I. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CORN LAWS.

All governments, in every age of the world, have interfered too much with the affairs of their subjects. A notion has very generally prevailed, that certain branches of commerce were sometimes advantageous to society, though ruinous to those who should attempt to carry them on; and that other branches, though profitable to individuals, were frequently inconsistent with the general advantage. On a first view, this opinion, though essentially erroneous, seems sufficiently plausible. Many of the pursuits of individuals apparently conduce very little, and may sometimes even seem hostile, to the interests of the whole; and hence we are naturally enough led to infer, that the public advantage would be best consulted by their prohibition. Nothing evinces more strikingly the prevalence of this notion of the propriety of restricting and directing the operations of industry and the investment of capital, than the regulations respecting the trade in corn. This, no doubt, is only what might have been expected. To secure an adequate supply of food, and to obviate famine and scarcity, must always be an object of the first importance with legislators; and while the efficacy of the regulating system is unquestioned, it is here it will be chiefly called into action.

When legislators abandon the principle of free competition, and imagine they can give a more advantageous direction to national industry, their habits and station in society have a powerful influence in determining the regulations they adopt. Agriculturists raise corn for sale, as well as for their own consumption; and as they naturally endeavour to obtain the highest price for their produce, where their voice predominates in the legislature of a country, it is reasonable to presume, that the regulations respecting the trade in corn will be framed with a design rather to enhance than to lower its price. Whether they have that effect is an entirely different, and often a very delicate inquiry; but unless there be pretty explicit evidence to the contrary, it is not easy to imagine, that agriculturists, or those supported by agriculture, should give their consent to any law intended to lower the value of the products they have to dispose of. On the other hand, where the legislature of a country is principally composed of merchants, manufacturers, capitalists, and others depending on the profits of stock, as was formerly the case in Holland, or where it is chiefly influenced by them, it is nearly certain it will not intentionally adopt any measure which may have for its object to raise the price of corn. When it is low, such persons obtain a comparatively large quantity in exchange for their peculiar products or services. How then is it to be expected that they should voluntarily consent to any measure which they supposed would contribute to raise the price of so important an article?

Throughout the principal continental states, the regulations affecting the corn trade have been mostly framed with a view to keep down the price of corn. This fact, however, is perfectly consistent with what has now been stated. After the feudal system lost its energy, and the power of the great barons had been weakened by the rise of cities and the consolidation of the royal authority, monarchs were able to take such measures as appeared most likely to benefit the lower classes of their subjects, which it was then their object to exalt. Of these, none seems more natural, or better calculated to effect its object, than the imposing of restrictions on the exportation of raw produce. If a nation raise more corn than is required for its consumption, the first consequence of a prohibition of export is undoubtedly to lower its value. It is certain, indeed, that this effect will very soon cease; but, in early ages, men seldom attend to prospective considerations, and it is not a very easy matter, even now, to convince the bulk of mankind that the granting liberty to send abroad the necessaries of life lowers their price at home. To demonstrate, or even apprehend this principle, requires a considerable acquaintance with political economy, a science altogether unknown when the first laws respecting the corn trade were framed in the European commonwealth. With a view still further to reduce the price of corn, its free importation was very generally allowed; and, in periods of scarcity, bounties or premiums, over and above the market price, were sometimes given by the state to the importer.

In this country, an opposite course has been pursued. The Lords and Commons, the first depending entirely, and the latter principally, on agriculture, having attained great power and influence, we cannot be surprised at their having more frequently exerted it to increase than to lower the price of corn.

Restrictions on the exportation of corn, without being in any degree advantageous to the consumers, are eminently hurtful to agriculturists. While they exist, no market can be found for that excess of produce which an agricultural country generally has to dispose of in favourable seasons. Farmers are not, therefore, stimulated to exertion, because, in a country thus situated, a luxuriant crop, by its causing a great fall of price, is nearly as prejudicial to them as a scarcity; which, indeed, by its lessening the quantity sown next year, it seldom fails to occasion. In most countries, however, these very simple considerations have been overlooked, and the exportation of corn, unless in years of extreme plenty, has been forbidden under severe penalties. In the reigns immediately succeeding the conquest, this was done in England; but, in 1436, in the reign of Henry VI., an act was passed permitting exportation without license, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 6s. 8d. (equal in amount of pure silver to 12s. 10½d. present money) per quarter, and barley 3s. 4d. In this act it is stated, that the previous regulations had obliged farmers to sell their corn at low prices, to the great prejudice of the whole kingdom. But, in addition to the reason assigned for this important measure, we may observe, that, for a considerable time posterior to the conquest, rents were paid in kind, and the high or low price of corn was not, therefore, a matter of so much importance to landlords, as it became after money rents were generally introduced. In Henry I.'s time, the rents of the crown lands were paid in corn and other farm produce, and were only converted into pecuniary payments, in consequence of the great complaints made by the tenants of the inconveniences they suffered in bringing necessaries for the king's household from distant parts of the kingdom. (Eden's Inquiry into the State of the Poor, vol. i. p. 55.) The same causes would doubtless affect, though in a less degree, the tenants of the great barons; and, when once money rents were introduced, it was for the advantage of the proprietors that all obstacles to a rise in the price of corn should be removed. A more favourable opportunity could not have been found for effecting their abolition. Henry, weak and irresolute, with a disputed title to the throne, and a powerful competitor, could not, had he been so disposed, have made any effectual opposition to a change At the time when this act was passed, the prices of corn were exposed to fluctuations of which we can now form a very inadequate conception; and hence it is not easy to determine whether the exportation price of 6s. 8d. was above or below the medium price. While the trade of corn merchants and corn factors was unknown, or laboured under degrading restrictions, very little providence was exercised in the distribution of the crops, and the superfluous produce of one year scarcely ever compensated for a deficiency in the crop of the next. "Purchasers," says Sir F. M. Eden, "who only looked to their immediate wants, having corn cheap, were naturally wasteful and improvident in the consumption; the price, therefore, almost invariably rose as the year advanced, and was frequently at an enormous height just before harvest; and, before a fresh supply could be obtained, the stock of the preceding year was often entirely exhausted." (Inquiry into the State of the Poor, vol. i. p. 18.) Of this Sir Frederick has collected many instances; and he conjectures, seemingly with great probability, that the enthusiastic joy with which the rustic feast of harvest-home was anciently celebrated, arose chiefly from the almost constant fall that then took place in the price of corn.

That the act of 1437 was advantageous to the agriculturists cannot be doubted; and having experienced the benefit of legislative interference in one instance, they were not slow in again having recourse to it. Not satisfied with the liberty of exporting, they procured in the following reign (1463) the enactment of a law prohibiting importation from abroad until the home price exceeded the price at which exportation ceased. Had the uncertain and fluctuating policy of the times permitted the proper execution of these laws, the restrictive system would have been thus early perfected; and, with the exception of the bounty, all the refinements of modern policy would have been in full operation. In practice, however, they were nearly inoperative, and a lengthened period elapsed before the agriculturists succeeded in obtaining a real monopoly of the home market. (Dionys's Inquiry, p. 34.)

Until the reign of Elizabeth, these acts nominally regulated the prices at which the exportation and importation of corn might take place. In that period, however, the coin had been greatly degraded; and the value of silver, owing to the discovery of the American mines, was rapidly falling throughout Europe in the latter part of the fifteenth and in the sixteenth century. The consequent rise of prices, as it could not, in a nearly stationary state of society, when capital was but slowly accumulating, be speedily followed by a corresponding rise of wages, was necessarily productive of much distress. But neither the government nor the people seems to have been at all aware of the real cause of the rise of prices, and of the extraordinary increase of pauperism in this interval. It was not yet known that silver may fall in value, and that this fall must always be attended by a proportional rise in the money price of the commodities for which it is exchanged. Instead, therefore, of ascribing the enhancement of prices to the degradation of the coin, and the greater plenty of gold and silver, it was universally affirmed to be owing to the decay of tillage, and to the improper practices of corn merchants; and many (now obsolete) statutes for the improvement of tillage, with the laws against engrossing, forestalling, &c., owe their origin to the absurd attempts that were then made to lower the price of corn.

That the complaints respecting the decay of tillage were very ill founded, appears evident. The great foreign demand for English wool, the exportation of which was not then prohibited, caused the consolidation of some small farms, and the more general introduction of inclosures. But this fact, so far from being any proof of the alleged decay of tillage, affords satisfactory evidence of the accumulation of capital, and shows that some improvement had been made in agriculture. An increase in the size of farms is, no doubt, always disagreeable to the lower classes; and being then attended by a great rise of prices, raised the popular indignation to such a pitch that, in the reign of Edward VI., the greater part of the inclosures were violently demolished. As might have been foreseen, the statutes directing the extension of tillage effected nothing; unfortunately, however, those against engrossing were not quite so inefficient.

By the statute fifth and sixth of Edward VI., cap. 14, it was enacted, that whoever should buy any corn or grain, against intent to sell it again, should be reputed an unlawful forestalling engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second, suffer six months imprisonment, and forfeit double its value; and for the third, be set in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king's pleasure, and forfeit all his goods and chattels. And by the same law no person could transport corn from one part to another, without a license, ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair

---

1 In 1436 the pound sterling contained as much pure silver as is now contained in L.l. 18s. 9d. In 1464 the value of the pound sterling was reduced to L.l. 11s. present money, at which sum it remained stationary until 1527, when it was reduced to L.l. 7s. 6½d. present money. In 1543 the previous value of the coin was again reduced about one seventh part, or to L.l. 3s. 3½d. present money. In the ten years subsequent to this era, the process of degradation advanced with unparalleled rapidity; the weight of the coin being not only diminished, but the standard purity of the metal itself debased; so that in 1551 the pound sterling only contained as much silver as is now contained in L.l. 7s. 7½d. In 1552, the last year of the reign of Edward VI., the standard was restored to its former purity; but the weight of the coin, and consequently the quantity of pure silver which it contained, was at the same time reduced about one seventh part below its weight in 1543, and hence the value of a pound sterling in 1552 corresponded to L.l. 6½d. present money.

Since that period the standard has undergone almost no variation, either as to weight or purity.

It therefore appears, that between 1527 and 1552, the value of the pound sterling was reduced from L.l. 7s. 6½d. to L.l. 6½d., or about one fourth part; and this degradation of the value of the coin, accompanied as it was by an extraordinary fall in the value of the precious metals themselves, leaves us little less to account for the distress by which the people of England were then assailed, and for the universal complaint of a rise of prices. The dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII., in 1536 and 1538 has commonly been considered as the immediate cause of the institution of a legal provision for the support of the poor in England; but it seems abundantly certain, that this was really a consequence of the misery of the lower classes, caused by the degradation of the standard, and the fall in the value of gold and silver. "The principal real grievance at this time," says Mr. John Smith (Memoirs of Wool, 8vo edit. vol. i. p. 89), when adverting to some riots and complaints caused by the high prices in 1550, "of the poorer manufacturers, they do not appear to have been sensible of, and historians have since overlooked it, was the state of the coin. The debasement of the coin, which was now of several years standing, had undoubtedly given a nominal advance to all things vendible; and, though perhaps to wages too, yet probably nothing near in proportion to the difference of the coin. And, as the money in which they were paid, not containing as much silver as it did before, would not purchase the same quantity of the necessaries of life it was wont to do; that, in course, must have borne hard upon the lower sort of people especially, who had every thing to buy, and nothing to sell except their labour." This idea has been borrowed, and illustrated, in an article of considerable merit, published in the 22nd volume of the Edinburgh Review.

In 1553 an act was passed, restraining the number of sheep to be kept in one flock to 2000. It is mentioned in that act, that some proprietors had then flocks of 24,000 sheep. Anderson states, that in 1551 no fewer than sixty ships sailed from Southampton for the Netherlands loaded with wool. (History of Commerce, vol. ii. p. 89.) Neither could corn be purchased to be laid up in granaries for home sale, unless the quarter of wheat was at or under 6s. 8d. and oats at 2s. money of the time. By the same statute the authority of three justices of the peace was necessary in order to grant a license; and even this restraint not being thought sufficient, a statute of Elizabeth confined the privilege of granting it to the quarter sessions.

That the landed interest should have made little opposition to the laws restricting the freedom of the internal corn trade, does not appear very surprising. Before the principles of trade began to be understood, it was natural for landlords and farmers to conclude that they would deal on fully more advantageous terms by selling their produce directly to the consumers, than by transacting with them through the medium of a third party. Forgetting that the profits of the corn merchants were but a fair remuneration for the capital they had engaged in the most important of all employments—that of distributing the supply of food equally throughout the year, and according to the effective demand—the farmers believed that they were acquired from the community at their expense, and, of course, felt no repugnance to the virtual annihilation of the trade of the dealer.

But as society improved, and as the principles of commerce were better understood, the bad effects of these laws became apparent. The statute of 1548 was considerably modified in 1624, and at last, by the 15th of Charles II. cap. 7, the engrossing or buying of corn, in order to sell it again, so long as the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the quarter, was declared lawful to all persons not being forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market within three months; an act, as Dr Smith has justly observed, which, with all its imperfections, has contributed more, both to the plentiful supply of the home market, and to the increase of tillage, than perhaps any other law in the statute book.

The act of Henry VI. regulating the export prices of corn was again renewed, but without any variation of the rates, in the reign of Philip and Mary. As the coin, however, had in the interim been greatly degraded, no exportation could now take place, until prices had really fallen much below the level of 1436. This act, like that against engrossing, was no doubt framed in the view of reducing the rising money price of corn, and of quieting the discontent then prevalent among the labouring classes; although, by shackling and discouraging cultivation, its real effects must have been extremely different.

In 1562 the prices at which exportation might take place were extended to 10s. per quarter for wheat, and the Corn Laws soon after abandoned; and in 1570 it was enacted that corn might be exported from particular districts: wheat 1562 and paying a duty of 1s. and other grain of 8d. per quarter, 1570. whenever no prohibition to the contrary was issued by government; and that the lord presidents and councils for shires, and the justices of assize, at their different sessions, should consult with the respectable inhabitants of the counties, and determine whether any exportation could with propriety be allowed.

The provisions of this act allowing corn to be exported from one part of the country, at the same time that its exportation was prohibited in another, arose from the extreme inequality of prices. At this era roads were scarcely formed; and as there hardly existed any communication between distant parts of the kingdom, the prices in the different counties differed exceedingly from each other, and from the price in London. England was then in the same situation as Spain in the present day. A particular province might be afflicted with scarcity, without deriving any assistance from the superfluous produce of its neighbours. But the complex nature of the regulations prevented their being properly executed; and they were superseded by a fresh law (35th Eliz. cap. 7), which permitted exportation on paying a duty of 2s. on wheat, and of 1s. 4d. on all other species of corn, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 20s. per quarter, and barley and malt 12s. This act did considerable service to agriculture, by repealing several absurd statutes for the promotion of tillage, and against the enlargement of farms.

It deserves to be remarked, that the check given to cultivation by the injudicious imposition of heavy duties on the exportation of corn, and still more, the rapid depreciation of money in the reign of Elizabeth, caused an astonishing rise in the price of commodities. A contemporary author, quoted by Mr Hume, estimates this rise in the twenty or thirty years previous to 1581, at no less than fifty per cent. Wages not having increased in proportion, pauperism became very general; and this circumstance, combined with the excessively high prices of 1596, 1597, and 1598, resulting from the bad harvests of those years, occasioned the enactment of the famous statute of 1601, which has served as a basis to the whole of the present English system for supporting and managing the poor.

No alteration was made in the duties payable on the

---

1 The contemporary author quoted by Mr Hume (Hist. of England, vol. v. p. 485), and by Sir F. M. Eden (State of the Poor, vol. i. p. 119), says, that in 1581 it required L200 to keep as good a house as might have been kept sixteen years before for 200 marks, or L133. 6s. 8d.—“Canst thou remember,” says he, “that within these thirty years I could, in this town, buy the best pig or goose I could lay my hands on for 4d., which now costeth 12d., a good capon for 3d. or 4d., a chicken for 1d., a hen for 2d., &c. Now a payre of shoes costs 12d.; yet in my time I have bought a better for 6d.” Latimer, in his sermons, ascribes this increase of price to landlords raising their rents. “Notwithstanding,” says he, “God doth send us plentifully the fruits of the earth mercifully, according to our deserts, these rich men causeth such dearth, that poore men, which live of their labour, cannot with the sweat of their face have a living, all kinde of victuals is so dear.” A variety of passages to the same import may be found in other contemporary authors, quoted by Sir F. M. Eden, and by Mr Smith in his Memoirs of Wool.

This extraordinary advance of prices, caused partly by the degradation of the coin, but more by the fall in the real value of the precious metals, as it very far exceeded the rate at which capital, and consequently the demand for labour, was then increasing, must, even supposing wages had been left to find their own level, and to be adjusted on the principles of fair competition, have been attended with a very great deterioration of the circumstances of the labouring classes. But positive enactments were framed to prevent the increase of wages; so that, while the prices of all sorts of commodities were advancing with unprecedented rapidity, the sums paid the labourers were steadily kept down near their former level.

By the statute 11th Henry VII. c. 22, regulating the wages of labour, a common labourer was allowed 4d. per diem, from Easter to Michaelmas; and, taking the average prices of wheat, rye, and barley at that period at 6s. 8d., 4s., and 2s. per quarter respectively, it will follow that a labourer who had 4d. a day, could earn a quarter of wheat by twenty days' labour, a quarter of rye by twelve days' labour, and a quarter of barley by nine days' labour.

But in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the labourer's situation was very different. The prices of corn may be supposed to have nearly corresponded with the rates at which exportation was allowed by statute 35th Eliz. c. 7, that is, wheat probably averaged 20s. a quarter, rye 13s. 4d., and barley 12s. It appears, however, from the determination of the justices of the East Riding of Yorkshire, in the same year, that the wages of a common labourer, without meat or drink, were limited to five pence a day, from the 1st March to the Feast of All Saints. Consequently, a common labourer could not, in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, earn a quarter of wheat by less than 48 days' labour, a quarter of rye in less than 32 days, nor a quarter of barley in less than 28 days. If barley was his common sustenance, he could have earned three times as much in 1495 as in 1563, of rye 2s. as but the prices at which exportation might take place were, after some trifling alteration in 1604, fixed in 1623 at the high rate of 3s. the quarter for wheat, and of 1s. the quarter for malt and barley. In this and the preceding reigns, and for a considerable time afterwards, importation continued unrestricted; and notwithstanding the improvement of agriculture, the nation was partially dependent for supplies of corn on the trade with the countries round the Baltic, and others.

During the agitation of the civil wars, the people of England, intensely occupied in endeavouring to throw off, or at least to restrict and modify, the royal authority, paid no regard to the corn trade. But this inattention does not seem to have been attended with any bad effects. The high prices of that turbulent period, if they were not altogether caused by a fall in the value of the coin, which, previously to the recoinage under Cromwell, was very much clipped and debased, were most probably owing to the interruptions thrown in the way of agricultural labour.

On the restoration of Charles II. in 1660, an act was passed, permitting the exportation of corn on the same terms as other commodities on which duties were payable, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 40s. per quarter, barley and malt 20s., and oats 16s. But as this law laid a duty of 20s. on every quarter of wheat exported, and on other grain in proportion, it really amounted to a prohibition; and neither the agriculturists nor the revenue derived any advantage from the extent to which exportation was permitted, although both must have been somewhat benefited by the high duties it imposed on importation.

Mr Diron's opinion, that the prohibitory duties on exportation were the chief causes of the high prices of this and the two following seasons, seems entirely destitute of foundation. The law against exportation could not certainly raise the prices of the year in which it was framed, and this high price, as far as it was not caused by a deficiency in the crop, or by any fluctuation in the value of the coin, was unquestionably owing, not to the duties on exportation, but to the exorbitancy of those on importation, which had really secured a monopoly of the home market to the agriculturists.

This view of the matter appears to have been soon after taken by parliament; for in 1663 the high duties on importation were taken off, and an ad valorem duty of nine per cent. imposed in their stead. The exportation price of wheat was at the same time extended to 48s. per quarter, chargeable with a duty of 5s. 4d. and other grain in proportion.

This act, however, by permitting the importation of foreign grain on paying a moderate duty, not being reckoned sufficiently advantageous to the landholders, a more decided step was subsequently taken, and in 1670 exportation prices were extended to 53s. 4d. per quarter for wheat, and other grain in proportion, while import duties, amounting to a complete prohibition, were imposed on foreign wheat till the home price reached 53s. 4d., and between that price and 80s. a duty of 8s. was exigible. But this law, though extremely favourable to the agriculturists, by whom indeed it had been framed, did not perfectly correspond with their wishes. The necessities of the crown caused the continuance of impolitic duties on exportation, and the prohibition of importation was rendered to a certain extent nugatory, by the want of any proper and settled method for ascertaining prices. Groundless complaints of the decay of agriculture, and of the evils of foreign competition, were therefore continued, and gave occasion to the act of 1685, designed more effectually to check importation from abroad, by securing correct returns of the home prices.

We have now reached a period no less memorable in Bounty the economical than in the political history of Great Britain. A bounty on the exportation of corn was granted at the revolution. The Prince of Orange could not oppose the wishes of the landed interest, who then constituted the immense majority of parliament, on this particular subject. Whether he really approved of the measure cannot now be ascertained; but whatever may have been William's private sentiments, it was necessary for him to give way to the inclinations of those who had so lately raised him to a throne, and on whose assistance he was chiefly to depend in prosecuting his war against France.

The bounty payable under the act 1st William and Mary, cap. 12, amounted to 5s. for every quarter of wheat exported, while the price continued at or below 48s.; 2s. 6d. for every quarter of barley or malt, while their price did not exceed 24s.; and 3s. 6d. for every quarter of rye, when its price did not exceed 32s.

