Napoleon Buonaparte, or Bonaparte, was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769. He was descended from a patrician family, which had been of some note in Italy during the middle ages; and one of his ancestors, the gonfaloniere Buonaparte of San Nicolo, had governed the republic of Florence about the middle of the thirteenth century. His father, Carlo Buonaparte, was an advocate of considerable reputation; and his mother, Letizia Ramolino, was eminent alike for personal beauty and uncommon strength of character. When the Corsicans under Paoli rose in arms to assert their liberty against the pretensions of France, Carlo Buonaparte espoused the popular side; and through all the toils and dangers of his mountain campaigns was attended by his lovely and high-spirited wife. Upon the termination of the war, the father of Napoleon meditated accompanying Paoli into exile; but his relations dissuaded him from taking this step; and being afterwards reconciled to the conquering party, he was pro- Napoleon was the second child of his parents—Joseph, afterwards King of Spain, being the eldest born; but he had three younger brothers, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome; and three sisters, Eliza, Caroline, and Pauline. Five others appear to have died in infancy; and at the age of thirty Letizia became a widow by the death of her husband, who seems to have left his family but indifferently provided for.

In his early years Napoleon betrayed no marked singularity; and when his character began to be formed, its development was too profound and too essentially intellectual to attract the notice of ordinary observers. At the age of ten he was admitted to the Military School of Brienne, where he spent several years devoted to his studies, and afterwards removed to a similar institution at Paris, where he appears to have completed his education. That he laboured hard both at Brienne and at Paris, may be judged from the vast quantity of information which his strong memory ever placed at his disposal, and which, from the nature of his after life, must have been nearly, if not wholly, accumulated at this period. He succeeded in all that he undertook, because his will was resolute and his perseverance indomitable. He applied himself particularly to the study of mathematics, and made good progress in history and geography, but neglected Latin and the belles lettres. His intellectual faculties exerted themselves without any great effort on his part. He had a lively and prompt conception, a strong memory, and a cool and decided judgment. A foreigner, poor and proud, he kept aloof, for the most part, from the other boys, who were accustomed to taunt the distant young Corsican. He commonly sought for something to interest him; and this disposition placed him in a species of solitude, where he communed only with his own thoughts—a state which afterwards became habitual to him in all situations through life.

His birth having destined him for service, Napoleon had just completed his sixteenth year, when, in August 1785, after being examined by Laplace, he obtained his first commission as lieutenant of artillery in the regiment of La Fere. Never did he receive any title with so much pleasure as this. He was delighted beyond measure at his promotion; and the highest pitch to which his ambition then aspired was, that he might one day wear a couple of epaulettes à bouillons. A general of artillery seemed to him the ne plus ultra of human grandeur. He was already desirous of fame, however, and had conceived the idea of making himself a name by writing the history of the war in Corsica. He communicated his intention to Paoli, at the same time requesting that that officer would furnish him with the necessary information; but an historian of eighteen did not probably inspire any great confidence, and Paoli took no notice of his proposal. His advancement, however, indemnified him for this little mortification. In the year 1789 he obtained a company of artillery; and the Revolution, which broke out immediately afterwards, seemed to open up a new and more enlarged sphere of action. With this movement he soon foresaw that all his hopes and prospects were identified. "Had I been a general," said he, in the evening of his life, "I might have adhered to the King; but being a subaltern, I joined the patriots."

Happening to be in Paris in the year 1792, he witnessed the scene of the 20th June, when the revolutionary mob stormed the Tuileries, and placed the lives of the King and his family in the greatest jeopardy. He followed the crowd into the garden before the palace; and when Louis XVI. appeared on a balcony with the red cap on his head, he could no longer suppress his contempt and indignation.

"Poor driveller," said Napoleon; "how could he suffer Napoleon this rabble to enter? If he had swept away five or six hundred of them with his cannon, the rest would soon have disappeared." He was also a witness of the events of the 10th of August, when the throne was overturned, a provisional council established, the king confined in the Temple, the Republic proclaimed, and a national convention called to frame a charter. At this time he was without employment, and poor; wandering idly about Paris, living at the shops of restaurateurs, projecting a variety of schemes,—some of them wild enough,—and in a great measure dependent upon the scanty resources of his class-fellow Bourrienne. But the circumstances of the times were such that he was not suffered to remain long inactive. Being offered the command of a battalion of national volunteers destined to join the expedition to Sardinia, he readily accepted it; and upon the return of the expedition he re-entered the artillery with the rank of superior officer, or commandant. Till the siege of Toulon, however, he led an insignificant life. But this operation proved in some measure decisive of his fortunes. He saw that, from the situation which he held, as second in command of the artillery, he might have some influence on the result of the siege; and the event justified his anticipations.

When, towards the close of August 1793, Toulon, the great port and arsenal of France on the Mediterranean, had, along with the fleet, been delivered into the hands of the allies, the situation of France was truly deplorable. Lyons had raised the standard of the Bourbons; civil war raged in Languedoc and Provence; the victorious Spanish army had passed the Pyrenees, and overrun Roussillon; and the Piedmontese army, having cleared the Alps, was at the gates of Chambery and Antibes. Terror, discord, and defection reigned within; whilst on the frontiers one reverse followed hard at the heels of another. But the allies were not sufficiently sensible of the importance of the acquisition which they had just made. About six weeks were passed in assembling the force and means necessary for the siege. On the 16th of October a council of war was assembled at Ollionelles, where the conventional proconsul Gasparin presided; and on this occasion there was read to the council a memoir on the conduct of the siege of Toulon, which had been drawn up by the celebrated engineer D'Arcon, and approved by the committee of fortifications. Napoleon opposed the adoption of this plan, and proposed one much more simple. "Your object," said he, "is to make the English evacuate Toulon. Instead of attacking them in the town, which must involve a series of operations, and ruin the place, endeavour to establish batteries so as to sweep the harbour and roadstead. If you do this, the English ships must take their departure, and the English troops will certainly not remain behind them." He then pointed out a promontory nearly opposite the town, by establishing batteries on which the desired effect might be attained. "Gain La Grasse," said he, "and in two days Toulon will be yours." Had this suggestion been adopted in time the result would have been as Napoleon predicted; but the English had leisure allowed them to construct Fort Mulgrave, and to render it so strong that it went by the name of Little Gibraltar. Nevertheless, Napoleon's system prevailed. Instead of attacking the body of the place, the principal effort was directed against Fort Mulgrave; and in a month the desired end was obtained. On the 18th December the besiegers entered Toulon, but were able to save only the half of the squadron; the other half, the arsenal, and the dock-yards, having been consumed by the conflagration kindled by the English as they abandoned the place.

During the siege of Toulon, Napoleon, whilst constructing a battery under the enemy's fire, had occasion to prepare an order, and called for some one who could write with facility. A young sergeant stepped out, and, leaning on the breast-work, wrote as he dictated. The recovery of Toulon was a service of the very first importance to the revolutionary government. It suppressed the insurrectionary spirit in the south of France, restored the credit of the republican arms, and rendered disposable the force which had been employed in the siege. But the man to whose genius alone success was due did not immediately obtain the credit of this important achievement. The truth, however, was too generally known to be effectually concealed. Napoleon was appointed general of brigade, and in the beginning of 1794 was sent to the army of Italy to command the artillery. The general-in-chief, Dumerbion, was old and incapable; the head of his staff, though a man of information, wanted talents; and, between them, war was carried on without art or skill in the Maritime Alps. Napoleon proposed a plan for turning the famous position of Saorgio. His suggestion was adopted; Saorgio, with all its stores, surrendered, and the French obtained possession of the Maritime Alps. He then proposed another, which had for its object to unite the army of the Alps and that of Italy under the walls of Coni—an operation which would have secured Piedmont, and enabled the combined force, without any great effort, to establish itself on the Po. It was found impossible, however, to come to an arrangement with the staff of the army of the Alps; but Napoleon indemnified himself by carrying the army of Italy as far as Savona, and to the gates of Ceva; by which means he disengaged Genoa, then threatened by the allies, and would have achieved more important results had not his progress been stopped by the approach of winter and the imperative orders of the committee. He was superseded on the 6th of August 1794, apparently in consequence of the labours of Aubry, who had reformed the organization of the army, in order to impart to it greater solidity.

Before the end of the year he went to Paris in order to solicit employment, but at first experienced a very cold reception, probably on account of his supposed connection with Robespierre, with whose younger brother he was known to have lived on terms of friendship. The reaction consequent on the downfall of that extraordinary personage was then at its height, and threatened France with evils not less terrible than those from which it had just escaped. Everything was in an unsettled state, and the monthly renewal of the Committee of Public Safety served only to increase the confusion. After a time, however, Napoleon was placed amongst the generals of infantry appointed to serve in La Vendée; but he refused to act in a situation which he considered as altogether unsuitable to him, and resolved to remain at Paris, where he might be more usefully employed. This proved a fortunate determination, and soon led to service of a more congenial kind. Kellermann had just allowed himself to be beaten in the Alpines. The committee were anxious to repair the disaster, and with this view attached Napoleon to the board of military operations, with orders to prepare such instructions as might seem calculated to bring back victory to the national standards. This afforded him an opportunity of making his talents known, and probably contributed not a little to the future advancement of his fortunes. Soon afterwards, he was appointed to command a brigade of artillery in Holland, where for some time the war had languished; but before he could avail himself of this appointment, his services were required upon a nearer and more important field of action.

During the contest between the Convention and the sections of Paris (of which details will be found in the article France) it was proposed to Napoleon to command, under Napoleon, Barras, the armed force destined to act against the Parisians. He consented, upon condition of being left free from all interference, and lost not a moment in sending to Meudon for the artillery. He had 5000 men and 40 pieces of cannon, a force more than sufficient to put down a riot, but not too much against a national guard well armed, and provided with artillery; and he was reinforced by 1500 patriots, organized in three battalions.

On the 13th of Vendemiaire (4th of October 1795), the sectionaries marched, nearly 30,000 strong, against the Convention. One of their columns, debouching in the Rue Saint-Honoré, advanced boldly to the attack; but it was instantly checked by the fire of the artillery, which swept the street with grapeshot, and soon afterwards it gave way in confusion. A number of the fugitives attempted to make a stand on the steps of the church of St Roche, where, owing to the narrowness of the street, they were in a great measure sheltered from the fire of the artillery. Napoleon, however, promptly brought a gun to bear upon them, and in a few minutes this crowd was dispersed, leaving behind them a number of dead. The column which debouched by the Port-Royal was not more fortunate. Exposed to the direct fire of the guns stationed below the Tuileries, and taken in flank by that of the other batteries by which the bridge was commanded, all its efforts to establish itself upon the quays of the Seine proved unavailing, and, after a very short struggle, it dispersed, and fled in all directions. In less than an hour the whole was ended, and the Convention victorious. This event, so trivial in itself, and which scarcely cost 200 men on each side, had important consequences. It prevented the revolution from retrograding; it enabled the Convention to disarm the sections; and, above all, it had a marked influence upon the future fortunes of Napoleon. The eminent service he had rendered was immediately rewarded with the rank of general of division; in five days he was named second in command of the army of the interior; and soon afterwards, on the resignation of Barras, he was advanced to the chief command. He had now passed into the order of marked and distinguished men. But the situation which he held was by no means suited to his views. He longed to make war upon a more extended theatre of action, and to profit by the advantages which fortune had thrown in his way.

