All history, whether sacred or profane, teems with proofs that war has been a social evil or disease, afflicting mankind from the earliest times, and recurring with such regularity at successive epochs, as to have almost appeared necessary to, or inherent in, the constitution of mankind, as an aggregate of men, just as some diseases are known to be to the constitution of the individual man. Many, however, if not most, of the diseases which afflict the human frame, are not of a normal character, or the necessary result of a natural law, but are abnormal, being the consequence of the unrestrained and vicious indulgence of human passions. In the same manner, it may be justly said, that most wars have originated in the impulsive action of human passions. Sometimes, in the earlier stages of the earth's history, one race of people, urged by want or necessity, abandoned a country no longer able to support its increasing numbers, and, like a hive of bees or a swarm of locusts, migrated to and ravaged the lands of their neighbours; whilst, in later or more civilised times, the ambition of the monarch has generally kept alive national prejudices, and induced his people to strive after objects which could in no degree benefit their own condition, or advance their own happiness. Taking, for example, the present difficulties in settling the affairs of Italy, may it not be asked, what possible advantage have the natural subjects of the Emperor of Austria either gained, or can by possibility gain, from the sovereignty of any portion of Italy being vested in their own monarch, or in the princes of his family? But though worthless as a national possession, the Emperor doubtless considered it a matter of honour and ambitious pride to secure for every member of his family, if possible, the position of a reigning prince; just as a man of rank endeavours to place not only his heir but all his descendants in positions similar to his own. The son of a gentleman shuns a contact with mechanical or other trades, and keeps himself, though not in a Scriptural sense, unsullied from the world. And, in like manner, the Emperor of Austria doubtless considers that the sons, the nephews, or the cousins of an emperor, are born to be the governors of other countries; whilst it is doubtless a matter of convenience to shift the cost of their maintenance from their native country to any other country on which they can be imposed.

Such feelings as these would be harmless, were it not that it becomes the motive of the governing body in every country to keep up national prejudices and natural hatred in the governed, and thus to make them share in the passion for conquest; nor is this confined to despotic governments alone, as history tells us that republics have shared with them in the craving desire to trample on the rights and liberties of their neighbours, and to impose upon them the government, often oppressive and always distasteful, of the stranger.

The most remarkable, and, up to this time, the most successful, republican government which the world has ever seen, the United States of America, has not entirely escaped from the charge of giving way to this absorbing passion for aggrandizement; nor is the charge entirely unfounded, though at the same time it should be remembered, that in the United States the spirit of encroachment or of conquest is strongly mixed with the spirit of propagandism; for, whilst Republicanism in America wars against the governments of other countries, it admits the People, when overcome, to its own advantages and privileges. America does not strive to force foreign rulers upon other countries, but to draw those countries into its own bosom as integral parts of one great whole. The advance of education, and probably still more, the increased facilities of intercommunication, have doubtless done much to soften the asperities of national prejudices; but the enthusiastic advocates of peace, at any price, ought to remember, that individual passions and individual crimes have not yet ceased on the surface of the earth; and although the inhabitants of one country may have ceased to hate those of another, yet no one can say that the Autocrat of one nation may not yet desire to rule over another. England, of all countries, has the most reason to cherish the institutions it possesses, and the happiness it enjoys; and let Englishmen remember, that national defence ought with them to be considered a personal question, as the most humble man in the nation has an interest in keeping off the hand of the spoiler or the foot of the invader. They do not desire to interfere with the affairs of others; but let them always feel that English institutions are those best fitted for Englishmen; and let them convince the world that they are always ready to resist any attempt, from whatever quarter it may come, to impose upon them the yoke of any foreign autocrat, however blandly he may smile upon them.

There are some persons who appear to imagine that peace has now supplanted war in the social system; but such persons should look at the records of crime, and then remember, that so long as individual passions continue to lead to the infraction of law, both as regards person and property, so may it also be expected that similar passions will, on the large scale, lead to like results, and excite the ambition of rulers to encroach upon the territories of their neighbours; whilst the national pride and animosity of their subjects will abet them con amore in their injustice. Individual passions must cease before it can be hoped that national animosity will die away. The real littleness of the motives which have led to most wars is exemplified by the difficulty which systematic writers have found in giving a satisfactory definition of the term itself. War, says old Montecucilli, means the conflicts of armies seeking for victory; whilst his commentator, Turpin, considers that peace, rather than victory, is the object of war. It may indeed be said, that whilst men's passions are at their height they rush into war, thinking only of victory and conquest; but when they begin to suffer under the privations it draws down upon them, they cease to think of victory, and yearn after that peace which they had thoughtlessly assisted to break.