A still more essential advantage was shortly after con-

much, and of wheat 2l. As far, therefore, as the necessaries of life were concerned, the situation of the labourer was not one half so advantageous in 1593 as it had been in 1495. (Edinburgh Review, vol. xxii. p. 195.)

This extraordinary rise in the price of provisions being unattended by any proportional rise in the price of labour, was the real cause of the institution of poor-rates. In the long interval between 1379 and 1530, it does not appear that any statute was passed directly referring to the maintenance of vagrants or beggars. At the latter era, however, when the prices of all sorts of commodities began suddenly to rise, pauperism became very prevalent, and engaged a considerable portion of the attention of the legislature.

The following extract from Dr Burn's Justice of Peace (vol. iii. p. 606), shows in a very distinct manner the various steps by which the compulsory maintenance was established in England:—

"By 22nd Henry VIII. c. 12, the justices were to distribute themselves into several divisions; within which divisions respectively they might license persons to beg. By 27th Henry VIII. c. 25, the several hundreds, towns corporate, parishes, or hamlets, were required to maintain the poor with such charitable contributions, as that none of them might be compelled to go daily in begging, or pain that any person might default shall be committed twenty shillings a month. And the burgess-wardens, or other such as are inhabitants, were to make collections for them with boxes on Sundays, and otherwise by their discretions. And the minister was to take all opportunities to stir up and exhort the people to be liberal and bountiful. By the 1st Edward VI. c. 3, houses were to be provided for them by the devotion of good people, and materials to set them at work; and the minister, after the gospel every Sunday, was specially to exhort the parishioners to a liberal contribution. By the 8th and 6th Edward VI. c. 2, the collectors of the poor, on a certain Sunday in every year, immediately after divine service, were to take down in writing what every person was willing to give weekly, for the ensuing year; and if any should be obstinate, and refuse to give, the minister was gently to exhort him; if he still refused, the minister was to certify such refusal to the bishop of the diocese, and the bishop was to send for him, to induce and persuade him by charitable ways and means, and so according to his discretion to take order for the reformation thereof. By the 5th Elizabethi, c. 3, if he stood out against the bishop's exhortation, the bishop was to certify the same to the justices in sessions, and bind him over to appear there; and the justices at the said sessions were again gently to persuade and persuade him; and, finally, if he could not be persuaded, then they were to commit him in what they thought reasonable towards the relief of the poor; and, in case of refusal, were to commit him till paid. By 14th Elizabethi, c. 5, power was given to the Justices to lay a rate for this purpose; and this hath been done ever since; for the statute of the 4th Elizabethi, c. 2, is only a re-enacting of former provisions, with some additional alterations."

In a tract published in 1611, the author dwells with great earnestness on the extreme dearth of victuals. They were grown more dear in price, he affirms, in the six years foregoing, than in the twenty years before.—See Memoirs of Wool, vol. i. p. 123. The fall in the value of gold and silver, caused by the discovery of the American mines, seems to have ceased about 1630 or 1640. History offered on agriculture, by the act 11th and 12th William III. cap. 20, which repealed all previous duties on the exportation of corn, and prevented the operation of the bounty from being in the slightest degree counteracted.

No alteration having been made in the prices and duties regulating importation, as fixed in 1670, and these duties being rigorously exacted, the act repealing the duties on exportation completed the restrictive system. Every part of this complex machine was now in operation; and while no foreigner was allowed to contend with the home growers, the liberality of the state enabled them to contend with foreigners, even when the price of corn in Great Britain was considerably higher than its price abroad.

The policy adopted in Scotland respecting the trade in corn was nearly the same as that of England. Previously to 1663 the importation of corn into this kingdom was permitted without limitation or duties (Diron, p. 61); but in that year it was loaded with an ad valorem duty of about forty per cent.; while its free exportation was allowed, on payment of a trifling duty, until the prices exceeded those mentioned below. This duty was afterwards relinquished, and a bounty granted by the statute William, Par. 1, cap. 32. At length, by the treaty of union, the corn laws of both kingdoms were incorporated, and it was settled that "the allowances, encouragements, and drawbacks, prohibitions, restrictions, and regulations of trade, and the customs and duties on import and export, settled in England when the union commences, shall, from and after the union, take place throughout the whole united kingdom." Oats not having been mentioned in the English statute granting the bounty, it was declared, that whenever oats did not exceed the price of 15s. sterling per quarter, there should be paid a bounty of 2s. 6d. for every quarter of oatmeal exported.

Whatever may have been the ultimate consequences of the bounty act, there can be no doubt that it was framed in the view of enhancing the value of corn. In the preamble to this celebrated statute, it is stated "that the exportation of corn and grain into foreign parts, when the price thereof is at a low rate in this kingdom, hath been a great advantage, not only to the owners of land, but to the trade of this kingdom in general." It would indeed be absurd to suppose that the landed interest should have unanimously urged the adoption of a law, had it been imagined to have any tendency to lower the value of agricultural produce.

We shall afterwards endeavour to show that the bounty had in fact no such tendency; but at present we shall only offer a few observations explanatory of the fall in the price of corn posterior to 1690, which has, as it appears to us, without any sufficient reason, been ascribed to the bounty.

It is obvious that no certain conclusions can ever be drawn as to whether the real value, that is, the expense of producing a commodity, is diminished, from the fact of its money price having declined. Before forming any accurate conclusions as to a rise or fall in the real price of commodities, from variations in their money price, it is essential to know, not only the state of the coin as to purity and weight, but also whether the value of bullion be itself stationary. A fall of money price may be as effectually produced by a rise in the value of gold and silver, as by a diminution of the cost of production; and the real price of a commodity may be increasing at the very time its money price is falling. To produce this effect it is only necessary that the real price of bullion should increase faster than the real price of the commodity with which it is compared.

That the real value of gold and silver rose in the early part of last century, has been maintained by Dr Smith, the Corn Laws apparently on pretty good grounds. As no remarkable improvements in agriculture were then made, either on the Value of continent or in England, the expense of producing corn gold and may be reckoned to have remained nearly the same, or silver in rather to have increased, as the increase of population, the early however slow, would cause recourse to be had to inferior parts of lands. But during this period the money price of corn fell, century, not only in this country, where a bounty was given on exportation, but in those continental kingdoms where exportation was prohibited. Conclusive evidence of this fact, as far as regards France, will be found in the table of the prices of wheat, at the Paris or Rosoy market, annexed to the work of Dupré de St Maur, entitled Essai sur les Monnaies, ou Réflexions sur le Rapport entre l'Argent et les Deniers. Paris, 1746. And the table of the price of wheat at Seville, from 1675 to 1764 inclusive, published in the appendix to the Bullion Report, strongly confirms the reasoning of Dr Smith, and shows that prices declined considerably in Spain in the first fifty years of last century.

The impulse imparted to this country by the revolution, the abolition of all oppressive and arbitrary exactions, and the number of intelligent and wealthy foreigners who sought refuge in England from the persecution of intolerant and blotted governments, coupled with the revival of trade and the establishment of the bank in 1694, caused the extension of commerce, and a considerable accumulation of capital, subsequently to the treaty of Ryswick. The wars of Queen Anne counteracted this progress; but during the long and pacific administration of Sir Robert Walpole, the increase of capital, and the improvement of every species of industry, though not so great as they afterwards became, continued uninterrupted. A rise in the money price of labour in Great Britain during that interval is not therefore inconsistent with the fact of an advance in the value of the precious metals, but, as Dr Smith has stated, is a natural consequence of the improving state of the country, and of the increasing demand for labour. In France, which had been completely exhausted by the ruinous enterprises of Louis XIV. and where, of course, the demand for labour remained nearly stationary, wages fell as the price of corn declined. (Wealth of Nations, i. 313.)

But whatever weight may be attached to these conclusions, respecting a general rise in the real value of gold coin in the and silver in the early part of last century, there can be no question as to the fact of a rise having taken place in the value of the coin of Great Britain, in consequence of the recoinage in the latter part of King William's reign. At that period silver constituted the English standard of value, and to such an extent had the silver currency been debased by clipping, filing, &c. that, in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was 6s. 5d. per ounce, or 1s. 3d. above the mint price. A guinea then passed current for about 30s., and the nominal exchange between London, Holland, and Hamburg was rather more than twenty-five per cent. against the first. (Wealth of Nations, i. 304.) That this degraded state of the coin raised the price of every other commodity as well as bullion, might be concluded for certain, although no direct evidence of the fact had been transmitted to us. Mr Lowndes, however, in his Report on the state of the silver coin in 1695, mentions its degradation as "one great cause of the raising the price, not only of all merchandises, but of every article necessary for the sustenance of the common people, to their great grievance." (Liverpool on Coin, p. 70.) And Mr Locke, in his answer

---

Wheat, L.12 Scots per boll; bear and barley, L.8 do.; oats and peas, 8 merks. The medium rise in the price of undepreciated gold coin, and of silver bullion, compared with the clipped and degraded coin, appears, from the statements of Locke and Lowndes, to have rather exceeded thirty per cent. And it is of importance to remark, that, in 1700, the year in which the new coin came into general circulation, the market price of corn, which had previously been rising, declined to very near the same extent. That this fall may in some degree have been owing to luxuriant crops, is probable; but it is quite certain that the increased value of the circulating medium would of itself have speedily lowered the money price of corn, and of every other commodity.

Mr Charles Smith, Mr Malthus, and others who contend that a bounty on the exportation of corn tends to lower its price, admit that the bounty granted in 1688 had no such effect anterior to 1700! This fact should have stimulated them to inquire whether any thing peculiar belonged to that year. They should have recollected, that a fall of money prices may be as effectually brought about by a rise in the value of the currency, as by a fall in the value of commodities. Had they kept this principle in view, and adverted to the circumstances under which the recoining of 1696, 1697, and 1698 took place, perhaps they would not have been so very confident in their assertions as to the effects of the bounty; and, at all events, they would not have adduced the fall of prices in 1700, and subsequently, as any proof of their correctness.

We do not certainly mean to affirm that the whole rise of prices, from 1692 to 1698 inclusive, is to be ascribed to the depreciation of the currency. The bounty, and, in a still greater degree, bad seasons, contributed to produce this rise; and the fair inference is, that had there been no bounty, prices would have fallen still lower after the recoining.

In considering the effects of the bounty, it ought always to be recollected that prices were gradually falling previously to its being granted.

From 1649 to 1658, the average price of the Winchester quarter of middling wheat was........L2 7 0 — 1659 to 1668..................................................2 6 8 — 1669 to 1678..................................................2 3 4 — 1679 to 1688..................................................1 18 4

The bounty was given with the avowed intention of checking this fall, and it was, in our opinion, well calculated to accomplish its object. But, whatever may have been its effects, it cannot surely be assigned as the cause of the fall of prices between 1700 and 1746, seeing that that very fall began thirty years before it was granted, and that prices rose in the first ten years of its existence.

Perhaps part of the fall of corn in England subsequently to 1640 may be justly ascribed to the prohibition of the exportation of wool, which, after several previous attempts, was carried into full effect by the act of 1660. The wool formerly raised in Great Britain having much exceeded what was required for our manufactures, its price declined as soon as its exportation was put an end to; and, of course, some portion of the soil employed in rearing sheep would be brought under tillage, and a greater quantity of good land, besides an additional capital, would be turned to the raising of corn.

Although the mint price of gold had been reduced by King William, it was still rated too high as compared with silver; and consequently the currency again became de-ranged. The deficiency of new silver coin, caused by the inducement to melt it down, was not immediately experienced; but towards the latter part of Queen Anne's reign, a want of silver, and a difficulty in making payments, were universally felt and complained of. As might have been expected, prices rose, and, from 1709 to 1717 both inclusive, were much above the average of the eight preceding or of the following years. That this could not be an effect of deficient crops, is evident from the fact of a considerable exportation, forced, no doubt, to a certain extent, by the bounty having then taken place. The government did not indeed entertain any such opinion, but having wisely adopted the suggestion of Sir Isaac Newton, and reduced the mint value of the guinea, the melting and hoarding of silver ceased, and prices, as in 1700, fell to their former level.

In accounting for the low price of corn in the reigns of George I. and George II., after allowing for the increased value of the coin, the relaxation of the laws against fore-stallers and engrossers must not be forgotten. Large capitals being engaged in the corn trade, extraordinary fluctuations of price were avoided. The home demand was rendered more steady and equal; while the perfect security of property, and the greater political influence attached to landed possessions, naturally attracted a more than ordinary portion of the accumulating capital of the country towards agriculture.

The bounty, by extending the foreign market, no doubt contributed materially to the extension of cultivation, although, by forcing recourse to worse soils in order to obtain additional supplies of corn, it raised prices. In the period from 1740 to 1751, the cheapest in last century, the bounties paid on exportation amounted in all to L1,515,000; and in 1749 alone they somewhat exceeded L324,000. The bounty, however, had by this time been too long in operation to permit the growers or exporters to realise more than the common and ordinary profits of stock; and, therefore, had it never been granted, the quantity of corn exported, and the home price (which must have been regulated by the expense necessary to produce the increased supply required by the bounty on the poorest soils in cultivation), would both have been reduced. We shall afterwards elucidate this principle at greater length; but it is of importance to remark how much this forced exportation must have raised the real price of corn, at the very time when it is supposed to have reduced it.

But notwithstanding the fictitious stimulus thus given Diminution to exportation, the exports which, in 1750, amounted to 1,667,778 quarters of all sorts, rapidly diminished; and ports subject to the gradual increase of the home demand, in the last ten years of the reign of George II. accompanied as it was by a rise of prices, reduced the annual average exportation, at the accession of George III., in 1760, to about 600,000 quarters. After the peace of Paris in 1763, the progress of improvement was prodigiously accelerated. The extension of industry caused by the acquisition of new branches of commerce, by the increase of our colonial possessions, and, perhaps more than all the rest, by the introduction of improved machinery into the cotton manufacture, was followed by a sudden increase of the population, and, as importation was prohibited, by a corresponding rise of prices.

The admirers of the restrictive system have generally reasoned as if this rise of price and the cessation of ex- History of portation had been a consequence of the alteration of the corn laws in 1773. But it should be carefully observed that this alteration was an avowed, and indeed a necessary consequence of the previous rise. In 1765, before any suspension of the restrictive system had taken place, the balance on the side of wheat exported amounted to only 77,000 quarters, and the home price in that and the two preceding years rose to an unusual height. The general and growing dissatisfaction at continuing the prohibition of importation under such circumstances, produced a suspension of the high duties in 1766; and by temporary enactments, this suspension (accompanied occasionally with Statute of restrictions on exportation) was continued to 1773, when a permanent act was framed under the auspices of Mr Burke. By this act foreign wheat was allowed to be imported on paying a nominal duty of 6d. whenever the home price reached 48s. a quarter; and the bounty and exportation were together to cease when the price reached 44s. This statute also permitted the importation of corn at any price, in order to be again exported, duty free, provided it was, in the mean time, lodged under the joint locks of the king and the importer.

The prices, when exportation was to cease, seem to have been fixed too low in this act; and, as Dr Smith has observed, there appears a good deal of impropriety in prohibiting exportation altogether at the precise prices at which the bounty given to force it is withdrawn; yet with all these defects, the act of 1773 was a material improvement on the former system, and should not have been altered unless to render the trade perfectly free.

The idea that this law must, when enacted, have been injurious to the farmers, seems altogether illusory. The permission to import foreign grain, when the home prices rose to a certain rate, certainly prevented their realizing exorbitant profits at the expense of the other classes, and prevented an unnatural proportion of the capital of the country being turned towards agriculture. But as this rate was fixed very considerably higher than the average price in the reign of George II., it cannot be maintained that it had any tendency to lower prices, which alone could discourage agriculture; and in fact no such reduction took place.

It is indeed true, that but for this act we should not have imported so much foreign grain in the interval between 1773 and 1791. This importation, however, was not occasioned by the declining state of our agriculture, for it is universally admitted that every department of rural economy was more improved in that period than in the whole course of the preceding century; but arose entirely from a still more rapid increase of the manufacturing population, and hence of the effective demand for corn.

By referring to the tables of exports and imports annexed to this article, it will be seen that, in 1772, the balance on the side of wheat imported amounted to 18,515 quarters; and in 1773, 1774, and 1775, all years of great prosperity, this balance was very much increased. The loss, however, of a great part of our colonial possessions, and the stagnation of commerce occasioned by the American contest, diminished the consumption; and this diminution concurring with luxuriant harvests, the balance was high on the side of exportation in 1778, 1779, and 1780. In 1783 and 1784 the crop was unusually deficient; and considerable importations took place; but in 1785, 1786, and 1787, the exports again exceeded the imports; and it was not till 1788, when the country had fully recovered from the effects of the war, and when manufacturing improvements were carried on with extraordinary spirit, that the imports permanently overbalanced the exports.

The growing wealth and commercial prosperity of the country had thus, by increasing the population, and enabling individuals to consume additional quantities of food, caused the home supplies to fall somewhat short of the demand; but it must not therefore be concluded that agriculture had not at the same time been very greatly ameliorated. "The average annual produce of wheat," says Mr Comber, "at the beginning of the reign of George III., was about 3,800,000 quarters, of which about 300,000 had been sent out of the kingdom, leaving about three and a half millions for home consumption." In 1773, the produce of wheat was stated to the House of Commons to be 4,000,000 of quarters, of which the whole, and above 100,000 imported, were consumed in the kingdom. In 1796 the consumption was stated in the House of Commons, by Lord Hawkesbury, to be 500,000 quarters per month, or six millions annually, of which about 180,000 were imported, showing an increased produce, in about twenty years, of 1,820,000 quarters. It is evident, therefore, not only that no defalcation of produce had taken place in consequence of the cessation of exportation, as has been too lightly assumed, from the occasional necessity of importation; but that it had increased with the augmentation of our commerce and manufactures." (Comber on National Subsistence, p. 180.)

These estimates are, no doubt, very loose and unsatisfactory, but the fact of a large increase of produce is unquestionable. In the Report of the House of Commons on Waste Lands, drawn up in 1797, the number of acts passed for inclosing, and the number of acres inclosed, in the following reigns, are thus stated:

| Number of Acts | Number of Acres | |---------------|----------------| | Queen Anne's reign | 2 | 1,429 | | George I. | 16 | 17,660 | | George II. | 226 | 318,728 | | George III. to 1797 | 1,592 | 2,804,197 |

It deserves particular notice, that from 1771 to 1791, both inclusive, the period when these great agricultural improvements were principally carried on, there was no rise of prices.

The landholders, however, could not but consider the liberty of importation granted by the act of 1773 as injurious to their interests, inasmuch as it prevented prices from rising with the increased demand. A clamour, therefore, was raised against that law; and, in addition to this interested feeling, a dread of becoming habitually dependent on foreigners for supplies of corn operated with many, and produced a pretty general acquiescence in the act of 1791, by which the price, when importation could take place at the low duty of 6d., was raised to 5½s., under 5¼s. and above 50s., a middle duty of 2s. 6d., and under 50s. a prohibitory duty of 2½s. 3½d., were exigible. The bounty continued as before, and exportation without bounty was allowed to 40s. It was also enacted that foreign wheat might be imported, stored under the king's locks, and again exported free of duty; but if sold for home consumption in the kingdom, it became liable to a warehouse-duty of 2s. 6d. in addition to the ordinary duties payable at the time of sale.

Mr Comber has justly blamed this imposition of duties on the warehousing of foreign corn; but the deficient crops of 1795 and 1797, followed as they were by a great rise of prices, superseded these provisions, and even caused the granting of high bounties on importation.

In 1797 the Bank of England was restricted from paying in specie, and the consequent facility of obtaining discounts gave a fresh stimulus to agriculture; the efficacy of which was most powerfully assisted by the great scarcity and high prices of 1800 and 1801. These may indeed be said to have inspired all classes with a sort of agri- not permit the profitable cultivation of the poor soils which had been taken into tillage during the scarcity, a new corn law was loudly called for by the farmers, and passed in 1804. This act imposed a prohibitory duty of 2s. 3d. per quarter on all wheat imported when the home price was at or below 63s.; between 63s. and 66s. a middle duty of 2s. 6d. was paid; and above 66s., a nominal duty of 6d.

The price at which the bounty was paid on exportation was extended to 40s. and exportation without bounty to 54s. By the act of 1791, the maritime counties of England had been divided into twelve districts, and importation and exportation had been regulated by the particular prices of each; but by the act of 1804, they were regulated in England by the aggregate average of the twelve maritime districts, and in Scotland by the aggregate average of the four maritime districts. The averages, as at present, were taken at four periods in the year, and the ports were either open or shut for not less than three months.

This method of ascertaining prices was, however, modified in the following season, and it was then fixed that importation both in England and Scotland should be regulated by the average price of the whole twelve maritime districts.

To prohibit the importation of the necessaries of life into a country where the supply is short of the demand, till prices rise to a certain height, has an obvious tendency to raise them still higher. In 1805 the crop was very considerably deficient, and the average price of that year was about 22s. above the price at which importation was allowed by the act of 1804. The depreciation of paper compared with bullion, being at that time about four per cent., the high price must have been owing to the new corn law preventing importation till the home price was high, and then cramping mercantile operations; and to the war rendering the cost of importation unusually great. In 1806, 1807, and 1808, the depreciation of paper, compared with bullion, continued at nearly four per cent.; and the price of wheat in these years being generally from 66s. to 75s., a small importation only took place. From autumn 1808 to spring 1813, the depreciation of our currency was rapid beyond all former example; and several crops in that interval being likewise deficient, the money price of corn, influenced by both causes, rose to a surprising height. The following is a statement of the money or paper price, and of the bullion price of corn, from 1809 to 1814, both inclusive:

| Paper Price per Quarter | Bullion Price per Quarter | |-------------------------|--------------------------| | 1809..................| 97s. 4d. | | 1810..................| 106s. 5d. | | 1811..................| 95s. 3d. | | 1812..................| 126s. 6d. | | 1813..................| 109s. 9d. | | 1814..................| 74s. 4d. |

The crops of 1809 and 1810 were much below an average, and the bullion price of these years is a good deal higher than the importation price fixed by the act of 1804. This excess is to be ascribed partly to that law, and partly to the extraordinary difficulties then thrown in the way of importing grain. At that time no vessel could be loaded in any continental port for England, without purchasing a license; and the freight and insurance were at least five times as high as during peace. The same causes operated in 1812; but in the autumn of 1813 the destruction of Napoleon's anti-commercial system having increased the facilities of importation, a large quantity of corn was poured into the kingdom; and in 1814 its bullion price was reduced below the point at which importation was allowed.

