In civilized countries some solemnities are usually employed to mark the constitution of this relationship. The Council of Trent made it a religious ceremony. In Lord Stowell's opinion it was not necessarily so in England prior to the Act of Geo. II.; and it certainly has not necessarily been so in Scotland since the Reformation. Into the past history of the subject we do not propose to enter. At present the marriage law of England is regulated chiefly by two statutes—the 4th Geo. IV. c. 76, and 6th and 7th Will. IV. c. 85. By the last of these it is enacted, that after the 1st March 1837, all the rules prescribed by the Rubrick should continue to be duly observed by every person in holy orders of the Church of England who should solemnize any marriage in England (the right of the Archbishop of Canterbury, or other person having authority to grant licences to marry at any convenient time and place, being reserved); while Quakers and Jews are allowed to contract marriage according to their respective usages, provided both the contracting parties be Quakers, or both profess the Jewish religion. One of the parties must give notice of their intention to the superintendent registrar of the district within which they have dwelt for seven preceding days, or if they have dwelt in the districts of different superintendent registrars, the like notice must be given to each. These officers are then required to preserve and enter a copy of the notices in the "marriage notice book," which is open to the public without charge; and after seven days, if the marriage is to be solemnized by licence, or after twenty-one days, if without licence, a certificate is issued authorizing the marriage, one of the parties having first made oath or affirmation of belief that there is not any lawful hindrance, and that the statements contained in the notice are correct.

Any person, duly authorized, may forbid the issue of the certificate by writing the word "forbidden" opposite the entry in the marriage notice book; in which event the superintendent registrar can issue no certificate until he be satisfied that the objection is unfounded. If he have doubt, the matter is referred to the registrar-general, who has power to decide; or if the superintendent refuses to grant licence, there is an appeal to the registrar-general, who either confirms the refusal, or directs the licence to be issued.

Without attention to these particulars no marriage can be solemnized in England. If not celebrated within three months after the notice, the notice, entry, and certificate must be renewed. The certificate of the superintendent, or where the parties live in different districts, the certificate of the superintendent of each, is delivered to the officiating minister if the marriage is to be solemnized according to the rites of the Church of England; or to the registering officer of the Quakers, or officer of a synagogue, who may solemnize the marriage in the registered building mentioned in the notice. When parties choose, they may dispense with a clergyman, and be married according to any form they please, provided the marriage take place between 8 and 12 o'clock in the forenoon, in presence of a registrar and witnesses, and provided each of the parties in some part of the ceremony declare that they do not know any impediment to their union, and expressly call upon the persons present to witness the proceedings. The parties may also be married in this manner, after the proper notice and certificate, in the office and presence of the superintendent registrar; and they have always the option of the parish church of either of them. It is further enacted that "every person who shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize any marriage in England, except by special licence, in any other place than a church or chapel in which marriages may be solemnized according to the rites of the Church of England, or than the registered building or office specified in the notice and certificate as aforesaid, shall be guilty of felony" (except in the case of a marriage between two Quakers, or two persons of the Jewish religion); "and every person who, in any such registered building or office, shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize any marriage in the absence of a registrar of the district in which such registered building or office is situated, shall be guilty of felony; and every person who shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize any marriage in England (except by licence) within twenty-one days after the entry of the notice to the superintendent registrar, as

Husband and Wife, aforesaid, or if the marriage is by licence within seven days after such entry, or after three calendar months after such entry, shall be guilty of felony." And any marriage solemnized in disregard of the statute is null and void; and in the case of a fraudulent marriage, the guilty party forfeits all the property that would otherwise have accrued to such party by the marriage. After the ceremony the marriage must be registered.

In Scotland, since the Reformation, a regular marriage is constituted by a proclamation of banns in the churches of the parishes in which the parties reside, of which a register is kept, and by the acceptance by the parties of each other before a clergyman, who pronounces the nuptial benediction in presence of witnesses. Till comparatively a late period, none but the Episcopal clergy, by 10th Anne, c. 7, could celebrate a marriage in Scotland, other than a minister of the Established Church. By 4th and 5th Will. IV., c. 28, this privilege was extended to "any person in holy orders, of whatever communion he may be," after proclamation of banns. If any other party celebrate a marriage, or if a clergyman do so without proclamation of banns, unless he appear to have been deceived, he is liable by the act 1661, c. 34, to banishment from Scotland, and by 1698, c. 6, to fine and imprisonment. Parties may go before a justice of peace to effect a marriage, but he is only entitled to certify that they declared themselves in his presence to be married; if he proceed further, and assume the ministerial office by pronouncing the nuptial benediction, he is liable in the penalties of the statute. By the statute 17th and 18th Vict., c. 80, it is provided that in all cases of regular marriage, the certificates of proclamation of banns, accompanied by a copy of a schedule given in the statute, shall be delivered to the officiating minister, or person solemnizing a marriage according to the rites of Jews and Quakers, to be filled up with the particulars required for registration, and signed by the contracting parties, minister or other person officiating, and witnesses; and within three days afterwards this schedule must be transmitted, under a penalty, for registration to the registrar of the parish within which the marriage was solemnized. If requested, the registrar is bound, on payment of a small fee, to attend at any place within his parish, for the purpose of making the entries, or seeing that they are properly made; and the marriage may be celebrated by the minister or pastor of a Christian congregation of any denomination. There is a provision in the statute for registering a marriage in the case of persons convicted before any justice of peace or magistrate of having contracted an irregular one; as well as a marriage declared by the sentence of any competent court, such registration being made in the parish where the conviction occurs, or of the domicile of the parties; but by an omission the act makes no provision for the registration of those irregular marriages, numerous in Scotland, of which there is neither any conviction before a magistrate, nor any decree of declarator.

As this statute expressly declares that the Scotch law of marriage shall not be affected by it, it is necessary to notice as briefly as possible what is essential to the constitution of marriage in Scotland. In doing so we may premise, that in order to be binding, and to secure all the rights of a legal marriage, it is not necessary that it should be what is called a regular one. By a long unbroken series of decisions confirmed by the House of Peers, it is established that the simple acceptance of the parties as husband and wife, without the prescribed ecclesiastical solemnities, and without any ceremony whatever, constitutes a legal marriage. That acceptance may be proved in various ways:—1. By express words; 2. By a promise to marry, followed by sexual intercourse; or 3. By conjugal cohabitation and acknowledgment.

The acceptance must be given seriously and voluntarily by legally qualified persons. Pupils (that is, boys under 14, and girls under 12 years of age), idiots, and persons in a state of intoxication, are incapable of giving consent; persons within the forbidden degrees, impotent, or bound by a previous and existing marriage, are legally disqualified; and the most express acceptance, though followed by consummation, if extorted by force or fear, is unavailing. Even when consent is apparently free from all objections, and expressed in the most regular manner, the law still views it in connection with every circumstance in the conduct of the parties which may explain or throw light on its true meaning. Accordingly, the acceptance contained in an antenuptial contract of marriage, wherever it is accompanied by the usual clause binding the parties to solemnize the marriage in a formal manner, is construed as amounting only to a promise which cannot be enforced, though it may be the foundation of an action of damages. Some objections, well founded at the time, may be removed by subsequent voluntary cohabitation. For example, parties going through a form of marriage in pupilarity, or under compulsion, will be bound by it if they voluntarily continue the cohabitation after passing pupilarity, or regaining unrestrained freedom. The subsequent discovery of previous profligacy, or error as to rank, name, temper, legitimacy, religion, or deception as to fortune, or non-consent of parents or guardians, will not invalidate a Scotch marriage. Indeed, nothing short of an absolute mistake as to identity will have that effect; and even then, cohabitation after the mistake is discovered will render the marriage irrevocable.

