the form in which it now exists, is a comparatively modern science. Among the Christian Fathers we find all the essential dogmas of our faith asserted and defended; but they made few, and these imperfect efforts, to present them in a systematic and complete form. The work of Origen De Principiis, Augustine's Enchiridion ad Laurentium, and the Exegetes της ὑποδοξου πνευματος of John of Damascus, are almost the only specimens that have come down to us of attempts on the part of the fathers to give a conspectus of the substance of Christian truth; but they are far from being what would now be required in works bearing such titles (1). The science of theology began with the scholastic divines, of whom Anselm, Abelard, Hugo St Victor, Peter the Lombard, Alexander de Hales, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, Durandus, and Occam, are those whose writings in this department are the most important (2). Since the Reformation the science has been assiduously cultivated, and many digests of it have been published (3). Some of the greatest theologians, however, of modern times, such as Howe, Owen, Bull, Waterland, Edwards, Fuller, Whately, have contented themselves with the elucidation of particular departments and questions in theology, rather than sought to present the science in a complete form.

1. Originis De Principiis cum annot., ed., E. R. Redepenning, Leip. 1838; Augustini Enchiridion, ed. Danneux, Geneva, 1575, and often since; Joan. Damasceni Expositio Fidei Orthodoxae, in his works edited by Leguén, Par. 1712, tom. i., p. 124, and in Augusti's Chrestomathia Patristica, vol. i., p. 244; where also are to be found the Catechesis Quarta of Cyril of Jerusalem, and the Oratio Catechetica Magna of Gregory of Nyssa, the former of which, however, has no scientific worth, and the latter treats only of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments, and that chiefly apologetically.

2. Anselm, Arch. of Canterbury, Opera, ed. Gerberon, Par. 1675, ib. 1721, fol.; Ven. 1744, 2 vols.; Abelard, Opera, ed. Duchesne, Par. 1616, fol.; Epitome Theol. Christianae, edit. F. H. Rheinwald, Berl. 1835, 8vo; Hugo St Victor, Summa Sententiarum, in Opp., Par. 1506, 4to, Rouen, 3 vols. fol., 1648; Peter the Lombard, Sententiarum Libri Quinque, Ven. 1477, fol.; Alex. of Hales (de Aula), Summa Theologiae, Ven. 1475, fol. and 1676, 4 vols. fol.; Albertus Magnus, Opera Omnia, ed. Jammy, Lyons, 1651, 21 vols. fol.; Thomas of Aquino (Aquinas), Opera Theol., cur. Bh. de Rubens, Ven. 1745, 28 vols. 4to; Summa Theologiae, published first between 1462 and 1470, and often republished; Bonaventura, Opera, Rome, 1588-96, 6 vols. fol.; J. Duns Scotus, Opera, coll. et illustr. L. Wadding, Lyons, 1529, 2 vols. fol.; G. Durand de St Poursault, Commentarius super IV. Libros sententiarum; William of Occam, Centiloquium Theologicum, Lugd. 1494-5, 6 fol.

3. The theologian of the Lutheran Reformation was Melanchthon, who, in his Locri Theologici, published first in 1521, set forth the pure Protestant doctrine in a systematic form. Of his followers Theology in the Lutheran Church the following are most worthy to be named here—Martin Chemnitz, Locri Theol., ed. Meyer, Frankf. 1591, 4to, and often since; Leon. Hutten, Compend. Locri Theol., Viteb. 1610; Locri Commen., Theol., Viteb. 1619; Joh. Gerhard, Locri Theol., Ven. 1610-25, 9 vols. fol., re-edited by J. Fr. Cuvier in 20 vols., Tub. 1762-89; Abr. Calovius, Systema Locri Theol., 12 vols., Viteb. 1655-77; Joh. Andr. Questenstedt, Theol. Distinctio-polem. sine Spec. Theol. in duas sect. did. et fct. divinum, Viteb. 1685 and 1693, Leips. 1702; Joh. W. Baier, Compend. Theol., Jen. 1686, 1691, and 1737; Dav. Hollaz, Examen Theol. Aerom. univers. Theol. Thetico-polem. Complectentes, Holm. and Leips. 1707, re-edited by Teller, 1763, 4to; J. Franc. Buddens, Instit. Theol. Dog., 4to, Lond. 1723-24-27-41.

In the Reformed Church the primary theologian is Calvin, whose Institutio Christianae Religionis, first published at Basle in 1536, and many times reprinted and translated into several languages, laid the basis of that theological system which still bears his name. Among his followers may be named Hyperius, Methodius Theol. prescrip. Chr. locup. locorum comm. loci ill., Bas. 1568; Wolf. Muenzen, Locri Comm. Theol., Basle, 1576, translated into English by John Man, 1568; Peter Martyr, Locri Commen., Bas. 1561, often reprinted, translated into English by Anthony Marten, Lond. 1583, fol.; J. Coch (Cocceius), Summa Doctr. de Fidei et Doctrinis Dei, 1648, and often reprinted, the foundation of the so-called Federal Theology, embraced and expanded admirably by Herman Witsius in his Economica Federum. Def. cum hominibus, Leuwarden, 1687, Utrecht 1694, 4to, translated into English, 2 vols. Svo, Lond. 1822; Pet. van Mastricht, Theol. Theoret. Practice, Amst. 1682, and often reprinted; Fr. Turritine, Instit. Theol. Elaticen., 4 vols. 4to, Lugd. Bat. 1595; Bened. Plezet, La Theologie Chretienne, 3 vols. 4to, Geneva, 1731; Joh. Marck, Christ. Theologia Medulla, Utr. 1742; H. Venema, Institutes of Theology, translated by A. W. Brown from the author's MS., Edin. 1850. To this school the majority of the English systems of theology belong. Of these may be named J. Owen, Theologoumena Pantodapta sive de Natura, Ortu, Progressu et Studio Verae Theologiae, Oxon. 1661; R. Baxter, Catholic Theologie, Plain, Pure, and Peaceable, Lond. 1675, fol.; Methodus Theologie Caroli, fol. 1681; Usher, Body of Divinity, Lond. 1647, fol.; Th. Ridgley, Body of Divinity, &c., 2 vols. fol., 1731; 4 vols. Svo, 1819, Th. Gill, Elements of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity, 2 vols. 4to, 1769; 3 vols. Svo, 1796; Th. Boston, Illustration of the Doctrines of Religion, 3 vols. Svo, Edin. 1773; Jn. Pearson, Exposition of the Creed, fol. Lond. 1674; Th. Dwight, Theology Explained and Defended in a series of Sermons, many editions; G. Hill, Lectures in Divinity, 2 vols. Svo, 1821; 2 vols. 12mo, 1833; Dick, Lectures on Theology, 4 vols. Svo; Th. Chalmers, Institutes of Theology, 2 vols., 1849; G. Payne, Lectures on Christian Theology, 2 vols. Svo, Lond. 1850; J. Pye Smith, First Lines of Christian Theology, Svo, Lond. 1854; R. Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. Svo, Edin. 1856.

The system which, without ceasing to be Evangelical, is most antagonistic to the Calvinistic is that of Arminius, whose works (Opera Theologica) were published in 1 vol. 4to, at Leyden in 1629, and have been since republished; they have been partially translated by J. Nichols, 2 vols. Svo, Lond. 1825. To this school belong Sim, Episcopius, Instit. Theol. Libri iv., in his collected works, Amst. 1650; Steph. Courcelles (Curcellaeus), Instit. Rel. Christ. Libri vii. in Opp. Theol., fol. Amst. 1678; Ph. Limborch, Theol. Christ., fol., Amst. 1686, 1735, fol.; G. Tomline, Elements of Christian Theology, 3 vols. Svo, Lond. 1819; R. Watson, Institutes of Theology, 3 vols. Of Roman Catholic theologians the following may be mentioned—J. Eck, Enchiridion locior. commun. cathol. Lutheranus, Coln. 1525; Melchior Canus, Locri Theol. Libri xii., Salmut. 1563, Lyons, 1704, 4to; Bf. Mt. Schnappinger, Doctr. Dogmatismus Eccles. Chr. Cathol., Augs. 1816, 2 vols. Svo; II. Klop, Spott der Kathol. Dogmatik, 3 vols. Svo, Mainz, 1835; T. M. Gousset, Theologia Dogmatica et Morale, 4 vols. Svo, Bruxelles, 1840-50.

Since the time of Semler, who in 1774 published Institut. ad Doctr. Christ. liberaliter disserend. and in 1777 Versuch einer freier Theol. Lehreart, a much more free, and in some cases purely rational method has been followed by the theologians of Germany in the study of their science. A few of their more valuable works may be here mentioned—In. Chr. Doderlein, Instit. Theologiae Christ. in Capitibus Relig. Theoreticis Nostri Temporis Accommodata, 2 vols. Svo, Alt. 1780, 6th edit. 1797; G. Chr. Storr, Doct. Chr. parv. Theor., 1793, translated into German, with additions by C. Chr. Platt, and into English by S. Schmucker, 2d ed. 1836, reprinted at Lond. 1839; Fr. Volc. Reinhard, Vorlesungen üb. die Dogmatik, Svo, 1801, newedit. by Schott (the 5th), 1824; Fr. von Ammon, Summa Theol. Christ., Svo, 1803, 4th edit. 1830; J. A. S. Wegscheider, Instit. Christ. Dogm., Hal. 1813, 7th edit. 1833; W. M. L. De Wette, Lehrbuch der Christ. Dogmatik, 2 vols., Berl. 1813, many editions; K. Gl. Bretschneider, Handb. der Dogmatik, 2 vols., 1814, 3d ed. 1822; F. Schleiermacher, Theology has to do with religion; indeed, the two are correlates, religion being the subjective apprehension and use of the truths, the system and science of which objectively it is the business of theology to set forth. Now religion is a relative term; it assumes the existence of two parties, God and man, who are at variance, and whom it is proposed to re-unite or re-bind (religare). The elements of all religion, then, are of necessity these:—1. God in his being, character, and claims. 2. Man as God's creature in his natural constitution and responsibilities, with the circumstances which have produced estrangement between God and man, and the consequences to which this has exposed him. 3. The medium through which reconciliation may be effected between God and man, and the grounds on which the efficiency of that medium depends. 4. The Concept of means by which men may come into enjoyment of this reconciliation, and the effect it is designed to produce upon their subsequent character and relations before God. These may be regarded as the essential elements of a religion for man, without which religion cannot exist.

Christianity claims to be a perfect religion, and the only true one; and these claims are grounded on the fact that she alone fully and correctly presents the truth on each of these four heads. She alone unfolds the true revelations of God, describes the true case and character of man, announces the true means by which reconciliation between God and man may be effected, and sets forth the true consequences of this reconciliation as respects both man's state and character, not only for this world but for that also which is to come. Christian theology, therefore, falls naturally into the divisions indicated by these four elements of the Christian religion. Its main parts are these four:—

I. THEOLOGY in its strict acceptation (λόγος περί τοῦ Θεοῦ)—The scientific development of the truths revealed concerning the Being, the attributes, the works, and the claims of God.

II. ANTHROPOLOGY (λόγος περί τοῦ ἀνθρώπου)—The scientific development of what the Bible announces concerning man, especially concerning him in his relation to God, and concerning that which has produced estrangement between God and him, its nature, its extent, its source, its consequences.

III. CHRISTOLOGY (λόγος περί τοῦ Χριστοῦ)—The scientific development of what Scripture unfolds concerning the medium of reconciliation between God and man, especially as respects the person of the Mediator, the nature of his work, and the results of his official constitution and agency.

IV. SOTERIOLOGY (λόγος περί τῶν σωτηριῶν)—The doctrine of human redemption, or the development of what Scripture teaches concerning the salvation of men, especially concerning the nature of salvation, the grounds of it, the means of it, the agent of it, the ultimate cause of it, and the manifested results of it, as in this life so also in that which is to come.

To these some add as a fifth head ESCHATOLOGY, or the doctrine of the last things; but this may be fairly included under Soteriology.

PART I.

OR THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD.

SECT. I.—Concept of God.

It is impossible for us to give any adequate definition of God; for, in order to define any object, we must be able to refer it to the genus to which it belongs, and to enunciate its characteristic difference from other objects belonging to the same genus, and both the genus and the characteristic difference must be previously and better known to us than the thing to be defined (comp. Aristotle, Top. i. c. 5, vi. 4).

But there is no genus under which the Infinite and Eternal may be subsumed; even the most abstract category under which we might propose to place Him, that of substance, is inadequate; for we cannot use even this term of Him except by analogy (comp. Augustine, De Trinit., bk. v.; Opp., vol. iii. col. 316, 317, ed. Bas. 1569) (1).

1. The definitions which are given by theologians of God are little better than mere identical propositions. Thus Melanchthon says in his Loci Theol., "Deus est essentia spiritualis, intelligens, uterum, verum, bonum, purum, justum, misericordem, liberrimum, immensum potentiae et sapientiae." Now, discounting from this definition those terms which describe God, not as He is in Himself, but as He is in relation to other beings, and which consequently do not properly enter into the concept of God; and discounting also those which describe qualities not exclusively distinctive of God, such as intelligence, freedom, and the moral qualities; there remain the terms "spiritualis, uterum, immensum," as definitive of the divine Concept of essence. But do we know these better than we know God? Are our ideas of spiritual essence, of eternity, of immensity, more simple and direct than is our idea of God? To say that God is such an essence, what is it but to say that \( \text{God} = \text{essence} \)? (See Cic., De Nat. Deor., i. 22; Augustine, De Cognitione Veræ Visæ, c. 7.)

Our incapacity scientifically to define God arises from our incapacity directly and adequately to think God. Nor is a definition necessary before we can advance to the consideration of what is knowable concerning Him (τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Ῥωμ. i. 19); for however imperative such a preliminary may be in the mathematical sciences, where the reasoning is deductive, it may be safely dispensed with in investigations of a moral kind, where we do not set out from a position which holds our conclusion, and from which we are to educe it, but arrive at our position from the comparison of different momenta tending to it.

See Hamilton, Discussions, p. 15, 2d edit. Manel's Bampton Lectures, lect. ii.—"Frigida tantum speculatibes ludunt quibus in hac quaestione insistere propositum est quid sit Deus: quam interit multum nostra petitis qualis sit et quid eus naturae conveniat, scire,"—Calvin, Institut., i. c. 2, § 2.

But though unable either adequately to think or to define God, we are not unable to learn something concerning Him. The sources of information are two, Nature and Scripture; "Duo sunt," says Augustine, "quae in cognitionem Dei ducant: Creatura et Scriptura" (1). The methods by which we obtain knowledge from the former of these sources are:—1. By negation (via negationis, καὶ ἀπορίας), in which we remove from God in our thoughts of Him all the imperfections belonging to creatures, and pronounce Him free from all such; 2. By eminence (via eminentiae, συνα εὐσεβείας), in which we ascribe to God in absolute perfection the excellences we find in creatures according to their measure; and, 3. By causality (via causalitatis, συνα εὐσεβείας), in which we ascribe to God those perfections which are requisite for the production and upholding of the created universe. Of these methods it is evident that the first two must always go together; for we cannot pronounce God absolutely free from imperfection without ascribing to Him infinite excellence. It is evident also that we must combine the teachings of the second method with those of the third, in order to reach just views of God; for it is only as we ascribe to Him that intelligence in perfection which we find in measure in ourselves that we think of Him as God, or as different from a mere world-power. Thus it appears that all these methods mutually supplement each other, and that it is from the skilful use of the whole that we obtain just views of God, so far as these are attainable by us (2).

1. To the two sources above noted some of the old dogmatic writers add what they call the "notitia insita Dei," and which they describe as "esse semel illa notio de Deo hominibus conquisito animo per natum ab eo insculpta et impressa, siquidem ex principiis istis nobiscum natis, non semel insita, sed quidam etiam Deum attinent."—Gerhard, Locc. Theol., i. 93. According to this, the knowledge of God is supposed to be one of those common notions or primary beliefs which form part of consciousness anterior to all reasoning. But when the tests by which all such notions are determined are applied to this, it will be found that it cannot abide there so as to make good its claim. This notion is resolvable into more comprehensive conceptions under which it is assumed; we affirm it to be true because something else is true; it is not a necessary truth of reason, for we can deny it without self-contradiction; and in fine, the notion of God which we possess is not in itself as evident as any proof that can be furnished of it; for we constantly seek to prove it by arguments drawn from data more evident to our minds than it.

2. This distinction of methods has come down to us from the earliest days of theology. We owe it to a Neo-Platonic writer of the fourth or fifth century, who wrote under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. It figures prominently in the writings of the schoolmen, and has been generally adopted by modern divines. Though not explicitly enunciated in Scripture, all the three methods are exemplified by the sacred writers. Comp. for the first, Num. xxiii. 19; Mat. iii. 8. For the second, Is. xi. 18; Matt. vii. 11. And for the third, Paul's discourse on Mars' Hill, Acts xvii. 24-29.

Sect. II.—Existence of God.

Though God is above all phenomena, yet it is only by means of the phenomena of being that we can ascend to a conviction of his existence. Now within this department there are two positions of which we are absolutely certain: the one is, that something exists; the other is, that something must always have existed. Of the former position we are sure, if from nothing else, from the fact of our own existence given to us in consciousness. The famous dictum of Des Cartes, "cogito ergo sum," understood as he meant it to be understood, not as logically inferring existence from thought, but as affirming that in the consciousness of thought is given the consciousness of personal existence, must obtain universal assent; as Des Cartes goes on to show, doubt here is suicidal, for, "it would be contradictory to assume that what thinks does not exist at the moment in which it thinks" (1). Of the latter of the above positions we are assured as a deduction of reason; for if something exists now, something must always have existed or have at some time come into being. But something cannot come into being if nothing existed before; ex nihilo nihil fit; that which is nothing cannot make itself something; a thing must be before it can do; whence it follows that as something exists, something must always have existed (2).

1. Princip. Philos., Para i. § 7. The use of the term "ergo" by Des Cartes has probably misled those (among whom is Dr Reid) who have censured him as resting the proof of existence on the fact of thought, and thereby falling into a petitio principii. But Des Cartes does not mean to say, "Because I think, I exist;" he means that, being conscious of thought, he is also and therein conscious of existence. See Art. METAPHYSICS, p. 616; Hotho, De Philosophia Cartiliana, p. 11; Cousin, Sur le vrai sens du cogito ergo sum; and Des Cartes' own explanation in his Respon. ad secundas objections, p. 87, Amst. 1663.

2. See Howe's Living Temple, Part i., ch. 2 § 9.

Assuming that something has always existed, there are three hypotheses which may be formed regarding this eternal something in relation to the cosmos or universe:—1. That it is an intelligent being distinct from the universe, and by whom the universe has been framed; 2. That it is the universe itself, the matter of which (ἐλάσσον) has always existed, developing itself in various forms and passing through innumerable changes, but never having in any proper sense begun to be; or, 3. That it is an intelligent substance not existing as a personality or distinct from the universe, but identical with it, developing itself in it, becoming conscious of itself in intelligent beings, and comprising in itself the sum of all existence. The first of these hypotheses is that of Theism, the second is that of Atheism, the third is that of Pantheism. Of these one must be true, and only one can be true. We proceed to exhibit the evidence on which the first, which theology adopts, rests.

The methods of proof of the existence of God are four—the historical, the physical, the anthropological, and the teleological.

I. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT.—Here the appeal is made to facts of experience; such as the common consent of all nations to the belief that God is, the fact that God has appeared and revealed Himself to men, and the fact of miracles proving the existence of the power by which they are wrought. The first of these facts presented itself to many of the ancient theists as carrying with it cogent evidence of the existence of God, and some modern writers have conceded to it the same distinction (1). It may be doubted, however, whether there is much force in this argument. Doubtless the fact that all nations have concurred in this belief affords strong presumptive proof that evidence in support of it is to be found somewhere; but that is a different thing from presenting such evidence itself, and beyond this it does not appear that this fact has any probatory force in relation to the present subject. Something more may be said in favour of the fact of theophanies (2). It may be admitted that what makes itself objectively manifest must have a real existence, and that if God has really manifested himself to the senses of his creatures, there is in that an evidence not to be resisted of his existence. At the same time, as no instance is on record of a theophany where a previous belief in the being of God did not exist, and as in such a case there is room for suspecting that what was assumed to be a theophany may have been a subjective deception, the reality of any asserted case of this kind will be admitted only where the belief of a God is already held on other grounds. As for the proof from miracles, it is plainly *a petitio principii*; for as the design of a miracle is to prove that God is with the party by whom it is wrought, the divine existence must be previously assumed before the supposition of miracle can be made.

1. See, for instance, Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, i. 17, ii. 4; *Tuscul. Quest.*, i. 13; Seneca, *Epist.*, 117; Maximus Tyrius, *Disert.*, i.; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromat.*, bk. v. § 134, p. 735, ed. Potter; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, bk. iii. § 10; Turritine, *Inst. Theol. Elene.*, i. p. 191, ed. 1696; Ridgeley, *Body of Divinity*, vol. i., p. 15; Payne, *Lectures on Christian Theol.*, vol. i., p. 28.

2. See Storr, *Biblical Theology*, translated by Schumacher, p. 87, of the London reprint, where other advocates of this view are mentioned; Bretschneider, *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, vol. i., p. 229, 2d ed.

II. PHYSICAL ARGUMENT.—Here the reasoning infers from the facts of existence an author of these facts. Presented in its simplest form, it simply postulates the necessity of a cause to existence, and from that argues the existence of a great first cause of all. Whatever exists must have a cause. The universe exists, therefore it has a cause which, as the cause of the universe, is prior to all other causes. But in this simple form the argument is untenable; it proves too much; for by the same reasoning, as God exists, He must be held to be the product of a cause, therefore not to be God. In place of the purely physical argument, therefore, recourse has been had to a modification of it, which is known by the name of the Cosmological argument. This is presented in two forms.

1. The former of these is thus stated by Howe:—"It is evident that some Being was uncaused, or was ever of itself without any cause. For what never was from another had never any cause, since nothing could be its own cause. And somewhat, as appears from what has been said [viz., that as something is something must always have been], never was from another. Or it may be plainly argued thus: That either some being was uncaused, or all being was caused. But if all being were caused, then some one at least were the cause of itself, which hath been already shown impossible. Therefore the expression concerning the First Being, that it was of itself, is only to be taken negatively—that is, that it was not of another, not positively, as if it did sometime make itself. Or, what is there positively signified by that form of speech is only to be taken thus, that it was a being of that nature as that it was impossible it should ever not have been; not that it did ever of itself step out of non-being into being" (1).

1. *Living Temple*, Part i., ch. ii. § 10 ff.

2. For a statement of the latter form of the cosmological argument, we may borrow from its ablest expositor, Leibnitz. "God is the first cause of all things; for those things which have their definite limitations, as *ex gr.*, everything which we see and experience, are contingent, and have nothing in themselves which makes their existence necessary. It is obvious that time, space, and matter, which, mutually united, are in and by themselves indifferent and conformable, may assume totally different movements and forms, and in a wholly different order. Hence we must seek the ground of the existence of the world, which is nothing else than the sum of all contingent things, and this must be sought in the substance, which has the ground of its existence in itself, and which consequently is necessary and eternal" (1).

1. *Theodice*, Opp. ed Datens, tom. i.

Besides Leibnitz, this argument has been urged by Wolf, Biltzinger, and others, and was by Kant regarded at one time as the only valid proof of God, a judgment from which he afterwards violently resented. In substance it is found in Aristotle, *Physica Auscult.*, bk. viii. ch. 5; Gregory Nazianz., *Orat.*, iv. 28; John of Damascus, *Exposit. Fidei Orthodoxe*, bk. i. c. 3; Diadochus of Tarsus in Photii Biblioth., p. 209; Th. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, p. i. 2, art. 3; Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*, Edinburgh, 1843, &c., Comp. Heb. i. 10-12; Ps. cxl. 25-27; and 2 Cor. iv. 18, for alleged examples of it or implications of it in Scripture.

The objections which have been urged against this cosmological argument are:—1. That we cannot be quite sure that the world is a contingent existence, because it does not follow from the contingency of individual phenomena that the universe, as such, is contingent; 2. That we can never safely conclude from the necessary relation of concepts in our own minds to the actual existence of what these speculatively necessitate; and, 3. That even supposing the argument valid, it could only prove the existence of something said to be a first cause and a necessary substance; it cannot show either that that something is an intelligent being, or that it is distinct from the universe.

See Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, p. 631, Riga, 1787.

III. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.—The reasoning here is founded on certain observed facts or phenomena of human consciousness. As these are different, the argument itself assumes different forms.

1. Ontological Proof.—The fact founded on here is the existence in the mind of a clear and distinct idea of God as the ens perfectissimum, the absolutely perfect being; from which it is argued that there must be an objective reality corresponding to the idea so existing in the mind, inasmuch as existence is as inseparable from the idea of the absolutely perfect, as the idea of a valley is inseparable from that of an elevation.

This argument is usually cited as that of Des Cartes, by whom it is propounded in several parts of his writings; see *Princip. Philos.*, p. i. c. 14; *Methodus de Prima Philos.*, Med. 5, p. 38, ed. 1658 Amati; *Respontiones ad Quintas Objectiones*, p. 89, &c. But it was still more ably propounded long before him by Anselm of Canterbury in his *Proslogion de Dei Existentia*, in his *Monologium de Divinitatis Essentia*, and in his *Liber Apologeticus Contra Gualdimaris*, &c., tracts which will be found in the Benedictine edition of his works, 2 vols. fol., Paris, 1721, and in a translated form in the American *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. v., p. 534 ff. In more recent times it counts among its exponents such men as Mallebranche (*Recherches de la Verité*, bk. iv. ch. 11. § 2), Mendelssohn (*Morgenstunde*, p. 306, 2d ed.), and Hegel (*Encyclop. d. Phil. Wissenschaft*, quoted by Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, i. 446). To these may be added the still greater name of Leibnitz; for though he says the argument is not absolutely complete, inasmuch as it postulates the possibility of the divine existence, which may be questioned, he virtually gives up this objection by saying that, "one has a right to presume the possibility of every existence, and, above all, that of God, until the contrary be proved;" whence," he adds, "this metaphysical argument affords a morally demonstrative conclusion which conduces to this, that in the present state of our knowledge we must judge that God exists, and act accordingly." *Novaeus Essai sur l' entendement Humain*, bk. vi. ch. 10. § 8 p. 404 of Raspe's edit.

This argument has often been treated with ridicule, as if it asserted, that we have only to be able to think a thing clearly in order to prove its objective existence. Such is the view usually given of Des Cartes' argument; but most erroneously, and in the face of repeated assertions and expositions to the contrary both by Des Cartes and by Anselm, as well as Mallebranche; nor is it likely that such reasoners as Leibnitz and Hegel would have been caught for a moment by it had it consisted of so transparent a paradoxism as this. As it appears in the writings of its origi- nal expounders, it resolves itself into the following syllogism:—We must attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the idea of it; but existence enters necessarily into our idea of God, so that we cannot think God but as existing; therefore, we must attribute existence to God, i.e., God exists. The subtle argument thus presented is formally correct, and it can be invalidated only by calling in question the material accuracy of one of its premises. Now, of these, the former is unimpeachable; to deny it would be to deny one of the most certain laws of thought. But the latter is not so intangible. It involves a fallacy, we apprehend, in assuming existence to be a quality or attribute of objects, whereas it is merely a judgment of the mind as to the relation in which objects stand to it. The existence of the sun, for instance, is not an attribute of the sun, does not enter into the idea of the sun ex necessitate; it is simply an expression of a certain relation under which the mind cognises that luminary. It is an error, then, to say that existence presents itself to the mind as included in the mere idea of the All-perfect Being; the very fact that this is proposed for proof, shows that we can think God as non-existent without contradiction.

In the writings of Anselm, this argument is presented in a form which is less easily assailable. He puts it thus:—We have a conception of a Being than whom there is none more perfect—the All-perfect One. But a Being than whom there is none more perfect cannot exist in the intelligence only; He must also exist in reality. For let us suppose that He exists only in the intelligence, then something greater than He can be thought, viz., this Being as existent, which is greater than the same Being non-existent; so that the very Being than whom a greater and more perfect cannot be thought, is a Being than whom a greater and more perfect can be thought, which is an absurdity. There exists, therefore, both in the intelligence and in reality, a being than whom a more perfect cannot be thought; and this being is God. To this piece of scholastic subtlety, one knows not what to answer, except by denying that the concept of a being as existing, is necessarily the concept of a more perfect being than is the concept of that same being as non-existing; or by denying that we have in our minds the idea of an All-perfect Being, a being than whom a more perfect cannot be conceived.

See Leibnitz, Nouv. Ét. bk. iv. ch. 10, § 8.

2. Psychological Proof.—This name has been given to an argument which deduces the divine existence from the mere fact, that an idea or concept of a supremely perfect being may be, and is formed by us. It differs from the ontological argument in this, that it takes no cognizance of the contents of the concept as involving necessary existence; it simply posits the fact that such a concept exists, and concludes that it can be referred for its source only to an objective reality answering to it.

See Des Cartes, Princip. Philos. p. i. c. 18; Meditationes de Prima Phil. Med. 3.

In this reasoning there lurks a fallacy, inasmuch as the existence of God is assumed to account for an alleged fact, which fact is adduced as a proof of the existence of God. Des Cartes, indeed, virtually admits this, by saying, that "God in creating us has imprinted this idea upon us, that it might be like a mark of the artificer stamped on his work." Of course, before we can hypothecate creation and impressions by the Creator on his works, we must presume the existence of the Creator.

3. Proof from the Operations of Conscience.—Man not only judges his own actions as right or wrong, but he pronounces on himself a sentence of approval or the opposite, according to the judgment at which he arrives. But such a sentence necessarily implies a law or standard by which rectitude is estimated and rendered obligatory, and this no less implies a lawgiver and sovereign by whom the law has been enacted, and who will enforce its declarations.

See the striking passage of Cicero in his De Republica, iii. 23, long preserved only as a fragment by Lactantius, but now found in its proper place in the recovered treatise. See also Lactantius himself, Die Inst. ii. vii. 8; and among modern writers, Jacobi, Sämmtl. Schriften, ii. p. 441; Chalmers, Works, i. p. 305; Tallich, Burnet Prize Essay, p. 295; Buchanan, Faith in God and Modern Atheism Compared, p. 101; Storr and Flatt's Theology, Eng. Tr. p. 81, &c.; Fichte also in his Vorrede zu Der Bestimmung der Menschen, p. 293; though it is rather a moral order of the universe than a moral governor for which he contends. It may be seriously doubted whether the argument be valid in itself for maintaining this. The moral order of the universe is reason sufficient why I ought to do this, and not that; if we go beyond this and introduce the idea of obligation, we already assume the divine existence; for how is it possible to have the idea of moral obligation unless we have first the idea and belief of God? (Moral Philosophy, p. 563.)