Before this fall of price, a committee of the House of Commons had been appointed to inquire into the state of the laws affecting the corn trade; and their report (dated 11th May 1813) recommended a very great extension of the rates at which exportation was formerly allowable, and when importation free of duty could take place. The recommendation of this committee was not adopted by the House; but the fact of its having been made when the home price was at least 112s. per quarter, displays a surprising solicitude to exclude foreigners from all competition with the home growers.

The lessening of the dependence of the country on foreign supplies formed the sole ostensible ground on which the committee proposed to alter the act of 1804. But spectating after the fall of price in autumn 1813, and in the early part of 1814, it became obvious, on comparing our former corn laws prices with those of the Continent, that, without an alteration of the existing law, this dependence would be considerably increased; that a good deal of the poor lands, which the recent high prices had forced into cultivation, would have to be thrown into pasturage; and that rents would be materially reduced. These consequences alarmed the landlords and occupiers, and in the early part of the session of 1814 a series of resolutions were voted by the House of Commons, declaring that it was expedient to repeal the bounty; to permit the free exportation of corn, whatever might be the home price, and to impose a graduated scale of duties on foreign corn when imported. Thus, wheat imported when the home price was at or under 64s. was to pay a duty of 24s.; when at or under 65s., a duty of 23s.; and so on till the home price reached 66s., when the duty was reduced to 1s., at which it became stationary. Corn imported from the British colonies in North America was to pay only half the above duties. As soon as these resolutions were agreed to, two bills founded on them, one regulating the importation of foreign corn, and another repealing the bounty, and permitting unrestricted exportation, were introduced. Very little attention was paid to the last of these bills; but that which imposed fresh duties on importation encountered a very keen opposition. The manufacturers, and every class not directly supported by agriculture, stigmatized it as an unjustifiable attempt to keep up the price of food, and to secure excessive rents and large profits to landlords and farmers, at the expense of the consumers. Meetings were generally held, and resolutions entered into strongly expressive of this sentiment, and dwelling on the fatal consequences that a continuance of high prices would have on our manufactures, in a season of peace, when we could no longer monopolize the commerce of the world. This opposition, coupled with the indecision of ministers, and perhaps, too, with an expectation, on the part of some of the landlords, that prices would speedily rise, without any legislative interference, caused the miscarriage of this bill. The other was passed into a law.

Committees of both houses of parliament were appointed in 1814 to examine evidence and to report on the state of the corn trade; and a great number of the most eminent agriculturists were in consequence examined. The witnesses were unanimous in this only, that the protecting prices fixed by the act of 1804 were insufficient to enable the farmers to make good the engagements into which they had subsequently entered, and to continue the cultivation of the inferior lands lately brought under tillage. Some of them thought 120s. ought to be fixed as the limit when wheat might be imported free of duty; others varied from 90s. to 100s.; others from 80s. to 90s.; and a few from 70s. to 80s. The general opinion, however, seemed to be that 80s. would answer; and, as prices continued to decline, a set of resolutions, founded on this assumption, were sub- History of corn laws from 1815 to 1828.

The agriculturists confidently expected that this act would immediately raise prices, and render them steady at about 80s. But, for reasons which will be afterwards stated, these expectations were entirely disappointed; and there has been a more ruinous fluctuation of prices since 1815, when it was passed, than in any previous period of our recent history. In 1821, when prices had sunk very low, a committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the causes of the depressed state of agriculture, and to report their observations thereupon. This committee, after examining a number of witnesses, drew up a report, which, though not free from error, is a very valuable document. It contains a forcible exposition of the pernicious influence of the law of 1815, of which it suggested several important modifications. These, however, were not adopted; and as the low prices and consequent distress of the agriculturists continued, the subject was brought under the consideration of parliament in the following year. After a good deal of discussion, a new act was then passed (3d Geo. IV. cap. 60), which enacted, that, after prices had risen to the limit of free importation fixed by the act of 1815, that act was to cease, and the new statute to come into operation. This statute lowered the prices fixed by the act of 1815, at which importation could take place for home consumption, to the following sums, viz.

| For Corn not of the British Possessions in North America | For Corn of the British Possessions in North America | |----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | Wheat | 70s. per quarter | | Rye, peas, and beans | 40s. per quarter | | Barley, bear, or big | 35s. per quarter | | Oats | 25s. per quarter |

But in order to prevent any violent oscillation of prices from a large supply of grain being suddenly thrown upon the market, it was enacted, that a duty of 17s. a quarter should be laid on all wheat imported from foreign countries during the first three months after the opening of the ports if the price was between 70s. and 80s. a quarter, and of 12s. afterwards; and if the price was between 80s. and 85s. the duty was to be 10s. during the first three months, and 5s. afterwards; and if the price should exceed 85s. the duty was to be constant at 1s.; and proportionally for other sorts of grain.

This act, by preventing importation until the home price rose to 70s. and then loading the quantities imported between that limit and the limit of 85s. with heavy duties, was certainly more favourable to the views of the agriculturists than the act of 1815. But, unluckily for them, no species of corn except barley was sufficiently high while this act existed to bring it into operation.

In 1825, the first approach was made to a better system, by permitting the importation of wheat from British North America, without reference to the price at home, on payment of a duty of 5s. a quarter. But the act for this purpose was passed with difficulty, and was limited to one year's duration.

Owing to the drought which prevailed during the summer of 1826, there was every prospect that there would be a great deficiency in the crops of that year; and in order to prevent the disastrous consequences that might have taken place had importation been prevented until the season was too far advanced for bringing supplies from the great corn markets in the north of Europe, his majesty was authorized to admit 500,000 quarters of foreign wheat, on payment of such duties as the order in council for its importation should declare. And when it was ascertained that the crops of oats, peas, &c. were greatly below an average, ministers issued an order in council, on their own responsibility, on the 1st of September, authorizing the immediate importation of oats on payment of a duty of 2s. 6d. a boll, and of rye, peas, and beans, on payment of a duty of 3s. 6d. a quarter. A considerable quantity of oats was imported under this order, the timely appearance of which had no doubt a considerable effect in mitigating the pernicious consequences arising from the deficiency of that species of grain. Ministers obtained an indemnity for this order in the subsequent meeting of parliament.

Nothing could more strikingly evince the impolicy of the acts of 1815 and 1822 than the necessity under which the legislature and government had been placed of passing the temporary acts and issuing the orders alluded to. The more intelligent portion of the agriculturists began at length to perceive that the corn laws were not really calculated to produce the advantages they had anticipated; and a conviction that increased facilities should be given to importation became general throughout the country. The same conviction made considerable progress in the House of Commons; so much so, that several members who supported the measures adopted in 1815 and 1822 expressed themselves satisfied that the principle of exclusion had been carried too far, and that a more liberal system should be adopted. Ministers having participated in these sentiments, Mr Canning moved a series of resolutions, as the foundation of a new corn law, on the 1st of March 1827. These resolutions bore that foreign corn might be imported, at all times, free of duty, for warehousing; and that it should always be admissible for home consumption on payment of certain duties. Thus, in the instance of wheat, it was resolved that, when the home price was at or above 70s. a quarter, the duty should be a fixed one of 1s. a quarter; and that for every shilling that the price fell below 70s. a duty of 2s. should be imposed; so that, when the price was at 69s., the duty on importation was to be 2s.; when at 68s., the duty was to be 4s. and so on. The limit at which the constant duty of 1s. a quarter was to take place in the case of barley was originally fixed at 37s.; but it was subsequently raised to 40s.; the duty increasing by 1s. 6d. for every shilling which the price fell below that limit. The limit at which the constant duty of 1s. a quarter was to take place in the case of oats was originally fixed at 28s.; but it was subsequently raised to 33s., the duty increasing at the rate of 1s. a quarter for every shilling that the price fell below that limit. The duty on colonial wheat was fixed at 6d. the quarter when the home price was above 65s.; and when the price was under that sum, the duty was constant at 5s.; the duties on other descriptions of colonial grain were similar. These resolutions were agreed to by a large majority; and a bill founded on them was subsequently carried through the House of Commons. Owing, however, to the change of ministers which took place in the interim, several peers originally favourable to the bill, and some even who assisted in its preparation, saw reason to become amongst its most violent opponents; a clause interdicting all importation until the home price exceeded 66s. having been carried in the Lords, ministers gave up the bill, justly considering that such a clause was entirely subversive of its principle.

A new set of resolutions with respect to the corn trade were brought forward in 1828 by Mr Charles Grant. They were founded upon the same principles as those which had been rejected during the previous session. But the duty was not made to vary equally, as in Mr Canning's resolu- History of thoms, with every equal variation of price; it being 23s. 8d. when the home price was 64s. the imperial quarter, 16s. 8d. when it was 69s., and 1s. only when it was at or above 73s. a quarter; a difference of 4s. in the price making a difference of no less than 15s. 8d. in the duty.

After a good deal of debate Mr Grant's resolutions were carried, and embodied in the act 9th Geo. IV. cap. 60.

The prices which governed the duties in this act were ascertained from the sales of corn in most of the principal towns of England. The dealers were bound, under a penalty for each omission, to make weekly returns of these sales to the corn inspectors resident in the different towns, who reported them to the comptroller of corn returns in London. The latter deduced from them a general average price, published weekly in the Gazette. Attempts have sometimes been made to falsify the average, by making reports of fictitious sales; but it is generally believed that the prices as reported have corresponded very closely with the real prices at the time.

Besides the objections which, it will be immediately shown, may be made to all protecting duties, from their tendency to force up average prices, and to render exportation in abundant years impossible, the duty imposed by the 9th Geo. IV. cap. 60 is liable to some weighty objections, which may be looked upon as peculiar to itself. From the way in which it was graduated, it introduced a new element of uncertainty into every transaction connected with the corn trade, producing a disinclination on the part of the merchant to import, and of the foreigner to raise corn for our markets. Suppose a merchant had commissioned a cargo of wheat when the price was at 71s. a quarter, in the event of the price declining only 3s. or to 68s., the duty rose from 6s. 8d. to 16s. 8d.; and if the merchant brought the grain to market he realised 13s. a quarter less than he expected, and 10s. less than he would have done had there been no duty, or the duty been constant!

It may perhaps be said, that if, on the one hand, the late scale of duties was injurious to the merchant when prices were falling, and when importation was consequently either unnecessary, or of less advantage, it was, on the other hand, equally advantageous to him, when prices were rising, and when the public interests required that importation should be encouraged. But the prices in the view of the merchant when he gives an order are usually such as he supposes will yield a fair profit; and if they rise, this rise would, supposing the duty to be constant, yield such an extra profit as would of itself encourage him to increase his importations to the utmost. If it were possible to devise a system that should diminish the losses of the merchants engaged in unfavourable speculations, by making a proportional deduction from the extraordinary gains of those whose speculations turn out to be unusually successful, something perhaps might be found to say in its favour. But the system we have been considering proceeded upon quite opposite principles; its effect was not to diminish risks, but to increase them; it added to the loss resulting from an unsuccessful, and to the profit resulting from a successful speculation!

It is plain, therefore, that if a duty be imposed, one that is constant is preferable to one that fluctuates. When the duty is constant, all classes, farmers as well as merchants, are aware of its amount, and can previously calculate the extent of its influence. But the effect of a duty that fluctuates with the fluctuations of prices can never be appreciated beforehand. Its magnitude depends on contingent and accidental circumstances, and it must, therefore, of necessity prejudice the interests of the farmer as well as of the corn-dealer.

The crops having been deficient in 1829 and 1830, there was a large importation of corn in these years, its History of average price being at the same time about 63s. a quarter. But the crops from 1831 to 1836 having been more than usually abundant, importation almost wholly ceased, and the price of wheat sunk in 1835 to 59s. 4d. a quarter, the corn being less than it had been in any previous year since laws from 1776. In consequence of this succession of good harvests and low prices, the corn laws ceased for a while to attract any considerable portion of the public attention, and an impression began to gain ground that the improvement of agriculture was so rapid, that, despite the increase of population and the existence of the corn laws, our prices would fall to about the level of those of the Continent. But the cycle of favourable seasons having terminated in 1837, the crops of that and the succeeding five years were considerably 'deficient'; so much so, that prices rose in 1839 to 70s. 8d. a quarter, the importations in that and the three following years being also very large. This increase in the price of corn, combined with the depressed state of commerce, originating in the pecuniary revolution in the United States, and other causes, again attracted a great deal of attention to the corn laws; and the oppressive magnitude and injurious operation of the duties were very strongly animadverted upon at public meetings in the manufacturing towns and elsewhere. An association, denominated the Anti-Corn-Law League, originally founded in Lancashire, but which subsequently extended its ramifications to most parts of the country, was set on foot for the express purpose of keeping up an incessant agitation against the corn laws, which, in consequence of these concurring circumstances, were assailed with greater bitterness than ever. The importance of the subject at length forced it on the attention of government; and in 1841, ministers, actuated partly by a sense of the mischievous influence of the sliding scale, and partly also by a wish to strengthen their declining popularity, brought forward a plan for remodelling the corn laws, by repealing the sliding scale, and imposing in its stead a constant duty of 8s. a quarter on wheat, and in proportion on other grain. But, having no majority in parliament, ministers were obliged to resort to a dissolution; and their proposal having, notwithstanding its moderation, excited the greatest apprehensions among the agriculturists, without being very warmly supported by the other classes, a new parliament was returned, which gave a decided majority to the opposition. It was, however, felt on all hands to be necessary to make some considerable change in the existing law, and in 1842 a measure was introduced in that view by Sir Robert Peel, which was subsequently passed into a law, 5th Vict. 2d Sess. cap. 14.

Unfortunately, however, this measure, like that by which it was preceded, was bottomed on the principle of making the duties vary with the variations in the price of corn; and though the duties were decidedly less oppressive than those imposed by the 9th Geo. IV. cap. 60, still they were in no ordinary degree objectionable, as well from their too great magnitude as from their adding to the natural insecurity of the corn trade, and increasing the chances and severity of fluctuations. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the new measure gave but little satisfaction. Instead of being abated, the agitation and clamour against the corn laws continued progressively to gain strength; and the conviction began at the same time gradually to extend itself among many of those by whom these laws had hitherto been supported, that farther modifications would have to be made in them, and that they might be made without inflicting any very serious injury upon agriculture.

This conviction was greatly strengthened by the result of the important changes made by Sir Robert Peel in the History of tariff in 1842, and more especially by those which had reference to the importation of live cattle and fresh provisions. These had previously been prohibited; but the minister proposed that this prohibition should be repealed, and that their importation should be permitted under reasonable duties. This proposal, when first brought forward, excited the greatest apprehensions among the farmers and graziers, and was followed by an immediate fall in the price of cattle. Happily, however, the measure was carried, and it was speedily discovered that there was no such difference between the prices of cattle of the same quality here and in the adjacent parts of the Continent as had been supposed, and that the fears entertained by the agriculturists of the approaching ruin of the businesses of breeding and grazing were altogether visionary and unfounded. The experience afforded by the reduction and subsequent abolition of the duty on wool was exactly similar. Instead of being injured, the interests of the British sheep farmers were promoted by these measures, the demand for home-grown wool having been rendered comparatively steady, and its price considerably increased by the stimulus which the change in the duty on foreign wool gave to the woollen manufacture.

In the following year, that is, in 1843, a measure was adopted, which made a wide breach in the corn laws. In 1842 the Legislature of Canada passed a law, imposing a duty of 3s. a quarter on all wheat imported into the province, unless from the United Kingdom, stating, in the preamble to this act, that it was passed in the expectation and belief that a corresponding reduction would be made in the duties on wheat and wheat-flour imported into the United Kingdom from Canada. And conformably to this anticipation, the act 6th and 7th Vict. cap. 29, passed in 1843, reduced the duty on wheat imported from Canada to 1s. a quarter, and proportionally on wheat-flour. This act met with much opposition from a part of the agricultural interest in this country, who contended that it would lead to the introduction of unlimited supplies of corn from the United States, at a duty of only 4s. a quarter, or, allowing for smuggling, at perhaps only half that amount. But experience showed that these anticipations were not likely to be realised; for, though the imports from Canada were materially increased, the obstacles in the way of the importation of corn from the United States into Canada, and the danger and expense of the voyage from Montreal or Quebec to England, must necessarily have prevented the importation through this channel from ever becoming of much importance. Still, however, the measure was in so far an abandonment of the corn laws; and if we were justified in admitting the produce of the United States to our markets in this indirect way, it was not easy to discover satisfactory grounds on which to exclude the produce of other States.

The success of the measures adopted in 1842 encouraged Sir Robert Peel to attempt still more considerable changes in 1845, when he abolished the customs' duties on about 420 articles, some of which were of very considerable importance. The measures then adopted were equivalent, in fact, to the virtual abandonment of the protective system; and, under such circumstances, it could not be expected that the corn laws, on which so serious an inroad had been made by the Canada act, would be able to maintain their place on the statute-book for any very lengthened period.

They might, however, have been continued for some time longer, had not the unsatisfactory corn harvest, and the failure of the potatoe crop of 1845, made it necessary to adopt measures for averting the anticipated deficiency in the supplies of food. Under the critical circumstances the Corn Laws, in which the population was then believed to be placed, the temporary suspension of the corn laws could hardly have been avoided; but, if once suspended, their re-enactment would have been all but impossible, and it was better, perhaps, by at once providing for their repeal, to make an end of the system, and of the dissatisfaction and agitation to which it had given birth, than to endeavour to continue it in any modified shape. Such was the view of the matter taken by Sir Robert Peel; and he fortunately succeeded, despite difficulties that none else could have overcome, in carrying the act 9th and 10th Vict. cap. 22, for the immediate modification of the corn laws, and for their total repeal at the end of three years, or on the 1st February 1849. From that date wheat and other corn will be subjected, on importation, to a fixed duty of 1s. a quarter; and flour and meal, of all sorts, to a fixed duty of 4½d. a cwt.

The policy on which the corn trade of Ireland was conducted during the last century, was not materially different in its principles from that followed in Great Britain. In 1707 the Irish parliament granted, by a statute framed in imitation of the English act of 1689, a bounty of 1s. 6d. per quarter on every quarter of wheat exported when the price was at or under 14s.; of 1s. on the quarter of barley, bear, or big, when at or under 10s.; and of 1s. on the quarter of oats when at or under 9s. This act, however, did not by any means place the Irish agriculturists on the same footing with those of Great Britain. The bounty scarcely exceeded a fourth part of what had been granted in this country; and Mr Newenham has shown, that the prices, when it became payable, were fixed much below the average rate at the time. (Natural and Political Circumstances of Ireland, p. 124.)

Though we are very far from imagining that Ireland lost anything by this different treatment, it shows the spirit which influenced, at that period, the English Government in its conduct towards that country. If bounties were really beneficial, as they were then supposed to be, Ireland had a right to every advantage that could be derived from them. We had just succeeded in putting a stop to her rising progress in the woollen manufacture; and if the government of England, and its dependents in the Irish parliament, had not been actuated by an illiberal jealousy of Irish agriculture, as well as of Irish manufactures, the same encouragements to cultivation would doubtless have been held forth in both countries.

The bounty continued to be regulated by the act of 1707 till 1755, when its mode of payment was changed, but the amount remained nearly the same. In the reign of George III., however, a different policy was adopted, and several consecutive laws (5th Geo. III. cap. 19, 13th and 14th Geo. III. cap. 11, 19th and 20th Geo. III. cap. 17) were enacted, by which the bounties were greatly enlarged. At last, in 1784, the statute 23rd and 24th Geo. III. cap. 19, was passed, by which a bounty of 3s. 4d. was granted on every barrel of wheat weighing twenty stone exported when the home price was at or under 27s.; of 1s. 7d. on the barrel of barley, bear, and big, weighing sixteen stone, when at or under 18s. 6d., and of 1s. 5d. on the barrel of oats, weighing fourteen stone, when at or under 10s. These high bounties, coupled with the prohibitory duties imposed at the same time on importation, amounting to 10s. the barrel on wheat when

---

1 The late fall in the price of wool has had nothing to do with these measures, but has been wholly a consequence of the vast and rapidly increasing importations from our Australian colonies, but generally throughout the commercial world. It is extremely doubtful, however, notwithstanding the encomiums which have been lavished on the act of 1784 by Mr Newenham and others, whether the increase of tillage it occasioned has not been really prejudicial. If the agriculture of Ireland had been improved, if more produce had been obtained with less labour than formerly, and if the cottage system, the bane of that kingdom, had been losing ground, it might have been justly contended that the immediate effects of the bounty had been beneficial; but it has not had, and could not rationally be expected to have, any such consequences. "Perhaps," says Mr Wakefield, "I shall be told that Ireland, under the present system, is improving, and that rents of late years have considerably risen. Rents will rise by an extension, as well as by an improvement of tillage; they will rise from an increase in the price of produce; and it is well known that they have risen in consequence of an enlargement of circulating medium. To these causes I ascribe the latter circumstance, the truth of which I fully admit, though I absolutely deny the former. If any one will show me farming buildings of a late erection, or point out a single plough of a proper construction, in the hands of an Irish farmer, whose only means of support is the cultivation of the soil, I will allow that some improvement has taken place. Is any competent judge prepared to say, that fewer acres in proportion to the whole tillage land, are cultivated with the spade, than there were twenty years ago? Some, perhaps, may consider this system as beneficial, by affording employment to the people; but it might be observed, on the other hand, that to count the grains of wheat in every barrel would furnish them employment also. In every case of this kind we ought to look to the result, for employment is useful only as it becomes productive." (Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political, vol. i. p. 582.)

