the killing of a human being, is accidental, culpable, or justifiable.

**Accidental**, in law, implies not merely the absence of intention but of fault. A man employed at some lawful operation, and taking due care, is not responsible for unforeseen fatal consequences—as, if a gun burst; a child unexpectedly runs in the way of a carriage; or two friends wrestle for Homicide's amusement, and death ensues. Such death is excusable. It is sometimes termed a misadventure. In judging, after the event, of the degree of caution which should have been used, it would be unreasonable, in every case, to require the very utmost that was possible. If two men are felling a tree, which unexpectedly falls, and one of them is killed, or if a man lays aside his unloaded fowling-piece, and, in ignorance of its being reloaded, handles it and kills his friend, it may be easy to say what would have averted the calamity; but the law is not so exacting, seeing that, in the language of an English judge, "accidents of this lamentable kind may fall to the lot of the wisest and best of men." If, however, the neglect or inattention amounts in any degree to what a jury regard as reprehensible, the case becomes

**Culpable** homicide, or manslaughter, meaning not accidental, and yet not amounting to murder. Cases of this kind vary from the faintest degree of culpability deserving only of nominal punishment, to guilt of the deepest dye. In them there is the absence of the intention to kill, and yet the party is amenable to punishment on account either of carelessness or wrong doing. To administer wrong medicine, neglect a fence, leave a horse on the streets unattended, or to inflict bodily injury, may happen without any intention to kill; but, if death ensue, the obvious culpability, high or low as it may be, cannot, on account of the interests of the public, be allowed to go unpunished. The last of these cases approximates to murder. If a man go a step farther, intending to inflict some severe injury, reckless of the consequences, such as beating with the declared intention of just sparing the life, or giving violent medicine to a woman to procure abortion, and death ensues, it is murder.

**Murder** consists in acts committed with the intention of killing, or at least of inflicting some grievous bodily injury which obviously puts life in hazard, followed by death; as, if a man strike another on the head with a hatchet, or treat him with such cruelty as denotes utter indifference whether he die or not, and he die. To chastise an infant excessively, regardless of his cries and the remonstrances of bye-standers; to shoot, intending to kill one person, and hit another; to fire a loaded gun along a street on which people are passing, though aiming at no one in particular; to cut the rope of a scaffold, by which a man is precipitated from a great height; and many such cases, where life is lost—have been found to amount to murder, as they show a determination either to kill or to do a serious wrong at the hazard of all consequences. The nature of the weapons, or means employed, such as a knife, a gun, or poison, are often conclusive; and when such is the case, jurors should, according to their oaths, do their duty to the law and to their country. Where the crime is proved, it is not sufficient to say that the manslayer was excited to frenzy by some fancied wrong or inadequate cause, and acted with little premeditation, because he was bound to maintain the mastery of his passions,—though no doubt his moral guilt is exceeded by that of the assassin, who, for hire or revenge, waylays and stabs his victim. On the other hand, if it appear that a man acted under a sudden impulse, occasioned by some intolerable wrong, he will not be held guilty. On the contrary, the killing will be regarded either as culpable or justifiable homicide, according to its circumstances. For example, if a man be unwarrantably assaulted with violence and indignity, as, by a horse whip, pulling his nose, or the like, and he inflict, in the sudden transport of passion so excited, a mortal wound on his assailant, the killing will be attributed to human frailty, rather than to recklessness or malice, and may be regarded merely as culpable homicide; but he will not be allowed after the assault is over to take satisfaction at his own hand, and kill his assailant. To do so is to commit murder. In no case will the law, after almost the briefest Homicide. lapse of time, permit the indulgence of revenge. An adulterer, detected by the husband in the act, may be killed; but if he escape, and be afterwards met and killed by the husband, such killing is murder. The shortest interval, after any provocation, destroys such a defense; as, if a man, injured even to the effusion of blood, should search for a gun, and follow and shoot the party who had assaulted him; because the interval afforded an opportunity for the exercise of reason, and the law could have been appealed to.