In regard to the evidence that a de praesenti consent was interchanged, we may observe—

1. That it may be proved directly—(1.) by witnesses swearing to the formal and serious verbal acceptance before a clergyman or friends; or by deliberate and explicit verbal acknowledgment of the parties that they were at some former period married to each other. (2.) It may be proved by writing, followed by delivery, provided the writing be either holograph of the parties, or be executed before witnesses, like other important documents; or at least that it be proved that the writing or subscription is genuine. And, (3.) It may be proved judicially, by the one party referring to the oath of the other, who either fails to deny it, or declines to swear. And it is of no consequence that the consent was secretly exchanged, if there be nothing else to discredit it. In some Scotch burghs the discreditable practice exists of presenting a complaint to the magistrates, praying that the parties be fined for having contracted an irregular marriage. The parties (who are the collusive promoters of the complaint) then confess the charge, and are fined in a nominal sum; and this procedure forms legal evidence that they were married. The equally discreditable Gretna Green marriage rests on the same acknowledgment.

As showing how completely the mere interchange of present consent, without any particular ceremony, constitutes in Scotland a valid marriage, we may mention that in a Scotch case, holograph and signed documents, "I hereby declare that Johanna Gordon is my lawful wife," and "I hereby acknowledge John Dalrymple as my lawful husband," were sustained in the House of Peers; Lord Stowell declaring that such a contract, without consummation, "does ipso facto et ipso jure constitute the relation of man and wife." As the most explicit declaration of marriage must be mutual, a document found in the repositories of either to which the other was no party is obviously worthless, unless connected with other circumstances. Thus a letter, containing on its envelope, "not to be opened till after the decease of George Fullarton," found in his repositories after his death, was disregarded, in respect that it was revocable while undelivered. A similar letter delivered to a third party, and connected with other circumstances implying the woman's recognition of it in her husband's lifetime, was

sustained, the delivery being held to have been for her behoof. A course of letters between the parties, which commenced "dear wife," and "dear husband," and ended "your affectionate husband," or "wife," although they contained no explicit declaration of marriage, were found by the House of Peers to be equally conclusive. In the case of M'Adam, affirmed in the House of Peers in 1809, it was found sufficient, that the man called four servants and declared to them verbally that the woman was his wife, and that his children by her were legitimate; on which she gave him her hand, and curtsied; though in a few hours afterwards he committed suicide. As there was no evidence of insanity, Lord Eldon remarked that no subsequent repentance, however bitter, could affect a marriage once constituted. A different judgment is given wherever circumstances warrant the opinion expressed by the House of Peers in the case of Taylor, 1787, that what the parties did "was not intended, or understood to be final," as was most remarkably illustrated in the case of McGregor and Jolly, where the House of Peers disregarded a formal ceremony of marriage before a clergyman, on the ground that, looking to all the circumstances in "the conduct of the parties, both before and after the 23rd May 1816" (the date of the ceremony), they did not "voluntarily and deliberately express that real and mutual consent," which is required. Some of these circumstances were, that McGregor never claimed the woman as his wife till many years afterwards, when she succeeded to a fortune, he having in the interval approved of her marriage with another, by whom she had children, and visited and acknowledged them as husband and wife.

2. The requisite consent may be proved inferentially—by a promise to marry, followed by sexual intercourse. Intercourse may be proved by witnesses, but the promise can only be proved by "writ or oath." It was at one time held that circumstances inferring that a promise had been given—such as an open courtship—might be proved by witnesses; but that doctrine is now exploded, and nothing short of a distinct promise can be founded on. Most conditions added to a promise—such as, "I will marry you when my circumstances permit"—are held to be discharged by the subsequent intercourse. The general rule is, that conditions of such a nature as cannot be fulfilled until after the copula,—as, for example, "I promise to marry you, provided an heir be born of our connexion,"—will not constitute marriage; while, if they might be fulfilled before the copula,—as "I promise to marry you when I am rich enough,"—the law will presume that they were either fulfilled or discharged at the date of the copula. Either party may pursue an action to have such a marriage declared. It is no objection to it that the intercourse existed prior as well as subsequent to the promise; because a party may have resolved to discontinue an unlawful course of life, and so have obtained the promise. Undoubtedly, if the interval between it and the subsequent intercourse be very long, or if circumstances indicate that the promise was renounced (such as the unchaste conduct with others of the party founding on it), it will be disregarded; and, generally speaking, whatever is sufficient to warrant a dissolution of a regular marriage, will elide a presumptive one. It has been found by the House of Peers that a woman's ignorance of the fact that the intercourse following on a promise constituted marriage, did not destroy her legal rights. Such a marriage is unquestionably valid, if circumstances do not create a sufficient presumption against it. Lord Kames, in his Elucidations, inquires whether it should be sustained in competition with a subsequent regular marriage? In an old case, the late Commissary Court of Scotland decided that question in the negative, but it was not carried to the higher court, and it is regarded as an erroneous judgment. No doubt parties contracting a regular marriage are exposed to most fearful and obvious hazards from collusion and perjury; and it may well be asked, if that judgment be erroneous, whether there is any use in going through a regular marriage after proclamation of banns. But while the principle of the law that the prior marriage, however informally contracted, is preferred to the most regular subsequent one, it will in most cases be held that any presumption in its favour is destroyed by the still stronger presumption arising from the conduct of parties and its undue concealment. But wherever there is no doubt of the promise, and of the intercourse following on it, if there be nothing to warrant the presumption that the promise was disregarded, a marriage so constituted is sustained.

3. The requisite consent may be proved inferentially—by conjugal cohabitation, and being reputed married persons by friends and neighbours. This is supposed to have been first introduced by the Scotch statute 1503, which declared that where a woman was reputed to be the wife till the man's death, she should be entitled to her rights as his widow till it be proved that she was not his wife. Where the cohabitation was of considerable duration, and the parties openly mingled in society as acknowledged married parties (for both cohabitation and repute must co-exist), the presumption that the requisite consent, which the law allows to be given secretly, was really interchanged, is not an unreasonable one. But wherever it appears that such cohabitation was assumed merely from respect to public decency, the effect of it is destroyed. In judging of its true character, therefore, it is of importance not merely to ascertain whether it occurred within the natural sphere of the parties, but also how it commenced. Lord Eldon said, that "wherever it clearly appeared that it was at first illicit, it was likely to continue illicit;" and Lord Redesdale concurring, said, "that to raise the presumption of marriage, the repute must be general, and not such as might be created by statements or conduct designed to induce lodging-keepers to admit the parties into houses of respectability." The complaint of a woman claiming the rank of a wife, that the man had taken advantage of her by not introducing her to his friends, led another judge to remark, that "that complaint destroyed the very foundation of a plea of repute; and that wherever the connection was originally illicit, the law required some decided and unequivocal act to mark the change." This desideratum was supplied in M'Adam's case by what passed before his servants; and it was also supplied in another case, after some length of illicit cohabitation, by a meeting of friends being purposely called, at which the parties were drunk to and bedded as married persons.