4. Moral Proof.—By this name is commonly known an argument urged by Kant, and by him pronounced to be the only valid argument for the existence of God. It may be thus stated:—We seek by necessity of our nature the highest good. But to this, perfect happiness is essential, i.e., the state of a being to whom everything is and happens as he wishes. Now this can happen only when all nature coincides with his purposes and ends. Such coincidence, however, we do not experience; as active beings, we are not the causes of nature, and in the moral laws there lies not the least basis for an union of morality and happiness. Nevertheless, as we must seek the highest good, this must be also possible. Thus the necessary connection of both momenta is postulated, i.e., the existence of a cause of all nature distinct from nature, which contains the basis of this connection. There must be a being who is the common cause of the natural and the moral world; and particularly such a being as knows our feelings, an intelligence, and one that, according to this intelligence, apportions happiness to us. Such a being is God.

Kant, Kr. der Reinen Vernunft, p. 847, ed. 1787; Kr. d. Prakt. Vern. p. 238, ed. 1797; Kr. d. Urtheils kraft, p. 448. Compare Schwelger, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 168, 3d ed. 1857.

To this moral argument it does not appear as if much weight could be attached. At the best, it is of merely subjective force, and cannot avail to evince the objective reality of the being whom it supposes. Further, it argues the existence of a divine being, from the fact that man feels himself obliged to obey conflicting laws. This certainly argues disorder somewhere; but may not the fault be with man himself, so that a return by him into a state of harmony with the order of the universe may bring all right? or may it not be merely some temporary disorder in the moral universe, some casual perturbation such as we see sometimes in the physical universe, which will pass away, and all will come right again of its own accord? Besides, as Fichte remarks, why make the highest good to consist in the felicity of individuals—in the satisfying of the wishes of imperfect creatures such as we are, rather than in the restoration of perfect moral order to the universe in the final victory of good over evil?

IV. Teleological Proof, or, Argument from Design.—The appeal here is to final causes, or the ends for which things manifestly exist; hence the name, from τελος, finis, end. This proof is sometimes also called the physico-theological, because it implies a theological conclusion from physical premises. It admits of unbounded illustration, but in itself it is capable of being very briefly stated. When we see two or more objects fitted to each other, so as thereby to secure a definite end or result, we are constrained to assume the agency of an intelligent mind by which the end was contemplated, by which the fitness of the given adaptation to secure that end was foreseen, and by which the objects themselves were adapted to each other, so as to accomplish what was thus designed, as well as of a power sufficient to effect the contemplated arrangement. This is an assumption which we make irresistibly; we cannot consider the facts without making it. Now, the universe, subject to our scrutiny, is full of such instances. Wherever our senses carry us, wherever our instruments unfold to us what our unaided senses cannot discern, wherever consciousness opens to us the phenomena of our inner being in every department of knowledge, we find instances of adaptation, traces of design. The inference is irresistible. There must have presided over the formation of this vast and everywhere well-ordered scheme a high intelligence by which it was conceived and planned, and a mighty power by which the whole was carried into effect.

This argument from design, as it is the most direct and convincing, so it is one of the oldest of the arguments for the existence of God. Though not formally stated in the Bible, it is frequently in substance adduced there. Comp. Ps. viii., xix., cvi.; Job xxxviii.-xli.; Acts xvii. 24; xviii. 24; Rom. i. 9. It was a favourite argument with Socrates; comp. Xenoph. Mem. i. 4; iv. 3. See also Plato, De Legg. x. 68; xii. 223; Philo. 244; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 38 ff.; Tusc. Quest. i. 28, 29. Among the Fathers this argument is urged formally by Theophilus (ad Autolycum i. 23); Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. xxviii.); Gregory of Nyssa (De opificio hominis); Theodore (Graec. Affec. Car. p. 113, ed. Gaisford); and Lactantius (De opificio Dei); and it is alluded to by Minucius (Octav. 17, 18); Augustine (Confess. x. 6); Clement Alexand. (Srom. v. p. 238); and Athanasius (Contra Gent. c. 30 and 34).

Of modern writers who have illustrated this theme, it may suffice here to mention the following—Paley, Natural Theology, or the Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the Appearance of Nature; The Bridgewater Treatises on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in Creation, by Chalmers, Kidd, Whewell, Bell, Hogei, Backland, Kirkye, and Prout; Chalmers, Natural Theology; Works, vol. i. and ii.; Maculloch, Proofs and Illustrations of the Attributes of God from the Facts and Laws of the Physical Universe, &c.; Whewell, Indications of the Creator; Thompson, Christian Theism; Tulloch, Theism; Buchanan, Faith in God and Modern Atheism; Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, vol. i.

This argument from design has sometimes suffered injury from being adduced as valid from more than it is really competent to prove. It shows that some being exists, possessed of intelligence and power, and it may be presumed also of benevolence, by whom the world has been made; but whether this being be himself uncreated, and whether his power and resources be infinite, and whether he be wholly beneficent, this argument by itself can do little to determine.

Kant, who is generally spoken of as rejecting the physico-theological argument entirely, admits it to be valid for all that we contend for. "The proof," says he, "at the highest, can establish only a world-builder, who would be always limited by the fitness of the materials which he had to work up; it cannot establish a creator of the world to the idea of which all is subject; and this is the only thing which we want to know when we say, namely, to prove an all-sufficient primal essence." Rev. der R. V. p. 554. But if any man ever proved to prove as much by the argument from design, he is to be considered for using that argument beyond its competency. We are content to have it proved to us that there is a world-builder, and to Him, assured of his existence, we turn, if haply He will speak to us and tell us more of himself than we can gather from the mere study of his works. Thus natural theology hands over its students to the teaching of Scripture. It is like the Pearl of eastern fable, that conducts her charge to the gates of that paradise she is not competent herself to enter.

Hume has offered one of his acute-looking but really sophistical objections to this argument from design. He says, that though in reference to the works of man, the indications of design afford valid proof of a designing intelligence, it is not so when we extend the proof from the universe to God, because the world is a singular phenomenon, of the making of which we have no experience. We infer from the contrivances in a watch that it had an intelligent maker, because we have seen such things made, but we never saw a world made, and hence from the mere beholding of its phenomena, we cannot infer that it had a maker. The fallacy here lies in the assumption—1. That it is in virtue of experience that we infer the existence of an intelligent designer from witnessing the evidences of design in any piece of work; and, 2. That we have such a thing as experience of intelligence producing results in the works of man. Names of Both these assumptions are false. We do not learn to make the inference in question; we make it by a mental necessity, and make it as surely the first time we see evidences of design as we do in all subsequent instances. Nor could observation and experience, however extensive, give us this inference if we had it not independent of these. For in observing the works of man, what is it we have experience of? Simply of the motion of certain limbs and members of the body, followed by certain changes on pieces of matter on which they operate. We have never had experience, in Hume's sense of the term, of a designing mind. We have never seen, heard, felt, smelt, or tasted a mind at work in the production of anything. That such a mind presides over and directs the operation, is purely an inference. But if this be a legitimate inference in the case of man's works, why is it to be forbidden when we contemplate the universe and pass from it to the existence of a maker of it? If we may validly say of a watch, "This must have originated in an intelligent mind," though we have had no experience of a mind making a watch, why may we not say, "This must have founded this vast machine, must have had an intelligent maker," though confessedly we have no experience of world-making? In this objection Hume has just repeated the same juggle, to which he has stooped in his famous objection to miracles; he has availed himself of the ambiguity of the word "experience," and has shifted in the course of his argument from an experience of one particular kind to experience of any kind. Fix one meaning on that word all through, and his objection will come out in all its real weakness and sophistry.

Sect. III.—Names of God.

In proceeding to investigate the Bible revelations concerning God, the first thing that demands our notice is the names by which He has been pleased to make Himself known to men. To the right apprehension of these, the Bible attaches importance. Its office, in fact, is to make known to us God's name. Revelation is not and cannot be an unfolding to us of God's essence; it is merely a setting before us of His manifestation (that is, His name) to His creatures. It is in keeping with this that all the appellations of God given in the Bible are significant, so that each of them stands as the symbol of some truth concerning Him.

The names of God in the Bible may be presented in three classes:

I. By itself stands the proper and incommunicable name of God, יהוה. This is commonly pointed and pronounced Jehovah, but, as is admitted on all hands, incorrectly, the points thus introduced being those belonging to Adonai, which the Jews, reverentiae causa, substitute in reading for the sacred name. Probably the true punctuation is יהוה, Jahveh, and the word is to be regarded as a formation from the substantive verb יהוה (1). It denotes essential unchanging being, and is the appropriate designation of Him whose it is to be, who never began to be, and never can cease to be, ὁ καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἔρχεται, as the Apostle gives it, Rev. i. 4 (2). Of this name, Jah is a contraction.

1. See Reiland, Decar Exercitationum Philologiarum de vera pronunciacione Nominis Jehovae, 1707; Tholuck, Versuchliche Schriften, i. 377; Gesenius, Thesaurus, and Lexicon, on the word; Hengstenberg, Authentie des Pentateuchs, i. 222. Horsey opposes the view above given in his Biblical Criticism, vol. i. p. 57.

2. The LXX. represent this name by οὐρανοῦ, the vulg. by Dominus, which most of the authorised versions have followed. The French versions give usually L'Éternel, and this, Bunsen, in his Bibel-Werk, adopts, giving always in his translation Der Ewige. See his Vorerrinnerungen, p. lxxxviii.

II. APPELLATIVES.—1. Of these the one chiefly in use is Elohim (אֱלֹהִים), the plural of אֱלֹהֶה, which is also used, though only by the older writers and in poetry). This word is derived from a root, now lost to the Hebrew, but surviving in the Arabic, אֵל, signifying to worship or reverence, so that, as applied to God, it conveys the idea that He is the being to be worshipped. 2. El (אֵל). Attributes This is derived from the verb יָדַע, to be strong or mighty, but it is applied to God, not as a predicate of his power, but simply as an appellation. 3. Adon (אֲדֹנִי), meaning Lord, and equivalent to dominus and κύριος. As applied to God, it is generally used in the plural Adonai, probably as the intensive plural = summus Dominus, the supreme Lord.

III. Attributes, or Epithetical Names.—Of these the following may be mentioned:—1. Shaddai or El Shaddai (אֵל שַׁדַּי), the Almighty; in the LXX. and New Testament, παντοκράτωρ. 2. This seems to have been the name earliest in use among the patriarchs (see Gen. xvii. 1-2). El Hahi (אֵל חָיִּים), the living God. 3. Eliyon (אֵל יָגוֹד), in the LXX. ὑψώτατος, the Most High (see Gen. xvi. 20; Ps. xcvi. 9). 4. El Tsebaoth (אֵל צְבָאוֹת), God of Hosts, an epithet denoting God's authority over all the powers of the universe, which are thought of as a host of which He is the commander. 5. To these may be added such terms as אֵל, Father; רְאֵה, Master, κύριος, Lord, &c., which, however, are hardly to be regarded as in any just sense names of God.

The names thus given to God in the Bible, point Him out to us as the supreme all-governing Being, who has all power and authority, to whom reverence and worship are due, and who dwells in the majesty of His own essential being, having a name which only He can bear, and a glory which He will not give to another.

Sect. IV.—Attributes of God.

By the attributes of God are meant those qualities which we ascribe to Him for the purpose of expressing our conceptions of His infinite essence in relation to the universe and to ourselves in particular. These are not to be thought of as qualities superadded to the Divine essence, as the quality of strength, wisdom, or goodness, may be added to a man, or that of whiteness, length, roundness, may to a body. He can receive no addition, can experience no change; "nunquam novus, nunquam vetus," as Augustine expresses it (Confess. i. 4). His attributes, therefore, are himself—He, not his. Their relativity to Him is apparent only, not real; it exists only in our modes of contemplating Him. "The Divine attributes," says Quenstedt, "do not denote anything added to the Divine essence, but are only inadequate conceptions of an essence infinitely perfect. The Divine essence is like an incomprehensible ocean of all infinite perfections, which the human intellect is impotent to exhaust in one simple conception, and hence by various conceptions, as if sip by sip, it draws somewhat out of that infinity." (System. Theol. i. 296.) If it be asked, why, then, speak of the Divine attributes as if they were distinct from the Divine essence? the answer is, that objects not in themselves divisible may be discriminated in thought, and hence divines have laid it down that the Divine attributes are distinguishable from the Divine essence, "non ex natura rei, sed ratione tantum" (1). The distinction is subjective, not objective; "it is founded not in inner distinctions in the Divine essence, but in the accompanying representations with which the idea of this is placed in combination" (2); or, as Quenstedt expresses it, "the foundations of this distinction are various connoted extrinsic things—i.e., diverse effects, or respects, or negations, in the order of which God is conceived by us." Whilst, however, this is held, we must beware, with Schleiermacher and others, of going to the extreme of pronouncing the distinction purely arbitrary or fictitious. God's attributes are not really distinct from Himself, for He is an absolutely pure uncompounded essence; but they have a ground in the nature of God; like all other true anthropomorphisms, they are human modes of conceiving and expressing actual facts in God in relation to His creatures, as He is revealed to us.

1. The schoolmen were divided as to whether the distinction should be held to be merely nominaliter or to be realiter. It was ultimately very generally agreed that neither was correct, and that it should be held to be formaliter, i.e., secundum nostrum concipendi modum' (Hollaz, Exerc. Theol. Acroam. In Loco). See the ample discussion of this whole subject by Quenstedt in the place above cited. Comp. also Thom. Aquin. Summa Theol. p. l., qu. 13, art. 4.

2. Tweeten, Vorlesungen uch. die Dogmatik, ii. 27.

3. This method of treatment has its origin in religious poetry, especially of a hymnal and lyric cast, as well as the accendant experiences of common life, which seeks to vivify and confirm the almost impersonal idea of the Supreme Being, by speaking of him in expressions such as we are wont to use of finite beings" (Blauenehleher, i., 256, 3d edit.). So, also, Hase says, in his Dogmatik, that the whole conception of the divine attributes is to be ascribed "to poetry and popular instruction rather than to science."

As the Divine attributes are not distinct from the essence of God, they are not really distinct from each other. Were they so, the totality of the Divine essence would be the sum or complement of these separate qualities, and hence God would not be pure essence, but a composite being, and so capable of division, and therefore of dissolution. As in the preceding case, they differ not in re but formaliter: we think them different because we have no other way of expressing or conceiving the different relations in which different objects stand to the one indivisible and immutable Jehovah.

Comp. Stapfer, Theol. Polen., i., 74; Marck, Medulla Christ. Theol. p. 7; Arminius, Works by Nichols, ii. 116; Limborch, Theol. Christ. bk. ii., ch. 2; Venema, Institutes, p. 135. "The Living God manifests the unity of His essence through a multiplicity of essential determinations or attributes. These attributes express one and the same essence from different sides; they are different fundamental utterances of one essence. They are consequently not without each other, but in each other; they mutually interpenetrate; and have that point of identity alone and the same Divine personality. Though they are thus distinctions which may be removed as well as exhibited, yet they are by no means to be viewed as mere human modes of conceiving the Divine essence, nor are they human modes of manifesting, but God's own modes of manifestation. We must, therefore, assent to the nominalist doctrine, which treats ideas and general conceptions as ours, and hence also the conceptions with which we denote the Divine Being as simply the expression of our theory of the universe, not as something in God himself. Whilst we admit that the idea of God must be purged of all that is simply human, of all false anthropomorphisms, we must nevertheless regard nominalism as destroying the concept of manifestation (or revelation). There is a destruction of the innermost truth of faith, if it is only we who think God as holy and just, whilst He Himself is not holy and just; if it is only we who invoke Him by these names, while He Himself does not so make Himself known to us. Hence we teach, with realism, that the attributes of God are objective determinations in the revelation of God, and consequently have their seat in His inner being."—Martensen, Christ. Dogmatik, p. 112, 3d edit.

Different schemes of classification of the Divine attributes have been proposed. These may be digested thus:—I. According to the form in which they are expressed, they may be classified as proper or metaphorical, as affirmative or negative. Thus, eternal self-existence is a proper and affirmative attribute, whilst unchangeableness is metaphorical and negative. II. According to their inner relation to each other as primitive or derivative. Thus, absolute perfection may be held as the primitive attribute of God from which the others are derived; or love or holiness may be fixed on as the primitive, and the other moral perfections be held as modifications of it. III. According to God's relation to the world, as immanent, quiescent, internal, and absolute, or transcendent, operative, external, and relative; thus unity, truth, goodness are ranked as immanent perfections of God—perfections resting in His being, while omnipotence, grace, justice, &c., are regarded as transcendent or Attributes outcoming perfections, passing, so to speak, from God over upon His creatures. IV. According to their relation to human capabilities, as communicable and imitable, or incommunicable and inimitable, the latter being the special characteristics of God, such as self-existence, infinity, omnipotence, whilst the former may exist in measure in his creatures, such as goodness and truth. V. According to their inner compass or tenor, as general and ontological—such as belong to the divine nature viewed per se, or special—such as are derived from the idea of God as a spiritual essence; thus eternity, immensity, immutability, are ontological attributes, while omniscience, wisdom, holiness, are special attributes. VI. According to the analogy of man's nature, as metaphysical and natural, or moral, the former including such perfections as belong to the Divine essence, the latter, such as characterise his mind and will. These are by some distinguished also as universal and special. VII. According to the varied relation of the consciousness of God to the pious feeling, as determined—1. By the feeling of dependence apart from any sense of guilt—eternity, omnipotence; 2. By the feeling of antithesis created by a sense of sin—holiness and righteousness; 3. By the feeling of difference arising from a sense of God's grace—love and wisdom. This is Schleiermacher's scheme, and it bears traces at once of the genius of the man, by which he made everything seem to fall in with his peculiar hypothesis, and of the fanciful and purely subjective character of all his modes of thought.

Of these schemes, that numbered VI. is, we think, on the whole, to be preferred, not only as the most obvious and natural, but also as most in keeping with the principle that our thought of God is formed after the analogy of our own spiritual nature. With the precaution, then—that in distinguishing the metaphysical or natural from the moral or ethical attributes of God, we do so merely in accommodation to our own limited modes of thinking, for in reality they are not, and cannot be separated—we may proceed to arrange the Divine perfections under these two heads:

I. Natural Perfections of God.—These are manifested in relation to existence or being in general, and under the three conditions of existence in time, existence in space, existence in degree, i.e., protensive, extensive, and intensive existence.

i. Natural Perfections of God in relation to Protensive Existence.—Here we proceed wholly via negations. We deny of God that He is subject to any temporal limitations—that is, we affirm—

1. His eternal being; in other words, we deny that He ever began to be, or can cease to be, or is subject to any succession of being. His eternity is, as Schleiermacher has expressed it, "the timeless primal causality of God, conditioning not only the temporal but time itself" (1). He is, says the Apostle, Βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων, 1 Tim. i. 17 (2); or, in the words of the Psalmist, "from eternity to eternity."

Comp. Ps. cii. 23; Mal. iii. 6; Eccles. iii. 4; Heb. xiii. 8; James i. 17.

2. It is affirmed that God is not subject to any change through the lapse of time—i.e., He is unchangeable. He never advances, never recedes. With Him there is no succession, no variation, no vicissitude. In the Divine essence and its attributes there is perpetual identity.

Comp. Ps. cii. 23; Mal. iii. 6; Eccles. iii. 4; Heb. xiii. 8; James i. 17.

ii. Natural Perfections of God in relation to Extensive Being.—Here also we proceed wholly by way of negation.

1. We deny that God exists in space. Space, like time, belongs to Him, not He to it. He is indissoluble, immense, invisible—a simple essence without parts, whom no limits can enclose or define, whom no eye hath seen or can see.

2. We deny that God's operations are determined by space, i.e., we affirm that He moves and acts on all things irrespective of any limits imposed by space—His is a "spaceless causality, conditioning all space and all things in space" (Schleiermacher, i. p. 273).

These two negations comprise what is intended by the omnipresence of God. This means something more than merely that God operates by a diffused energy everywhere, as the sun may be said to operate within the sphere of his influence; it means, that He is, and operates immediately and directly, everywhere. His presentia operativa is not to be distinguished from His adessentia; nor, to use the language of the schoolmen, is the immediatio virtutis to be distinguished from the immediatio essentiae.

Comp. 1 Kings, viii. 27; Ps. cxixix. 7-13; xliii. 2; lxvi. 1; Jer. xxiii. 23, 24; Amos, ix. 2, 3; Acts, xvii. 24-28. As the omnipresence of God is what we can form no positive conception of, it behoves us to be very cautious in the language we use regarding it. Such expressions as that of Augustine, "Deus non aliquid est" (Quæst. Divers. 9, 20), or that of Des Cartes, "Deus non nugatium, sive nullib," at the utmost only dimly hint at some idea; they can hardly be said to express one. On the other hand, if we say, with Augustine, "In illo sunt omnia;" or, with Newton and Clarke, that "Space is the sensorium of deity;" or, with the Roman poet, "Jupiter est quæque vide, quæque movet" (Lucan, Phars. ix. 580); or, with Pope (Essay on Man, l. 267, &c.)—

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole, Whose body Nature is and God the soul.

To Him no high, no low, no great, no small, He fills, He bounds, connects and equals all"

we incur no small risk of imbibing or conveying pantheistic notions. But on a subject of this sort, it is hardly possible for us to use any language that shall be otherwise than imperfect, or when strictly examined incorrect. (See Stewart's Dissertation prefixed to this work, p. 147.)

The opinion that the omnipresence of God is merely his operative energy diffused through the universe, had its origin among the Socinians, and passed from them to the Arminian school. (See Episcopius, Instit. bk. iv. sect. 2, c. 13.) It has been adopted, among others, by Döderlein (Instit. i. 363); von Ammon (Summa, sect. 41); Wegscheider (Instit. sect. 63); and Schleiermacher (Chr. Glaub. i. 280). The last says, "The all-presence of God is to be understood as only an almighty presence, i.e., as the conditioning of space itself and all space-things in God."

The affirmation that God is not limited by space, stands closely connected with the assertion of His spirituality. When we say "God is a spirit," what do we mean but that He is a living personal power not limited by conditions of space?—a being that cannot be seen or touched, is not extended or figured, does not need to move from place to place in order to be actually present in any given spot (1). Comp. Ps. cxixix. 7; John iv. 24. It is in connection with this that God is emphatically called in Scripture "the living God," a phrase which has reference to the continuous agency of the Divine being as spirit. Hence some of the old divines speak of God as "Actus purus," or "Actus simplicissimus;" by which they mean that God, as the infinite life, contains within himself the complement of all actual and possible modes of being (2).

1. Robert Hall, Serm. on Is. xxxi. 3; Works, fol. v. p. 7, and vol. vi. p. 1.

2. "God is not a spirit, but God is spirit, i.e., consummate life. He has the complement of being, whereby He is distinguished not only from pretended gods as living and true, but from all other actual life and being, as He who alone hath immortality, and as the Creator of all things" (Nitzsch, Christ. Lehre, p. 144).

iii. Natural Perfections of God in relation to Intensive Attributes Being.—Here we deny that in God there is any limitation of God, in degree of existence. Hence we ascribe to Him—

1. Infinitude of being, i.e., boundless fulness of essence. Though there are other beings and other intelligences and powers besides Him, their existence imposes no limit or qualification or restraint on His. He remains alone God, of infinite greatness, in whom all fulness dwells.

2. Incomprehensibility; by which is meant that no being but Himself can comprehend God. Comp. Job xi. 7; Ps. cxlv. 3; Rom. xi. 33; 1 Tim. vi. 16, &c.

3. Majesty and glory unlimited. He dwells in light which is inaccessible and full of glory. The Lord is clothed with majesty; honour and majesty are before Him; He is the Father, of an infinite majesty. His is the kingdom and the power and the glory for ever.

II. Moral Perfections of God.—The term “moral” here is used in a wide acceptation as opposed to “natural,” and embraces not only ethical, but also mental or intellectual attributes. The subject thus divides itself into two parts—the former relating to the intelligence, the latter to the will of God.

1. Attributes of God in respect of Intelligence.—The intelligence of God is that by which He perfectly knows Himself and all things by one pure, eternal, and simple act. This intelligence is infinite; God is omniscient (1). He knows all things, both as they find their reason in Himself (things absolutely possible), and as they really exist out of Him (scientia necessaria, sc. libera). He foresees all that shall happen, as well as knows all that is—the necessary as necessary, the conditioned as conditioned. And this intelligence is at once most real, and most minute; simultaneous as well as intuitive (2).

1. See Job xxiii. 24, xxiv. 21; Ps. xxxviii. 10, iv. 9, xvii. 5–9, xxxix. 2–16; Is. xxix. 15, 16, xlii. 22–26; Jer. i. 5, xvi. 17, xxiii. 24; Matt. vii. 8, 32, xii. 28–30; Luke xvii. 15; Acts i. 24, xv. 18; Rom. viii. 27, xi. 33; 1 Cor. ii. 10, iii. 11, iii. 20, v. 5; Heb. iv. 13, &c. Of God’s prescience every prediction recorded in Scripture is a proof: “Prescintia Dei tot habet testes, quot fecit prophetas” (Tertullian, Adv. Marc. i. 2).

2. Some scholastic divines add to the scientia necessaria and the scientia liberis of God the scientia media, by which they intend a knowledge of what would have happened had something else, which was not to happen, happened. For this they adduce as scriptural authority, 1 Sam. xxiii. 10–13; Ps. cxxxix. 2, 4; Jer. xxxviii. 17–20; Ez. iii. 6. The term is due to the Jesuit Fonseca, by whom and Molina the idea was chiefly worked out and applied, though it was not unknown to older writers. (See especially Gregor. Nyss., De Morte Praeemortuam Infantium; Augustine, De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 9; Gerhard, Loc. Theol. i. p. 171.) Comp. Döderlein, Inst. Theol. Christi, l. 304. It has been objected to as importing what is incident only to our imperfect modes of knowing: “Since it is possible,” it has been said, “it is nothing else than a condition of human thought, insomuch as for us a thing is either thinkable or unthinkable, objectively either possible or impossible, and since everything is a condition of thought, whether there can be no scientia media, properly speaking, with God.” (Bretschneider, Handbuch, I. 325.) But since, as the same writer observes, our whole discourse of God’s omniscience is anthropopagitical, there is no greater objection to our speaking of God as knowing what might have happened had certain conditions been fulfilled, than there is of His knowing things as past, present, or future. (See Reid’s remarks on this subject, with Hamilton’s note, Works, p. 632.)

In virtue of His perfect intelligence, God is all-wise, ever selecting the best ends, and employing the means best fitted to secure these ends. The evidences of this meet us in every department of creation, and in every event of history; while Scripture is full of the most emphatic assertions of it. The highest manifestation of it is in the scheme of redemption through the incarnation and work of Christ.

Job xlii. 12–17, xxviii. 20–23; Ps. civ. 24; Prov. iii. 19, vii. 12–31; Is. xl. 12–14; Jer. xii. 12, 15; Rom. xi. 33, xvi. 17; Eph. iii. 10, 11; 1 Tim. i. 17; 1 Cor. i. 20, iii. 19; Eph. i. 8, iii. 10; Col. ii. 2, 3.

ii. Attributes of God in respect of Will.—Of the divine will we predicate:

1. Absolute Freedom.—In all that God decrees, and in all Attributes of God, that He does, He follows only His own mind and purpose; “Deus sui juris est,” as it has been expressed. This, however, is not incompatible with his acting from necessity of nature; for God must ever be consistent with himself, and find the highest reason of all that He does in himself.

2. Omnipotence.—Whatever God wills He can do and does. His power is limited only by His will, which is directed only to what is good. Herein lies one essential distinction between Him and His creatures—He can do all things immediately by simple volition, whilst they can operate only through the medium of organs, and that within narrow limits.

Gen. xxviii. 14; Ps. xxxiii. 6, 9, cx. 6; Is. xliii. 13, xlv. 34; Jer. xxxiii. 17; Matt. xix. 26; Luke i. 37, xviii. 27; John x. 29; Rom. i. 20, iv. 20; Eph. iii. 20; Heb. xi. 3; Rev. iv. 11.

3. Veracity.—Whatever God has revealed of His will to men is ever what He wills to do and does. He cannot lie; He cannot repent. He wills only what is in harmony with Himself; and in His decrees, His deeds, His declarations, the same harmony prevails: He decrees what He wills; He does what He decrees; He fulfils what He says. Hence He manifests Himself as faithful to all His promises, infallible in all His engagements, and constant in all His dealings with His creatures.

Ps. xxxi. 6, xxxiii. 11; Rom. iii. 3 ff. xi. 29; 2 Cor. i. 18 ff.; 2 Tim. ii. 13.

4. Holiness.—God is emphatically the Holy One; by which is intended not merely that He is infinitely removed from all that is sinful, not merely that His mind and will are ever in harmony with the good and the pure, but especially that in Him all moral excellence dwells, that He is the chief good, that His absolutely free will ever consorts most perfectly with his most perfect intelligence (1). In this aspect holiness may be viewed as that of which all the other ethical attributes of God are but manifestations (2).

1. Lev. xix. 2. (See a dissertation on the word ἁγιασμός, here used, by Achelis in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken for 1847, p. 187.) Ps. v. 5 ff.; Is. vi. 3; Matt. v. 48, xix. 17; Eph. iv. 24; 1 John i. 5; 1 Pet. i. 15, ii. 9.

2. “Quando Deus se ipsum amore purissimo amare concipitur, ut simul ab omnibus imperfectionibus remotus cessetur, amor illius vocatur sanctitas.”—Buddens, Inst. Theol. Doc. p. 237. The doctrine of Kant, that the Divine holiness is the perfect accordance of the will of God with the moral law, is not only inadequate, but a reversal of the truth. The moral law is the utterance of God’s holiness, and is what it is because He is perfectly and absolutely holy. “Sanctitas Dei—attributum quo Deus fons legis moralis est”—Klein, Darstellung d. Dogm. Syst.

5. Love.—God, as the chief good, desires to communicate what is good, so that his universe shall be filled with creatures possessing all the good of which they are capable. The primary and only adequate object of the love of God is God himself; but it flows over on his creatures, and is manifested in the bounties of creation, and especially in the wonders of redemption (1). In respect of His creatures, we have to distinguish His love as—1. Love of complacency (amor generalis), or His delight in that goodness which He has implanted in His creatures, and in them on account of this; 2. Love of benevolence (amor particularis), or His regard to the human race, for whose recovery He has sent His Son into the world; and, 3. Love of friendship (amor specialissimus), or His regard to those who believe in Christ and are partakers of his grace (2). Of this love His long-suffering (παραστήσις, Rom. ii. 4); His forbearance (δέος, Rom. ii. 4, iii. 25, ix. 22); His gentleness (πρόνεια, Rom. ii. 4, xi. 22); His pity (Ps. ciii. 13; Luke i. 72, &c.); His mercy and grace (Exod. xxxiii. 19, xxxiv. 6, 7; Ps. ciii. 8); Isa. xxx. 18; Dan. ix. 9; 2 Pet. iii. 9, &c.), are manifestations.