Von Decker observes, that, in studying the history of wars, it is very interesting to discover the real causes which have led to them; but to do so, he adds, "it is not only necessary to go back to the first steps of a war, but to dive into the political history of the states involved in it." Time, he adds, in such questions, "affords the best solution to even the most complicated enigmas; but what does that solution teach us when it is found necessary to seek for the motives of war, not in anything immediately present and patent to us, but in the almost forgotten records of the opinions and policy of emperors, kings, and statesmen of other days?"

It is usual to speak of wars as either offensive or defensive; but it may be fairly asserted that a defensive is the only legitimate form of war, though sometimes the necessities of defence may cause it to assume the aspect of offensive war. Von Decker, for example, observes that Frederick the Great, having rightly judged the real design of the coalition of 1756 to have been the dismemberment of Prussia, defeated the project by himself abruptly assuming the offensive, even at the risk of being proclaimed by the rest of Europe the aggressor. But the same author quotes many other examples where peace has been abruptly broken merely for the purpose of rendering aggression more successful; as, for instance, when Russia, in 1805, wishing to obtain possession of Finland, did not think it prudent to avow such an intention, but, regardless of reasons, took Sweden by surprise and rushed into war. Purely offensive wars, for the mere purpose of extending the authority of one monarch over the territories of another, are as unholy as purely defensive wars for the purpose of upholding the independence of one country, and of resisting the interference of another in its affairs, are holy. Let no one be deceived by the cunning device of securing peace by a universal autocracy; for though, in truth, wars might cease, peace would be gained by the abandonment of that wholesome emulation between nation and nation which is the result of their independent existence under their own approved though varied institutions, and which, like individual emulation between man and man, leads to the development of the higher qualities of mankind. It is better to be awake and active, even amidst the storms of war, than to be in a state of torpor under the dull and oppressive atmosphere which peace would spread over the world were it obtained by the abandonment of national independence, and by submission to the will of one irresponsible ruler.

Let it then be laid down as an established law amongst nations, that, just as no individual is considered justified in using arms except for self-defence, so also will no nation be held justified in waging war for any other object than the preservation of its independence; and, further, as the violence of individuals is brought under the cognizance of proper tribunals, so let a great national court be established for the consideration and arbitration of all disputes and complaints arising between nation and nation. The present system of holding congresses is an approximation to such an arrangement, though it has been hitherto conducted in a manner not calculated to produce the desired results, as the greater states or powers have assumed to themselves the right of deciding upon the interests of the smaller states, and even dismembering them, without any reference to national feeling, which may be, and often is, as intense in them as in their more powerful neighbours; witness, for example, the manner in which a Congress assumed the right to hand over the ancient and historically renowned Republic of Venice to Austria.

Whilst, however, it is to be devoutly hoped that a time may come when offensive or aggressive war, in the literal sense of the word, will be considered a national crime; still, in practice, offensive and defensive will be convertible terms, according to the various exigencies of war, a defensive changing into an offensive, and an offensive into a defensive; and it may be fairly said, that whilst the objects of those engaged in a defensive war should be to assume as soon as possible the attitude of aggression, so must those who undertake an aggressive war be prepared for defence in case of discomfiture.

As the first rules of every science must be established on the observation of facts, so also must war, as a science, be built up on the careful consideration of the facts and results of the wars of preceding ages. It is on this account that the study of military history becomes so important a means of training the soldier; not, however, contemplating that loose kind of reading which is sufficient for a novel or other book of fancy, but that close analytical study which endeavours to trace every effect to its cause, whether that effect be success or failure. In mechanics, it is a recognised fact that the greatest effect is produced when the power is applied in the right direction and to the right place, so also in war, it has been laid down as a fundamental maxim by successive military writers, including Jomini, and the commandant of our own staff college, Colonel Macdougall, that to obtain success in the shortest time, the greatest force should be brought to bear, in the right direction, on the weakest or most impressible point of an enemy. This maxim is manifestly equally applicable to a war viewed as a whole, to a single campaign as part of a war, or to a battle as an incident of a campaign; and it is therefore evident that the first step on entering into a war is to determine by what plan of operations the war as a whole may be best conducted to a successful issue, in the least possible time; next, to prearrange at the commencement of each campaign the operations by which the forces then available may be brought to act against the enemy in that point which will lead to a decisive result, or, in other words, to prepare the plan of the campaign; and, last of all, preparatory to a battle, to carry out the same principle in respect to the disposition and movements of the troops, so that each arm may be brought to bear on the enemy's line in such a manner that the more powerful mass may be directed on that point which will not only be easiest shaken, but will lead, when shaken, to the overthrow of the whole, or, in ordinary phrase, on the most decisive point. Each of the plans which have been here enumerated—the plan of war, the plan of campaign, and the plan of battle—requires to be settled on considerations of equal importance but of varying character.