Mr Wakefield is quite correct. By suddenly raising prices, the bounty certainly stimulated the cultivation of the soil; but the want of capital, and the consequent difficulty of finding farmers capable of taking large farms, coupled with the general predilection of the Irish people in favour of small ones, conspired to cause a still more minute division of property, and to give a factious stimulus to population. The fact of an increase having taken place in the numbers of a people (and it is on this that Mr Newenham principally relies when contending for the favourable effects of the bounty), does not by itself authorise the inference that it has been really beneficial. Were it possible, and we trust it is not, to give the English and Scotch peasants the same habits as those of Ireland, to render them satisfied with potatoes, mud cottages, rags and wretchedness, their numbers would rapidly increase; but their situation would, at the same time, be altered very much for the worse. In the same way, if we could inspire the people of Ireland with that taste for comforts, cleanliness, and good living, which so honourably distinguishes the people of England, their numbers would perhaps be diminished, but their social condition would be rendered far more enviable than at present. More happiness, more enjoyment, more, in short, of every thing that is either desirable or praiseworthy, will be found in a country occupied by a comparatively small number of well fed, well clothed, and well educated inhabitants, than are to be found in a nation peopled with myriads of human beings pressing against the limits of subsistence, and sunk in sloth and poverty.

To endeavour to impress on the minds of the lower classes the propriety of being contented with the simplest and cheapest fare, is generally pernicious to the best interests of mankind. Encomiums should not be bestowed on those who are satisfied with mere necessaries. On the contrary, such indifference ought to be considered as disgraceful. A taste for the comforts, the enjoyments, and the luxuries of life, should be as widely diffused as possible, and, if possible, interwoven with the national character and prejudices. This, as it appears to us, is the best mode of attempting to meliorate the condition of the lower classes. Luxurious and even wasteful habits are incomparably better than that sluggish apathy, which would content itself with what can barely continue mere animal existence. "In those countries," Mr Ricardo judiciously observes, "where the labouring classes have the fewest wants, and are contented with the cheapest food, the people are exposed to the greatest vicissitudes and miseries. They have no place of refuge from calamity; they cannot seek safety in a lower station; they are already so low that they can fall no lower. On any deficiency of the chief article of their subsistence, there are few substitutes of which they can avail themselves, and death to them is attended with almost all the evils of famine."

The corn law of 1804, the first framed subsequently to the union, extended to Ireland; and the price at which the bounty became payable on the exportation of wheat from that country was raised to 29s. 4d. per barrel, and of rye to 20s. 4d.; the price at which the bounty was given on the exportation of oats remained the same, and very little alteration was made in the amount of the bounties themselves.

The shackles which an absurd policy had at different times (see 33rd Geo. III. cap. 65, 42d Geo. III. cap. 35, 44th Geo. III. cap. 65, &c.) imposed on the transport of corn between Great Britain and Ireland, were not removed by the freedom in the corn act of 1804. They were, however, abolished very soon after. The act of 1806 (46th Geo. III. cap. 97) established a perfect freedom in the corn trade between the two great divisions of the empire; and contributed more perhaps to the general advantage and prosperity, than any other enactment framed in the reign of Geo. III. The law of 1828, and the 9th Geo. IV. cap. 60, regulating importation from abroad, and the subsequent acts having the same object in view, have all extended to Ireland.

II. PRINCIPLES OF THE CORN LAWS.

Having completed this sketch of the history of the corn laws, we shall now briefly examine the principles on which they have been founded. And as there no longer exists any difference of opinion as to the propriety of giving an unbounded freedom of exportation, we shall confine our inquiries, 1st, to the policy of encouraging this exportation by means of a bounty; and, 2d, of laying restrictions on importation.

That this subject may be properly understood, it is necessary to premise that the average value of corn, like that of every other commodity, is regulated, in every stage of society, by the greater or less quantity of labour necessary to its production under the most unfavourable circumstances. A bushel of wheat may be obtained from the Principles rich soils of Essex, Kent, or the Carse of Gowrie, at a half or a third part of the expense necessary to produce it in less favoured situations, and might therefore be sold for a half or a third part of the price of the other. But if the demand be such as requires the cultivation of inferior lands, the price of the produce of such lands is elevated so as to admit of the ordinary profits of stock being realised by their cultivators. For were it not raised thus high, the cultivation of inferior lands would be abandoned, and the necessary supplies of food would no longer be obtained.

In the earlier stages of society, and wherever the population is very limited, the best lands only are cultivated; and as they yield a large produce with comparatively little labour, its value is proportionally low. But as society advances, and the density of population increases, recourse must be had to inferior soils. A greater expenditure of capital and labour is then required to produce the same quantity of corn; and, of course, its value, compared with other commodities, in the production of which no additional quantity of labour has been required, is increased.

The raising of raw produce differs, therefore, from any other species of industry. In manufactures, the worst machinery is first set in motion, and every day its powers are improved; and it is rendered capable of yielding a greater amount of produce with the same expense. The discovery of a new machine, or of a more expeditious and less expensive mode of manufacturing, very soon supersedes the older and clumsier machinery previously in use; while the consequent competition never fails to reduce the price of commodities to the sum which the least expensive method of production requires for their manufacture.

In agriculture, on the contrary, the best machines, that is, the best soils, are first brought into use; and recourse is afterwards had to inferior soils, requiring a greater outlay of capital and labour to produce the same supplies. Improvements in the construction of farming implements, and in agricultural management, reduce the price of raw produce; and, operating like improvements in manufacturing machinery, so far assimilate the two species of industry. Any fall, however, which may take place in the price of raw produce, as it enables every class of society to procure a greater quantity of it than before, in exchange for their commodities or their services, raises the profits of stock, and leads, of course, to an increased accumulation of capital. But "this accumulation necessarily leads to a greater demand for labour, to higher wages, to an increased population, and consequently to a further demand for raw produce, and to an increased cultivation." (Ricardo, Principles, &c., p. 79.) Agricultural improvements check, for a time, the necessity of having recourse to inferior soils; but the check is only temporary. The stimulus which they at the same time give to population, equalizes, in the end, the demand with the supply, and, by a re-action of a different kind, raises prices, and forces the cultivation of poor lands.

The value of raw produce, therefore (though improvements in agriculture, and other circumstances, occasionally reduce it), naturally tends to rise as society advances. As it becomes more difficult to raise food, it necessarily exchanges for a greater quantity of other products. Not merely its nominal, but its real price is increased; and no person can have the same command over it as before, without making a proportionally greater sacrifice of labour, or of some other equivalent.

This circumstance, and not the accumulation of capital, by raising wages, reduces the profits of stock, and checks, or at least retards, the progress of all old settled and populous countries. The cost or real value of a commodity not being regulated by the price at which the labour required for its production is paid, but by the quantity of that labour, every increase in the wages of workmen obviously lessens the share of the commodity they manufacture which belongs to the capitalist, or, which is the same thing, it lessens the profits of stock.

Supposing the value of money to be invariable, and the quality of labour necessary to produce L1000 worth of gloves to remain the same, the gloves would continue to sell for that sum, whether the wages of the labour necessary to their production amounted to L600, to L800, or to L900. The rise of wages, it must be remembered, is supposed to be quite general; and hence, if the L1000 worth of gloves freely exchanged, before wages rose, for a certain quantity of boots, stockings, coats, &c., they would do the same afterwards, unless the labour expended on the other commodities had increased or diminished; for it is evident that a rise of wages which equally affects different commodities leaves their relative values unaltered.

If the rise of wages were not universal, and if the glove manufacturer alone had to pay 10 per cent. additional on the wages of his workmen, while the manufacturer of boots, of labour, stockings, coats, &c., paid only the former rate of wages, he would either obtain a greater quantity of these articles in exchange for gloves, or be forced to abandon his profit of trade. Hence there would in no long time be an influx stock of labourers into the glove manufactory; and their increase in that department of industry, and consequent diminution in the rest would, in the end, adjust wages to the same level. And when this adjustment is effected, the exchangeable values of commodities are precisely the same as before a rise of wages. The glove manufacturer could not then say to the stocking manufacturer that he must have a greater quantity of stockings in exchange for gloves, because he paid a higher rate of wages, for the other would have it in his power to answer that the rise of wages affected him to exactly the same extent. Commodities would, therefore, continue to sell after the rise for the same price as before, but that price would be differently divided. A greater share would belong to the labourer, and a less to the capitalist, or, which is the same thing, the profits of stock would be diminished.

Fluctuations in the value of money obscure, but do not in any degree affect, the relation of profits and wages. A rise or a fall in the real wages of labour, the only one we are here considering, results entirely from a greater or less proportion of its produce going at one time to workmen, and at another to capitalists. When a greater share is assigned to the workmen, their wages are really augmented, and when a smaller share, they are as really diminished, whatever may be the state of money wages.

It has, indeed, been contended, that the price of labour has no connection with the price of food, and that the former, being regulated solely by the supply and demand, a provision in the price of corn does not necessarily cause any increase in the wages of labour, nor consequently any reduction in the profits of stock. But the cost of rearing and maintaining labourers, independent of all other considerations, determines the lowest limit to which the price of labour can permanently fall. In a manufacturing country the rate of wages is, no doubt, exposed to great fluctuations, and a stagnation may take place in trade at the same time that corn is rising, so that the labouring class may at once experience an increase in the price of provisions and a fall of wages. But if the rise in the price of corn be of a permanent nature, and if the demand do not occasion a corresponding rise in the price of labour, the principle of increase will be affected, and the number of inciples workmen will be gradually reduced, until wages be raised to their proper level.

It may perhaps be objected, that in countries where labour is well rewarded, and where a third or two fifths of the wages of workmen suffice for the purchase of corn, an increase in the price of bread and meal would act rather as an inducement to retrench from what was not essentially necessary, than to diminish the rate of increase. Few, however, of the countries of Europe are in this situation; and as labourers constitute by far the greater portion of every society, no system of policy should be recommended which has any tendency to diminish their comforts. The experience of all ages has shown that a needy populace lose a just sense of their dignity and rights as men, and become depraved and riotous. It is in vain to expect industry where it does not meet with a suitable reward; men will not submit to privations and labour, unless in the hope of securing corresponding comforts.

If the number of labourers were suddenly increased when wages rise, or suddenly reduced when they fall, such fluctuations would have little influence over their condition. But the number of labourers, though not fixed, can, speaking generally, be increased or diminished only by slow degrees. When wages rise, the condition of the labourers is improved; for the stimulus given to population by such rise cannot have any sensible influence over the supply of labour for more than twenty years, and during this lengthened period the labourer has time to acquire improved tastes and habits; the standard of his enjoyments is raised; and he hesitates at marrying unless he supposes he can maintain his wife and children in the improved condition to which he has attained. The opposite circumstances take place when wages fall. The labourers are in that case obliged to economize; to descend, as it were, to a lower station, and to content themselves with inferior accommodations; so that when wages rise after having been for a considerable time depressed, a good deal of the influence of the rise, or perhaps the whole, is exhausted in elevating the labourers to the point whence they had been sunk by the fall.

Hence, in stating that money wages are determined by variations in the price of food and other necessaries, the proposition must be understood with its necessary limitations. There is in all cases a vis inertiae to be overcome, that prevents any change of prices from having what may be considered its proper effect on wages. When the former rise, money wages do not immediately rise in the same proportion, nor do they immediately fall when prices fall. But they always vary in the same direction, and depend mainly upon, and are materially influenced by, each other.

If, therefore, speaking generally, a bounty on exportation, or a restriction on importation, raise the exchangeable value, or real price of corn, it will also raise the rate of wages. But as the exchangeable value of manufactured commodities is not enhanced by a rise in the price of labour, it is evident that the profits of stock, and the power of accumulating capital, must be diminished proportionally to the fictitious increase in the price of corn.

By extending the market for corn, when a bounty is first granted, the money price of raw produce is raised, and agricultural profits being elevated above the general level, there is an influx of capital from other departments, until they are again reduced. Thus far a bounty accomplishes its object, and gives at least a temporary stimulus to cultivation. If the newly employed capital render the same returns as the capital previously engaged in raising corn, its real price will not be increased. But, as we have already observed, this is not likely to be the case for any considerable period. Discoveries in agriculture may, for a while, prevent recourse being had to poor soils; but the constant increase of population will in the end force their cultivation. Now, the bounty has in this respect the same effect as an increase of population. Both increase the demand for corn; and as by this increase we are at length forced to employ inferior machinery, or worse land, in order to raise the additional supplies, their value must be augmented.

Were the prices of corn in Britain and Spain, for example, nearly on a level, no exportation would take place from the one to the other. But if, when prices were in this situation, a bounty of 10s. per quarter were granted by our government, corn would be immediately poured from England into Spain. Limits would, it is true, be soon set to its exportation. The competition which takes place among exporters, as among every other class of traders, prevents their realizing more than the ordinary profits of stock, so that grain would be exported from England to Spain, not in the expectation of realizing the whole bounty as profit, but in the view merely of securing the ordinary rate of profit on the capital employed in its transfer. A rise of prices, though not to the whole extent of the bounty, would therefore immediately take place in this country and a corresponding fall in Spain. And this rise and fall would not be temporary. Corn would be permanently cheaper in Spain, because the unusual cheapness of the foreign supplies would throw the poorest lands out of tillage; and it would be permanently dearer in England, because the increased demand would stimulate the bringing of them under cultivation. A bounty to the extent we have supposed would perhaps depress prices 5s. per quarter in Spain, and raise them as much in Britain. To the Spaniards it would be advantageous, inasmuch as it would enable them to obtain an indispensable necessary for less than it would otherwise cost; in Britain, however, its effects would be directly opposite. A few more of our heaths and bogs might be cultivated, but every class of persons, landlords only excepted, would find it more difficult to procure food than before. The higher price of corn (supposing it not to raise wages and diminish profits, which it would certainly do) would obviously be of no advantage, and could not enrich the public, since it would in the end be proportioned to the greater difficulty experienced in raising the additional quantity.

Every bounty is objectionable, as producing an unnatural distribution of the national capital; but a bounty on a manufactured commodity does not increase the quantity of labour necessary for its production, and does not, of course, raise its exchangeable value. In this respect, a bounty on the raising of raw produce is the most impolitic of any, inasmuch as it not only occasions a faulty distribution of capital, but also raises the cost of production, or real price of the article produced, and consequently lowers the rate of profit.

It has, however, been contended, that although the first effect of a bounty may be to raise prices, yet that, by attracting an unusually great capital to land, it ultimately tends to cause a glut of the market, and a fall of price. That this real price statement may to a certain extent be consistent with fact, of corn and that a glut of the market, sufficient to cause a tempo-causing a depression of prices, may be produced by a bounty, glut of the we do not mean to deny; but such depression cannot last market, for any lengthened period, unless the real price of corn, that is, unless the labour necessary for its production, be diminished.

When an unusual demand is experienced for corn, and capital is in consequence moving from manufactures to land, prices may subsequently be higher, lower, or the same as before. Their rise or fall depends entirely on the circumstance of equal quantities of this newly employed Principles capital being less or more productive than the capital previously engaged in agriculture. The fresh capital cannot, however, be more productive, except from an improvement in the manner of working land, or from a saving of labour, which it is evident might take place without any bounty, and is not occasioned by it; and if it be expended unaccompanied by any such improvement, it will either raise prices or be in a great measure lost to the proprietors; for if the poorest soils in tillage do not yield the ordinary rate of profit, their cultivation will be abandoned.

In reference to a glut of the home market caused by a bounty, it may be observed that that will seldom happen, except in seasons when there is an extraordinarily luxuriant crop, and of course very low prices, in the country to which the grain exported by means of the bounty is usually sent. Were Great Britain regularly in the habit of exporting corn, either by a bounty or otherwise, to Spain, the average prices of both kingdoms would become nearly stationary, at a rate such, that the cost of a quarter of wheat in Spain would exceed that of a quarter in England, by the cost of its transport from the one to the other, including therein the profits of the capital employed, insurance, &c. But though such would be the case in ordinary years, it would be very different when there was any great diversity in the crops in either country. When prices suddenly fell in Spain, owing to a luxuriant harvest, exportation from England would be suddenly cease, and would not be renewed until the fall in this country, caused by the cessation of the foreign demand, had been as great as in Spain. A nation which exports corn is liable to fluctuations of price, not merely from the state of its own harvests, but also from those of its customers; and insomuch as a bounty gives a factitious extension to exportation, it must also tend to render prices less steady.

But supposing the accuracy of this statement to be admitted, it may still be contended, that a nation which exports an extra quantity of corn by means of a bounty, has at least a greater resource in years of scarcity than a nation in a different situation. This idea, however, though plausible, and to a certain extent correct, is in the main fallacious. If the deficiency of the crop did not exceed the ordinary quantity of corn exported, there would not certainly be any considerable rise of price; but if the deficiency exceeds that quantity, the situation of an exporting country must evidently be a good deal worse than that of a regularly importing one. In the latter, a slight rise of prices would occasion a greater importation than ordinary; but in an exporting country, prices must not only be raised by the whole cost of the carriage from foreign ports, but by an additional sum, sufficient to determine importation into new channels.

Thus, a deficiency of the crop of Poland, not exceeding the quantity of corn ordinarily exported from that country, would not have any material effect over prices; but no importation to make up for a larger deficiency could take place until prices had risen, not merely higher than ordinary, but decidedly higher than the prices of the countries to which Poland is in the habit of exporting.

Again, in seasons when there is a luxuriant crop in a country exporting by means of a bounty, it operates with double effect, and very little of the surplus is stored up to answer the home consumption in case of future exigencies. By forcing exportation, it hinders, as Dr Smith has observed, the plenty of one year from relieving the distresses of another, and therefore occasions, in years of scarcity, a greater importation than would otherwise be necessary.

Those who compare the prices in the subjoined tables from 1688 to 1766, during what may be called the period of the Corn Laws, with the prices from 1766 to 1792, when the corn trade was comparatively free, will see that the foregoing conclusions do not depend on theory only, but are consistent with experience.

We have now said enough to show the tendency of a factitious bounty. The following remarks shall therefore be directed solely to the consideration of restrictions on importation; and as we have already shown that restrictions, wherever they prevent access to the cheapest markets, and thereby fictitiously keep up the price of corn, tend, as well as the obtaining bounty, to diminish the profits of capital and to force it abroad, we shall now advert, first, to the security which cut supply the restrictive system is supposed to afford, of furnishing corn, an independent and ample supply of provisions; and, secondly, to its influence in maintaining prices uniformly at a high level.

I. Where one nation has been for a series of years in the habit of importing corn from another, it must have exported some more acceptable produce as an equivalent. The farmers of the corn-growing country will, after this commerce is established, reckon as much upon the demand of the importing country, as on that of their fellow-subjects. They will cultivate an additional quantity of land, raise larger crops, and consequently pay higher rents, solely because they are assured of this vent for their produce. The benefits of this intercourse are therefore reciprocal, and the corn growers, as much as the corn buyers, are interested in the continuance of the traffic, and would suffer as much by its cessation. "When we consider," says Mr Ricardo, "the value of even a few weeks consumption of corn in England, no interruption could be given to the export trade, if the Continent supplied us with any considerable quantity of corn, without the most extensively ruinous commercial distress, distress which no sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, would be willing to inflict on their people; and, though willing, it would be a measure to which probably no people would submit. It was the endeavour of Bonaparte to prevent the exportation of the raw produce of Russia, more than any other cause, which produced the astonishing efforts of the people of that country against the most powerful force, perhaps, ever assembled to subjugate a nation." (Essay on the Profits of Stock, p. 19.)

But when a nation adopts a policy like that on which we have till lately acted, and refuses to admit any foreign corn, except when the home price reaches a height indicating scarcity, she must then, it is obvious, enter a market to which no corn has been brought, with a view to her demand. The difficulties we have occasionally experienced in importing have been greatly exaggerated; but they resulted more from the nature of our own policy respecting it, than from anything peculiar to importation. Perpetually fluctuating between bounties, restrictions, and prohibitions, no foreign country could ever rely on our continuing to import their corn. We might buy a million of quarters to-day, but we might buy no more for a couple of twelvemonths. Had our demand been steady, had we regularly imported, additional supplies would have been raised for our markets; rents would have been increased; and foreign farmers, landlords, merchants, shipowners, &c., would have been interested in procuring us whatever quantity of corn we might require; but hitherto we have entered the foreign market as strangers only. Our orders might be expected, but they could not be reckoned on. Whatever supplies we might procure were withdrawn from the ordinary stock, so that prices abroad were unnaturally raised, exportation checked, and the home price allowed to reach a comparatively great height. When a merely temporary liberty is granted to import, or when the duties on importation vary with the prices, the operations and the enterprise of merchants are alike cramped. They cannot safely order corn from distant countries, lest the price should fall before it arrives, and the ports be shut, or the duty have attained to a ruinous height. They are compelled to have recourse to countries in our immediate vicinity; their orders must be given on the spur of the moment, and all that consideration and combination necessary to insure the success of every complex transaction are unavoidably excluded.

The regulations laid down in 1815, and those enacted since, gave liberty to import and warehouse foreign grain duty free, for re-exportation or for home consumption, when the price reached the limit at which it was admissible; but this liberty was not of so much consequence as might be supposed. Corn is at once a bulky and a perishable commodity; and capitalists seldom employ large funds in importing it, unless there be at the time a strong probability that prices will very soon attain the limit when it may be sold. Corn will at all times be stored up for a market like that of Amsterdam, because it may be disposed of at the pleasure of the holder, and its sale is not dependent on any contingent circumstance. In this country the case has been different. An unforeseen change of weather often checked a rise of prices at the time that a further rise was confidently expected; and even the warehousing of any considerable quantity of foreign grain had of itself a similar though a less effect. By giving little freedom to mercantile operations, and preventing the importer from disposing of his commodity when he thought proper, this system, in ordinary years, tended to suppress warehousing altogether, and, consequently, tended to deprive the country of one of its main securities against a sudden rise of prices in deficient years.

