Exhibiting a Systematic View of Words, as they are commonly arranged into distinct Classes, with the Subdivisions under each Class.

All language is composed of words, each of which may be defined, a sound significant of some idea or relation. These words may be arranged into four general divisions, namely,

1. SUBSTANTIVES; which are all those words that are expressive of things which exist, or are conceived to exist, of themselves, and not as the energies or qualities of any thing else. These may be divided into two orders, viz.

1. Nouns, properly so called, being the names of all those things which exist, or are conceived to exist. These may be divided into three kinds, each of which admits of the subdivisions after mentioned, viz.

Natural, or those which are used as the names of natural substances; such as (genus) animal; (species) man, dog; (individual) Alexander, Cyrus, Cerberus, Argus.

Artificial, or the several names of artificial objects; such as, (genus) edifice; (species) house, church; (individual) Vatican, St Peter's, St Paul's.

Abstract, or those which are the names of qualities considered as abstracted from their substances; such as, (genus) motion; (species) flight, course; (individual) the falcon's flight, the greyhound's course.

Nouns of all kinds admit of the following accidents, viz.

Gender, which is a certain affection of nouns denoting the sex of those substances of which they are the names. For as in nature every object is either male or female, or neither the one nor the other, grammarians, following this idea, have divided the names of beings into three classes. Those which denote males are said to be of the masculine gender; those which denote females, of the feminine gender; and those which denote neither the one nor the other, of the neuter gender. The English is the only language of which the nouns are, with respect to sex, an exact copy of nature.

Number. As there is no object in nature single and alone, and as by far the greater part of nouns are the names of whole classes of objects, it is evident that every such noun ought to have some variation, to denote whether it is one individual of the class which is meant, or more than one. Accordingly we find, that in every language nouns have some method of expressing this. If one be mentioned, the noun is used in that form which is called the singular number; if more than one, it is used in a different form, which is called the plural number.

Cases. All nouns, excepting proper names, are general terms; but it is often necessary to use those general terms for the purpose of expressing particular ideas. This can be done only by connecting the general term with some word significant of a quality or circumstance peculiar to the individual intended. When that quality or circumstance is not expressed by an adjective, it is in English and most modern languages commonly connected with the noun by the intervention of a preposition; but in the Greek and Latin languages the noun has cases to answer the same, and even in English the noun has, besides the nominative, one case to denote possession.

2. Pronouns, which are a species of word invented to supply the place of nouns in certain circumstances. They are of two kinds, viz.

First, the prepositional; so called because they are capable of leading a sentence. These are divided into three orders, called the pronouns of the

First person. The pronoun of this person, in English I, denotes the speaker as characterized by the present act of speaking, in contradistinction to every other character which he may bear. It is said to be of the first person, because there must necessarily be a speaker before there can be a hearer; and the speaker and hearer are the only persons employed in discourse.

Second person. The pronoun of this person, in English thou, denotes the person addressed as characterized by the present circumstance of being addressed. It is said to be of the second person, because in discourse there cannot be a hearer till there be a speaker. The pronouns of the first and second persons have number and cases, for the same reason that nouns have these accidents; but in no language have they any variation denoting gender. The reason is, that sex, and all other properties and attributes whatever, excepting those just mentioned as descriptive of the nature of these pronouns, are foreign from the mind of the speaker when he utters I or thou in discourse.

Third person. The pronouns of this person, he, she, it, are employed to denote any object which may be the subject of discourse different from the speaker and the hearer. They are improperly said to be of any person; for there can be but two persons employed in discourse, the speaker and the party addressed. They are, however, pronouns; since they stand by themselves, and are the substitutes of nouns. He is the substitute of a noun denoting a male animal; she, of a noun denoting a female animal; and it, of a noun denoting an object which has no sex. All these, like the pronouns personal, admit of number and cases; but there is this peculiarity attending them, that though in every case of the singular number the distinction of gender is carefully preserved, in the plural it is totally lost in some languages; they, theirs, and them being the nominative, possessive, and accusative cases of he, of she, and of it.

Secondly, the subjunctive; so called, because they cannot lead a sentence, but only serve to subjoin a clause to another previously enunciated. Of this kind are

Which and who. This subjunctive pronoun may be substituted in the place of any noun whatever, whether it be expressive of a genus, a species, or an individual; as, the animal which, the man who, Alexander who, &c. Nay, it may even become the substitute of the personal pronouns themselves; as when we say, I who now write, you who now read, thou who readest, he who wrote, she who spoke; where it is observable, that the subjunctive who adopts the person of that prepositional pronoun which it represents, and affects the verb accordingly. Who and which, therefore, are real pronouns, from substitution; and they have this peculiarity besides, that they have not only the power of a pronoun, but also of a connective of the same import with that which in English is expressed by the preposition of. The word that is now used indifferently for who or which, as a subjunctive pronoun; but it was originally used only as a definitive, and as such it ought still to be considered in philosophical grammar.