It was at this time, when his residence in Paris had begun to appear insupportable to his active mind, that he became acquainted with the widow of General Beauharnais, whom he afterwards married. At the moment when the sections were disarmed, the sword of her husband, who had perished by the guillotine, a victim of the tyranny of Robespierre, had been taken from her; and she now sent her son Eugene, a boy of fifteen, to beg that it might be restored to her. Her request was at once complied with, and the boy shed tears as he received from the hands of Napoleon the sword of his unfortunate father. This scene touched Napoleon; and, having gone to give an account of it to the mother of Eugene, he was so enchanted with her elegance and grace, that he soon afterwards made her a tender of his hand, which was accepted. Such appears to be the simple truth in regard to the origin of his relations with Josephine, concerning which so many absurd and injurious stories have been circulated. Napoleon had little relish for the society of women, which accorded neither with his tastes nor his character, and in which he experienced constraint; but, being desirous to fix himself in life, Napoleon, and finding in Josephine spirit and elegance united with celebrity, he resolved to make her his wife. The marriage took place on the 9th of March 1796, only a few days before he set out to assume the command of the army of Italy.

Tranquillity being now restored at Paris, the Directory had time to turn their attention to the state of affairs, particularly to that of the army of Italy, the condition of which was by no means satisfactory. It was determined to supersede Schérer, who had disappointed the expectations of the Directory, and to give it a new general; and as the chief command of the army of the interior naturally led to that of an active force, provided the individual holding it possessed the confidence of the government, Napoleon was consequently appointed general-in-chief of the army of Italy. To this command he had pre-eminent, and indeed exclusive claims. When serving under General Dumorillon, as commandant of artillery, he had turned the important position of Saorgio, and disengaged Genoa, then threatened by the allies; when employed at the board of military operations, he had digested a plan of campaign, the result of which was the signal victory gained at Loano, and the possession of the line of the Appennines, as far as Savona and the sources of the Bormida; and now, when brought into more direct contact with the government, he satisfied Carnot, to whom the direction of military operations was intrusted, that his plan in regard to Piedmont, which had been rejected by the Committee of Public Safety in 1794, might still be executed, with every prospect of success. These circumstances, independently of his services at Toulon, and also against the insurgent sections of Paris, naturally pointed him out as the person best qualified to obtain that success of which the Directory at this time stood so much in need, in order to support its credit and consolidate its power. That his talents were fully appreciated, and that he was solely indebted to his merits for this splendid command, admits of no doubt whatever. "Advance this young man," said Barras to one of his colleagues, "or he will advance himself without you." Napoleon quitted his wife ten days after their marriage, and, after a rapid journey, arrived at the head-quarters of the army at Nice. With that moment began the most brilliant scene of his entire career. "In three months," said he, "I shall be either at Milan or at Paris;" and before a year elapsed, he had grown old in victory.

The plan which he proposed for the campaign united all suffrages; for, though at once bold and original, it was in reality extremely simple. It had been agreed that he should manoeuvre by his right, in order to descend by Montferrat upon Lombardy, directing all his efforts against the Austrians, in the hope of detaching Piedmont from the imperial alliance. The armies of Germany being re-organized, were to resume the offensive by the end of April, and to endeavour to pass the Rhine. Jourdan, who commanded 70,000 men on the Lower Rhine, was to blockade Mayence with 30,000, and to advance into Franconia with from 40,000 to 50,000. Moreau, who had nearly an equal number under him, was to mask Manheim, and advance in Suabia; and it was proposed that both should unite in the heart of Bavaria. As to Napoleon, he had no other task to perform than that of advancing on the Adige; provided he succeeded by his victories in detaching Piedmont from the coalition, or in dethroning the King of Sardinia if the latter should refuse to make peace. In a word, this plan was merely a copy of that which Napoleon had previously drawn up for the committee, and the execution of which that body had recklessly intrusted to the incapable Schérer. Its distinctive characteristic consisted in the mode by which it was proposed to gain access to the fertile regions of Italy. Former invaders had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point or other of that mighty range of mountains. Napoleon judged that the same end might be more easily attained by turning them; that is, by advancing along the narrow gorge of comparatively level country which intervenes between these huge barriers and the Mediterranean, and by forcing a passage at that point where the last elevations of the Alps pass by gradual transition into the first and lowest of the Apennine range. The military advantages of operating in this direction will be immediately apparent.

Napoleon arrived at Nice on the 27th of March, and there found the army in a very precarious as well as destitute condition. Perched upon the summits of the Appennines, from Savona to Ormea, it was too widely dispersed, and its communications with France, running along the coast in a parallel direction between the enemy's line and the sea, were everywhere exposed; whilst the soldiers were in rags, without shoes, and a prey to almost every species of misery. Napoleon lost not a moment in placing the army in more advantageous positions, and in announcing that he was about to assume the offensive, with a view to provide for its wants, at the same time that he consulted its glory. This announcement had the desired effect. The soldiers forgot their privations, and eagerly longed to signalize their courage and devotion under the young chief who had promised to lead them to victory. Having occupied the principal roads leading from Nice to Italy, particularly that which sweeps the north by Saorgio, and crosses the chain of the Alps at the Col di Tende, Napoleon demanded of the senate of Genoa a free passage by the city and the Bochetta, along the road leading from Genoa to Alexandria, promising, in return, to carry the theatre of war beyond its frontiers, and to insure it the alliance and protection of the French republic.

On the 10th of April the Austrian general Beaulieu descended from the Appennines by the Bochetta, at the head of his left wing, and having dislodged the advanced guard of the French from Voltiri, carried two of their redoubts. On the 12th Napoleon defeated the Austrian centre under Argenteau, overcame the Piedmontese on the 13th, and on the day following compelled Provera to lay down his arms. After a few more decisive encounters, in which he carried all before him, the conqueror concluded a sort of armistice at Cherasco, by which the King of Sardinia engaged to deliver up Coni, Alexandria, and Ceva, to withdraw from the coalition, and to send the Count de Ravel to Paris to treat of a definitive accommodation.

Thus, in somewhat less than a month, Napoleon with an army destitute of everything, had gained six victories, taken twenty-one standards, fifty guns, and several strong places, conquered the richest part of Piedmont, made 15,000 prisoners, and killed or wounded 10,000 men. He had reduced the Austrians to inaction, destroyed the army of the King of Sardinia, detached him from the imperial alliance, wrested from his hands the keys of the Alps, and established a solid basis for his future operations. In a few days he had done more than the former army of Italy in four campaigns; he had displayed consummate genius in achieving victory, and proved that he combined with it the still rarer talent of turning it to profit, by promptly gathering up its fruits. But his hopes were not yet realized. To deliver Italy from the German yoke, and to falsify the proverb which regarded that country as the tomb of the French, was the task which he still reserved for himself, and which he hesitated the less to undertake, as the armistice had left him at liberty to direct his whole force against the isolated army of Beaulieu, now too much enfeebled to resist his attacks with any chance of success.

No commander ever appreciated more justly than Napoleon the value of time in military operations. The day after the signature of the treaty of Cherasco, he put his divisions in motion, and directed them upon Alexandria. Partly by stratagem, and partly by dexterous movements, Napoleon succeeded in obliging Beaulieu to withdraw from his position at Valleggio, on the Ogogno, and to attempt concentrating his army towards Lodi. With the view of forcing the Austrians to retire from this position, Napoleon marched on Lodi, at the head of the grenadiers and the corps of Massena and Augereau, leaving before Pizzighetone a division to mask that place and cover his right, and taking measures for the safety of his left, by directing Serrurier upon Pavia. On the 10th he arrived before Lodi, where Beaulieu, having retired with the main body of his army to Crema, had left General Schottendorf with 10,000 men to defend both sides of the Adda. By means of this strong rearguard the enemy had hoped to preserve the bridge of Lodi, which was defended by twenty pieces of cannon established on the left bank; but they soon found that they had reckoned without their host. A battalion and some squadrons which occupied the town of Lodi were, without much difficulty, dislodged, and the French reached the bridge before the enemy's workmen had time to cut it down. Napoleon instantly formed his grenadiers in close column, and rushed along the bridge. The troops advanced with loud shouts to the attack, but being assailed by a perfect storm of grape-shot, they hesitated for a moment, and began to waver. The generals, including Napoleon himself, hurried to the front, cheering and animating the men by their example. The effect was electric. The column dashed along the bridge in spite of the tempest of fire which thinned their ranks, overthrew all that opposed their progress, carried the enemy's batteries at the point of the bayonet, and dispersed his battalions. Schottendorf retreated upon Crema, with the loss of fifteen guns and 2000 men killed or wounded. This, though only an affair of the rearguard, was a daring feat of arms; and its immediate consequences were the occupation of Pizzighetone, the retreat of Beaulieu towards the Mincio, and the triumphal entry of Napoleon into Milan, where his presence had become absolutely necessary. As the French troops had been in continued motion for a month, it was judged expedient to allow them some days' rest; and hence Beaulieu was not pursued.

Having thus descended like a torrent from the Apennines, overthrown and dispersed all that opposed him, separated Piedmont from the coalition, received the submission of the Dukes of Parma and Modena, driven the Austrians behind the Mincio, and entered the capital of Lombardy in triumph, Napoleon immediately directed his attention to the internal administration of the country, prescribed the measures necessary for the reduction of the citadel of Milan, imposed contributions, and made arrangements for establishing the republican system in Italy. His career of victory had been one of unexampled rapidity, and he now sought to secure and consolidate the conquests he had made. The intelligence of his success, however, appears to have excited astonishment and suspicion in the minds of the French Directory, who perceived with alarm that their young general had already made himself master of Italy. Scarcely had he reached Milan, when he received orders to divide his army in two; to give up the command of that of Italy to Kellermein, who was to observe the Austrians on the Mincio; and with the remaining 25,000 men, forming an army of the south, to advance upon Rome, and even to act against Naples. But this division of force, at the moment when it was about to contend against all the resources of the House of Austria, was a great deal too absurd to be submitted to by a commander like Napoleon; he answered by resigning his command, and thus saved the army from inevitable destruction. Meanwhile, he resolved to drive Beaulieu into the Tyrol, and with this view he addressed to his soldiers one of the most remarkable proclamations that ever proceeded from his pen. He knew well the men with whom he had to deal; he knew that the French soldiery, full of fire and enthusiasm, would be transported by an appeal which awakened in their minds heroic sentiments; he knew that such an address would produce at Rome or at Naples the same effect as it had done at Turin; he knew also that in proportion as he exalted the courage of his troops he struck terror into those of the enemy, and at the same time bequeathed to posterity a monument of his talent for command. The revolt of Lombardy for a moment endangered the success of his plan. On the day when he quitted Milan to advance against the Austrians, the tocsin sounded in the rear of his army; the people flew to arms, and having seized upon Pavia, put the garrison to death. The least hesitation on his part would have rendered this rising general. Without stopping the march of the army, he proceeded in all haste to Pavia, followed by 300 horse and a battalion of grenadiers, at the head of which he forced the gates, penetrated into the city, which was delivered up to pillage, ordered the municipality to be shot, and thus, by one vigorous blow, extinguished the insurrection in its principal focus. At Binasco, Lannes acted with equal promptitude and severity; and at Lugo, where a squadron of French horse had been destroyed, a number of the male inhabitants were shot.