It may be further observed, that the wider the surface from which a country derives its supplies of food, the less is it exposed to fluctuations of prices arising from favourable or unfavourable seasons. A general failure of the crops of an extensive kingdom is a calamity that but seldom occurs. The weather that is unfavourable to vegetation in one species of soil, is frequently favourable to it in another. If moist clay lands suffer from a wet summer, the crops are rendered more luxuriant in dry rocky districts. The excess of produce in one province compensates for its deficiency in another; and, except in anomalous cases, the total supply is nearly the same. But if this be generally true of a single nation, it is always true of the world at large. No instance of universal scarcity darkens the history of mankind. It is constantly found, that when the crops of one country fail, plenty reigns in some other quarter. A free trade, that is, a trade without any duty, or with one that is fixed and constant, is alone wanted to guarantee a country like Britain, abounding in all the varied products of industry, in merchandise suited to the wants of every society, from the evils of scarcity. The nations of the earth are not condemned to throw the dice to determine which of them shall submit to be starved. There is always abundance of food in the world. To enjoy a constant plenty, they have only to lay aside their prohibitions and restrictions, and to cease to counteract the benevolent wisdom of Providence.

The case of Holland strongly corroborates the truth of this statement. In the days of her greatest prosperity she chiefly depended upon imported corn, and the prices at Amsterdam were extremely moderate, and, which is of infinite consequence, were steadier than in any other market of Europe. Even during the convulsions of the late war, and when her former commercial connections were almost all dissolved, prices fluctuated very little.

II. But, independently altogether of the circumstances already alluded to, it is easy to see that oppressive restrictions on the importation of corn into a country like this necessarily occasion ruinous fluctuations of price, raising it sometimes far above, and at other times sinking it as much below, the common level.

The ability to export is indispensable to the equality of prices in a country that grows nearly its own supply of corn; for, without such ability, all the increased produce of an unusually luxuriant harvest being thrown upon the home market, prices sink to such an extent as to inflict a serious loss on the agriculturists. But the mere absence of any legal obstacle will not insure the power of exportation. This may be about as effectually prevented by the influence of restrictions on importation, as by a prohibition of export. Suppose that a country, less populous than her neighbours, lays a restriction on importation, and that, in consequence, her average prices are raised 10s. or 15s. a quarter above those of the surrounding states: This increase of price will give such a stimulus to agriculture, that the corn produced at home may, and most probably will, at no distant period, become adequate to supply the consumption. But should such be the case, it is plain that the first unusually productive harvest will cause a glut of the home market; and that it will be impossible to set about relieving this glut by exporting to other countries, till prices fall to the foreign level—that is, till they sink 10s. or 15s. a quarter more than they would have done, but for the previous enhancement caused by the restriction on importation.

The practical operation of the principle thus hypothetically stated, has defeated the expectations, and baffled all the efforts of the landholders of England to keep up prices since 1815. Owing to the extraordinary encouragement given by the high prices to agriculture during the latter years of the war, we grew, in 1811, 1812, and 1813, a sufficient supply for our own consumption, the imports in these years being fully balanced by the exports to the Peninsula on account of the British army. This showed conclusively that the restrictive system had attained its maximum degree of influence; and any one who attended to the circumstances might have foreseen that the first particularly luxuriant crop would inevitably occasion a heavy fall of prices. No one, however, seems to have taken this view of the matter; and, in consequence, the agriculturists entertained the most unfounded expectations of relief from the act of 1815. They imagined that the exclusion of foreign corn till prices reached 80s. a quarter, would make them immediately rise to that level, and prevent them from again sinking materially below it. Had the home supply been decidedly under the consumption, or had it been impossible to cultivate any considerable portion of the lands under tillage in 1813 at so low a rate as 80s., the anticipations of the agriculturists might have been realized; but such was very far indeed from being the case. The home production had become about equivalent to the demand; and experience proved that a price considerably under 80s. was sufficient to enable the culture of the greater part of the inferior lands, that had been broken up during the war, to be carried on. It is no doubt true, that a good deal of the fall of price in 1814 and 1815 was apparent rather than real, and resulted as much from the rise that then took place in the value of the currency, in consequence of the destruction of country bank paper, as from an increased supply of corn. Still, however, the fall in the value of corn, brought about by the rise in the value of money, contributed equally with that occasioned by increased production, to disappoint the agriculturists. The exclusion of foreign corn till the home Principles price reached 80s., rendered its price in ordinary years, though considerably under that limit, a good deal higher than in the surrounding European countries. But when, as in 1816 and 1817, the crops were materially deficient, the restriction operated with increased efficacy, and powerfully contributed, in the way already pointed out, to stint importation, and consequently to increase the pressure of the scarcity, and to raise prices. Unlooked for, however, as it certainly was, this effect of the restriction proved in the end quite as injurious to the agriculturists as to the other classes; for by adding materially to that rise of prices, which a scarcity must under any circumstances occasion, the stimulus it gives to agriculture is proportionally augmented; so that when a luxuriant crop again occurs, the market is much more overloaded than it would have been under a free system, and prices sink in a corresponding degree.

Owing partly to the deficient crop of 1816, but more to the obstacles in the way of importation, the price of corn in 1817 rose to 96s. 11d., and in 1818 to 86s. 3d. Now mark the effects of these high prices. They revived the drooping spirits of the farmers, who imagined that the corn laws were at length beginning to produce the effects anticipated from them, and that the golden days of 1812, when wheat sold for 126s. a quarter, were about to return! This, however, was only a transient gleam. The increased prices led to a fresh extension of tillage; improvements were recommenced with new energy; vast additional sums were expended upon the land; and these circumstances conspiring with luxuriant harvests, and the impossibility of exportation, sunk prices to such a degree, that they fell, in October 1822, so low as 38s. 1d., the average price of that year being only 44s. 7d.!

It is nugatory, therefore, to attempt to obviate the recurrence of periods of low prices and agricultural distress by imposing severe restrictions on importation. Freedom is, speaking generally, the only effectual security against injurious vicissitudes. Restrictions, unless they be of the most moderate description, and contrived with great care, occasion the very evils they are said to remove or palliate. If they prevent importation in ordinary years, and raise average prices above the common level, they make exportation in favourable seasons impracticable, till prices have sunk unnaturally low. This is a defect inherent in the exclusive system, which nothing but the adoption of the Dutch plan of destroying a portion of the produce of a plentiful harvest will ever be able to get rid of! Protection cannot be carried further than monopoly; and monopoly cannot sustain prices in abundant years in countries where the supply and consumption are nearly balanced, nor prevent the consequent destruction of agricultural capital, and the ruin of a large proportion of the agriculturists.

We should mistake, however, if we supposed that the injury resulting from a heavy fall of prices is confined to the agriculturists. It is idle, indeed, to imagine that a system ruinous to the producers can be otherwise to the consumers. A glut of the market, occasioned by luxuriant harvests, and the want of the power to export, cannot be of long continuance; for, while it continues, it can hardly fail, by distressing all classes of farmers, and ruining many, to check every species of agricultural improvement, and to lessen the extent of land in tillage. When, therefore, an unfavourable season recurs, the reaction is for the most part appalling. The supply, being lessened not only by the badness of the season, but also by a diminution of the quantity of land in crop, falls very far below an average, and a severe scarcity generally ensues. Injurious restrictions on importation turn what ought to be a blessing into a curse. They make an abundant crop productive of injury to the farmer, and go far to render two or three such crops in succession sure forerunners of scarcity, and perhaps of famine!

The principles now laid down are so obvious, and are so completely corroborated by the history of the period since 1814, that it is unnecessary perhaps to enlarge further on this part of our subject. But the following extract from a speech of Mr Huskisson in 1825, exposes the principal defects of the late system, in so forcible, and at the same time so popular a manner, that we shall take the liberty to lay it before the reader:

"He had always understood that the great desideratum in this important question was to provide for steady prices, and to guard against excessive fluctuations from the vicissitudes of trade. How did the present law provide for these ends? By limiting the markets from which we draw our supplies, by destroying the vent which we should otherwise have for our produce whenever we are blessed with a superabundant harvest, or by exposing us to an alternate fluctuation of high and low prices. To say of a system which affected the price of labour and the comforts of the labourer, and which cramped the resources, not only of the manufacturer, but of the farmer himself—to say of such a system, that it 'worked well,' was so completely refuted by the fact, that he was surprised that any man should be bold enough to make it. What did they think of its working well in 1822, when corn was as low as 38s. a quarter? Within two years and a-half the price of corn had varied from 112s. to 38s. a quarter. Such fluctuations deprived the farmer of all security, and converted his business into mere gambling. The man who engaged in a long lease could not at present be aware of the conditions on which he was taking it, nor of the results which it might produce upon his family arrangements. But this was not the only inconvenience of the system. Look at the situation in which we were placed when a bad harvest made it necessary for us to go to foreign markets. The price of corn immediately advanced then. The foreign government, seeing our demand for it, laid a tax upon the article; this further increased the price; and the result was, that our exchanges were suddenly altered, so that we obtained the required supply under the greatest possible disadvantages. He had heard it said, and by gentlemen who had reflected on the subject, that if we had great fluctuations, there was in them, notwithstanding, a fair average price! He wondered what this phrase meant when applied to the subsistence of the people. He should like to know how any gentleman accustomed to eat a good dinner every day would like to be kept a week without food, and to be supplied the next with twice as much as he wanted. Would he be satisfied with being told that he had got a fair average quantity of provisions for each day in the two weeks? He thought that the gentleman would not be satisfied; that he would find such an average system was neither wholesome to his constitution nor pleasant to his stomach." (Debates, 28th April 1825.)

The previous reasonings and statements have sufficiently established, 1st, That a prohibition of importation into a country that would generally or occasionally import, occasions an increased cultivation of bad land, and by so doing tends to raise prices and to depress profits; 2d, That such prohibition tends in so far to throw a country on her own resources, and lessens her ability to profit by the provision made by Providence for equalizing the deficiencies in the harvests of particular countries by a corresponding

1 Alluding to the statement of a preceding speaker.

Principles surplus in others; 3d. That the prohibition of importation of corn in ordinary years, by raising the average price of corn to a comparatively high level, renders exportation in a peculiarly abundant year impossible, till prices sink so as to be productive of great agricultural distress; and, 4th, That this distress, by defeating the plans of the cultivators, discouraging improvements, and lessening the quantity of land sown, tends materially to diminish the home supply; and when the produce of a year, diminished by these causes, happens also to be diminished by a bad season, the combined influence of the two is most disastrous, and there is both an enormous increase of price, and the severest pressure upon the industrious classes.

Such being the inevitable consequences of the restrictions hitherto imposed on the corn trade, it was surely high time that they should be abolished, and a return made to a free system. But we must guard the reader against supposing that this or any other system will suffice to prevent the public feeling the injurious effects of deficient harvests. It will palliate their influence, but it will do nothing more. Should the home supplies of corn under the new system be in ordinary years nearly or about equal to our consumption, we may expect prices to be comparatively steady; for, under such circumstances, we shall have little difficulty in procuring supplies from abroad to meet any deficiency (unless it be of an extraordinary character, as in 1847) in our home produce; and we shall also be able, without any very extraordinary sacrifice, to export the surplus of our crops in unusually productive years. But if we should in ordinary years import any very considerable portion of our supplies, the result of the new system will be less favourable. In that case an unusually luxuriant harvest, and still more a cycle of such harvests, would, by occasioning a glut of the market, and a heavy fall of price, be injurious at once to the agriculturists, and to those depending on them for employment; for, under such circumstances, they would not be able to export till prices had fallen from 12s. or 14s. to 15s. or 20s. a quarter below their usual level. And hence, as this contingency is neither impossible nor improbable, the advantage (as will be afterwards more fully shown) of imposing a moderate duty on importation, accompanied with a corresponding drawback on exportation.

The restrictions imposed on the trade in corn during the ten or fifteen years preceding the change effected in 1846, were not nearly so injurious as they had previously been, or as they might, on theoretical grounds, have been expected to be. This modified action is wholly, or all but wholly, attributable, 1st, to the extraordinary improvement that has taken place in agriculture in Great Britain since the peace of 1815; and, 2d, though in a very inferior degree, to the increase in the imports of corn from Ireland.

1. It was for a while contended, that, owing to the fall of prices, agriculture declined materially after 1815, and in particular in the years immediately subsequent to 1820. This view of the matter was strongly supported in the Report of the Agricultural Committee of 1833; and it is but too certain that the fall in question involved very many persons, landlords as well as farmers, in very great difficulties; and in some districts, particularly in the southern parts of the island, there may have been, for a while, a pretty general decline. On the whole, however, there is incontestible evidence to prove, speaking of Great Britain generally, that the effects of the sudden and heavy fall of prices in 1814 and 1815, though severe at the time, were very soon overcome, and there has been an all but unparalleled improvement in agriculture since 1815 or 1820.

How else could the extraordinary increase of population that has taken place in the interval have been provided for? and how else could the rental of England and Wales of the Corn Laws have exceeded by L5,836,627 its rental in 1814-15? There was no increase, or at least none worth mentioning in a question of this sort, in the quantity of foreign corn retained for home consumption during the twenty years ending with 1840, as compared with the previous twenty years; and yet the population of Great Britain increased during that interval from 14,481,139 to 18,844,434! Now it is impossible that a result of this sort could have taken place without either a very great increase of agricultural produce, or a signal and almost unprecedented falling off in the demand for corn; but the latter supposition is out of the question. Instead of there being any decline in the consumption, there can be no manner of doubt that, speaking generally, the bulk of the population consume, at this moment, more corn, particularly wheat, than at any former period. In fact, wheaten bread has now almost entirely superseded every other sort of bread. The consumption of rye, barley, and oats in the northern and south-western parts of England, and in Wales, is reduced to a mere trifle. All classes subsist mainly on wheaten bread; and, during the last twenty years, there has been a growing indisposition to use even the inferior sorts of such bread. In Scotland the change has been still more decided than in England; and we believe we are quite within bounds, when we express our conviction that fully ten times more wheat is consumed in Scotland at present (1848) than in 1790.

II. A part of the extraordinary increase in the home imports of corn since 1820 has been derived, as stated from Ireland above, from Ireland; but this part is not so great as is usually supposed. Previously to the recent failures of the potato crop (in 1845 and 1846), the annual importations of all sorts of corn from Ireland exceeded by about 1,500,000 quarters their amount in 1820. But between 1820 and 1845 we added about 5,400,000 individuals to the population of Great Britain only; at the same time that, at an average, the consumption of individuals has been materially increased, and that there has been a large increase in the number of horses—the great consumers of oats, the principal article of import from Ireland.

On the whole, therefore, it may be safely affirmed, that the soil and agriculture of Great Britain furnished, in 1846, food sufficient for the comfortable subsistence of at least five millions of inhabitants more than in 1820. Little, comparatively, of this wonderful result can be ascribed to the bringing of waste land into cultivation, or to the extension of tillage. It is principally a consequence of improved drainage, improved modes of management, and of the adoption of improved manures, processes, and implements. In proof of the extraordinary change that has taken place, we may mention that, in the wolds of Lincolnshire, the crops of turnips have become from five to ten times heavier within the last few years, from the application of bone manure to their culture; at the same time that there has been a proportional increase in the productivity of other crops! Similar improvements, and in some instances quite as great, have been made in other parts of the country. It is gratifying, too, to know that the capacities of improvement are far from being anywhere exhausted. But what has been effected shows what may be done, were the productive energies of the more backward districts better developed by the extension of the improved practices of Norfolk, Northumberland, Lincoln, &c., to other counties. The granting of leases of a reasonable length, and the enforcing of proper conditions as to management, would be the most likely means to bring about so desirable a result.

1 Descriptive and Statistical Account of the British Empire, 3d Edit. i. 553. It is impossible, indeed, to say to what extent, under such circumstances, improvement might be carried.

Immense, however, as are the capacities of improvement in Great Britain, they are far exceeded by those of Ireland. The latter, indeed, owing to the humidity of the climate, is better suited for pasturage than for tillage. But any one who has ever been in Ireland, or is aware of the wretched state of its agriculture, and of the amazing fertility of its soil, must be satisfied that were an improved system of husbandry generally introduced, its exports could not fail to be vastly increased. And this may, perhaps, be fairly expected. The mendicant agitation by which Ireland has been so long distracted and disgraced has received a check; and it is to be hoped that such measures may be adopted as may be effectual for the permanent abatement of the nuisance. Till this be done, and till confidence be established, and a complete stop put to the subdivision of the land, the resources of the country cannot be developed. So long as the Catholics were treated as an inferior and degraded caste, neither tranquillity nor improvement of any kind could rationally be expected to grow up. Happily, however, this vicious policy has been wholly abandoned; and were adequate provision made for the Catholic clergy, every just ground of complaint on the part of the Irish would be removed. What Ireland now wants is a firm and consistent system of government, which, while it does justice to all classes, without either flattering or irritating popular prejudices, shall, with a strong hand, suppress all attempts at agitation, enforce the empire of the law, and give confidence to the capitalist, and to the landlord anxious to improve his estate. We are not prepared to say whether such a system of government can be established in Ireland without the suspension of some of those political privileges that may be safely entrusted to the people of England, but if not, they should be suspended. Security of life and property is the one thing needful in Ireland; and were it fully established, she might yet, perhaps, assume a respectable place among civilized nations, be distinguished for her agriculture, and be a stay and support, instead of a burden upon and a disgrace, to England.

Perhaps the most imposing of the arguments urged against an unrestricted corn trade proceeds on the assumption, that ultimately every agricultural nation will manufacture for itself, and will cease purchasing from abroad. But surely it is not meant to be insinuated that, in the progress of society, there will be no interchange by different nations of manufactured commodities for raw produce. It is evidently impossible that such a state of things can exist unless the price of raw produce were everywhere the same. America may, and it is most probable will, at some future period, manufacture cotton goods for her own consumption, but while the cost of raising wheat is less or not more in that republic than in England, it will be sent hither when our crops are deficient, in return for some species of our produce. Nothing but the revival of the enactments of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and prohibiting exportation altogether, can possibly prevent corn finding its way to those places where its value is greatest.

But supposing it were otherwise, is a system injurious to the community to be kept up for the sake of a particular class? The rents of landlords are not to be maintained at an artificial elevation by means that depress profits, and occasion an incessant alternation of glut and scarcity. It was not contended, when the steam-engine, or when Sir R. Arkwright's cotton-mill was introduced, that they should not be employed, because the old clumsy machinery would in consequence be superseded, and the capital vested in it lost. No such ridiculous notion was ever entertained; but in what respect would it have been more absurd than to persist, for the sake of a trifling advantage to landlords, in raising produce from inferior soils at home, if we may purchase supplies at a cheaper rate elsewhere? Why should not the best machinery be employed in raising corn as well as in spinning cotton? If an expenditure of L1,000 suffice to manufacture cottons or hardware at Glasgow or Birmingham, that will exchange for 400 or 500 quarters of Polish or American corn; and if the same sum, applied directly to the raising of corn, will not in this country yield more than 350 or 400 quarters, what folly can be greater than to continue so disadvantageous a production, and to refuse to buy corn from foreigners with manufactured goods? Were private interests in such cases not to give way to the general good, society would at once come to a stand, and mere routine take the place of genius and invention.

The most popular defence of the corn laws, and the only additional one we shall notice, rests on the ground that, as exclusive advantages are granted to different manufactures, agriculture ought in justice to be placed in the same favoured situation. But it was long ago demonstrated that it cannot be for the interest of a state to manufacture at home when it may purchase cheaper abroad. If, therefore, any of our manufactures could not exist under a free system, it would be for the general advantage that they were abandoned, and the capital vested in them employed in some other way. We doubt, however, whether any of them can be truly said to be in this predicament. The duties on the importation of similar fabrics have been all either repealed or very greatly reduced since 1826, and none seem to have suffered by the change. On the contrary, they have continued to prosper more than at any former period. Even the linen and silk manufactures, the existence of which was formerly supposed to depend on prohibitive duties, have been vastly improved and extended since these were repealed, and the importation of linens and silks permitted under reasonable duties.

The expectations entertained by the manufacturers of the advantages to be realised from the repeal or modification of the corn laws, appear to have been singularly exaggerated. They believed that there would be a very large increase in the imports of corn, and a corresponding increase of the foreign demand for our manufactured goods. But no such increase of importation could be fairly anticipated, unless the average prices of corn in England had greatly exceeded those at which foreign corn might be imported, which has not been the case for some years past. And it is farther obvious, that were any very large proportion of our supplies of corn derived in time to come from abroad, there would be a like falling off in the supplies produced at home, and consequently, in the demand for manufactured goods by the home growers. A result of this sort would, however, be anything but advantageous to the manufacturers. Their immediate neighbours have always been, and will necessarily continue to be, their best customers. And though they might, perhaps, in the long run, be benefited by a heavy fall in the price of the corn raised at home, the influence that such fall would have in diminishing the home demand for their products, in adding to the pressure of the poor rates, and in reducing wages by the competition of the parties thrown out of agriculture, would, for a lengthened period, make the change most injurious to them. It is not, therefore, by any sudden or considerable fall of price, nor by the substitution of a foreign for a home demand for their produce, that the manufacturing classes will be benefited by the measures adopted in 1846; but by the greater equality of prices that may be expected to result from them, and the consequently diminished frequency and intensity of commercial revulsions. Our heavy taxation, provided it be equally imposed, and the comparatively high wages of labour in this country, furnish no apology for the restrictive system. Equal taxes affect every part of the community, and do not fall heavier on the agriculturists than on any other class. It is only in the event of taxation being unequal, or of its pressing with greater severity on those engaged in a particular business than on their neighbours, that it affords an adequate ground for laying a duty on the importation of the produce of the overtaxed class, though it can never be a reason why it should be prohibited. Now it is contended that the agriculturists are in this predicament—that is, that the burdens laid on them exceed those laid on the manufacturing and commercial classes, and that they are in consequence entitled to have duties laid on foreign corn and other agricultural produce, when imported, sufficient to counteract the excess of taxes to which they are subject. This, however, has been strenuously denied; and it must be admitted that the question is not quite free from difficulty. But were this a proper place for entering upon such inquiries, it might, we think, be conclusively shown, that, owing to the various local and other direct and indirect burdens laid on the land, those occupying it are really subjected to heavier taxes than any other class. It is difficult, or rather, perhaps, impossible, to estimate with any degree of precision, what the excess of taxes laid on the agriculturist beyond those laid on manufacturers and merchants may amount to; but we have elsewhere shown that if we estimate it as making an addition of from 5s. to 7s. to the quarter of wheat, we shall not be far from the mark.

