from the Latin miles, a soldier, in its original signification, means warfare, the qualification of soldiership, or the military body. In this last signification it became incorporated with the English language. It is now used to distinguish, from the regular forces, the body of citizens who may be annually called out for a limited time, and embodied on occasions of emergency. As the system out of which the present militia has arisen existed previously to the establishment of a mercenary army, and frequently constituted the sole military organization of its time, a historical sketch of the institution will involve to a certain extent a general view of the military state of Britain during the earlier periods of our history.

Any account of the military system of the Saxons, especially when we approach the era of the Norman Conquest, becomes involved in the great question as to the extent to which feudal practices had been adopted in England previous to that event. It has, however, been distinctly ascertained, that land, amongst the Anglo-Saxons, became not only the reward of military services performed, but the stipulated wages of their continuation. Thus there came to be a connection between the performance of services to a chief and the holding of land under him; the soldier or thane possessing the land on the condition of performing military duties, but not, as by the mature usages of the feudal system, rendering the service as an incident of the tenure of the land. The grants so made were generally for a contingent period, and were revocable from a vassal unfit to perform his military engagements; and we find amongst them a species of transaction so complicated as grants to churchmen, on the condition of their making provision for the performance of the military duties they were personally disqualified from undertaking. (Sir Francis Palgrave's Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth; Proofs and Illustrations, cxxx.) The oath of the vassal was personal and conditional, and had no reference to the land as a bond of union. (Allen On the Rise and Growth of the Royal Prerogative, Ap. xxiii.) It was the duty of the superior to protect his follower, and when he ceased to do so, the vassal was relieved from obedience; but desertion was viewed as a crime of great magnitude. Those freemen who had undertaken to perform military service in return for lands were entitled, like the clients of the Romans, to select their own "Hilfords" or patrons; but this class of followers seems to have gradually decreased towards the era of the Conquest, when it would appear from Domesday-book that all land was, or was presumed to be, held of a superior. It was perhaps for the furtherance of such a principle, without the invasion of existing free rights in property, that an exception sometimes appears in favour of the tenant:—Et potestat ire cum ea (terra) ad quem vellet Dominum: intimating that he might hold his land of whatsoever lord he chose.

Whatever right the patron may have had to the exclu- Militia.

The military services of his dependent, it undoubtedly yielded to the claim of the state to the assistance of every freeman in cases of invasion or rebellion. It is probable that when the national force, denominated the *Fyrd*, was brought into existence, the right of patronage gave the superior no further power than that of leading his dependents when they joined the general host. The approach to any decision on this point is impeded by many difficulties, arising from the incongruities in the practice of different periods and of different parts of the country; and the absence of any contemporary treatise explanatory of the general rules and the reason of the apparent exceptions. It is thus that on some occasions the right of the Hlaford to command his followers is spoken of without any reference to the paramount claims of the public, whilst elsewhere we find the community arrayed by command of the sovereign, without reference to the circumstance that two distinct classes are to appear in the field, in the respective position of patrons and vassals. "From the earliest period," says Sir Francis Palgrave, "to which our documents can reach, we find the Fyrd appearing as a general armament of the people, comprehending every rank, though under different obligations and penalties." If the *Sitheand-man*, being a land-holder, remained at home, he forfeited all his land; sixty shillings was his fine; whilst thirty shillings was the *Fyrd-wite* of the churl, and to the last it continued a levy of all the population of the country." (Proofs and Illustrations, ut supra, ccclxxviii.) Sir William Blackstone and others include the national militia amongst the improvements attributed to the inventive genius of the great Alfred. The Fyrd, however, is of earlier origin. In the laws attributed to Edward the Confessor, the authenticity of which is justly doubted, though they are certainly the work of some one well acquainted with the Anglo-Saxon constitution, there are regulations for the organization and discipline of the Fyrd, probably embodying those improvements of Alfred which procured him the credit of having planned the system. These regulations adapt the arms to be provided by each freeman to a scale of wealth; forbid their being sold or pledged under penalties; provide for their descending to heirs; and appoint annual exhibitions, which, in order to baffle attempts to display the same weapons in different districts, were to take place simultaneously all over the country. (*Leges Edwardi,* apud Wilkins, sect. 35.) The command was given to district leaders called "Heretochs," who, it is stated, were like the *vice-comites* or sheriffs elected by their respective districts in full-folkmote. Sir William Blackstone observes, that the power thus vested in the people proved dangerous to the community, by erecting a rival to the royal prerogative; and he refers to this source of influence the treachery of Eric Streone, and the usurpation of Harold. Whatever the theory of the Anglo-Saxon constitution may have admitted, however, it does not appear, from the history of the period, that the voice of the people regularly influenced the command of the natural force; and undoubtedly, in the instances cited, the power unduly used had been otherwise obtained.