After the defeat of Lodi, Beaulieu had not ventured to halt behind the Oglio, nor even behind the Chiesa. He preferred the stronger line of the Mincio, flanked on the left by the fortress of Mantua, and on the right by the Lago di Garda and the mountains of the Tyrol. Behind this barrier he established his army, with his centre posted at Valleggio, his left at Goito, and his right at Peschiera, a small place belonging to the Venetians. As the wings thus rested upon two strong places, Napoleon resolved to force the centre; at the same time making demonstrations on the side of Peschiera, which covered the enemy's line of retreat to the Tyrol. On the 30th of May he arrived at Borghetto with the mass of his army, and immediately dislodged an advanced guard of the enemy stationed on the left of the Mincio. Having repaired the bridge of Borghetto, which the Austrians had partly destroyed in their retreat, he was preparing to force the passage of the river, when a column of grenadiers threw themselves into the stream, carrying their arms on their heads, as the water reached to their shoulders. The enemy, believing themselves about to be attacked by the redoubtable column of Lodi, gave way, and taking the road to the Tyrol, allowed the French to effect the passage without opposition. Beaulieu attempted to make a stand upon the heights between Villafranca and Valleggio; but having learned the movement of Augereau on Peschiera, he immediately retired beyond the Adige, and ascended the right bank by Dolce as far as Caliano. Part of his left ascending the Mincio to join him at Valleggio, came suddenly upon the French head-quarters, and nearly captured the general-in-chief, but was soon dispersed by the troops under Massenay; and the remainder of this wing, being detached from Goito, entered Mantua, the garrison of which now exceeded 13,000 men. The investment of that fortress was immediately decided on by Napoleon; materials for the siege having previously been prepared at

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1 The success of this attack was facilitated by the very circumstance which seemed to entail instant failure. Whilst the troops hesitated under the storm of fire with which they were assailed on the bridge, some soldiers slid down by the piles into an island in the river, where they hoped to find some point of attack less exposed to the enemy's fire. Here they discovered that the second branch of the Adda was fordable, upon which a battalion immediately spread itself out en tirailleurs, in order to turn the Austrian line; and, thus favoured, the mass of grenadiers passed the bridge at the pas de charge. Meanwhile Napoleon took measures for strengthening himself upon the Adige, where his situation had become complicated, and in fact presented a variety of new combinations. The investment of Mantua required that he should be master of the course of the Adige; and the key of this river is Verona, the position of which forms the basis of every system upon that line of operations. He therefore took it upon him to summon the latter city, which was surrendered without resistance, on the 1st of June; and by this precious acquisition he procured three fine bridges on the Adige, and a strong central position, defended by bastions, and protected by two forts perched on the last slopes of the Tyrolese mountains, so as to shut up hermetically the valley of the Adige on the left bank of the river. He also placed garrisons in Crema, Peschiera, and other strong places belonging to the Venetians; and having concluded armistices with the King of Naples and the Pope, occupied Leghorn, where he seized a large amount of English property and merchandise. The investment of Mantua was now converted into a regular siege, the labours of which were intrusted to Serrurier's division; 10,000 strong, whilst the rest of the army remained in observation upon the Adige as far as the western bank of the Lago di Garda. The trenches were opened on the 18th of July; but a new act of the drama was about to commence.

The cabinet of Vienna, justly alarmed at the progress of Napoleon, had resolved to check his career by opposing to him a new army and a new general. Beaulieu was replaced by Wurmser, who, having set out from Mannheim, reached Trent towards the end of July, at the head of an army of 60,000 men. At this time Napoleon had not more than 30,000 men under his immediate command, and 10,000 were engaged under Serrurier in the siege. The Austrians had therefore a superiority of force which seemed to insure them the victory. In the last days of July, Wurmser debouched from the Tyrol; Quasdanovich, with 25,000 men, moving by the left bank of the Lago di Garda upon Salo and Brescia; and the marshal, with the remaining 35,000, descending the Adige in three columns. Napoleon instantly resolved to attack Quasdanovich before he could form a junction with Wurmser on the Mincio. This was his only chance of success, and to secure it he quitted everything. The siege of Mantua was raised; 140 pieces of cannon were abandoned in the trenches; and by the evening of the 30th Napoleon had assembled between Peschiera and Goito the divisions of Massena and Augereau, with the reserve of Serrurier's division.

Next day he passed the Mincio to encounter Quasdanovich. The Austrian general, assailed by a superior force, was driven from Lonato, Brescia, and Salo, and compelled to fall back on Gavardo. On the 3d, Augereau's division, supported by the reserve, advanced upon Castiglione; that of Massena directed its march on Lonato; and Guyeux received orders to debouch on Salo, in order to induce Quasdanovich to continue his retreat by threatening his communications with the Tyrol. Napoleon conceived that he was directing his effort against Wurmser, but, on the contrary, it fell upon the left of Quasdanovich, who was now making another attempt to operate his junction by Lonato. As might be expected, the Austrian was again defeated, and being warmly pursued, was forced to direct his columns on their former position at Gavardo. The same day Augereau attacked and defeated the advanced guard of Wurmser at Castiglione. Napoleon had as yet obtained only partial successes; but they strengthened him in his central position, and gave him the means of dealing heavier blows. The first of these was directed against Quasdanovich, who, on the very next day, was surprised at Gavardo, threatened with an attack in reverse, and obliged to fall back in great disorder upon Riva; thus definitively ridding Napoleon of a corps formidable from its strength, as well as from the strategic direction which had been assigned to it.

But if fortune seconded Napoleon in this juncture, he was at the same instant exposed to the greatest danger in the midst of his very head-quarters. Massena's division had just quitted Lonato, where Napoleon remained with 1200 men, when all of a sudden an alarm was given that the place had been surrounded by an enemy's corps, and soon afterwards an Austrian officer came to summon him to surrender. Happily his presence of mind did not forsake him. He presumed that this could only be one of the detachments of Quasdanovich which had been separated from the main body in the recent affair of Lonato; and he resolved to extricate himself by audacity from a situation which must have been not a little embarrassing. Assuming a menacing tone, "What means this insolence?" said he. "Do you dare to beard the French general in the midst of his army?" The Austrian officer was confounded, and hearing the word "fusillade" significantly pronounced by Napoleon, he became so terrified that he consented to surrender. Two thousand men, provided with four pieces of cannon, then laid down their arms, and discovered, when it was too late, that if they had stood firm, the French general-in-chief and all his staff must have been their prisoners. This corps formed the advanced guard of Quasdanovich, which, in executing a reconnaissance with a view to a junction with Wurmser, had crossed on the march the columns of St Hilaire and Sauret, and had fallen upon the French head-quarters at the very moment when the camp of Gavardo was unexpectedly attacked by the French troops.

The combat which decided the final success of this operation took place on the 5th of August, near Castiglione. Wurmser, still infected with the mania of detachments, had pushed one in the direction of the Lower Po, and left another to blockade Peschiera, so that there remained under his immediate orders not more than 25,000 men. The divisions of Massena and Augereau, with the reserve, presented a force equal to that of the enemy, and the arrival of the division of Serrurier turned the balance decidedly in favour of the French. As soon as the latter came up, Napoleon attacked the enemy's left with his right and centre, defeated it, and forced him to repass the Mincio with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon. Massena instantly crossed the Mincio at Peschiera, and falling upon the enemy's right wing, established before that place, routed and put it to flight. Wurmser now perceived that a prompt retreat could alone save him, and, leaving in Mantua a garrison of 15,000 men, he fell back along the valley of the Adige, warmly pursued by the French as far as the entrance of the Tyrol, which he regained with a total loss of 12,000 men and fifty pieces of cannon.

The Austrians, however, had scarcely re-entered the Tyrol, when, being joined by considerable reinforcements, they once more found themselves stronger than their adversaries; and Wurmser having received positive orders to relieve Mantua, imagined that he could attain this end without fighting, by means of manoeuvres alone. Davidovich was to cover the Tyrol with 20,000 men disseminated from the environs of Feldkirch as far as Roveredo; whilst Wurmser himself, with the remaining 25,000, should descend the valley of the Brenta, to debouch on Porto-Lezigno and the rear of the French army. But the young chief of the French army was not the man to allow himself to be deceived by false demonstrations. At the moment when Wurmser was meditating this false movement, Napoleon received a reinforcement of 6000 men from the army of the Alps; and being thus strengthened, he resolved to penetrate into the heart of the Tyrol, and to Napoleon fell upon the right of Wurmser at the moment when he was draining the Tyrol in order to manoeuvre by his left. On the 4th of September, Wukassowich, who commanded the advanced guard, was expelled from the camp at Mori, and driven back, first on Roveredo, and then on Calliano, where he formed a junction with the mass of the corps. The position of Calliano seemed inexpugnable; but Davidovich, being attacked by a greatly superior force, was compelled to abandon this redoubtable gorge, leaving in the hands of the assailants twenty-five guns and 2000 prisoners. The Austrians retreated in the greatest disorder, and next day the French entered Trent. Meanwhile Davidovich rallied the remains of his corps behind the Lavis; Napoleon, however, resolved to dislodge him; he was attacked by Vaubois, and having in vain attempted to defend the passage of the river, he was thrown back upon Salurn and Neumark.

In the course of this victorious march, Napoleon learned the movement of Wurmser on the Brenta, and resolved to make the most of it. After a series of successful manoeuvres, on the part of the French, Wurmser was attacked on the morning of the 8th of September, and driven back in disorder on Bassano. The French instantly pursued, and reaching the town close on the heels of the fugitives, carried it by main force. Not knowing where to make head, Wurmser, with the left of his corps de bataille, retired on Fonteriva, where he passed the Brenta, and took the direction of Vicenza; whilst Quasdanovich, with the right, finding it impossible to gain the Brenta, fell back upon Friuli. In this affair 2000 prisoners, thirty pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of baggage, fell into the hands of the French. The situation of Wurmser seemed desperate; and he resolved to throw himself into Mantua, and there await the arrival of fresh succours from Austria. A mistake on the part of Sahaguet enabled him to accomplish this more easily than might have been expected. He had flattered himself with appearing before that fortress at the head of 26,000 victorious troops; but in reality he threw himself into the place with no more than 12,000 men, discouraged by defeat, and, instead of raising the siege, about to be themselves invested. The entire garrison having salled out to forage on the 15th, Napoleon attacked them with his whole force; penetrated as far as St George, which he carried at the point of the bayonet; and having compelled Wurmser to retire within the body of the place, completed the investment of the city and the fortress. The charge of the blockade was intrusted to General Kilmaine, with Serrurier's division, and the rest of the army were placed in observation before the Tyrol.

The position of Napoleon, however, was by no means without difficulty, to say nothing of danger. By the middle of October, Davidovich had received reinforcements which raised the force of his corps to 20,000 men, that of Quasdanovich now amounted to 25,000 combatants, and the Croats were permanently organized into regiments to facilitate the arrival of the levies drawn from the Tyrol, and the recruits raised in the interior. The supreme command was conferred on General Alvinzi, a veteran of high reputation, who, having joined the corps of Davidovich, resumed the offensive, directing that corps by Bassano on Verona, where he hoped to effect a junction with Davidovich, who had received orders to descend the Adige.