1. Ps. xxxiii. 5, iii. 1, c. 5, cxix. 68, cxlv. 9; Matt. xix. 7; John iii. 36; Rom. v. 8, viii. 32, xv. 33; James, i. 17; 1 John iv. 8, 16. 2. These phrases are sometimes applied in a sense different from that above given. Thus, love of benevolence is used to indicate the Divine desire that all His creatures should be happy, as far as compatible with higher requirements, while love of equity or mercy is reserved to express His regard for such as are holy and pious—holy angels and redeemed sinners. But the usage above signalled is that of the divines by whom the phraseology was first introduced.

6. Justice.—God has promulgated a law or system of moral truth, under which He has placed His intelligent creatures, and this He ever upholds, and in accordance with this He ever acts. Hence He will assign to each according to his deeds. From all He expects perfect obedience; and every transgression and disobedience shall receive a just recompense of reward. As His rule is founded in right, as His law is a perfect expression of moral truth, and as His administration is conducted with an unerring regard to what equity demands, He is manifested to His intelligent creatures as the just God, all whose ways are just and true. The justice of God, however, is not incompatible with the admission of a vicarious satisfaction for the transgressor, so that he may escape the penalty he has incurred.

1. Ps. vii. 9 ff.; lx. 4, 5; xi. 7; xviii. 20 ff.; Ix. xlv. 21; Jer. ix. 24; Matt. xxii. 39; Rom. ii. 6-11; I Cor. iv. 5; 2 Cor. v. 10; Eph. vi. 8; Col. iii. 25; Rev. xvi. 3.

7. Rectitude.—God acts not only always in accordance with the law He has promulgated, but always also in accordance with Himself. What He does, therefore, may be something beyond or above law; but it will not only not be contrary to law, it will be also perfectly becoming Himself. He cannot deny Himself, or act otherwise than like Himself. It is in this sense especially that God is styled ἁγιασμένος in such passages as John xvii. 25; Rom. iii. 26; 1 John i. 9, ii. 29; Rev. xvi. 5.

This attribute is often identified with that of justice. But justice, strictly speaking, has respect to acting according to law, whereas the righteousness of God often has respect to His sovereign acting, whereby, on grounds satisfying to Himself, He suspends or supersedes law. Besides, as has been justly observed, "Jehovah would have been a God of rectitude although no being had existed in the universe besides Himself, because rectitude is what God is, or His nature is the standard of holiness. But in that case justice could not with propriety have been predicated of Him, because justice supposes the establishment of moral government, and relates to the conduct of God, as the moral governor, towards every being connected with that government. When no system of moral government exists, as would be the case if Jehovah existed alone, there would be no room for the exercise of justice."—Payne, Theological Lectures, i. p. 97. The rectitude of God is identified by this very acute writer with His holiness. For this there is much better ground than there is for identifying it with his justice. Still the holiness of God, in the sum total of His moral perfections, may be advantageously distinguished from His rectitude, or the perfect conformity of all His ways with that moral perfection.

The sum of these attributes, natural and moral, constitutes the glory of God. He is the Lord of glory, and to Him alone is glory to be ascribed. Of this glory the central ray is His holiness. He is "glorious in holiness" (1). And as He has manifested to us this His glory, He is to be worshipped and reverenced by us. We are to give to Him glory, and to Him alone. All worship offered to any other than Him is impiety and idolatry: He will not give his glory to another, nor his praise to graven images (Is. xlii. 8) (2).

1. "He is called the Holy One above thirty times in Scripture; the seraphim in an ecstasy cry out, Holy, holy, holy! denoting by that repetition the superlative eminence of His holiness. This is an universal attribute which runs through all the others. Hence we find in Scripture, that His power or arm is holy (Is. lii. 10); His truths and promise holy (Ps. cv. 42); His mercy holy (Acts xiii. 34). A vein of purity runs through His whole name. Without holiness His wisdom would be subtlety, His justice cruelty, His sovereignty tyranny, His mercy foolish pity; all would degenerate into something unworthy of God. Holiness is the infinite purity and rectitude of his essence."—Polhill, A View of some Divine Truths, ch. iii.

2. "Majestas Dei est attributum ex quo Deus non tantum dicitur gloriosus, sed etiam ipsi soli cultus gloriosus dabitur."—Haller. On this ground the Protestants denominate as idolatrous the worship of angels and saints in the Romish Church. (See Fletcher's Lectures on the Principles and Institutions of the Romish Church, Lect. vi.)

As God is thus all-perfect and glorious, so is He ever blessed. He is ὁ παντοκράτωρ θεός, the blessed God (1 Tim. i. 11), the blessed and only potentate (1 Tim. vi. 15). Perfect exemption from want and evil on the one hand, and the perfect unity of power, knowledge, and will, with love on the other, with the enjoyment arising from the sense of this, furnish to us the idea of the happiness of God.

1. Nitzsch, Christi Lehre, § 78. Modern divines sometimes shrink from the anthropomorphism of ascribing feelings of happiness or blessedness to God, and would resolve this into the consciousness of His own absolute perfection, and of the fullest assurance thereof arising.—Ammon, Summa Theol., p. 140, § 69. But the older divines, with closer adherence to Scripture, ascribe to God a sense of happiness in Himself. "Convenit equidem quodammodo benti- tude Dei cum summa ejus perfectione, quippe quod itidem omnium attributorum divinorum complexum denotat, sed discribunt in eo intercedit quod in beatitudine Dei jucundissimus etiam illa sensus, qui ex ista tot bonorum perpetuo possessione ortur, simul in censum vestit."—Buddens, Instit. Theol. Dogr., p. 256. The following remarks of a recent writer deserve notice:—"Love spread over the universe, streaming back upon Himself, is blessedness. Blessedness is the expression for life completed in itself. It is the eternal peace of love, which is higher than all reason—its Sabbath-rest its own perpetuum. But the Sabbath of love is not to be identified with the solemnity and the inward enjoyment of the heathen deities; its holy is the eternal working: 'My Father worketh hitherto' (John v. 17). In the closer development of the concept of blessedness there comes up this difficulty: whilst, on the one hand, God must be thought as He who is sufficient for Himself, who needs nothing (Acts xvii. 25); on the other hand, His blessedness must appear as conditioned by the completion of His kingdom, since the Divine love cannot be satisfied except as it is blessing, as it is all in all. The only solution of this contradiction is furnished by the consideration that God lives a double life—a life in Himself in unobserved peace and self-sufficiency; and a life for and with his creations, since He submits himself to the conditions of finitude, nay, suffers his power to be limited by the sinning will of men. In this co-life of God with His creation, the biblical ideas of a Divine grief, wrath, and such like, find their applications; which evidently posit a conditioning of the Divine blessedness. But for this there is no place in His inner life, which is independent of the creation; a life of perfectness, and of the contemplation of the certain fulfillment of all His purposes. With the ancient theologians, therefore, we may say, 'In the outer chambers there is grief, but in the inner chamber there is nothing but joy.'"—Martensen, Christ. Dogr., p. 123. (See on this section generally the works on Natural Theology, and Zanchius, De Natura Dei sine de Div. Attri- butis; Charnock On the Divine Attributes; Barder, The Scripture Character of God, or Discourses on the Divine Attributes.)

Sect. V.—Unity of God.

This is sometimes presented as one of the Divine attributes, but improperly; for these are qualities that may be predicated of the Divine existence, whether there be many Gods or only one God, and unity is a condition of relation, not a quality of essence (1). The unity of God—more properly his soleity or monadity (μονος θεός, John v. 44; 1 Tim. i. 17)—is the necessary consequence of his absoluteness, for a plurality of absolute beings is a contradiction; where there are more beings than one, each must limit the other (2). Monotheism is the strongly declared doctrine of Scripture; and to this nature gives concurrent testimony (3). This unity is a unity of subject, and not merely a unity of kind: there is but one Being in whom this idea of God is realized (4).

1. "Minus apte nonnulli unitatem Dei attributis Divinis adnu- merant, quam potius sit fundamentum, quod versus numinis ideam supponi debet."—Wegscheider, Instit. Theol., p. 228, 6th edit.

2. "Rationes peri possunt, 1. A Dei simplicitate, quod est simplicissimum et imperfibile, non potest esse nisi unum; 2. A Dei si- finitate, non possunt esse plura actu infinita extra contradictionem;" The unity of God is that of a being possessing a personal and proper essence distinct from that of the world. This is to be maintained against those who confound the Divine essence with that of the universe, whether by regarding God as the vivifying, animating soul of the world, or by identifying Him with the world as the ἐν καὶ ὑπό, the One in All, and the All in One—a Being impersonal, and yet able to produce persons, and which comes into manifestation and consciousness in the physical and intelligent universe. (See Pantheism.)

See also G. B. Jäsche, Der Pantheismus nach seinen Hauptsformen, Seinen Ursprünge und Fortgang, &c., 2 vols., 1826-28; Krause, Opuscula, p. 73 ff., Regionum, 1813.

Sect. VI.—The Trinity.

The Scripture makes known to us three distinct Beings, to whom divine names, attributes, works, and honours are ascribed—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (1). To reconcile this with the revealed and strongly asserted unity of God, some have resorted to the hypothesis, that the distinction is not essential, but merely modal or economical; that it simply brings before us the fact, that God manifests Himself in three different relations to the race of men; or that it merely aims at impressing on us the practical truth, that in the work of redemption God recovers man to Himself, by Himself, through Himself (2). It may be admitted that this is the practical aspect of the truth, as it is presented to us in Scripture, and that beyond this we cannot probably realise or construe in thought this revelation of God; but that this comprises the whole of the truth which it is the design of Scripture to intimate to us by this distinction, has ever been held to be a heresy in the Church. As a more just and full expression of the truth, the doctrine of a Trinity in the Divine essence has been embraced. According to this, whilst the Divine essence is held to be one, there are recognised three distinctions in this unity, which for convenience sake are designated Persons (Προσώπα), or Hypostases (ὑποστάσεις, subsistentes), the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The expression given of this doctrine in the so-called Athanasian Creed, is that generally adopted by Evangelical divines:—“We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one: the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal.”

1. The supreme Deity of the Son and of the Spirit is here assumed; the Scripture proof of both will be found farther on. It may be proper, however, here to notice those passages in which Scripture joins the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that all are alike, and equally to be reverenced as divine. Such are Is. lii. 9, 10, xviii. 16, xxxiv. 16; Matt. xxviii. 19; 2 Cor. xiii. 14; Tit. i. 3, 4, &c. Of these, the most remarkable are Matt. xxviii. 19, and 2 Cor. xiii. 14. In the former of these we have the commission of Christ to His apostles, and the formula of the baptismal rite by which they were to make known His disciples. “Go,” says our Saviour, “and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” What was it the apostles were to teach all nations? Was it not to turn from their vanities to the living God; to renounce their idols and false gods, and so to be baptised in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost? What now must occur to the Gentile nations on this occasion but that, instead of all their deities, to whom they had before bowed down, they were in future to serve, worship, and adore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as the only true and living God! To suppose that the God and two creatures are here joined together in the solemn rite by which men were to be admitted into a new religion, which directly condemns all creature-worship, would be so unreasonable, that we are persuaded such a supposition never was made by any converted polytheist of antiquity. The nations were to be baptised in the name of three persons, in the same manner, and therefore, doubtless, in the same sense. It is not said in the name of God and his two faithful servants; nor in the name of God, and Christ, and the Holy Ghost, which might have suggested a thought that one only of the three is God; but in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Whatever honour, reverence, or regard, is paid to the first person in this solemn rite, the same It has been asked by opponents of this doctrine, how can three Divine persons be but one and the same God? This is a question which has been often put, but which, we believe, no created being can fully answer. It is to be observed, however, that no intelligent Trinitarians affirm that these Divine Persons, or Hypostases, are one and three in the same sense; for this would be a contradiction in terms. What is affirmed is, that in one sense they are three, and in another one; though how this is, or what may be the difference between the one sense and the other, we are utterly unable to tell. The case is one which admits of no explanation. The Divine nature, and its manner of existence, is to us wholly incomprehensible; and we might with greater reason attempt to weigh the mountains in scales, than by our limited faculties to fathom the depths of infinity. The Supreme Being is present in power to every portion of space, and yet it is demonstrable that in His essence He is not extended. Both these truths, His inextension and omnipresence, are fundamental principles in what is called natural religion; and when taken together they form, in the opinion of most people, a mystery as incomprehensible as that of the Trinity in unity. Indeed, there is nothing of which it is more difficult to form a distinct notion than unity simple, and absolutely indivisible. Though the Trinity in unity, therefore, were no Christian doctrine, mysteries must still be believed; for they are as inseparable from the religion of nature as from that of revelation; and atheism involves the most incomprehensible of all mysteries, even the beginning of existence without a cause. We must indeed form the best notions that we can of this and all other mysteries; for if we have no notions whatever of a Trinity in unity, we can neither believe nor disbelieve that doctrine. It is, however, to be remembered, that all our notions of God are more or less analogical; that they must be expressed in words which, literally interpreted, are applicable only to man; and that propositions understood in this literal sense may involve an apparent contradiction, from which the truth meant to be expressed by them would be seen to be free, had we direct and adequate conceptions of the Divine nature.

As the doctrine of the Trinity, though not contrary to reason, is above reason, it can neither be rationally explained nor rationally impugned. It is to be regretted, therefore, that some zealous supporters of it, instead of resting their cause solely on Scripture, have endeavoured by philosophical speculations, or by analogies drawn from the physical universe, to throw light on this subject (1). It is to be regretted, also, that divines have so overloaded the doctrine with attempts to state exactly the relation of the three Persons in the Trinity to each other; for they have thus put into the hands of the adversary implements of attack against it which the doctrine, simply as drawn from Scripture, does not furnish (2).

1. See Kidd's Essay on the Doctrine of the Trinity, attempting to prove it by Reason and Demonstration, &c.; Melanchthon, Corp. Doct. Christ., p. 333 sq., Lips., 1560; Keckermann, System. Theol., lib. I., c. 3; Schelling, Idea der Naturphilosophie, p. 139, 24 ed.; Vorlesungen ü. d. Akad. Studium, p. 184; Marheineke, Grundriss der Christl. Dogmatik, p. 131, &c. Of these attempts a very competent judge has said: "In all these philosophical representations there is apparent a certain arbitrariness, such as would justify their authors in concerning a Devil, or a Tempter, just as well as a Triad in God; whilst they obliterate what is essential to the Biblical doctrines of the personality of the Son and Spirit."—Bretschneider, Handbuch der Dogmatik, 2d ed., l. p. 476. Another very shrewd thinker, himself an opponent of the doctrine, has observed:—"Neminem fugit . . . quamlibet Trinitatis explicacionem philosophicam sive unum subiectum aut triplicem ejus rationem aut operationem, sive trin subiecta intelligendi et volendi facultate praedita defendat, necessario abire vel in Sabellianismum (Modalismum) vel in Tritheismum aut Arianismum dureta, ab ecclesiis omnium damnata."—Wegscheider, Theol. Christ. Dog., p. 30, 6th ed. This is true, and therefore it is safest to resolve, with Morus:—"Rem simpliciter eloquiatur, et Patre Pillo, Sanctoque Spiritu, his tribus distinctis, communem esse divinam naturam, sive divinas perfectiones, docemus, delarantes simul idem non statui alium aliò plus minusve habere, nec statui plures Deos esse."—Epistle Theol. Christ., p. 69. "The attempt has been made to illustrate the Trinity by analogies from nature. Cassiodore (on Ps. I.) makes use for this purpose of that of fire. He finds in it, "Speciem ignis, splendorem et calorem; splendor ab igne nascitur, calor ab igne et splendoris generator. Splendor est de igne, et tamen sunt coeva. Si tria in sole occurrent, triplices ipsi solis substantiae, radium et lumen, et tamen in eis trium est eodem lux; ut radius de sole nascenti sit idem de Patre genere, sed non est eodem propediem." Sp. S. ad astrum splendens." Basil (Ep. ad Nov.) addresses the following to Ambrose: "Luther, with others, fixed upon the fact that flowers have form, scent, and virtue or power. Others refer to the three genders and numbers of grammar; the three parts in a proposition—the subject, the predicate, and the copula; the three positions in a syllogism; the three dimensions in space; the threefold faculty of man—that of knowledge, that of will, and that of feeling," &c. (Bretschneider, Handb. I. 389.) Of these analogies some are absurd; and even the best, the first, is far from being a true analogy, or one calculated to throw light on the real difficulty in the concept of the Trinity—that of the union of personal distinction with essential unity.

2. To each of the Persons in the Trinity has been ascribed a "character hypostaticus"—i.e., complexus notarum quibus personas divinas inter se differunt." These notae or marks are partly internal and partly external. By the former are meant the eternal relations existing between the divine persons themselves, by which their subsistence as persons is from eternity determined, e.g., "personae." These are—1. The actus personales, or opera immaculata quibus definitur ratio substantiae trium personarum. The Father's personal act, in relation to the Son, is generation, by which is meant the production, not of the essence of the Son, but of his Sect. VII.—Works of God.

The Divine Being manifests Himself by his works. Within the sphere of our observation, He has made Himself known by the works of Creation and Providence. All things with which we are conversant are the mediate or immediate product of His hands, and bear marks of His wisdom and power in their original constitution (1). By His almighty fiat, being was given to what did not before exist, and by His plastic energy has everything been framed and ordered as it exists. He is, in the strict sense of the term, the Creator of all things (2). And as all things have been made by Him, so it is by Him that all are sustained,—their being preserved, their form, places, and uses secured; their mutual order and harmony continued (3).

1. Gen. i. and ii.; Ps. xxxiii. 6, c. 3; Ps. civ. 2-5, 24, 25; cxlvii. 5-9; Is. xlv. 24; Zech. xii. 1; Heb. iii. 3; Rom. xi. 36.

2. It must be acknowledged that the Hebrew word נָעַר does not always imply the production of substance, but very often the forming of particular organised bodies out of pre-existing matter. Thus when it is said (Gen. i. 21, 27), that "God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the water brought forth abundantly after their kind;" and again, "that he created man male and female;" though the word נָעַר is used on both occasions, we are not to conceive that the bodies of the first human pair, and of these animals, were brought into being from nonentity, but only that they were formed by a proper organization being given to pre-existing matter. But when Moses says, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," he cannot be supposed to mean, that "in the beginning God only gave form to matter already existing of itself;" for in the very next verse we are assured that after this act of creation was over, "the earth was still without form and void," or in other words, in a chaotic state.

That the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, understood their lawgiver to teach a proper creation, is plain from that passage in the second book of the Maccabees, in which a mother, to persuade her son to suffer the cruellest tortures rather than forsake the law of his God, uses the following argument: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth, and all that is therein, and consider that God made them out of things that were not." To the same purpose the inspired author of the epistle to the Hebrews, when magnifying the excellence of faith, says, "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear;" where, as Bishop Pearson has ably proved (Exposition of the Creed), the phrase μὴ ἐξ ὑπάρχοντος is equivalent to οὐκ ἦν in the quotation from the Maccabees.

The very first verse, therefore, of the book of Genesis informs us of a most important truth, which all the uninspired wisdom of antiquity could not discover. It assures us, that as nothing exists by chance, so nothing is eternally existing but the three Divine Persons in the one Godhead. Everything else, whether material or immaterial, derives its substance, as well as its form or qualities, from the fiat of that self-existent Being, "who was, and is, and is to come."

It does not, however, follow from this verse, or from any other passage in the sacred Scriptures, that the whole universe was called into existence at the same instant; neither is it by any means evident that the chaos of our world was brought into being on the first of those six days during which it was gradually reduced into form. From a passage in the book of Job (xxxviii. 7), in which we are told by God himself, that when the "foundation of the earth was laid the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy;" it appears extremely probable that worlds had been created, formed, and inhabited, long before our earth had any existence. Nor is this opinion at all contrary to what Moses says of the creation of the stars; for though they are mentioned in the same verse with the sun and moon, yet the manner in which, according to the original, they are introduced, by no means indicates that all the stars were formed at the same time with the luminaries of our system. Most of them have been created long before, and some of them since, our world was brought into being; for that clause (ver. 16), "He made the stars also," is in the Hebrew no more than "and the stars;" the words he made being inserted by the translators. The whole verse, therefore, ought to be rendered thus, "And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light with the stars to rule the night;" where nothing is intimated with respect to the time when the stars were formed, any more than that verse of the Psalms (cxlvii. 9), which exhorts us to give thanks to God who made the moon and stars to rule by night; for his mercy endureth "for ever."

The first verse of the book of Genesis informs us that all things spiritual and corporeal derive their existence from God; but it is nowhere said that all matter was created at the same time.

3. Ps. xxxvi. 6-9; cxlii. 6-9, cxlv. 90-92, cxlvii. 25; Prov. viii. 15, 16; Dan. ii. 21; Matt. vi. 26, x. 29; John v. 17; Acts xvii. 28, &c. See on this subject especially Calvin's Institutes, bk. i. ch. 16.

Sect. VIII.—Reverence due to God.

The revelation which God has been pleased to give of himself to His intelligent creatures, is designed to raise their minds and hearts up to Him, and enable them to think of Him as He is, and feel towards Him as they ought. As before observed, He requires us to give unto the Lord glory and strength; to give unto the Lord the glory due unto His name; to worship Him in the beauty of holiness (Ps. xxix. 1, 2). He commands us to sanctify the Lord of Hosts himself; to let Him be our fear, and to let Him be our dread (Is. viii. 13). And he warns us against polluting His holy name, profaning His name, and taking His name in vain (Ez. xxxix. 7; Lev. xviii. 21; Ex. xx. 7). Such reverence towards the Almighty even natural reason Reverence teaches to be most fit and imperative. No man who contemplates the Divine perfections, as made known in Creation and Providence, can doubt that it is his duty to fear and reverence the Being to whom such matchless perfections belong. He who thinks irreverently of the Author of nature can never have considered seriously the power, the wisdom, and the goodness displayed in His works; for whoever has a clear notion of these must be convinced that He who performed them has no imperfection; that His power can accomplish everything which involves not a contradiction; that His knowledge is intuitive, and free from the possibility of error; and that His goodness extends to all without partiality and without any alloy of selfish design. This conviction must make every man on whose mind it is impressed ready to prostrate himself in the dust before the Author of his being; who, though infinitely exalted above him, is the source of all his enjoyments, constantly watches over him with paternal care, and protects him from numberless dangers. The sense of so many benefits must excite in his mind a sense of the liveliest gratitude to him from whom they are received, and an ardent wish for their continuance.

While silent gratitude and devotion thus glow in the breast of the thoughtful observer, he will be careful not to form even a mental image of that all-perfect Being to whom they are directed. He knows that God is not material; that He exists in a manner altogether incomprehensible; that to frame an image of Him would be to assign limits to what is infinite; and that to attempt to form a positive conception of Him would be impiously to compare himself with his Maker.

The man who has any just notion of the perfections of the Supreme Being will never speak lightly of Him, or make use of His name except on great and solemn occasions. He knows that the terms of all languages are inadequate and improper, when applied directly to Him who has no equal, and to whom nothing can be compared; and therefore he will employ these terms with caution. When he speaks of His mercy and compassion, he will not consider them as feelings wringing the heart, like the mercy and compassion experienced by man, but as rays of pure and disinterested benevolence. When he thinks of the stupendous system of nature, and hears it perhaps said that God formed it for His own glory, he will reflect that God is so infinitely exalted above all His creatures, and so perfect in Himself, that He can neither take pleasure in their applause, nor receive any accession of any kind from the existence of ten thousand worlds. The immense fabric of nature, therefore, only displays the glory or perfections of its Author to us, and to other creatures who have not faculties to comprehend Him in Himself. When such an one talks of serving God, he does not dream that his services can increase the Divine felicity; but means only that it is his duty to obey the Divine laws. Even the pronoun He, when it refers to God, cannot be of the same import as when it refers to man; and by the philosophical divine it will seldom be used but with a mental allusion to this obvious distinction.

As the man who daily venerates the Author of his being will not speak of him on trivial occasions, so will he be still further from calling upon him to witness impertinences and falsehood. The slightest reflection will convince him that the world, with all that it contains, depends every moment on that God who formed it; and this conviction will compel him to wish for the Divine protection of himself and his friends from all dangers and misfortunes. Such a wish is in effect a prayer, and will always be accompanied with adoration, confession, and thanksgiving. But adoration, confessions, supplications, and thanksgiving constitute what is called worship, and therefore the worship of God is a natural duty. It is the addressing of ourselves as His dependants to Him as the supreme cause and governor of the world, with acknowledgments of what we enjoy, and petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us.

See Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated; Wilkins', Principles and Duties of Natural Religion.

PART II.

ANTHROPOLOGY, OR DOCTRINE CONCERNING MAN.

SECT. I.—Original State of Man.

God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul (1). These statements indicate that man received from his Maker a bodily constitution essentially the same as that given to the lower animals, which the earth at the Divine command brought forth; and also that he received, as a separate boon, the gift of life, which in his case inheres not in the bodily organisation, so as to cease when that is destroyed, but in a different substance, the soul, by which the life is retained after the body is dead (2). We are further told, that God made man upright, that he was created in the image and likeness of God, and that God pronounced him "very good." We are thus led to predicate perfection of man in his original estate—perfection not merely of physical constitution, but perfection of intellectual and moral constitution, and actual moral and spiritual integrity (3). At the same time, his perfection was not supernatural, nor was it the full perfection of man, for that can be reached only through experience and discipline.

The image and likeness of God in which man was created has often been taken to signify moral excellence alone, and sometimes to signify a superhuman degree of such excellence. That moral excellence must be regarded as forming part of this image cannot be questioned in the face of such passages as Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 24; but that it consisted wholly in this is a mistake. The image of Him who is the source of all intelligence, must include the faculty of intellect and the possession of knowledge; and as we know that man still retains the image of God in some sense after the fall (see Gen. ix. 6; James iii. 9), whilst he lost by that his moral resemblance to God, we are bound to believe that that image consisted originally in something besides moral excellence and purity.

1. Gen. ii. 7. The expression ἐκ τοῦ γαίας, a living soul, has been frequently taken for more than it really means. A common view is, that it refers to the possession by man of an intellectual nature; and some refer it to the moral excellence originally conferred on him. But the phrase itself simply denotes the possession of animal life. (See Gen. i. 20, 24; ii. 19; ix. 12, 15, 18.) This, indeed, man has not, as the lower animals have, resident merely in his bodily organisation, so as to cease when this is disintegrated; but the evidence for this does not rest on such an expression as that before us.

2. It is doubtless in allusion to this that the Apostle lays so much stress on man's possessing a soul-body (ψυχήν καὶ σῶμα), 1 Cor. xv. 44, 45. The recognition of this peculiarity also seems essential to our attaching due importance to the biblical trichotomy of our nature as composed of body, soul, and spirit. (See Olshausen, De Nat. Num. Trichotomy, p. 145.)

3. The Image of God in Adam appeared in three attitudes, righteousness and holiness in which he was made; for God made man upright (Ecclus. vii. 2), a holy and righteous creature, which holiness and righteousness were in their kind perfect; his understanding was free from all error and mistakes; his will biased to that which is good; his affections flowed in a right channel towards their proper objects; there were no sinful notions and evil thoughts in his heart, nor any propensity or inclination to that which is evil; and the whole of his conduct and behaviour was according to the will of God. And this righteousness was natural, and not personal and acquired. It was not obtained by the exercise of his free-will, but was created with him, and belonged to his mind as a natural faculty. or instinct." (Gill's Body of Divinity, b. iii. ch. 3.) If by these concluding words be meant that Adam's moral excellence was not the result of acquired habits, but was connate with him, the statement may be admitted. But this truth should not have been so expressed. Virtue does not exist apart from choice or free-will. (Moral Philosophy, p. 560.) It would be more correct to say that man, in his original state, was made to choose that which is good; and as he was free from any bias to evil, so he was capable of discerning good, and inclined to prefer it.

Many learned men, and Bishop Bull (English Works, vol. iii.) among others, have supposed, that by the image of God is to be understood certain gifts and powers supernaturally infused by the Holy Spirit into the minds of our first parents, to guide them in the ways of piety and virtue. This opinion they rest chiefly upon the authority of Tatian, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Athanasius, and other fathers of the primitive church; but they think, at the same time, that it is countenanced by several passages in the New Testament. Thus when St. Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 45, 46), "and so it is written, Adam was made a living soul," they understand the whole passage as relating to the creation of man, and not as drawing comparison between Adam and Christ, to show the great superiority of the latter over the former. In support of this interpretation they observe, that the apostle immediately adds, "howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual;" an addition which they think was altogether needless, if by the quickening spirit he had referred to the incarnation of Christ, which had happened in the very age in which he was writing. They are therefore of opinion, that the body of Adam, after being formed of the dust of the ground, was first animated by a vital principle, endowed with the faculties of reason and sensation, which entitled the whole man to the appellation of a living soul. After this, they suppose certain graces of the Holy Spirit to have been infused into him, by which he was made a quickening spirit, or formed in the image of God; and that it was in consequence of this succession of powers communicated to the same person, that the apostle said, "howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural."

We may hardly observe that, with respect to a question of this kind, the authority of Tatian and the other fathers quoted is of no great weight. These men had no better means of discovering the true sense of the Scriptures of the Old Testament than we have; and their ignorance of the language in which these scriptures are written, added to some metaphysical notions of their own school, which too many of them had derived from the school of Plato, rendered them very ill qualified to interpret the writings of Moses. Were authority to be admitted, we should consider that of Bishop Bull and his modern followers as of greater weight than the authority of all the ancients to whom they appeal. But authority cannot be admitted; and the reasoning of this learned and excellent man from the text of St. Paul, is surely very inconclusive. It makes two persons of Adam; a first, when he was a natural man, composed of a body and a reasonable soul; a second, when he was endowed with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and by them formed in the image of God. In the verse following, the apostle expressly calls the second man, of whom he had been speaking, "the Lord from heaven;" but this appellation we apprehend to be too high for Adam in the state of greatest perfection in which he ever existed. That our first parents were endowed with the gifts of the Holy Ghost may be granted; but as these gifts were adventitious to their nature, they could not be that image in which God made man.