An English judge expressed what is the law both of England and Scotland when he said, "in all possible cases homicide, upon a principle of revenge, is murder." One thing is quite fixed, that as contumelious words will not justify blows, so neither will blows with the hand justify the use of a knife, or other lethal weapon. Wherever the use of a lethal weapon is not justified by dire necessity, in order to preserve a man's own life, killing by its use is murder. Accordingly, the law both of England and Scotland agree in this, that no attempt to steal or to trespass will justify a man whose life is not in imminent hazard, in the taking of life. On a similar principle, to kill a poacher, or to place a spring-gun to protect a garden, and it kills, is murder. It would, indeed, be strange if the law permitted a private party to take the life of another, for an offence which, on conviction after a legal trial, it would not punish with a penalty so dreadful.

To warrant a conviction, it is necessary that death result directly from the injury, or from its natural, and not remote or merely probable consequences. If a wounded man die from grossly erroneous treatment, or from unnecessarily exposing a wound, so as to irritate it into a mortal complaint, it would be hard to visit his assailant with the penalty of murder. On the other hand, if the wound be the direct cause of death, though if a surgeon could have been got on the instant, the life would probably have been spared, the assailant must take the consequences, because he had no right to put life in hazard; and, on the same principle, it is murder to kill a man apparently dying from some mortal disease, because no man has a right to abridge the life of another even by a moment, or to cut off the feeblest chance of recovery.

It is not necessary, in order to warrant a conviction, that a man perpetrate murder with his own hand. If he hire or assist another to commit it, or if he furnish the means, or watch for the protection of the murderer while the crime is being committed, he is, both in law and in reason, accessory to the commission of the crime, and is most rightfully amenable to punishment as a murderer.

The appropriate punishment of murder is death. Long before the moral law was given from Sinai, the Divine Being declared that "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed;" and we think that the natural dictate of the well-regulated mind is to repel the sophistries by which this solemn declaration is sometimes sought to be evaded. So repulsive is murder to the Great Author of life, that, under the law which He gave to Moses, He allowed no sacrifice to be provided, nor ransom to be taken, for the life of a murderer—and even the accidental manslayer was compelled, for the safety of his own life, to remain within one of the cities of refuge while the high priest of the time was alive. It is sometimes questioned whether capital punishment should take place publicly, or within the precincts of the prison, in presence of a number of witnesses provided to attest its execution. The latter opinion is approved by some, as having a less hardening tendency on the minds of the populace. To remove the felon from the bar of earthly judgment, to immure him within the walls of the prison, from which he is not to return alive, and to detain him till the determinate moment at which he shall find himself at the bar of the Judge of all the earth, may produce in the minds of the thoughtless something more fearfully solemn than the parade of a public execution, during which, in our sympathy for the sufferer, his crimes may be forgotten. But however that question may be settled, and so long as the Homicide declaration of the Divine Being, "I will put my laws into their mind, and write them on their hearts," is respected by his creatures, we believe that the punishment of death for the most fearful of all crimes cannot be relaxed without multiplying the number of victims hurried into eternity, without even the murderer's privilege of time to prepare for their final account.

The punishment for manslaughter or culpable homicide is, fine, imprisonment, or transportation, in the discretion of the judge according to the degree of guilt; and the offender is further left to the issue of an action of law for civil reparation at the instance of the widow and next of kin of the person whom he has killed.

Homicide is justifiable when it is occasioned by unavoidable necessity. Illustrations of this are daily afforded by soldiers and sailors in battle, or in the necessary defence, when on duty, of their post or their arms—judges pronouncing, and inferior officers executing legal sentences of death—and magistrates or other officers killing when such is the only mean of suppressing a riot or breach of the peace. In the case of private individuals also, the infliction of death becomes justifiable when no other means of defence remain against highway robbery, housebreaking under night, or assaults involving danger of life, or in the case of a woman as a last resource in defence of her chastity. The justification, however, will only avail when matters have come to an extremity—and certainly not either before the danger has reached that point, or after it has passed away. If the danger be over, killing becomes revenge, and is justly regarded as murder. Even the clearest necessity of killing in defence will be unavailing, if it was brought about by a man's own criminality, as by his culpably irritating and rousing another by wanton and unwarrantable provocation or cruelty to attack him. It becomes, therefore, always of importance to ascertain all the circumstances connected with the beginning and progress of an assault, and by whom the first blow was given.

