Children born in wedlock, or in a competent time after its dissolution, are legitimate. In some countries legitimacy is conferred on children by the marriage of their parents to each other subsequent to the birth of the children (see HUSBAND AND WIFE); or, in certain circumstances, is admitted where no marriage was, or could lawfully be, entered into. Children born in other circumstances are called illegitimate. By the law of England, children born before marriage are incapable of succeeding to their father's English property except by will, even although they were born in a country which recognises legitimation by a subsequent marriage; and the same rule exists in reference to children born after the marriage of a British subject to his deceased wife's sister, though it take place in a country where such a marriage is lawful. In Scotland, a subsequent lawful marriage removes the legal stain of bastardy. Scotch institutional writers are not agreed as to the principle on which it does so. Some suppose that, by a legal fiction, the marriage is held to have occurred prior to the birth; while others, on better grounds, think it results from the expediency of converting what was Parent and Child.

Parent and at first an irregular into an honourable relationship. The former necessarily hold, that if either of the parents contracted an intermediate marriage with a third party, the fiction was destroyed, and the children remained illegitimate; while the latter, discarding the fiction altogether, maintain that when the intermediate marriage is dissolved, the Scotch law permits the parents to marry, for the express purpose of putting an end to illicit intercourse, and of conferring legitimacy on the children previously born. This last may now be regarded as the law of Scotland, unless the birth be the result either of incestuous or (probably) of adulterous intercourse. To confer the privilege of legitimation, the subsequent marriage must take place when the father has his domicile in Scotland, or in a country which holds, in this respect, a similar law; for if he be domiciled at the time of the marriage in England, or in any country, the law of which, like that of England, does not recognise such a mode of legitimation, the children will continue to be regarded as bastards in Scotland, and disqualified to succeed as heirs to their father. So entirely does this mode of legitimation in Scotland depend on the father's domicile at the date of the marriage, that although both the birth and the marriage occur in Scotland, if the father be domiciled in England at the time of the marriage, the children born previously to the marriage remain illegitimate. On the other hand, and on the same principle, though both the birth and the subsequent marriage take place in England, yet if at the time the father's domicile be in Scotland, the children will be regarded as lawful children in Scotland; and it is probable that they would be so regarded though only the subsequent marriage occurred when the father's domicile was in Scotland. A father domiciled in England at the time of his marriage there to a woman by whom he has previously had children, and afterwards acquiring a Scotch domicile, cannot confer legitimacy on such children by his again going through in Scotland the ceremony of marriage with their mother.

The obvious result of this difference between the law of England and Scotland is the incongruous one, that if a father domiciled in Scotland die intestate, leaving estates in both countries, and two sons, both by the same mother, the one born before and the other after his marriage with her, the son born before the marriage will succeed to the Scotch estate, and the son born after it will succeed to the English estate, each in the character of being his father's eldest lawful son in these countries respectively. If the one of these sons who was born before the marriage had died before his father, leaving a child, such child, as representing its father, acquires all the rights which its father would have acquired in Scotland had he survived, to the exclusion of the son first born after the marriage, and his heirs; and this although the marriage does not take place till after the death of the son who was born before it.

In all these cases of legitimacy by subsequent marriage, it is necessary that the husband acknowledge himself to be the father. The acknowledgment, if distinct, need not be in any specific form. It may even be inferred from the conduct of the father,—such as his presence at the child's baptism, or receiving the child into his family and treating it as his own.

A question has arisen whether, in any case, children can be legitimate where their parents went through the ceremony of marriage, but could not have been lawfully married? If a man and woman go through the ceremony of marriage with each other, knowing that they are disqualified by relationship, their children will remain illegitimate, even although the legality of the marriage may not have been called in question during the lifetime of the parents. But what if the parents acted in blameless ignorance? Of course, on the discovery of the disqualification, the marriage may be annulled as being unlawful; but if it were entered into innocently, the legitimacy of the offspring is secured Parent and by the good faith of the parents. Accordingly, in Scotland, the good faith of both parents was held to save the rights of the children in a case which occurred more than a hundred years ago. The jurist who reported that judgment gave it as his opinion, that the good faith of either of the parents would have led to the same result; and this point became the subject of litigation within the present century, but unfortunately the claimant died before judgment could be pronounced. This doctrine is not new. At a period prior to the Reformation, when impediments to marriage were absurdly extended, it was sometimes discovered, after children were born, that their legitimacy was doubtful; and it became more reasonable to support the legitimacy than to bastardize children who were begotten in utter absence of any intention to violate the law. After the Reformation the Commissary Court in Scotland acted in accordance with this view.

