of or belonging to a league or covenant: a term usually employed to designate the government of a confederacy consisting of several united sovereign states. The principal purposes for which such a union is formed are, the protection of the common interests of the members, their defence against the attacks of foreign enemies as well as against internal convulsions, and the superintendence of their political and commercial intercourse with other nations, together with the regulation of the commerce between the confederated states themselves. To accomplish these purposes, the federation must be invested with full power to levy troops, to build and equip fleets, to raise the money requisite for the support of an army and navy, to prescribe rules for their government, and to direct their operations. The members of the union must therefore surrender to the joint body certain sovereign powers which they have been accustomed to exercise in their several states. The interpretation of the contract which determines the extent of the powers to be surrendered must belong to the joint body; but it will be necessary for the protection of the rights of the various members against the encroachments of the federation, that any one party should be allowed to withdraw from the union at pleasure. The degree to which the sovereign states united under one federal government have given up their individual rights varies considerably. In some confederations there is no federal government, and the union between the various associated states is not closer than a mere treaty, offensive and defensive, would effect between two states. In others the government is invested with unlimited discretion to take measures for the common defence—to make requisitions of men and money—to govern the common army and navy, and to direct their operations; and the proceedings of the government are made constitutionally binding upon all the associated states, even without their unanimous consent. In the old Germanic empire, one member might wage war with another; in the Swiss confederation, the different states are allowed to conclude treaties with foreign powers, unless they are expressly prohibited by the constitution; while the confederated states of North America have surrendered among other things all political power in so far as it relates to foreign affairs. Professor Austin makes a distinction between a supreme federal government and a system of confederated states. The former enforces its commands in each and all of the associated states, whereas the latter, through their representatives or delegates, may assemble and pass resolutions which concern all the members of the confederacy, yet leave these resolutions to be enforced in each state by its own sovereign power. In this system, therefore, each of the several societies is an independent political society, and each of their several governments is properly sovereign or supreme. For an example of this system of confederated states, the professor refers to the German confederation, which has succeeded to the ancient empire. "I believe," he says, "that the present diet is merely an assembly of ambassadors from several confederated but severally independent governments; that the resolutions of the diet are merely articles of agreement, which each of the confederated governments spontaneously adopts; and that they owe their legal effect in each of the compacted communities to laws and commands which are fashioned upon them by its own immediate chief. I also believe that the Swiss confederation was and is of the same nature. If, in the case of the German or of the Swiss confederation, the body of confederated governments enforces its own resolutions, those confederated governments are one composite state rather than a system of confederated states. The body of confederated governments is properly sovereign: and to that aggregate and sovereign body, each of its constituent members is properly in a state of subjection."

The principal examples of this form of government have been the confederacy of the ancient Grecian republics, and in more modern times, the Germanic empire, the Swiss republics, and the United States of North America. There is conclusive evidence that several associations existed at a very early period among the Grecian states, for the purpose of repelling the attacks of their common foes, and of protecting the temple of their common deity. The most important of these confederations was the union of the twelve tribes, which constituted the Amphictyonic League. All the members of this confederacy retained the character of independent states, and, though some of them were very insignificant, had equal rights and equal votes in the federal council, which met twice every year, in the spring at Delphi, and in the autumn at Anthela, near the pass of Thermopylae. The deputies who were sent to these meetings were appointed in their respective states by lot, and each state had two votes. The council was empowered to watch over the temple at Delphi, and to guard the immense wealth deposited there—to decide all controversies between the members of the league—to inflict a fine upon the aggressor—to employ the whole power of the confederacy to punish those who should disobey its mandates—to admit new members—to declare and carry on war, and generally to adopt whatever measures it deemed necessary for the common welfare of the confederation. The Amphictyons were bound by an oath mutually to protect and defend the associated states, and to inflict vengeance on those who should sacrilegiously despoil the temple of the deity whose worship formed the external bond of union among them. The objects of the Amphictyonic confederacy were no doubt wise and humane, but they were never adequately carried out, and in their active interference in the affairs of Greece the council showed themselves more influential for evil than for good. The more powerful members successively tyrannized over the weaker. There was no cordial co-operation among them even in the midst of the most dangerous defensive wars, and their mutual jealousies and incessant quarrels paved the way for the ruin of their liberties and independence.