We may here observe, as applicable to all sorts of marriage recognised by the law of Scotland, that the circumstances inferring its constitution must occur either in Scotland or in a country where the same inference would be drawn from the like circumstances. This rests on the principle that the conduct of parties must be tried according to the law of the country where it occurred. In the case of the Countess of Strathmore in 1750, a proof of matrimonial cohabitation and repute in a foreign country was allowed, because a marriage was understood to be so constituted in that country; while, in another case, in 1811, an offer to prove that a promise and subsequent copula occurred in England, was disregarded, because no such mode of constituting marriage was then recognised in England. It makes no difference in such cases that the parties are Scotch by birth. These rules of judgment are followed in England even in the case of English parties. Lord Stowell said, "the validity of Miss Gordon's marriage rights must be tried by reference to the laws of the country where, if they exist at all, they had their origin." The same principle received effect in England in 1748, where, in reference to a marriage of English parties contracted in France, Lord Hardwick said, "that a marriage established by the sentence of a foreign court, having proper jurisdiction, is conclusive by the

In 1819, such a judgment was repeated in England with reference to a marriage of English parties in Sicily.

On the marriage being constituted the parties are bound to adhere with fidelity to each other; and the husband must support his wife according to his circumstances, unless she have property of her own sufficient for her support, with which her husband cannot interfere. The moveable property of both, including the fruits of the wife's heritable subjects, the interests of her bonds, and even the profits of her personal labour and skill, become the property of the husband. The marriage operates like a deed of assignation, so that the husband can sue for the recovery of these rights of his wife in his own name and without her concurrence; and any attempt on her part to defeat him, occurring after the proclamation of bans, is held to be fraudulent. The common moveable property of the parties is sometimes called the goods in communio; and yet the wife during the marriage has truly only the hope of getting a share of it—her right in it not being indefeasible till the death of her husband. The husband's right is called his jus mariti. In virtue of this right he may sell, gift, or waste the common property at his pleasure, and his creditors may attach it for his debts. The wife's paraphernalia, comprehending her personal attire and ornaments, and such articles of a kind used by either party as the husband may have gifted to her before the marriage, are excepted. Besides having this right to her moveables, the husband on the marriage becomes her legal guardian. He may, however, renounce both his jus mariti and his right of administration; and where he does so, the wife can act in reference to her own estate independently of her husband, and altogether as fully and freely as if she were unmarried—leasing, fencing, selling, or burdening her property, or appointing factors to manage it, though in opposition to her husband's will. But the husband may renounce his jus mariti and yet retain his curatorial powers, in which last case she can only act with his concurrence. Third parties may convey property to a wife conditionally, and so as to exclude all the rights both of the husband and his creditors; as, by declaring the conveyance to be purely alimentary, and exclusive of these rights; or by conveying to trustees for her behoof, with a similar exclusion of the husband and his creditors. A wife, by her own antenuptial contract, may reserve all the rights which she possessed as a single woman. After, however, a marriage is entered into, a husband cannot renounce his jus mariti to the prejudice of his creditors; and even when the renunciation is not to their prejudice, it seems to be in the nature of donations between husband and wife, which are revocable at pleasure during the existence of the marriage. In law the husband is liable, so long as she remains alive, for all the personal debts contracted by his wife prior to the marriage; but this liability terminates on her death, unless his estate were attached by "complete legal diligence," during the marriage; or unless he was a gainer by the marriage to the extent of something beyond a reasonable tocher. Even when made liable, on the ground of having received some excessive advantage, it is only in the event of the wife's separate estate being found insufficient, that he becomes personally liable. If he be imprisoned for a prior debt of his wife, for which his own separate estate has not been attached, and if she die, he is no longer liable in payment. During the marriage the husband and not the wife is liable for all domestic furnishings which she may order; and such furnishings may be proved against him by her attestation or evidence. In other respects she is not received in evidence against her husband, except in the case of assault committed by him against herself. For furnishings unsuitable to his condition in life made on the order of a wife, the husband is not liable; neither is he liable for any fine in which she may be subjected by a court of law as the punishment of her crimes. In this last case, however, so entirely is a wife's person exempted from imprisonment during marriage (except in a few instances now to be noticed), that where a fine is awarded against her on account of her crimes, it cannot be enforced by her imprisonment until the death of her husband. Indeed, even for her apparent crimes she may be relieved of all consequences, if it clearly appear that she acted under the compulsion of her husband. When, however, she voluntarily acts on her own account, or in concert with him, in the commission of crime, she is liable in criminal punishment.

In England, as Justice Coleridge remarked, a husband may compel his wife to cohabit with him; adding, however, that the moment compulsion becomes unnecessary "for keeping her in the path of duty, it becomes illegal." In Scotland the same end is generally effected by the husband being entitled to withhold all alimentary support if she withdraw from his society, unless on sufficient cause. It has been found that a husband may, without any reason, debar his wife from his house, and assign her a separate, if it be not an unsuitable, residence. She takes his rank and precedence, unless these are merely official. She cannot sue at law, either in England or Scotland, without his concurrence, unless he have renounced all his rights, including that of guardianship; neither can she be sued in civil actions, unless her husband be called as a defender. All voluntary deeds of separation are revocable at pleasure, unless it appear that the revocation is merely for the purpose of obtaining an increase of aliment. The bills, bonds, and cautionary obligations of a married woman are null, so that she cannot be sued on them even after her husband's death; yet, like a minor, she may insist on other parties, who may have contracted with her in the knowledge that she was a married woman, fulfilling their contracts with her, wherever it is her interest to do so, provided she is ready to perform the counter part incumbent on her. Contracts, however, gone into by a married woman, are binding against her separate estate wherever they are clearly beneficial, such as for improvements on her separate property, just as the expense of managing or recovering her separate estate forms a good charge against it. Necessary furnishings for clothing, or aliment for herself, as well as for the domestic consumption, do not form the ground of a charge against her, but only against her husband. If a married woman fraudulently holds herself out as a single woman, and deceives parties into contracts with her, her separate estate will be liable in all consequences. Where a husband becomes insane, the disabilities under which a wife lies, equally with his curatorial powers or guardianship, are at an end, and she is entitled to manage, and probably to alienate, her estate, and do every act of a rational character; though even then it is not understood that she can be imprisoned for civil debts. If the married pair be judicially separated, a wife's creditors may attach her allowance for necessary furnishings made to her. Where the husband is abroad, a wife's obligations for necessaries are effectual; and if, in order to procure a livelihood while her husband is abroad, she engage in trade, she then becomes, even during his life, liable to imprisonment for her debts. There is nothing to prevent a married woman making a settlement of her separate estate, without the consent of her husband, to take effect after her death; and there is no reason why, if she please, the party to be benefited by such a deed should not be her husband. She is also liable to be imprisoned in order to compel her to subscribe necessary deeds which the Court has found her to be under a legal obligation to grant. Where she pursues an action at law, she must have her husband's concurrence, unless he have renounced his jus mariti and right of guardianship; and if he improperly withhold his concurrence, the Court will appoint a curator to her for the occasion. When an action is raised against her, the husband must be called for his interest; and if he refuse to appear, which he may when the action may have a prejudicial effect on himself; the Court, on being satisfied of the propriety of doing so, will appoint a curator for her, to aid her in the defence.