II. ATTRIBUTIVES; which are those words that are expressive of all such things as are conceived to exist, not of themselves, but as the attributes of other things. These are divided into,

1. Verbs, or those words which are expressive of an attribute and an assertion; as, I wrote.

The attributes expressed by verbs have their essence in motion or its privation; and as motion is always accompanied by time, therefore verbs are liable to certain variations called tenses, viz.

The present, which represents the action of the verb as going on, and as contemporary with something else; as, I write, or I am writing, either just now, or when you are reading. The proter-imperfect, which represents the action of the verb as having been going on but not finished in some portion of past time; as, I was writing, no matter when, yesterday, last week, or last year. The aorist of the past, which represents the action of the verb as finished in some indefinite portion of past time; as, I wrote, or did write, yesterday, or last week. The proter-perfect, which represents the action of the verb as just now finished, or as finished in some portion of time within which the present instant is comprehended; as, I have written this day or this week. The plusquam-perfect, which represents the action of the verb as having been finished in some portion of time within which a determinate past instant was comprehended; as, I had written last week before I saw you. The first future, which represents the action of the verb as to be going on at some indefinite future time; as, I shall write or be writing to-morrow, or next week. The second future, which represents the action of the verb as to be completed at some definite future time; as, I shall have written when Abstract, you come to-morrow, next week, next month, or next year.

Affirmation is the essence of every verb, insomuch that all verbs may be resolved into the substantive verb is, and another attributive. But a man may affirm something of the action of the verb directly, something of his liberty or capacity to perform that action, or something of his wish that another should perform it. To denote these several kinds of affirmation, all verbs have what grammarians call modes, viz. the indicative, to denote the first kind of affirmation; as, I write; the subjunctive, to denote the second; as, I may or can write; the imperative, to denote the third; as, write thou, or do thou write. Besides these, grammarians have given to every verb a mode, called the infinitive; as, to write. But this seems on every account to be improperly styled a mode. Nay, if affirmation be the essence of verb, the infinitive cannot be considered as any part of the verb at all, for it expresses no affirmation. It is indeed nothing more than an abstract noun denoting the simple energy of the verb in conjunction with time.

Verbs have likewise been distinguished into the following kinds, according to the nature of the attribute of which they are expressive, namely, 1st, Active-transitive, or those which denote an action that passes from the agent to some external object; as Caesar conquered Pompey; 2d, Active-intransitive, or those which express that kind of action which has no effect upon any thing beyond the agent himself; as, Caesar walked; 3d, Passive, or those which express not action but passion, whether pleasing or painful; as, Portia was loved, Pompey was conquered; 4th, Neutral, or those which express an attribute that consists neither in action nor in passion; as, Caesar stood.

2. Participles, or those words which are expressive of an attribute combined with time. In English there are only two participles; the present, as writing, which expresses the action of the verb to write, as going on; and the past, as written, which expresses the action of the same verb as finished, and therefore past in time. In Greek and Latin there is a future participle, by which the attribute is represented as being in a state of exertion at some future time; as, γραφόμενος, scripturæs, about to write.

3. Adjectives, or those words which express as inhering in their substances the several qualities of things, of which the essence consists not in motion or its privation; as, good, bad, black, white, large, small, and the like. As attributes are the same whether they belong to males or females, to one object or to many, adjectives ought in strictness to admit of no variation respecting sex or number; and in English they actually admit of none. Some qualities, however, are of such a nature, that one substance may have them in a greater degree than another; and therefore the adjectives denoting these qualities admit in most languages of a variation which grammarians call the degrees of comparison. Thus Plato was wise, Socrates was wiser than he, but Solomon was the wisest of men. There is a species of adjectives derived from nouns, and even from pronouns; for we say, the Pompeian party, a brazen trumpet, and my book, which are phrases equivalent to "the party of Pompey, a trumpet of brass, and the book of me."

4. Adverbs, or those words which, as they denote the attributes of attributes, have been called attributives of the second order, to distinguish them from verbs, participles, and adjectives, which denote the attributes of substances, and are therefore called attributives of the first order. Adverbs are divided into two kinds, viz.