Another confederacy of Grecian republics was the famous Achaean League, which dates from the year B.C. 280, though it did not rise into importance till about thirty years later. The states composing this league, as in the former instance, enjoyed a perfect equality. They retained their municipal jurisdiction, and appointed their own officers, but they had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money, though it is uncertain whether this was the result of their own choice, or proceeded from the authority of the federal council. This council had the sole right of peace and war, of sending and receiving ambassadors, of entering into treaties and alliances, and of appointing a prætor or chief magistrate, who, with the advice and consent of ten of the deputies, administered the government in the recess of the council. At first the council had two prætors or presidents, who were nominated alternately by the different towns, and were associated in the administration, but after a short trial only one was elected. The union among the members of the Achaean League was much closer, and its organization more judiciously framed, than in the case of the Amphictyonic confederacy. The united testimony of all the historians who have taken notice of its affairs, shows that the government of this federal league was administered with far greater justice and moderation; and the citizens of the various states under its superintendence were much less turbulent and seditious than in any of the cities of Greece which exercised singly all the prerogatives of independent and sovereign states. The popular government, says the Abbé Mably, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, because it was there tempered by the general authority and laws of the confederacy.

In later times, another example of a federal government was exhibited by the Germanic Empire, the administration of which was vested in a representative diet, in the emperor to whom the powers of the executive were entrusted, and in two judiciary tribunals (the imperial chamber and the aulic council) which possessed supreme jurisdiction in all disputes among the members of the confederacy. To the diet was entrusted the general power of legislating for the empire—of making war and concluding peace—forming alliances—assessing quotas of troops and money—constructing fortresses—regulating the coinage—admitting new members, and subjecting refractory members to the ban of the empire. To the emperor belonged the exclusive right to make propositions to the diet—to negative its decrees—to name ambassadors—to confer dignities and titles—to fill vacant electorates—to receive and disburse the public revenues, and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases he was assisted by a council formed of the electors. In theory this federal constitution seemed well fitted to gain the end for which it was framed; but experience has shown that it afforded no security either against external dangers or internal dissensions. "The history of Germany," it has been justly said, "is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states—of wars among the princes and states themselves—of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak—of foreign intrusions and foreign intrigues—of requisitions of men and money disregarded or partially complied with—of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty—of general imbecility, confusion, and misery."

The United Provinces of the Netherlands were a confederation composed of seven co-equal and sovereign states, each of which consisted of several equal and independent cities. The sovereign authority was vested in the states general, consisting usually of about fifty deputies, who held their seats, some for life, some for a fixed limited period, and in two cases during pleasure. In all important matters, not only the provinces, but the cities, required to be unanimous. The executive magistrate was the stadtholder, to whom was entrusted the command of the army and navy, with authority to appoint all naval and military offices, to assist at the deliberations of the states general, and to settle all disputes between the provinces. The history of this celebrated confederacy has shown that its practice differed widely from its theory; and the mutual jealousies of its members, and the weakness of the government, ultimately brought the league to anarchy and dissolution.

The Swiss Confederation consists of twenty-two sovereign cantons, united for "the maintenance of their liberty, their independence, and security against any attacks from abroad, as well as for the preservation of order and tranquillity at home." For these purposes, a certain fixed contingent of troops is furnished by each canton whenever required, amounting in all to about 34,000, and the reserve, in case of need, to as many more. A pecuniary contribution for defraying the military and other general expenses of the confederacy is also paid by each canton in proportion to its property and resources. The diet consists of the deputies of the twenty-two cantons, who are chosen by their respective governments. It is entrusted with authority to declare war, to conclude peace, and to form alliances with foreign powers; and on these occasions three-fourths of the votes are necessary to constitute a majority. All other questions are decided by a simple majority. The diet also appoints the military officers and the diplomatic agents of the confederation, settles disputes among its members, acts the part of mediator in cases of internal disturbances within a canton; and, in general, takes all steps that may be deemed necessary for the safety of the country. No canton is allowed to go to war with another canton, and the diet may have recourse to arms to punish the violation of this or of any other fundamental law of the confederacy. The ordinary sessions of the diet, which last about five weeks, are held annually in the chief town of one of three vororts, or directing cantons, Zurich, Berne, and Lucerne, which hold the office of vorort by turn, for two years. The council or executive of the directing canton for the time being, along with its burgomaster, is entrusted with the management of the affairs of the confederation during the recess of the diet, but it is assisted in its duties by a federal chancery, consisting of a chancellor and a secretary, both appointed by the diet.

It will be evident from these statements, that the Swiss republics do not form one united state, but rather a confederation of states, having each their own peculiar constitution. They have, properly speaking, no permanent federal executive, and the diet is merely an assembly of delegates, who vote according to the instructions given by their constituents.