Very delicate questions have arisen in the cases of officers of the law bound on behalf of the public to execute a legal warrant. Their position is different from that of private individuals, in this respect, that they incur responsibility if they fail to do their duty. Of course, if in the discharge of their duty their lives are brought into peril, they are justified, like any private individual, in killing; but they differ from private individuals in this, that they may be required to do the very thing, under the sanction of law, that puts their lives in danger. If persons in a smuggling vessel do not desist from attempting to escape when hailed by a known revenue cutter, it is lawful to enforce compliance by firing, for in such a case the fleeing to defraud the revenue is just that resistance which it is the duty of the officers of the law to overcome by the only means in their power. But if, on coming in contact with those whom they are required to apprehend, they be the first to resort to lethal weapons, or if, under any circumstances, they use them unnecessarily, they will be liable for the consequences. It is murder for an officer to kill a person flying from the execution of a civil process, or even of a criminal warrant for an offence not capital, or for an assault not at the time known to involve danger of life. It is only the deep interest which the public has in the punishment of those who commit the highest crimes, that justifies an officer armed with a criminal warrant (if indeed the law of Scotland will justify him) in killing such a criminal when fleeing, who might otherwise altogether escape. The requirements of military law are necessarily more strict, but these may be noticed in another place.

In the preceding remarks we have abstained from taking any notice of the absurd and criminal practice of duelling, that subject having been already fully treated. See Duela. Homily (ὁμιλία, an assembly), a plain and homely discourse upon some point of religious faith or duty. This nature was adopted in the church to indicate the practical discourses as contrasted with the speculative and purely ostentatious harangues of the philosophic schools.

All the homilies of the Greek and Latin fathers are from the pens of bishops, because, in the first ages, they alone were permitted to preach. The privilege was not ordinarily allowed to priests till towards the fifth century. St Chrysostom was the first presbyter who preached regularly. Origen and St Augustin also preached, but it was by a peculiar license or privilege.

Photius distinguishes a homily from a sermon in this, that the homily was delivered in a more familiar manner, the prelate interrogating and talking to the people, and they in their turn answering and interrogating him, so that it was properly a conversation; whilst the sermon was spoken continuously in the pulpit, after the manner of the orators.

The practice of compiling homilies, which were to be committed to memory, and recited by ignorant or indolent priests, commenced towards the close of the eighth century, when Charlemagne ordered Paulus Diaconus and Alcuin to form homilies or discourses upon the Gospels and Epistles, from the ancient doctors of the church. This gave rise to the famous collection entitled the Homiliarium of Charlemagne, which, being followed as a model in many productions of the same kind, composed by private persons, contributed much to nourish the indolence, and to perpetuate the ignorance, of a worthless clergy.

The English book of homilies is a collection of plain sermons on the doctrines of the gospel, especially with a view to illustrate the principles of the Reformation. The first part was published by Cranmer during the reign of Edward VI.; and the second was added by order of Convocation during the reign of Elizabeth.