Man thus constituted was placed by God in a pleasant and fitting habitation, in an enclosed demesne, in a district which bore the name of Eden, or pleasant land (1). Here there was provided for him all that was needful for sustenance, and along with that whatever could minister to those pure and simple tastes with which he had been endowed. In this pleasant abode Adam was placed as in a school and a temple, that his nature might be cultivated, that his religious tendencies might have scope, and that, in the contemplation and service of God, he might enjoy the highest felicity of which his nature was capable. His life was to be one of activity; he had to dress the garden and to keep it. His intellectual powers were called into early exercise by God's teaching him to use language, and summoning him to the effort of naming the different tribes of animals by which he was surrounded. Endowed with social instincts and affections, these were at once stimulated and satisfied by the formation of one who should be an help-meet for him—one who, bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh, should be his equal, companion, and aid. In close and constant communication with God, and surrounded by innumerable evidences of the Creator's power, wisdom, and goodness, his religious powers and tendencies were stimulated and directed, and he was taught to worship God and wait upon Him. To this the institution of the Sabbath (2) was doubtless designed to contribute, as well as the two symbolical trees in the midst of the garden, the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil; of the former of which man might eat, and probably did eat sacramentally, as a pledge of that life which he was to enjoy so long as he was obedient, and a sign of that higher life to which success in his probation would conduct him; and the latter of which furnished the test of his obedience, the means of his probation (3). Of this tree he was forbidden to eat, on pain of death should he transgress this prohibition (Gen. ii. 8–25).

1. The word Paradise, which is the term applied to the abode of our first parents by the LXX., the Vulgate, and the Syriac translators, is of Persian origin (= pairi daiza, in the old Zend, an enclosure), and was the customary designation of those large parks, παρεῖα ἐκδήλωσις καὶ στάσις, as Xenophon says (Helli. iv. 1, 15), which were used as pleasure-grounds by the Persian princes and nobility (Zemoh. Cyrop. i. 4, 11). It was introduced into the later Hebrew under the form of בַּיִת, Cant. iv. 13; Neh. ii. 8; Eccl. ii. 5.—On the situation of Eden, see Rosenmüller, Biblical Geography, vol. i. p. 46, Eng. Tr.; Kurz, History of the Old Covenant, vol. i. p. 71, Eng. Tr.; Smith's Biblical Cyclopaedia, art. Paradise.

2. See Owen's Preliminary Examinations to his Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, part v. exer. iii. & iv.; Taylor's Scheme of Scripture Divinity, ch. ii.; Horne's Introduction, vol. ii. serm. xxii.–xxiii.; Wardlaw's Observations on the Sabbath, disc. i.

3. Comp. Vitringa, Observationes Sacrae, bk. iv. c. 12; Poole's Comment, on the passage.

Sect. II.—Man's Temptation and Fall.

Man was thus placed under probation. How long he sustained his state of probation we cannot tell; but we may presume it was long enough to prove the fitness of his condition for the ends it was designed to answer, and to enable our first parents to make some progress in intellectual and spiritual culture. We know, however, that whether it continued for a long time or a short, it ended unhappily. Seduced by Satan, who, in the guise of a serpent (1), took advantage of her simplicity and heedlessness, Eve was led first to doubt the goodness and fairness of God in the restriction under which they had been placed, and to despise His threatening in case of disobedience. After this, it was not difficult to work upon her feelings, to stimulate appetite, curiosity, and ambition, so as to hurry her to a breach of the law on which man's continuance in Paradise depended. "She saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise;" and seeing this, and being already, by the wiles and falsehood of the tempter, drawn off from her primeval sense of God and reverence for Him, "she took of the fruit thereof; and did eat." No unpleasant consequences seem at the time to have ensued; and triumphing, perhaps, in her experiment, "she gave also to her husband, and he did eat." In his case there was no deception; what he did he did consciously, and fully aware both of the evil of what he did and of the penalty he incurred. (1 Tim. ii. 14.) (2).

1. Some have supposed that the term "serpent" (emphatically the serpent, ὑπόστασις) is used by Moses (Gen. iii. 1), as by Paul (2 Cor. xi. 3) and John (Rev. xii. 9), merely as a designation of Satan, without intending to intimate thereby anything as to the form which he assumed. It has been also supposed that he came to Eve in the guise of an unfallen angel, and that allusion is made to this by the apostle when he says that "Satan is transformed into an angel of light!" (2 Cor. xi. 14), as there is no other occasion on record to which such an allusion would so well apply. In the subsequent part, however, of the Mosaic narrative there are statements which seem to necessitate the belief that an animal serpent was somehow mixed up with this transaction; and such has been the prevailing belief of the Church, as well as the prevailing testimony of tradition.

2. Attempts have been made to set aside entirely the historical character of the narrative in the third chapter of Genesis, and to resolve it into an allegorical poem, setting forth the genesis and growth of evil in the soul. In support of the historical character of the passage, however, there is much to be urged. In the first place, it occurs in a book of history, a book the design of which is to narrate facts; and it is inserted there apparently as a piece of the history the writer has to narrate. The preliminary presumption, therefore, is, that it is an account of a real occurrence; at least the osus probandi here lies on those who oppose this position.

ii. The sober simplicity of the style in which the whole is narrated favours this conclusion. An historian may introduce a parable or an apologue into his history, though it is usual for the historian to give formal notice of the fact when he does it; but there is in all such cases such a manifest departure in the style of the narrator introduced from the style of the narrative portion of his book, that even if he did not formally announce his intention, the reader would be at no loss to discover the change. In the case before us, however, there is no such alteration of style; the narrative of the temptation and the fall moves on in the same simple matter-of-fact style as any subsequent part of the book.

iii. The traditions of all nations, so far as they bear on the subject of man's primeval state, are in favour of the literality of the Mosaic history. The tradition of a golden age of unsullied purity and perfect happiness, as the first stage of man's history on earth; the important place occupied by the serpent in the traditions of the ancient nations, and the uniform identification of the evil spirit in these traditions with the serpent-form hostile to man, and the glimpses which the ancient mythologies give of some great deliverer who is to appear for the rescue of oppressed humanity: all may be held as corroborating, so far as they go, the Mosaic narrative. (See Faber's Horæ Monastici, i. c. iii.)

iv. The allusions to the Mosaic narrative as to a record of real events, in other parts of Scripture, afford strong evidence of its historical character. Passing over some of a more doubtful character, in the Old Testament, what can be more explicit than the allusions made to it in the New? Comp. such passages as those already cited from Romans xii. 21; 1 Corinthians vii. 34; 2 Corinthians iii. 3; 1 Timothy i. 13; John viii. 44; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xii. 9, 10, xx. 2.) "The last chapter of the book describes, with the most marked allusion to the third chapter of Genesis, a time when all the effects of his (Satan's) temptation are to disappear. In Genesis the ground is cursed, and a flaming sword guards the tree of life. In the Revelation they who enter through the gates into the city, which is there described, are said to have a right to the tree of life; the tree grows in the midst of the street, and on either side of the river; and the leaves of it are for the healing of the nations; and, it is added, there shall be no more curse. The effects of the curse are exhausted with regard to all who enter into the city. Thus the beginning and the end of the Bible lend their authority in support of each other. The transaction recorded in the beginning explains the reason of many expressions which occur in the progress of the sacred Scriptures; and the description which forms the conclusion reflects light upon the opening. Whatever opinion we may entertain of the third chapter of Genesis, when we read it singly, it swells in our conceptions as we advance; and all its meaning and its importance become manifest when we recognise the features of this early transaction in that magnificent scene by which the mystery of God on earth shall be finished."—Hill, Theology, ii. p. 10.

Comp. Holman's Divine History of Man; Smith's Disposition on the Sense of the Ancients before Christ; upon the Occurrences and Consequences of the Fall, appended to his Discourses on the Use and Intent of Prophecy; Stockhouse's History of the Bible; Horneley's Biblical Criticism, vol. i.)

But even if this narrative were to be taken as allegorical or mythical, we should still have to recognise the substance and main facts of it as real. For if it be an allegory, there must be something which the allegory is designed to teach; and if it be a myth, there must be a historical basis, of which this is the poetical representation. This throws us back on the question, What is it that the allegory is employed to teach? What are the facts of which this myth is the poetical adumbration? In reply to this, if it be answered—and this is the only answer that can be given—that we have here an allegorical or mythical representation of the introduction of sin into our world, and the result of that sin to the first man and his posterity, I do not see that it matters much, in a theological point of view, whether we take the narrative literally or not. The only difference is that, taken literally, the narrative teaches directly and by explicit affirmation what, taken figuratively, it teaches indirectly and by shadows. This, whilst it seems to render the attempt to deny the literal reality of the narrative a State since very needless piece of hyper-criticism, from which nothing is to be gained to any side, renders it less necessary that the theologian should contend for that literality, as if any vital position of his science depended on it.

The result of man's transgression was his fall from a state of innocency (status integritatis); his being doomed to death, the penalty he had incurred; and his being cast out of Paradise to endure a life of sorrow, toil, and pain. The death which he incurred was not merely the death of the body; it was supinely spiritual death, consisting in exclusion from the Divine favour, and in exposure to all the spiritual disadvantages of his altered position. He passed from a state of high moral life to one of moral death, of which the sorrows of life, the disorders of the natural world, and physical death itself, are but the fruits and the tokens (1). Into this state man entered as soon as he had sinned, according to the threatening—"In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." God came and brought him to an instant reckoning before the tempter had time to withdraw; and then He pronounced on all parties the doom which they had incurred. To Satan He assigned degradation and hopeless, fruitless conflict with the good which was still, in spite of his craft and wickedness, to remain in the world; whilst, to man He conveyed, in the very existence of that conflict, a ray of hope, and at the same time assured him of the final triumph of the good over the bad, notwithstanding all the efforts of the powers of evil to the contrary.

1. See Edwards On Original Sin, part ii. ch. ii. sect. ii.; Alexander's Connection and Harmony of the Old and New Testaments, p. 100, 2d edit.

SECT. III.—Man's present State since the Fall.

The Bible represents man universally as in a state of sin. Not only does it expressly declare that all have sinned and come short of the glory of God; that there is none righteous, no not one; that there is not a man that sinneth not; that if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us (1), with many other similar statements; but the truth of this is assumed throughout by its writers, and is involved in the whole scheme of religion which it unfolds. It is because all have sinned that all are subject to death; because all have sinned that it became necessary that salvation should be provided of God's grace for men. Christ represents Himself as having come to seek and to save the lost; and that all are in this condition is involved in the assertion, that except a man be saved by Christ he perishes for ever. The doctrine of regeneration also involves the fact of sin, for if any man were sinless, it would not be necessary for all to be born again before they can see the kingdom of God. Thus emphatically and unequivocally has the Scripture concluded all men under sin.

1. Comp. 1 Kings viii. 46, 47; John xiv. 4, xv. 14; Eccles. vii. 20, 29; Is. liii. 6; Rom. i. 18, iii. 23; Gal. iii. 22; 1 John i. viii., &c.

What the Bible thus plainly declares is abundantly attested from other sources. It is attested by man's own conscience, which ever accuses him of having done wrong and incurred blame. It is attested by the fact, that all men impute blame to others for what they do contrary to rectitude, and regard all men as under this imputation. It is attested by the unwillingness which all men have naturally to realise the being and claims of God, and their own relation to Him, as shown by their habitual extrusion of Him from their thoughts, and by their manifest uneasiness when the subject is pressed upon them. It is Nature of attested by the constant care which men in society take to guard themselves by penal laws against the consequences of the assumed wickedness of others. It is attested by the fact, that all religious systems which have prevailed amongst men are constructed on the assumption that men are sinners, and are directed to the end of delivering men from the consequences of this by propitiating the just wrath of Heaven. And it receives large and striking attestation from the prevalence of disorder and deformity in nature, which bears in the scars and blots that disfigure it, and in the confusion and discord by which its functions are impeded, the unmistakable traces of the moral disorder of the being for whose use it was destined, and by whose fortunes it cannot but be affected.

Butler's Analogy, part i. ch. iii.; Dwight's Theology, serm. 29; Bashnell's Nature and the Supernatural, ch. v. and vi.

Sect. IV.—Nature of Sin.

The sacred writers employ different terms to designate that with which man is chargeable as a sinner. These may be classified as follows:

1. Those which represent sin as an erring from the right way—a swerving from the prescribed path. To this belong the often recurring words, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιτάξεως, all of which are formed from the root ἀπο, he erred, or missed his mark (see Judges xx. 16). The Greek word ἀπαγραφή, which is the standard designation employed in the New Testament, has a similar etymological meaning, being connected with the verb ἀπαγράφειν, which signifies originally, I miss or err (Hom. Il., iv. 491, τούς μὲν ἀπαγράφει, "Him, indeed, he missed;" x. 372, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἀπαγράφει φάρος, "He intentionally missed the man"). The idea here conveyed is, that sin is a missing of or departing from the way which has been marked out for us, a failing to hit the mark set up. To this class also belong ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιτάξεως, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιτάξεως, from ἀπο, he swerved, and ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, from ἀπο, with the same meaning.

2. Those which represent sin as a defection from God. Here we have such words as ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, from ὁδός, he resisted, or drew back; sometimes, as in Jer. xxviii. 16, translated "rebellious" in the Auth. Vers.; ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, from ὁδός, he was refractory or contumacious; ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, from ὁδός, he turned aside, declined; ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, from ὁδός, he revolted; παραπτώματος, an offence, i.e., against God; ἀδελέα, want of reverence for God, godlessness, the state of those who are ἀδελέα.

3. Those which represent it as lawlessness or guiltiness. Here we have ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, from ὁδός, which in Hiphil signifies to declare guilty of a breach of law; so the Greek ἀδικία, ἀδικία, and ἀδικία.

4. Those which represent sin as moral evil; such as ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ (comp. Gen. xliiv. 16), ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, &c.

As in all these terms there lies, on the one hand, the idea of something which man ought to be or to do—some mark he is bound to hit, some path he is bound to follow, some law he has to obey, some excellence he ought to exemplify; and, on the other hand, the fact of his failing to come up to what is required of him; we receive from them the general conception of sin as a not doing of or being, on the part of man, what he is required to be and to do.

When we seek to acquire a still more precise concept of sin, an especially valuable guide is supplied to us by such a passage as 1 John iii. 4, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ, "sin is lawlessness," or opposition to law. With this may be compared Rom. iii. 20, "By the law is the knowledge if sin;" and v. 13, "Sin is not imputed where there is no law."

According to this representation the essence of sin lies in its contrariety to law, the law of God. With this fall in—1. The peculiar character of the first sin, the essential evil of which lay in its being a violation of God's law; 2. The fact that God treats sin with punishment, which can happen righteously only under a system of law; and 3. The fact that sin cannot be forgiven except on the ground of atonement, the necessity for which arises from the claims of law and the danger that would accrue to government were sin pardoned without an atonement.

With this must be connected the view of sin so often and so emphatically given in Scripture as rebellion against God, disobedience to God (comp. e.g., Gen. xiii. 13, xxxix. 9; Exod. xxxii. 33; Deut. xx. 18; Ps. li. 4; Matt. vii. 14, 15; Rom. v. 15-20; 2 Cor. v. 19; Eph. ii. 1-4, &c.). This is viewed as something beyond mere transgression (see Job xxxiv. 37); it implies at once disregard to law, apostacy of heart from God, and ungrateful alienation from Him. These two aspects of sin, however, coalesce through the consideration that a law implies a lawgiver, and as God is the giver of the law of which sin is a transgression, such an act is not only against the law but against God also.

The formal notion of sin is thus, not so much moral evil in itself as moral evil viewed as an act of transgression of the Divine law, and rebellion against God, involving ingratitude to Him and apostacy from Him.

Melanchthon—"Pecatum est defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei." Gerhard—"Pecatum est discrepancia, aberratio, declinatio a lege." Calovius—"Illigitas sine differendo a lege." Luther's Catechism—Sin is any transgression of or want of conformity to the law of God. Augustine maintained that sin was essentially something "contrarietas, clogitatem, dictam, factum adferens Divinae legem" (Conf. Fass., bk. xxi. c. 27); and the same idea lies in Melanchthon's "pugnans." Augustine's view has been pressed by papal theologians as the service of their doctrine of works of supererogation. A distinction is made, also apparently acknowledged by Augustine, between moral perfection and immunity from sin, the former being absolute and complete conformity to the law of God, the latter being reached by a sincere and honest and determined effort after such conformity (the obligatio ad finem and the obligatio ad mediam of Bellarmine, De Monarchia, ch. 13, &c.); and on this is erected the conclusion that a man may attain merit before God, even though he may not reach absolute perfection. As this conclusion would be utterly invalidated were the maxim "Omne minus bonum habet rationem maii" admitted, this maxim is denied, and sin is held to be only what is a positive transgression of the law. But if the law requires what is good, what man's moral sense approves, and what he feels that he ought to attain, is not every shortcoming from that felt by his own conscience to be evil? and to what is such a shortcoming to be traced but to the presence and working of evil in his mind? Why should a man do less than a law, holy, just, and good, requires him to do, except that something not holy, just, and good, requires him to a course which is less or other than the law requires? If it be true on this ground there never can be a sinless creature, for a creature being limited must ever fall short of absolute goodness and holiness, it is enough to reply, that if there is sin only where there is transgression of or want of conformity to law, and as no law can be set and given which demands of a creature more than he can perform, sinless perfection may be reached by a creature by perfect conformity to a law which is far from embodying or requiring absolute goodness. All creature perfection is relative perfection, and when this is reached, sinlessness for the creature is reached.

Schleiermacher rejects the definition of sin as transgression of the Divine law, on the ground that law has reference merely to conduct, and therefore cannot be a norm of that goodness which depends more on the inner act of the mind than on the more outward performance (see his Glaubenslehre, i. p. 383; ii. p. 229, sect. 66, 2, and sect. 112, 5, 34 edit.). But this is an arbitrary and untenable restriction of the concept of law, especially of that Divine law which "is exceeding broad," and which extends to the feelings and intents of the heart no less than to the outward conduct. Schleiermacher, moreover, has here overlooked the fact that there can be no moral law which simply enjoins conduct; from the moral constitution of man, in commanding what is outwardly good, it summons forth also his moral sense to the approval of it, and is obeyed only as that is fully rendered (see Müller, Christian... Principle Doctrine of Sin, Eng. Tr., vol. I., p. 43 ff.) Schleiermacher's own definition of sin is, that it is "a positive antagonism of the flesh to the spirit," where by "flesh" he means "the totality of the so-called lower powers of the soul," and by "spirit" he means what he calls "the God-consciousness." "If," says he, "we suppose a condition in which the flesh has a receptivity only for the impulses which issue from the place of the God-consciousness, without being an independent motive principle; in such a case no antagonism between the two would be possible, and in so supposing we have supposed a similar condition. Both potential would then, in each moment, be in the same state, and perfectly one; for each momentum would begin in the spirit and also end in the spirit, and the flesh would only be as a living intermediate, as a sound organ, without bringing into view anything not originated in and approved by the spirit, whether its own proper act or an adulterated part of an act issuing from the spirit." More popularly he afterwards says of sin, that "it is committed when we last after what Christ contemned and the contrary," a definition which he supports by a quotation from Augustine (De Vera Relig., 31): "Non enim illum peccatum committit potest, nisi aut dum appetiturum esse quae illo contemnat aut fugiuntur quae ille sustinuit." It would be easy to multiply statements favouring Schleiermacher's doctrine from Augustine (as, for instance, "animam peccati arguimus cum eum convincimus, superioribus deserta, sed frumentum inferiore praeponeor" (De Lib. Arbit., iii. 1)); but though such may be regarded as useful practical descriptions of sin, they cannot be regarded as scientific definitions of it. Schleiermacher's way of stating the doctrine, besides, is objectionable; for what he calls "God-consciousness" is really, in point of fact, a man's own conscience; and to make sin consist solely in going against this, is either to erect a purely subjective, and therefore flexible, standard of rectitude, or to evade the question, What is sin? by merely raising it a stage or other back. When the flesh draws one way and the spirit another, unless the spirit have in itself the reason of what it approves, we have still to ask why is it that the flesh inclines to sin. A similar fallacy lies in the view of sin given by Poiret, that "profound but mystical thinker," as Sir W. Hamilton has designated him (Notes to Reid, p. 784): "Pecutum est indecentia, incongruitas, repugnancia in re secum vel cum suo statu." De Cogit. Ration., bk. iv. c. 11, sect. 1. This presumes that in man himself is found the norm or standard of what ought to be. If self were law, repugnance to self would be sin. But this can be said only of God.

Sect. V.—Principle of Sin.

Sin, in its nature, is lawlessness. But does this per se constitute the evil of sin? Is not this the mere effect of the operation of some principle of evil in the soul? All man's voluntary acts flow from some inner principle or spring. What is the principle of sin in man that leads him to that lawlessness which is sin?

The antagonist of sin is moral goodness or holiness. If we can ascertain the principle of holiness in the creature, it will go far to enable us to determine the antagonist principle of sin.

Moral goodness or holiness in the creature is conformity to the moral nature of God (Moral Philosophy, pp. 556, 563); not conformity to the Divine law simply as law, but conformity to that perfect nature of which the Divine law is the utterance. But this conformity can exist only where there is a harmony between the Divine mind and the creature mind; in other words, where the mind of the creature has perfect sympathy with God in that complacency with which He necessarily regards His own all-perfect nature. We find the principle of holiness in the creature, then, in complacency in the Divine nature, as made known to us. Delight in God, as the absolutely holy,—adoring, admiring love to Him for what He is, so far as that may be apprehended by us: this is the germ from which alone, and from which surely, all holy affections and actions spring in the creature.

We are commanded to be holy as God is holy, i.e., our holiness is to be of the same kind as His. But the holiness of God is His most perfect love of Himself (Buddens, Inst. Theol. Dog., p. 238), and in the exercise of which He shows Himself in all His affections in exact conformity to His own perfect nature (Venema, Theology, p. 161). It follows that our holiness, to be as His, must flow from a like love for God, and complacent delight in Him. This falls in with and is supported by our Lord's teaching, that all moral goodness is resolvable ultimately into supreme love to God (Matt. xxii. 36, 39), and the place which the apostles assign to this as the root and spring of all goodness (1 Cor. viii. 2, 3; Rom. v. 1—5; Eph. iii. 17—19, iv. 16, &c.). (See Wardlaw's Christian Ethics, lect. vii—viii.)

We are thus brought to the conclusion, that the principle of sin, and of all moral evil, must be an absence of love to God—the state of those who, in the Bible sense of the term, are ἀδειοί. It is not necessary that this should amount to positive enmity to God, to hatred of Him, or to a dark conscious repugnance of heart from Him; the negative state is enough; if the heart be a stranger to love to God, there the principle of sin is enthroned. Hence the apostle, in tracing the progress of human depravity and degeneracy, finds the commencement and source of the whole in man's becoming irreverent and unthankful, in his not glorifying God as God, in his not liking to retain the knowledge of God in his thoughts. He thus became destitute of the only sure guiding principle of goodness, and as a consequence he was left to a reprobate mind, and soon became proficient in all evil (Rom. i. 21—23).

It may be objected, that we thus fix upon a negative rather than a positive principle of sin. But this, instead of being an objection, seems rather a recommendation; for as sin itself is a negative state ("peccatum defectivus motus est; omnis autem defectus ex nihil obstante," August., de lib. art. ii. 20), just as darkness is the negation of light, and cold the negation of heat, the principle appropriate to it is a negative one. Those who insist upon determining a positive principle of sin, find this in creature love in general, or selfishness as a form of creature love. The latter alternative is exposed to the obvious objection, that by adopting it we are shut up to pronouncing all actions selfish, or admitting that some actions of man are sinless; nay, that though man withhold his affection from God, yet, if he bestow it not on himself, but on other creatures, he is so far sinless. Deterred by such considerations, most have followed Augustine in placing the germ of sin in creature love in the general, "How often perchance God made in imposed in creature love, me aequo certe, voluntatis sublimate, veritate amarissime, atque ille irremissibilis, in dolores, confusiones errores?" (Confess. i. 31). But may not this be with greater propriety regarded as a primary result of alienation of heart from God—the first step in sin, rather than as the principle and source of sin itself? Wrong thoughts of God, wrong affections towards God, draw men away from Him, and lead them to give to the creature that which is due only to the Creator. The next step is all rebellion; for the mind, averse from God, no sooner comes into relation to His law, than it repels its claims, resists its authority, and violates its injunctions. (See Müller's Christian Doctrine of Sin, vol. i. p. 93 ff.)

Sect. VI.—Kinds of Sin.

Though all sin has essentially the same nature, and proceeds from the same evil principle, there are different forms in which it presents itself to observation. Hence theologians have been led to classify sins according to certain differential qualities, as follows:

Class A.—In respect of their immediate object—that against which they are immediately committed. Here we have—

1. Sins against God; also sins of the first table of the law, Peccata prime tabulae Decalogi.

2. Sins against our neighbours; Peccata secundae tabulae Decalogi.

3. Sins against ourselves.

B. In respect of the law of which they are a transgression.

1. Sins of commission—Peccata positiva qua commituntur adversus legem vetamentum.

2. Sins of omission—Peccata negativa, qua commituntur adversus legem jubentem. Comp. Matt. xxv. 42—45, "Inasmuch as ye did it not," James iv. 17, "Therefore to him that knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin" (1).

C. In respect of the compass of the act itself. 1. Inward sins, *peccata interna*, *vice cordis*, *tropus*—all such tendencies and emotions as oppose, or are inconsistent with the law of God,—evil thoughts, lusts, and passions.

2. Outward sins, *peccata externa*, *sermonis et operis*—all words and deeds which transgress the law.

D. In respect of the party charged with them:

1. Sins directly committed by himself, *peccata propria*.

2. Sins committed by others in which he partakes, *peccata aliena*, *permissionis*, *participata* (2).

E. In respect of intention on the part of those committing them:

1. Voluntary sins, *peccata voluntaria*, *spontanea*, *qua deliberato consilio committuntur* (3).

2. Involuntary [unpremeditated] sins, *qua non deliberato consilio committuntur*. These may be either,

a. Sins of ignorance, transgressions of an unknown law, and that either (1) helpless ignorance, as where the law has not been revealed [These are properly not sins at all. Comp. John xv. 22, "If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin"; or, (2) ignorance that may be overcome, as e.g. that of the Jews in crucifying Jesus: "I wot," said Peter to them, "that through ignorance you did it, as did also your rulers;" and that of Paul in persecuting the Church, "I did it," says he, "ignorantly in unbelief." In both these instances, however, the ignorance was culpable, because it might have been helped.

b. Sins of rashness or precipitancy, into which a man falls from the suddenness of the temptation. To such Paul refers when he says, Gal. vi. 1, "Brethren, if a man be overtaken [προληφθῇ] in any fault," &c.

c. Sins of infirmity arising from the influence of physical causes. Comp. Matt. xxvi. 41, "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak."

F. In respect of enormity and punishability:

1. Clamant sins, *peccata clamantia vel manifesta*—such as those of which Paul speaks when he says, "Some men's sins are open or manifest beforehand (προδεικνύσαι) going before judgment." Sins of this class are such as, whether man punish them or not, the righteous judgment of God will be sure to overtake those who have committed them. Comp. Gen. iv. 10, xviii. 20, xix. 13; Exod. iii. 7, 9; Deut. xv. 9; James v. 4 (4).

2. Non-clamant sins, *peccata non clamantia, muta, qua Deus longanimitate sua dissimulat et tolerat*. Comp. Acts xvii. 30.

3. Mortal sins, *peccata mortalia*, or *mortifera*. Comp. 1 John. v. 15–18. These, as distinguished from venial sins, are commonly described by Protestant divines as sins committed deliberately by the regenerate, and which destroy spiritual life; while the latter are sins of rashness, &c. So far as this is true, it coalesces with the following.

4. Sins of greater or lesser aggravation. Matt. xi. 24; Luke xii. 47; 1 Tim. v. 8.

5. Sins remissible or irremissible. The only irremissible sin is that against the Holy Ghost, Matt. xii. 31. Comp. Mark iii. 28; Luke xii. 10; Heb. vi. 4–6.

There is perhaps here a want of sufficient precision. Every positive act of sin is a breach of a law which forbids that sin, but it is also a breach of a corresponding law which enjoins the opposite good. On the other hand, every omission of good which the law enjoins is not necessarily a breach of the law which forbids the opposite evil. We cannot commit evil without omitting the antagonist good; but we may omit good without necessarily committing the antagonist evil. E.g., we cannot tell a lie, which is a breach of the law forbidding falsehood, without at the same time breaking the law which commands to speak the truth; nor can one may omit to obey the law which commands to show kindness to all men without directly breaking the law which forbids to do injury to any man. We must distinguish then here, and say that all sins of commission are also sins of omission, but all sins of omission are not also sins of commission. And we must distinguish further between a law of primary obligation and a law of secondary obligation. By the former we mean one which arises directly out of our relation to God, and which is always binding; by the latter, we mean a law arising out of our relations to our fellowmen, and which is binding only under certain conditions. Now, in reference to the former, there is no distinction between a sin of omission and one of commission; every omission of the commanded good is a commission of the prohibited opposite evil, and vice versa. In reference to the latter there is a distinction between sins of omission and sins of commission, to the extent that though the commission of a forbidden evil is also of necessity the omission of the opposite good, the omission of a commanded good is not necessarily the commission of the opposite evil.

2. This distinction is founded on such passages as Rom. i. 32, "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death, yet not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them, or consent with them that do them?" and 1 Tim. v. 22, "Neither be partaker of other men's sins." But neither of these passages seems to authorise the distinction. There is, undoubtedly, a distinction between sins which we ourselves commit, and sins which we are pleased to see others commit; but, in the latter case, the *quaedam nos* is not in the thing actually done, but in the approval which we bestow upon the doing of it; and this is as much a *peccatum proprium* to us as the doing of the act is a *peccatum proprium* to the party committing it. Then, as to the apostle's caution against our being partakers of other men's sins, his meaning plainly is, that we are not to sanction, authorise, or encourage men to do wrong, insomuch as we thereby become participators, as it were, in the sins which they commit. But in this, as in the former, the sinful part of the act *quaedam nos* lies in what we really do, viz., the sanctioning of what is wrong, or the permitting a person to do what we know to be wrong. The sin of an act, as an act, belongs wholly to the party committing it; the sin that attaches to others, in the case supposed, accrues from their regarding with satisfaction that sinful act, or encouraging to the commission of it by their sanction. In fact, the reason of the thing forbids such a distinction as this. There is no such thing as a sin chargeable on a party which is not a *peccatum proprium* to that party. If he can say truly, "I did not do it, another did it," he says what completely removes from him the charge of that sin. He may, indeed, approve and consent to it, or sanction and encourage it, and in so far he is guilty of sin; but the sin of which he is guilty is his own sin, viz. the transgression of God's law, which he has committed in approving of what is evil, or sanctioning it; whereas, if of the evil done, or the wrong committed, the sin rests wholly on the party who acted in the case. We would set aside this distinction, then, as one altogether unfounded.