Napoleon could not advance to encounter Alvinzi without abandoning Verona, and consequently enabling Davidovich to overthrow Vaubois, unite with Wurmser under Mantua, and thus establish in his rear an army superior in number to all the troops he had been able to collect. Vaubois was too weak to defend the approach to Trent; but in ordering him to assume the offensive, Napoleon hoped to impose on David-

owich. In this, however, he was deceived. On the 3d of November Vaubois was forced to fall back on Calliano; on the 4th Davidovich entered Trent; and on the same day the army of Alvinzi arrived at Castelada and Bassano. At the approach of the enemy Massena fell back on Montebello. Davidovich now marched on Calliano, and Alvinzi prepared to move upon Verona by Vicenza. Napoleon now decided to repeat from right to left the manoeuvre which had succeeded against Wurmser from left to right,—that is, after first trying to defeat Alvinzi, and drive him behind the Piave, he proposed to ascend the Brenta, in order to fall upon the rear of Davidovich. With the divisions of Augereau and Massena he advanced towards the Brenta, which the enemy had already passed, and on the 6th attacked their left under Provera at Carmagnano, and their right under Quasdanovich at Lenovo, though with only partial success. Provera repassed the Brento, and Quasdanovich withdrew to Bassano without suffering any serious loss. Meanwhile Vaubois, being warmly pressed on the Adige, was, after two days' fighting, driven from the strong position of Calliano, and obliged to retreat on La Corona. Napoleon flew to this division, harangued the 39th and 85th regiments, which had given way at Calliano, and threatened to inscribe on their colours that they were no longer worthy to belong to the army of Italy. Moved with these reproaches, the soldiers shed tears, and swore to conquer or die when next led against the enemy. Napoleon, however, found it necessary to renounce his projects, and to retire on Verona, where he established the head-quarters of the army. The whole country between the Brenta and the Adige being now in the hands of the enemy, the French general began to be closely pressed, and, not choosing to be more so, resolved once more to fall upon Alvinzi. On the 11th he left Verona with the divisions of Massena and Augereau, and next day attacked the enemy, whom he found in position at Caldiero. But a violent tempest which beat in the faces of the troops, and the strong position of the enemy, rendered all his efforts unavailing; he was repulsed with loss, and forced to return to Verona, where his situation now became more critical than ever. He was everywhere too weak; and the fortune which had hitherto so signally befriended him seemed at length to abandon her favourite. Any other general, in his circumstances, would have thought only of repassing the Mincio, and would thus have lost Italy. But in war it often happens, that to gain all a general must risk all. Reduced to this predicament, Napoleon determined to pass the Adige below the left of Alvinzi, and thus to act on his rear. The project was hazardous in itself; but it was nevertheless wise, because it was the only one which still left him some chance of success.

Having recalled Kilmaine with two thousand men from the blockade of Mantua, Napoleon confided to him the defence of Verona, and on the night of the 14th November he set out from Verona for Ronco, where he threw a bridge over the Adige. On the 15th he passed the river, with the divisions of Massena and Augereau and the reserve of cavalry, forming in all about 20,000 men, and advanced by the three dikes which conduct to Arcole. A brigade of Croats, however, profiting by the advantages of the ground, repulsed the attack of Augereau, whose column had been directed on the bridge of Arcole, and afforded time to Alvinzi to come to their assistance. The latter also sent Provera with six battalions to attack Massena at Porcil, and with the mass of his army retrograded on St Bonifacio. But this unforeseen obstacle did not discourage Napoleon. Perceiving that if he could not attain Villa Nova by the

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1 Napoleon never forgave Sahaguet for this oversight, which deprived him of one of the fairest fruits of his victory of Bassano. His plan had been so ably formed, that, but for Sahaguet's blunder, the destruction of Wurmser would have been inevitable. Napoleon, left bank of the Alpon, he might act more directly by Porcil on Alvinzi's line of retreat; and sensible that, with this view, as well as to secure his right, and prevent himself from being taken in an end-de-sac, it had become absolutely necessary to make himself master of the village and defile of Arcole, he made fresh efforts to carry the bridge. The greater part of his generals being wounded, he seized a standard, and urged his grenadiers once more to the charge. They advanced boldly amidst a tremendous fire; but the head of the column being shattered the troops gave way, and Napoleon being thrown into the marsh was in imminent danger of being taken. At this critical moment Belliard charged with a company of grenadiers, and rescued the general-in-chief when about to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nevertheless, towards evening, the Austrians abandoned Arcole, on the approach of a brigade which had passed the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo, and was advancing along the left bank of the Alpon. But it was now too late; and Napoleon, not choosing to run the risk of passing the night with his troops crowded in the marshes, in presence of the hostile army deployed between San Bonifacio and San Stephano, and fell back to Ronco, on the right bank of the Adige.

The combat of the second day proved not more decisive than that of the first. It was maintained with equal bravery on both sides; and in the evening Napoleon, from the same motives as before, repassed the Adige. But the third conflict proved decisive. At daybreak on the 17th the French troops resumed their march to the bridge, and drove back the Austrians on Porcil and Arcole. It was not against this point, however, that Napoleon had resolved to direct his principal efforts. Leaving Robert with a demi-brigade to keep the enemy in check, he therefore directed Massena with another demi-brigade on Porcil, whilst the rest of his division remained in reserve near the bridge; and he ordered Augereau to throw a bridge over the Alpon, near the embouchure of the rivulet, so as to be in a condition to act against the Austrian left, and thus take Arcole in reverse. As Napoleon had foreseen, the Austrians, reinforced at Arcole, assumed the offensive, and drove back Robert, whom they pursued with reckless impetuosity. Proud of this success, their deep columns continued to advance, and suddenly came upon the main body of Massena's division, placed in ambuscade amongst some willows, who instantly assailed them in flank, cut off 3000 men, and forced the remainder to retire in disorder on Arcole. The decisive moment had now arrived. Augereau developed his attack, whilst some cavalry appeared on the enemy's flank; Massena debouched by Arcole and St Gregorio; the little garrison of Legnago threatened the enemy's rear; and the latter, unable to maintain themselves in ground favourable for acting on the defensive, were reduced to the alternative of either accepting battle in an open country or commencing a precipitate retreat. Alvinzi durst not risk the former, and on the 18th he retired on Montebello, leaving Napoleon at perfect liberty to turn upon Davidovich.

After a few more successful encounters, which will be found detailed in the article France, Napoleon had rendered abortive all the efforts of Austria. A fourth army had been baffled; and for two months after the last day of Arcole the French general remained undisputed master of Lombardy. To him this interval was of great importance, as it enabled him to take the necessary measures for consolidating his conquests, and also to procure reinforcements sufficient not only to put him in a condition to maintain himself, but also to insure the fall of Wurmser, and to strike a blow at the very heart of the Austrian monarchy.

All that Napoleon had yet done seemed like the web of Penelope; it was invariably undone by the constancy with which the cabinet of Vienna reinforced its army of Italy, and by the negligence of the Directory, which had so long delayed to afford him adequate support. In fact, he was Napoleon treated by the government of France as Hannibal had been by the senate of Carthage. But public opinion forbade the sacrifice of a general and an army that had gained so many victories; and, as the battles of Arcole showed that both were within a hair's-breadth of being expelled from Italy, it was at length resolved to adopt decisive measures. Accordingly, the fine divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, drawn from the armies of the Rhine, were, notwithstanding the winter, directed across the Alps, and, on joining the French army, would have made its total strength about 75,000 men. On the other hand, by the end of December, Alvinzi having under his orders upwards of 40,000 men, resolved to descend from the mountains, and make another effort for the relief of Mantua. For the fourth time, therefore, the possession of that important place was to be submitted to the arbitrement of arms.

Whilst waiting the arrival of the reinforcements which he expected from the Rhine, Napoleon, apprized that Alvinzi had assumed the offensive, flew to the Adige, to watch the development of his attack. At this moment the division of Serrurier was before Mantua; that of Augereau occupied the line of the Adige from Verona to Legnago and beyond it; Massena was at Verona; and Joubert, with a fourth division, held the important positions of La Corona and Rivali. Each of these divisions was about ten thousand strong; and Rey, with a reserve of four thousand, occupied Desenzano. The imperialists, as if determined to profit by no lesson, advanced at once on the centre and the two wings of the French army, by Roveredo, Vicenza, and Padua; but Napoleon, as he had not yet ascertained in which of these three directions Alvinzi was carrying the mass of his force, resolved to keep his positions until the Austrian general had developed his projects. On the 12th of January 1797, the column which advanced by Vicenza approached Verona, and drove in the advanced posts of Massena. But the division of that general having debouched on St Michel, the enemy was repulsed with loss; and Napoleon acquired the certainty that he was not in force upon that point. Having received intelligence that the principal corps was advancing by the valley of the Adige, Napoleon instantly set out from Verona with the greater part of Massena's division, leaving two thousand men to keep in check the column of Vicenza; and at the same time he sent orders to Rey to advance from Salo on Rivali, and to Joubert to maintain himself, at any sacrifice, in advance of Rivali until his arrival.

Soon after midnight Napoleon arrived. It was a fine clear moonlight, and by the enemy's watch-fires, which illuminated the white peaks of Montebaldo, he could easily distinguish five separate encampments. On the morning of the 14th he made his dispositions for battle, and commenced the attack by directing Joubert against the Austrian centre, whilst a demi-brigade was detached to keep in check Lusignan. The enemy sustained the shock with great firmness, and, becoming the assailant in his turn, forced Joubert to give way; Vial, who commanded the right, also retrograded, and the plateau seemed about to be carried. At this critical moment Napoleon, favoured by the vigorous stand made by one of his regiments in the centre, flew to the left, whither he directed the column of Massena, which had just arrived; the enemy were repulsed, and the French left established itself on the heights of Trombadora. The danger, however, was not yet passed. The right was warmly pursued by the Austrians, who had descended from the heights of San Marco; Quasdanovich, having forced the entrenchments of Osteria, was also beginning to ascend the plateau of Rivali; and Lusignan was moving by Affi upon the rear of the French. Napoleon was in fact surrounded; but an instant's reflection convinced him, that if he could overpower Quasdanovich, he would have nothing to fear. Napoleon from Lusignan, and that matters might easily be re-established on the right. This intuitive judgment decided the fortune of the day. As soon as the head of Quasdanovich's column appeared on the plateau it was assailed on both flanks by the infantry, and in front by the cavalry under Lasalle; and being forced back into the ravine, it was thrown into complete disorder by the explosion of an ammunition wagon in the midst of the troops when crowded together in the hollow. Confusion and terror reigned supreme; infantry, cavalry, artillery, fled pell-mell by Canale. Having thus got rid of Quasdanovich, Napoleon directed his efforts to support Vial, who was now in full retreat. The Austrians, pursuing with headlong impetuosity, had got into disorder, when a charge of two hundred horse completed the confusion; the panic communicated itself to the centre, which immediately disbanded; and it was only behind the Tasso that Alvinzi succeeded in rallying the fugitives. The fate of Lusignan was now sealed. Attacked by Massena in front and by Rey in the rear, his corps was destroyed, and he regained Montebaldo with only a few hundred men.