HOMEOPATHY, a system of medical practice, introduced by Samuel Hahnemann into Germany in the end of last century, and having, in the present day, adherents in most European countries. The homopathic system was reduced by its founder to a very simple expression, or elementary therapeutical law, similia similibus curantur—i.e., let like things be treated by like. In other words, it is asserted that a disease, having certain external manifestations or symptoms, is to be treated by the administration of a remedy, or a succession of remedies, which have the power of originating similar symptoms in the healthy body. The name Homoeopathy (from the two Greek words ἰκός, like, and μόδος, a morbid state, or perhaps from the compound word ὁμοιομορφεύων, a similarity of feeling), is expressive of this relation between the effects of the remedy and those of the disease for which it is presumed to be a cure. Hahnemann was fond of contrasting the simplicity of the homopathic system with the complexity of the prevailing medical doctrines, which, he alleged, instead of following the indications of nature by regarding disease as a collection of symptoms, was engaged in a fruitless search into its proximate or essential causes; remedies being administered, not from their bearing any relation to the evident symptoms, but from a presumed power over the hidden causes of disease. The system so characterized, Hahnemann termed allopathy, or allopathy (from ἀλλος, different, and πάθος). He admitted also another possible therapeutical system, viz., Antipathy (from ἀντί, opposed to, and πάθος), comprising those cases in which a remedy was selected on account of its producing in the healthy body symptoms of a kind opposed to those of the disease. Of this method, Hahnemann professed to find numerous examples in the practice of medicine in all ages. He even found it laid down as a rule (contraria contrariis curantur) in some of the Hippocratic writings, and constantly refers to it as an established method against which he protested as fallacious, ineffective, or, at Homoeopathy, only palliative. Homoeopathy, according to Hahnemann, is not merely a more certain or more effective method of cure than either of these competing systems; it is, on the contrary, the only method by which disease ever has been, or ever can be, truly eradicated by art. It is in theory a universal as well as an exclusive method; and all the other principles on which medical men have from time immemorial been accustomed to act in the treatment of disease stand condemned by its acceptance.

It would be easy to show that with Hahnemann himself the homoeopathic theory was expressly set forth as waging an internecine war with all previous medical doctrine. The vilification of ancient and contemporary medicine as a system or a science, and the almost equally unlimited condemnation of its results as an art, form in fact the key to his doctrine, the corner-stone of his system. Medicine is to him a "fatal art," which has never, except by accident, rendered a service to suffering humanity. It can be continuously practised only by those whose conscience is seared, and whose mental discrimination is destroyed by long-continued persistence in mischief; in all others, it reduces itself to the administration of placeboes without efficacy, and of which the best that can be said is that they do little harm. But it was inconsistent with the justice and mercy of Divine Providence to leave mankind in this miserable plight. The discovery of a sure and simple way of treating all diseases must be possible, if God is a beneficent being, and not a ruthless tyrant. Now, there are only three possible ways of using remedies. For, firstly, all that we know of diseases, and of remedial agents, is founded on a knowledge of their palpable effects or symptoms; and, secondly, the symptoms of the remedy (its effects upon the sound body) must be either similar to (similia similibus), or opposite to (contraria contrariis), or different altogether from, those of the disease. Of the systems founded on these data, the last two alone have been hitherto tried; and multiplied experience having proved that allopathy and antipathy are equally erroneous and equally destructive, homoeopathy follows as an inevitable consequence; and was thus, in fact, as Dr Henderson says, reasoned out by Hahnemann "before a single testing experiment had been tried."

We carefully avoid exaggerating, though undoubtedly we greatly condense, the argument of Hahnemann, as it appears in several of his works, when we thus state it. Were we to enter on what might be called the metaphysics of his system, we should greatly exceed our limits; still more so were we to devote any space to the consideration of individual instances, or to the quotation of individual passages. It must be apparent to any intelligent reader, that the system blocked out above is that of a fanatic, not of a severe inquirer into nature; that it begins and ends in assumptions, of which it is difficult to say whether the first or the last be the more extravagant. It is surely not too much to suppose, in opposition to Hahnemann, that an art which has existed, and has been accumulating the elements, at least, of science, in the experience of several thousand years; which has laboured assiduously wherever there has been sickness and suffering, with certainly not less of disinterested feeling, and certainly not more of wickedness or of stupidity among its professors, than falls to the common lot of humanity in almost all professions and callings—that such an art may have had some little foundation in truth, some glimpses of principle, some insight into the laws which regulate the human frame in health and disease. Equally certain is it that these principles and laws have not been asserted (like those from which Hahnemann endeavours to deduce his philosophy) to be final and universal. If the choice be only between "allopathy" or "antipathy" and "homoeopathy," as Hahnemann asserts, we feel little disposition to pronounce any comparative opinion; but we place ourselves readily on the side of limited but reasonable knowledge, and experience tried by ages, against extravagant credulity and bombastic self-assertion.