3. These would be more properly called premeditated sins. All sin is voluntary. It is a fundamental principle in ethics, that neither viciousness nor innocence can be predicated of any act if it be not voluntary. "Nunc vero," says Augustine, "quae adeo peccata voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum si non sit voluntarium."—De Vera Relig. cap. 14. If the party apparently performing the act be not acting in accordance with his will, he really ceases to be an agent; he becomes passive in the hands of another; and the act, so far as he is concerned, possesses no moral quality whatever. The apostle, indeed (Heb. x. 26), uses the words *lexaon* *apostasiae*; but he is speaking there of apostasy, and the sins against which he cautions are such as lead to apostasy. He that, knowing the natural result of such sins, runs into them with his eyes open, virtually rejects the gospel, and for him there is no second Saviour.

4. These clamant sins have been enumerated in the mnemonic verse—

"Clamitat ad colum vox sanguinis et Sodomorum Vox oppressorum, mercesque retenta laborum."

As in this distich Exod. xxii. 23 seems to be overlooked, the second verse has been altered by some, thus—

"Vox oppressorum, viduae, pretium famularum?"

Perhaps still better thus—

"Oppressi ac viduae mercesque retenta laborum."

(See Bretschneider, Handbuch, II. p. 11, sect. 119; Hahn, Lehrbuch, p. 416.)

Sect. VII.—Source of Man's Sinfulness.

Having considered the fact of man's sinfulness, and the nature, principle, and modifications of sin, it now comes in course that we should ask, whence this fact? To what are we to trace this universal sinfulness of the race?

Now, as sin is the same thing in all men, its essential Source of principle and manifestations being the same in all, it must be regarded as something adhering to our nature in our present state of being. Were it not so we should either find some men who are not sinners, or some whose sins sprang from a different principle from that which lies at the source of those of others.

Further, the fact that all sin, both in act and in principle, is the same as that sin by which our first parents fell—viz., in act, a transgression of the law of God; and in principle, alienation of heart from God—is a fact which, if it does not suggest, certainly falls in with the conclusion that the first sin has had something to do with the production of all that have followed.

Once more, if sin be the same thing in all men, and therefore something adhering to our nature as at present existing, it must be something which is either added to that nature in each individual man immediately by God, or it must be something which accrues to each man in consequence of the connection of all men with the common source of the race. Besides these two, there is no way in which we can suppose that a quality belonging to the nature of all men could have come to be attached to that nature; nothing but community of derivation, either directly from God, or by connection with a common head, being adequate to account for a quality belonging to all men. The former supposition, however, is altogether incredible, and must, therefore, be rejected, insomuch as it would make God directly and immediately the author of sin. We are, therefore, shut up to the latter, and must trace the universal sin of men to their connection with the first man, Adam. We do not at present express any opinion as to the nature of that connection—that will be subsequently investigated; we simply indicate the conclusion, that to a connection of some sort with the original man, the sinfulness of the human family must be traced.

What these general considerations thus render probable, is placed beyond doubt by the testimony of Scripture.

1. The sacred historian of man's origin and early experience, after telling us that Adam was made in the image and likeness of God, tells us that his son Seth—the successor of Adam in the line of the godly—the heir after him of the patriarchate or covenant-headship of the children of God—was begotten by him "in his own image and likeness." It would not be competent for us to lay much stress upon this expression by itself; but when it is considered that the expression occurs only here—that it occurs on the first occasion that seems suitable after the narrative of Adam's fall—that it enunciates a marked contrast with what the historian has previously described as the original state of man—and that there seems no reason for its being introduced here except to mark that man no longer comes into being in the image and likeness of God, but now bears the image of his sinful and fallen parents; there seems strong ground for concluding from this passage, that an intimation of no very doubtful kind is conveyed in it, of a connection between Adam's sin and fall, and the sinful and corrupt nature of his posterity.

This is confirmed when we find the apostle describing the natural condition of men as a hearing of the image of the earthly (1 Cor. xv. 49). The most natural and satisfactory explanation of this is, that an allusion is made in it to man's natural condition, as a result of the descendants of Adam being born in his image and likeness, and no longer in the image and likeness of God.

2. There are many passages of Scripture which distinctly assert that sin is connatural to man. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Gen. vi. 5). "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth" (Gen. viii. 21). "What is man, that he should be righteous?" (Job xv. 14, 15); "Shall mortal man be just before God? shall a strong man be pure with his Maker?" (Job vii. 20). Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Ps. li. 5). "That which is born of the flesh is flesh" (John iii. 6). "I am carnal, sold under sin" (Rom. vii. 14, &c.) (1). None of these passages, it is true, assert any connection between man's sin and that of Adam; but they all more or less clearly intimate that sin is not an accident that befalls this man or the other—not something which is conveyed to man from external sources, and grows upon him wholly from without; but something which operates from within—something which is in man as man—something which if not of the nature of a vitium originis, is at least the result of a privation of which all men are the subjects; and as this can belong to all men only in virtue of their being descended from a common stock, these passages implicitly support the position now before us.

1. On these passages, see, on the one side, Taylor On Original Sin, and, on the other, the replies of Edwards and Payne, in their respective treatises on this subject.

3. To the same effect is that remarkable expression of the apostle, Eph. ii. 3, "by nature the children of wrath even as others." Here the being by nature children of wrath is described as the common condition of the race: the Ephesians were so even as others—not by any peculiarity of their state or character, but because all men are so. As regards the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι, it is best explained by reference to the Hebrew idiom, according to which a person was said to be the son of any object or quality when that object or quality exercised a dominant influence on his condition or state; compare ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι, Ps. cii. 21, = persons delivered over to death, exposed to its attack; cf ἐκ τοῦ φόβου, Luke xvi. 8, = persons under the illuminating influence of Divine teaching; ἐκ τοῦ κυρίου, 2 Pet. ii. 14, = persons under the curse of God. Thus taken, the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι is much the same as if the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι had been used; = persons under wrath—i.e., the wrath of God. Now this says the apostle, all men are ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι by nature—i.e., they become so not by any external influence, ordinance, or power, but by an internal tendency which develops itself in them from their birth. It is impossible to attach to this any clear or consistent meaning, but by understanding it of the native sinfulness of the human race, exposing them universally to the Divine displeasure and consequent condemnation.

Some who oppose the position we are supporting endeavour to get rid of the argument from this passage by denying that ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι means here by nature, and asserting that it is to be taken in the sense of really or truly; while others represent it as meaning "by customary practice" (Whitby On the Place). But for the former of these there is not the shadow of authority, and for the latter Whitby constructs a kind of authority only by mistranslating and mangling a passage from Suidas. "His words," says he, are these: When the apostle saith, we are by nature the children of wrath, he saith not this according to the proper acceptation of the word Nature; for then he had cast the blame on the Author of Nature; but he understands by it a long and evil custom." What Suidas says is, that Paul "says this not according to this signification of nature (ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι) ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι, with reference to what precedes—viz., where ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι is stated to be used in the sense of essential cause; ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι, but he means by it an inclination and most evil disposition (or affection), and a long and wicked habit (ἀληθῶς ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι). What support there is here for Dr Whitby's exegesis the reader can judge for himself; there can be but one opinion of the fairness of Dr Whitby's quotation. There are only two senses in which the candid scholar can take Paul's words here; either they mean that men are born children of wrath (compare the use of ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι by Iosec. Euseb. xv. 16, where a man's ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι is contrasted with his ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι), or they mean that they become children of wrath through the development of a native principle (as David is called by Josephus ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι, Ant. vii. 7, 1; and as ἐκ τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι is used Rom. ii. 14; 1 Cor. xi. 14, &c., in the N.T.). For our present object, it is little moment which of these two be preferred: in either case, the sinfulness of man is asserted by the apostle.

4. The fact of a connection between Adam's sin and that of mankind is expressly asserted in several passages of Sacred Scripture.

Is. xliii. 27: "Thy first father hath sinned." God is in this context by the prophet charging the people of Israel with iniquity, and the words cited appear to have the force of an assertion that they were sinners, as the fallen members of a fallen family—the worthless branches of a degenerate stock. Some interpreters, indeed, would take the word father here collectively, as including all the progenitors of the Israelites; but though this interpretation might be admitted if the word father stood alone, it is entirely precluded by the use of the adjective first before it: by no principle of interpretation could the phrase, "thy first father," be construed to mean "all thy fathers." This language plainly fixes our regards upon some individual as here referred to; and amongst individuals our choice lies between Abraham, the progenitor of the Jewish people, and Adam, the progenitor of all men. But the reference of the passage to Abraham seems excluded by the thing here predicated of the party spoken of, viz., that he sinned. This must be looked on as emphatic—as constituting in some way a marked and peculiar fact in his history, which distinguished him from others. Now this could not be said of Abraham. He doubtless was a sinner; but he was a sinner just as other men are. He committed no special and peculiar sin, which stands out in contradistinction from those of others as the sin of Abraham. His peculiar distinction among men is rather the eminent piety to which he attained than any eminent sin of which he was guilty. It was otherwise with Adam. The great event in his history is the sin he committed. This stands out from all the other events recorded concerning him as the peculiar event of his history; and as it has acquired this character not so much from anything in itself as from its momentous bearing on the race, so it is most natural to understand such an expression as that of the prophet in the passage cited as referring to this. In this interpretation Hitzig, Umbreit, Knobel, and several others, whose conclusions are guided solely by hermeneutical reasons, and are not in the least swayed by doctrinal bias, concur.

Hosea vi. 7 is sometimes also adduced as asserting this: "But they like men have transgressed my covenant." The expression, "like men," is in the original אָנֹכִי, "like Adam," and hence the passage has been regarded as alluding to the sin of our first progenitor, whom the Israelites are said to have followed in the case referred to. This interpretation is not to be invalidated; at the same time, the fact that Adam is hardly ever used, except in the first chapters of Genesis, as a proper name, and the circumstance that, if the word be taken as a collective, it produces very good sense—the allusion being to the usual and characteristic waywardness of man in rebelling against God—conspire to render the former interpretation at least doubtful.

In the New Testament there are two classical passages on this head, Rom. v. 12–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 45–47. In the former of these, the fact of a connection between the sin of Adam and the sinfulness of mankind is set forth in the most explicit terms: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men because all have sinned (I). By the offence of one many are dealt. By the offence of one [there came] on all men [something which tended] to condemnation. By one man's disobedience the many were made sinners." In this context Paul also affirms that Adam was the type of Christ, i.e., the official position or relative character of the one bore an analogy to that of the other; and this the apostle still further illustrates by showing that, as the conduct of the one has had results which extend beyond himself to others connected with him, so had the conduct of the other; and that, as the results flowing from Christ's work are for the acquittal and redemption of His people, so those flowing from Adam are for the condemnation and destruction of those connected with him. With this stands closely connected Paul's allusion to this subject in the other of the two passages above referred to, 1 Cor. xv. 45–47. In this passage Paul styles Adam and Christ the first and second man. Now, as he cannot intend by this that Christ was second to Adam either in order of time or of dignity—for in respect of time many generations intervened between Adam and Christ, and in respect of dignity Christ had ever the pre-eminence over Adam—he must intend to convey the idea that Adam and Christ sustain a character peculiar to these two, in which they appeared successively, Adam first and Christ second, and in which they alone appeared. Now the character peculiar to Christ, as we know from the whole of the New Testament, was the character of a public head or representative, in virtue of whose obedience those connected with him are constituted righteous. It follows that, if the position of Adam was the same, mutatis mutandis, with that of Christ, he must have occupied the place of one through whose sin all connected with him were constituted guilty or under condemnation.

1. The words ἐπὶ ὅλην τὴν γῆν, rendered in the authorised version, "because all have sinned," have been variously rendered by different interpreters. Augustine renders them, "In quo omnes peccaverunt," and refers them directly to Adam, the "one" of the preceding clause (De peccat. mer. et remiss., i. 10). Others refer the ἐπὶ to ἀναστάσεις, as the nearer antecedent, and render "unto which all have sinned." In support of this it is argued that ἐπὶ, when construed with a dative case, often signifies ἐπὶ ὅλην, or unto. Thus ἐπὶ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ (Lucian). Κακοποιοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ ἁμαρτήματι, a criminal unto death (Demosth.). Ἐπὶ ἀναστάσεις ἐπιβαλλόντων, to carry to death or execution (Isoc.). Ἐπὶ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν ἐπιβαλλόντων, ye have been called to liberty (Gal. v. 13). Κακοποιοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ ἁμαρτήματι ἐπιβαλλόντων, created in Christ Jesus unto good works (Eph. ii. 10). See also 1 Thes. iv. 7; 2 Tim. iii. 14; and many other places of the New Testament. ἐπὶ ὅλην has likewise this import, denoting the terminus ad quem in Phil. iii. 12, and iv. 16. If this construction be adopted, the meaning of the apostle will be, that death has passed on all men as that whereunto sin reaches as its terminus. Others take ἐπὶ ὅλην in the sense of "on condition that, provided," death has been appointed to all who shall sin. But the vast majority of interpreters, and the best of all schools, take these words, with the authorised version, as equivalent to ἐπὶ ὅλην, "because," ἐπὶ ὅλην, etc. So taken, they may mean either that all die because all have sinned in Adam, or that all die because they sin themselves. The former is favoured by both the context and the use of the acrot. ἐπιβαλλόντων, "Because, as Adam sinned, all men in and with him, as the representative of all mankind, have sinned. Death, which came into the world through the coming of sin into the world, has, in virtue of this causal nexus of sin and death, passed on all." (Meyer, comment, on the passage.)

On these grounds we may set it down as an ascertained truth of Scripture, that the sin of Adam is somehow connected causally with the sin of men universally. We have yet to inquire of what kind the connection is; in other words, how it is that Adam's sin has become the source of sin to the race.

To this inquiry different answers have been returned, the chief of which we will endeavour to classify and state. They fall into two great classes, according as the effects of Adam's sin on his posterity are viewed as—1. Natural; or, 2. Penal.

Class A. Those which teach that the consequences of Adam's sin to his posterity are simply Natural.

i. The Pelagian hypothesis. This, though bearing the name of Pelagius (Morgan?), a British monk of the fifth century, found its most logical expounder and defender in Celestius, a pupil and friend of Pelagius. According to this hypothesis, no evil result flows to Adam's posterity from his sin except what is inseparable from their being born into a world in which sin and misery already are; there is no penalty to which they are exposed, no vitium originis under which they suffer.

In the list of tenets for which Celestius was condemned by the Council at Carthage in 412, are the following bearing on the subject before us. He taught "Adamum mortalem factum, qui, sine peccato sine non peccaret, fulset moriturus;" that "pecc..." Source of catum Adam ipsum volum ludit, et non humanum genus;" that Man's "Infantes, qui nascentur, in eo statu sunt in quo Adamus fuit ante Sinfulness. pravitaricentem." It would appear that Pelagius himself thought his disciple went too far when he asserted that no man had come to the race from Adam's sin: "Ipse dicit non tantum primo homo sinistri, sed etiam humano genere maximam illud obfusione secutum, non propagine sed exemplo" (August. De Pecc. Orig., c. 15; Opp. ed. Erasmus, t. vii. p. 794). He held, however, strenuously, "ut sine virtute ita et sine vitio procearum, atque ante actionem propria voluntatis id solum in homine est quod Deus condidit" (same book, c. 13). See Cardinal Noris's Histor. Pelagianorum, &c., fol., Padua, 1708; Wiggers, Versuch ein. Pragmatisch Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, &c., 2 vols., Hamb, 1833, translated into English by Emerson; Neander, Church Hist., iv, 313-322, English Tr. by Torrey.

ii. The Arminian or Remonstrant hypothesis. According to this, Adam is only the remote source of that natural propensity to sin which all men exhibit; the immediate source being each man's own parents. So that sinfulness is propagated from Adam just as any other disease, defect, or morbid quality might be; the connection of mankind with him being simply that of natural descent. Death also comes on all men from Adam not as a penal infliction, but simply as a natural inheritance.

It is hardly just to Arminius to connect this opinion with his name, for, so far as he has given utterance to his views on the subject, he seems to have held that the consequences of Adam's sin to his posterity were penal. "Original sin," says he, "is not that actual sin by which Adam transgressed the law concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and on account of which we have all been constituted sinners, and rendered (rei) obnoxious or liable to death and condemnation." Works, by Nichols, ii. 717; see also p. 375. But his followers of the Remonstrant party are very distinct in their announcement of the doctrine above imputed to them. Thus Limborch says: "Mors hæc non habet rationem causæ proprie dictæ in posteris; sed est naturals tantum mortendi necessitas, ab Adamo, mortis poena punito in ipsos derivata." "Effectum peccati Adami in posteris est impuras quædam naturales, quæ tamen non est peccatum propriæ dictæ," and again, "fatemur infantes nasæ minus puræ quam Adamus fuit creatus, et cum quantum propensione ad peccandum; illam autem habent non tam ab Adamo quam a proximis parentibus." Theol. Christ. bk. iii. c. 3, sect. 1, 4. See also Whitby, De imputatiorum peccati; and Comment. on Rom. v.; Adam Clarke, Comment. on do. Adam is thus only the remote source of man's natural propensity to sin; to each man his parents are the immediate source, just as some remote ancestor may have introduced a disease into his family but which afflicts each man only through his parents.

Class B. Those which teach that the consequences of Adam's sin to his posterity are penal.

These fall into two sub-classes according as they retain or reject the doctrine of imputation. We begin with the latter, viz.—

I. Those which reject the doctrine of imputation.

1. View of some Socinians. For the most part the Socinians hold by the doctrine of Pelagius on this subject; but some, and among them F. Socinus himself, hold that in consequence of Adam's sin men are legally liable to death, not from any mortal effect in the sin itself, nor that man was created at first naturally immortal, but that in consequence of Adam's sin his posterity have come under the actual power of death, to which naturally they are liable, but from which they would otherwise have been protected.

"Concludimus . . . ex peccato illo primi parentis nullam laborum aut gratiarum universæ generis humani necessario ingentiam esse, nec illud malum ex præsens illo delicto ad posteriores omnes necessarium manesse, quam mortendi omniummodum necessitatem, non quidem ex ipsius delicti vi, sed quia cum jam homo naturæ mortalis esset, ob delictum illud seæ natælæ mortallætæ a Deo relatus est."—F. Socinus, Protect. c. 4. (Comp. Taylor, Doct. of Orig. Sin. part i. pp. 51-55.) "Through his (Adam's) one sin death came upon all mankind, as far as which all men are sufferers through his disobedience. Men are subject to death, not from their own personal sins but from the sin of Adam."—Taylor, Par. on Rom. v. 12.

2. Identification hypothesis. According to this, Adam's descendants are held to have been so identified with him that they sinned his sin, are guilty of his guilt, and fell in his fall. By some who use this language, nothing more seems to be intended than that, as the apostle says that Levi paid tithes in Abraham, for he was in the loins of his father when Melchizedek met him, so the race sinned with Adam in the sense that they are involved in the consequences of his sin; and it may be doubted whether any of those who have spoken as if they meant to identify the race with Adam in his act of sinning, really intend their words to be taken for what they express. Their language, however, is such that we feel constrained to assign the opinion it utters a place in this scheme; and for want of a better name have called it the Identification hypothesis.

"Manifestum est alia esse propriae culpae pecatae . . . aliquid hoc umquam in quo omnes peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus homo fuerunt?"—Augustine De Pecc. meritis et rebus, i. 11. "Quia . . . [Adam] . . . per liberum arbitrium Deum deservit justum judicium Dei expers est, ut cum tota sua stirpe quæ in illo adhuc posita tota cum illo peccaverunt, damnaretur."—De Corrupt. et gratia, c. 10. "Ut cum omnes posteri ex primo parente seu ex radice ortum eum trahant gentis humanæ universitas cum stirpe non abliter quam unicum aliquod totum, sive unica massa considerari potest, ut non sit aliquod a stirpe diversum, et non altera ab ea different posteriori ac ramæ ab arbore. Exquisitus facile patet quo modo stirpe peccante omne illud quod ab ea descendit et cum ea aliquod totum effectum, etiam percosse judicari possit, cum a stirpe non differat sed cum ea unum sit."—Stapfer, Theol. Polen. i. p. 236. "The sin of Adam was ours, as really and truly so as it was the sin of Adam himself, so that every believer is bound to acknowledge and confess that he is guilty of Adam's sin."—Haldane, Comment. on Rom. vol. i. p. 440.

3. Hypothesis of a vitium originis. In the opinion of many, the effect of Adam's sin on his posterity as a penalty, was to poison, pollute, vitiate their moral nature, or so to injure it that the lower propensities became strengthened against the higher powers, and thus man enters the world not only a fallen but a positively depraved being.

"Ille in quo omnes mortiatur praeter quod eis qui præceptum Domini voluntate transgreduntur limitationis exemplum est, occulta enim tabe carnalis concupiscientia sui tabescit in eo omnes de sus vitæ venientes."—Augustine, De pecc. mer. et remiss. i. 9. Some, whilst they repudiate this notion that a positively vitiated nature has been entailed on men by Adam's sin, yet think that an increased susceptibility to evil has thence resulted to the race, or that his descendants have received such dispositions and affections as greatly incline them to yield to those inducements to sin in the midst of which they were placed. (See Moses Stuart, Comment. on Rom. v. 19; Ballantyne, Examination of the Human Mind, Note i. p. 457.) Some have gone the length of supposing that the forbidden fruit possessed a lethiferous and morally vitiating power, which has been transmuted into the race by natural descent, and so has brought all under the power of depravity and death. (See Knapp's Christian Theology, p. 259, ff.)

II. Those which involve the doctrine of imputation. Here we have again two subdivisions, according as the imputation is held to be imputatio ad reatum, or culpam, or imputatio ad paenam.

1. Imputatio ad reatum. According to this, men are regarded by God as culpable, as blameworthy, because of Adam's sin; they are guilty, not merely in the sense of being legally liable to suffer through Adam's fault, but also in the sense of being judicially chargeable with that fault. Here we have to distinguish between a mediate and an immediate imputation.

a. Imputatio mediate. Those who hold this, teach that God has adjudged men to the same penalty as Adam, because they, inheriting from him a fallen and corrupt nature, appropriate, as it were, to themselves the sin of their progenitor; in other words, they sin as he sinned, and so incur the same guilt as he, and the same penalty as came on him.

"Those who hold that imputation is mediate admit that men are in a state of condemnation on account of their depravity and their participation in the sin of Adam. This, we say, they do not deny, but they maintain that the ground on which they are punished is not the sin itself, but their participation in that sin, by reason of their natural corruption. This corruption is the antecedent, and..." Source of the condemnation is its consequent and not vice versa; so that Man's God, in imputing Adam's sin to his posterity, had respect to the influence, natural depravity which intervened, and in virtue of which they became partakers of his sin and rendered themselves deserving of being visited with the same punishment to which he exposed himself."—Venema, Instit. of Theol., p. 279. See also Dwight's Theology, Sermon 32. Of this view it may be remembered here, that whether true or false, it is improperly ranked as a form of the doctrine of imputation. If men are treated as sinners simply because they sin through a vice of nature derived from Adam, it is on the ground of their own sin that they are brought under penalty, not because that of Adam is in any sense imputed to them.

b. Imputatio immediate. God, on account of Adam's sin, holds all men as if they had themselves committed that transgression—holds them to be culpably guilty of it, and adjudges them on that ground to be legally condemned, as well as morally corrupt and depraved. This is properly imputatio ad culpam, and is the view commonly held by strict Calvinists as well as by many Lutherans.

"Primum peccatum Adami quatenus ut communis parentes, capit, stirps et representator totius generis humani spectatur, omnibus ipsius posteria vere et justo Dei judicio ad culpam et poenam imputatur."—Hollars, Exercit. Theol., &c. See also Quenstedt, Theol. Dissert., ii. 53 ff. The doctrine of the elder Lutherans on this head is thus stated by Reinhart (Dogmatic, sect. 81):—"Imputatio in reatum est judicium, secundum quod orta est peccato primo culpa ad omnes hominum pertinent." Of the reformed divines the following testimonies may suffice:—Signum enim Adam admissae peccati primi reum factae est Dei; deinde quae erat, peccati peccati, id est corruptioem illam tum animi tum corporis, subit; sic quoque in posteros naturam transitit tum rem in propriam tum deinde corruptam. De reatis igitur propagatione proprie est hoc loco Apostolos, cui opponitur imputatio abditiens Christi, quae obediencia per imputationem cum fidibus communicata postquam idem Christus morte sua poenam reatus peravit, non etiam imputata justitia induit."—Beza on Rom. v. 12. "Quateritur actuall peccatum Adami in omnibus reipublica imputatur ut propter illud omnes rel consequantur et vel poenas dent, vel saltem poenis digni existimantur?" Affirmatur.—Turretine, Instit. Theol. Loc. ix. qua. 9, sect. 9. "Corruptionis causa est culpa Adam posterior imputata." Justissima est autem hæc imputatio cum Adam omnium fuit parent, et praeteresse fideliter omnes representeraverit."—Marek, Medulla, ch. xv. sect. 31. "Original sin containeth two things—1. The guilt of eternal damnation for the sin of our first parents; 2. The corruption of our whole nature after the fall."—Ursinus, Summe of Christian Religion, Explained by H. Parry, p. 51. "Our first parents being the root of all mankind, the guilt of their sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."—Confession of Westminster Assembly of Divines.

2. Imputatio ad poenam. According to this view, God does not impute guilt to men on account of Adam's sin, though they enter the world with a positively corrupted nature, derived from Adam; but He treats them legally in consequence of Adam's sin, as legally involved in it, by withholding from them all those covenant or chartered blessings which Adam forfeited immediately and directly by his first sin. Men thus come into the world not only without any positive bias to goodness, but with a positive bias to evil, and so fall under the influence of selfish lusts and passions, stimulated and strengthened by the circumstances in which they find themselves, whereby, in process of time, they not only contract personal guilt before God, but become wholly depraved, as they are wholly without God.

By most of those who hold the doctrine of imputatio ad poenam, it is also held, that man derives from Adam a vitiated nature. This is Edwards' view (see his Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended, &c., especially part i.), and this seems also to have been substantially the view of Calvin:—"Hacque itaque duo distinx observanda: nempe, quod sine omnibus naturae nostrae partibus vitiali perversoque, jam ob talern duntaxat corruptionem damni merito convictique coram Deo tenemur, cui nihil est accptum nisi justitia, innocentia, puritas. Neque ista est alieni defici obligatio: quod enim dicitur nos per Adam peccatum obnoxios esse factos Dei judicio, non ita est accepclendum acsi insontes ipsi et immerentes culpam delicti ejus sustineremus; sed quia per ejus transgressionem malelicitones induit sumus omnes, dicitur ille nos obstinatus. Ad illo tamen non solum in nos poena proposita est, sed instillata ab ipso illo in nobis resident, cui jus poena debetur."—In Sinfulness, Christ. Est., book ii. c. viii. sect. 3. Between Edwards and Calvin, however, there seems to be this difference of opinion, that whilst the former held that all men are exposed to penalty simply on account of Adam's sin, the latter seems rather to teach that men are exposed to penalty because of the "vice" or corruption which is in their nature derived from Adam. Edwards has here the advantage in point of accuracy of thought; to hold a creature subject to penalty for a corruption or vice in his nature, for a connate defect, can never be "jure."

Some, while denying that any vitiosity of nature is legally communicated from Adam to his posterity, have maintained that certain supernatural gifts were enjoyed by Adam, which being bestowed by God out of pure sovereignty, and held only on the ground of the constitution under which Adam was placed, were forfeited by his sin, and so lost to his posterity. "Pena, qua proprie primo peccato quasi e regione respondet, jactura fuit originalis justitie, et supernaturalium donorum, quibus Deus naturam nostram instruxerat. . . . Corruptio naturae non ex aliquid donum daretur, neque ex aliquid malae qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola dono supernaturalis ob Adam peccatum amissione profuit."—Bellarmine, Ansiae, Grat. iii. 1 and 5. "The federal transgression of Adam exposed us, who had been rendered prospective beneficiaries by the gracious charter given to him, to the loss of all the blessings, the permanent enjoyment of which by us was suspended upon his federal obedience—his fulfilment of the terms of the charter prescribed by the wisdom and goodness of God. It rendered us liable to death in the two senses which stand in direct opposition to those in which, as we have seen, he enjoyed life—to the death of the body and the death of the soul; or, to express more accurately, to the loss of that sovereign and efficacious influence, without which life, in either sense of the term, has never been known permanently to exist. It rendered us, I may add, legally liable to this loss, for God offers certain blessings to an individual, which are to be obtained or retained on any specified condition, that offer has the binding force of law; it lays a moral obligation upon the individual to accept the blessing, by the performance of the condition, and renders its rejection an act not only of folly but rebellion. . . . It must not be forgotten, that the punishment destined to overtake him in his federal relation was merely the loss of chartered blessings; the loss of the life which had been given to him by sovereign favour, and whose continuance was suspended on the condition of abstinence from the forbidden fruit."—Payne On Original Sin, p. 110 ff.

In seeking to bring these various opinions to the test of Scripture, two preliminary postulates may be assumed. The one is, that, as by the supposition it was through Adam's sin that evil came on his posterity, the nature and degree of that evil, as affecting them, cannot essentially differ from the evil he brought on himself. The other is, that as what was purely personal to Adam could not in any judicial way descend to his posterity, we must look to something public and legal in his relation to them as the source of the transmission from him to them of legal disabilities. These two positions being assumed, we proceed to observe—

1. The only peculiarity of Adam's position in paradise bearing on our present inquiry, was his being subjected to a positive test of obedience, on his meeting and satisfying which depended his continuance in that state of privilege in which he had been placed. Much is often said of the supernatural endowments and chartered blessings which our first parents enjoyed in paradise, as constituting the peculiarity of their lot; but if by these phrases anything more is intended than that the privileges suspended on Adam's obedience were purely constitutional privileges, which he enjoyed, not in virtue of his creation, but in virtue of his being placed under a certain legal constitution, they are calculated to mislead the inquirer. They certainly do so if they convey the impression that Adam and Eve possessed any supernatural powers of intellect or degrees of moral strength; for the history gives no intimation that anything of this sort was enjoyed by them; on the contrary, the marvellous ease with which they were led into transgression rather impresses with the conviction, that neither in intelligence nor in moral power were they on a par with multitudes of their descendants. They were intelligent, sinless beings, but their intelligence was certainly not supernatural, nor their moral power equal to that which the struggles of life give to the virtuous man, who by resisting overcomes temptation. Besides, intelligence and holiness are purely personal qualities, and could neither be transmitted by a legal act, nor forfeited by a parent for his child; so that whatever was the degree of these possessed by our first parents, it is not of them we can properly speak in such an inquiry as this. According to the history, that on which Adam's continuance in paradise depended, was his observing the one prohibitory injunction regarding the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and the peculiarity of his position was, that his retaining of privilege hung suspended on this purely legal condition.

