order of men in the commonwealth of Rome, to which we can furnish no exact parallel in modern times. They seem, indeed, to have resembled in some degree the gentry of England; with this difference, however, that they enjoyed peculiar privileges, and were more of a separate caste than any body of men which can now be pointed out. Their origin goes back to the earliest times of Roman history, though we can perceive, even from the legendary statements of Livy and Dionysius, that their constitution and mode of selection had been changed in the course of ages. During the reign of the kings they evidently appear to have been of noble birth, the younger branches of patrician families. This we may infer from the statement of Polybius (vi. 20), when he says that the knights now are chosen according to fortune; evidently intimating that their selection had depended on a different principle at a previous period. Romulus is said to have divided them into three centuries; and the very names of Ramnenses, Titiences, and Luceres, by which he designated them, point out distinctly their high origin. Both Tullus Hostilius and Tarquinius added to their number; but it was Servius Tullius (576 B.C.) who first organized them into a distinct body, and compelled the state to contribute annually to their maintenance. It is difficult to perceive in what way we are to explain the statement of Livy (i. 43), that the sum of ten thousand pounds of brass was given to each for the purchase of a horse; an enormous sum when compared with that at which oxen and sheep were rated in the table of penalties. They were bound, of course, to be provided with a noble steed, and may have been obliged to replace it if lost through any casualty in war. Its accoutrements, too, and a slave to take charge of it, were possibly all included in this large sum. But whether, when the censor ordered the knight to sell his horse, it was the intention that the outfit money should be refunded to the state, we have now no means of determining. Livy tells us also that a tax of two thousand pounds of brass was imposed on each ridua, to maintain a knight's horse. This certainly sounds very strange, for it seems inconceivable that there should have been such a large number of rich widows; and even though we understand by the word ridua every single woman, maiden as well as widow, we do not think that we thereby get out of the difficulty.

As early as 400 B.C. we find that a certain fortune was required to enable a man to be raised to the rank of eques. In that year, at the siege of Veii, we are told that those who possessed the requisite fortune, but to whom horses had not been assigned, offered to provide these at their own expense. This proposal was accepted; and then it was, according to Livy (v. 7), that they first received regular pay. In 308 B.C. the censors Q. Fabius and P. Decius established a law by which it was ordained that every fifth year a procession of the equites should take place, and that those who had misconducted themselves should be degraded from their rank. They now evidently became a very powerful body in the state; yet in 186 B.C. we find it allowed as a reward to P. Eubius, that the censor should not assign him a public horse, and thereby compel him to serve as an eques against his will. This proves that the duties must have been burdensome, and regarded by many with distaste. In the later times of the republic they increased in power and consequence, when the judicial functions were transferred from the senate to the body of equites by the Sempronian law, passed by C. Gracchus about 123 B.C.; and a short time afterwards they became the farmers of the public revenues, by which they were enabled to amass immense riches. They were deprived of their judicial powers by Sylla; but they now possessed too much influence in the state to be excluded from the higher and more dignified offices. After his death they were admitted to their former power, which, however, they shared with the senate.

Towards the end of the republic, and under the emperors, the fortune requisite for an eques seems to have been four hundred sestertia, equal to about L.3229 of our money; and even at this time knights' horses were furnished by the state, as we find by ancient inscriptions of that period. (Gruter. Inscrip. 404.)

Equity (aequitas), even-handed justice; right; the impartial distribution of justice; the treating of others according to reason and justice, or in that way to which, by the natural law, that is, in strict justice, they are entitled.

Equity or justice is personified as a female divinity, bearing in one hand a sword, and in the other a balance.

In Jurisprudence, equity is defined by Grotius to be "the correction of that wherein the law (by reason of its generality) is deficient." "Equity," says Blackstone, "in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all law; positive law is construed, and rational law is made by it. In this respect equity is synonymous with justice; in that, to the true and sound interpretation of the rule."

Courts of Equity are distinguished from Courts of Law, in that the former have jurisdiction in cases where the proper remedy cannot be found, or cannot be administered to the full extent of the relative rights of all parties in the courts of common law, in which proceedings can be carried on and decisions given only according to certain prescribed forms. The rights secured by the former are termed legal; those by the latter, equitable. Though equity, if not in name, at least in substance, must have a place in every rational system of jurisprudence, yet it is impossible that any code, however minute and particular, should embrace or provide for the infinite variety of human affairs, or should furnish rules applicable to every case.

The most general description of a court of equity is, that it has jurisdiction in cases where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the common law courts. It is not confined or limited in its modes of relief, like courts of law, but grants relief to all parties in cases where they have rights ex aquo et bono, and modifies and fashions that relief according to circumstances. The jurisdiction of a court of equity is sometimes concurrent with that of courts of law, and sometimes it is exclusive. The most common exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is in cases of accident, fraud, mistake, &c. In many cases falling under these heads courts of law cannot afford redress; in others they can, though not always in so adequate a manner. It exercises exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of merely equitable rights, that is, such as are not recognized in courts of law. Most cases of trust and confidence come under this head. (See Justice Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence; Fonblanque On Equity; Maddock's Treatise on Equity; Lord Redesdale's Treatise on Equity Pleadings.)

The equity judges are the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, the two Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, and the three Vice-Chancellors. The Lord Chancellor is a political officer of the highest importance and influence. He is a privy-councillor, and at the head of the judges and of the law. His duration of office, however, is dependent upon that of the ministry of which he is a member. The Master of the Rolls holds his appointment for life; and the Vice-Chancellors and Lords Justices of Appeal, by act 13th Will. III., cap. 2, during good conduct.

The salary of the Lord Chancellor is L10,000; that of the Master of the Rolls and the Lords Justices of Appeal, L6000 each; and that of the Vice-Chancellors, L5000.