The presumption in favour of the legitimacy of children born in wedlock is so strong, that it can only be overcome by evidence leading to the conclusive conviction that the husband is not the father. The presumption is against the legitimacy if the parents were entirely separated between eleven solar and six lunar months antecedent to the birth. The most open adultery of a married woman will not of itself bastardize her offspring, unless it be rendered credible by other facts and circumstances that her husband is not the father. Even the united declaration of both husband and wife, that the husband is not the father, though always important, is insufficient, because they may be acting collusively and falsely for improper purposes. But if, in addition to the manifest adultery of the wife, with the admission, probably, of the paternity by a third party, there are circumstances which seem to infer that a child was not lawfully begotten, then the declaration of the parents will become matter of grave consideration. Looking to the whole conduct of the married pair, prior and subsequent to the birth, the House of Peers has on more than one occasion found it morally impossible to believe in the legitimacy of a child, and has therefore given judgment against it, even where the physical possibility was not absolutely excluded. In one of these cases, the married pair dwelt near each other, but then the birth was studiously, and for a considerable period successfully, concealed from the husband, while the paternity was acknowledged by another man with whom the woman had been intimate, and who bequeathed his whole property to the child. Some circumstances extinguish the plea of legitimacy at once; as, if the child were a Mulatto, the husband being a white man. No reliance is placed on family resemblance, as being too fanciful; though in one case the House of Peers heard an argument partly founded on that circumstance.

We shall now briefly notice,—1st, The duties of parents to their lawful children; 2d, The powers of parents over their children; 3d, The duties of children to their parents; and 4th, The duties and obligations between parents and illegitimate children.

1. The Duties of Parents.—In every civilized country a father is obliged, if he be able, to support his children, and to train them to be able to support themselves. This is the dictate of nature. It is scarcely possible, however, for a court of law to interfere with the details of the father's management, unless it be obviously cruel or immoral. In regard to education of children, it has been thought that, except in extreme cases, "there is no further obligation than what nature has implanted" in the father's breast. If the father be dead, and the child is in the custody of tutors, courts of law find no difficulty in interfering, wherever it appears that the child is being reared in a manner unsuitable to its position and prospects. When children have attained an age at which, under ordinary circumstances,

Parents and they should be able to support themselves, the father's obligations cease, unless they become disabled by accident or disease; and then the father, if able, is bound to provide them with necessaries only, and nothing more. If a father, being able, refuses to aliment his children, whereby they become chargeable to the parish, he is punished by fine and imprisonment, under the statute 8 and 9 Vict., c. 83, § 80. It is not the policy of law to tempt children to lead idle lives. A gentleman of fortune, however, will hardly be relieved of his obligation to support his son on his being qualified to become a lawyer or a physician, because, by training his son to any such profession, the father virtually undertakes to maintain him until he can support himself by it. Still more, if a wealthy father were not to train his son to any profession or trade whatever, he raises against himself an obligation to support him beyond majority, if he be otherwise destitute. If the father be incapacitated to support his minor children, his duties fall first on the mother, if she have independent means of her own, and next on the father's nearest ascendant, going backward according to their ability, rather than on the parish, with a right of relief against the father of the children if he afterwards become possessed of means. But a grandfather is not bound to support his indigent daughter-in-law. The obligation of support ceases in the lower ranks when children are able to support themselves by labour; and in the upper ranks, when they obtain the means,—as when a son gets a commission in the army,—unless he is thereafter incapacitated by some blameless cause, as a stroke of palsy, in which case the father is the sole judge as to how and where the support shall be given. It has been decided by the House of Peers that the amount of aliment in such a case "is, support beyond want, and all that is beyond that, is left to parental affection." Under all circumstances, a child drawing profits from any source is bound to bear his own expenses so far as he is able, but he is not bound to repay what his father may have expended on him out of any property which he may subsequently succeed to or acquire. If a wealthy father neglect his duty to a disabled son, a third party supplying him with necessaries has a good action against the father for payment; but not the lender of money, unless he prove that it was truly expended in providing what should have been provided by the father. If, in advancing money to a son, to enable him to purchase a commission or to enter into business, the father take a voucher for it, or enter it in his books against the son, a debt rather than a donation will be implied. If a father become bankrupt, his obligations to support his children are altogether subordinated to his obligations to pay his other lawful debts; so that children cannot be ranked like ordinary creditors on their father's estate, excepting in certain cases where a credit has been created in their favour, as by an antenuptial contract of marriage. If an heir succeed to an estate through his father, and the latter have left children in poverty, the obligations of the father are transferred to the heir. This results, not from relationship, because a man is not bound in law to support his brother or sister, and still less more remote relatives, but from the heir representing, and taking possession of the estate of, his ancestor. In such a case, the liability of the heir does not exceed the liability of the ancestor, had he survived. Every such case, however, must be governed by its own circumstances. For example, if a father die, leaving several sons and daughters, and an estate clogged with debt, the daughters, like their brothers, must betake themselves to some employment; while the heir of a large unburdened estate is liable to support his sisters, if they have not been trained to work, until their marriage. On that event, the obligation expires.