2. The privilege which thus was suspended on this condition was "life." This is plain from the threatening appended to the prohibition: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The penalty, therefore, which Adam incurred, and which alone he could constitutionally judicially transmit to his posterity, was "death"—a term of wide and varied meaning in Scripture, and which must in each case be interpreted according to the context in which it occurs. As Adam actually incurred this penalty, it cannot refer here to bodily death; for, with whatever latitude the expression "in the day thou eatest thereof" be interpreted, it would be monstrous to affirm that it could be used of the happening of an event which did not take place for nearly a thousand years after. The term "death" is here best explained by seeing what it was that Adam did receive as the penalty of his sin. By the law, that penalty was to come on him surely and instantly on his committing the offence; and, therefore, we have only to ask, What did not come on him? to ascertain how we are to interpret the term "death" here. Now, on turning to the history, we find that what came on Adam directly and immediately in consequence of his sin was the loss of God's favour, the loss of free and immediate access to God as his creator, subjugation to a certain extent to the power of Satan, and exclusion from the case and blessedness of paradise, and consignment to a life of toil, privation, and sorrow, to be consummated by a return of the body to the dust whence it was taken. These were the direct and immediate consequences that came on Adam because of his transgression—the elements of that curse which he brought on himself, and which alone he could transmit to his posterity. Of collateral effects, such as moral obliquity produced by the act itself of sinning, the history says nothing, though such there doubtless were; but such it does not behove us to include in the penalty which Adam's sin brought upon him by legal incidence under the constitution under which he was placed.

3. Acting thus under a constitution which secured to him certain privileges, not necessarily belonging to him as a creature, Adam, of necessity, sustained a representative character. He appeared as the chief of his race, by whom the family honours were to be transmitted if he acted worthily; by whom they were to be forfeited for all coming time if he acted otherwise. In the case of purely personal qualities or possessions, these may or may not be transmitted to a man's posterity; and this may depend, in the latter case, wholly on the man's own will; but in the case of constitutional privileges,—chartered rights and advantages secured by patent,—these, if retained by worthy conduct, cannot but be transmitted to the holder's posterity; if forfeited by unworthy conduct, cannot but be withdrawn from them. In all such cases the holder of the privileges for the time being sustains a representative character, and cannot do otherwise; and this, be it observed, is wholly independent of his own will and choice in the matter.

The representative character, which is thus, from the nature of the case ascribed to Adam, the Scripture distinctly assigns to him. Especially instructive on this point is the apostle's reasoning in Rom. v. 12-19. Here it is asserted that "by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin; and so [in this and no other way] death passed on all men, for that [or because] all have sinned;" i.e., sinned in that first sin (see above). The case of infants is then adduced by the apostle, and this must be viewed as an instantia crucis, to use Bacon's phraseology, determining the point which he is here asserting. If infants who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's sin—i.e., by personal transgression—yet suffer that which was part at least of the penalty of Adam's sin, the consequence is irresistible that they have been involved in that sin—that they shared in his ἀμαρτία though innocent and incapable of a ἀμαρτία like his; and consequently were represented by him when he acted and fell; for under an equitable government, penalty can come upon a party who has not done the evil himself, only when it is done in his name and room by another; according to the maxim of the jurists, "quod facit per alium facit per se." Further, the apostle institutes a comparison or analogy here between Adam and Christ (as also in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45), the former of whom he says was the type of the latter, and whom he distinguishes as the First and Second Adam. Now it is only in respect of relation to those who are affected by their agency that any resemblance exists between Adam and Christ; and only in respect of their standing out from all other partakers of human nature, as sustaining a peculiar relation to mankind, that they are respectively first and second. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" as death came on all connected with Adam without any demerit of theirs, so righteousness and life came upon all connected with Christ without any merit of theirs. The relation of both to those connected with them was thus a federal one, and the consequences resulting from both are constitutional, not personal or natural. Thus the apostle represents the relation of Adam to his posterity as respects the penal effect on them of his sin. It was not as their natural head that his sin affected them, but as their covenant or constitutional representative. And in perfect accordance with this the apostle represents men not as becoming sinners through Adam as if by imitation, nor as growing to be sinners as if through the operation of a vicious principle within, but as constituted sinners (ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατακτηθεῖσιν)—i.e., legally held to be under penalty, and treated accordingly.

4. As the representative of the race, Adam brought on his posterity the penalty he had himself incurred, neither more nor less—viz., death in the sense above described. This could not be avoided under a charter or covenant of privilege. His position resembled that of the chief of a noble house whose disloyalty brings attainder on himself and all who descend from him. His personal qualities, good or bad, may or may not be transmitted; that depends on circumstances with which the patent of his nobility has nothing to do. So was it with the head of our race: when he fell he forfeited for himself and all mankind the privileges of paradise, the life which he there enjoyed. Less than this could not flow from his act; more than this could not be legally inflicted. Hence the notion of a positively vitiated nature as also inflicted on his posterity—a notion which no ingenuity can reconcile with the personal freedom and responsibility of every man—must be rejected. If human nature is vitiated, which we do not deny, this is to be traced to some other cause than the penal incidence of Adam's sin. What the apostle says entered by Adam's transgression was ἀμαρτία—i.e., such a legal liability as stands in direct contrast over against the blessing men derive through Christ, which is righteousness or legal absolution, and re-establishment. On these grounds the view of those who hold the imputatio ad panam of Adam's sin to his posterity appears to us that most deserving of being adopted. We say, then, that the sin of Adam has been imputed to his posterity of the human race; by which we do not mean that there is any mysterious identity between Adam and his posterity, as if in some inexplicable sense they were included personally in him; nor that the moral blame of his transgression is shared by them; nor that his act of eating the forbidden fruit was in any sense the act of any but himself; nor that the personal consequences of his offence, as experienced by him, descended to them on account of him; but solely and simply that, in consequence of what he did on that memorable occasion, his posterity have universally come under penal disabilities. They do not inhabit paradise. They have no title to heaven. They cannot claim access to God. They are frail, suffering, sorrowing, dying creatures. They have no natural goodness; no internal spring of holiness; no supreme protection against temptation and evil. They are crownless kings, attainted nobles. Earth, with all its sorrows, is the only inheritance they can lay claim to—the outfield of a world that has been cursed for their ancestor's sake. For that offence by their first parent they take no blame; they can feel no remorse. But in consequence of it they come into circumstances which forbid all pride and self-glorying. They are the descendants of a fallen and dishonoured progenitor; and if they are ever recovered out of this fallen estate, it must be by an act of pure grace on the part of their sovereign; an act reversing their ancient attainder, and restoring their forfeited honours.

And thus it is that the universal sinfulness of the race arose. We need not to resort to the violent hypothesis of a vitiated nature to account for man's being in every case a sinner. Every child enters the world under a legal forfeiture, and subject to legal disadvantages. He is destitute of any outward safeguard from evil; he is without any positive bias to what is good; he is surrounded by innumerable incentives to sin. Under such circumstances, with nothing to hinder him from sinning and everything to induce him to sin, how can he help becoming a sinner? The centre of his being is self; he knows nothing better, nothing higher; he is ἀθεός, without God; he has no natural desire to please God; and hence no sooner does God's law come athwart his inclinations, than he rises in actual rebellion against Him. Thus the habit of sin is formed. Thus personal guilt is contracted. And thus the moral nature becomes wholly depraved, so that the man requires to be born again ere he can see the kingdom of God.

Sect. VIII.—Consequences of Man's Sinfulness.

The consequences of sin are twofold—guilt and depravity; the former having respect to man's condition as under law, the latter having respect to man as possessed of and acting by means of a moral nature.

That man is guilty—i.e., under legal condemnation—because of his violations of God's holy law, is declared with the utmost plainness in Scripture, and is supported by the principles of natural ethics and the dictates of conscience (Gal. iii. 10; Rom. ii. 5-16, iii. 9, 19, 20, vi. 23; Matt. xxv. 41, 46, &c.)

Through the influence of sin man is also depraved, morally corrupt, vicious (Ps. xiv. 2, 3; Is. liii. 6; Jer. xvii. 9; Rom. vii. 18; Gal. v. 16, 17; Eph. ii. 1-3; James i. 13-15, &c.)

This depravity of man is total. By this it is not meant that man's physical or intellectual powers are destroyed or even directly impaired by sin. Nor is it meant that he is not susceptible of many affections which are noble, and lovely, and beneficent. Nor is it meant that he has lost the capacity of discriminating right from wrong, or the tendency to approve the right as right, and to condemn the wrong as wrong. What is meant is, that his will is subject to an unholy bias; that his principle of moral action is ungodly; that, in short, being destitute of love to God as the supreme and all-comprehending principle of moral action in him, he is incapable of doing any moral act without sin.

See Chalmers, Institutes of Theology, vol. i. p. 370, ff.

PART III.

CHRISTOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE CHRIST.

Having contemplated man as a sinner, the mind naturally turns to consider that salvation which Christianity announces as provided for him: from considering the disease, one is led to consider the means by which it is to be removed, and the party affected by it is to be cured. But, before we can enter on this, there is an intermediate inquiry to which we must give heed, relating to the person and work of Him by whom salvation has been procured for us. With these the salvation itself stands inseparably connected; and it is impossible to acquire just views of the latter unless we have first just views of the former. We proceed, therefore, to consider the doctrine relating to the person and the work of Christ, as unfolded to us in Scripture.

SECT. I.—Jesus of Nazareth the Messiah.

When Jesus appeared on earth, He claimed to be the Messiah promised to the fathers of the Jewish nation, and He substantiated His claim by an appeal to the Old Testament Scriptures, where the criteria of Messiahship are set forth. His apostles followed Him, both in advancing the claim and in the manner of supporting it, "opening and alleging out of the Scriptures that this is the very Christ." It is proper that we should, in the outset, glance at the evidence on which this claim rests, because we shall then be at liberty to combine the Old Testament declarations concerning the Messiah with the New Testament declarations concerning Jesus, and thereby to arrive at a satisfactory view of the entire Christology of the Bible.

The argument here is cumulative; and the entire strength of it becomes manifest only when we have explored the whole body of prediction in the Old Testament concerning Him who was to come, and seen how it finds, in the person, the life, the work, and the reign of our Lord, its fulfilment. For our present object, however, it will suffice to take certain criterial passages relating to the Messiah contained in the Old Testament, and which admit of being compared with facts in the personal history of Jesus of Nazareth. This will serve to establish the fact that He was the person actually promised by God to the Jews; and being satisfied on this point, we shall be free to consider what the Bible generally states concerning the person and work of the Christ.

1. We can determine a time before which the Messiah was to come, and after which He cannot be looked for.

In Gen. xlix. 10, it is predicted that the Messian, here denominated Shiloh (שִׁלֹה) from שָׁלוֹם quievit, tranquillus fuit = the Peaceful One, or the Peace-bringer; comp. Eph. ii. 14, where εἰρήνη is applied as a designation of Christ), should appear, while as yet the tribe of Judah retained the power of rule and legislation. In the overthrow and total destruction of the Jewish state, therefore, we can fix upon a terminus posterior to which He cannot be expected, and also near to which He must have appeared. If it was to last until He came, then, clearly, the date of its ceasing must be nigh to the date of His appearing.

We get the same terminus from the prediction in Haggai Jesus of Nazareth the Messiah.

ii. 6–9, where the appearance of the Messiah is announced as to take place before the destruction of the temple. In Dan. ix. 24, 25, also, we have a period assigned beyond which the Messiah cannot be expected, and this coincides with the period above determined; for we cannot begin to calculate the seventy weeks which the prophet says are to elapse before the coming of the Messiah much later than the return of the Jews from Babylon; and this, on the principle of taking each week for a period of seven years (see the commentators, and Hengstenberg's Christology of the Old Testament, vol. iii. p. 99, Eng. Tr.), will bring us not only within the period above determined, but not far from the date of our Lord's crucifixion.

Now it is undoubted that our Lord did appear in Judea, claiming to be the Messiah, within the period thus determined, and that there was no other who at that time appeared with a similar claim. The probability therefore is, that He was the being to whom these ancient predictions refer.

2. We can ascertain the family of which the Messiah was to be born, the place of His appearance, and the manner of His birth. He was to be of the family of David (Is. xi. 1; Ps. cxxxii. 11; lxxxix. 3, 4; Jer. xxiii. 5). He was to be born at Bethlehem (Mic. v. 2). He was to be son of a virgin (Is. vii. 14). So well known was this among the Jews, that the prophet describes the mother of the Messiah definitely as the virgin καρ' ἐξοχῆς (ἡ θυγάτηρ τοῦ θεοῦ); and Micah speaks of her as "she which travaileth," without any further specification. These are minute criteria, and in the last case a singular one is adduced; as they all met and were fulfilled in Jesus the son of Mary, who was of the house and lineage of David, and who was by a peculiar concurrence of circumstances at Bethlehem when her son was born, the probability becomes very strong that He was indeed the Christ.

3. We know what the Messiah was to teach, to do, and to suffer. He was to be a Prophet like unto Moses (Deut. xviii. 15, 18), of at least equal authority with Moses, and whose efforts should be directed not so much to uphold the Mosaic Institute, as to establish on an independent basis His own doctrines. He was to perform many notable miracles, many works of marvel and of beneficence (Is. xxxv. 5, 6; xiii. 7; lxi. 1–3). He was to lead a life of suffering, and contempt, and persecution (Is. lii. 3; Ps. xli.; Zech. xi. 12, 13). He was to be betrayed to His enemies by one of His own familiar associates; He was to be sold for thirty pieces of silver; He was to be cruelly handled and insulted, to have gall and vinegar given Him to drink, to have His garments parted and lots cast for His vesture, to have His hands and His feet pierced, and to die amid the mockery and hatred of His enemies (Ps. xxii. 12, 13, 16, 17, 18; lxix. 21; Zech. xi. 12, 13; xiv. 10). Yet God was to keep all His bones, so that not one of them should be broken; He was to be with the rich after His death, though His enemies had appointed His grave with the wicked; and He was to be raised again so as not to see corruption, and to be exalted to great glory and honour (Ps. xxxiv. 20; Is. liv. 9; Ps. xvi. 9, 10, &c.). How exactly and literally all these criterial predictions were fulfilled in the life, works, sufferings, death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord, no reader of the Gospels needs to be told; compare, for instance, Luke vii. 16; xxiv. 19; Matt. xi. 4, 5; iv. 23, 24; xv. 30, 31; Luke ix. 58; Matt. xxvi. 30; xxvii. 30, 39, 41, 42; John xix. 1, 2, 29, 32–34; Matt. xxvii. 38, 57–60; xxviii. 5, 6; Acts i. 9.

This concurrence of evidence is such as to place the claims of Jesus to be the Messiah on irrefragable grounds. The prediction and the fact correspond like two tallies, so that only the most obstinate scepticism can resist the conclusion, "He who was in the world at the time when the Messias was to come, and no other at that time or since pretended; He who was born of the same family, in the same place, after the same manner, which the prophets foretold of the birth of the Messias; He who taught all those truths, wrought all those miracles, suffered all those indignities, received all that glory, which the Messias was to teach, do, suffer, and receive: He was certainly the Messias." Pearson, Exposition of the Creed, Art. ii.

See also Barrow's Sermons on the Creed, Serms. 17–20; Works (Hughes's edit., Lond. 1831), vol. v. p. 388, ff.; Horne's Introduction, vol. i. p. 492, ff., edit. 1839.

Sect. II.—Of the Person of Jesus Christ.

The dogma universally received in the Christian Church, for many generations, concerning the person of Jesus Christ is, that in that one person were united two natures, the divine and the human. In holding this opinion both Romanists and Protestants are agreed. On a point so familiarly known it is unnecessary to quote from the symbols of either party. Opposed to this dogma is that of the Arians, who deny the existence of a divine nature in Christ, but hold that He had, in union with His human body, a soul possessing an antecedent existence, and a superior nature to that of all other creatures (1); and that of the Socinians or Unitarians, who are Pseudanthropists, maintaining that Jesus Christ was a mere man, and that His divinity consisted simply in His divine commission, and the superior honour which God conferred upon Him as His servant (2).

Arianism was introduced through the Armenian school in the end of the sixteenth century, according to which the Deity of the Son was acknowledged, but His derivation from the Father, and His consequent essential subordination, was upheld. "Generatio divina est fundamentum subordinationis inter Patrem et Filium. Plus est esse a nullo quam esse ab alio, generare quam generari." (Epiphan., Inst. Theol. p. 334.) "Colligimus essentiam divinam et Filio et Spiritui Sancto esse communem. Sed non minus constat inter tres hanc personas subordinationem esse quamdam; quatenus Pater naturam divinam a se habet, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre; qui proinde divinitatem in Filio et Spiritui Sancto fons est et principium." (Limburch, Theol. Christ., p. 102.) By those who held this view, a distinction was taken between Sires and sacerdotes, the latter of which they ascribed to the Father, to whom alone they attributed "assists." In England this doctrine found advocates in Samuel Clarke (Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, Lond. 1712), Dr Price, Dr Taylor of Norwich, and others. This school, however, was retreated under the logical pressure of its opponents into pure Arianism, or even into Socinianism.

2. De Christi essentia, hoc est, illud quod hominem in virgilio utero, et sic sine viri opere, Divini Spiritus in conceptione fecit formam indeoque genitum, primum quidem patibiliter, postea autem docet scilicet munus sibi a Deo mandatum in terris obivit, deinde quo postquam in coelum ascendit impatibilibus et immortali factum." (P. Socinus, Brevis, Instit. p. 654, n.) "Si quisdam naturam seu substantiam divinam nomine ipsam Dei essentiam intelligimus, non agnoscimus hoc sensu divinam in Christo naturam: cum id non solum rationi sane, verum etiam divinis literis repugnat. Alleguin si naturae divinae nomen vel de Spiritu Sancto quin in eo, naturae ejus humanae individuo nexa conjunctus habitavit, et mirabilis sine eo non vulgaris praesentiae effectus addit: vel eo sensu accipias quo Petrus, Ep. ii. c. i, nos divinae nature fore participes assertat, id est, de natura divinitatis, divinique proprietatibus ex Deo gratia praedita, adeo eam in Christo agnosceamus ut secundum Deum neminiaco magis convenire cessemus." (Catachet, Eccles. Polon., p. 25, Starg. rep. 1650.) Most modern Socinians deny the miraculous conception of Jesus, and refuse to impute to Him any higher nature than that of man. An able defence of Socinian doctrine will be found in the work of Mr Yates, Vindication of Unitarianism, 4th ed., Lond. 1859.

In the first promise given by God to our first parents after their fall, the deliverance of the human race is attributed to one who should appear as "the seed of the woman." On this expression it would not be safe to found anything as to the Person of the promised deliverer beyond the assertion of his true and proper humanity; but the expression itself is a singular one, and in its very form conveys a suggestion at least of something remarkable, if not supernatural, in the condition of the being to whom it is applied. Whether any more precise intimation of his true nature was given to our first parents we are not directly told; but in the exclamation of Eve on the birth of her firstborn, "I have gotten a man," many learned divines have found an announcement of her expectation that the promised deliverer, whom she supposed to be now given to her was the Man-Jehovah. The probability is, that this exegesis is just; but as it rests on a supposition which may be denied, and on a point in philology which may be disputed (1), much stress cannot be laid on it. In the book of Genesis repeated references are made to a Being who is styled אֵלֶּה יְהוָה, Angel or Messenger of Jehovah, and to whom are ascribed names and qualities which are truly divine. The same person is introduced in several of the other early books, and is mentioned by some of the prophets. The latest of the prophets, Malachi, identifies this Divine Person, manifested to men, with the Messiah, thus completing the testimony of Scripture concerning the Angel of Jehovah, and linking these revelations of the Old Testament with the Jewish belief concerning the Memra Jah, and with the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos. (See Gen. xvi. 7-13, where the Angel is called אֵלֶּה יְהוָה, God of sight = God Manifest; xviii. 1-33; xxii. 11-19; xxxi. 11-13, compared with xxviii. 13-16; xxxii. 24-30, compared with xii. 4, 5; Ex. iii. 1-6, xxiii. 20, 21; Josh. v. 14; Judg. xiii. 3-23; Zech. i. 12; Mal. iii. 1.) Of the other references which occur in the earlier books of the Bible concerning the promised deliverer, more cannot be said in relation to our present object than that they ascribe to him a dignity, a power, and a stretch of influence not compatible with the ordinary conditions of mere humanity (compare Gen. xxii. 18, xliv. 10; Deut. xviii. 18; 2 Sam. xxiii. 1-7; Job xix. 23-27, xxxiii. 23-28 (2). It is when we come to the poetical and prophetical books of the Old Testament that we find those descriptions of the Messiah which, sustained, illustrated, and defined by the explicit statements of our Lord himself and His Apostles, guide us to the conclusion, that in His Person there was a union of real deity with real humanity.

1. The point in dispute here is whether the רֹא is the mere sign of the accusative, in which case the translation is "I have gotten a Man, Jehovah," or "even Jehovah," or is the particle answering to our "with" — it never means "from," as the authorized version gives it— in which case the meaning is, "I have gotten a man with (i.e., with the help of, by aid of) Jehovah." The objection to this latter exegesis is not, as Dr J. Pye Smith asserts (Scripture Testimony, i. 154, 4th edit.), that it gives to רֹא a sense unknown to the earlier Hebrew, though found in the later, for רֹא occurs in the earlier books of the Bible, according to the same usage as in the later (compare e.g., Gen. vi. 13; xliii. 16, &c.); but that it gives to רֹא a meaning which it has not at all in either earlier or later usage. For it is to be observed, that in proving that רֹא is used to denote "with," it is not proved that it is used to denote "by the aid of." In both the earlier and later books it is used to convey the idea of being in the company or presence of another; but we desiderate any instance of its being used to denote the deriving of help from another. It is true the Greeks used εν Σταυ in the sense of "with the help of God;" but that does not prove that the Hebrews used רֹא in the same way.

2. See Dr J. Pye Smith's Scripture Testimony to the Messiah, vol. i., 4th edit.; Hengstenberg's Christology of the Old Testament, translated by Meyer, vol. i.; Alexander's Connection and Harmony of the Old and New Testaments, pp. 75 and 176, 2d edit.

1. The evidence furnished by the sacred writers in support of our Lord's true and supreme divinity is usually presented under the following heads:

1. The appellations appropriate to the Divine Being are throughout Scripture applied to the Messiah, and to Jesus as the Christ. He is repeatedly called "God;" and He is styled "the mighty God," "the true God," "God over all, blessed for ever," "Emmanuel, God with us." He is called "Jehovah," "Jehovah of Hosts," "Jehovah our Righteousness." He is called "the Lord," "the Lord their God." He, Himself, spoke of Himself as the Son of God in a sense which made Him equal with God; He declared that He and the Father are one; and He allowed one of His disciples, without correction, to address to Him the words, "My Lord and my God." (Compare Ps. ii. 7; xvi. 8-11; Is. vi. 1-3, 5; vii. 14; ix. 5, 6; xi. 3-5; Jer. xxiii. 5, 6; John i. 1-3, 14; x. 24-38; xiv. 9, 10; xx. 28; Rom. ix. 5; 1 Cor. i. 2; Heb. i. 8, 9; 1 John v. 20, &c.) As these are the peculiar and appropriate designations of the Divine Being, the application of them to the Christ plainly indicates, that those who so apply them regarded Him as truly divine. This is the argumentum ὑποκρίσεως of the old theologians.

2. Divine attributes are ascribed to the Messiah and to Jesus Christ. He is presented to us as an Eternal and Immutable Being; as endowed with Omnipotence; as Omnipresent and Omniscient. Now these four, eternity, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, are essential attributes of God—i.e., they are attributes without which God would not be God, and which no being can possess without being God. From their being thus freely applied to Christ, we are led to infer that the sacred writers intend to represent Him to us as properly God. (Compare John i. 1; viii. 58; Rev. i. 8; xxii. 13; Is. ix. 6; Mic. v. 2; Phil. iii. 21; Matt. xviii. 20, compared with Exod. xx. 24; John ii. 24, 25; xi. 17; Rev. ii. 23, &c.) This is the argumentum ὑποκρίσεως.

II. Works peculiarly divine are ascribed to the Messiah and to Jesus Christ in the Bible. He is frequently spoken of as the Creator of all things. He is represented as the Lord of all, the Governor of the Universe, the Lord of the Conscience, and the Supreme Disposer of all events, including life and death. He is repeatedly set forth as the Judge of all, the Lord who shall judge the quick and the dead, and at whose bar all must stand to give account of themselves unto Him. And He is set forth as the Author of Grace, the Supreme Dispenser of Spiritual Blessing, the Giver of the Spirit, and the Author of eternal life to man. Now each of these is a divine work; a work which only God can perform, and the performing of which gives indisputable evidence that he by whom they are done is God. When, therefore, they are ascribed to Jesus Christ, the fair inference is, that the sacred writers meant thereby to teach that Jesus Christ is God. (Compare John i. 3; Col. i. 16, 17; Heb. i. 10, 11; Matt. xxviii. 18; Rom. xiv. 9, 10; Acts x. 42; 2 Tim. iv. 1; Matt. xxv. 31, 36, &c.) This is the argumentum ὑποκρίσεως.

III. The worship due only to God is represented in Sacred Scripture as to be offered to Jesus Christ. To call upon the name of Jesus is frequently stated in the New Testament as the duty and privilege of men; the apostles join Him with the Father in their prayers; they invoke His blessing as they invoke that of God; they represent the heavenly world as worshipping Him; and they tell us that God has commanded all His angels to worship Him, and that at His name every knee shall bow of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, &c. As worship of this sort belongs only to God, we cannot but believe that those who thus direct us to worship Christ must have meant us to view Him as God. (Compare John v. 23; Acts ix. 14; Rom. x. 11-13; 1 Cor. i. 2; 1 Thess. iii. 11-13; 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17; 2 John iii.; Rev. v. 6-14, &c.) This is the argumentum ἀρχαρίας.

Besides these more direct proofs of the divinity of our Lord, there is a strong body of evidence accruing from the general aspect under which the sacred writers present Him to their readers. They seem continually to have written with a consciousness of His supernatural claims and perfections; their whole cast of thought, feeling, and representation is in keeping with this assumption; and, indeed, apart from it is not to be accounted for. Deny this, and their language is in many cases absurd, and the lights in which they place Him perplexing and misleading; whilst all becomes plain and natural if we regard this as the belief which regulated their language, and the fact out of which arose the representations they give of Him. We may notice, in illustration of these remarks, the following particulars.

1. The apostles invariably represent the humanity of Christ as being in itself a marvellous thing. The simple fact that He should have been a man, that He should have been born, that He should have had a woman for his mother, that He should have grown in wisdom and stature, that He should have lived in circumstances of poverty and toil, that He should have been persecuted, and that He should have died, are all, in the judgment of His followers, so many marvels at which we cannot sufficiently wonder. With them it is not His divine nature and perfections that are the objects of admiration; it is His humanity at which they stand in amaze. Is this to be accounted for otherwise than on the supposition, that they esteemed Him in original and proper nature as divine, and that what filled them with wonder was that He, the Divine, should descend to become man?

2. The apostles represent the sending of Jesus into the world as an act of unparalleled love on the part of God to man—as a costly expression of God's benevolence towards His creatures. Now, in what respect did the mission of Christ so differ from the mission of any of the prophets whom God had sent to His people as to be a proof of God's love such as they could not parallel, and as to cost Him (so to speak) what they did not cost Him? Is there any way of accounting for this but by the supposition that Jesus Christ was not only dearer to God than any other of the messengers He had sent, but dearer than any creature can be? that whilst they were but servants, this was his Son, in a sense altogether peculiar, a sense involving a oneness of nature with God?

3. The apostles always speak of Christ's coming into the world as an act of unexampled condescension and love on His part. Suppose Him a creature, what meaning can we attach to this? Where was the condescension implied in His being born and coming to dwell as a man among His fellows? Who ever heard of a child condescending to be born? Of a man showing unexampled love by coming to live on the earth with other men? Either the language is absurd, or He of whom it is used was more than man.

4. The apostles represent Jesus Christ's life on earth as a becoming poor, on the part of Him who had been rich, as an emptying Himself of His glory, and such like expressions. Is there any sense in such representations if His pre-existence in a state of glory and majesty be not assumed?

5. The apostles uniformly give utterance to the strongest and warmest expressions of gratitude, admiration, and love when they speak of what they owe to their Master for His interposition on behalf of man. Much may be allowed to the enthusiasm of scholars in celebrating the praises of an honoured and beloved instructor; but the language in which the New Testament writers speak of Christ transcends all reasonable bounds, and becomes absolutely senseless, if not profane, if He was no more than a mere creature. We can account for such men indulging in such language only on the ground that, fully recognising His divinity, they felt that no language could be too strong to express the emotions of reverence, adoration, and gratitude with which the contemplation of His grace towards man inspired them.

6. The sacred writers represent our Lord as speaking of the sublimest things with the ease and familiarity of one to whom such things were native. An apostle, brought to contemplate heavenly things, is prostrated and rendered speechless; Jesus speaks of heavenly things as one whose it is to dwell amidst them as His own—with the ease, simplicity, and naturalness with which the native of a palace might speak of the splendours and majesty of a court. It is easy to see how this falls in with the hypothesis of His original deity; whilst, on the opposite hypothesis, it is, to say the least, singular if not unaccountable.

7. The striking religious solitude of Jesus Christ, as represented by the evangelists, is remarkable in connection with our present inquiry. He alone, of all God's servants, appears capable of sustaining His spiritual life by Himself. He is never found asking counsel of anyone; He never supplicates help from anyone; never asks anyone to pray for Him; never Himself unites in prayer with anyone. Such solitariness in one so gentle, and loving, and companionable is a strange thing, to be fully accounted for only by the fact, that to Him belonged a nature which rendered religious companionship with mere mortals impossible.

8. Jesus Christ is represented as claiming from His followers a homage, a devotion, and a love which no being but God is entitled to claim. To His claims those of parents, of brother and sister, of friend, of life itself, must yield. Who is He that asks such devotion, that asserts such supremacy as this? If He is not God, His language in this case is inexcusable, and His pretensions immoral.

9. As the birth of Jesus was supernatural, so His exaltation after His resurrection was such as no mere creature could have received. To pass into the heavens, and in bodily form sit down on the right hand of the Majesty in the heavens, a partaker of the glory and the authority of God, is an honour such as only a divine being in human nature was capable of receiving.