The Norman Conquest did not produce so much effect by altering the system so established, as by bringing the new engine of feudalism to act in concert with it. The king was then the commander of two separate forces. His feudal army was furnished by the tenants of his knights' fees, for each of which he could demand the service of one knight or of two esquires for forty days. These were his personal followers during their period of service, and were liable to be employed either at home or abroad. But the absolute demand on his services was inconvenient to the vassal, and the limitation of the period was often no less so to the king. Hence those who were partial to the occupation of war frequently remained with the army beyond their assigned period for a stipulated remuneration, whilst others got their services commuted into a money-payment, which afterwards merged into the oppressive exaction of scutage. Whilst this new species of force came into operation, the Fyrd of the Saxons still remained in existence. It afterwards was the source whence arose two distinct institutions: the *posse comitatus*, liable to be called out by the sheriff to keep the king's peace; and the militia force of the present day.

In the celebrated "assize of arms" of 1181, we find the Fyrd of the Anglo-Saxons in its original purity. All freemen are appointed to have arms in their possession, according to a scale of ranks, which consists, first, of the holders of a knight's fee; secondly, of the possessors of chattels or rents to the extent of sixteen merks; thirdly, of the holders of similar property to the value of ten merks; and, lastly, of all other burgesses and freemen (Wilkins, 296). The Fyrd, with its periodical exhibitions of arms, was recognised as late as the year 1285, when, by the statute of Winchester (13 Ed. I., st. ii., c. 6), the scale of arms assigned to the respective ranks was revised. The part of the act which enforces the keeping of arms was adjusted to the progress of the art of war in 1558 (4th and 5th Ph. and M. c. 2), and finally abolished in 1604 (1st Jac. I., c. 25, sect. 46).

Meanwhile practices commenced which gave rise to much subsequent dispute respecting the question, how far the right of the monarch to demand the military assistance of his subjects in such wars as he chose to prosecute was restricted. Many apparent anomalies in the constitution of this early period may be explained by reflecting that the Anglo-Saxon people continued to cherish certain privileges and customs which the Norman monarchs were often unable openly to abolish, whilst they were frequently powerful enough to infringe them. The annual array was an institution with which they naturally tampered, finding it their interest to amalgamate it with their feudal prerogatives. On the other hand, there were no definite limits to the prerogative, which insinuated itself wherever it was not practically checked. Accordingly we find parliament avoiding for some time any distinct recognition of the prerogative of the crown, or the privileges of the subject, and acting on the defensive against the former. Thus, by statute 1st Ed. III., c. 5, "The king wills, that no man from henceforth shall be charged to arm himself, otherwise than he was wont in the times of his progenitors kings of England; and that no man be compelled to go out of his shire but where necessity requireth, and sudden coming of strange enemies into the realm; and that it shall be done as hath been used in times past for the defence of the realm." The seventh chapter of the same statute gives redress on complaints that commissioners appointed to raise soldiers had been chargeable to the shires; and by the instructions to the sheriffs in the 10th Ed. III., stat. ii., money so exacted is directed to be returned. More decided attempts to amalgamate the assize of arms with the feudal force appear to have been opposed in 1351, when by 25th Ed. III., stat. v., c. 8, it was enacted that "no man shall be constrained to find men of arms, hobelers nor archers, other than those who shall hold by such services, if it be not by common assent and grant made in parliament."

At an early period, the crown gradually enlarged its military authority by issuing commissions of array. These writs, which were at first probably mere authorities to individuals to use the royal name and influence in collecting troops, came from practice to be viewed as emanating from the prerogative. In that anxiety to avoid collision with the crown which distinguishes many of the old acts of parliament, they are frequently alluded to without being either sanctioned or condemned. A singular instance of apparently intentional ambiguity occurs in 1st Ed. III., stat. ii., c. 15, which was avowedly passed for the relief of indivi-

