, the restless sea, the rushing stream, the irresistible storm, in short, every display of superhuman power, roused in the mind of the Greek a distinct sentiment of religious awe. Everywhere he found deities, which, however, may not for a long time have been distinguished by name from the objects in which their presence was manifested. In this manner it may be supposed, the Pelasgians, or earliest inhabitants of Greece, worshipped the powers which, according to primitive notions, animated the various forms of the visible world. Herodotus, who attempts to trace the steps by which this simple belief in the divine powers of nature was transformed into the complicated system of Greek mythology, assumes two great causes of the change: first, the introduction of foreign divinities and rites; and, secondly, the inventive imagination of the Greek poets. In regard to the first point he believes, that nearly all the names of the Greek gods had been imported into Greece from Egypt; but this supposition, which was formerly adopted without scruple, and was believed in as firmly as the establishment of Egyptian colonies in Greece, has in modern times been the subject of very earnest controversies; and although it is not to be denied, that eastern nations, and even Egypt, present some striking coincidences with the religion and rites of the Greeks, yet the accounts contained in Herodotus and others who followed him are little more than dreams. As to the second point, Herodotus says that Homer and Hesiod were the authors of the Greek theogony, gave titles to the gods, distinguished their attributes and functions, and described their forms. But this opinion can be regarded as reasonable only on the supposition, that Homer and Hesiod were viewed by the historian as the representatives of a whole line of poets who were the organs and interpreters of the popular creed, and thus gradually determined its permanent form." The religion of the Greeks was in all essential points of purely native origin, but their mythology, as we now have it, must have passed through two important processes of formation. The one was that of personifying the powers of nature and conceiving them as distinct beings; the other was that by which divinities which had at first enjoyed only local worship in certain districts, or among certain tribes, were raised to the rank of national divinities, and of members of the one great family of gods. Both these processes may have been going on simultaneously, but it must certainly have taken a long period before they produced those results which we term the mythology of Greece. Although the groundwork of the Greek religion was the worship of nature and her powers, it cannot be denied that among several tribes we meet with divinities that were neither personified powers of nature, nor personified abstractions, but represented the general consciousness of man's dependence on beings of a higher order. As, however, the gods were conceived as beings with human forms, the belief that they were subject to the same passions and frailties as mortal men was a very natural consequence. But notwithstanding this, it was believed that they punished men for their offences and negligences, both in this world and in the world to come; and in this respect, it cannot be denied that the religion of the Greeks exercised a salutary moral influence. The belief in a future state was very general among the Greeks, but even the life of the blessed in the other world was not conceived by a Greek as an enviable condition at all.

At the same time it was a system of show and parade, of festivals and ceremonies, of rites and observances, and, as this religion, singularly adapted to take a powerful hold of the popular mind, more especially when it became intimately blended with the literature as well as with the political institutions of the country. It imposed no particular set of doctrines, and exacted no peremptory compliances, but, addressing itself exclusively to the senses and the imagination, it was acquiesced in without inquiry, and maintained without persecution. As the religion of the state, an outward respect was due to it and required; but crimes against this religion were only punished as they affected the state, and not on the abstract grounds of impiety or sacrilege. Socrates was condemned to death, not because he revered the deity and taught a purer faith than that entertained by his countrymen, but because he attacked the religion of the state as by law established, and closely interwoven with the whole system of national policy; and even this sacrifice to the violated law was speedily and deeply repented; for the genius of polytheism was essentially tolerant. Hence mere railing, when general and not directed against positive institutions, seldom or never incurred the animadversion of the magistrate, and was often highly relished by the people. Aristophanes, for example, made as free with the gods as he did with the great, and lashed the supposed foibles of the former with as little mercy as the vices and follies of the latter; yet his wit produced no inconvenience to its author, and was even loudly applauded by his countrymen. Æschylus, indeed, incurred some danger from a suspicion of having betrayed the secrets of Eleusis; but as this was always considered a crime of the greatest magnitude, and as it imported a violation of the most sacred human obligations, as well as of the public policy of the state in a matter where the sanctions of its laws were peculiarly severe, no inference can justly be drawn from this against the general toleration ex- ercised, viz., when its salutes were directed only against the public religion.