These considerations not only fall in with the assumption of our Lord's supreme divinity, but it is only on that assumption that the statements and representations referred to can be reconciled with the sobriety and the truthfulness of the sacred writers. When, in connection with this, it is remembered that such modes of speech and representations pervade the sacred writings—that they proceed from men who were fully aware of the responsibility of the work in which they were engaged, and of the necessity of taking heed to every word they uttered in teaching their doctrines to men—that such language and representations were calculated to frustrate one main end of their mission, if the being to whom they are applied was not divine, inasmuch as, whilst they were sent forth to denounce idolatry, they might lead men to offer divine honours to a creature—that, though denouncing blasphemy as the most heinous of sins, they constantly attribute to their Master words and attributes which, if He is not divine, involve both Him and them in the guilt of blasphemy—and that the ascription to Jesus Christ of divine names, attributes, and honours is wholly their own act, the very idea having been originated by them, and resting wholly on their mode of speaking concerning Him; so that their uttering it is both a gratuitous and an unaccountable piece of folly or dishonesty on their part, if Jesus Christ was not really divine: it seems to the last degree improbable that the sacred writers did not intend to teach that the Messiah was to be, and that Jesus, as the Christ, was, a divine person in human nature. If Jesus was a mere man, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that never was there a set of writers who more systematically or perseveringly used language calculated to deceive and mislead their readers, and that in a case where error is fatal, and to be misled is to be ruined.

II. The humanity of our Lord is no less distinctly, though with less of copiousness, asserted by the sacred writers. I. He is expressly called a man—the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. ii. 5), and the designation by which He frequently designates Himself is "the Son of man." It is said of Him that He became flesh (John i. 14); that He was made of a woman (Gal. iv. 4); that He was the first-born son of Mary (Matt. i. 23), &c. He is also spoken of as the Seed of the woman, the Seed of Abraham, the Rod or Sprout from the root of Jesse, and other similar appellations, all of which convey the idea of His true and proper humanity.

2. It is expressly said, that when He became flesh He took on Him a nature the same as ours (Heb. ii. 14). He not only partook of flesh and blood as we do, but He partook of these παράγοντες, that is, really and after the same kind with us—οὐ δικαιοῦσιν ἀλλὰ ἐξουσίας, as the Fathers explain it.

3. The two constituent parts of our nature, body and soul, are ascribed to Jesus Christ. Luke xxiv. 39 (comp. Ignatius, ad Smyrnæos, § 3); Matt. xx. 28; John xii. 27; Col. i. 22; 1 Pet. iv. 1, &c.

4. The affections and qualities of a true man are ascribed to Christ. Luke ii. 40, 51, 52; Matt. iv. 6; xi. 19, 20; xxi. 18, 19; Mark iii. 5; Luke xiv. 41; xxiii. 34; John ii. 1–10; iv. 6; xi. 35, 36; xii. 27, &c. He had a moral nature the same as ours, was liable to temptation as well as subject to moral law, and was capable of moral discipline and growth (Heb. ii. 18; iv. 15; v. 8). He possessed also the capacity of dying, a capacity which only a true animal nature has; and in death His soul was separated from His body, as with us.

In the early ages of Christianity, there were few of whom we know certainly that they denied the divinity of our Lord; but there were many who called in question His humanity. Of these, some held His human appearance to be a mere phantasm, whilst others, allowing it to be real, contended that it was of a different kind from ours (1). Even some of the orthodox fathers sought to modify their admission of our Lord's true humanity in various ways. Thus Clement of Alexandria thought that the body of Jesus was not sustained by ordinary means, but by the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost; and Origen ascribed to His humanity qualities which would have essentially removed it from the ordinary nature of man (2). The catholic belief, however, always remained, that He was verus homo as well as verus Deus.

1. "Erraverunt in ipsa carne ejus; aut nullius veritatis, contendentes cum (unde phantasmas dictior) aut proprium qualitatis." (Tertullian, De Resurrect. Cornis, § 2.) The Docetæ held the apotrical or phantasmal character of our Lord's humanity; others held that He suddenly came down from heaven in a body fashioned there, and of a nature different from that of man; and Valentinus maintained that though He was apparently born of the Virgin, He merely made use of her as a channel through which He passed into the world, καθὼς ὁ θεὸς ἐν σώματι ἤλθεν. (Theodore, Ep. 145, Opp. tom. iv., p. 1248. Tertullian, ad Valent. c. 27.)

2. Clement, Alex., Strom. vi. 9, p. 775, ed. Potter; Pindar, l. 5; Cohort. ad Gentes, p. 68 D. Origen, c. Cels. iv. 19; vii. 16; Comment in Matt., p. 906, C., &c.

But though the human side of Christ's person was in all respects consubstantial with the nature of man, yet His humanity had its own peculiarities and properties. These were—

1. His extraordinary conception, sine viri ope vi Spiritus Sancti sola.

2. Impeccability. He was not only without sin, but without liability to sin; He was perfectly free from all sin, original and actual. John viii. 46; 2 Cor. v. 21; Heb. vii. 26; 1 Pet. ii. 22, &c.

3. Singular excellence of body and mind, whereby He surpassed all men in physical beauty, and in intelligence, sagacity, and purity. Col. i. 18; John vii. 46.

Some add to these what they call Imperfectiones, or ἀποτροπή, by which they mean that, as there was but one person in Christ,

the human nature lost its personality in the divine. But it is not easy to see how human nature can be perfect without personality, and the difficulty arising from the union of two personal natures, so as to form only one person, is not to be got rid of by so cheap an expedient as that of asserting that the one was absorbed in the other. Absorption is not union. It is better to admit that the whole subject transcends our knowledge.

III. The divine and human natures are so united in Jesus Christ, that He is truly Θεανθρωπος, Godman. To Him, as subject, the properties and qualities of both God and man are ascribed; and He has these in one person, because He, as the subject of these, subsists per se, and is one intelligence.

"Si quisdam est conjunctam unitatem humanitatis divinitatem asservat, ut una utrique natura solidis proprietatibus maneat, et tamen ex duabus illis unus Christus constitutur." (Calvin, Inst., ii. 14, 1.)

"Two whole and perfect natures, that is, the Godhead and the manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided; whereof is one Christ, very God and very man." (Art. 2 of the Church of England.) See also Westminster Confession of Faith, ch. viii. § 2.

This union was effected by the Divine nature assuming the human into union with itself. The Logos became flesh; Jesus Christ, being in the form of God, took on Him the form of man; He took part of flesh and blood. It was not an ἀποτροπή, or deification, but an ἑνομοσύνη, or man-becoming; an incarnation (ὑποστάσεις), an incorporation (ἐνομοσύνης), that was effected. Further, this personal union of the two natures in the one Christ is a union entirely sui generis, and which cannot be compared to, or illustrated by, any with which we are familiar. It is not an essential union, as if the two natures, after the manner of a chemical combination, coalesced into one; nor is it, as some of the ancient heretics taught, a simple apposition of the one-nature to the other, such as that of objects which are mechanically agglutinated; nor is it a mixing of the two, so that they are confounded the one with the other; nor is it a merely mystical and moral union, in virtue of which the one nature always acts in union with the other. All we can say of it is, that it is a personal union; that it is real—i.e., that the two natures partake of each other, so that each has in common with the other what is proper to it, yet ever so as that the divine shall permeate and appropriate the human, not the human the divine; that it is supernatural, and as to the mode of it altogether beyond our comprehension. In fine, in consequence of this union of the Divine nature with the human in Jesus Christ, statements are made concerning the concrete Person, which are strictly true only of one or other of the natures thus combined. This is technically called "communio naturarum," and is in truth inseparable from that reality of union between the two to which we have already referred.

See Augustine, Ep. 162 [169]; Calvin, Inst., ii. 4, 1; Burnet, Exposition of the 39 Articles, Art. ii. On the Person of our Lord in general, see Gess., Die Lehre von der Person Christi, &c., Basle, 1856; Horsley, Tracts in Controversy with Priestley, 1812; Jamieson, Vindication of the Doctrine of Scripture, and of the Primitive Faith Concerning the Deity of Christ, 2 vols., 1794; Wilson, Illustrations of the New Testament from the early Opinions of Jews and Christians concerning Christ, 1828; and the works of Wardlaw, Pye Smith, and others on the Socinian controversy.

Sect. III.—Christ's Twofold Estate.

I. State of Humiliation. When the Divine Being assumed our nature in the person of Jesus Christ, He entered on a state of humiliation, in order to which He emptied Himself of His glory, so as to become poor and to be of no reputation. To this state pertain His being conceived in the womb of the Virgin, His being born, His obedience, His submission to a servile and suffering condition, His death, and His burial; to which some add His descent into Hades.

II. State of Exaltation. When the Godman had consummated His suffering and obedience, He retraced the path by which He had descended, and rose to glory, and honour, and joy everlasting. To this state belong His resurrection from the dead, His ascension into heaven, His exaltation to God's right hand, where He sits as Ruler of the Universe, having all power committed to Him.

SECT. IV.—Offices of Christ.

The Son of God came into our world and assumed our nature to effect the reconciliation (κατάλυσις, at-one-ment) of God and man. For this end He sustains certain offices having respect to the three ends which must be attained in order to this result. As man is guilty, his Saviour must be a priest, to make propitiation for him; as man is in ignorance and error, his Saviour must be a prophet, to teach him the truth; and as he is far from goodness and holiness, his Saviour must be a king, to rule over him, and by a wise and gracious discipline to educe the healthy development of his spiritual life, as well as to protect him from those hostile influences by which his spiritual growth and prosperity would be interrupted. It is in respect of these offices that Jesus is the Messiah, or Christ, or Anointed; and these combined constitute his Mediatorial office.

1. Christ's Priestly office. The design of this function of the Mediator is to restore peace and amity between God and man. With this view He has come to bring salvation to the sinner, justly exposed to the wrath and curse of God, by turning away from him the Divine displeasure. His office as a Priest has thus a twofold object—a personal as it respects mankind, a material as it respects the sin which man has committed. Christ saves man by cleansing him from the guilt which sin has brought upon him.

The Priestly office of Christ was typified by that of the priests under the law. They were appointed by God to offer sacrifice and to make intercession for the people. The design of sacrifice was symbolically to set forth the great truth of vicarious propitiation, to proclaim the necessity of an expiation ere sin could be forgiven, and to adumbrate as a type the fact that an all-sufficient expiation would in due time be offered for the sins of men, according to the gracious appointment and provision of God. In fulfillment of the symbolical prediction which had thus been given of Him under the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations, our Lord appeared as a Priest ordained of God, "to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself" (Heb. ix. 26). In this capacity He has made peace for us by the blood of His cross, and by that blood hath obtained eternal redemption for us (Col. i. 20; Heb. ix. 12). As the ancient high priests, when they went into the Holiest of all, made intercession for the people of Israel, so Christ, as our High Priest, has entered into heaven, where He appeareth for us and maketh intercession for us. He is thus able to save to the uttermost all that come unto God through Him (ἐδίκαιον, through His medium, through Him as a Mediator). Sinners have thus redemption through His blood, even the forgiveness of sins; their prayers are accepted of God; and the blessing of the Most High descends on them in rich effusions of grace. (Comp. Eph. v. 2; Heb. vii. 25; viii.-x., &c.)

On the Priestly office under the Law, see Bähr, Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus, ii. 11, ff.; Fairbairn, Typology, 2 vols.; Litton, Bampton Lectures for 1856, p. 75, ff. On Sacrifice, besides the classical work of Oestram, De Sacrificio, 4to, Lond. 1677, the following may be consulted:—Davison, An Inquiry into the Origin and Intent of Primitive Sacrifice, Lond. 1825; Faber, Treatise on the Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice, Lond. 1827; Magee, Discourses and Dissertations on the Atonement and Sacrifice, 32vo, Works, Lond. 1842; J. Pye Smith, Four Discourses on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ, &c., 2d ed., Lond. 1842; Tholuck, Das Alte Test. im Neuen, p. 64, ff.; Delitzsch, Comment. zum Br. an die Hebräer, in loc.; Thomson, Bampton Lecture for 1853, lect. 2, 3; Macdonnell, Domellian Lecture for 1857, lect. 1, 2, 3; and the works of Bähr, Fairbairn, and Litton above referred to. On the Priesthood of Christ, besides the above, see the comprehensive and conclusive dissertation of Owen which forms the fourth of his Exercitations on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

That Jesus Christ in some sense acted on behalf of mankind whilst on earth, and that it is in some way through His obedience and sufferings that men are saved, is so manifestly taught by the sacred writers, that none who profess to receive the Scriptures as their guide to religious truth venture to call this in question. To most they appear to teach much more than this. The names given to our Lord, such as Saviour, Captain of Salvation, the Sanctifier, the Mediator, the Shepherd, connected as these are with His sufferings and His death (see Eph. v. 2, 3, 25, 26; Heb. vii. 25; ii. 10; Acts iii. 15; Heb. xii. 2; Heb. ii. 11; viii. 6; ix. 15; 1 Tim. ii. 5; John x. 11, 15; Heb. xiii. 20); the phrases used to describe Him in relation to His work, such as Lamb of God (i.e. Lamb, provided by God for sacrifice,) who keth away the sins of the world, Ransom, or Ransom-price given for us (λύτρον, διάλυτρον), He who was made a curse for us, so as to redeem us (John i. 29; Rev. v. 6–14; Matt. xx. 28; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Gal. iii. 13); the language used to describe the design and effects of Christ's work in relation to us, such as that it was "for us" (in our place, ἡμῶν); in several instances ὑπὲρ, for our benefit; ὑπὲρ, on our account, ὑμῶν); "for sins" (ἐπὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν), that it was to take away sins (ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν), and that by the sacrifice of Himself (Matt. xx. 28; John x. 11; 1 Cor. viii. 11; Rom. v. 6, 8; 1 Pet. iii. 18; John i. 29; 1 John iii. 5; Heb. ix. 26, 28; Is. llii. 12; 1 Pet. ii. 24, &c.); and the expressions employed to describe the benefits we derive from His work, especially His death, such as acceptance with God, redemption, ransom, reconciliation, the turning from us of God's wrath; all combine to produce a conviction that it is in consequence of the propitiatory efficacy of His work that benefit accrues to us through Christ. That this is what the sacred writers meant to teach is admitted not only by all evangelical Christians, but even by many who reject the peculiar doctrines of Christianity from their religious system.

"I could almost wish that we might meet with a man that had never heard anything of these matters before, one who knew nothing of the apostles, who or what they were, and had no concern whether the doctrines they taught were reasonable or unreasonable; that we might only propose it to him, and that he might give us a free, unprejudiced answer, what notion he would conceive that these writers had and designed to convey to us concerning Christ's mediation, and His death and sufferings." (Tomkins, Jesus Christ the Mediator between God and Man, p. 31.) Such an unsophisticated and earnest inquirer we can hardly hope to find in the present state of society; but the next best to such an one is an inquirer who, not intending to submit his reason to the teaching of the apostles, but merely for the satisfaction of a literal curiosity, candidly and leisurely interprets their words for our purpose of determining what they really taught. Such may be found among the German rationalists, and to the verdict which some of them have returned on this matter it may be worth while to listen. "Ab omnibus fere scriptoribus sacris," says Wegscheider, the Coryphaeus of the old Rationalist party, "maxime a Paulo ut exposita est [sententia] ut mortem Jesu Christi ostendentem tangam expliatoriam candemque vicariam, velut poenam peccatorum hominum omnium ab ipso susceptum, et Jesum ipsum tangam agnum purum atque immaculatum, a patre ipso morti victimam placarem traditum sanguine suo peccata mundi ablucem." (Initii. Theol., p. 437, 6th ed.) With the same distinctness another eminent rationalist, Dr Von Ammon, speaks on this subject (see his Summa Theologici, p. 282, 4th ed.); though he goes on to apologise for the apostles in teaching such doctrines, on the ground that they had to accommodate themselves to Jewish prejudices and modes of thought. Another eminent rationalist, Dr Hase, says, "In the New Testament Christ is set forth as sent by God to save the world, ruined by sin. . . . The condition of God's giving salvation or pardoning sin is the whole life of Christ on earth in its separate moments; above all, His death as a ransom-price for our sins, as a sin-offering in our stead, in virtue of which we are redeemed from the bondage of sin and obtain forgiveness of sins, eternal life, and peace with God." (Hutterus Redivivus, p. 243, 7th ed.) "Christ hath saved men," says De Wette, "principally by what He did and suffered," The death of Jesus is the central point of apostolic doctrine, Christ, and especially that of Paul. This death Jesus, the blameless and sinless, endured for the sins of men, accomplishing thereby, as the self-offering High Priest in the higher sense, what the sin-offerings of the Old Testament were intended to accomplish, as a voluntary sin-offering well-pleasing unto God." (Biblische Dogmatik, p. 256 ff., 3d ed.)

Resting on the biblical statements above considered, theologians have arrived at the conclusion that a satisfaction for sin is that to which the priestly work of Christ had respect. He is regarded as having made atonement for the sins of men, and thereby reconciled them to God. As to the nature of this atonement and the extent of it, great diversity of opinion has arisen among evangelical divines. Some of the more important of these views we shall now state.

I. Some hold that Christ died only for the elect, and that His atonement was of the nature of a price paid down for their redemption, an exact equivalent in the Saviour's sufferings for what they had deserved to suffer for their sins, so that He has merited for them grace and glory.

"Christ paid the same thing that was in the obligation, as if in things real a friend should pay twenty pounds for him that owed so much, and not anything in another kind; and I affirm that He paid ideas, that is the same thing that was in the obligation, and not tantamount, something equivalent thereto in another kind." (Owen, Of the Death of Christ, ch. ii.) "We, according to the Scriptures, plainly believe that Christ hath, by His righteousness, merited for us grace and glory." (The same, Display of Arminianism, ch. ix.) See also Edwards, Essay concerning the Necessity and Reasonableness of the Christian Doctrine of Satisfaction for Sin.

II. Some hold that Christ died for all men alike, that His atonement was rendered to the public justice of God, and that its effect was not to secure or merit blessing for any, but to open a channel along which blessing might flow freely to all, on their repentance and faith.

"Immediata mortis Christi effectio et passioeis, illa est non actualis pecaminum ab eo aut illis ablato, non actualis remissio, non justificatione, non actualis horum aut illorum redemptio, ... Redemtio, justificatione, et redemptionis aedipus Deum imperativus, qua factum est ut Deus jam positis, utpote justitia cui satisfactum est non obstante, hominibus peccatoribus pecata remitteret." (Arminius, Antiperkina, p. 76.) "Christus, ex decreto et intentione Patris, mortuus pro omnibus et singulis hominibus, ut illis gratiam et remissionem peccatorum impetraret, omnino specialiter excepto." "Poenam eandem quam nos peccatis nostris committimus, non nos tamen nos non tuliit; non enim tuliit mortem nostram, sed tuliit miseriam gravem et mortem eruntum nostro loco; quae est die praes a nobis juste sustinendae." "Dices: si Christus eo tantum modo pro nobis salvetisset, non meruit est nobis fidem et regenerationem. Resp. Ita est; meritus est, hoc est imperavit et effect ut Deus frum suam suspendat, gratiae tempus nobis concedat, ad fidem et regenerationem nos vocaverit, omnino gratiae auxilia quibus vocatioe divinae parere possimus largietur est; ipsam autem fidem et regenerationem nobis non meruit." (Limborch, Theol. Christ. bk. iv. c. 3, sect. 2; bk. iii. c. 22, sect. 2, 3.) In accordance with these views, divines of this school speak of a double reconciliation effected by Christ—the one, a potential and conditional; the other, an actual and real: in virtue of the former, God may forgive the sins of any; in virtue of the latter, He does forgive the sins of those that believe. (See Corvinus, ad Moles, c. 28, sect. 11; Limborch, bk. iii. c. 23, sect. 3, 4.) From the frequent use of the verb "imperare," and the noun "imperatio," by divines of this school in announcing their views, this has been called the "imperative scheme" of the atonement.

III. Some hold that the death of Christ was a satisfaction rendered to the Divine justice with a view to reconcile the exercise of mercy towards sinners with the claims of the Divine administration; that it was of infinite value, sufficient for the salvation of all men; but that God, having from all eternity determined that only some men should be saved, the efficacy of the atonement thus made is limited by God's electing purpose.

Of those who hold this view there are again two subdivisions, according as the salvation of the elect is held to have been the design and purpose of the atonement (1), or as the purpose to save the elect is held to have been consequent, in the order of nature, on the appointment of the Offices of atonement (2).

1. Christum, ex mera idonea Patris, destinatum et datum fuisse redemptorem et caput non omnibus sed certo hominum numero, corpore ipsius mysticum ex Dei electione constitutum; et pro illo Christum, vocatiom sine sumpto concilium, ad exequendum decimum electionem et consilium Patris voluisse et decrevere mori, praeterea non induisse addere efficacissimam et singularem voluntatem pro illo esse substitutam et fidem ac salutem illis acquirendi intentionem." (Turretin, Institutiones Ecclesiasticae, lib. xiv. qu. 14, sect. 8. See also Witteins, Occas. Red., bk. ii. c. 4, sect. 2.) Divines of this school maintain that, strictly speaking, Christ died, satisfied Divine justice, and made atonement only for such as were saved; that "the death of Christ is a legal satisfaction to the law and justice of God on behalf of elect sinners;" but they, at the same time, hold that "the sufferings of Christ are to be regarded in the light of a moral satisfaction to the law and justice of God, which would have been requisite had there been but one sinner to be saved, and had that sinner had but one sin; and which would have been adequate had the number to be saved been to any conceivable extent greater than it is." (See Dr Symington, Essay on the Atonement.)

2. According to this scheme, the atonement was designed as a vindication, manifestation, or display of the righteousness of God, such as to render forgiveness and salvation consistent with the honour of that perfection of the Divine character; leaving the Supreme Ruler and Judge in the free and sovereign exercise of the mercy in which He delights to dispense these blessings more or less extensively, "according to the good pleasure of His will." We might conceive the desire of Divine mercy as bent on saving sinners; in order to this desire becoming a purpose in the mind of the Godhead, there must of necessity be the discernment of a way in which the salvation may be effected in consistency with the full honour of every attribute of His character, and every principle of His government. To make God to promise salvation, and to ordain sinners to the possession of it previously to such discernment (speaking, as we necessarily must, after the manner of men) and independently of it, is to suppose Him doing what it is morally impossible for Him to do." (Wardlaw, Discourses on the Nature and Extent of the Atonement of Christ, pp. 61, 77.)

IV. An opinion has of late come into considerable favour in certain quarters, according to which the effect of Christ's obedience unto death is wholly moral; that is to say, it is such an exhibition of love, benevolence, and obedience, that it subdues the enmity of the human heart to God, draws men to Him in childlike love, and gives at once the pattern of, and stimulus to, a self-sacrificing submission to all God's will.

Maurice, Theological Essays, ess. vii.; Essay on Sacrifice, passim.

Without attempting to criticise these different opinions, or pretending in this outline to discuss the subject exhaustively, we would submit the following hints as a contribution towards a just theory of the atonement as made known to us in Scripture.

1. God, as the infinitely perfect Being, and as moral Governor of the universe, must always act in perfect accordance with Himself, and with that government which is but an expression of Himself.

2. God having denounced sin as not only utterly abhorrent from His nature, but as positively forbidden under His government, must ever act towards sinners so as to manifest His abhorrence of sin, and to uphold the stability of His government under which it is forbidden.

3. While God is thus under an obligation, arising out of His own essential nature, to denounce sin, and as a governor to pronounce sentence of punishment on those who, by committing sin, have incurred the penalty He has attached to the law prohibiting it; He is also under an obligation arising out of His own nature to pity and compassionate the sinner.

4. Though the knowledge of this latter may lead to the indulgence of a hope, that some way may be devised by which sin may be forgiven, it is impossible, anterior to experience, for man to determine by what means this is to be brought about.

5. But whilst unable to determine a plan by which the exercise of the Divine mercy in the forgiveness of sin may be harmonized with the Divine abhorrence of sin and God's rectoral obligation to uphold the penal sanctions of His own law, and the stability of His government as therein involved, it is possible to ascertain two conditions without which such a harmony cannot be effected. These are, 1st, that in whatever way the Divine mercy may find access to the sinner, it must be on the ground that a sufficient compensation has been offered to the law of which sin is a breach—a compensation, that is, sufficient to manifest forth God's unchanging abhorrence of sin, and His unchanging regard to the honour and stability of His administration and law; and, 2d, that if such a compensation is to be made for man's sin, it cannot be by man himself (who can never do more than as God's creature and subject he is bound to do) that this is to be effected, but it must be effected by some other being vicariously in man's stead, and for his behoof.

6. Having determined that it is only through a mediator or vicarious representative that the requisite compensation for sin can be offered, we may also determine the qualifications, without which such a mediator cannot adequately accomplish his office. 1. Our natural reason teaches us that it must be with the consent, if not by the appointment, of God himself, that he acts. 2. We can see also that he must do or suffer something that shall have the effect of demonstrating God's utter hatred of sin, and His fixed determination to treat it as an offence against His law. 3. What he does, also, must be something that shall be final, something of a nature not to be repeated, something of such peculiarity and preciousness that it may never be expected again; for a cheap, or easy, or common-place work would obviously fail of meeting the requirements of the case. 4. There appears a fitness, moreover, if not necessity, in requiring that the substitute shall be of the same nature with those for whom he acts; for, in order to a valid substitution, the substitute must be able to enter with a full sympathy into the case of those for whom he acts, and must be himself subject to the laws under which they are placed. 5. Further, as possessing the nature and under the same laws as those for whom he acts, he must himself be perfectly free from all blame; for he who has failed to keep the law himself can never satisfy for the failure of others. 6. It is requisite that his becoming a substitute for others shall be his own free, voluntary act; for not only without this would his acting be destitute of merit, but an act of injustice and tyranny would be committed against him, such as would render the transaction void as a vindication of a moral government; and, 7. With this stands closely associated as another condition, that whatever may be required of him, or laid on him, in order to the accomplishment of his expiatory work, no permanent or irreparable injury shall accrue to him; for it would be obviously unrighteous that, in order to exempt the guilty from the penalty they had deserved, an irreparable evil should fall upon one who was innocent.

The reader will find these conditions of valid substitution admirably illustrated in R. Hall's Works, vol. i., p. 483; and still more fully by Mr Gilbert in his Congregational Lectures, "The Christian Atonement," &c., lect. vii.

7. The conditions, which may be thus a priori determined, are found to be fully met and satisfied in Jesus Christ, who is made known to us in Scripture as the propitiatory substitute for sinners. He came forth voluntarily, yet in accordance with the Divine appointment, to make satisfaction for sinners; in His submission to sufferings so awful that no finite mind can adequately conceive them, He gave indubitable evidence of the Divine abhorrence of sin, and the impossibility of its being committed with impunity; for if God gave up His Son to endure such agony ere sin could be forgiven, who can doubt that in the estimation of God sin is most hateful, and His law not to be broken with impunity? In the union of the Divine nature with the human in the person of Jesus, moreover, we have, on the one hand, that rare and unrepealable character of the transaction, and, on the other, that identity of nature with those for whom He appeared, both of which we have seen to be conditions of a valid substitution; while in His perfectly sinless humanity we have another of these conditions satisfied. In fine, we see Him in the end victorious over all the evil to which He submitted, and exalted to glory and honour as the reward of his obedience. In Him, therefore, are all the conditions of a valid substitute for man found. He fulfilled all righteousness, and accomplished by His submission to death the great end of a propitiatory redemption for sinners—the reconciling of the exercise of the mercy of God in forgiving sin with the righteousness of God as a moral governor, and the perfection of God as a being who cannot look upon sin.

8. This great end being secured, salvation is placed within the reach of all men to whom the gospel comes. The nature of the transaction accomplished by Christ was such that, to be of service for any, it must be sufficient and available for all. What reconciles the exercise of mercy with righteousness in the forgiveness of one sin, must be sufficient to reconcile these in the forgiveness of all sin. A door which is sufficient to admit the passing through it of one person, must be sufficient to admit the passing through of any person not naturally differing from the other. If any are in any way kept from passing through, it must be from some other cause than the nature of the opening through which this passage is to be made.

9. As all men are kept from accepting the benefits of Christ's death by their wilful obduracy, it is only as God moves them to avail themselves of His propitiation that any are saved; and as God is not pleased thus to move all, the remedy, though of universal sufficiency, becomes of limited efficiency.

10. As this limitation rests on the eternal purpose and choice of God, and as our Saviour could not but know, as an omniscient being, who of the human race were included in that gracious purpose, He must be viewed as having had for the elect a special regard in what He did for the salvation of man, and consequently to have died for them in a sense in which He did not die for all men. If this be conceded, it seems superfluous to inquire whether the appointment of the atonement, in the order of things, preceded the purpose of God in election, or the purpose of God in election preceded the appointment of the atonement. If we allow that the work was done with a special regard to the salvation of the elect, why seek to ascend the dizzy heights of speculation as to the order of the purposes in the infinite mind which determined the doing of it?

11. Hitherto we have looked at the propitiatory work of Christ only in its relation to God. As its design, however, is satisfactorily to effect a reconciliation between God and man, it must have an aspect also to the latter, and a fitness to move him to such reconciliation. It must be in accordance with man's moral constitution; it must commend itself to his sense of rectitude; it must present God to him in a light calculated at once to impress and to attract him; it must address itself powerfully to the best and highest affections of his heart; and it must be fitted to exert a constant constraining influence over his active nature, which shall continue to operate during his subsequent existence in the way of drawing him in trustful, loving obedience towards God. These conditions are fully met in the work of Christ; in connection with which God appears as a just God and a Saviour, and the salvation of man is secured in a way that at once commands the approval of his moral judgment, and captivates and controls the affections of his heart.

Edwards, Remarks on Theol. Controversies, ch. vi.; Magee, Discourses and Dissertations on Atonement and Sacrifice, 3 vols., 1832. II. Christ's Prophetic Office.—Our Lord was appointed to communicate the mind of God to man. According to God's gracious and eternal purpose, the truth whereby men are to be restored and sanctified was to be made known to them through the Mediator. This function our Lord discharged mediately and immediately; the former as He was the source of knowledge and authority to the prophets and apostles, in whom spoke "the spirit of Christ;" the latter as He himself appeared and taught men the will of God. In regard to this, He spoke of Himself as the Light of the world (John viii. 12), and forbade His disciples to be called rabbi or master, seeing one was their Teacher and Master, even Christ (Matt. xxiii. 8, 10; comp. Deut. xviii. 18; Luke xxiv. 19; Heb. i. 1). Jesus as a teacher did not propagate the doctrines of any sect or school; nor did He utter speculations of His own; He came to make known to men the doctrine of God (John vii. 16). "Doctor doctrum Christus, cujus schola in terra et cathedra in coelo est," says Augustine. The divinity of His mission, and, by implication, the truth of His doctrine, our Lord proved by His miracles and prophecies.

See Neander, Life of Jesus, bk. iv. part ii.; Reinhard, Versuch über den Plan Jesu, &c., 5th ed., Wittenberg, 1830; translated into French (Essai sur le Plan, &c.), by J. L. A. Dumas, Valence, 1842; Alexander, Christ and Christianity, part ii. ch. 4.