First, Those which are common to all attributives of the first order, that is, which coalesce equally with verbs, with participles, and with adjectives. These may be divided into adverbs of intensification and remission, or of quantity continuous; as moderately, vastly, exceedingly, &c. These, like adjectives of a similar nature, admit of the dif- Abstract. feren degrees of comparison. Of quantity discrete; as, once, twice, thrice, &c. These are not, in strictness of speech, adverbs, being in reality the possessive cases of one, two, three, &c. Of relation; as more, most, less, least, equally, proportionally, &c.

Second. Those which are confined to verbs properly so called, and which are of the following kinds: Of time; as, then, when, afterward, now, &c.; of place; as, here, there, where, hence, whence, &c.; and also adverbs derived from prepositions; as, upward, downward, &c.; of intensions and remissions peculiar to motion; as, speedily, hastily, slowly, &c. We have given adverbs a place amongst the parts of speech necessary for the communication of thought; but it may be doubted whether they be entitled to this distinction. English adverbs at least seem to be nothing more than corruptions of nouns, adjectives, and verbs.

III. DEFINITIVES; which are all those words that serve to define and ascertain any particular object or objects as separated from others of the same class. These are commonly called ARTICLES, which are divided into two kinds, viz.

1. INDEFINITE, as a or an, which is prefixed to a noun or general term, to denote that but one individual is meant of that genus or species of which the noun is the common name. This article, however, leaves the individual itself quite indeterminate. Thus, man is the general name of the whole human race; a man is one individual, but that individual is unknown. Any is prefixed to a noun either in the singular or plural number, when it is indifferent as to the truth of the proposition what individual or individuals be supposed; thus, "any man will be virtuous when temptation is away." Some is prefixed to nouns in the plural number, to denote that only part of the species or genus is meant, leaving that part undetermined; thus, "some men are great cowards."

2. DEFINITE, as the, which is prefixed to a noun, to denote one individual of the species of which something is predicated that distinguishes it from every other individual. Thus, "the man that hath not music in himself" is fit for treasons." It is used before nouns in both numbers, and for the same purpose; for we may say, "the men who have not music in themselves are fit for treasons." This, prefixed to a noun in the singular number, denotes an individual as present and near at hand; as, "this man beside me." That, prefixed to a noun in the singular number, denotes an individual as present but at a little distance; as, "that man in the corner."

Besides these, there are many other articles both definite and indefinite.

IV. CONNECTIVES, or those words which are employed to connect other words, and of several distinct parts to make one complete whole. These may be divided into two kinds, viz.

1. CONJUNCTIONS, by which name are distinguished all those connectives which are commonly employed to conjoin sentences. These have been divided into two kinds, called conjunctives, or those words which conjoin sentences and their meanings also; and disjunctives, or those words which, at the same time that they conjoin sentences, disjoin their meanings. Each of these general divisions has been again subdivided; the former into copulatives and continuatives, the latter into simple disjunctives and adversative disjunctives. But the general division is absurd, and the subdivisions are useless. Conjunctions never disjoin the meaning of sentences, nor have any other effect than to combine two or more simple sentences into one compound sentence. If these simple sentences be of opposite meanings before their combination, they will continue so after it, whatever conjunction be employed to unite them. In nature, different truths are connected, if they be connected at all, by different relations; and therefore, when the sentences expressive of those truths are connected in language, it must be by words significant of those natural relations. Thus, accidental addition is expressed by the conjunction and; as when we say, "Lyssipus was a statuary, and Priscian was a grammarian." The unexpected junction of contrary truths is expressed by but; as, "Brutus was a patriot, but Caesar was not." The relation of an effect to its cause is expressed by because; as, "Rome was enslaved because Caesar was ambitious." The relation of an effect to a cause of which the existence is doubtful, is expressed by if; as, "you will live happily if you live honestly;" the relation of a cause to its effect, by therefore; as, "Caesar was ambitious, therefore Rome was enslaved." The idea of simple diversity is expressed by either and or; "either it is day or it is night." Contrariety between two affirmations, which, though each may be true by itself, cannot both be true at once, is expressed by unless; as, "Troy will be taken unless the Palladium be preserved." Coincidence of two affirmations apparently contrary to each other is expressed by although; as, "Troy will be taken although Hector defend it."

2. PREPOSITIONS, or those connectives of which the common office is to conjoin words which refuse to con- lese; and this they can do only by signifying those relations by which the things expressed by the united words are connected in nature. The first words of men, like their first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects; and therefore there can be no doubt but that the original use of prepositions was to denote the various relations of body. Afterwards, when men began to discern with their intellect, they took those words which they found already made, prepositions as well as others, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions.

