ancient Doric magistrates, whose power and influence seem to have varied at different times. In Sparta the college consisted of five, and these entered on their annual office at the autumnal solstice, the beginning of the Lacedaemonian year. The first of these magistrates gave name to the year, in the same way as the first elected archon did at Athens; and they began their official duties by publishing a species of edicts, in which they appointed the secret officers or ἀπότεροι. In this edict was found the strange metaphorical expression for subjection and obedience, "that they must shave the beard and obey the laws." They held their daily meetings in an office set apart for them (ἀπόκειν), where they were also in the habit of eating together.
It is supposed by Müller, in his able treatise on the political institutions of the Dorians, that the duties of the ephori were originally limited to the superintendence of sales and of the public markets. Aristotle informs us, while describing their judicial powers, that they decided civil causes, but that the council presided over all capital crimes. It appears therefore that the court of ephori gave judgment respecting civil duties and property. The Perioeci and Helots, when they were in Sparta, were also under its jurisdiction. But the ephori gradually extended their authority; and it seems to have been the usual course of events in Greece, that the civil courts should enlarge their influence, whilst the power of the criminal courts was continually on the decline.
The circumstance which seems principally to have extended the jurisdiction of the ephori, was the privilege they enjoyed of instituting an inquiry into the official conduct of all magistrates, excepting that of councillors. We do not mean to say that this scrutiny always took place; but the ephori had it in their power to compel any magistrate to stand his trial, if they had remarked anything suspicious in his administration. The king was not exempted from this power, but bound to yield as implicit obedience as the lowest officer of the state. Thus we find Cleomenes tried for bribery before the Persian war. But it must not be supposed that the ephori could of themselves punish with death: they were only the accusers before a larger court, which consisted of all the councillors, of the ephori themselves (who seem to have acted both as accusers and judges), of the other king, and probably of several other magistrates, who had all equal votes. The ephori had only the power to impose fines, and to demand immediate payment. Thus Agesilaus was fined for endeavouring to make himself popular; whilst Archidamus was reprimanded for having married a wife of too small stature. Sometimes we find them punishing one man for having introduced money into the state, another for indolence, and a third for the most extraordinary reason, namely, that he was generally ill treated and insulted.
The ephori appear from very ancient times to have had a right to transact business with the popular assembly in preference to any other magistrates. They could convene the people and put the vote to them. They had great authority in transacting with foreign nations, admitting ambassadors, and dismissing them from the confines of the kingdom. In time of war they were empowered to send troops on whatever day they thought fit, and seem even to have been able to determine the number of men. The army was then intrusted to the king, or some other general, who received from them instructions how to act, and was even restrained in his proceedings by deputies whom the ephori sent to watch over him. The generals could be recalled by the scytala, and their first duty was to visit the office of the ephori. It is impossible, however, to believe that the ephori could act by their own authority on such important occasions as these; they could only have been the agents and plenipotentiaries of the popular assembly. It must in fact have been the decrees of the people which they put in execution.
The office of the ephori was abolished by Cleomenes, but restored under the Roman dominion. (See Müller's Dorier, Breslau, 1824, t. ii. p. 111-129.)