The writings of Hahnemann are, for the most part, violent and outrageous polemics, not always without plausibility, against the systems which he caricatures under the names of allopathy and antipathy, followed or accompanied by statements of an equally extravagant kind in favour of the law "similia similibus curantur," which he everywhere treats as a pure and unaltered truth, admitting neither of qualification nor of question. The practitioners who act upon an uncertain or imperfect apprehension of this truth, and who attempt, in any degree, to reconcile their practice with the traditional doctrines of the art, Hahnemann treats with a contempt and dislike to which even his dislike of allopathy itself is obliged to yield. This "bastard homoeopathy" is, in his view, as discreditable as it is dangerous. Those who practise it are in no sense homoeopaths, and are deserving of the strongest condemnation. It is a crime against homoeopathy to give even the semblance of an allopathic remedy; and Hahnemann does not hesitate to confess that he has on this account given up the use of some of those simple palliatives, whose value he had attested by his own experience before he embraced homoeopathy, but whose use he considered as being at once superseded by the new system, and inconsistent with its principles.

A system like this must of course be tried as a whole. It must stand or fall by its own tests. If true, it demands nothing less than that all previous systems shall give way to it. But, on the other hand, if it errs in one point, it is guilty of all. Hence the question between the homoeopaths and their opponents cannot be settled by an array of instances on the one hand, or an array of authorities on the other. A thousand instances of like curing like will not prove the law universal in the face of half a dozen opposing facts. But all the authorities in the world will not disprove homoeopathy, unless they can succeed in establishing a system or a fact which is at variance with it.

Tried by this simple issue, the strength and the weakness of homoeopathy (or at least of Hahnemann's homoeopathy) are at once apparent. Its strength lies in the confessed inability of ordinary medicine to oppose to it any system as simple, and apparently as complete, as its own; its weakness, in the total insufficiency of its alleged instances to support the enormity of the postulate. To the mind which must at all hazards have a complete and universal system, it may be conceded that homoeopathy is no worse than any other, and, in connection with its ordinary practice of infinitesimal doses, less hurtful than many systems. But to the mind which regards all systems as subject to the rigid criticism of facts homoeopathy must ever appear one of the most unfounded and monstrous of delusions.

In saying that "like cures like" Hahnemann uses a form of expression which (especially in Latin) bears a very respectable resemblance to the enunciation of a great natural law. But examine that expression, and, still better, try it by instances. What is "like," and what unlike? Polonius thought that Hamlet's cloud was like a camel, a weasel, and a whale, in turn; it was probably as like the one as the other. One man sees a likeness between certain members of a family; another cannot see it; a third sees it at one time, and fails at another. In one sense all men are more or less alike; in another infinitely varied and dissimilar. In the region of ideas, the poet and the wit equally see resemblances which duller minds fail to appreciate. The naturalist discovers likeness in those objects which to the ordinary sense are the most dissimilar; while flowers and minerals, birds and fishes—so like that the common eye cannot distinguish them from each other, or can distinguish them only with effort and by dint of instruction—are found to be placed far apart among the genera and species of the careful and analytic observer. In short, no feature of objects is more liable to be differently appreciated from different points of view, and by different minds, than precisely this one of external resemblance.

The force of this argument, in its application to the homoeopathic law, is all the greater that Hahnemann does not admit identity between the symptoms of the disease and the effects of the remedy as constituting a reason for its therapeutical employment. On the contrary, identity is destructive of the alleged homoeopathic action, which is found to exist only in connection with great similarity. But it may well be asked if absolute identity be not, in such a case, merely the greatest possible amount of similarity.