Prepositions viewed in this light are

Either proper, or those which literally denote the relations subsisting amongst the objects of sense, such as the accidental junction of two things between which there is no necessary connection; as, "a house with a party wall." The separation of two things which we should expect to find united; as, "a house without a roof, a man without hands." The relation subsisting between any thing and that which supports it; as, "the statue stands upon a pedestal." The relation of higher and lower; as, "the sun is above the hills," "to support uneasy steps over the burning marl," "the sun is set below the horizon," "the shepherd reclines under the shade of a beech tree." The relation between any thing in motion and that in which it moves; as, "the rays of light pass through the air." The relation between any thing continued, whether motion or rest, and the point of its beginning; as, "the rays of light proceed from the sun," "these figs came from Turkey," "that lamp hangs from the ceiling." The relation between any thing continued and the point to which it tends; as, "he is going to Italy," "he slept till morning." The relation between an effect and its cause; as, "I am sick of my husband and for my gallant."

Or metaphorical. For as those who are above others in place have generally the advantage over them, the prepositions which denote the one kind of superiority or in-

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1 These two articles have plurals: these is the plural of this, and those the plural of that. 2 Conjunctions and prepositions are indeed employed only to connect sentences and words; but it may be doubted whether they be parts of speech distinct from nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Grammar, superiority, are likewise employed to denote the other. Thus we say of a king, "he ruled over his people;" and of a soldier, "he served under such a general."

Interjections are a species of words which are found perhaps in all languages on earth, but which cannot be included in any of the classes above mentioned; for they are not subject to the rules or principles of grammar, as they contribute nothing to the communication of thought. They may be called a part of that natural language with which man is endowed, in common with other animals, to express or allay some very strong sensation; such as, ah! when he feels pain. In this view the interjection does not owe its characteristic expression to the arbitrary form of articulation, but to the tone of voice, and the modifications of countenance and of gesture with which it is uttered; it is therefore universally understood by all mankind. In discourse interjections are employed only when the suddenness or vehemence of some affection returns men to their natural state, and makes them for a moment forget the use of speech. In books they are thrown into sentences without altering their form either in syntax or in signification; and in English this is generally done with a very bad effect, though the writer no doubt employs them with a view to pathos or embellishment.

To the masterly and instructive treatise on the Theory of Language, which is here reprinted, it does not seem to be either necessary or desirable that any large supplement should now be added. Historical or Comparative Grammar—that special department of philology which traces the history of particular languages, and disentangles their mutual relations—has in the present age made vast advances, if it might not rather be said to be a science almost altogether new. But there has not, and could not have been, a similar progress in that first and fundamental department of philology on which Historical Grammar rests—the recent developments of Universal Grammar may safely be asserted not to have yet stretched, in any leading section, beyond points reached in the foregoing dissertation. It is true, indeed, that a science like Universal Grammar, directly dependent on mental laws, and on not a few mental laws which are far from having been satisfactorily evolved by the psychologists or metaphysicians themselves, cannot in all quarters be free from discrepancies of opinion. But, if there were here room or fit occasion for a systematic exposition of the relations between our article Grammar and the most modern phases of philological inquiry, both special and general, the commentary, fairly conducted, would make two things appear very clearly. On the one hand, the results of late investigations into the history of particular tongues, while they would give rise to very few corrections, and to none that are at all important, would exhibit many additional proofs and illustrations of doctrines taught in the article. On the other hand, a comparison with later attempts to develop the universal theory of language, would show that several doctrines, now so currently recognised as to be even trite, were propounded or proved for the first time, either in this treatise, or in the oral teaching of the distinguished thinker and philologist, from whose prelections its materials are announced as having been mainly derived.

One part only of Dr Hunter's philological system has the advantage of being published authoritatively in his own words; and, perhaps, in the preceding dissertation, this part is less clearly set forth than the rest; because his own enunciation of it was not made in print till late in his life, and because it involves several fine and peculiar steps of analysis. The part in question is his Theory of the Verb, which Grammar probably contains no doctrine not to be found in the foregoing pages, but which, nevertheless, should also be studied as a whole in his own statement of it. That statement, in the shape of an "Introductory Essay on the Moods and Tenses of the Greek and Latin Verb," is affixed to the several impressions of Dr Hunter's edition of Ruddiman's Latin Rudiments; and some specific illustrations from the tenses of the Greek verb appeared in the ninth volume of Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

A complete generalization of this Theory of the Verb, such as to fit it exactly to its place in a system of Universal Grammar, would be a very ambitious undertaking; while it would be liable to the risk of incorporating, with the opinions of the venerable scholar himself, others which might not really be his. A few sentences, however, attempting to explain the outline of the theory, may be useful as a clue to some of the views stated in the body of the article.