On the evening of the battle, however, Napoleon learned that Provera, having forced the centre of Augereau's division, scattered along the Adige, had succeeded in passing the river at Anghiari on the 13th, and was directing his march on Mantua. On the 14th the Austrian general was at Nogara, and on the 15th he arrived before Mantua, into which he hoped to make good his entrance by the suburb of St George. But finding it retrenched and occupied by the besiegers, he next day attacked the post of La Favorita, whilst Wurmser salied out against that of San Antonio. Serrurier, however, succeeded in maintaining his ground; Wurmser retired into the body of the place; and Provera, assailed on all sides by the forces which Napoleon had promptly directed against him, was forced to lay down his arms. Meanwhile Joubert, acting with equal vigour, pursued Alvinzi without intermission, turned both his flanks, and getting upon his line of retreat, made 5000 prisoners. Having lost half his army, the Austrian general now withdrew the remainder behind the Piave, leaving only 8000 men for the defence of the Tyrol, and the French army resumed the positions which it had occupied before the combats of Arcole. Such, then, was the famous battle of Rivoli, in which Napoleon, with only thirty thousand men, made twenty thousand prisoners. But its most important result was the capitulation of Mantua, which surrendered on the 2d of February, thus rendering the French undisputed masters of Lombardy. The terms granted to Wurmser were much more favourable than he had any reason to expect, with a garrison reduced to the last extremity, and suffering from almost every species of privation and misery.

Whilst Napoleon was at blows with Alvinzi, the court of Rome, seduced by the instigations of Austria, had broken the armistice concluded in the month of June immediately preceding, and raised a considerable body of troops, the command of which was intrusted to General Colli, whom the cabinet of Vienna had sent for the purpose. Thinking it necessary to punish this hostile demonstration, partly as an example to others, and partly also to get rid of an enemy seldom dangerous but always inconvenient, Napoleon formed a division, which he placed under the command of Victor, and directed to march upon Imola in the Romagna, where it arrived on the 2d of February, the very day on which Mantua capitulated. The campaign was neither long nor bloody. A corps of 4000 papal troops, which attempted to defend the Senio, was totally routed; Faenza was carried at the point of the bayonet; and Colli, with about 3000 men, were made prisoners. On the 9th Victor arrived at Ancona, where he compelled 1200 men to lay down their arms; on the 10th his van-guard entered Loretto, and rifled the treasury of the Santa Casa; and by the 18th he had reached Tolentino, where his progress was stopped by the conclusion of peace. The terms were such as Napoleon thought fit to dictate. The pope confirmed the cession of Avignon, the Comtat, and the legations of Ferrara and Bologna; he also ceded the Romagna, obliged himself to pay a contribution of L1,200,000, and agreed to execute, in the fullest manner, the provisions of Bologna respecting works of art.

The face of affairs being now completely changed, Napoleon hastened to carry the war into the hereditary dominions of Austria. With 55,000 men he resolved to advance against the enemy; and the Directory, with a view to second him, ordered Moreau to repass the Rhine at Kehl, whilst Hoche, after re-organizing the army of the Sambre and Meuse, should again advance upon the Meyn. The cabinet of Vienna had entertained the idea of carrying the theatre of the war into Italy; but it was not till after the capture of Kehl by the Archduke Charles, and the disaster of Alvinzi at Rivoli, that it was resolved to act upon this principle. Accordingly, about the middle of January, the archduke, who had just distinguished himself by a masterly campaign, set out with three divisions of chosen troops to traverse the Tyrol, and to oppose the conqueror of Italy. Meanwhile, as the divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas had actually joined the French army, whilst the Austrian reinforcements were as yet only traversing Bavaria, Napoleon, finding himself ready to take the field before the enemy, resolved to profit by this advantage, anticipate his adversary, and attack him à outrance, before his whole force should be assembled. Having arranged his plan of operations, and recalled Victor from Ancona to the Adige in order to cover his communications, he put his army in motion on the 10th of March, and with the mass of his force advanced towards the Tagliamento, whilst Massena was directed to move on Feltre, in order to push the brigade of Lusignan, left in observation on the Piave, and also to menace the right of the archduke. This secondary movement was immediately successful. Lusignan retired, ascending the Piave; but on the 13th, his rear-guard, being overtaken at Longaro, was overpowered, and the general himself made prisoner. Satisfied with having thrown the Austrian brigade on Cadore, Massena now directed his march on Splinbergo and Gemona, in order more effectually to turn the Austrian right, and occupy the important route of Poteba, of which the enemy might take advantage in order to retire upon Villach. On the 16th Napoleon arrived at Valvasone, on the Tagliamento. The archduke had already commenced his retreat, leaving only a rear-guard on the Tagliamento. But the river being fordable, the French columns rushed into the stream, overthrew the enemy, and pursued them along the road leading to Palmanova. Prince Charles having now divided his army, he himself fell back on Goriza; one of his columns, commanded by Gontreuil and Bayaltisch, with the greater part of the matériel, moved by Cividale and the valley of Natiso upon Caporetto; and Ocksay, with the brigade of Lusignan, covered the road from Villach to Chiussi-Veneta. But the Isonzo, from its source as far as Goriza, flows between two chains of mountains which are nearly impassible on the side of Krainburg. Napoleon, therefore, manoeuvred against the left flank of the archduke, with the view of throwing him back into the valley of the Isonzo, where his army would have found themselves in the Candine Forks; and, for a moment, he entertained some hope of accomplishing his object. The left of the enemy was covered by the town of Gradisca, occupied by four battalions. On the 17th Bernadotte attacked the place in front; whilst Serrurier, passing the Isonzo between the city and Montefalcone, took it in reverse, and forced the garrison to capitulate. Directing Guyeux by Cividale on Caporetto, Napoleon now ascended the left bank of the Isonzo, for the purpose of cutting off the enemy from the road of Czernita, or obliging him to plunge into the valley of the Isonzo by Canale. But as soon as the French general had developed his movement, the archduke fell back, in all haste, upon Laybach, taking the road by Czernita and Adelsberg, closely followed by Bernadotte. Disappointed in one object, Napoleon instantly turned his attention to another, and directed all his efforts against the column of Gontreuil and Bayatitsch, which, being headed by Massena at Tarvis, was thrown back into the gorges of Oberpreth, and being there surrounded, was forced to lay down its arms. On this occasion, 4000 prisoners, 25 pieces of cannon, and 400 baggage waggons, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

From Laybach the archduke had marched by Klagenfurth on St Veit, where he was joined by the first of the reinforcements sent from Germany; but not believing himself even yet in a condition to deliver battle, he fell back upon Neumarkt, and on the 30th Napoleon arrived at St Veit. On the 2d of April Massena forced the gorges of Dirmstein, and at Neumarkt and Hundsmarck defeated the enemy's rear-guard, consisting of the grenadiers who had just arrived from the Rhine. The archduke continued his retreat on Vienna, and on the 6th Napoleon arrived at Jundburg. But the contest had now reached its term. Two days afterwards, the Austrians, who had received instructions from Vienna touching a letter which Napoleon had addressed to Prince Charles from Klagenfurth, manifesting a desire of accommodation, demanded an armistice, with a view to treat of the preliminaries of peace. To this proposal Napoleon gladly consented. His position was in fact more brilliant than solid. In these circumstances the negotiations speedily advanced towards a favourable issue; and, on the 18th of April 1797, the preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben, to which the French head-quarters had been transferred.

The conclusion of peace with Austria was almost immediately followed by the annihilation of the republic of Venice. The government of that state had done everything to call down the vengeance of the conqueror. Besides other offences, a repetition of the Sicilian Vespers had taken place at Verona, where every Frenchman found in the streets or houses was butchered in cold blood, and the commandant, General Balland, forced to retire into the castles with 3000 men. Napoleon now hastened to pour the full storm of his wrath on the devoted republic. The senate, in despair, made the most abject offers of submission; but it was too late. The price paid by the republic for its perfidy and cruelty was the surrender of large territories on the mainland, and five ships of war; the payment of three millions of francs in gold, and as much more in naval stores; and giving up twenty of the best pictures, along with five hundred manuscripts.

After the occupation of Venice, and the dissolution of its oligarchical government, Napoleon established his headquarters at Passeriano, near Udine, where he awaited the arrival of the plenipotentiaries which the emperor was to send to treat of a definitive peace. In order to accelerate the progress of the negotiations, he had, on the 24th of May, signed a preliminary convention with the Duke de Gallo; but the cabinet of Vienna having refused to ratify this act, he repaired to Milan to hasten the organization of the Cisalpine republic, by annexing to it Modena, Reggio, Brescia, Bergamo, Ferrara, and Bologna—the whole destined to constitute a single state, with about 3,000,000 of inhabitants. He also profited by his stay at Milan to direct the democratic revolution which overturned the oligarchy of Genoa, and placed all the friends of change in entire dependence on France; an event which was soon followed by the establishment of another mushroom state, under the name of the Ligurian republic.

By the treaty of Campo-Formio, concluded on the 3d of October 1797, Austria yielded to France Belgium and the boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps, recognised the Cisalpine republic, and received, as an indemnification for the loss of territory, Venice and her Italian provinces; whilst France assumed the sovereignty of Dalmatia and the Ionian Islands.

Napoleon having thus terminated the most wonderful series of campaigns recorded in the history of war, set out for Paris, where he arrived in the beginning of December. The reception which he met with, on this occasion, was such as would have elated the most modest, and encouraged the least ambitious. It was easy to see that he might aspire to everything in France. Nevertheless, the time had not yet arrived to profit by his fame, and take advantage of his popularity; it was necessary to wait until the Directory had completed its discredit with the country, and lost all hold of public opinion. France had indeed proclaimed him as its hero; but this was not enough, and to become the head of the state, it was necessary to be at the same time its deliverer and restorer.

During the negotiations at Campo-Formio, Napoleon had suggested the idea of a descent upon Egypt, though he did not then think of undertaking it himself. The project had been relished by Talleyrand, who had replaced Charles Delacroix in the ministry of foreign affairs. Napoleon now offered to carry it into execution. Europe he considered as but a mole-hill in comparison of Asia, whence "all the great glories" had come. And from the view which he took of the state of India at the time, he conceived, that in undertaking to open a direct communication with that country he was taking the surest means to strike an effective blow at England. The expedition to Egypt had three objects: first, to establish on the Nile a French colony, which, without having recourse to the system of cultivation by slaves, should supply the produce of St Domingo and the sugar islands; secondly, to open new outlets for French manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to obtain, in return, all the productions of these countries; and, thirdly, setting out from Egypt as a base of operations, to carry an army of fifty thousand men to the Indus, and make common cause with the Mahrattas, the Hindus, the Mussulmans, and all the oppressed races of the Indian peninsula. The last was the grand and ultimate object aimed at.