The law of England and of Scotland are alike to the disadvantage of the wife, in this respect, that marriage operates like a formal deed of assignation to the husband of all the wife's moveable estate, unless she is protected by an antenuptial contract, or by special clauses in conveyances by third parties for her behoof. She cannot otherwise acquire and hold money, or other moveable property. The husband is no doubt bound, as the holder of the goods in communion, to give to her a reasonable sum for her support; but then he may give that sum actually out of the proceeds of her own labour, as an author or an actress, a trader, or a needlewoman, and spend or mispend the surplus according to his own pleasure. The laws of both countries certainly relieve the wife from all responsibility, even for the necessary furnishings required for her own consumption; and where her personal gains are less than what is required by both her and her husband, she may have nothing to complain of. But when a husband altogether fails to support his wife, and squanders his time and means in utter profligacy, leaving to her only the alternative of labour or starvation, it is well worth the consideration of parliament whether the law should permit him to keep his wife constantly in poverty, by periodically pouncing on the fruits of her industry, and dishonestly wasting it, without even paying to her out of it what is required for her support. If this cannot be restrained, as we think on a husband's failure to do his duty it easily might, it may well be questioned whether a wife does not purchase exemption from personal responsibility at too great a price.

Marriage is dissolved by divorce or death. In Scotland there are two grounds of divorce—malicious desertion, and adultery. Neither of these necessarily dissolve the marriage, but only afford a plea, which may either be abandoned or rendered available by an action at law. If either party die during the dependence of the action, and before final judgment of divorce is pronounced, the rights of the survivor and of the heirs of the deceased must be tried on the footing of the marriage having been dissolved only by death.

1. Desertion.—By the Scotch statute 1573, c. 55, it is enacted, that where any of the "spouses shall divert from the other without sufficient grounds, and shall remain in his or her malicious obstinacy for four years," the injured party may take certain steps to bring about a dissolution of the marriage. The first is the action of adherence, which may be raised after one year's desertion. If the desertion have not lasted for a year, or if it occurred in the course of necessary and lawful business, this action is useless as a step in the divorce. If the defender have broken up his Scotch domicile, and withdrawn himself from the jurisdiction of the courts of Scotland, leaving his wife behind, it seems hard to deprive her of her legal remedy by his own unlawful act; and therefore such an action in Scotland, provided the husband received notice of it, has been often sustained, though the legality of doing so is now seriously questioned. Where the wife is the deserter, and the husband remains in Scotland, there is no difficulty, as her domicile is in law held to be that of her husband. The action of adherence will be sustained in the face of an agreement to separate, because such an agreement is contrary to the first duty of marriage. Mal-treatment or adultery furnishes a good defence against this action. On the decree of adherence being pronounced, the next step is to raise letters of horning and charge the defender to adhere. If recusant, the defender is denounced rebel, and application is made to the presbytery to admonish, and, if necessary, to excommunicate. In practice, presbyteries decline to interfere, whereupon the pursuer protests for remedy at law, and, on the expiry of four years from the desertion, raises the action of divorce. It is then too late for the defender to offer to adhere. On its appearing that the steps now alluded to were regularly gone through, decree of divorce is pronounced. The act 1573, c. 55, provides that the defender shall "tyne and lose" the tocher and the donationes propter nuptias, by which is understood all provisions, either by law or pacton. If the husband be the offending party, he must restore the tocher, and pay to the wife all the provisions in her favour, legal or conventional; and if the wife be the offending party, she forfeits the tocher and all the right that would have belonged to her if she had survived, such as terce, jus reliefs, &c. If the offending wife be an heiress, the husband has right to the courtesy of her estate, if there were an heir of their marriage. An estate devolving to either party subsequent to a divorce, is free from all claim at the instance of the other party, as the divorce terminates all relationship between them. It is an error to suppose that any desertion, however protracted, by either of the married pair, unless followed by a decree of divorce, will warrant the other in entering into a second marriage in the lifetime of the party who deserted, or furnish a defence against a criminal prosecution.

2. Adultery.—By the canon law adultery entitled the innocent party only to separation from bed and board. By the Scotch law, it does not dissolve marriage unless the aggrieved party shall bring the proper action requiring the dissolution; and the offender may be pardoned at the pleasure of the injured party. Pardon, which may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, or being accessory to the defender's guilt, is a bar to divorce. When divorce is pronounced, both parties are free to marry, as if they had never been married to each other, with this exception, that by the statute 1600, c. 20, the guilty party is prohibited from marrying the person with whom the adultery was committed. The prohibition, however, fails if the person with whom the adultery was committed be not judicially ascertained and named in the decree of divorce, or if the divorce were pronounced by a foreign judicature, as the statute refers only to divorces pronounced by the "ordinary judge," meaning a judge in Scotland. On raising the action, the pursuer must swear that it is believed to be well founded, and that it was not raised, either directly or indirectly, in collusion with the defender. Both the date of the marriage and of the guilt of the defender must then be proved, so that it may be ascertained that the latter did not occur prior to the former.

Sometimes it is pleaded in defence that the domicile of the defender is beyond the jurisdiction of the Scotch courts. Some years ago this defence was disregarded wherever the marriage was Scotch, and the defender was cited edictally. It is now otherwise. Where the wife is the defender, and her husband is domiciled in Scotland, she is held, on being cited edictally, and getting notarial intimation of the action, to be amenable to the Scotch court wherever she is resident, on the ground that her husband's domicile is hers. As against the husband, however, there must either be, at the date of the action, his actual domicile in Scotland, or the presumption of such a domicile, founded on residence of forty days within Scotland. When such domicile on the part of the husband exists, an action will be sustained against either party, even though English by birth, and though the marriage was contracted in England; and it will be sustained against the wife even although she be still resident there. This has led to a painful collision with the law of England. In the case of Lolly, the husband had contracted an English marriage, and he was divorced by the Scotch court on the ground of adultery committed while on a visit to Scotland of a duration sufficient to found jurisdiction. He then returned to England, and having there married Husband another woman, he was tried at the Lancaster assizes for bigamy, and received sentence of transportation—not because of insufficiency of the residence in Scotland to subject him to the law of Scotland, but because an English marriage being indissoluble in England, except by act of parliament, it was held that it could not be disturbed by the law of another country, to which the parties could not be supposed to have had reference at the time of their marriage. The sentence of transportation against Lolly has had no effect whatever in altering the Scotch practice in this particular; and there can be no doubt that if Lolly had remained and married in Scotland, even the House of Peers would have sustained the validity of his second marriage, to the effect of finding its issue entitled to succeed to his property in Scotland. Another question yet remains. While domicile creates jurisdiction, must the Scotch court decide all questions arising from marriage, according to the law of the place where the marriage was contracted, and thus refuse divorce to parties domiciled in Scotland who were married where such a mode of dissolution is not permitted? This question is in Scotland uniformly answered in the negative, otherwise the supremacy of the law of Scotland within its own territory would be compromised. The legality of the marriage itself, however, like all other contracts, is determined according to the law of the place where it is said to have been contracted. Analogous to this is the rule existing both in England and Scotland by which the goods in common are divided according to the law of the domicile, without regard to the place of the marriage. In the comparatively recent case of Duntz, 1816, the parties were English by birth, and married in England in 1810. In 1813 the husband came with his wife to Scotland, where his domicile was established, after which he raised an action of divorce. In the course of the process the opinions of the Judges of the Court of Session were taken on this question, "Is it a valid defence against an action of divorce in Scotland on account of adultery committed there, that the marriage had been celebrated in England?" and they unanimously concurred in saying that it is not. In a similar case, Edmonton, 1816, with this variation, that the parties were Scotch, the defence was urged that the action should be restricted to separation from bed and board, but it met the same fate. On this subject Lord Robertson expressed with great clearness views which were recognised as correct by Mr Justice Storey, when he said, "marriage is merely a personal consensual contract;" and it may be thought that the lex loci must be resorted to in expounding every question that arises relative to it;" but it "is a contract sui generis," and "it differs from other contracts in this, that the rights, obligations, or duties, arising from it, are not entirely left to be regulated by the agreement of parties, but are to a certain extent matters of municipal regulation, over which the parties have no control. It confers the status of legitimacy, &c. Unlike other contracts it cannot, in general amongst civilized nations, be dissolved by mutual consent, and subsists in full force even though one of the parties should be forever rendered incapable, as in the case of incurable insanity or the like, from performing his part of the mutual contract." It is no defence after domicile is established that the adultery is committed only out of Scotland; but it is a good defence to either party in an English marriage that it was committed abroad, before the Scotch domicile was acquired. The following seem to be the results of the above and some other decisions:—1. Adultery abroad, where the law does not on that account dissolve marriage, and prior to the Scotch domicile, will not warrant a divorce in Scotland. 2. But the instant that a forty days' domicile is acquired by the husband in Scotland, divorce will be pronounced by the Scotch court against either husband or wife on account of adultery committed anywhere after or in the course of acquiring such domicile, no matter where the marriage was contracted, or where the parties have been born. 3. If before the action of divorce is raised, the husband have left Scotland and established a foreign domicile, the courts of Scotland cease to have jurisdiction. 4. The circumstance of both or either of the parties being Scotch by birth, or having estates in Scotland, will not, independent of the husband's domicile, confer jurisdiction on the Scotch court. These results rest on the principle that when parties break up their old domicile, and enter and acquire a domicile in a new territory, they voluntarily subject their future conduct to its laws.