1. The separate consideration of the element of Time is the key to all the intricacies presented by the Verb.

2. Two only of the three possible Modes of Time are expressed directly by the verb. These are, the Present and the Past. Those forms of the verb which deal with the Future do not express it directly; they merely enable us to infer it. This is seen most easily through the auxiliary forms prevalent in such languages as our own. Our "will" expresses directly nothing more than resolution, and our "shall" nothing more than obligation; but futurity is naturally and necessarily inferred, in regard to the action or suffering to which the resolution or the obligation relates.

3. In all tenses of the verb Time is expressed, not Absolutely, but Relatively; that is, relatively to those two points, the present and the past. "If," says Dr Hunter, "we separate the Time from the other circumstances involved in those forms of the Greek and Latin verb called the Moods and Tenses, the Time thus separated, or separately attended to, will in every one of them be found to be either the Present or the Past. One primary object of those forms seems to have been, to give the present and the past as two fixed points of time, with a reference to which all the other ideas involved in them are to be estimated and determined. They are all past, present, future, contingent, &c., with reference to one or other of these two fixed points."

4. It is implied in the preceding propositions, that the Moods of the verb cannot be rightly analysed, until the relations of the Tenses have been clearly brought to light.

5. For the dissection of the Moods, however, a second principle is required, which may be stated broadly thus. That which forms the radical part of a verb into a Mood (a flexional termination in some languages, an auxiliary or group of auxiliaries in others) is commonly said to modify the radical part of the verb. But the opposite view is the correct one. The radical part of the verb modifies that by which it is formed into a mood; the radical part modifies the flexion or auxiliary. The Modal part of the expression really contains the leading assertion, whose varieties are thus comparatively few; the Radical part of the verb modifies and varies the meaning of the assertion, according to an indefinite multiplicity of occasions. Whatever opinion may be adopted as to the origin and history of the [Greek and Latin] Flexions, no doubt can be entertained that they are similar in their nature to our Auxiliaries; that the terminations contain the generic part of the expression, and are modified by the radical part of the verbs combined with them. Thus, in the expression "Amem, I may love," the generic assertion is made by "—em, I may;" and this assertion is specified by "Am—, love."

Besides classical and other illustrations of the inferential character of the future tense, the fact is curiously exemplified by our own mother-tongue. In the Anglo-Saxon verb, one and the same form does duty both as present and as future, the context determining which of the two is intended. 6. This analysis, when followed out to its consequences, is maintained to carry with it the doctrine, that there is only one true Mood, namely, the Indicative. Our English auxiliaries are again convenient as examples. "I am, or I am not; I do, or I do not;" expressions affirming or denying existence and action,—are readily admitted to be indicatives. But so, likewise, are expressions like these: "I may, or I may not; I can, or I cannot;" which affirm or deny liberty and power; and which affirm or deny liberty and power quite as positively as the other expressions affirm or deny action and existence. "To consider certain of those forms as exclusively Indicative or Assertive, and others as not so, seems to be founded completely in misapprehension, and tends to perplex and mislead. "I may write," "I might write," are equally Assertions as "I do write" and "I did write." The thing indicated or asserted is different; but, in so far as assertion is concerned, they are completely similar; they stand on precisely the same footing."

7. The result of the examination of the moods, in its application to the classical languages and our own, is, in skeleton, briefly this: Our common Auxiliary Verbs, "am, do, have, shall, will, may, can," assert, respectively, existence, action, possession, duty or obligation, volition, liberty or possibility, ability or power; "and they are all verbs of the present time or tense, each of them having a correspondent form appropriated to past time." The Flexional Forms of the Greek and Latin verbs imply or involve those auxiliaries, and contain the same assertions; and each of them "will be found, like the auxiliaries which they involve, to have two corresponding forms, the one predicating those attributes of the present time, the other of the past."

8. The manner in which this analysis of the moods is applied in detail to the modifications expressed by the tenses, will be best learned from Dr Hunter's own treatise. But, in the preceding article, in the section on the verb, the particulars are worked out with so much of general adherence to the principles just explained, that, with no further aid than these few general propositions, the application of the two laws jointly cannot be difficult.