When a duty is laid on the importation of foreign corn, for the equitable purpose of countervailing the peculiar duties laid on the corn raised at home, an equivalent drawback should be allowed on its exportation. "In allowing this drawback, we are merely returning to the farmer a tax which he has already paid, and which he must have, to place him in a fair state of competition in the foreign market, not only with the foreign producer, but with his own countrymen who are producing other commodities. It is essentially different from a bounty on exports, in the sense in which the word bounty is usually understood (and as we have previously considered it); for by a bounty is generally meant a tax levied on the people for the purpose of rendering corn unnaturally cheap to the foreign consumer; whereas what I propose is, to sell our corn at the price at which we can really afford to produce it; and not to add to its price a tax which shall induce the foreigner rather to purchase it from some other country, and deprive us of a trade which, under a system of free competition, we might have selected." — (Ricardo on Protection to Agriculture p. 53.)

A duty accompanied with a drawback, as now stated, would not only, under the circumstances supposed, have been an equitable arrangement, but it would have been highly for the advantage of the farmers, without being injurious to any one else. The radical defect, as already shown, of the system followed from 1815 down to 1846, in so far at least as respects agriculture, was, that it forced up prices in years when the harvest was deficient, while it left the market to be glutted when it was abundant. But while the influence of a constant duty of 5s., 6s., or 7s. a quarter, would have done nothing to stint the market in bad years, it would, with the corresponding drawback, have assisted to relieve it, and to maintain prices at a fair level in years when the harvests were redundant.—(See Post.) It is surprising the agriculturists did not take this view of the matter. If they were entitled to a duty on foreign corn, on account of their being more heavily taxed than the other classes of the Corn laws, they were also entitled to a corresponding drawback. And it admits of demonstration, that their interests, as well as those of the community, would have been better promoted by such duty and drawback than they ever could have been by any system of mere duties, how high soever they might have been carried.

It is generally believed and alleged, that the landlords' interests were deeply interested in the support of the former system of corn laws, and that they will be materially injured by its repeal. But though it is probable that many landlords are of this opinion, we look upon it as destitute of any good foundation. There is not at bottom any real opposition between the interests of the owners of land and those of the other classes. To borrow the just and forcible expressions of Sir Josiah Child,—“Land and trade are twins, and have always, and ever will, wax and wane together. It cannot be ill with land but trade will feel it, nor ill with trade but land will fall.” To those only who take a superficial view of the question, their interests may seem to be opposed; but those who look even so little below the surface, and reflect on the motives which stimulate the different classes to industry and enterprise, will be satisfied that they are really identical. What is the genuine, and indeed, only, effectual encouragement to agriculture? What is it that stimulates the occupiers to adopt the best system of cultivation, and to make the ground yield the largest crops? Does any one doubt that it is the demand of the other classes for their peculiar products? Flourishing manufactures and commerce are indispensable to a flourishing agriculture. To suppose that the latter should exist without the former, is to suppose that men may be industrious without a motive—that there may be an effect without a cause. But we have seen that the artificial enhancement of the price of corn lessens the rate of profit, and the power to accumulate capital, at the same time that it occasions its transfer to other countries. It must, therefore, be exceedingly injurious to the buyers of corn—that is, to those classes whose prosperity is essential to the prosperity of the agriculturists. Hence it is obvious that any advantage gained in the first instance by the landlords from a restriction on importation, can only be evanescent and illusory. It may be compared to the influence of doses of brandy or opium on the human body, which, while they intoxicate and exhilarate, enfeeble and shatter the constitution, occasioning premature old age and death.

But apart from general considerations, and looking at No good the question with reference merely to the immediate pecuniary interests of the landlords, we do not think they have supposing much, if anything, to apprehend from the measure of the revenue. It cannot be injurious to them, unless it should peel off the occasion such a reduction in the price of corn and other corn laws raw products as may affect rents; and if there be no good will be grounds on which to anticipate such a reduction, the measure, serious to sure will not be, even in this narrow point of view, adverse to the landlords.

Now, though this be a matter in regard to which there must necessarily be much uncertainty, we are entitled to say, that no reasons have hitherto been alleged for thinking that wheat of the average quality of that of England will be imported even in abundant years, under the new system, at less than from 42s. or 45s. to 48s. a quarter. In years of extraordinary abundance the case may be different, but they are usually of rare occurrence, and, except when they follow for two or three years in

---

1 McCulloch's Treatise on Taxation, p. 191. 2 For proofs of this, see Post, and the article Corn Laws and Corn Trade, in Commercial Dictionary. Principles succession, have little influence over average prices. The expenses of importing wheat into this country, and disposing of it to the millers, may be moderately estimated at from 10s. to 12s., or 14s. a quarter; so that, supposing its cost in the great shipping ports to be from 34s. to 35s. a quarter, it could not be imported and sold under the price specified above. But wheat of the same quality as English wheat is seldom so low as this, either at Dantzig or any other corn shipping port within a reasonable distance; and it is never so low when there is any considerable exportation. It is, no doubt, impossible to say what changes may take place in prices in the course of a few years. But looking at the rapid increase of wealth and population in the countries in the north of Europe, in those round the Black Sea, and in the United States, the presumption is not that prices will fall, but that they will rise. But supposing that, under the new system, they are pretty constant at from 42s. or 45s. to 48s., it is quite clear its introduction can have no very serious influence over agriculture. The average prices of corn in England and Wales during the five years ending with 1835, were 52s. 8d., and during the five years ending with 1845, they were 54s. 9d. a quarter, being only from 6s. to 12s. a quarter above their future probable average range under a perfectly free system. Prices, indeed, were decidedly lower in 1834, 1835, and 1836, years of great agricultural improvement, than there is much probability of their being after the new system has been carried into full effect.

But suppose that prices should fall 10s. or 12s. a quarter, it is the greatest error to suppose that this fall would be productive of any material injury to agriculture. Prices, after allowing for the depreciation of the currency, were, during the five years ending with 1810, 83s. 3d. a quarter; they have since fallen so, that during the five years ending with 1845 they were only 54s. 9d. a quarter, being a fall of no less than 28s. 6d. a quarter in the interval. And yet, as already seen, there has been in the teeth of this immense fall, and coincident with it, an extraordinary improvement of agriculture, accompanied with a vast increase of production, and a very great rise of rent. And such being the case, despite a fall of 28s. 6d. a quarter, it would be contradictory to suppose that agriculture should sustain any very serious or, indeed, sensible injury from a farther fall of 8s. or 10s. or even of 12s. a quarter.

At the same time, we are ready to admit that we should have preferred seeing this question settled, by imposing a low fixed duty of 5s., 6s., or 7s. a quarter on wheat and other grain in proportion, accompanied with a corresponding drawback. We make this statement on general grounds, and without any reference to the peculiar burdens that affect the agriculturists, though these should neither be forgotten nor overlooked. In scarce years a duty of this description would fall wholly on the foreigner without affecting prices, or narrowing importation; for in such years the prices of corn are wholly determined by the demand and supply, without reference to the cost of the corn, including therein any reasonable duty with which it may be charged. The latter is then, in truth, deducted from the profits of the foreign grower or merchant, and its repeal would not sensibly affect prices. But, while in scarce years, when importation is necessary, the influence of a low duty is thus innocuous, it lessens or prevents importation in unusually abundant years, when the home supply is sufficient. The drawback by which it is supposed to be accompanied would then also come into play and facilitate exportation, so that their conjoint effect would be to hinder the over-

loading of the market, and consequently to prevent prices falling so low as to be injurious to the agriculturists and of those dependent on them. And it must be borne in mind that the distress of the agriculturists never fails to react on the other classes. When the former are involved in difficulties, their demands for the products of the loom and of our colonial possessions are proportionally diminished, so that the market is glutted with manufactured goods, sugar, &c., as well as with corn. It is, indeed, uniformly found that the injury that is thus occasioned to the manufacturing and trading part of the community, very much exceeds all that they gain by the temporary fall in the price of raw produce. It is plainly therefore a capital mistake to suppose that the duty and drawback now referred to, would be advantageous only to the agriculturists. They would redound quite as much to the advantage of the other classes. And though this were less certain than it appears to be, still, in a matter of such importance as the welfare of agriculture, and of those dependent thereon, a wise government should be extremely cautious about taking any step, of the consequences of which it is not fully assured. But even if our limits permitted, it would be to little purpose to insist on these or any similar considerations. The pertinacity with which the agriculturists opposed every approach to a more liberal system, roused a spirit which would not be satisfied with anything short of a complete abandonment of all restrictions. The time for compromise and arrangement having been allowed to go by, government had to deal with an irritated and unreasoning populace. Cum ventre humano tibi negotium est nec rationem patitur, nec aquilae mitigatior, nec ulla prece flecitur populus. (Seneca de Brev. Vitæ c. 18.) Under such circumstances, it was better, perhaps, to make an end of the matter, than by attempting to introduce any intermediate system, however well devised, to prolong, as it would have done, a sense of insecurity and the pernicious trade of agitation. The agriculturists need not, however, despair; they have little to fear from the downfall of the protective system. There is not, in as far as can present be seen, any real room or ground for thinking that it will occasion such a fall of average prices as will do them any material injury; and should there be at any time so very abundant a season or cycle of seasons in this country and in the north of Europe as to threaten such a fall of prices as might give a serious shock to agricultural industry, the crisis may be averted by some temporary expedient. It is seldom, indeed, that a law enacted under the influence of popular excitement and enthusiasm can be advantageously maintained as a rule of national policy. The practical merits and defects of the arrangement made in 1846 will be gradually disclosed; and it will be the business of Parliament to adopt such measures as may be required to secure the former, and, in as far as practicable, to obviate the latter. And though we should not wish to speak confidently respecting any measure, the working of which must necessarily depend on so many contingencies, our impression is that the imposition of a reasonable fixed duty on corn, accompanied with an equivalent drawback, will be found to be possessed of the double advantage of yielding a considerable revenue, raised in the least burdensome manner, and of giving, at the same time, increased steadiness to prices and security to industry.

But without farther indulging in speculations, the correctness of which it must be left to time to decide, it appears at present to be abundantly certain that the notions current among us respecting the extreme cheapness of corn

---

1 The population of Prussia, which amounted to 10,160,899 in 1816, had increased in 1846 to 16,112,948. The increase of population in the Russian provinces round the Black Sea, during the same period, has, we believe, been about as great.

2 See Treatise on Taxation, by the author of this article, p. 190. in foreign ports, have no very solid foundation. Though generally sound in principle, and, most likely also, beneficial in its operation, there seem to be good reasons for thinking that the late measure will disappoint alike the fears of the one party and the expectations of the other. Indeed the chances are that the agriculturists will gain by the change, for it will teach them to depend for success on practical skill, science, and industry, and to cease to rely on custom-house regulations and parliamentary majorities; and it will give them increased security by identifying their interests in opinion as well as in fact with those of the public.

III. PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH CORN TRADE.

It has sometimes been attempted to estimate the quantity of corn raised in a country, from calculations founded on the number of acres in tillage, and the average produce per acre. But no accurate account can be obtained of the extent of land under cultivation. It is perpetually changing from year to year; and the amount of produce varies, not only with the differences in the seasons, but with every improvement of agriculture. This method, therefore, has been very generally abandoned, and statisticians are now in the habit of estimating the growth of corn by its consumption. But although this is certainly the preferable mode, still the conclusions to which it leads are necessarily very loose. The consumption varies considerably from one year to another, according as the ability of the consumers to purchase happens to be greater or less. And supposing this to remain the same, the average quantity and species of corn consumed by each person can only be ascertained by approximation. Mr Charles Smith gave a great deal of attention to this important investigation (Tracts on the Corn Trade), and his estimate of our aggregate produce deserves particular attention, from its having been corroborated, in its more important particulars, by subsequent researches both at home and abroad, and from its forming the groundwork of almost all the estimates that have been more recently framed. Having taken the population of England and Wales in 1765 at 6,000,000, Mr Smith reckoned the consumers of each kind of grain, the quantity consumed by each individual, and hence the whole consumed by man, as follows:

| Species of Grain | Estimated average of the Population of Great Britain and Ireland | Each Person averaged | Consumed by Man | Consumed by Animals | Used in Beer and Spirits | Used in various Manufactures | Total of Quarters | |-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------| | Wheat | 9,000,000 | 1 | 9,000,000 | ... | 170,000 | ... | 9,170,000 | | Barley | 1,500,000 | 1/2 | 1,875,000 | 210,000 | 4,250,000 | ... | 6,355,000 | | Oats | 4,500,000 | 1/4 | 6,750,000 | 10,200,000 | ... | 1,000 | 16,500,000 | | Rye | 500,000 | 1/4 | 625,000 | 50,000 | ... | 1,000 | 625,000 | | Beans and Peas | 500,000 | 1 | 500,000 | 1,360,000 | ... | 1,000 | 1,860,000 | | Totals | 16,000,000 | ... | 18,750,000 | 11,829,000 | 4,250,000 | 171,000 | 35,000,000 |

But though this estimate be compiled with greater care, and be entitled to more confidence than most of those put forth by its author, it is in some respects grossly inaccurate. There can, for example, be no manner of doubt that the consumption of oats is underrated by at least 2,250,000 quarters, or by 1/4 quarter in the quantity assigned to each of the 4,500,000 individuals Dr Colquhoun supposed were fed on them. And besides underrating the consumption of oats, the learned Dr has made no allowance for seed, though it be unnecessary to say that the expenditure of corn as seed is as indispensable, and its consumption as effectual, as if it were employed in the feeding of men or of horses. Adding, therefore, to the 37,250,000 quarters which Colquhoun's estimate should have amounted to, 1/4th for seed, we have, on his data, 43,438,000 quarters for the total consumption of corn in the united kingdom in 1814.

But instead of a population of 16,000,000, which is assumed as the basis of the above estimate, the United Kingdom had, in 1852, a population of above 27,500,000. If, therefore, the estimate of Dr Colquhoun were accurate, and the consumption, as compared with the population, were about the same as in 1814, it should now amount to nearly 75,000,000 quarters. But during the last thirty years the proportion of wheat used as food has been materially in- creased; and at present the consumers of barley certainly amount to nothing like 1,500,000 individuals,—probably not more than 250,000. The consumption of oats has also increased very materially, partly and principally from the great increase in the number of horses and their better keep, and partly, also, from the increase of population in Ireland; but it is abundantly certain that the expenditure of corn on the lower animals, and in breweries, distilleries, &c., does not now amount to anything like twice the quantity at which it was estimated by Colquhoun.

On the whole, we are inclined to think that the consumption of the various kinds of corn in the United Kingdom, exclusive of seed, might, in 1852-53, have been estimated as follows:

I. Consumed by man: Wheat ........................................... 15,500,000 Oats, rye, and malin (a mixture of rye and wheat) ............ 10,650,000 Barley for malting, food, &c. .................. 6,000,000 Beans and peas as meal ......................... 700,000

Total consumed by man ........................................ 32,850,000

II. Consumed by the lower animals: Corn (principally oats) used in the feeding of horses and other animals, in distillation, manufactories, &c. .............. 16,370,000

Total consumed by man and the lower animals, &c. ........................................ 49,220,000

But it appears from No. V. of the subjoined tables, that at an average of the seven years ending with 1852, the annual entries of foreign corn for consumption were, wheat and wheat flour 4,231,185 quarters, barley 870,786 do., oats and oatmeal 1,162,546 do., rye 99,510 do., peas 172,393 do., and beans 393,366 do.; making an aggregate importation of 6,930,798 quarters a-year. And, therefore, if from the annual consumption by man and the lower animals—amounting to 49,220,000 quarters—we deduct the above average annual importation, we have 42,289,202, or about 42,300,000 quarters, for the portion of such consumption supplied by the native corn of the United Kingdom; and adding to the latter a reasonable allowance for seed, we have about 50,000,000 quarters for the total average annual growth of all sorts of corn in the United Kingdom.

The total entries of foreign corn in 1849 amounted to 9,538,705 quarters, being the largest quantity ever entered in any single year. Now as this quantity amounts to little more than ¼th part of the entire corn raised at home, it would seem as if the greatest importation could have but a very slight influence over prices. But it has been already shown that a very large proportion of the corn produced in the empire is never brought to market, being partly consumed by the agriculturists, and partly used as seed and in the feeding of farm horses, &c. And allowing for this, an importation of 7,000,000 quarters may be supposed to be equal to about ¼d part of the corn brought to market in ordinary years, and could not therefore fail to have a very powerful influence in alleviating the pressure of scarcity, and in reducing prices. It is also to be observed, that these importations are exclusive of a very large and almost wholly unprecedented importation of Indian corn and meal. Through the all but total failure of the potato crop in Ireland and its partial failure in Great Britain in 1846, and the efforts of government to supply the deficit, the imports of 1847, including those of Indian corn, afford no fair criterion of their probable amount in ordinary years. But the average aggregate imports during each of the last seven years, given in table No. V., may perhaps represent with tolerable accuracy their amount for some years to come. On the whole, however, the probability seems to be that they will be increased rather than diminished.

We give below an estimate, on which we have bestowed a good deal of pains, of the extent of land under the different descriptions of crops in the different divisions of the United Kingdom; of the average produce per acre of such crops, with their total produce, value, &c.

Account of the Extent of Land in the United Kingdom under the principal Descriptions of Crops in 1852-53; the average Rate of Produce per Acre; the total Produce; the Amount of Seed; the Produce under deduction of Seed; and the total Value of such Produce.

| Crops | Acres in Crop. | Produce per Acre | Total Produce | Seed 1/10 of Produce | Produce under Deduction of Seed | Price per Quarter | Total Value | |-------|----------------|------------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|------------| | Wheat | 5,000,000 | | | | | | | | Barley | 1,000,000 | | | | | | | | Oats and rye | 2,000,000 | | | | | | | | Beans and peas | 500,000 | | | | | | | | Potatoes, turnips, and rape | 2,500,000 | £7 per acre. | | | | | | | Carrots | 1,200,000 | | | | | | | | Fallow | 50,000 | | | | | | | | Hops | 50,000 | | | | | | | | Gardens | 250,000 | | | | | | | | Wheat | 350,000 | | | | | | | | Barley | 400,000 | | | | | | | | Oats | 1,200,000 | | | | | | | | Beans and peas | 50,000 | | | | | | | | Fallow | 100,000 | | | | | | | | Peas | 200,000 | | | | | | | | Turnips | 50,000 | | | | | | | | Clover | 450,000 | | | | | | | | Flax | 50,000 | | | | | | | | Gardens | 250,000 | | | | | | | | Wheat | 400,000 | | | | | | | | Barley | 320,000 | | | | | | | | Oats | 2,200,000 | | | | | | | | Potatoes | 1,400,000 | £5 per acre. | | | | | | | Fallow | 140,000 | | | | | | | | Flax | 140,000 | | | | | | | | Gardens | 25,000 | | | | | | | | Totals | 19,475,000 | | | | | | |

British Corn Trade. ### Tables showing the Prices of the different Sorts of Grain in Great Britain, the Quantities imported and exported, &c.