Egypt, it is true, was then a tributary of the Porte, one of the most ancient allies of France; but as the Mamelukes

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2 On his return to Paris, Napoleon took up his residence in the same small and modest house which he had occupied before his departure for Italy, in the Rue Chantereine, where he resumed his favourite studies and pursuits; contented, apparently, with the society of his friends, and carefully avoiding any act which might seem intended or calculated to invite popular notice or distinction. His society was much sought after in the highest circles, and he occasionally received company at home; but pride as well as policy led him to shun notoriety, and shrink from being stared at in the streets or saloons as the wonder of the day. On one occasion, when greeted with some noisy demonstration of popular favour, "Bah," said he, "they would crowd as eagerly around me if I were on my way to the guillotine." At this period he was reserved and thoughtful, like one too much occupied with serious designs to take any pleasure in the elegant frivolities of fashionable conversation. Wherever he appeared he was the man of Lodi, of Arcole, and of Rivoli, disdaining to disguise his military bluntness in those brilliant circles where a man of an inferior stamp of character would have been ambitious to shine. Piqued by this haughty demeanour, Madam de Sibel made various attempts to enlist him amongst the number of her votaries, but without success. "Whom?" said she, one day addressing herself to the victorious soldier, "whom do you consider as the greatest of women?" insinuating a compliment in expectation of an equivalent. "Her," replied Napoleon, drily, "who has borne the greatest number of children." This keen retort was not forgotten, and the daughter of Necker became his declared enemy. were the real masters of the country, and in open revolt against the Sultan, it was thought that the Divan, already occupied with the war against Paswan Oglou, pasha of Widin, and that against the Walabees, and obliged, from weakness, to tolerate the independence of a number of refractory pashas, would not, for a mere shadow of sovereignty, throw itself blindly into the ranks of the enemy. The preparations were accordingly carried on with great activity, but with the utmost secrecy. All was under the direction of Napoleon, and his characteristic energy everywhere appeared. To draw the attention of England from the ports of the Mediterranean, he visited those of the Channel, and affected to occupy himself with the project of crossing it, when his thoughts were directed towards the invasion of Egypt. At length, all being ready, he repaired to Toulon on the 10th of May 1798, and, on the 19th, sailed from that port with thirteen ships of the line, six frigates, and a fleet of transports, having on board 25,000 men. He was joined at sea by the squadrons which had sailed from Bastia, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia, with from 7000 to 8000 men on board, destined to form part of the expedition; and on the 9th of June the whole arrived before Malta. The subsequent history of the expedition, until the return of Napoleon, is fully detailed under France; and in the article Egypt will be found an account of the final conquest of that country by the British under Abercromby and Hutchinson. It is clear, indeed, that, after the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir all the chances of success were changed. It is no doubt true that Napoleon might still hope to maintain himself in possession of the country, provided he succeeded in attaching the inhabitants to his cause. But two serious obstacles presented themselves to the attainment of this object; namely, the maritime blockade, which obstructed all exportation; and the peculiar nature of the Mohammedan religion, which forbids all obedience or submission to an infidel power. Nor were these difficulties lessened by the failure of the attack on St Jean D'Acre, which, in proving that the invaders were not invincible, encouraged resistance and invited hostility.

The truth of this was soon exemplified by the landing of a Turkish army of 15,000 men in the peninsula of Aboukir, the fort of which they immediately stormed and carried, putting the garrison to the sword. But they paid dear for this momentary success. On the 25th of July 1799, Napoleon pounced on them like an eagle on its prey, and annihilated them by a single blow.

The destruction of the Turkish army having consolidated the position of the French in Egypt, Napoleon decided on returning to France. Even when before St Jean D'Acre, he ascertained that a new coalition had been formed; and at a later period he received, through Sir Sidney Smith, several English journals, and the French gazette of Francfort, which informed him of the reverses sustained by the armies of Italy and the Rhine, as well as of the successive revolutions which had completed the disorganization and debasement of the Directory. The consummation which he had contemplated before leaving France seemed to have at length arrived; and no obstacle stood in the way to prevent his return to that country. Having left the chief command to Kléber, Napoleon sailed from Alexandria on the 24th of August 1799, with a small squadron of four ships, and, after a passage full of marvellous escapes, landed at Fréjus on the 6th of October. His presence excited the enthusiasm of the people, and was considered by them as the certain pledge of victory. His progress to the capital had all the appearance of a triumphal procession, and, upon reaching Paris, he found that everything was ripe for a great change in France.

The circumstances attending the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire (9th of November) have been narrated in the article France. That event was not produced, but only accelerated by the return of Napoleon. The necessity of a change in the existing order of things had for some time been generally felt and acknowledged. The Directory government having lost all hold on public opinion, and become equally feeble and contemptible, it seemed necessary to replace it by an imposing authority; and there is none so much so as that which is founded upon military glory. Napoleon perceived this in all its force. The Directory could only be replaced by him or by anarchy; and, in such a case, the choice of France could not for a moment be doubtful. Accordingly, all parties now ranged themselves under two distinct banners: on the one side were the republicans, who opposed his elevation; and on the other all France, which demanded it. A coup d'état was nevertheless necessary to produce the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire; and this was effected by the employment of the troops, although without spilling a drop of blood. Napoleon had for a moment hoped that the projected change would be carried by acclamation. He was disappointed. But, after a short and noisy struggle, the republic, born amidst anarchy, and baptized in blood, expired in clamour and uproar—Siéyès assisting in the demolition of his own work; and the Directory was replaced by a provisional consulate, with Napoleon at its head. The dissolution of the councils was followed by the appointment of a legislative commission, and to a committee of this body was assigned the task of preparing a new constitution, which was afterwards denominated that of the year VIII.

Great as had been the ability displayed by Napoleon in the field, few expected that he would evince equal talents and aptitude for government. At the very first meeting of the consuls, a lengthened discussion took place concerning the internal condition and foreign relations of France, and the measures not only of war, but of finance and diplomacy, which it either was or might be expedient to adopt. To the astonishment of Siéyès, Napoleon entered fully into all these subjects, showed perfect familiarity with them even in their minutest details, and suggested various resolutions, which it was impossible not to approve. "Gentlemen," said Siéyès, on reaching his house, where Talleyrand and others awaited his arrival, "I perceive that you have found a master; one who can do and will do every thing himself." The work of reform proceeded rapidly and surely: order was everywhere established, and vigour infused into all the departments of the state. The situation of France, however, occasioned him some disquietude; and, notwithstanding the chances of success in his favour, he resolved to sue for peace, which he could then do in good faith, because the misfortunes of the preceding campaigns were not his work. But Pitt turned a deaf ear to the application, and by this refusal obliged Napoleon to enter upon that course of

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1 There are two proceedings connected with this expedition for which Napoleon has been severely and justly censured. The one was the wholesale murder of the remains of the garrison of Jaffa, consisting of 2000 men, who had fallen into the hands of the French after the storming of that town. The ruthless conqueror, seeing no ready way of disposing of these unfortunate men, ordered them at once to be shot; and all who had escaped the terrors of the siege perished in consequence. The other point was the poisoning of those of his soldiers who had been seized by the plague during the siege of St Jean d'Acre. He had resolved to march for Egypt, and the 50 poor plague-smitten patients could not be conveniently removed, when their impatient and unscrupulous commander ordered them to be poisoned by opium. His humanity in other instances on this retreat was certainly highly praiseworthy, yet there can be no doubt that in these two cases he obeyed the spirit which, to a great extent, characterized his entire career. This was, to sacrifice anything, no matter how precious—whether truth, honour, or even human life—whenever it materially stood in his way. victory and conquest which ultimately extended his empire over the greater part of the Continent.

War being thus inevitable, the First Consul issued a decree, dated the 7th of January 1800, ordaining the formation of an army of reserve, to consist partly of veterans, who were ordered to rejoin their respective corps, but principally of a new levy of 30,000 conscripts. He caused arms to be forged; appealed to the sentiment of national honour, and assembled an army, young, it is true, but full of enthusiasm. The miserable state of the army of Italy has already been noticed; but that of the Rhine, when united to the army of Italy, presented a fine and formidable body of men, the command of which Napoleon intrusted to Moreau, at the same time sending him the recruits necessary to complete his different corps, and to put him in a condition to assume the offensive. The remainder of his disposable troops was directed on Dijon, where he organized an army of reserve, amounting to 40,000 men, which, from that central point, might be ready to march into Swabia, Switzerland, or Italy, according as circumstances should require.

Finding that the attention of Melas was exclusively fixed on Genoa, into which Massena, with the remains of his force, had been obliged to throw himself; and being anxious, if possible, to relieve that place, which was closely invested; he resolved to give the preference to the shorter route of the Great St Bernard, leaving that of the St Gothard to be followed by the corps which were on their march from the Rhine. In the beginning of May Napoleon set out for Dijon, and on the 8th he arrived at Geneva, where he made the necessary dispositions for effecting the passage of the Alps. The operations which followed have been pretty fully detailed in the article France. By a series of well-combined manoeuvres and demonstrations, Napoleon deceived Melas as to his movements, descended like a torrent from the Alps upon his line of communications, and, by a single march, conquered Italy. Genoa had indeed surrendered; but the battle of Marengo, fought on the 14th of June, repaired everything, and, by a victory snatched from the enemy, after he thought the fortune of the day decided, completed at one blow the conquest of Italy. Never as yet had Napoleon been in such imminent peril, not even at Arcola; never had genius and fortune more happily conspired to change the fate of battle. The victory was glorious, and its results were immense. A convention was entered into, by which Melas obtained permission to retire with his army behind the Mincio; and, in return, he consented to give up Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, with the fort of Urbino, the citadels of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Piacenza, Ceva, and Savona, and the castle of Arona.

Meanwhile both parties continued their preparations for a renewal of the contest; and as all hopes of peace had entirely vanished, Napoleon resolved to put an end to the armistice in the middle of November, and, notwithstanding the severity of the season, to recommence hostilities. Moreau and Brune accordingly received orders to denounce the armistice, and between the 17th and the 27th all the French troops were put in motion. The fate of the contest was to be decided in Germany, where hostilities recommenced towards the end of November; and, in a few days afterwards, Moreau obtained a decisive victory at Hohenlinden. The battle was obstinate and bloody, but never for an instant doubtful; indeed it is one of the few instances to be met with in war where complete success was obtained by the literal execution of the plan previously devised by the general-in-chief. Moreau lost not a moment in taking measures to improve his success. The Austrians were forced to sue for an armistice, which was concluded at Steyer on the 23rd of December; the cabinet of Vienna having consented to detach itself from England, and to treat for a separate peace. A definite treaty of peace was signed at Lunéville in 1801, by which France secured the boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps. This treaty, in fact, differed but little from that which, in 1797, Napoleon had concluded at Campo-Formio.

But amidst all these successes, the conspiracy of the 3d of Nivose (24th of December) convinced Napoleon that he was still upon a volcano. The plan was simple, for it consisted in obstructing the progress of Napoleon's carriage as it passed along the Rue St Nicaise, and in the same instant exploding a machine crammed with all sorts of combustibles, and hence called the infernal machine. Napoleon escaped by a miracle; and the assassins were tried, condemned, and executed, glorying in their design, and lamenting that it had not been successful.