It is well known to the man of science that nothing is so apt to mislead the mind as the tracing of analogies. Yet the whole basis of the law, similia similibus curantur, is nothing but a series of analogies so vague, and sometimes so preposterous, that in any department of natural history they would be rejected as unworthy the name of science. The truth of this assertion will be admitted by almost any man (not being a professed homoeopathist), who will examine the assertions recorded in regard to only a few articles of the homoeopathic materia medica. But as our limits forbid this inquiry, it may suffice for the present to mention that a large proportion of Hahnemann's instances of the homoeopathic law are adduced from the writings of physicians who not only were unaware of the resemblance between the symptoms of the remedy and those of the disease, but, according to Hahnemann, prescribed those very remedies upon the antipathic or allopathic principle. Were it true (as it is not) that ordinary medical practice was founded on either of these alleged principles, there would be little or no difficulty in defending one or both of them by a reference to the very same remedies and the very same diseases as are adduced by Hahnemann to prove the homoeopathic law. But in placing his so-called therapeutical law upon a basis of mere analogy, Hahnemann has scarcely betrayed a greater misconception of true science than he has of medical history, in ascribing to his opponents a practice founded on "allopathy" or "antipathy"—names as entirely unknown to medical science as "homoeopathy" itself.

It may safely be alleged that the favour shown to homoeopathy as a system by a certain portion of the public depends much more on the supposed success of its practice than upon the validity of the evidence adduced in support of its law. Homoeopathy is embraced, not as a philosophical truth, but as a method of dealing with the minor ills which flesh is heir to, certainly much more agreeable, and presumed to be not less safe, than that of ordinary physic.

This idea is not entirely without foundation, if ordinary physic be conceived to be nothing else but a succession of bleedings, purgings, and blisterings. That medical resources have often been abused, and that a large amount of suffering and inconvenience, if not of disease and death, have sprung from the too active use of remedies having acknowledged power both for good and for evil, no one will be disposed to deny. The employment of infinitesimal or very minute doses by the homoeopathist has undoubtedly tended to make that system the natural refuge of those who have suffered from the visiva diligentia medic. And as a very considerable portion of diseases require little else than dietetic and hygienic means for their cure, when cure is possible, even the pure homoeopathist does not always fail so notoriously as to discredit his system. Many diseases, besides, are well known to be self-cureative; as the most ancient and celebrated of the Greeks has expressed it, "Our natures are the physicians of our diseases." And in those cases which plainly require the assistance of active remedies there are now-a-days few homoeopathists who are not found willing to cast aside their system so far as to employ at least the simpler and safer varieties of active drugs after a fashion confessedly not homoeopathic. With such practitioners, homoeopathy, with its infinitesimal doses, qualified by the administration of active drugs in cases of emergency, becomes merely ordinary practice reduced to the minimum of activity; and, as such, may be a much better practice than the opposite extreme. But, on the other hand, such "bastard homoeopathy" would, as we have seen above, have been most severely condemned by Hahnemann. It is, in fact, homoeopathy in nothing but the name.

The doctrine, or rather the practice, of infinitesimal doses, is undoubtedly one of the most curious aspects of homoeopathy, as it is one of the most singular phases of human opinion in matters medical. The ordinary and universal persuasion that remedial substances act upon the system in something like a direct proportion to the quantity in which they are introduced into it, is not indeed opposed by Hahnemann, so far as the physiological effects of these substances are concerned. It is not denied that one hundred grains of arsenic, for instance, are more likely to kill than the hundredth part of one grain. But it is maintained that the powers of remedies over disease are so distinct from all their physiological, and, indeed, all their material properties, as not to be subject to the same conditions of increase and diminution. The curative property of a remedy is, according to Hahnemann, developed in a much higher degree by an inconceivably minute than by a palpable dose. The latter, indeed, interferes directly with the cure; because the symptoms developed by the remedy, being similar to those of the disease, invariably tend to its aggravation in a degree corresponding with the amount of the dose and its homoeopathicity. It was, indeed, this constant aggravation of the disease under homoeopathic remedies which first led Hahnemann to reduce his doses to impalpable quantities as an indispensable condition of safety in their use. So bigoted was he to his system that he did not see even in this contradictory result of his own experience an argument against his alleged universal law!