duals who, at the suggestion of "false and evil counsellors," had been prevailed on by "duress" to come under burdensome obligations to perform military duties. The contracts are cancelled with a sort of oracular qualification, evidently inserted as the nominal price of a real concession: "Considering that such writings were made to the king's dishonour, sithens that every man is bound to do to the king as his liege lord all that pertaineth to him, without any manner of writing." In the fifth year of Henry IV., a statute was passed limiting the form and authority of commissions of array. It involves the anticipation of foreign invasion, empowers the commissioners in such circumstances to array and train all men-at-arms, to cause all able-bodied men to arm themselves according to their substance, to amerce those unable to bear arms in a similarly adjusted ratio, and to require the services of persons so armed on the sea-shore, or elsewhere, at the moment of danger. It is singular that this statute, which forms the only legislative authority to which Charles I. finally appealed in the celebrated struggle for the command of the militia, has never been conceived of sufficient importance to be printed in any collection of the statutes, and seems to have been accidentally discovered in manuscript by some of the crown officers (Rush Hist. Col., part iii., vol. i. 661-9). It was indeed, like the last cited statute, an act of grace, having been passed for the protection of the persons nominated as commissioners, who, according to the preamble, were liable to many penalties and forfeitures in the performance of their assigned duties. It is worthy of note, as bearing on the extent of the authority intended to be conferred by this act, that during the previous year (by 4th Hen. IV., c. 13) the enactments above referred to, checking the encroachments of the royal authority, were all jealously confirmed; the holders of lands in Wales and of military fiefs, and persons who had bound themselves by contract to perform military services, being specially excepted. During the Tudor dynasty, the declaratory limitations attempted by the old statutes were undoubtedly little respected by the crown, and forced levies were made on many occasions, when the necessities contemplated by the acts could be brought forward as a nominal justification, without being minutely questioned. A statute of the year 1558 (4th and 5th Phil. and M. c. 3) appears at first sight to give full sanction to the right of impressment; but an observation of the circumstances in which the act was to be enforced, and reference to a previous act which it professed to amend, show that it was intended for the discipline of those who had become soldiers, and to prevent their desertion. During the Long Parliament, by an act granting the temporary power of impressing as many men as the king and both houses of parliament might appoint (16th Car. I., c. 28), the limitations were again confirmed; and it was declared, that by the law of the realm the subject ought not to be impressed or compelled to go beyond his county, &c., in the same terms as the statute of the first of Edward III.

Such was the state of matters when, in the celebrated dispute between Charles I. and the parliament regarding the right to command the militia, it was maintained on the one hand that the preservation of the peace of the country, and its protection from foreign invaders, were the unalienable privileges of the crown, and involved the right to command all armies, and to demand on all occasions the military service of the lieges; and, on the other, that such privileges existed in no individual without the consent of both houses of parliament; whilst it was urged, first in the form of an ordinance, and next in that of a bill, that the king should consent to the militia being placed in the hands of commissioners named by parliament. Although the statutes above referred to show that in moments of danger the king was so far the guardian of the peace, that he was entitled to put himself at the head of the persons bound to keep themselves in readiness for such occasions, and the practice had been undoubtedly still more favourable to the prerogative, neither an act of the legislature, nor any uninterrupted train of precedents, had given the monarch the unlimited military command which he arrogated. At an unfortunate time for the adjustment of such a question, it had to be settled between the conflicting branches of the legislature; and Whitelocke at least approached the truth when he said, he apprehended "that the power of the militia is neither in the king only, nor in the parliament; and if the law hath placed it anywhere, it is both in the king and parliament, when they join together;" though the state of matters equivocally illustrated his remark in continuation, that "it is a wise institution of our law not to settle this power anywhere, but rather to leave it in dubio, or in nubibus, that the people might be kept in ignorance thereof, as a thing not fit to be known nor to be pried into." Arguments founded on precedent and the nature of the constitution were at that juncture, however, merely like the diplomatic manoeuvres preceding an international war. Each party was calculating its strength for the approaching conflict; and if their respective rights were so earnestly insisted on by either side, with any other view than that of colouring the real grounds of the rupture, it was that of securing the wavering by a show of adherence to constitutional principles. In a short time each party mustered its own forces in its own way.

In the parliament which was summoned after the Restoration, effectual means were taken by two statutes (13th Car. II., c. 6, and 13th and 14th Car. II., c. 3), which probably would not have been passed by the convention parliament, to put an end to any doubts as to the prerogative on this point. It was declared, that "the sole supreme government, command, and disposition of the militia, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, is, and by the laws of England ever was, the undoubted right of his majesty and his royal predecessors;" and lieutenants and their deputies were empowered to charge their counties to provide horse and foot soldiers, according to a fixed scale of property. The system thus constructed was slightly amended in the years 1699, 1714, and 1743.