The second coalition being now dissolved, England alone maintained an attitude of hostility to France; but the progress of events soon developed a prospect of an accommodation. Egypt and Malta were at first stumbling-blocks in the way of an arrangement; but the conquest of the one led to an adjustment respecting the other; and at length, after a tedious negotiation, preliminaries of peace were signed at London on the 1st of October 1801, and these were afterwards followed by a definite treaty, which was concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March 1802. But the peace of Amiens, like that of Campo-Formio, proved merely an armistice. It was signed in the midst of mutual suspicion; and, before the ink was dry, difficulties arose, and from day to day accumulated the elements of a speedy and inevitable rupture.

During this short cessation of arms, the attention of the First Consul was occupied with the re-establishment of religion, and the arrangement of a concordat with the pope. The churches were deserted and in ruins; and since the famous civil constitution of 1791, the clergy had been in a state of complete schism. His object was to restore the one and to reconcile the other, but without suffering them to acquire the power and influence they had formerly possessed. His next measure was the establishment of a system of national education; and this was followed by the commencement of the great and difficult but highly important task of providing France with a uniform code of laws. Of the various remarkable codes known generally under the collective designation of Code Napoléon, the code civil de Français is unquestionably the best. It has continued hitherto to be the law of France, and is perhaps the most valuable result of his extraordinary reign. It was his own proud anticipation that he would go down to posterity with the codes in his hand, and in this he was not mistaken. Innumerable works of public utility were likewise begun. Roads and bridges were planned; museums were founded; and the vain were gratified with rising monuments of magnificence, whilst the reflecting recognised in every such display the depth and forecast of a genius formed for empire. This was more fully evinced in the measures by which Napoleon sought to secure the prolongation of his power. The establishment of the consulate for life, which was decreed on the 2d of August 1802, proved a grand step towards the completion of his design, and formed the primary base of the edifice which it yet remained for him to construct. This dignity had already been prorogated for ten years by a senatus-consultum of the 6th of May; but on referring the matter to the people, it was decided that the consulate should be conferred upon him for life. He was now virtually sovereign of France. His task was to terminate the Revolution by giving to it a legal character, that it might be recognised and legitimated by the public law of Europe. He instituted, likewise, a new order of chivalry, called the Legion of Honour, which, if it served to further his scheme of empire, did not militate with that equality which alone he sought to maintain. The causes which so soon led to the rupture of the hollow truce of Amiens will be found recorded in the articles France and Britain. On the 18th of May 1803 Great Britain declared war against France; and that fierce contest recommenced, which, after an unexampled career of victory on the part of Napoleon, was destined to terminate in his downfall. His first measures were, the occupation of Naples and of Hanover; and his next project was one of a far more daring and formidable character, namely, that of invading England, and thus striking a blow at the heart of his inveterate and implacable enemy. (See Britain.)

The English ministry were not without serious apprehensions as to the result of the threatened invasion; and to cause a diversion, they are said to have countenanced the unwarrantable warfare of plots and conspiracies. The projects of Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal, and others of the same stamp, have already been described in the article France. That assassination was contemplated by some of them, appears from the evidence of Cadoudal; but the real designs of these men have never been brought clearly to the light. Finding himself exposed to the attempts of desperadoes who aimed at his life, Napoleon resolved to deal a decisive blow, which he considered as indispensable to strike terror into his enemies. A distinguished Bourbon was at the gates of Strasbourg; the police pretended to have discovered evidence which implicated him in the designs of those who had plotted against the life of the First Consul; and under the first excitement produced by this information, the fatal command was issued to seize the prince and bring him to Paris. The order was promptly obeyed, and the Duc d'Enghien, having been seized at Ettenheim, in the territory of Baden, was carried to Paris, where on his arrival he was tried by a military commission, as an emigrant who had borne arms against France, condemned, and shot almost immediately after the sentence had been pronounced. This was the most unwarrantable occurrence in the life of Napoleon. That he was misled by the infamous reports of the secret police, and by the pernicious suggestions of those around him, may perhaps be true; indeed, there is good reason to believe that such was the case. He was likewise kept in ignorance of the afflicting circumstances which accompanied the catastrophe; and the appeal made to his clemency by the unfortunate prince was infamously withheld until after the sacrifice of the ill-fated victim had been consummated; but, with every allowance which can justly be made, it must nevertheless be admitted that, in commanding the seizure of the duke in a neutral territory, he became answerable for all the consequences which ensued, and that he had the double misfortune to incur the guilt of a public crime, and at the same time to commit a political error of the greatest magnitude.

The conspiracies intended to subvert the power of Napoleon, however, served only to confirm it; and the necessity of restoring to France an hereditary and stable government had now become equally obvious and urgent. A motion was accordingly made and carried in the Tribunate, that the imperial dignity should be conferred upon Napoleon; the legislative body without hesitation adopted the proposition; and a senatus-consultum appeared, in which he was declared Emperor of the French, with remainder to his male line, or, in the event of his having no children, to any son or grandson of his brothers whom he might choose to adopt as his heir. This decree was sent down to the departments, and on the 1st of December 1804, the prefects reported that between three and four millions of citizens had subscribed their assent to the proposed measure. By the army the elevation of Napoleon was hailed with enthusiasm; and when he visited the camp at Boulogne, he was received with an excess of military devotion. His coronation took place at Paris on the 2nd of December, amidst all that was most splendid and illustrious in that capital. The ceremony was performed in the cathedral of Notre-Dame, where the Pope officiated on the occasion, and consecrated the diadems, which Napoleon placed on his own head, and on that of the Empress Josephine. In like manner, on the 25th of May 1805, he placed on his head the iron crown of the Lombard kings, in their ancient capital, and henceforth styled himself Emperor of the French and King of Italy; announcing, however, that the two crowns should not be held by the same person after his death.

The history of the wars of the empire belongs to that of France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to which the reader is accordingly referred. The Emperor Napoleon again made an offer of peace, which was rejected, and a third coalition was formed against France. The ostensible objects of this league were, to restore the independence of Holland and Switzerland, to free the north of Germany from the presence of the French troops, to deliver Piedmont, and to compel the evacuation of Italy; but its grand aim and design, in as far as concerned England, was to find employment for the French troops on the Continent, and to avert, for a time at least, the dangers of a threatened invasion. The hopes of the allies were, however, speedily crushed by the decisive victories of Ulm and Austerlitz; and Napoleon would soon have been at liberty to turn his arms against England, had it not been for two events, one of which served in a great measure to counterbalance his successes in Germany. We allude to the battle of Trafalgar, in which, on the 21st of October 1805, the very day after Mack surrendered at Ulm, the French grand fleet was annihilated by one mighty blow, and the means of effecting a descent on England completely destroyed. The other event above referred to was the declaration of war by Prussia, after Austria had been crippled and forced to receive the law from the conqueror, and whilst the Russian army was still behind the Vistula. This rash and headlong conduct was dearly expiated at Jena and Auerstadt, and the dismemberment of the Prussian monarchy formed a just retribution for the double perfidy and presumptuous confidence of the cabinet of Berlin. The campaign of 1807, after a prodigious effusion of blood, terminated with the battle of Friedland; and the peace of Tilsit, which followed, not only confirmed the humiliation of Prussia, but appeared to throw Russia into the arms of France. The French emperor had already made a gigantic stride towards the establishment of an European monarchy, and the effectual exclusion of English commerce from the ports of the Continent, by which means he vainly hoped eventually to reduce Great Britain to the necessity of listening to terms of accommodation.

In prosecution of this system, which ultimately proved the main instrument of his ruin, when, to all human appearance, it seemed about to be crowned with success, Napoleon commenced his aggressions on Portugal and Spain, and thus entangled himself in a struggle which became the proximate cause of his ultimate overthrow. In vain did he bring all his means to bear upon this unhappy contest; in vain did he drive the English under Sir John Moore out of Spain. The formation of a fourth coalition again called him away into Germany, where Austria was actively preparing to take up arms, in the hope of recovering what she had lost, and freeing herself from the yoke of France. The attempt, however, proved unsuccessful; and though accident gave her a temporary advantage at Aspern, the battle of Wagram placed her once more at the feet of the conqueror. At this moment the power of Napoleon seemed irresistible. No enemy opposed him on the Continent except the insurgents in Spain, aided by the English; and had he instantly directed his whole energies to terminate the war in the Peninsula, it is probable that his power would have remained unshaken by any reverse likely to Napoleon befell him. But he judged otherwise; and, in seeking to attach Austria to his interests by a marriage with a princess of the imperial family, he became involved in a system of policy, the ultimate term of which was the abdication of 1814. From this moment his ascending movement was stopped; he had reached the culminating point of his greatness; and though his genius had as yet lost nothing of its vigour, his power began to decline.

The events of 1810 and 1811 belong chiefly to the history of Spain, where the genius of Wellington was gradually but steadily maturing a resistance which every day became more formidable. Those of 1812 were fraught with the destiny of Napoleon. He had long regarded a war with Russia as inevitable. The co-existence of two such empires as those of France and Russia seemed to him incompatible; and differences speedily arose which led to a terrible collision. The preparations on both sides were immense; the fate of Europe, or rather of the empire of the world, was about to be decided in a single campaign; but Napoleon contemplated the conflict without dread, because, in his view, it afforded the only means of terminating for ever the long struggle which had consumed his life. The result is well known. Amidst the frozen steppes of the Scythian wilderness perished those invincible legions which had carried the imperial eagles in triumph to Vienna, to Berlin, to Warsaw, and to Moscow. No such catastrophe had ever been witnessed in modern times; all preceding examples of suffering and disaster in war sank into nothing in comparison with it. Yet Napoleon, undismayed by the magnitude of the calamity, displayed the almost miraculous resources of his genius in repairing the losses he had sustained; and his appearance in Germany early in 1813, at the head of a powerful army, is perhaps the most astonishing circumstance in his extraordinary career. But fortune now completely changed sides. Victorious at Lutzen, at Bautzen, and at Dresden, he was, through the treachery of his allies, and the faults of his lieutenants, defeated at Leipzig, and forced to retreat beyond the Rhine. Still he maintained the struggle with incomparable energy and perseverance; and never did his transcendent genius for war display itself more resplendently than in the astonishing campaign of 1814, when, by incredible efforts, he struggled, though in vain, to expel the invaders from the territory of France. But the battle of Montmartre, followed by the capitulation of Paris, decided the fate of the campaign, and with it that of Napoleon. The marshals were tired of war, the spirit of the nation had sunk under its misfortunes, the people demanded that a term should be put to their sufferings, and Napoleon himself shrank from entailing upon France the still greater calamities of a civil war. In these circumstances, he resolved to abdicate, and, on the 18th of April, signed an instrument by which he renounced for himself and his heirs the thrones both of France and of Italy.

The allies having left Napoleon the choice of his retreat, he chose the island of Elba, near to his native Corsica, and set out, accompanied by four commissioners, one from each of the great allied powers. He was allowed to retain the title of Emperor, and to take along with him a small number of those veteran soldiers who had accompanied him in so many dangers, and whose attachment was not shaken by his misfortunes. In traversing France on his way to the place of his exile, he had occasion to observe the extreme divergence of opinion respecting himself; for in proportion as he was beloved and regretted in the environs of Paris and the provinces of the east, he was detested in those of the south, where even the respect due to misfortune was denied him; and he was more than once obliged to put himself under the protection of the stranger, to defend his life against the people who had been so often intoxicated with his triumphs. On the 4th of May he landed in Elba, wherein, being separated from his wife and Napoleon, son, and without any projects for the future, he seemed to regard himself as politically dead to Europe, with no other task remaining for him to perform but that of writing the history of the rise and fall of his power.