Another circumstance deserving of notice is, that the ministers of religion were not confined exclusively to the service of its altars. The sacerdotal dignity was indeed incompatible with the exercise of any regular profession; and for this reason the priests had a fixed revenue secured to them; but they were eligible to the most important offices in the state, and might, if so inclined, serve as soldiers in the field. Their salaries were in general proportioned to the dignity of their functions and the rank of the deities whom they served; and these were paid out of the sacred revenues, which were derived partly from fines that individuals were condemned to pay for various offences, partly from the produce of lands consecrated to the gods, or appropriated to defray the expense of sacrifices offered in the name of the republic; partly from particular grants, and partly from a tithe of the spoils taken in war, although the last were commonly considered the exclusive property of Athena. These, with the produce of accidental confiscations, formed the regular sources of income; but the credulity of the people supplied an inexhaustible fund, which enriched the temples of Delos and Eleusis, and supported the magnificence and splendour amidst which the Delphic oracle was enshrined. The solemn festivals, such as the Dionysiac and Panathenaic, which indeed constituted the greater part of this religion, and contributed alike to maintain its hold of the popular mind and to nourish a taste for the arts, were celebrated at the expense of the choragi or leaders of the choruses, of which each tribe furnished one; and the richest citizens only were appointed to the office, which, though ruinous, was eagerly solicited, as it paved the way to more substantial honours, and formed a passport to the favour of a people ever ready to reward him who ministered profusely to their pleasures. Hence the privilege enjoyed by the choragus who had proved victorious in the scenic contests, of inscribing his name on the tripod erected by his tribe, or of perpetuating the memory of his success by a choragic monument, was not the only recompense looked for by those who had incurred the expense of ministering to the pleasures of the people. Lastly, although Athens had a state religion, it had no sacerdotal hierarchy. The priests did not, as in Egypt and in other countries, form a distinct order or caste, which, indeed, would have been incompatible with a democratical form of government. They were not a separate body united by peculiar laws under a chief whose authority extended over all its inferior members. The dignity of supreme pontiff was unknown, and each priest served his particular shrine unconnected with his brethren. The temples of the principal divinities, indeed, such as those of Athena, Poseidon, Demeter, and Persephone, had each a high priest who presided over its service; and the number of subordinate ministers employed was commonly in proportion to the rank of the particular deity, and the wealth accumulated at his shrine; but the pontifical dignity was altogether local; and the priests of one temple formed a society wholly distinct from those of another. Hence the ministers of the gods at Athens were not judges in matters of religion, nor authorized to take cognizance of or to punish crimes against the deity. This, as we have already said, was exclusively within the competency of the civil magistrate; and, accordingly, we find that it was in consequence of a civil sentence alone, and not in virtue of any power or authority in themselves, that the Eumolpidae launched their anathemas against Alcibiades, and that Socrates was condemned to die.

The subject of the public economy of the Athenian state—embracing inquiries concerning prices, wages, and the interest of money; the administration of finance and the public expenditure; the ordinary and extraordinary revenues; and the peculiar financial measures of the Greeks—is too vast and complicated to be treated here at full length. In Boeckh's learned and laborious work, however, there will be found a prodigious accumulation of curious facts relative to all these branches of the subject; and although the science of the author is greatly inferior to his erudition, and his conclusions are frequently at variance with sound principle, yet he has furnished abundant means for the correction of his own errors, and collected a body of information, the value and importance of which it is difficult to over-estimate. A large part of his first book is dedicated to an enumeration of the various prices of commodities in Attica, by comparing which with the actual prices of the same commodities in different countries, he endeavours to determine the relative wealth of Attica according to modern standards. But although this collection is equally interesting and valuable, the utility of such a comparison may be fairly questioned, upon the ground that no certain inference can be drawn from the similarity or dissimilarity of ancient and modern prices. The proportion between the value of any given commodity, and that of gold or silver, may be a safe enough criterion in the same place and for short periods of time; but for distant ages and countries such a comparison can lead to no result upon which any reliance can be placed; and for this plain reason, that we have no common or invariable standard to which we can refer. For a comparison with prices in other countries at the same time, and for such a purpose as that to which Boeckh has applied it in examining the statement of Polybius respecting the valuation of Attica, his list of prices may be used with safety and advantage; but whether the precious metals, labour, or any other standard, be adopted as a medium of comparison between the prices of commodities in ancient Greece and in modern Europe, the result must, for the reason already stated, be equally fallacious and nugatory. The standard employed, whatever it may be, is itself indeterminate; or, in other words, the measure assumed and the thing to be measured by it are equally uncertain.

Again, with regard to the interest of money, it is evident Interest of that no sound conclusion can be drawn as to its rate from a money consideration of the various rates or interest of money lent on bottomry, which Boeckh takes as a criterion; because this was doubtless a most hazardous species of investment, on account of the imperfect state of nautical science, the dangerous navigation of the Greek seas, and, worse than all, the insecurity of the laws and the corruption of the tribunals; and the premium paid by the borrower to the lender would of course be in some measure commensurate with the risk to which the capital of the latter was exposed. Nor is this all. For, if the rate of interest be that sum which the lender receives and the borrower pays for the use of a certain amount of monied capital, without any consideration for trouble in the collection of the income, or for risk as to the punctual repayment of the interest or principal at stipulated periods, it may fairly be doubted whether there was anything which can justly be considered as a general or an established rate of interest at Athens. There were no public securities, no means of investing money under the guarantee of the national credit; whilst, from the continual dread of revolution or foreign invasion, the insecurity of property was such, that the punctual repayment of interest or principal at stipulated periods must have been liable to very great, but at the same time very variable, risks; a state of things wholly incompatible with a general or an established rate of interest. And with respect to money lent on mortgage or land-pledge, which, in the settled communities of modern times, approaches nearest to the public securities in point of safety, the tenure of land in Attica was, from the causes already mentioned, so precarious and insecure that, in this case also, a large yet variable indemnification, in the name of interest, must have been paid, and consequently no particular rate could have been general or common.

Some historians have accused the Athenian state of ne-Revenue.