In regard to the defences against an action of divorce—

1. Collusion, if proved, between the parties, affords to the repentant defender a good defence against divorce; but though it should appear that the defender intentionally gave ground for the suit so openly that detection was inevitable, and expressly to provoke the other party to bring the suit, divorce will be granted, if the pursuer was not accessory to the misconduct.

2. Forgiveness, or the plea of remissio injuriae, as it is called, when established, is fatal to the divorce. As adultery operates only as a plea for divorce on the necessary action being raised, it follows that the injured party may forgive, or abstain from suing for redress. The forgiveness may be proved directly, by words or writing, or inferentially, from cohabitation after the guilt is known. As generally speaking, a wife cannot so easily withdraw from the husband as the husband from the wife, Lord Stowell remarked, "that though the husband is bound to take prompt notice of the infidelity of the wife, yet this doctrine is not to be pressed against a wife, except in particular circumstances."

It is a plea in bar of process, but to be successful it must apply to the specific guilt charged, and not to other offences which may not have been either known or pardoned. Facts inferring forgiveness can only be regarded when it appears that the guilt was certainly known. The raising of the suit infers certain knowledge; but not the conducting of a preliminary preoccupation. It may be proved by a reference to oath. A written discharge of all and any offences committed prior to a certain date is available.

3. Lenocinium, or a party's either directly or indirectly encouraging, countenancing, or instigating the other's guilt, or purposely throwing temptation in the way, affords an available defence; as no one is entitled to take advantage of his own improper conduct.

4. Recrimination, or the plea that the pursuer has been guilty as well as the defender, seems at one time in Scotland to have been an available defence; but it is not so now. If the defender bring a counter action, and both parties are successful in proving each other's guilt, mutual divorces will be pronounced, producing patrimonial consequences.

5. Further, it is a good defence against decree of divorce being finally pronounced that either party have died in the course of the process, no matter how plainly the guilt may have been proved in the lifetime; and the guilty party, or the heirs of the guilty party, cannot then be deprived of those patrimonial rights which may open on the dissolution by death.

It is competent to creditors interested to prevent a decree of divorce going out against their debtor, to sit themselves as defenders, and propone all defences competent to their debtor; as, for example, that the guilt was pardoned; or that the action is carried on collusively, to injure the defender's civil rights, and defeat the chance of the creditors recovering their claims. It has been decided by the House of Peers that it is too late for the trustee for the husband's creditor to appear and offer to prove collusion after the pursuer had both deponed that there was none, and had also proved her husband's guilt.

In regard to the proof, the only general rule that can be Husband laid down is, that the circumstances in evidence must be such as lead the discretion of reasonable men to the conclusion of guilt. The paramour is not bound to criminate himself; but his declining to answer is not to be overlooked in considering the other evidence, though by itself it is of no consequence.

1. As to the consequences of the dissolution of marriage by death. We shall advert to these as they stand, irrespective of the recent statute 18th Vict., c. 23; and then mention the changes introduced by that statute. Where marriage subsists for a year and day, or where a living child has been born, the surviving wife succeeds to her terce, being the fiferent of the third of her husband's heritage (excluding burgage property) in which he died intestate, and to the half or third of the goods in communion, called jus relicte, according as a child has or has not survived; or otherwise, where she has conventional claims, sometimes granted in lieu of her legal rights, these conventional rights are secured to her. In regard to the husband, if he survive, and the marriage have subsisted for a year and day, he becomes the irrevocable proprietor of the tocher, and of the half of the goods in communion, or two-thirds if children be alive, subject to their claim of legitim. His conventional rights are secured to him. If a child of the marriage was heard to cry, the husband succeeds to his courtesy, being the fiferent of the deceased wife's heritage, which fell to her by succession, and in which she died intestate. If the wife had a living child by a former marriage, who succeeds to her heritage, the last and surviving husband has no right to the courtesy. If the marriage be dissolved within a year and day, without there having been a living child, the parties are reinstated in the condition in which they were before the marriage, in so far as practicable, and the tocher must be returned, in so far as unconsumed. The surviving party, whether husband or wife, loses all right in the other's estate. Even contracts between the parties are annulled, unless they contain a provision to the contrary. If there be no children born of an irregular marriage, the year and day are counted from the date of the acknowledgment. Where children were previously born it draws back to the birth.

It must now be kept in view, that by the recent statute, 18th Vict., c. 23, § 6, it is enacted, "that where a wife shall predecease her husband, the next of kin, executors, or other representative of such wife, whether testate or intestate, shall have no right to any share of the goods in communion; nor shall any legacy or bequest, or testamentary disposition thereof, by such wife, affect or attach to the said goods or any portion thereof." And farther, by § 7, that "where a marriage shall be dissolved before the lapse of a year and day from its date, by the death of one of the spouses, the whole right of the survivor, and of the representatives of the predecessor, shall be the same as if the marriage had subsisted for the period aforesaid;" and by the 3d and 4th sections of that statute, it is provided that where any person dying intestate shall predecease his father, without leaving lawful issue, his father shall have right to one-half of his moveable estate; and where such person dying intestate, whose father has predeceased him, shall be survived by his mother, she shall have right to one-third of his moveable estate. These, it is believed, are the only alterations of the prior law of Scotland introduced by that statute, affecting the dissolution of marriage by death.