The plan of war necessarily involves political considerations, such as the value of the result to be gained as compared to the cost of the struggle; the necessity and possibility of avoiding any infraction of the neutrality of adjoining states; the determination as to the best mode of carrying on the war, whether by sea or by land, either singly and in succession, or conjointly and simultaneously; the selection of the most vital point against which the operations of the war should be directed; the possibility of securing pecuniary and other means for carrying it on without interruption for a definite time. On such questions as these the combined talents of the statesman, the financier, and the soldier must be exercised.

The plan of campaign requires the conjoint consideration of the soldier, sailor, and of the authorities in charge of all the departments connected with war. The final results expected to be gained by a war having been previously determined, the first question to be determined is, whether they are within the scope of a single campaign, or will in all probability require to be extended over several. In either case the General, or the Admiral should it be decided to carry on the war principally by sea, must, from his knowledge of the country to be attacked, point out the proportions of the several arms of the service which are best suited to the physical conditions, resources, and communications of the country, or of the different classes of vessels which are best suited to navigate its coasts, and to approach its assailable points, so that the heads of departments may be early warned of the amount of equipment and of material of every description they will have to supply, not only at first, but under any conceivable circumstances during the whole of the campaign. These are all matters which require the greatest administrative ability, and on the part of the General, a power of thought and acquaintance with all the rules, casualties, and necessities of war, which are rarely to be expected from any but a man of high intellect, sound judgment, and ready decision.

The plan of battle requires in the General for its consideration not only that intimate acquaintance with military rules, strategical and tactical, which will enable him to anticipate the probable movements of his opponents, but also the coup d'oeil which brings at once to his mind all the features of the ground, and enables him to adjust each arm of the service to its proper place, to select the positions which will enable artillery, cavalry, and infantry each to act with the best effect, both in supporting his own army and in annoying that of the enemy.

Each of these Plans—the Plan of war, the Plan of campaign, and the Plan of battle—is sui generis, and requires for its determination a variety of knowledge, a maturity of judgment, and an accuracy of perception, which are sufficient to prove that a good general cannot be an ordinary man. Nature bestows genius and physical endowments of a high order, but art has supplied the knowledge and the training which renders the application of nature's gifts to practice easy and certain. It may indeed be justly said, that to no man more than to a general is a power of rapid combination necessary; and those studies, therefore, which have a tendency to strengthen the mind for the exercise of this species, as it were, of mental arithmetic or of mental geometry, ought not to be despised, even though they may not be dignified with the appellation "military." Every country in Europe, and we may add America, has long felt that a large amount of education is necessary to prepare an officer for the fulfilment of the higher functions of his profession; and in no country has this necessity been recognised and acted upon with so much energy as in France; and however tenaciously some old officers may still cling to the prejudice which leads them to imagine that, in military men, ignorance even of common things is no defect, the French have acted upon the very opposite principle, and proved that even the high mathematical instruction, for which the Ecole Polytechnique, the Ecole d'Etat Major, and, though in a less degree, the Ecole Imperiale de St Cyr, have long been distinguished, has in no degree deteriorated from the high character of their military officers.

In the Austrian army less attention is paid to what may be called scientific instruction (including mathematical), on the supposition, doubtless, that sound professional instruction can be given without any such elaborate preparation. The result of the late war in Italy may be appealed to as a proof that the intellects of the French officers had been cultivated and invigorated to a truly good purpose, as, under their guidance, and the command of their clear-headed Emperor-general, the French army was always found quickest in movements and most successful in action. The scientific education of French military officers may possibly be pitched too high, but experience has proved that there is far less danger to be expected from the excess of such education than from the want of it, which want so many fondly desire to continue as the distinguishing quality of the British officer. It was reserved for the present commander-in-chief, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, to supply one of the most serious deficiencies in the British army by establishing a Staff college, and almost at the same moment to remove the barrier, corporal punishment, which had long deterred the more intellectual and better educated portion of the working classes from entering the military service of their country. Without doubt, there are still some who look with apprehension at both these signal improvements, considering the teaching of a staff college worse than useless, and the lash the only security for military discipline; but the country at large will hail them as steps in military reform, consistent with those either made or about to be made in civil reform, and essential for the good of the army.