In 1756, when the large standing force, which the position of Britain rendered it expedient to keep up, was made more unpopular by the introduction of the Hanoverian mercenaries, a bill to reconstruct the militia passed through the House of Commons under the auspices of Mr Charles Townshend and his friends, but was rejected in the House of Lords by 59 to 23. With some difficulty the measure was carried in 1757; but, though approved of by a large party, its practical enforcement frequently produced discontent and local disturbance. In 1762 the system was improved, and several acts were afterwards passed amending particular departments. In 1802 the militia laws of England and Scotland were consolidated by 42d Geo. III., c. 90 and 91; and these statutes, with that of 49th Geo. III., c. 120, applicable to Ireland, and the later acts of 15th and 16th Vict., c. 50; 17th and 18th Vict., c. 13, 105 and 106; and 18th and 19th Vict., c. 1, 57, 100, and 106—contain the law applicable to the militia of the United Kingdom. Before giving such a brief selection from the many minute regulations prescribed by these statutes, as a work of general reference is expected to contain, we may be permitted to glance at the origin of the militias of Scotland and Ireland.

In Scotland there seems never to have been, except in burghs, a national force for the defence of the citizens, like the Fyrd of the Saxons. The earliest acts of parliament, however, enforce practice in the bow, of which the efficiency had been so dearly learned in the English wars; whilst periodical "wapenshowings" are directed to be held, in which each individual should be armed upon a scale vaguely proportioned to his property. (Acts, 1424, c. 18 and 44; 1425, c. 60; 1437, c. 64; 1491, c. 31; and 1540, c. 85-91.) In time of war or rebellion proclamations were issued, charging all sheriffs and magistrates of burghs, to direct the attendants of the respective wapenshawings to join the king's host (1482, c. 90); and the criminal records contain many prosecutions for "abiding from" the various "raids," which are generally settled by composition with the lord treasurer. During the civil wars of the seventeenth century, the army which had been brought into existence by the enthusiasm of the Covenanters was supported by levies and assessments apportioned by district committees of war appointed by parliament, whose duties and powers were modelled on those of the commissioners of array in England. In 1662 (1st Car. II, 3, 27), the parliament made offer of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse to be at his majesty's sole disposal, and to be marched to any part of Scotland, England, or Ireland. This body constituted a regular standing army, the organization of which underwent some alterations in the years 1669, 1672, 1693, and 1695. From this last period no legislative improvements were made in the militia of Scotland until the year 1797, when the system established in England was partially extended to that part of the empire, though not without considerable local disturbance.

In Ireland the predatory army of gallowglasses, which, even in times of comparative tranquillity, it was found necessary to keep constantly armed for the preservation or the enlargement of the pale, was supported to a small extent by supplies from England; but it chiefly depended on exactions from the Anglo-Irish, made by a dexterous application of the many fines and petty tributes originally exigible by the native chiefs. To these the English added the formidable exactions of coign and livery, which embracing free quarters, and all that is generally taken under the sanction of that licence, were the frequent subject of bitter complaint, though not much heeded by a government which expected that the conquest would at least support itself. (See Irish State Papers, published by authority of government, ii. 477, &c.) In 1715, on occasion of the rebellion in Scotland, an act was passed by the Irish parliament (2d Geo. I., c. 9) for raising a militia to consist of Protestants. Roman Catholics were subject to double rates; and all serviceable horses belonging to them might be seized and made use of, provided that within ten days the sum of £5 (deducting the expense of seizure and keeping) was tendered to the owner of each as full payment. After several partial alterations, the militia laws were consolidated by the Irish parliament in 1793 (33d Geo. III., c. 22), and 1795 (35th Geo. III., c. 8), and accommodated to those of England in 1809.

By the present constitution of the militia in the United Kingdom the sovereign appoints lords-lieutenant in Britain, and governors in Ireland, to each county or province, with power to call out and train the militia annually, and to appoint deputy-lieutenants or deputy-governors, and other officers, subject to the royal approval. The higher officers in the militia, unless they enjoy an exemption on account of their rank in the army, require to be qualified by the possession of property. The amount varied greatly in the different departments of the United Kingdom, and being of the character of real or landed estate, was farther complicated by the different kinds of feudal tenure. From time to time there were partial legislative innovations on the purely territorial character of the qualification, and by an act passed in 1855, a uniform qualification throughout the empire, which might be in landed estate or any other property, was adopted. The qualification thus fixed is a yearly rent or value of,—for a colonel, £600; for a lieutenant-colonel, £400; for a major, £300; and for a captain, £200.