2. As to the consequences of the dissolution of marriage by divorce on the ground of adultery. If the wife be the divorced party, she is considered, in reference to all patrimonial rights, to be dead, and therefore can claim no provision of any sort, either legal or conventional; and the husband has right to the courtesy. If she made a donation to her husband during the subsistence of the marriage, she can now no longer revoke it; and no right can pass to those who would have been her executors for a share of the goods in communion. If the husband be the divorced party, the wife has immediate right, exactly as if he were dead, to her terce and jus relicte, or to her jointure; in a word, to all her rights, legal, or conventional, as if he were naturally dead. All rights in the husband flowing from the wife, and all his power of administration of her estate are at an end. He forfeits his right of courtesy. He can no longer draw his wife's rents, or revoke gifts which he may have made to her. He is not, however, called on to restore the tocher; for justice does not require that the woman should be placed in a better situation by the divorce than she would have been by the husband's death. Neither party has any interest in the rights which may accrue to the other after divorce. This last point was fixed by a judgment in a case at the instance of the Earl of Elgin in 1827.

Where a ceremony of marriage has been gone through by parties disqualified to marry, such as idiots, impotent persons, or persons already married, the action of divorce is inapplicable. The proper remedy is an action concluding for a decree, declaring the ceremony void and null, and that the defender has no interest in the pursuer's estate. In some circumstances the defender may be liable in damages to the pursuer, as if, for example, where the defender had previously been married to a party alive at the date of the second ceremony.

In the direct line marriage is forbidden in infinitum. First cousins, and all of remoter degrees, may lawfully marry. A man after his wife's death cannot marry any of her kindred nearer in blood to her, than he may of his own, nor vice versa; but as relationship by affinity properly exists only between the husband and the wife's relations, or between the wife and the husband's relations, there is nothing to hinder brothers from marrying sisters, or a father and son from marrying a mother and daughter.

Though maltreatment is not a ground of divorce, it warrants a decree of separation. By maltreatment, less than personal violence is meant. If a man, particularly in the better ranks, ill uses his wife by threats, degrading restraints, and licentious conduct, a decree of separation will be pronounced. Lord Stowell remarked in an English case—Evans, 1790—that, in general, when married people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off. "Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, want of civil attention, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty." "There must be proof of a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. I say an apprehension, because assuredly the court will not wait till the hurt is actually done; but the apprehension must be reasonable. It must not be an apprehension arising merely from an exquisite and diseased sensibility." In the case of Waring, in 1813, Lord Stowell said, it must be kept in view "that a wife may, by provocations, have brought upon herself the ill treatment complained of. When that appears she is not entitled to demand relief." "It is a difficult task to return blows, let them come from where they may, with words only. Force may be opposed, and in some cases must be opposed, with force." The adultery of either party entitles the other, by the laws of England and Scotland, to a separation; and even for maltreatment it will be awarded in favour of the husband as well as the wife, though it will require stronger grounds. This kind of action draws after it none of the consequences resulting from death or divorce. It only entitles the wife to obtain from a husband a suitable allowance for her separate support during their joint lives, a right which she possesses, even where the separation has been decreed against her at his instance; in respect that he is the possessor and administrator of the Husband and Wife.

goods in communion. But the grounds of such an action, and the decree itself may be discharged by the pursuer at pleasure. Where there are children, if the mother be the successful pursuer, she is allowed to have the custody of female children till twelve, and males till seven years of age, with a suitable allowance for them. The court has a discretionary power to dispose of the children, according to circumstances, but it is not exercised except in extreme cases. After the parties are judicially separated, the husband is no longer liable for the debts which the wife may contract, provided he pay to her the sum awarded by the court for her support.

From what has been stated above, it will be seen that the leading differences between the law of England and Scotland on the subject of marriage, are to be found both in its constitution and dissolution. Certain forms are required in England in order to constitute marriage, which are not essential in Scotland, provided the consent of parties is given clearly and seriously. To avoid the strictness of England, her subjects sometimes cross the border to contract an irregular marriage, which may be effected in Scotland in a few minutes. This may be prevented by the legislature enacting that such a marriage should not be binding, unless preceded by the residence for a certain length of time of the English parties in Scotland; and a bill is at present before parliament to accomplish that object, which will be adverted to in conclusion, if it be passed into a law before the publication of this volume. In regard to the dissolution of marriage by divorce, a woman cannot, except in extraordinary circumstances, sue in England for such a remedy; and even the husband cannot, in that country, obtain it, except on the single ground of his wife's infidelity, nor until he obtain a verdict for damages against her seducer; after which he may procure an act of parliament dissolving the marriage. The expense of this procedure is so great as to exclude the remedy of divorce from husbands in the lower ranks of England. The practical exclusion of the English wife from such a remedy, rests on the ground that her husband's infidelity does not involve a family in calamities so great as those occasioned by the infidelity of the wife. In Scotland, malicious and obstinately continued desertion is regarded equally with infidelity as a violation of the marriage vow; and the husband, as well as the wife, having undertaken that vow, is equally with her liable in the consequences of its violation; while the remedy of divorce can be obtained by all ranks, even as a matter of right, and in forma pauperis if necessary. Marriage may thus be said to be more easily constituted, and more easily dissolved in Scotland than in England; and yet Scotland is not particularly remarkable for rash and inconsiderate marriages; neither do the number of divorces pronounced in that country lead to the inference, that the facility with which they are obtained tends to increase their number. Indeed, the number of Scotch divorces is very small; those at the instance of the wife not exceeding twenty annually; showing that divorce is a remedy not usually sought for by a wife, until her wrongs have become intolerable.

The Bill referred to in the last paragraph has now been passed into a law; by which it is enacted that after the 31st day of December 1856, no irregular marriages contracted in Scotland shall be valid, unless one of the parties had at the date thereof his or her usual place of residence there, or had lived in Scotland for twenty-one days next preceding such marriage; while, if any parties contracting an irregular marriage shall, within three months thereafter, present a joint application for a warrant to register such marriage to the sheriff, the sheriff shall, on evidence, direct it to be registered, provided that one of the parties had lived in Scotland for twenty-one days next preceding such marriage, or had his or her usual residence in Scotland at the date thereof; and it is now no longer lawful to convict any parties of having irregularly contracted marriage, unless Huskisson there shall be adduced sufficient proof other than the acknowledgment of such parties, that one of them had at the date thereof his or her usual residence in Scotland, or had lived in Scotland for twenty-one days next preceding such marriage. See Parent and Child.

Huskisson, William, an able financier and statesman, was born in 1770, at Birch-Moreton, in Worcestershire. After an excellent education at home, he went to Paris to study medicine, which he had chosen as his profession. Accident, however, made him acquainted with Lord Gower, English ambassador in that city, and Huskisson, abandoning medicine, became his private secretary. Connecting himself on his return to England with the Tory party, he held various offices under government, to which he made himself valuable, and indeed indispensable, from his knowledge of business, especially in the department of finance. After the death of Pitt he attached himself to the party of Canning, and distinguished himself by the part he took in the celebrated Bullion Committee, in which he supported and enforced the views of Horner for an immediate resumption of cash-payments by the banks. In 1822 he succeeded Canning as secretary of state. For the remainder of his public history see art. Britain. His death, which took place September 15, 1830, was accidental. At the opening of the Manchester and Liverpool Railway, he was run over by a train, and so severely injured, that he survived but a very short time. A collective edition of his speeches appeared in 1831. They do not exhibit any great eloquence strictly so called; but are distinguished for clear statement, lucid order, close reasoning, and a great mastery of details. The views, without being new or brilliant, are sound and comprehensive, and evidently the result of mature thought and study. The conscientious fulness of the details makes them both instructive and interesting, even to readers of the present day.