As each of the plans to which reference has been made is necessarily dependent on a great variety of circumstances, so the "decisive point," which is the proper object of all, cannot be defined or selected according to any one rigid rule, but must vary with the circumstances of each case. It must also be remembered that what is decisive as to one Plan may not be so as regards another. For example, though the decisive point for attack in a battle may be rightly chosen and the battle gained, no decisive result may have been produced on the campaign, the blow having been struck at a point and on a part of the enemy's force which do not prevent his keeping the field with a fair chance of recovering his lost ground, or at least of balancing his failure at one point by success in another. In like manner, a campaign may be throughout successful, and yet not materially affect the issue of the war itself. In fact, the strength of a country may be exhausted in efforts to gain an object which, when attained, may either prove of little value, or be only gained when its resources have been exhausted, and no strength or means are longer available to make use of it. Surely then the qualifications of a General-in-chief cannot be rated too high, when it is considered that, whilst he ought to be unshackled in the formation of his own plans, he ought to be held responsible for defects in them, or for errors in his mode of carrying them into effect; and this is specifically laid down as a rule for the general-in-chief of the army of the German confederation. After what has been said, it will appear remarkable that several modern writers, and some of them military men, maintain that attempts to teach war as a science are delusive, and lead only to pedantry; nothing in their opinion being of any value but experience.

What is the object, it may be asked, of reading military history but to benefit by the experience of others? Little good, however, would be derived from such reading were it unaccompanied by any analysis of the facts recorded, or by any attempt to trace effects up to their causes. In war, as in every science, the impulse of genius may, and often does, outstrip, in its results, the slower process of reasoning; but it is not the less necessary for those who do not possess such genius, and yet are likely to be required to walk in the same path, to investigate every step in the process which has been successfully followed by the man of genius. Grammar has grown out of language, and military science out of military experience. Wargery, himself an experienced general of Frederick the Great, has observed that, in his opinion, "an officer who had made himself fully acquainted with the theory of war (that is, with the results of experience), although he had not been actively engaged in war, would be more likely to succeed as a general than one who, though he had served long as an inferior officer, had no knowledge of the theory of war." The mere soldier may act as an automaton, others thinking for him; the man in high command must both think and act. It is indeed a sad thing that the lives of soldiers, the conduct of warlike operations, and the interests of a country, should be intrusted to a man who has yet to learn his first lesson in war, and is forced to excuse his blunders by the plea of want of experience.

A staff college has now been established; the instruction, to be given there, is founded on a judicious combination of sound military training with an extensive professional education, calculated at once to invigorate and inform the mind. So high a standard of scientific education has not been adopted as in France; it is more practical in its design, and though in conformity with the school and college systems of our own country, is calculated to supply their more palpable deficiencies. The British staff officer, and therefore the General, will henceforth be efficient as well at the beginning as at the end of a war or of a campaign. Having thus stated the necessity which is every day more powerfully forcing itself upon the public attention, of educating and training for war those men who are destined to act one day as subaltern officers, and at some future day as generals; it is right to add, that for national security it is equally desirable that those youths whose ambition can scarcely aspire to the rank of officer, should also, in their respective positions, be trained to military exercises.

The curious spectacle has been afforded of a monarch who has no ancestral claims to rule over the rich and powerful training of nation which has submitted itself to his absolute rule, being still urged on by ambition to appropriate to himself Savoy. Such an act has necessarily alarmed Switzerland for the preservation of its neutrality, and indeed of its independence as a nation; for how much more tempting than Savoy are the prosperous lands of Switzerland adjoining it. Aroused to a sense of the danger which threatens, the national militia, or rather the volunteers, for they include the great mass of the people, begin to beatir themselves. England had before caught up the same feeling, and, the national spirit being awakened, our volunteers are rapidly swelling into a body which will ere long supplement our regular army, and our enrolled militia, with a force which may, perhaps, one of these days, lead Englishmen to feel that they are as able to cross the channel, and, like their ancestors, invade France, as continue to live in apprehension of an invasion from France. Of every free country its volunteers should be the main resource, the standing army being just sufficient to form the nucleus of defence at home and abroad; in our colonies a local volunteer force is equally necessary. It is well to bear in mind the judicious observations of Jomini on this most important subject.