III. Christ's Kingly Office.—As seated on the mediatorial throne, Jesus Christ governs all things in heaven and on earth, and makes all tend to the furtherance of that cause which is His own. He is Lord of the created universe, Sovereign in the kingdom of grace, Head over all things for the Church, and King of glory, by whom the honours of heaven are sustained, and the rewards of heaven shall be dispensed.

See Ps. li. 6; Ps. lxxxi.; Is. xxxli. 1; Dan. vii. 13, 14; Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; Mark xvi. 15; John xviii. 33-37; Rom. xiv. 9; 1 Cor. xv. 23-28; Col. ii. 10, 15; Phil. ii. 10, 11; Heb. ii. 14; 1 Pet. iii. 22; Rev. xi. 15, &c. See Symington, Messiah the Prince, or the Mediatorial Dominion of Jesus Christ, 2d edit., Edin. 1842. Comp. Ernesti, De Officio triplici Christi, in his Opuscula Theologica, p. 371.

PART IV.

SOTERIOLOGY, OR DOCTRINE CONCERNING SALVATION.

God is the sole author of salvation to man. It is of His benevolence, compassion, and free grace alone, that there is any salvation for sinners at all; and the scheme of redemption in all its parts, and from its first device to its final consummation, is wholly of God. "All things," says the apostle, "are of God, who hath reconciled us unto Himself by Jesus Christ," 2 Cor. v. 18.

The benevolence of God towards mankind has a twofold aspect, according as it respects the race at large, and as it respects those who are saved through Christ; the former is the Divina benevolentia universalis, the latter the Divina benevolentia specialis. Of the former we have manifestations in such facts as—1. God's sparing the race notwithstanding its sinfulness; His showing kindness to men, and doing them good; His bearing long with them, and giving them opportunities and means and motives to repentance. 2. His not willing that any should perish, but that all should come unto Him and live (Ezek. xviii. 32; xxiii. 11; 1 Tim. ii. 4, &c.) 3. His sending His Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world should be saved—that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life (John iii. 16, 17); and, 4. His appointing Christ to accomplish a work of propitiation of infinite value, so that it is sufficient for the redemption of all, and lays a ground on which salvation may be offered to all. Of the special benevolence of God we have manifestations in all that He does for the actual and final redemption of His own people—those who in effect are saved.

Of what God does in relation to them, there are three kinds: 1. What He does for them; 2. What He does upon and in them; 3. What He enables them to do for themselves.

I. What God does for His people. 1. Election to salvation; 2. The mission and gift of the Holy Spirit; 3. The institution of means of grace.

II. What God does upon and in His people. 1. Effectual calling; 2. Regeneration, including renewal and justification; 3. Sanctification; 4. Perseverance to the end.

III. What God aids His people to do for themselves. 1. To believe in the Saviour; 2. To repent; 3. To resist evil, &c.; 4. To use the means of grace, and the discipline of life, so as to advance in meetness for heaven; and, 5. To triumph over death.

Our limits do not admit of our doing more than to touch on a few points in this wide field.

SECT. I.—Of Election.

Following the guidance of Scripture, and seeking to receive on this high theme only what Scripture teaches, and all that Scripture teaches, we would lay down the following positions, with their Scriptural evidence, as embracing the sum of this doctrine.

1. Believers stand in a peculiar and endeared relation to God. They are His special treasure, His peculiar people, a people for His possession (comp. Ex. xix. 5; Deut. vii. 6, with Mal. iii. 17, Tit. ii. 14, and 1 Pet. ii. 9).

2. This special relation into which the people of God have been brought is the result of a choice or election of them by Him. They are called the elect or chosen of God, an elect or chosen generation or race, the election. God is said to have chosen them; and they are exhorted to know their election of God, and to make their calling and election sure (Rom. xi. 5-7; 1 Cor. i. 27, 28; Eph. i. 4; 1 Thess. i. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14; Tit. i. 1; 1 Pet. ii. 1, 2; ii. 9; 2 Pet. i. 10).

3. God's choice of His people is from all eternity. This follows of necessity from the preceding position; for if God elect at all, it must be from eternity, seeing all His purposes are according to the counsel of His unchanging will. Hence believers are said to be called of God according to purpose (κατὰ προθεσιν), to be known of God, and to be chosen before the foundation of the world (Rom. viii. 28; Gal. iv. 9; Eph. i. 4-6, 11).

4. This choice is a choice of them in Christ Jesus (comp. Eph. i. 4-6; 1 Thess. v. 9; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Pet. i. 2). But in what sense is this true? in the sense that Christ is the meritorious ground of their election, or in the sense that they were chosen to be saved in and through Christ? Looking at this question as one of exegesis, the latter seems to be the view authorised by the language of the apostles in the passages above cited. When it is said that believers have been predestinated through (κατὰ) Jesus Christ, and that they have been appointed to obtain salvation through Him, it seems clear that the meaning is, that the respect which God is said to have had to Christ in the election and predestination of the saved, is respect to Him as the me- Of Election.

dum or procuring cause of their salvation, not as the ground of their election. In other passages where they are said to have been elected in Christ, the meaning may be that it is in Christ that the primary reason of their election is found; but the meaning may also be, that it was with a view to their being in Christ by belief in Him that they were chosen of God; and that this is the apostle's meaning seems clear from his tracing election to the mere election of God, which could not be if there was a meritorious cause of it, and from his stating that the design of their election was that they might be holy, &c., thereby indicating that at the time of their election they were not contemplated as in Christ actually, and therefore holy. We conclude, then, that (in the language of theologians) in election respect was had to the merit of Christ not antecedent, as the cause on account of which God destined believers to be saved, but consequent, as the primary medium through which the gracious purpose was to take effect.

5. The purpose of God in election is sovereign; that is, not without reasons, and these the highest, but determined by reasons of His own, of which we are wholly ignorant, and which do not lie in the parties themselves who are the objects of His choice. Whilst Scripture explicitly ascribes this choice to the wisdom (σοφία), the mind (νους), and the counsel (βουλή) of God (Rom. xi. 33, 34; Eph. i. 11), it not less explicitly pronounces it wholly of grace, resolves it into the good pleasure of His will (εὐδοκία τοῦ θεοῦ), and asserts it to have been "according to His good pleasure, which He hath purposed in Himself"—"according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will" (Rom. ix. 16; xi. 5-6; Eph. i. 5, 11; 2 Tim. i. 9).

An attempt is made to get rid of the sovereignty of God in election, asserted by these passages, by maintaining, that though the reason of the choice is not, and cannot be in the actual faith and piety of the saints, seeing it is like all God's purposes from eternity, yet, as it proceeds out of the Divine foreknowledge, it finds its reason in the foreseen faith and piety of the saved. Strangely enough this was the original opinion of Augustine (see his Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Ep. ad Rom. c. 60, and his Retractationes, book i. c. 23). Traces of it may be found in the Greek fathers, and in Jerome; and among the schoolmen it found advocates in Duns Scotus and Bonaventura. It is a favourite doctrine of the Remonstrant party (see Grotius on Eph. i. 5; and Art. Remonstr. Art. I.; see also Bishop Tomline's Elements of Theology, and Watson's Institutes, vol. iii. p. 78). Of this opinion, a recent German expositor, in no wise attached to Calvinistic views, but whose philological and exegetical merits are of the highest order, says that it is "destitute of exegetical validity" (ohne exegetisches recht, Meyer on Eph. i. 5). This is true; there is not a passage in the New Testament in which such a doctrine is either directly or implicitly taught, or which has even the appearance of teaching it; whilst there is much that is distinctly against it. It is irreconcilable with the strong and decided terms in which the perfect gratuitousness of election is asserted; and it is irreconcilable with those passages in which faith and piety are represented as ends contemplated in the election of the people of God (compare, especially, Acts xiii. 48; Rom. viii. 29, 30; Eph. i. 4; 1 Pet. i. 2). It may be added, that if election be nothing more than a choosing of men on the ground of their foreseen piety, it is by no means such a mysterious, or to human pride offensive, doctrine, as St Paul represents it to be; nor is it possible to see how, if we deny the pure grace and sovereignty of God in election, we can preserve ourselves from attributing to the believer a meritorious making of himself to differ, as the Pelagians teach, but in direct contradiction to what the Apostle says, 1 Cor. iv. 7 (see Turretine, Instit. Theol. Elene. i. p. 398). We may fairly ask also, if men are elected on the ground of foreseen faith and piety, to what is it that they are elected? Is it to salvation? Then is God's election nugatory; it is an election of a man to the enjoyment of a blessing which the man has already received by that which forms the ground of election, viz. faith and goodness. Is it to the means of salvation? Then God must have purposed to furnish to certain persons the means of salvation, because He foresaw that they would of their own accord, and without aid from above, use them aright; that is to say, because He foresaw that something would happen which He has expressly told us never does happen! Besides, what is to be said of those to whom the means of salvation are sent but who do not use them? In what do the elect in virtue of their election differ from them on this hypothesis?

6. The Divine purpose in election has respect to the actual salvation of those who are its objects (Acts xiii. 48; Rom. viii. 28, 29; ix. 23; Eph. i. 4, 11; 1 Thess. v. 9; 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14; 1 Pet. i. 1, 2). This is opposed to the doctrine of those who teach, that it is only to the offer of salvation, and not to salvation itself, that men are elected; a doctrine which is not only groundless, so far as Scripture is concerned, but which is irreconcilable with many express teachings of Scripture—such as that salvation is an evidence of election (1 Thess. i. 4, 5), and that heaven is a place prepared from eternity for the people of God (Matt. xxv. 34). Besides, what advantage is gained by this hypothesis? There still remains on it an election as arbitrary as on the hypothesis it is meant to supersede. If it be inconsistent with the Divine equity to elect individuals to salvation, on what ground does it become consistent with the Divine equity to elect individuals or communities to the possession of the means of salvation, while these are withheld from others? If, on the one hypothesis, there is the appearance of partiality on the part of God, there is no less the appearance of this on the other, and along with that the appearance of feebleness or indifference, in merely providing the means without in any way securing the end.

7. The Divine election is an election of persons and not of communities (Acts xiii. 48, ἐκλέγεται; Rom. viii. 28; ix. 14-16; 1 Thess. i. 4; v. 9; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 2; 2 Pet. i. 10). Those who oppose this view appeal to the case of the Jewish nation, which was chosen as a nation; but the analogue to the Jewish nation is not any of the nations of the earth, but the Christian Church, the "holy nation," of which it was the type; and how the Church as a spiritual body can be chosen, except by the choice of its members individually, it is impossible to conceive. "The personality of election," as has been well observed, "seems to arise out of its very nature. It is difficult to conceive of any purpose or determination existing in the Divine mind, without being specific and definite in all its arrangements." (Fletcher, Discourse on Spiritual Blessings, p. 30).

8. In election, God had respect to men not simply as creatures, but as fallen creatures. This is a middle position between two extremes; the one of which is occupied by those who maintain that in predestination God had respect to man simply as a creature, and anterior to his fall; the other of which is occupied by those who suppose that God in predestinating had respect to man not merely as a fallen being, but specifically as either also redeemed through union with Christ, or as condemned through final impenitence. The former is the scheme of the supralapsarians; the latter that of the sub or infralapsarians. The difference between those two systems, though deprecated by some, is real and important; it is nothing less than the distinction between the assertion that God decrees man to suffer wrath irrespective of their guilt; and the assertion that He decrees them to suffer wrath on the ground of their foreseen guilt. Neither doctrine, however, appears exactly to express the truth on this head. God, in the decree of election, Divine has not respect to men merely as creatures; for believers are chosen in Christ as vessels of mercy, and therefore as fallen and guilty creatures who alone need mercy, and for whom alone Christ has provided salvation. On the other hand, we have already seen, that it is not on the ground of foreseen faith and obedience that believers are elected, and Scripture says nothing of a damatory decree predestinating the finally impenitent to destruction on the ground of their foreseen impenitency. Abstracting from the wicked, who are left to themselves, the purpose of God in election had respect only to the saved, as those whom God of His free grace would bring out of the mass of fallen humanity to the enjoyment of eternal life through His Son. Scripture, justly interpreted, knows nothing of an unconditional reprobation, as held by some divines of the Gomarist or ultra-Calvinistic school. God nowhere appears in His Word as creating men simply with the sovereign purpose of damning them eternally. Nor does there seem any good ground for holding the modified view on this subject of the Preteritionists, who, while rejecting the doctrine that God, in the exercise of His free sovereignty, elects any but to blessing, nevertheless contend for a decree of preterition, in virtue of which God has determined to pass by those who are not saved. On the principle that God decrees what He does, but not what He does not do, we conclude that He decreed, by an absolute decree, to save the saved, but did not decree not to save the lost.

See Williams, Essay on the Equity of Divine Government, and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace; Defence of Modern Calvinism, ch. 3; Fletcher, Spiritual Blessings, a Discourse on Election and Sovereignty, 5th ed., 1850. Payne, Lectures on Divine Sovereignty, &c., lect. I.-vii.; Wardlaw, System Theol., ii. pp. 485-549; Turritine, Instit. Theol., loc. iv. qu. 6-18.

Sect. II.—Divine Personality of the Holy Spirit.

The term "Spirit" (Πνεῦμα) is used in Scripture in many applications, both physical and mental. It is used to designate breath, air in motion, or wind, animal life, the human soul, the intelligent and emotive nature of man, any immaterial object, such as a ghost, or an angel, in which sense also it is applied to God. From denoting the inner nature of man, it came to denote the source of impulsive power, animating force, or vivifying energy. (See Judges xv. 19; Is. xxxi. 3.) Hence the phrase, "Spirit of God," in many places denotes the Divine energy or power (Job xxxiii. 13; Ps. xxxiii. 6; 2 Thess. ii. 8); and from this, combined with the usage of the term to designate what is immaterial and invisible, the phrase came to be used as an appellation of the Holy Spirit, the invisible but mighty agent in man's salvation.

Besides the appellation Holy Spirit, we have the appellations, Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ, and Spirit of Holiness, used in such a way as to be appropriate only to a personal agent. The Spirit of God moves, strives, speaks, sends, or is sent, is vexed, dwells in man, &c. (Gen. i. 3, vi. 3; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2; Is. xlviii. 16, lxiii. 10; 1 Cor. iii. 16, &c.) The Spirit of Christ (i.e., whom Christ sends) is in men, aids men, suffers or permits (Rom. viii. 9; Phil. i. 19; Acts xvi. 7). The Holy Spirit is sent by Christ as a προάγγελος, to act the part of a guide, director, and helper of believers; the Holy Spirit speaks and commands (Acts xiii. 2); the Holy Spirit judges and determines (Acts xv. 28); wills, and acts accordingly (1 Cor. xii. 11); is capable of being grieved, resisted, lied unto, tempted, blasphemed, &c. In speaking of the Spirit, also, the terms ἐκεῖνος, ἀνεξος, and ὁ are used, which can be accounted for, or grammatically excused, only on the assumption of His personality. On these grounds it is concluded that the Holy Spirit is a person; in fact, they supply to us exactly the same reasons for believing in the personality of the Spirit as we have for believing in the personality of God.

But some of these passages do more than this, they also convey to us the impression of the divine personality of the Spirit. The very expressions, Spirit of God and Holy Spirit, contain in them something divine; and if they designate a person, that person must be God. Further, though the Holy Spirit is nowhere especially called God, yet in repeated instances this phrase is used interchangeably with the term God, and the same things are ascribed to both (Acts v. 4, 9; 1 Cor. iii. 16, compare with vi. 19). Again, certain divine attributes are ascribed to the Holy Spirit. Thus, He is presented to us as omniscient (1 Cor. ii. 9, 11; comp. Ps. cxxxix. 7; Rom. viii. 26); as omnipotent (Acts ii. 4; Rom. xv. 19; 1 Cor. xii. 11); as revealing the mind of God to men (Luke ii. 26; Mark xiii. 11; 1 Cor. ii. 9, 10; 2 Peter i. 21); as eternal (Heb. ix. 14). The Holy Spirit, in fine, is joined with the Father and the Son in such a way as to indicate that an equality of dignity and power belongs to Him with them (Matt. xxviii. 19; 2 Cor. xiii. 14). A being to whom such qualities are ascribed, and such a position assigned by the sacred writers, must be divine.

See Owen, Pneumatologia, or a Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit, ch. iii.; Wardlaw, Discourses on the Socinian Controversy, disc. x.; Smith, Personality and Divinity of the Holy Spirit, Lond. 1831; Script. Testimony, ii. 446.

Sect. III.—Work of the Holy Spirit.

The special office of the Holy Spirit in redemption is to glorify Christ, by taking of the things of Christ and showing them unto men (John xvi. 14). In fulfilling this office, He specially dwelt in the apostles, and some of those who were associated with them in the first promulgation of Christianity, so as to qualify them for declaring with perfect accuracy the truth concerning Christ to men; He inspired the authors of the Bible, so that their writings are the word of God; and He dwells in believers, so as to cause them to understand, receive, and believe the truth thus revealed and recorded for their own salvation.

It is customary to distinguish these operations of the Holy Spirit into two classes, under the heads of extraordinary and ordinary—the former embracing the Spirit's agency in inspiration and miraculous endowments; the latter having reference to his agency in the conversion and sanctification of men through the truth. So far as respects effects and ends, this distinction is valid; inspiration is not regeneration, nor is the end contemplated in the one case the same as that contemplated in the other. But, ignorant as we are of the mode of the Divine operation on the mind of man, we are not entitled to say that it differs in nature in the one case from what it is in the other; and there are many points of analogy between the two, the consideration of which is calculated to facilitate the just apprehension of the whole subject. These points of analogy may be thus stated:

1. In both cases the influence exercised on the mind is sovereign in its source; that is, it is dispensed by God, not on the ground of desert on the part of any who receive it, but on the ground solely of His own free grace. As it was entirely of favour that the apostles were put into the ministry, and endowed with the faculty of communicating God's will to the world; so it is equally of grace that the Spirit of God is given to any to work in them moral and spiritual life. In both cases it is by the grace of God alone that His servants are what they are.

2. In both cases the influence bestowed is special in its destination; that is, it is bestowed on individuals as such, and it is bestowed for a given end or purpose. As there was not a given quantity of inspiration bestowed on the Church, of which each member might avail himself if he willed, but certain persons were selected by God, on Effects of whom He sent his Spirit to fit them for teaching His will to men; so in the spiritual life it is not by a gift of common grace conveyed to the Church, of which each individual is to make what use he can, but by a special gift to individuals of the Spirit, for the purpose of bringing them to God and fitting them for His service and inheritance, that the work of regeneration and sanctification is carried on.

3. In both cases the inference is direct and irresistible; that is, it is exercised at once and immediately by the Spirit on the mind of man; and wherever it is so exerted, it invariably secures the end it was designed to effect. In inspiration, it was through no medium, but by direct action on the mind, that the Holy Spirit moved the prophets and apostles to speak and to write; nor did this action ever fail of effecting this result. In like manner the agency of the Spirit on the soul, in conversion and sanctification, is immediate and direct, nor is it ever put forth without actually effecting the result it was designed to effect, for we cannot conceive that God can be frustrated in any purpose for which He puts forth the efficient energy.

4. In both cases the influence is such, and is so exerted, as not to interfere with the ordinary laws and operations of the human mind and will. As the sacred writings manifest that, though under the afflatus of the Spirit, each writer retained his idiosyncracy of thought and expression; so in the other department the influence is altogether occult, and operates through the faculties of the individual, suspending none, strengthening none, adding none, but using all according to their own laws, for the realization of the purposed end. In conversion, God does not make known to us new truth, nor does He make the truth more potent in its action on us than it was, nor does He increase our natural faculties in any way: He simply opens the heart to attend to the truth, and Himself shines into the hearts of men to "give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (Acts xvi. 14; 2 Cor. iv. 6).

See Owen, Theologiae, bk. ii. and iii.

Sect. IV.—Effects of the Holy Spirit's work in Man.

The older divines have set forth with considerable elaboration what they call the ordo salutis, by which they mean the different stages through which a sinner passes to the attainment of full and final salvation. These, according to them, are vocation, illumination, justification, regeneration, and mystical union with God; to which some add conversion, contrition, conservation, and glorification. These all are classed under the general head of gratia Spiritus sancti applicatrix, and they are referred to different offices, which the Holy Spirit is represented as discharging, viz.:—1. His officium elencticum (John xviii. 8), or epinorthoticum (2 Tim. iii. 16); 2. His officium didacticum (John xvi. 13–15); 3. His officium pedagogicum (2 Tim. iii. 16; Rom. viii. 14); and, 4. His officium paracleticum (Rom. viii. 26). In this there is perhaps a needless minuteness, and an artificiality which enforces upon Scripture what does not naturally flow out of it. We think it unnecessary to set forth more than the following effects of the Spirit's grace.

1. Vocation or Calling. This is not the outward invitation of the gospel, which is common to all men to whom Christianity comes, but the inward call or effectual power by which men who hear the gospel are brought to accept the blessings therein announced and offered. Of this calling the properties are—1. It is of God (Rom. xi. 29; 1 Cor. vii. 17; Phil. iii. 14; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 1 Pet. v. 10). 2. It is of grace (Gal. i. 15; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Pet. v. 10). 3. It is sovereign (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Cor. i. 27, 28). 4. It is predestinated (Rom. viii. 29). 5. It is effectual (Rom. viii. 30). 6. It has its foundation in the work of Christ (Rom. i. 6; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Pet. v. 10). 7. It is irrevocable (Rom. xi. 29). 8. It is effected through the Effects of instrumentality of the gospel (2 Thess. ii. 14). 9. It is high and heavenly (Phil. iii. 4; Heb. iii. 1). And, 10. It is holy (2 Tim. i. 9; Rom. i. 7; 1 Tim. vi. 12; 2 Pet. i. 3).

It thus appears that calling is the counterpart and complement of election, being the actual realisation of that of which election is the purpose. It will be apparent, also, that under vocation, as above explained, fall two of the other steps in the ordo salutis of divines—viz., illumination and conversion; for in effectually calling a man to Himself by the gospel, God both sheds light into his mind and turns him to Himself and to heaven.

2. Regeneration. Through the operation of the Spirit, the sinner, naturally the enemy of God, is brought to become the child of God, and that not by adoption merely, but by a new birth or new creation. In this are involved two things: the one of which is the removal of the legal attainder and personal guilt under which the sinner lies; the other is the renewal of the spirit of the mind; by the implantation of a godly principle, a principle of love to God, which shall become the ruling principle of the soul and life. Both these are essential to a man's becoming a child of God; both, therefore, are properly included in regeneration; and both are brought about by that Spirit of sonship (υἱότης) which God, in the fulfilling of His electing purpose, gives to those that are saved (comp. Tit. iii. 4–7).

Thus viewed, Regeneration includes both Renewal and Justification, though it is commonly restricted to the former. In renewal, the Holy Spirit acts directly on the mind of man, restoring to him right moral dispositions, changing his prevailing bias from evil to good, and bringing him under a godly influence, whereby he is inclined to the things of God. It includes in it, therefore, repentance or change of mind. In justification, the Holy Spirit acts by operating faith in Christ in the sinner's mind, and thereby uniting him with Christ; faith being "that whereby" (to use the words of Owen) "the Lord Christ, and believers actually coalesce into one mystical Person." Being thus one with Christ, what He did and secured in His public character becomes theirs by God's gracious donation; and as He, having been put to death in the flesh, has been justified in the spirit, they too are held to have died in His death, and to be justified in His justification. The justification of believers, then, whereby they acquire a right to be the sons of God (John i. 12), is their legal acquittal and absolution from guilt, on the ground, not of any transfer of Christ's righteousness to them, nor on the ground of their being held as if they had not been guilty, but on the ground of a free grant being made to them by God of the benefits of Christ's meritorious work. As it is their faith which so unites them to Christ as to make them partakers of Him and of His work, so it is said in Scripture that they are justified by faith, and faith is counted to them for righteousness (Rom. iv. 5; v. 1).

See Owen, Doctrine of Justification by Faith through Imputation, &c.; Fuller, Works, vol. iv. pp. 223, 229, v. p. 586, &c.; Pictet, Theologiae Christianae, ii. 109, &c.; Payne, Lectures on Divine Sovereignty, &c., lect. xiv.–xx.; Wardlaw, System. Theology, ii. pp. 678–727.

3. Sanctification. The renewal of the mind is the first step in a process which, conducted under the immediate agency of the Divine Spirit, by whom it was commenced, gradually advances until the mind is wholly delivered from sin and all its evil effects, and he who had borne the image of the earthly is brought to bear the image of the heavenly. The consummation of this result is not to be expected on earth, but is assured to the believer in heaven, and constitutes the main element of his glorification (John xvii. 17; Rom. vi. 4, 6, 11, 12, 19, 22; 1 Cor. vi. 11; 2 Cor. vii. 1; 1 Thess. v. 23, &c.) Under this head may be ranked the unio mystica of theologians, for they intend by this "the state of a sanctified man, who embraces God with sincere love, and enjoys the blessedness of such love" (Hase, Huterus Redivivus, p. 287).

4. Perseverance. Wherever God has bestowed saving grace on a sinner, it has been with a view to his final salvation; therefore, all such will be kept so as that they shall never wholly nor finally fall from a state of grace, but will continue, with Divine assistance, to the end, so as finally and forever to be saved (John iv. 14; vi. 37, 39; x. 28; Rom. viii. 28-30, 35-39; Phil. i. 6; 2 Tim. iv. 8; 1 Pet. i. 4, 5).

See Owen, The Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance explained and confirmed, 1654, and in collected Works; Dwight, Theology, Sermon 87.

Sect. V.—Means of Grace.

The Holy Spirit is the agent in the salvation of all who are saved; but His agency is conducted in connection with the use of means. It is not meant by this that the Holy Spirit either adds force to these means, which would be to impeach their intrinsic worth as divine provisions; or that the Holy Spirit uses them as instruments by which He operates, a position to which it is impossible to attach any meaning. What is intended is, that the Spirit, operating directly on a man's mind, enables him to use these means so as that they shall effect for him the ends to which they are inherently and perfectly adapted. It is on account of this that the same effects are ascribed in Scripture to the Spirit and to the means of grace, as if they were co-ordinate causes. They are not really so; but as they co-operate to the same result, and contribute each an independent part to it, they are virtually so.

The means which the Spirit thus enables men to use for their salvation are these:

1. The written Word. This is given by inspiration of God, and as such is a perfect and infallible expression of His will to men. It is divinely adapted to enlighten, to guide, to reprove, and to stimulate in religious matters. By it men are called, convinced, quickened, comforted, and sanctified (Ps. xix. 7-9; John v. 39; Rom. xv. 4; 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17; Heb. iv. 12, 13; James i. 21; 1 Pet. i. 24, 25).

2. The preaching of the Truth. The design of this is to expound, apply, and enforce the written Word by means of oral addresses. As this instrument is admirably adapted to promote the ends which revelation is intended to effect, it has always formed an important part of the means employed for the edification of the Church (2 Chron. xvii. 7-9; Neh. viii. 1-8; Is. vi. 9, 10; Jer. xxv. 4 ff.; xxxv. 15; Mark xvi. 15, 20; Luke iii. 18; iv. 18, 19; vii. 1; 1 Cor. iv. 5; 1 Tim. iv. 13).

3. Worship. This consists of praise and prayer offered to God. In praise, we adore and celebrate the Divine perfections, acknowledge the Divine bounty, and give thanks for special mercies received by ourselves. In prayer, we offer up our desires to God for things agreeable to His will. Both these are to be presented in the name of Christ, through whom alone we can approach unto God; both are to be presented in the Spirit; and both are to be united in the same service, if not in the same act. Worship, in both its parts, may be either private or social (Ps. lxv. 1, 2; lxvi. 4; lxvii. 3; xcii. 1-3; xcvi. 1-9; cvii. 22; cxlvii. 1; Is. xliii. 10-12; Matt. vi. 7-12; vii. 1-3; Luke xviii. 1; Eph. v. 19; Phil. iv. 6; 1 Tim. ii. 11; Heb. iv. 14-16; x. 19-25; Eph. ii. 18; vi. 18).

4. The Sacraments. Truth may be presented either in words or by means of symbols. It is presented in the latter way in the sacraments, which are symbols or outward signs of spiritual truths; and the observance of them is an expression of a certain relation to the truths thus symbolised, as well as a pledge of adherence to the religion of which they are part. They are two in number, Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The former symbolises, by means of the application to the person of water, the purifying tendency of Christian truth when applied to the soul through the outpouring on it of the Holy Ghost (which is also called a baptism); and the observance of it is an expression of allegiance to Christ as the Lord of the conscience, and an engagement that the party receiving it shall become a disciple or learner in Christ's school. The Lord's Supper symbolises by means of bread broken and wine poured forth the propitiatory work of Christ for sinners, and the observance of it is in commemoration of this, as the crowning manifestation of Christ's love to His people, and in pledge of their continual dependence on Him, and devotedness to Him.

The ordinances of Christianity become means of grace to the sinner, by bringing before him those truths by the knowledge of which alone he can be saved, and reminding him of the obligations under which he lies to receive them in the love of them; and to the believer, by bringing before him the truth as the aliment of the soul, and drawing forth into lively exercise those habits of mind and states of feeling which constitute true piety. They thus advance his sanctification and preparation for heaven.

Sect. VI.—The Last Things.

As death has been introduced into our world by sin, and as every member of the race has sinned, the lives of all are forfeited, and must in due time be yielded as Providence may appoint. When this takes place, the soul is separated from the body, and the latter speedily decomposes into kindred dust. The former, however, still retains possession of all its peculiar faculties, and passes at once into a state of separate existence, the character of which is determined by the conduct of the individual during life. To those who have availed themselves of the gracious provision made by Christ for their redemption, death brings an immediate entrance into the enjoyment of heaven; while for those who have neglected or despised that provision, there remains only the endurance of the punishment which the Great Judge of all shall see necessary to inflict. (Compare Rom. v. 12; Matt. x. 28; Luke xvi. 22-31; Phil. i. 23; Rom. xiv. 13, &c.)

This state of separate existence is destined to continue only for a time. Christ has himself arisen from the dead as "the first-fruits of them that sleep;" and we are assured, that as He arose, so must all the dead who possess that nature of which He partook be raised at the last day. When that period arrives, the Saviour shall again, in person, revisit this world, summon from their grave the bodies of all mankind who have died, change in a moment the bodies of those who shall then be alive, and afterwards proceed to a solemn trial of the whole, each one by himself, according to their deeds done in the body. At the close, the eternal destiny of each will be announced, and the mediatorial reign of Christ terminated by the introduction of the righteous into the fulness of that celestial enjoyment to which our race was originally destined, and the banishment of the wicked into that place which was prepared for the devil and his angels. (Compare 1 Cor. xv.; John xi. 23-26; Matt. xxv. 31-46; Rom. xiv. 9, 10; 2 Thess. i. 5-10, &c.)

(W. L. A.)