Huss, John, the Bohemian reformer, was born at a village called Hussinecz, situated in that part of Bohemia which borders on Bavaria, on the 6th of July 1369. His parents were in humble circumstances, and he was in early life subjected to both toil and privation—a discipline which was probably not without its use in preparing him for his subsequent career. After passing through the initiatory branches of education, he entered the university of Prague, where he studied philosophy and theology under Stanislaus of Znaim, a man of liberal tendencies, and from whom Huss probably received the first impulse towards those opinions and efforts to which he owes his fame and his place in the history of the Church. Huss took his master's degree in 1396, and in 1398 he began to lecture. In 1400 he was appointed confessor to Sophia, queen of Bohemia; in 1401 he became president of the theological faculty in the university; and in 1402 he was selected to fill the office of preacher at the Bethlehem Chapel, an edifice which had been erected and endowed by John of Millesim, one of the royal councillors, and a wealthy citizen of Prague named Creutz, for the express purpose of facilitating the preaching to the people in the Bohemian tongue (verbum Dei communi populo civitatis in vulgari Bohemico ad predicandum.) These appointments show in what respect Huss, though as yet but a young man, was held. His chaplaincy at the Bethlehem was especially important to him, as it afforded scope for the exercise of those peculiar powers of popular address which he possessed, and gave him opportunity of employing these in the promotion of those measures of reform on which his heart was already set.

Whilst yet a student at the university, Huss's earnest and religious mind had been grieved by the prevailing levity and immorality of the clergy, as well as the gross superstition, ignorance, and vice of the body of the people. The times in which he appeared were those of the deepest medieval darkness, when boundless corruption reigned throughout the Church, when anarchy and discord were threatening her with ruin, and when almost every man in whose bosom a regard for the interests of religion and morality remained, was compelled to assume the position of a censorer and a reformer. Mosheim observes, that "no teacher or writer of any eminence in this century (the fifteenth), can be named, who does not plainly and greatly lament the miserable state of the Christian Church, and anticipate its ruin, unless God should interpose for its rescue." Several had already appeared in Bohemia, who had uttered energetic testimony against the prevailing corruptions. Milicz of Krenstia, Conrad of Waldhausen, John of Steink, and Matthias of Janow, had formed a succession of witnesses whose unwearied and vehement denunciations alike of the misconduct of the clergy and the corruptions of the populace, had been gradually leavening the minds of the community with sentiments favourable to a better state of things. In the footsteps of these men, Huss, deeply imbued with their spirit, and familiar with their opinions, enthusiastically followed, and by his eloquent, impassioned, and fearless discourses at the Bethlehem Chapel, greatly extended the movement they had commenced. At first, indeed, he confined himself to topics affecting only the laity, but from these he advanced boldly to attack the sensual and vicious habits of the clergy. The result was, that he drew around him a small but attached and congenial community from among the former, while he incurred the bitter hatred and opposition of the latter.

It is true, that at first his efforts for reform seemed to be conducted under the sanction of his ecclesiastical superiors. A young nobleman, Shynko, or Zbynec, of Hasenburg, was at that time archbishop of Prague; and being disposed to introduce order into his diocese, and to discourage the gross superstitions that were bewildering the people, he availed himself of the knowledge, influence, and zeal of Huss for this purpose. For some time, therefore, the latter worked under the protection and with the approval of his diocesan; but the motives, designs, and the spirit of the two men were so different, that it was not possible they should continue very long to pursue a common course. Zbynec was a man of the world, whose tastes were more for military operations than for ecclesiastical or spiritual functions, and whose desire for reform in his diocese was kindled by no higher feeling than that which prompts a general to enforce order among his soldiers. Huss was a man fired with religious zeal, caring little for secular interests, devoted to the service of morality and piety, and whom nothing could satisfy but a return to such a state of things as the high standard of spiritual Christianity sanctioned. Between two such men there was hardly anything in common; and though peculiar circumstances might impel them in a common direction for a season, no sooner would the influence of these be removed, than their paths must necessarily diverge ever more and more widely from each other. As it happened, hardly seven years had elapsed when their relations were completely changed; the patron had become the persecutor, and the humble priest was agitating a reform which not only roused the indignation of the archbishop of Prague, but occupied the attention, and perplexed the counsels of the supreme Pontiff himself.

Several circumstances conspired to push Huss forward in the career on which he had entered. Already imbued with principles derived from the study of the sacred Scriptures, the writings of Augustine, and those of Milicz and Matthias of Janow, his mind received a still more decisive impulse in the direction of reform from the perusal of the writings of Wycliffe. With some of these he had become acquainted as early as 1391; but it would appear that it was not till a later period that he experienced the full amount of their influence on his mind. By the perusal of them he was completely won over to the views of the Realists in philosophy; and though he did not embrace all Wycliffe's theological opinions, he undoubtedly owed to him much spiritual enlightenment,—a benefit which he was prompt publicly to acknowledge whilst preaching, commending them to the people as full of truth, and frequently declaring that he wished his soul after death to go to the same place whither that of Wycliffe had gone. It was as a defender of Wycliffe that Huss first came into collision with Archbishop Zbynec. In 1406, the latter began to institute proceedings for the suppression of the Wycliffite heresy in his diocese, and even went the length of banishing or committing to the flames some who refused to recant the opinions they had embraced from the teaching of the English reformer. Against this cruelty Huss, though not himself prepared to concur in all the opinions for which these men suffered, indignantly protested. "What sort of thing is this," he wrote to the archbishop, "that men guilty of incest and every kind of crime pass with impunity, whilst humble priests, plucking out the thorns of sin, fulfilling their duty, well affected towards your rule, not following avarice, but gratuitously, for God's sake, labouring in the gospel, are cast into prison as heretics, and suffer banishment for preaching the gospel itself?" To these remonstrances Zbynec seems at first to have listened; at least he did not at this time pursue his persecution of the Wycliffites, nor does Huss appear to have incurred his displeasure by the zeal he had shown on their behalf. A more serious cause of quarrel arose out of the part which Huss took in the disputes which were then agitating Christendom, in consequence of the Papal schism. The archbishop had espoused the side of Gregory XII., in opposition to Wenceslaus, the king of Bohemia, and Huss, taking the same side as the king, employed his influence in securing support for his cause. Not long before this an event had occurred, very much through Huss's efforts, which greatly increased his power of serving the king in such an emergency. The university of Prague had hitherto numbered among its students a large body of Germans, who indeed formed the majority, and to whom had been conceded the privilege of three votes in all questions affecting the interests of the university, whilst the native Bohemians possessed only one. Against this, as an act of injustice, Huss, supported by his friend Jerome of Prague, and by the patriotic feeling of many of their countrymen, had at length successfully struggled; by an edict of the king in 1409, the relative weight of the parties was reversed, three votes being given to the Bohemians, and only one to the Germans. In consequence of this the latter seceded in a body, to the number, according to the lowest estimate, of 5000. Huss was immediately after elevated to the post of rector of the university; but whilst he was thus enabled to serve the side of the king in his contest with the archbishop and clergy more efficiently, the part he had taken in the measures which resulted in the secession of the Germans, materially contributed to his own subsequent injury. He had thereby not only given mortal offence to the archbishop and the clergy of Bohemia, but he had multiplied enemies in every place to which the dispersed students and professors betook themselves; whilst, at home, the loss occasioned to the city by the withdrawal of so large a number of its inhabitants turned from him the favour of the citizens, and facilitated the attempts of his enemies to stir up a party against him.