#### I.—Account of the Prices of Middling or Mealing Wheat per Quarter at Windsor Market, as ascertained by the Audit-Books of Eton College.

| Year | Prices of Wheat at Windsor, 9 Gallons to the Bushel | Prices of Wheat reduced to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | Average of Ten Years according to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | |------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1646 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 8 | | 1647 | 3 s 13 | 3 s 5 | 3 s 5 | | 1648 | 4 s 5 | 3 s 15 | 3 s 15 | | 1649 | 4 s 0 | 3 s 11 | 3 s 11 | | 1650 | 3 s 16 | 3 s 8 | 3 s 8 | | 1651 | 3 s 13 | 3 s 5 | 3 s 5 | | 1652 | 2 s 9 | 2 s 4 | 2 s 4 | | 1653 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 11 | 1 s 11 | | 1654 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 3 | 1 s 3 | | 1655 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 7 | 1 s 7 | | 1656 | 2 s 3 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 16 | | 1657 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1658 | 3 s 5 | 2 s 17 | 2 s 17 | | 1659 | 3 s 6 | 2 s 16 | 2 s 16 | | 1660 | 2 s 16 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 10 | | 1661 | 3 s 10 | 3 s 2 | 3 s 2 | | 1662 | 3 s 14 | 3 s 9 | 3 s 9 | | 1663 | 2 s 17 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 10 | | 1664 | 2 s 0 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 16 | | 1665 | 2 s 9 | 2 s 3 | 2 s 3 | | 1666 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1667 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1668 | 2 s 0 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 15 | | 1669 | 2 s 4 | 1 s 9 | 1 s 9 | | 1670 | 2 s 1 | 1 s 7 | 1 s 7 | | 1671 | 2 s 2 | 1 s 7 | 1 s 7 | | 1672 | 2 s 1 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 6 | | 1673 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1674 | 3 s 8 | 3 s 1 | 3 s 1 | | 1675 | 3 s 4 | 2 s 17 | 2 s 17 | | 1676 | 1 s 18 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 13 | | 1677 | 2 s 2 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 17 | | 1678 | 2 s 19 | 2 s 12 | 2 s 12 | | 1679 | 3 s 0 | 2 s 13 | 2 s 13 | | 1680 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 0 | | 1681 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 5 | | 1682 | 2 s 4 | 1 s 19 | 1 s 19 | | 1683 | 2 s 4 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 15 | | 1684 | 2 s 4 | 1 s 19 | 1 s 19 | | 1685 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1686 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1687 | 1 s 5 | 1 s 2 | 1 s 2 | | 1688 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 0 | | 1689 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 6 | | 1690 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1691 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1692 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1693 | 3 s 7 | 3 s 0 | 3 s 0 | | 1694 | 3 s 4 | 2 s 16 | 2 s 16 | | 1695 | 2 s 13 | 2 s 7 | 2 s 7 | | 1696 | 3 s 11 | 3 s 3 | 3 s 3 | | 1697 | 3 s 0 | 2 s 13 | 2 s 13 | | 1698 | 3 s 8 | 3 s 0 | 3 s 0 | | 1699 | 3 s 4 | 2 s 16 | 2 s 16 | | 1700 | 2 s 0 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 15 | | 1701 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 13 | | 1702 | 1 s 9 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 6 | | 1703 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1704 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1705 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 6 | | 1706 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 3 | 1 s 3 | | 1707 | 1 s 8 | 1 s 5 | 1 s 5 | | 1708 | 2 s 6 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 16 | | 1709 | 3 s 10 | 3 s 9 | 3 s 9 | | 1710 | 3 s 18 | 3 s 9 | 3 s 9 | | 1711 | 2 s 4 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 0 | | 1712 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1713 | 2 s 11 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 5 | | 1714 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 4 | 2 s 4 |

| Year | Prices of Wheat at Windsor, 9 Gallons to the Bushel | Prices of Wheat reduced to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | Average of Ten Years according to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | |------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1715 | 2 s 5 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 13 | | 1716 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 2 | 2 s 2 | | 1717 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 0 | | 1718 | 1 s 18 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 14 | | 1719 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 11 | 1 s 11 | | 1720 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1721 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 13 | | 1722 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1723 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1724 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1725 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 5 | | 1726 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 0 | | 1727 | 2 s 2 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 17 | | 1728 | 2 s 1 | 1 s 8 | 1 s 8 | | 1729 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1730 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1731 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1732 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 3 | 1 s 3 | | 1733 | 1 s 8 | 1 s 5 | 1 s 5 | | 1734 | 1 s 18 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 14 | | 1735 | 2 s 3 | 1 s 18 | 1 s 18 | | 1736 | 2 s 0 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 15 | | 1737 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 13 | | 1738 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 11 | 1 s 11 | | 1739 | 1 s 18 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 14 | | 1740 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 5 | | 1741 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1742 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1743 | 1 s 4 | 1 s 2 | 1 s 2 | | 1744 | 1 s 4 | 1 s 2 | 1 s 2 | | 1745 | 1 s 7 | 1 s 4 | 1 s 4 | | 1746 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 14 | | 1747 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1748 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1749 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1750 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1751 | 1 s 18 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 14 | | 1752 | 2 s 1 | 1 s 17 | 1 s 17 | | 1753 | 2 s 4 | 1 s 19 | 1 s 19 | | 1754 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1755 | 1 s 13 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 10 | | 1756 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 0 | 2 s 0 | | 1757 | 3 s 0 | 2 s 13 | 2 s 13 | | 1758 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 4 | 2 s 4 | | 1759 | 1 s 19 | 1 s 15 | 1 s 15 | | 1760 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 12 | 1 s 12 | | 1761 | 1 s 10 | 1 s 6 | 1 s 6 | | 1762 | 1 s 19 | 1 s 14 | 1 s 14 | | 1763 | 2 s 0 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 16 | | 1764 | 2 s 6 | 2 s 1 | 2 s 1 | | 1765 | 0 s 14 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 8 | | 1766 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 3 | 2 s 3 | | 1767 | 3 s 4 | 2 s 17 | 2 s 17 | | 1768 | 3 s 0 | 2 s 13 | 2 s 13 | | 1769 | 2 s 5 | 2 s 9 | 2 s 9 | | 1770 | 2 s 9 | 2 s 3 | 2 s 3 | | 1771 | 2 s 17 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 10 | | 1772 | 3 s 6 | 2 s 18 | 2 s 18 | | 1773 | 3 s 6 | 2 s 19 | 2 s 19 | | 1774 | 3 s 2 | 2 s 15 | 2 s 15 | | 1775 | 2 s 17 | 2 s 11 | 2 s 11 | | 1776 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 2 | 2 s 2 | | 1777 | 2 s 15 | 2 s 10 | 2 s 10 | | 1778 | 2 s 9 | 2 s 4 | 2 s 4 | | 1779 | 2 s 0 | 1 s 16 | 1 s 16 | | 1780 | 2 s 8 | 2 s 3 | 2 s 3 | | 1781 | 2 s 19 | 2 s 12 | 2 s 12 | | 1782 | 3 s 0 | 2 s 13 | 2 s 13 | | 1783 | 3 s 1 | 2 s 14 | 2 s 14 | ### CORN LAWS AND CORN TRADE

| Years | Prices of Wheat at Windsor, 9 Gallons to the Bushel | Prices of Wheat reduced to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | Average of Ten Years according to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | |-------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1764 | 3 0 6 | 2 13 9 | | | 1765 | 2 14 0 | 2 8 0 | | | 1766 | 2 7 6 | 2 2 2 | | | 1767 | 2 11 6 | 2 5 9 | | | 1768 | 2 15 6 | 2 9 4 | | | 1769 | 3 3 2 | 2 16 12 | | | 1770 | 3 3 2 | 2 16 12 | | | 1771 | 2 15 6 | 2 9 4 | | | 1772 | 2 15 6 | 2 15 0 | | | 1773 | 2 15 6 | 2 15 0 | | | 1774 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1775 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1776 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1777 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1778 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1779 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1780 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1781 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1782 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1783 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1784 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1785 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1786 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1787 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1788 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1789 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1790 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1791 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1792 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1793 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1794 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1795 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1796 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1797 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1798 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1799 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1800 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1801 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1802 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1803 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1804 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | | | 1805 | 2 14 0 | 2 14 0 | |

* From this year inclusive the account at Eton College has been kept according to the bushel of eight gallons, under the provisions of the act 31 Geo. III. c. 30, sect. 8.

II.—Account of the Average Prices of British Corn per Imperial Quarter, in England and Wales, since 1771, as ascertained by the Receiver of Corn Returns.

| Years | Wheat | Barley | Oats | Rye | Beans | Peas | |-------|-------|--------|------|-----|-------|------| | 1771 | 2 7 | 1 6 | 1 7 | 1 15 | 1 9 | | | 1772 | 2 12 | 3 | 1 6 | 1 16 | 1 17 | 1 10 | | 1773 | 2 12 | 3 | 1 9 | 1 17 | 1 14 | 1 14 | | 1774 | 2 14 | 3 | 1 9 | 1 18 | 1 15 | 1 12 | | 1775 | 2 9 | 10 | 1 6 | 1 17 | 1 13 | 1 9 | | 1776 | 1 19 | 4 | 1 0 | 1 15 | 1 7 | 1 7 | | 1777 | 2 6 | 11 | 1 1 | 1 16 | 1 8 | 1 9 | | 1778 | 2 3 | 3 | 1 3 | 1 15 | 1 9 | 1 8 | | 1779 | 1 14 | 8 | 1 0 | 1 14 | 1 4 | 1 4 | | 1780 | 1 16 | 9 | 1 7 | 1 13 | 1 2 | 1 2 | | 1781 | 2 6 | 0 | 1 7 | 1 14 | 1 7 | 1 3 | | 1782 | 2 9 | 3 | 1 3 | 1 15 | 1 9 | 1 6 | | 1783 | 2 14 | 3 | 1 11 | 1 0 | 1 16 | 1 15 | | 1784 | 2 10 | 4 | 1 8 | 1 18 | 1 13 | 1 13 | | 1785 | 2 3 | 1 | 1 4 | 1 17 | 1 8 | 1 11 | | 1786 | 2 0 | 0 | 1 5 | 1 18 | 1 8 | 1 14 | | 1787 | 2 2 | 5 | 1 3 | 1 17 | 1 8 | 1 12 | | 1788 | 2 6 | 4 | 1 2 | 1 16 | 1 8 | 1 8 | | 1789 | 2 12 | 9 | 1 3 | 1 16 | 1 10 | 1 8 | | 1790 | 2 14 | 9 | 1 6 | 1 19 | 1 15 | 1 11 | | 1791 | 2 8 | 7 | 1 6 | 1 18 | 1 12 | 1 11 | | 1792 | 2 3 | 0 | 1 16 | 1 16 | 1 11 | 1 12 | | 1793 | 2 9 | 3 | 1 11 | 1 16 | 1 17 | 1 19 | | 1794 | 2 12 | 3 | 1 11 | 1 17 | 1 19 | 2 8 | | 1795 | 3 15 | 2 | 1 17 | 1 11 | | | | 1796 | 3 12 | 7 | 1 15 | 1 11 | | | | 1797 | 2 13 | 9 | 1 7 | 1 16 | | | | 1798 | 2 11 | 10 | 1 9 | 1 19 | | | | 1799 | 3 9 | 0 | 1 16 | 1 17 | | | | 1800 | 5 13 | 10 | 2 19 | 1 19 | | | | 1801 | 5 19 | 6 | 3 8 | 1 17 | | | | 1802 | 3 9 | 10 | 1 13 | 1 10 | | | | 1803 | 2 18 | 10 | 1 5 | 1 16 | | | | 1804 | 3 2 | 3 | 1 11 | 1 4 | | | | 1805 | 4 | 9 | 2 4 | 1 8 | | | | 1806 | 3 19 | 1 | 1 13 | 1 7 | | | | 1807 | 3 15 | 4 | 1 19 | 1 13 | | | | 1808 | 4 1 | 4 | 1 13 | 1 11 | | | | 1809 | 4 17 | 4 | 2 7 | 1 11 | | | | 1810 | 5 6 | 5 | 2 8 | 1 8 | | | ### CORN LAWS AND CORN TRADE

#### British Corn Trade

| Years | Wheat | Barley | Oats | Rye | Beans | Peas | |-------|-------|--------|------|-----|-------|------| | | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | | 1811 | 4 15 3 | 2 2 3 | 1 7 7 | 2 8 4 | 2 9 4 | 2 13 11 | | 1812 | 6 6 6 | 3 6 9 | 2 4 6 | 3 18 7 | 3 14 7 | 3 16 10 | | 1813 | 5 9 9 | 2 18 6 | 1 18 6 | 3 11 11 | 3 16 4 | 4 1 11 | | 1814 | 3 14 4 | 1 17 4 | 1 5 8 | 2 4 8 | 2 6 2 | 2 11 10 | | 1815 | 3 5 7 | 1 10 3 | 1 3 7 | 1 18 1 | 1 16 2 | 1 19 4 | | 1816 | 3 18 6 | 1 13 11 | 1 7 2 | 2 5 1 | 1 19 4 | 1 19 10 | | 1817 | 4 16 11 | 2 9 4 | 1 12 5 | 2 18 3 | 2 11 7 | 2 13 4 | | 1818 | 4 6 3 | 2 13 10 | 1 12 5 | 2 15 4 | 3 3 7 | 3 1 9 | | 1819 | 3 14 6 | 2 5 9 | 1 8 2 | 2 9 6 | 2 14 1 | 2 16 1 | | 1820 | 3 7 10 | 1 13 10 | 1 6 0 | 2 2 0 | 2 3 3 | 2 5 10 | | 1821 | 2 15 1 | 1 6 0 | 0 9 6 | 1 12 0 | 1 10 11 | 1 12 8 | | 1822 | 2 4 7 | 1 10 | 0 18 1 | 1 0 10 | 1 4 5 | 1 6 4 | | 1823 | 2 13 4 | 1 11 6 | 1 2 11 | 1 11 10 | 1 13 1 | 1 14 11 | | 1824 | 3 3 11 | 1 16 4 | 1 10 | 2 1 5 | 2 0 0 | 2 0 7 | | 1825 | 3 8 6 | 2 0 0 | 1 5 8 | 2 2 3 | 2 2 9 | 2 5 4 | | 1826 | 2 18 8 | 1 14 4 | 1 6 8 | 2 1 1 | 2 4 3 | 2 7 7 | | 1827 | 2 18 5 | 1 17 7 | 1 8 2 | 2 0 2 | 2 9 0 | 2 9 0 | | 1828 | 3 0 5 | 1 12 10 | 1 2 6 | 1 14 2 | 1 18 4 | 2 0 6 | | 1829 | 3 6 3 | 1 12 6 | 1 2 9 | 1 14 10 | 1 16 8 | 1 16 8 | | 1830 | 3 4 3 | 1 12 7 | 1 4 5 | 1 15 10 | 1 16 1 | 1 19 2 | | 1831 | 3 6 4 | 1 18 0 | 1 5 4 | 2 0 0 | 1 19 10 | 2 1 11 | | 1832 | 2 18 8 | 1 13 1 | 1 0 5 | 1 14 7 | 1 15 4 | 1 17 0 | | 1833 | 2 12 11 | 1 7 6 | 0 18 5 | 1 12 11 | 1 13 2 | 1 16 5 | | 1834 | 2 6 2 | 1 9 0 | 0 11 | 1 12 9 | 1 15 3 | 1 19 4 | | 1835 | 1 19 4 | 1 9 11 | 1 2 0 | 1 10 4 | 1 16 11 | 1 16 6 | | 1836 | 2 8 6 | 1 12 10 | 1 3 1 | 1 13 4 | 1 19 1 | 1 18 4 | | 1837 | 2 15 10 | 1 10 4 | 1 3 1 | 1 14 9 | 1 18 7 | 1 17 6 | | 1838 | 3 4 7 | 1 11 5 | 1 2 5 | 1 16 1 | 1 16 8 | 1 17 2 | | 1839 | 3 10 8 | 1 19 6 | 1 5 11 | 2 2 0 | 2 1 3 | 2 1 2 | | 1840 | 3 6 4 | 1 16 5 | 1 5 8 | 1 17 0 | 2 3 5 | 2 2 5 | | 1841 | 3 4 4 | 1 12 10 | 1 2 5 | 1 16 9 | 1 19 10 | 2 0 4 | | 1842 | 2 17 3 | 1 7 6 | 0 19 3 | 1 13 0 | 1 12 5 | 1 12 11 | | 1843 | 2 10 1 | 1 9 6 | 0 18 4 | 1 10 7 | 1 9 2 | 1 11 1 | | 1844 | 2 11 3 | 1 13 8 | 1 0 7 | 1 13 11 | 1 14 5 | 1 13 5 | | 1845 | 2 10 10 | 1 11 8 | 1 2 6 | 1 12 6 | 1 18 11 | 1 18 8 | | 1846 | 2 14 8 | 1 12 8 | 1 3 8 | 1 15 0 | 1 19 0 | 1 19 0 | | 1847 | 3 9 9 | 2 4 2 | 1 8 8 | 2 9 0 | 2 10 6 | 2 11 6 | | 1848 | 2 10 6 | 1 11 6 | 1 0 6 | ... | ... | ... | | 1849 | 2 4 3 | 1 7 9 | 0 17 6 | 1 5 8 | 1 10 2 | 1 11 2 | | 1850 | 2 0 3 | 1 3 5 | 0 16 5 | 1 3 3 | 1 6 10 | 1 7 4 | | 1851 | 1 18 6 | 1 4 9 | 0 18 7 | 1 5 6 | 1 8 7 | 1 7 2 | | 1852 | 2 0 9 | 1 8 6 | 0 19 1 | 1 9 10 | 1 12 3 | 1 10 7 |

*Note:* The Imperial bushel contains 2219/192 cubic inches, the Winchester bushel 2594/2 do., the former being about one-thirty second part larger than the latter.—See WEIGHTS and MEASURES.

### III.—Account of the Quantities of Wheat and Wheat Flour (stated as Quarters of Wheat) imported into the United Kingdom during each of the Ten Years ending with 1852, exhibiting the quantities brought from each country, and the Annual Average Imports of the said Ten Years.

| Countries | 1843 | 1844 | 1845 | 1846 | 1847 | 1848 | 1849 | 1850 | 1851 | 1852 | Annual Average for Ten Years | |-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----------------------------| | Russia | 33,668 | 104,526 | 33,781 | 204,850 | 80,587 | 523,138 | 509,556 | 638,613 | 699,684 | 733,734 | 442,216 | | Sweden and Norway | 678 | 10,782 | 678 | 218 | 8,647 | 5,346 | 6,494 | 356 | 6 | 546 | 3,375 | | Denmark | 69,864 | 94,490 | 74,170 | 61,563 | 73,508 | 191,787 | 243,213 | 162,207 | 168,768 | 218,834 | 105,847 | | Prussia | 653,663 | 551,015 | 424,639 | 360,831 | 492,928 | 528,156 | 618,690 | 835,650 | 996,175 | 452,292 | 561,983 | | Germany, incl. Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, Oldenburg, Hanover, and Mecklenburg | 126,521 | 108,922 | 154,271 | 126,572 | 154,839 | 532,591 | 498,984 | 380,944 | 264,721 | 179,631 | 252,806 | | Holland | 858 | 11,772 | 1,614 | 473 | 11,800 | 163,978 | 308,482 | 293,465 | 66,414 | 124,963 | 98,382 | | Belgium | 332 | 1,101 | 963 | 3,064 | 27,469 | 178,398 | 366,099 | 201,922 | 69,046 | 97,961 | 87,437 | | France | 3,131 | 44,875 | 35,809 | 73,774 | 179,259 | 320,010 | 742,023 | 1,145,146 | 1,193,433 | 459,418 | 419,688 | | Spain | 1 | 11 | 4,016 | 74,041 | 24,706 | 917 | 458 | 2,186 | 115 | 6,321 | 11,281 | | Italy | 5,206 | 80,280 | 57,403 | 194,256 | 64,850 | 83,176 | 281,260 | 117,328 | 241,829 | 65,168 | 119,697 | | Malta | 3,153 | 6,163 | 4,120 | 11,069 | 46,291 | 8,576 | 9,049 | 16,598 | 10,358 | 17,166 | 12,676 | | Greece | ... | ... | 3,240 | 11,893 | ... | 4,129 | 61,136 | 6,292 | 165 | ... | 8,656 | | Turkey, incl. Syria, Egypt, Wallachia, and Moldavia | 14,899 | 44,790 | 7,030 | 41,557 | 266,779 | 40,340 | 295,542 | 382,793 | 873,130 | 533,524 | 250,038 | | Cape of Good Hope | ... | ... | 83 | 2 | 87 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 18 | | British East Indies | 3,624 | 2,303 | 1,204 | 261 | 203 | 2,755 | 2,028 | 690 | 22 | ... | 1,319 | | Australian Settlements | 1,292 | 4,210 | 14,035 | 20,316 | 13,890 | 5,539 | 15,699 | 14,584 | 104 | ... | 8,952 | | British N. Am. Colonies | 113,445 | 228,069 | 229,340 | 327,105 | 398,793 | 186,254 | 142,295 | 80,394 | 129,680 | 116,033 | 194,542 | | U. States of America | 26,090 | 85,853 | 93,622 | 808,178 | 1,834,142 | 296,102 | 617,131 | 537,030 | 911,855 | 1,231,894 | 644,190 | | All other parts | 2,674 | 8 | 2,090 | 24,122 | 16,250 | 11,023 | 26,830 | 19,812 | 4,656 | 5,272 | 11,274 | | **Total** | 1,064,942 | 1,379,262 | 1,141,957 | 2,344,142 | 4,464,757 | 3,082,231 | 4,835,290 | 4,830,263 | 5,330,412 | 4,164,602 | 3,263,781 | IV.—Account of the Quantities of the different Varieties of Corn and Grain, Flour and Meal, imported into the United Kingdom in 1832, specifying the Countries whence the same were brought, and the Quantities brought from each, in Imperial Quarters.