The extent of these infinitesimal dilutions is such as to be inconceivable by the human intellect; they can only be expressed in the technical abbreviations of the arithmetician, and even then are with difficulty carried in the memory. Thus in the thirtieth dilution one grain of the resulting liquid contains one decillionth of a grain of the remedy, or $10^{30}$ parts of the whole. If one entire grain of medicine were thus diluted, it may be shown, by accurate mathematical computation, that the quantity of fluid required for the purpose would form an ocean one hundred and forty billion times as large as our whole planetary system; or if a solid substance were used, so that a single globule might contain a decillionth of a grain of the remedy, the original grain thus diluted with inert matter would be equal in weight to "one hundred and forty billion spherical masses extending from limit to limit of Neptune's orbit," or to "many hundred spheres, each with a semidiameter or radius extending from the earth to the nearest fixed star." With which calculations from Dr Simpson's work on homoeopathy, revised and corrected as they are by Professor Kelland, we trust our readers will be satisfied. Yet the homoeopathic dilutions recommended by some of the more modern homoeopaths far exceed the thirtieth in minuteness; and Hahnemann himself often recommended the simple smelling (olfaction) of a globule diluted as above!

Hahnemann was born in 1756, at Meissen, on the Elbe, near Dresden. His father was a painter on porcelain; and his early education, as well as his medical studies, were pursued under considerable pecuniary pressure. He began thus early the occupation which for a long time afterwards was one of his chief sources of emolument, viz., translating from the English. He graduated at Erlangen in 1779, and soon after this he commenced practice and married. He did not at first succeed in gaining public confidence; and Homonyme indeed, for a good many years before the great arcana was discovered he had almost no actual practice, and occupied himself chiefly with translations, and with chemistry, of which latter science he made some useful and profitable applications. He himself said, years afterwards, that he had retired from practice from conscientious motives, finding that he could not reconcile the responsibilities of medicine with his scepticism as to the remedies in use. It is rather inconsistent with this view of the matter, however, that he was busily engaged in propagating with his pen those very therapeutical doctrines which he thought it a sin to apply in practice. He was still translating very largely, and in 1790 was engaged on Cullen's *Materia Medica*, which had appeared in England the previous year. During that previous year, too, he had written his original work *On Syphilis, and on the Mercurius Solubilis Hahnemanni*, a work which presents no trace of scepticism, but, on the contrary, an all-devouring faith in the drugs then in use. It was from Cullen's *Materia Medica* that he obtained the suggestion as to the homoeopathic use of Peruvian bark. After some temporary engagements he removed to Königsfluter to begin practice in 1795. He continued as before to be a copious writer, and in 1796 produced his first attempt to expound the homoeopathic law. In 1799 his practice of dispensing his own medicines brought him into collision with the apothecaries of the place, who managed to bring the laws to bear on a method of practice so much opposed to their vested interests as tradesmen. The consequence was that Hahnemann left Königsfluter, and that the unjust restrictions to which his practice had been subjected produced the usual fruit of persecution—sympathy and notoriety, both for the man and for the doctrines, which he now began to put forward with a bolder front than hitherto. From Königsfluter he went to several places in succession, and ended by settling in Leipzig in 1810. In this year he published the *Organon der Heilkunst*; and in the next a volume on *Materia Medica*, containing numerous "proving" of drugs on himself and on others. The completion of this work occupied him till 1821. He became at Leipzig a successful practitioner, and let it only in consequence of a persecution like that to which he was subjected at Königsfluter. He next went to Anhalt-Coethen, where the reigning prince was one of his warm partizans. He remained here, occupied with practice and with his pen, till 1835, when, at the age of eighty, he married a second time, or rather was married and carried off to Paris by an enthusiastic young lady, Mlle. Mélanie d'Herville, who was anxious to secure for the French capital the benefits of homoeopathy and the person of its founder. He died at Paris on the 2d July 1843, having engaged in a large practice during the eight years he resided there, in which he was assisted by his wife and daughter. Madame Hahnemann continued to practise homoeopathy after the death of her husband, notwithstanding an attempt in the French courts of law to restrain her as an unlicensed practitioner; on which occasion she received the powerful support, in the Chamber of Deputies, of M. Montalembert, who argued, in a speech of great eloquence and power, against restrictions on medical practice.