After pointing out the many examples of national wars, either partly or entirely successful, such as that of the Low Countries against Philip II., that of our American colonies against ourselves; that of La Vendée against the French Republic; those of Spain, Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon; that of the Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the forces of Queen Christina; he observes, that without the aid of any regular force, popular risings may, as in La Vendée, long protract the struggle without entirely preventing invasion or ultimate conquest; but when the population in arms rest upon a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops, a war of conquest becomes one of immense difficulty. On one side there is indeed an army, but on the other there is an army aided by the whole mass of the people, all panting for the destruction of the enemy. The invader occupies only the ground on which he is encamped, as everything beyond is pregnant with hostility and danger. He gives some examples from his own experience of the nature of such struggles. "On one occasion," he observes, "I placed in cantonments the artillery companies between Betanzos and Corunna, there being no signs of any Spanish troops within 20 leagues on either side." Notwithstanding this, "one fine night the companies of the train, men and horses, all disappeared, and no one at the time knew what had become of them. A wounded corporal, however, saved himself, and brought in the news that the peasantry, led by the priests and monks, had seized upon and massacred all his comrades. A similar event occurred when the army of the gallant Romans cut off some of the isolated regiments of the division of Marchand."

Jomini sums up his observations by the following statement:—"No army, however warlike, can act successfully against such a plan of national defence, unless it is sufficiently numerous to occupy in force all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and keep in motion corps sufficiently powerful to attack and defeat the enemy wherever he may appear." Napier cites many instances of the gallant conduct of the Portuguese armed peasantry, even when opposed to regular troops. When, in fact, a nation has a respectable regular army forming a nucleus, round which the population may be grouped (not only armed, as in the case of our volunteers, but also disciplined), the forces required by the assailant in order to be at once superior in the field, and to preserve his own communications, would be enormous.

Enough, it is hoped, has been said to prove that, in a defensive war, and England ought rarely to be engaged in any other, the national policy ought to be to maintain a moderate but highly trained regular army, effective in every arm, and to supplement it, in time of need, by the militia and volunteers; the latter not being a rabble or mob, but men well armed, well trained to the use of arms, and ready to sacrifice everything to the protection of their country. Proceeding, then, on this principle, that defensive warfare is the only form of war which it is probable England will be ever called upon to engage in, a few sentences may be well devoted to the question so often agitated at the present time, On what system ought that defence to be conducted? In the first place, then, it may be boldly asserted, that every country ought to rely for ultimate security on the number and efficiency of the armed men it is able, in the event of danger, to bring into the field. A nation united in itself, provided with the best arms, and trained to their use, willing to submit itself to authority when acting against an enemy, and in its nature warlike and fearless of danger, would be unconquerable by any army which could be brought against it. Though much is said by those who rest the defence of the country either on works of fortification or on a regular army only, of the past invasions of England, they should remember that in no one case were all the conditions here enumerated fulfilled. Warnery has well argued, that the boasted invasions of Britain by Caesar were productive of no permanent results, and deserved, therefore, to be looked upon as reconnaissances; and that if William III. conquered England with a small force, the army and people were with him. In such a country as England, little help can be obtained from the natural difficulties of the ground; and hence, were the defence to depend solely on a regular army, that army must be equal in strength to any which can be brought against it. The maintenance of such an army within Great Britain and Ireland would swallow up all the resources of the country, leave no troops for the defence of our colonies, and reduce the whole population to beggary. The only really available method is that which has now become as popular in England as it has always been in Switzerland and America—viz., to supplement a moderate but highly disciplined army by a well armed and fairly trained mass of volunteers.