The business of balloting for and calling out the militia, commences with the annual general meeting of the lieutenancy of each county, when the next subdivision meeting is appointed, to which chief constables, or other officers, are required to direct constables or schoolmasters to return lists of all males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five in their respective parishes. Within fourteen days after requisition, the constable or schoolmaster leaves a schedule in each dwelling-house, to be filled up within fourteen days, with the names and designations of persons within the ages, and their claims of exemption, if there be any, under a penalty of £5. Within a month after serving the notices, the constables or schoolmasters make up, and affix to the church doors, lists mentioning exemptions and incapacities, and notifying the times and places for the discussion of appeals. These are decided by two or more deputies at the subdivision meetings, and their decisions are final. The clerks of general meetings then transmit lists to the privy council, distinguishing those liable to serve from those exempt. The men to be enrolled are chosen by ballot from each parish; all who are not above four feet and five inches in height, or are not approved of on examination by a surgeon, being discharged, and others balloted for in their room. Those who do not personally appear, or send an approved substitute to take the oath, are liable in a penalty of £10. There are arrangements by which, with the consent of the inhabitants, volunteers, remunerated by parish assessments, may be substituted for balloted men.

The persons exempted are,—peers; commissioned officers of the other forces, whether on full or half-pay; non-commissioned officers and private men in the other forces; persons serving, or who have served for four years, as commissioned officers in the militia; persons serving in the yeomanry or volunteers; persons serving, or who have served at any time within a year past in the local militia; resident members of the several universities; clergymen of the establishments, and registered dissenting clergymen; parish schoolmasters; articled clerks; apprentices; seafaring men; persons employed in the royal docks, the Tower, Woolwich Warren, the gun-wharf of Portsmouth, and the stores under the direction of the Board of Ordnance; persons free of the company of watermen of the Thames; any poor man with more than one child born in wedlock, in England; any man with more than two lawful children, and not possessing property to the value of £50, in Scotland; and in Ireland, any poor man not worth £10, or who does not pay £5 a year of rent, and has more than three lawful children under the age of fourteen.

The mutiny act and the articles of war apply to the militia, when called out, with the ordinary constitutional limitation, that no punishment can extend to life or limb. There are separate provisions for recovering deserters, &c. Until lately the conditions on which the militia could be called into service were, in Britain, invasion, or imminent danger of invasion, or actual rebellion or insurrection; in Ireland, actual invasion, rebellion, or insurrection. An act of 1854 so far altered this constitutional principle as to authorize the sovereign to call out the militia "whenever a state of war exists between her majesty and any foreign power." The old principle, that the militia cannot be compelled to serve out of the kingdom is still adhered to; and it has been thought necessary to pass special laws to enable them to volunteer for foreign service. In 1813 (54 Geo. III., c. 1) provision was made for accepting the service of militiamen and officers, to be formed into provisional regiments, and to co-operate with the regular forces. At previous periods, considerable numbers of militiamen had been drafted into the line, the losses of the militia regiments being made up by temporary acts, which slightly increased their original quotas. In 1855 a special act was passed "to enable Her Majesty to accept the services of the militia out of the United Kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war." By 48 Geo. III., c. 111 and 150, the celebrated local militia was, in 1808, appointed in England and Scotland, being limited in each county to "six times the original quota, or proportion of the original quota of militia." In 1812 two new acts were passed (52 Geo. III., c. 38 and 68), which apportioned the numbers of men to the respective shires in England and Scotland, but contained regulating provisions which tended to make the local militia and volunteers together amount to six times the number of the original militia contingents. When these forces were added to the 200,000 men allowed to be trained by Mr Windham's act (46 Geo. III., c. 90), the citizen army at the disposal of government in Great Britain amounted, independently of the militia, &c., of Ireland, and of temporary augmentations, to very nearly 500,000 men. In 1811 the effective strength of the regular militia was 77,424 private men, whilst that of the local militia was 213,609. In 1819 the disembodied militia of Britain and Ireland, calculated from the estimates of the year, amounted in round numbers to 71,200; and in 1829 it amounted to 70,082 private men and drummers.

The balloting, enrolling, and exercising of the militia has of late taken place only at occasional periods, an act being generally passed during each session suspending their annual recurrence. The militia were called out during the late war with Russia; and by a parliamentary return, the numbers in the three kingdoms on the 14th March were,—England, 44,198; Scotland, 4461; and Ireland, 13,095; making a total of 61,754. Within a month the numbers had decreased to 51,183, but during that period 19,450 had volunteered from the militia into the line. At the close of the session of 1837, the great Indian mutinies rendered it necessary again to take measures for calling out the militia.