The law of England does not prevent a father from disinheritting his children. The Roman law allowed him to do so only if he could show a sufficient reason. In Scotland Parent and Child, the father can disappoint his heir of his unentailed lands by the expedient of giving them to the person he desires to prefer, in terms implying a present conveyance, under reservation of his (the father's) interest, and power at any time to revoke the deed. Such a deed, if unrevoled, receives effect at his death.

2. The Powers of Parents.—At one period the Roman law set no limits to the parental authority; and though it subsequently did so, it never interfered with the father's right to the whole of his child's earnings. By the laws of England and Scotland the father is entitled to the custody of his children, even though he may have violated his conjugal duties, except in the extreme cases already hinted at; and he has a right to inflict that moderate degree of chastisement which is necessary to secure obedience, and to promote the real welfare of his minor children. After their majority, if they require assistance, he may exact residence in his family as the condition of granting it. So long as they reside in family with their father, he has a right in England to the profits of their industry, and in Scotland to such profits to the extent of the expense which they occasion to him. The father is tutor to his children while in puberty, and their curator thereafter until their majority. In the former capacity, he acts for them; and in the latter, with them. No legal proceedings are necessary to invest a father in these offices; and he is not required, like a stranger, to take the oath to act faithfully, nor to find security for his intromissions, unless he be insolvent. No deed by a minor is binding if it be disapproved of by the father,—not even articles of apprenticeship,—although to such a deed his consent may be implied from his tacit acquiescence for a length of time to his child remaining in the service. A minor, although living independently on his own fortune, cannot grant leases, remove tenants, or sell or burden his lands, without his father's express consent; because the parental guardianship is designed to supply the immaturity of the child's judgment and experience. Without such consent, the minor's bond or bill for borrowed money affords no ground of action, after his majority, to a greater extent than the sum which the creditor can prove was applied to the profitable uses of the minor. Unsuitable furnishings to a minor never afford a good ground of action against him; and if he have no means of his own, even furnishings which are suitable in their own nature constitute a debt, not against the minor, but against his father, unless the father have previously sufficiently supplied the minor. It is the duty of third parties to make inquiry before giving credit to a minor. Where the minor is not residing in the family of his father, these rules may not be so strictly enforced against the merchant; but in no case will an action lie for unsuitable furnishings, nor for necessaries too frequently given, unless they may eventually become available to the minor. A minor is not entitled to restitution for the loss he may have suffered from his unsuitable purchases with cash, the father or guardian being to blame for having allowed him the command of the money, whereby the merchant may have been thrown off his guard. And if a minor be so nearly major that the merchant might be mistaken as to his age, and he fraudulently imposes on the merchant by pretending that he has attained majority, and thus gets credit, the minor, by his fraud, will create a debt against himself for which he may be justly sued in majority.

The father's right of administration in reference to any estate to which his children may succeed by the will of a third party, is excluded wherever the granter either gives the administration to another, or simply excludes that of the father. In this last case, the court will appoint a guardian in reference to such estate. The marriage of a minor daughter puts an end to the guardianship of her father, and Parent and transfers it to her husband; and it is excluded wherever the child has an action at law against the father, and wherever the father has an interest adverse to the child: the court in these cases appoints a curator.

One cannot here help noticing a remarkable difference between the laws of England and Scotland in this respect, that in England the consent of the father is required to prevent the marriage of a minor from being invalidated, while in Scotland such consent is not required. Somewhat inconsistently with itself, the law of Scotland requires the father's approval of very unimportant transactions on the part of a minor, and yet allows a girl of twelve years of age and a boy of fourteen to enter into the contract of marriage, on which the happiness of their lives may depend, without the concurrence or advice of any guardian whatever.