The archbishop now resolved to proceed vigorously for the suppression of the reformers. In 1410 he procured from the pope, Alexander V., full powers to prohibit preaching in private chapels, and to consign the writings of Wycliffe to the flames. Huss, in the face of this, boldly continued to preach as before at the Bethlehem Chapel, where he was still listened to by admiring crowds. This provoked the archbishop to accuse him to the pope of heresy; in consequence of which he was summoned to appear at Bologna, before Cardinal Otto of Colonna, to answer for himself; and, on his failing to appear, was excommunicated. This sentence was renewed by Cardinal Brancas, to whom the case had been referred for reconsideration; but, though Zbyněk endeavoured to carry it into effect, the influence of Huss with the king and the people of Bohemia was still so great that he was compelled to relinquish the attempt, and even to recant his accusation of heresy, and request the pope to remove the ban under which Huss had been laid.

Archbishop Zbyněk died in 1411, and was succeeded by Alric of Unitzow, a man wholly uninterested in religious disputes, and devoted to the interests of the king. Under his sway Huss might have remained unmolested, had it not been that events occurred which compelled him to assume even a still more decided posture of opposition to the corruptions of the Papacy than he had hitherto assumed. In 1412 the pope issued a bull commanding a crusade against King Ladislaus of Naples, and proclaiming full indulgence to all who should take arms in this crusade, or furnish money for carrying it on. This roused Huss's indignation, and he attacked the bull both with voice and pen. In this he was seconded only too zealously by his friend Jerome, who, not content with exerting his fiery eloquence on the subject, proceeded to parade the papal rescript through the streets suspended to the neck of a common strumpet, after which it was publicly burnt. These proceedings called forth, as might be expected, the anger of the pope; they were even too much for the king; and, accordingly, when Huss was again placed under the papal ban he was obliged to yield. He left Prague in 1413, and retired to Hussinecz, having first appealed from the pope to Christ himself, and defended his views in a work entitled De Ecclesia. At Hussinecz he employed himself in writing letters to his friends, in composing some additional expositions of his opinions, and in occasionally preaching to the peasantry in the open fields.

In the meanwhile his enemies had not forgotten him, or relinquished their determination to destroy him. In 1414 the council of Constance was opened, and thither Huss was summoned by the Emperor Sigismund to answer on a charge of heresy. Though knowing that he was about to appear before "numerous and mortal enemies," he went without fear, having confided himself wholly to God and to His Saviour, from whom he besought wisdom and prudence, that he might answer his accusers, and stand firm for the truth. Before leaving Prague, however, he sought to fortify his innocence by submitting to an examination before the papal inquisitor, who gave him a certificate that he found nothing heretical in him. He also secured from the emperor a letter of safe-conduct, and from the pope the strongest assurances of protection. Accompanied by several Bohemian noblemen, he left Prague on the 11th of October, and reached Constance on the 3d of November. For the first four weeks after his arrival nothing was done or said touching his case. Expecting to be allowed to address the council, he employed the interval in preparing his defence. But his enemies had no intention of allowing him such an advantage. On the 28th of November he was seized and imprisoned in a loathsome dungeon. In consequence of the interference of the emperor, he was some weeks after transferred thence to a more salubrious apartment, where he remained a close prisoner till the 24th of March. After this he was, in spite of the remonstrances of the Bohemian barons, removed to the Castle of Gottlieben, where he was treated with the utmost severity, under which his health, already greatly enfeebled, completely sank. At length, emaciated by sickness and exhausted by suffering, he was brought before the council, but it was only to be treated as one already condemned. At his first appearance, which took place on the 5th of June, whenever he attempted to speak in his own defence, he was assailed by violent outcries, amidst which not a syllable he uttered could be heard. At his second and third hearing, which took place on the 7th and 8th of June, the presence of the emperor prevented the tumultuous proceedings which had disgraced the former assembly, but Huss was still rather harassed by his assailants than allowed freely and fairly to answer for himself. The council persisted in imputing to him errors which he repeatedly declared he never held, and they would hear of nothing but that he should solemnly recant and abjure them. In vain did he ask "How can I abjure what I never held?" The council was inexorable, and he was remanded to prison, there to make up his mind between recantation and death. Repeated efforts were made by emissaries of the council to induce him to the former; but the spirit of the martyr rose within him as he saw his end approaching, and he steadfastly refused to swerve from the path of consistency and truth. "I write this," says he in a letter to his friends at Prague, "in prison and in chains, expecting to-morrow to receive sentence of death, full of hope in God that I shall not swerve from the truth, nor abjure errors imputed to me by false witnesses." The sentence he expected was pronounced on him on the 6th July, in the presence of the emperor and the council. When it was read to him he fell on his knees and said, "Lord Jesus! forgive my enemies; as Thou knowest that I have been falsely accused by them, and that they have used against me false testimony and calumnies; forgive them for the sake of Thy great mercy." Loud laughter rang through the hall, from the assembled prelates, as this prayer went up for them to heaven. They then proceeded to degrade Huss from his sacerdotal rank. For this purpose he was dressed in the robes of a priest, the different parts of which were then successively taken off him, with set forms of expression. When this was over, and the tonsure had been obliterated from him, a cap painted with figures of demons was placed on his head, and the bishops said, "Now we devote thy soul to the infernal devils." "But I," exclaimed Huss, raising his eyes to heaven, "commend my soul, redeemed by Thee, into Thy hands, O Lord Jesus Christ!" He was then led to the place of execution. When fastened to the stake he said, "I willingly wear these chains for Christ's sake, who wore still more grievous ones." Once more he was admonished to recant, but his reply was, "What error should I recant when I am conscious of none? The chief aim of my preaching was to teach men repentance and the forgiveness of sins, according to the truth of the gospel of Jesus Christ, and the expositions of the holy fathers; therefore am I prepared to die with a joyful heart." The fire was then kindled. As its smoke and flames rose around him, Huss began to shout, "Jesus, son of the living God, have mercy on me." Twice did he utter this, but before he could finish it a third time, his voice was stifled in the flames which the wind drove towards him. Still his lips moved as in prayer, and the calm bearing of the dauntless confessor of Christ continued to mark his countenance to the last. When the flames had done their office, his ashes were collected and cast into the Rhine, that no relics of him might remain. "But the miserable precaution was without any effect, since his disciples tore up the earth from the spot of his martyr-

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1 See his letter addressed to the Bohemians before commencing his journey. Bonnechose Lettres de Jean Hus, p. 82. dom, and adored it with the same reverence, and moistened it with those same tears, which would otherwise have sanctified his sepulchre." Waddington's Hist. of the Church, vol. iii., p. 192. See also Neander's Church Hist., vol. ix., pp. 319-506; Gieseler's Church Hist., vol. v., pp. 103-122; Bonnechose Reformateurs avant la Réforme, &c., 2 vols.