Napoleon anxiously watched the progress of events, which outran his expectations; he was also well informed as to what passed at the congress of Vienna; and having learned in time that the ministers of Louis XVIII. had proposed to the congress to remove him from Elba, in order to send him in exile to St Helena, he conceived a project which will appear audacious in history, but which, in reality, circumstances indicated as the only reasonable course to be followed. He resolved to return to France.

His preparations were not long; he brought nothing with him but arms, and trusted that France would provide the rest. After a passage of five days, he landed without opposition at Cannes, near the spot where, fifteen years before, he had disembarked on his return from Egypt. This memorable event took place on the 1st of March 1815. He had no determinate plan, because he wanted particular data as to the state of affairs; his intention was to be guided by events, making provision only for probable contingencies. Nor was he at all embarrassed as to the route he should take; for he required a point of support, and as Grenoble was the nearest fortress, he lost no time in directing his march on that place, which opened its gates to receive him. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds, and the reception which he everywhere met with confirmed him in his project. In fact, his march to Paris was throughout a triumphal procession. In twenty days this new revolution was terminated without having cost a single drop of blood. Amidst the acclamations of all France, Napoleon was reinstated on the throne. The grandeur of his enterprise had effaced the recollection of his misfortunes; it had restored to him the confidence of the French people; and he was once more the man of their choice.

In a proclamation published by the Congress of Vienna to all Europe, it was declared that Napoleon, "by appearing again in France, had deprived himself of the protection of the law, and manifested to the world that there could neither be peace nor truce with him." Nothing remained, therefore, but to commit the future destiny of Europe to the arbitrement of arms. Various attempts were made to open a negotiation with the allies, but all proved abortive; and as Napoleon had no intention to await the onset of his enemies, he resolved to fall upon the Anglo-Prussians, before the troops of Austria or Russia could be in a condition to take part in the conflict. By the end of May he had about 180,000 ready to take the field, and by the middle of July this number would have been increased to 300,000; but by transporting the seat of war into Belgium, he would save France from invasion, and perhaps take the enemy unprepared. These considerations decided him to become the assailant. On the 12th of June he set out from Paris, and on the 14th he established his head-quarters at Beaumont, where, in order to profit by the dissemination of the enemy, he judged it necessary to open the campaign without a moment's delay.

Accordingly, he passed the frontier of Belgium on the 15th, and on the following day advanced to Fleurus, where he discovered the Prussian army ranged in order of battle between St Amand and Sombref. Ney had received orders to push forward with 42,000 men by the Brussels road as far as Quatre Bras, an important point situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Brussels, Neville, Charleroi, and Namur, and there to keep the English in check, and prevent them from advancing to the aid of the Prussians, whom Napoleon proposed to attack with the 72,000 men that remained under his command. The battle of Ligny followed, in which the Prussians were defeated; and so complete was the rout; that, of 70,000 men, their generals were never afterwards able to assemble more than about 30,000. A night pursuit would have annihilated them. But Ney had been much less fortunate at Quatre Bras, where he displayed great infirmity, neither bringing his whole force to bear on the English, nor throwing himself back on Bry to act on the rear of the Prussians. The Prussian army being thus defeated, Grouchy was detached in pursuit of it with 35,000 men, whilst Napoleon proceeded to turn his efforts against Wellington. It is not necessary here to detail the operations which followed, nor even to describe that fierce conflict which decided the fate of Napoleon, and with it that of Europe. (See France.) The result, more fatal to France than that of either Aiguncon or Poictiers, is known to every one. By the timely arrival of the Prussians, who had given the slip to Grouchy, and their junction with the English, the French army was not only defeated, but totally dispersed.

Napoleon returned to Paris, in the hope that the national spirit might be roused, and that all good Frenchmen would unite in defending their country against another foreign invasion. But he soon found that he had deceived himself. Misfortune had deprived him of all consideration; he experienced opposition where he least expected it; the chambers rose in a state of insurrection against him; and, in a short time, he was compelled to sign a second abdication. He then decided to retire to America, and at first proposed to embark at Bordeaux, where his brother Joseph had hired a merchant-vessel for the purpose. But he afterwards changed his purpose, and set out for Rochefort, where he arrived on the 3rd of July. Finding it impossible, however, to put to sea, and nearly equally perilous to return to the interior, he took the resolution of throwing himself upon the generosity of the prince regent of England; and, on the 15th, embarked on board of the Bellerophon, in Aix Roads. By a formal decision of the English government, he was sent as a prisoner of war to St. Helena, where he pined away in hopeless exile, until death put an end to his misery on the 5th of May 1821. In his will he had expressed a desire that his body should be conveyed to France and buried on the banks of the Seine, "amongst the French people whom he had loved so well;" but this request could not, it seems, be complied with until 1840, when, at the request of the government of Louis Philippe, Britain permitted the removal of his remains to France. The body was accordingly deposited with unparalleled pomp and display in the Hôtel des Invalides, on the 15th December 1840. (J. B.—E.)

(For particulars of Napoleon's residence in St. Helena, and of his endless petty disputes with his keepers Cockburn and Lowe, see the work of Las Cases; and the History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena, from the Letters and Journals of the late Sir Hudson Lowe, by W. Forsyth, 3 vols. 8vo, 1853.)

A few words remain to be said regarding the personal character of the man Napoleon. The materials for such an estimate still continue to increase. The memoirs dictated by himself to Count Montholon and General Gourgaud at St. Helena possess great value and interest, notwithstanding the disingenuousness which they display, and the amount of misstatement and palpable untruth in which they abound. Facts and dates and characters are all deliberately sacrificed for the purposes apparently of stage effect and theatrical eclat. More satisfactory materials, however, have been recently accumulating for forming a correct judgment of his policy, motives, and general character. The Letters and Journals of Sir Hudson Lowe, already referred to, afford not only information respecting the character of the prisoner of war hopelessly chained to his rocky islet of St. Helena, but enable the reader, from the striking conversations which they occasionally record, to obtain a true glimpse into his past history. Still more satisfactory materials, however, are to be met with in the Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his brother Joseph, sometime King of Spain, 2 vols., 1855, selected and translated from the Mémoires de Du Casse, 1853-55. These letters extend over the period from 1795 to 1815, and refer both to his personal and family history, and to nearly all the remarkable events of his remarkable career. They possess the additional advantage, moreover, of presenting him somewhat in his every-day attire, and may be regarded as the most genuine, because the most unconscious and accidental, disclosure of his character which posterity can now read. They indicate in unmistakable characters the strange blending of grandeur and meanness, of gigantic power and heartless selfishness, which reigned supreme in his nature. Success was his ruling motive, and to that everything had to succumb. He shed blood like water to make his projects float over all obstacles; and when an object was once set steadily before him, he hewed his way pitilessly on until he reached it. He shot down his prisoners by thousands when they proved an incumbrance, and ordered his own soldiers to be poisoned when they were smitten by the plague. "Sire, General Clarke cannot combine with General Junot, for the dreadful fire of the Austrian battery." "Let him carry the battery," called the chief. "Sire, every regiment that approaches the heavy artillery is sacrificed; Sire, what orders?"—Forward, forward!" was the reply. "My lads you must not fear death," he said to a regiment of chasseurs before the battle of Jena; "when soldiers brave death they drive him into the enemies' ranks." When the Russian army was making its retreat over a frozen lake after the battle of Austerlitz, the emperor came riding at full speed, shouting to the artillery, "You are losing time: fire upon those masses; they must be engulfed: fire upon the ice!" It is needless to add that the ice was fired upon, and that thousands of Russians and Austrians were buried under the waters of the lake. If the Alps were pronounced impassable; "There shall be no Alps," was made the order of the day. Napoleon can hardly be called cruel or bloodthirsty, but he was as remorseless as fate, and seemed never to have known pity. He would risk everything to gain his end—money, troops, and even himself; but his movements were never reckless, and without due deliberation and insight. "He never blundered into victory," says Emerson, "but won his battles in his head before he won them on the field." "My hand of iron," he said, "was not at the extremity of my arm; it was immediately connected with my head." Embarrassments of conscience and scruples of sentiment and affection were unknown to him. If he had a work to do, nothing could stand in its way. "They charge me," he said, "with the commission of great crimes; men of my stamp do not commit crimes:" such was his justification of himself. While fond of regarding himself, however, as the "Child of Destiny," no man ever more thoroughly understood his business. Nothing was effected by magic; the calmest penetration was brought to bear upon everything; and he knew the value to a grain—of gold, iron, ships, and men, in all their possible combinations. If the enemy had three men for his one, he made the contest a matter of simple calculation; and strained all his superhuman genius for maneuvering and evolution, to attack their forces at an angle, and destroy in piecemeal what he could not crush in the mass. "On any point of resistance he concentrated squadron on squadron in overwhelming numbers, until it was swept out of existence." His troops almost worshipped him: their devotion is best indicated in the order of the day at the battle of Austerlitz, when Napoleon, unlike ordinary generals, promised his troops that he would keep out of reach of fire. With his officers, his freedom and companionship was never so great as with his ordinary troops. "When soldiers have been baptized," he remarked, "in the fire of a battle-field, they have all one rank in my eyes." He accordingly made merit and personal valour the passports to distinction. The cross of the Legion of Honour was the reward of bravery; and he raised seventeen men from the rank of common soldiers to that of king, marshal, duke, and general. He was nevertheless unjust to his generals when his boundless egotism came in the way; and we find him meanly appropriating the fame due to Kellerman and Ber- nadotte. Junot, who was true to him through all hazards, he intrigued to ruin, because his manners were too familiar for the taste of the emperor. Here is a glimpse into his relation to men:—"There are two levers for moving men, interest and fear. Love is a silly infatuation, depend upon it. Friendship is but a name. I love nobody. I do not even love my brothers; perhaps Joseph a little from habit, and because he is my elder; and Duroc, I love him too; but why? Because his character pleases me; he is stern and resolute, and I believe the fellow never shed a tear. For my part I know very well that I have no true friends. As long as I continue to be what I am, I may have as many pretended friends as I please. Leave sensibility to women but men should be firm in heart and in purpose, or they should have nothing to do with war and government." He fought sixty battles, and felt that he must go on fighting or it was all over with him. "My power would fall were I not to support it by new achievements. Conquest has made me what I am, and conquest must maintain me." France both thought and fought with him for a time, but got tired of the game of fighting with her neighbours and impoverishing herself, and in 1814 joined all Europe in crying "asez de Bonaparte." His absorbing ambition and boundless egotism blighted with death, like the upas-tree, everything that came within his sphere. Millions alike of men and money sacrificed and squandered could, on his principle, produce no permanent result. The world never witnessed a grander attempt to succeed without a conscience. The intellect, the will, the resources of the man seemed often superhuman; but he was destitute of moral principle, and laughed at rectitude. He broke friendship with truth, and thereby exposed himself to that terrible retribution which sooner or later overtakes all insincerity and wrong-doing.