In England and in Scotland both sexes are enfranchised at the age of twenty-one.

3. The Duties of Children to their Parents.—These are very strongly written on the heart, though it is not always easy for human laws to enforce them. Children should yield to their parents obedience in youth, and affection and reverence through life. The maltreatment of parents by children is justly punished as an aggravated offence. Some of the duties of children are not extinguished even though their parents may be the reverse of exemplary. For instance, children are bound at all times, if able, whatever the character or conduct of their parents may have been, to support them when indigent, in return for the support which they (the children) received in infancy; and this altogether independent of the question, whether they succeeded to any property through their parents or not. The obligation of a child to support, if able, his indigent mother, does not depend on his representing his father, as it does in the case of brothers or sisters. It is a natural obligation, incumbent on himself according to his ability, and which the law will enforce.

4. Of the Duties and Obligations between Parents and Illegitimate Children.—These are very inferior to those above referred to. At one time, the bastard was treated as if he had been a delinquent. For example, unless he had heirs of his own body, he could not make a testament without letters of legitimation from the crown; but this disability was removed by the statute 6 Will. IV., c. 22. At present, a bastard cannot succeed to his father, except by will. In England the rights of an illegitimate child "are only such as he can acquire, for he can inherit nothing, being looked on as the son of nobody."

In Scotland, as in England, so far as succession is concerned, the illegitimate child is regarded as having no father; and therefore, on the one hand, he is not his father's heir, and on the other, the father has no right to the custody of, neither has he a right to act as administrator at law to, the unfortunate infant. It follows that the father cannot appoint tutors or curators, or guardians of any kind, to his illegitimate child, unless he leave property by special deed to him; in which case he can only appoint guardians in reference to the property left, on the same footing with a person leaving property by will to a stranger. The law compels the father, when the paternity is ascertained, to contribute along with the mother for the support of the bastard; the amount, which is only for "support beyond want," varying a little with the rank and condition of the parents, and never for a longer period than until the child attain an age at which it is able to work for itself; the mother till then being entitled to the custody of the child. The father can only exclude the mother's right to the custody by proving that she is an improper person for such a trust, or is guilty of cruelly mistreating the child. Even her right to the custody expires on her illegitimate son becoming seven, and her illegitimate daughter ten years of age; and then the father may, if he wish it, make his right to have the custody a condition of his giving farther aliment, unless the mother can show (which at these tender years is not always difficult) the existence of circumstances sufficient to justify an extension of her right. Practically no aliment is awarded by law after bastards have reached twelve or sixteen years. If the father be dead, his executors cannot at any period demand the custody from the mother. The father is not liable to third parties for any debts which the mother of illegitimate children may contract on account of their upbringing; and on the other hand, he cannot claim any portion of the gains which may be acquired through their talents or industry. But if they be residing in family with their father, he may take such gains to the extent of the expense which they occasion. So little is there of mutual obligation between these parties, that if the illegitimate child make no claim on the father, the father has no power whatever over the child; and the illegitimate child is not liable, though he be able, to support his indigent father. The mother, however, stands in a very different position. The relationship between her and her illegitimate child is at least indisputable; and therefore the child is bound, if able, to support her when in poverty, according to the rules by which lawful children are bound to support their mother. For the same reason, though a bastard does not succeed to his father's estate, he does so to his mother's. A man is not bound to support his son's bastards. Failing their father and mother, they must be supported in infancy by the parish of their mother's settlement. The Poor Law Act, 8 and 9 Vict., c. 83, § 80, renders a father liable to fine not exceeding £10, or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, who leaves a bastard, acknowledged or proved to be his, to become chargeable on the parish.

(PARENT-DUCHATELET, Alexis-Jean-Baptiste, a sanitary reformer, was born in Paris in 1790, and was educated for the medical profession. After practising for some time as a doctor in the French capital, he directed his attention to the subject of public health. Actuated by pure philanthropy, and undeterred by any considerations of personal comfort and health, he visited all those places where noisome effluvia were daily killing their unconscious victims. Common sewers, tobacco manufactories, pyroligneous acid factories, burying-grounds, and dissecting-rooms, all came under his scientific inspection, and were described to the public in a great number of pamphlets. His last investigation was upon the prostitution of the capital. A report of it was published in 1836, the year in which he died.