| Countries from which Imported | Wheat and Wheat Flour | Barley and Barley-Meal | Oats and Oat-Meal | Rye and Rye-Meal | Indian Corn and Meal | Other Grain and Meal | All Sorts | |-------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------| | Russia—Northern Ports | 27,112 | 5,997 | 304,448 | 6,085 | ... | 306 | 343,948 | | Russia—Ports within the Black Sea | 706,622 | 14,070 | 1,290 | 829 | 233,816 | 1,250 | 957,877 | | Sweden and Norway | 516 | 759 | 56,272 | ... | ... | 93 | 57,640 | | Denmark | 218,834 | 254,870 | 247,104 | 301 | ... | 49,087 | 770,196 | | Denmark—Iceland | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 49,087 | 770,196 | | Prussia | 452,292 | 54,207 | 24,693 | ... | ... | 23,310 | 534,700 | | Mecklenburg Schwerin | 120,544 | 15,580 | 2,239 | ... | ... | 7,344 | 143,407 | | Hanover | 9,158 | 833 | 133,131 | ... | ... | 6,222 | 149,314 | | Oldenburg and Kniphausen | 442 | ... | 39,655 | ... | ... | 4,377 | 44,034 | | Hanseatic Towns | 49,487 | 37,063 | 41,386 | 66 | ... | 29,835 | 167,837 | | Holland | 124,963 | 1,001 | 79,176 | 35 | ... | 16,384 | 221,559 | | Belgium | 25,961 | 10,190 | 1 | ... | ... | 9,556 | 45,708 | | Channel Islands (Foreign Produce) | 1,640 | 99 | ... | ... | ... | 4 | 1,743 | | France | 450,418 | 100,292 | 56,458 | 357 | 92,116 | 38,520 | 745,161 | | Portugal Proper | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 9,646 | 9,647 | | Portugal—Azores | ... | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 6,144 | 6,146 | | Portugal—Madeira | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 6,144 | 6,146 | | Spain and the Balearic Islands | 6,321 | 8,441 | ... | ... | ... | 1,186 | 15,932 | | Spain—Canary Islands | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,186 | 15,932 | | Gibraltar | 7 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 7 | 7 | | Italy and the Italian Islands, viz.: | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 7 | 7 | | Sardinian Territories | 57 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 674 | 731 | | Tuscany | 11,696 | 2,306 | ... | ... | ... | 1,351 | 15,353 | | Papal Territories | 22,732 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 22,732 | 22,732 | | Naples and Sicily | 20,635 | ... | 1,923 | ... | ... | 12,693 | 41,256 | | Austrian Territories | 3,983 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 106,005 | 113,982 | | Malta and Gozo | 17,106 | 41,389 | ... | ... | ... | 3,408 | 63,519 | | Ionian Islands | 1,431 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 9,512 | 10,943 | | Turkish Dominions, exclusive of Wallachia, Moldavia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt | 40,341 | 16,103 | ... | 1,261 | 138,314 | ... | 106,019 | | Wallachia and Moldavia | 86,140 | 55 | ... | 968 | 626,714 | ... | 713,877 | | Syria and Palestine | 12,375 | 3,664 | ... | ... | ... | 338 | 16,377 | | Egypt | 394,668 | 54,218 | ... | 17 | 71,590 | 257,222 | 777,745 | | Algeria | ... | 3,746 | ... | ... | ... | 3,746 | 3,746 | | Morocco | ... | 560 | ... | ... | ... | 2 | 571 | | Africa, West Coast, not particularly designated | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 518 | 518 | | Mauritius | 163 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 163 | 163 | | Aden | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | | British Territories in the East Indies | 34 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 | 18 | | China | 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3 | 3 | | British Settlements in Australia | 12 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 12 | 12 | | British North America | 110,033 | 90 | 1,454 | ... | 3 | 14,660 | 126,240 | | British West India Islands, and British Guiana | 2 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2 | 2 | | Foreign West Indies, viz.: | | | | | | | | | Cuba | 621 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,014 | 1,635 | | St Thomas | 1,353 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 400 | 1,753 | | United States of America | 1,231,894 | 8 | 133 | 72 | 167,663 | 788 | 1,400,558 | | Brazil | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,074 | 1,075 | | Peru | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 | 1 | | Southern Whale Fishery | 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3 | 3 | | Total | 4,164,602 | 625,602 | 989,578 | 9,991 | 1,471,400 | 485,405 | 7,746,668 |

British Corn Trade. | Years | Wheat and Flour | Barley/Corn Meal | Oats and Oat-Meal | Rye | Peas/Beans | Total | |-------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|-----------|-------| | 1809 | | | | | | | | 1810 | | | | | | | | 1811 | | | | | | | | 1812 | | | | | | | | 1813 | | | | | | | | 1814 | | | | | | | | 1815 | | | | | | | | 1816 | | | | | | | | 1817 | | | | | | | | 1818 | | | | | | | | 1819 | | | | | | | | 1820 | | | | | | | | 1821 | | | | | | | | 1822 | | | | | | | | 1823 | | | | | | | | 1824 | | | | | | | | 1825 | | | | | | | | 1826 | | | | | | | | 1827 | | | | | | | | 1828 | | | | | | | | 1829 | | | | | | | | 1830 | | | | | | | | 1831 | | | | | | | | 1832 | | | | | | | | 1833 | | | | | | | | 1834 | | | | | | | | 1835 | | | | | | | | 1836 | | | | | | | | 1837 | | | | | | | | 1838 | | | | | | | | 1839 | | | | | | | | 1840 | | | | | | | | 1841 | | | | | | | | 1842 | | | | | | | | 1843 | | | | | | | | 1844 | | | | | | | | 1845 | | | | | | | | 1846 | | | | | | | | 1847 | | | | | | | | 1848 | | | | | | | | 1849 | | | | | | | | 1850 | | | | | | | | 1851 | | | | | | | | 1852 | | | | | | | | Totals| | | | | | | IV. FOREIGN CORN TRADE.

1. Polish Corn Trade. Dantzig is the port whence we have hitherto always derived the largest portion of our supplies in deficient seasons; and as it is most probable that our principal importations will continue to be drawn from the same source, it becomes peculiarly important to ascertain the cost of wheat in Dantzig, and the expense of its importation into this country.

According to the data collected by Mr Jacob in his reports on the agriculture and corn trade of the north of Europe, the ordinary price of wheat at Dantzig, free on board, would amount to about 40s. a quarter, made up as follows:

Cost of wheat at Warsaw, 28s. 6d. per quarter. Conveyance to the boats, and charges for loading and stowing, and securing it with mats, 6 6 Freight to Dantzig, 5 0 Loss on the passage by pilfering, rain, &c., 3 0 Expenses at Dantzig in turning, drying, screening, warehousing, and loss of measure, 2 0 Profit or commission, as the case may be, to the merchant in Dantzig, 1 6

Cost at Dantzig, exclusive of shipping charges, which amount to about 10s. a quarter, 40 0

Now, if to this we add 10s. or 12s. a quarter for the expense of importing the wheat into England, and delivering it to the miller, including the profit of the importer, it is plain that it could not, supposing Mr Jacob's estimate of the cost to be nearly accurate, be sold in London, free of duty, for less than 50s. or 52s. a quarter.

It has, no doubt, been alleged that the cost of wheat in Dantzig is overrated in the above estimate; and in seasons when there is little or no demand for corn from abroad, this allegation may be well founded. But this estimate is not meant to apply to such years, but to those when there is some considerable foreign demand; and whenever this is the case, it will be found, that though some of the items which go to make up the cost may vary, the result is nearly correct; and that there are really no good grounds for supposing that corn could, in the seasons in question, be shipped from Dantzig for less than about 40s. a quarter.

In further corroboration of this statement we may mention, that owing to the deficient harvest of 1845, the average price of wheat in January 1846, in Warsaw, exceeded 40s. a quarter, and it is stated in a despatch from the consul in that city, that at an average of the twenty years ending with 1845, prices had been as follows, viz.: wheat from 26s. 6d. to 30s. per imp. quarter; barley, 17s. 10d. to 20s. 6d. per do.; and oats 8s. 6d. to 10s. per do. It is plain, therefore, that Mr Jacob's estimate of the cost of wheat at Warsaw is not in any degree overstated; and we are well assured that this also is the case with his estimate of the expense of conveying it down the Vistula to Dantzig.

We subjoin a statement by Mr Grade of Dantzig, of the average price from ten to ten years, from 1770 to 1820, of the different species of corn, free on board, per quarter, in sterling money at Dantzig.

| Years | Lowest Prices per Quarter | Highest Prices per Quarter | Average Prices per Quarter | |-------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------| | 1831 | 41 1 | 41 6 | 41 3 | | 1832 | 39 5 | 43 7 | 41 0 | | 1833 | 28 5 | 32 9 | 30 7 | | 1834 | 25 1 | 29 11 | 27 6 | | 1835 | 21 0½ | 26 3½ | 23 8 | | 1836 | 22 3 | 35 7 | 28 11 | | 1837 | 24 9 | 34 8½ | 29 8½ | | 1838 | 26 6½ | 61 9 | 44 1½ | | 1839 | 31 9 | 61 1 | 46 5 | | 1840 | 39 0 | 62 9 | 50 10½ | | 1841 | 45 9 | 57 0 | 51 4½ |

Average of 11 years from 1831 to 1841: 30 8½ 45 2 37 11

It appears from this table that the average price of wheat in Dantzig during the 11 years ending with 1841 was 37s. 11d. a quarter; making, with the addition of 10d. a quarter for shipping charges, its average price free on board, 38s. 9d. a quarter. Now, if to this last sum we add 12s. or 13s. for the expense of its importation and delivery to the millers in London, it is plain, judging from the experience of these 11 years, that the average cost of Dantzig wheat in England, independent of duty, may be estimated, in round numbers, at from 51s. to 52s. a quarter.

It is material, however, to bear in mind that no very large quantity could be shipped at the above prices. They represent only average years; and whenever there is any unusual demand for corn, or when from 200,000 to 300,000 quarters are wanted for this country, the price immediately rises, as seen above, to from 45s. to 50s. a quarter and upwards. During the course of 1847 the average price of the wheat shipped at Dantzig exceeded 55s. a quarter.

Quality of Dantzig Wheat. The price of wheat in Dantzig is usually about 7s. a quarter above its average price in Hamburg, and about 2s. above the average of Amsterdam. This difference is entirely owing to the superior quality of the Dantzig wheat. Though small grained, and not so heavy as several other sorts, it is remarkably thin-skinned, and yields the finest flour. Some of the best white, or as it is technically termed, "high mixed" Dantzig wheat, is superior to the very best English; but the quantity of this sort is but limited, and the average quality of all that is exported from Dantzig is believed to approach very nearly to the average quality of English wheat. Allowing for its superior quality, it will be found that wheat is, speaking generally, always cheaper in Dantzig than in any of the Continental ports nearer to London. There are but few seasons, indeed, in which Dantzig wheat is not largely imported into Amsterdam; and it frequently, also, finds its way into Hamburg. But it is quite impossible that such should be the case, unless, taking quality and other modifying circumstances into account, it were really cheaper than the native and other wheats met with in these markets. When there is any considerable importation into England, it is of every day occurrence for merchants to order Dantzig wheat in preference to that of Holstein, or of the Lower Elbe, though the latter might frequently be put into warehouses here for 20s. a quarter less than the former! It is, therefore, quite indispensable, in attempting to draw any inferences in regard to the comparative prices of corn in different countries, to make the requisite allowances for differences of quality. Unless this be done, whatever conclusions may be come to can hardly fail of being false and misleading; and when they happen to be right, they can only be so through the merest accident.

Dantzig being by far the greatest port for the exportation of corn in the north of Europe, its price may be assumed as the general measure of the price in other shipping ports. At all events, it is certain that when Dantzig is exporting, wheat cannot be shipped, taking quality into account, at a cheaper rate from any other place. The importer invariably resorts, to what he believes to be, all things considered, the cheapest market; and it is a contradiction and an absurdity to suppose that he should burden himself with a comparatively high freight, and other charges for wheat in Dantzig, provided he could buy an equally good article in so convenient a port as Hamburg at the same or a lower price.

If, therefore, we are right in estimating the lowest price at which wheat could be imported from Dantzig free of duty in ordinary years at about 50s., we may be assured that this is the lowest importation price. The greater cheapness of the imports from other places is apparent only, and is uniformly counterbalanced by a corresponding inferiority of quality.

2. Corn Trade of the Elbe, &c. Next to Dantzig, Hamburg is, perhaps, the greatest corn market in the north of Europe, being a depot for large quantities of Baltic corn, and for the produce of the extensive countries traversed by the Elbe. The exports of wheat from Hamburg amounted, at an average of the eleven years ending with 1841, to 210,871 quarters a year. The price of wheat, as already stated, is frequently less in Hamburg than in Dantzig; but this lowness of price is altogether ascribable to the inferiority of the Holstein and Hanover wheats, which are generally met with in great abundance in Hamburg. Wheat from the Upper Elbe is of a better quality. Bohemian wheat is occasionally forwarded by the river to Hamburg; but the charges attending its conveyance from Prague amount to full 15s. a quarter, and prevent its being sent down, except when the price is comparatively high. In 1841 the shipments of wheat from Hamburg amounted to 507,400 quarters, of which 460,900 were for England. Perhaps we might be able, did our prices average about 50s., to import in ordinary years from 300,000 to 400,000 quarters of wheat from Denmark and the countries intersected by the Weser and the Elbe.

3. French Corn Trade. It appears from the accounts given by the Marquis Garnier, in the last edition of his translation of the Wealth of Nations, that the price of the hectolitre of wheat at the market of Paris amounted, at an average of the nineteen years beginning with 1801 and ending with 1819, to 20 fr. 53 cents, which is equal to 30 fr. 80 cents the septier; or, taking the exchange at 25 fr. to Foreign 45s. 6d. the quarter. Count Chaptal, in his valuable work Sur l'Industrie Françoise, tom. i. p. 236, published in 1819, estimates the ordinary average price of wheat throughout France at 18 fr. the hectolitre, or 42s. 10d. the quarter. The various expenses attending the importation of a quarter of French wheat into London may be taken at a medium at about 6s. a quarter. France, however, has very little surplus produce to dispose of; so that it would be impossible for us to import any considerable quantity of French corn without occasioning a great advance of price; and in point of fact our imports from France have been at all times quite inconsiderable.

The mean of the different estimates framed by Vauban, Quesnay, Expilly, Lavossier, and Arthur Young, gives 61,519,672 septiers, or 32,810,000 quarters, as the total average growth of the different kinds of grain in France. (Pouchet Statistique Élémentaire, p. 290.) We, however, took occasion in a former article on this subject to observe, that there could not be a doubt that this estimate was a great deal too low; and the more careful investigations of late French statisticians fully confirm this remark. The annual produce of the harvest of France was lately (1843) estimated, from returns obtained under official authority, at 69,558,000 hectolitres of wheat, and 112,958,000 ditto of other sorts of grain; making in all 182,517,000 hectolitres, or 62,740,000 imperial quarters. Of this quantity it is supposed that about 16 per cent. is consumed as seed, 19 per cent. in the feeding of different species of animals, and 2 per cent. in distilleries and breweries.

The foreign corn trade of France was regulated, till within these few years, by a law which forbade exportation, except when the home prices were below certain limits, and which restrained and absolutely forbade importation, except when they were above certain other limits. The prices regulating importation and exportation differed in the different districts into which the kingdom was divided. Latterly, however, importation has been at all times allowed under graduated duties, which, like those recently existing in this country, become prohibitory when the prices sink to a certain level. The frontier departments are divided into four separate districts, the prices in each district governing the duties on importation into it, so that it sometimes happens that corn warehoused in a particular port, where it is not admissible except under a high duty, has been carried to another port in another district, and admitted at a low duty. An official announcement is issued on the last day of each month, of what the duties are to be in each district during the succeeding month.

4. Spanish Corn Trade. The exportation of corn from Spain was formerly prohibited under the severest penalties. But in 1820 grain and flour were both allowed to be freely exported, and in 1823 this privilege was extended to all productions (frutos) the growth of the soil. There is now in fact no obstacle whatever, except the expense of carriage, to the conveyance of corn to the sea-ports, and thence to the foreigner. Owing, however, to the corn-growing provinces being principally situated in the interior, and to the extreme badness of the roads, which renders carriage to the coast both expensive and difficult, the exports are comparatively trifling: this difficulty of carriage frequently gives rise to very great differences of prices at places in all parts of the country only a few leagues distant.

5. Corn Trade of Odessa. Odessa, on the Black Sea, is the only port in southern Europe from which any considerable quantity of grain is exported. We believe, indeed, that the fertility of the soil in its vicinity has been much exaggerated; but the wheat shipped at Odessa is principally brought from Volhynia and the Polish provinces to the south of Cracow, the supplies from which are susceptible of an indefinite increase. Owing to the cataracts in the Dnieper, and the Dnieper having a great number of shallows, most part of the corn brought to Odessa comes by land carriage. The expense of this mode of conveyance is not, however, nearly so great as might be supposed. The carts with corn are often in parties of 150; the oxen are pastured during the night, and they take advantage of the period when the peasantry are not occupied with the harvest, so that the charge on account of conveyance is comparatively trifling.

Both soft and hard wheat are exported from Odessa; but the former, which is by far the most abundant, is only brought to England. Supposing British wheat to sell at about 60s., Odessa wheat in good order would not be worth more than 52s. in the London market; but it is a curious fact, that in the Mediterranean the estimation in which they are held is quite the reverse; at Malta, Marseilles, Leghorn, &c., Odessa wheat fetches a decidedly higher price than British wheat.

The hard wheat brought from the Black Sea comes principally from Taganrog. It is a very fine species of grain; it is full ten per cent heavier than British wheat, and has less than half the bran. It is used in Italy for making macaroni, vermicelli, and things of that sort. Very little of it has found its way to England.

The voyage from Odessa to Britain is of uncertain duration, but generally very long. It is essential to the importation of wheat in a good condition, that it should be made during the winter months. When the voyage is made in summer, unless the wheat be very superior, and be shipped in exceedingly good order, it is almost sure to heat, and has sometimes indeed been injured to such a degree as to require to be dug from the hold with pickaxes. Unless, therefore, means be devised for lessening the risk of damage during the voyage, there is little reason to think that Odessa wheat will ever be very largely imported into Britain.

The entire expense of importing a quarter of wheat from Odessa to London may be estimated at from 16s. to 18s. The exports of wheat from Odessa, and other ports on the Black Sea, to Constantinople, the Levant, Italy, the south of France, &c., have latterly been very large indeed. In 1846 the exports from Odessa only amounted to 1,279,502 quarters, and in 1847 to 2,016,692 ditto; the latter being, we believe, the largest exportation that ever took place in a single year from any single port. Owing to the scarcity in this country, above 400,000 quarters of the above quantity were shipped for England, but the speculation entailed a heavy loss on the importers. The price free on board at Odessa considerably exceeded 40s. a quarter.

6. American Corn Trade. The prices of wheat at New York and Philadelphia may be taken at an average at from 37s. to 40s. a quarter; and as the cost of importing a quarter of wheat from the United States to England amounts to from 8s. to 12s., it is seen that no considerable supply could be obtained from that quarter were our prices under 50s. or 52s. It ought also to be remarked, that prices in America are usually higher than in the Baltic; so that but little can be brought from the former, except when the demand is sufficient previously to take off the cheaper wheats of the northern ports. The usual price of wheat in Canada, when there is a demand for the English market, is about 40s. a quarter; but taking it as low as 35s., if we add to this 10s. a quarter as the expenses of carriage, it will make its cost price in Liverpool 45s.; and being spring wheat, it is not so valuable, by about 6s. a quarter, as English wheat.

Owing to the failure of the potato crop in Ireland, Belgium, and other parts of Europe, the exports of flour and of Indian corn and meal from America in 1846 and 1847 were extremely large. Those sent to this country were, however, completely overdone, and occasioned a heavy loss.

We subjoin An Account of the Exports of Flour and Wheat, Indian Corn and Indian Corn Meal, Rye, Ship-bread, &c., from the United States, during the Year ending 30th June 1847, specifying the Countries to which the same were sent, and the Quantities sent to each.

| Articles | British N. American Colonies | West India generally | South America generally | North America generally | |----------|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------| | Flour | 227,220 | 453,871 | 249,507 | 66,903 | | Wheat | 593,054 | 15,469 | 3,564 | 10,354 | | Rye | 20,526 | 176,418 | 2,209 | 10,354 | | Rye meal | 27,691 | 3,499 | 101 | 100 | | Rye meal and other small grain and pulse value | D.21,312 | D.113,555 | D.2,401 | D.18,509 | | Ship bread | 29,266 | 54,288 | 1,711 | 91,318 | | | 229 | 13,807 | 7,447 | 673 |

TO EUROPE.

| Articles | Great Britain | Ireland | France | Spain and Portugal | Other parts of Europe | |----------|---------------|---------|--------|-------------------|----------------------| | Flour | 2,144,581 | 388,499 | 432,541 | 1,262 | 112,659 | | Wheat | 2,075,056 | 749,312 | 749,312 | 1,262 | 112,659 | | Rye | 7,250,000 | 7,250,000 | | 1,262 | 112,659 | | Rye meal | 400 | 3,662 | 3,006 | | 6,322 | | Rye meal and other small grain and pulse value | D.552,202 | D.65,680 | D.60,077 | D.732,601 | | Ship bread | 24,236 | 11,594 | 3,271 | | 1,728 | | | 6,047 | 556 | | | 568 |

TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

| Articles | Asia generally | Africa generally | Asia and Pacific generally | Total value to all parts | Total value of exports | |----------|----------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------| | Flour | 1,852 | 30,000 | 764 | 4,389,495 | 26,133,841 | | Wheat | 1,902 | 125 | 24,774 | 10,309,551 | 6,695,320 | | Rye | 71 | 71 | | 16,200,000 | 10,261,211 | | Rye meal | 71 | 71 | | 48,092 | 212,503 | | Rye meal and other small grain and pulse value | D.286 | D.538 | 131 | 1,600,563 | | Ship bread | 3,106 | 5,000 | 1,723 | 156,000 | 355,295 | | | 1,022 | 169 | | 21,003 | |

Inferences from the above Review of Prices. We may, we think, satisfactorily conclude, from this review of the state of the foreign corn trade, that, after 1849, when the new system is carried into full effect by the abolition of all restrictions on importation, the price of foreign wheat of about the same quality as average English wheat will, in ordinary years, be but little below 50s. a quarter. But supposing it were to fall to 45s. or even 40s., the latter is a price at which agricultural improvements may be successfully carried on. A most extraordinary improvement has taken place in agriculture since 1820, notwithstanding the heavy fall of prices in the interval. And such being the case, it would be unreasonable to suppose that such a further fall as should reduce our average prices from 54s. or 55s. to 45s., or even less, should have any disastrous influence over agriculture? Improvements of all sorts have seldom been more vigorously prosecuted than in 1834, 1835, and 1836, and yet the average price of corn in those years did not exceed 44s. 8d.; that is, it did not exceed its probable future price with open ports and no duty.

These details with respect to the foreign corn trade have been extracted from the article Corn Trade and Corn Laws in the last edition of Mr M'Culloch's Commercial Dictionary. In it the reader will find accounts specifying the different items of charge on the importation of corn from Dantzic, Odessa, the United States, &c.; and to it he is referred for further particulars. (J. R. M.)