In this respect the Swiss confederacy differs widely from the United States of North America, which have a permanent executive, with a federal treasury and army and navy at its disposal. The federal legislature or congress consists of two bodies—a house of representatives chosen for one or two years, and a senate for a period varying from two years to six—the former by popular election, the latter by the representatives of the twenty-four states. The congress has power to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States—to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states—to levy taxes and coin money—to declare war—to raise and support armies—to establish and maintain a navy—to provide for organizing, arming, disciplining, and calling forth the militia—to admit new members into the Union—to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court—to regulate and dispose of the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and, in general, to make all laws which may be regarded as necessary for carrying into execution the foregoing and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, and to propose amendments in the constitution, which, however, shall not be held valid unless ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states.

The executive power is vested in the president for the time being, who holds his office for four years, but is occasionally re-elected for four years more. He is commander-in-chief of the federal army and navy, and of the militia when called into active service; and has power, with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, to appoint ambassadors, the judges of the supreme court, and the other public ministers, consuls, and officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the constitution. He has a partial and temporary vote upon the measures adopted by congress. But if, on reconsideration of the bill objected to by the president, two-thirds of both houses adhere to their approval of the measure, it becomes a law.

A few amendments have been made on this form of government since its promulgation in 1798, but the constitution itself has stood the test of more than half a century, though exposed to several by no means inconsiderable dangers. In 1827, the constitutional right of congress to legislate for all the states of the confederation was called in question by South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia. The cause of this hostility to the Union was the reduction of the tariff on foreign produce, which was vehemently opposed by these states; but a compromise on the part of the Union restored the good-feeling of the disaffected provinces, although the principle of nullification was left unsettled, and still continues to be so. The late violent discussions on the slave question have likewise been attended with the same hostility, and a threat to dissolve the Union.—(St Croix des Anciens Gouvernements; The Federalist; Vieuxsean's History of Switzerland.)

FEÉ, in Law, the same as feud or fief, properly signifies a conditional stipend or reward, and is applied to property held of a superior on condition of rendering him service. An estate of inheritance is said to be in fee-simple when it is held in the freest manner, clear of any condition, limita-

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1 The Federalist, vol. i., pp. 114-116. Limited fees are such as are burdened and confined with conditions or qualifications; and these may be divided into two kinds, viz., qualified or base fees, and fees conditional or fees tail. A qualified or base fee is such as has a qualification annexed to it, and which must terminate when the qualification subjoined to it is at an end; e.g., an estate granted to A and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Dale, is determined whenever A or his heirs cease to be tenants of that manor. A conditional fee at common law was a fee restrained to particular heirs exclusive of others; as, to the heirs of a man's body, by which collaterals were excluded. In such case, if the donee had no heirs of his own body, the land reverted to the donor on the death of the donee; but if heirs were born, his estate became absolute and unconditional, so that he might alienate it, and thereby bar not only his own issue, but also the donor, of his reversionary interest. If, however, the tenant did not so alienate the land, the condition still remained in force; for if the issue had afterwards died without any alienation, the land, in terms of the donation, reverted to the donor on the death of the donee. This naturally gave rise to fictitious sales of land by tenants in possession, as soon as they had performed the conditions specified in the grant; so that on the reconveyance of the land into their hands they held it unconditionally, or in fee-simple. To abolish this practice, the statute of 13th Edw. I., cap. 1, commonly called the statute de donis conditionalibus, was passed, enacting that from thenceforth the will of the donor be observed, and that the land should go to the heirs specified, if there were any, or if none that it should revert to the donor. Thus the donee had no longer a conditional fee-simple which became absolute and at his own disposal the instant any issue was born; but the estate was divided into two parts, leaving in the donee a new kind of particular estate, denominated a fee-tail, and vesting in the donor the ultimate fee-simple of the land, expectant on the failure of issue; which expectant estate is termed a reversion. Estates tail are either general or special; the former being where lands and tenements are given to one, and the heirs of his body; the latter is where the gift is restrained to certain heirs of the donee's body; as where lands and tenements are given to a man and his heirs by his now wife. Estates in general and special tail are further diversified by the distinction of sexes in such entails, for either may be in tail male or tail female.

See ENTAIL.

FEEJEE or FIJI ISLANDS, a group of islands in the South Pacific, lying between S. Lat. 15° 30' and 19° 30', and E. Long. 177° and 182°, and forming part of the Friendly islands. The group comprises upwards of 150 islands, 65 of which are inhabited. They are of volcanic formation, are rich and fertile, and some of them are very mountainous. The productions are sugar-cane, cotton, coffee, cocoanut, bread-fruit, oranges, melons, citrons, olives, guavas, and sandal-wood. The natives are well formed and active, but warlike and cruel. The principal islands are Kantaon, Ovola, Amban, and Muthuatu. The Feejee islands were discovered by Tasman in 1643. Pop. estimated at 133,000.