The movements of light troops are undoubtedly more difficult of execution than those of the ordinary line soldiers, but the increased difficulty is due to the increased intelligence required, and, therefore, the more likely to be mastered by the class of men who become volunteers. There is something, also, in the drill which assimilates it more to the rapid and independent action required in many a manly game of amusement, and thereby renders it rather fascinating than irksome. Let a light-infantry regiment be stationed in the vicinity of several volunteer corps, and let them go through the exercise, first separately and then combined together, and it cannot be doubted that the power of imitation, and the spirit of emulation, would soon render volunteers an efficient addition to the light-infantry, as the militia force is to the line and artillery. An invading army advancing into an enemy's country, and having before it a smaller but equally brave and disciplined army, would find its progress both difficult and dangerous, when subjected on each side of its route to the incessant worrying of a crowd of active and brave, though volunteer, riflemen. It should be also remembered, that the skirmishers sent out by an invading foe to clear their way, lose that peculiar moral advantage which they had derived from acting together, and are obliged, like the volunteer, to depend on individual activity, coolness, and intrepidity. We believe that Englishmen, whether regulars or volunteers, are exceeded by the people of no other nation in those qualities.

Having thus stated the manner of providing for the active defence of the country in a defensive war, it remains to inquire how far the security of the country can be promoted by material or passive defences, such as works of fortification. Every fortress must of course, according to its magnitude, absorb so much of the active army, and hence lead to the great evil to which defensive warfare is generally liable—namely, the breaking up of an army into detachments. Where a defensive war is carried on by active means only, this evil may be reduced to a minimum, by allowing the enemy to waste his time and efforts on unimportant points, and by concentrating the great body of defenders on the most vital points. Many fortresses, however, must necessarily require many garrisons, as it would be folly to build what it is not intended to defend; and though even here volunteers will relieve a portion of regular troops, it must be deemed a piece of good fortune that there are few fortresses in England.

So many and such conflicting opinions have been advanced on the best mode of defending a country against invasion, that it would be in vain to attempt to discuss them all. Some have attached importance to such arrangements as the triple line of fortresses, by which France was once supposed to be rendered secure; whilst others, pointing to their inefficiency on several occasions to stop the progress of invading armies, have gone to the opposite extreme, and declaring all fortresses useless, have recommended their demolition. Unquestionably fortresses are more important, in facilitating the operations of offensive warfare than as auxiliaries to those of defence, and yet they cannot be entirely abandoned: the real object ought to be to restrict them to the smallest possible number, and to take care that their value justifies the expense of their construction. Captain Vandeveld has well summed up the question in the two following passages:

"Passive defence is perilous: fortresses which are not constructed for some special object of utility are injurious. Most states have too many fortresses; fortresses ought not to have for their object the closing or defence of a frontier. The disposition of defence which requires a cordon of fortresses erected on the frontier of a state is vicious and out of date."

"Active defence is the best that can be adopted. Active operations may require to be aided by fortresses. The defence on the flanks ought to be combined with the defence on the front. The combination of the two kinds of defence, which is the best system to be adopted, requires that the capital, which is the focus of the national power, and the main object of attack, should also be the focus of general operations; or, in other words, should be placed by a great intrenched position, where the principal military resources of the nation might be concentrated; that in the dispositions for defence account should be taken of the new modes of propulsion; and, finally, that the military forces and resources of a state ought to determine the number of fortresses, their strategic position, and their tactical form and development."

Acting on these maxims, Vandeveld proposes a system which, applied to France, would require twenty-one fortresses only—namely, six maritime, Toulon, Rochefort, La Rochelle, L'Orient, Brest, and Cherbourg, as covering the dockyards, ports, and depots of the navy; six frontier places to serve as bases for an offensive war, and as advanced posts to watch the movements of an enemy in a defensive war; five places of large development between the frontier and the centre or capital, where of course the armies destined to act in particular directions would be assembled, and to which, in case of defeat, the frontier detachments would retire, as the enemy advanced towards the great central fortress, or intrenched camp, being in France, the capital, Paris.

Applying the same principles to England, it must be premised that the coast becomes the frontier, and, as Vandeveld observes, the protection of that frontier from insult should mainly depend on "the moveable citadels afloat rather than on inert coast defences." Keeping this principle in view, and it is undoubtedly a sound one, our maritime fortresses should be simply those which are necessary to afford safe rendezvous to our fleets, whether armed or commercial, and protection to our arsenals and dockyards. A communication between them should be kept up by occasional watch-towers, and by a naval police, or, in other words, by small steam-vessels running from one port to another, and so built as to secure great speed, and be efficient in running down boats or other small craft. Railway and telegraphic communication should also be established, so that, an enemy being observed, immediate notice of his apparent strength

and object should be spread through the country, so that troops from every adjacent locality, as also all the available scout or police boats, might be at once directed to the point where the landing of the enemy was expected, in order to dispute it, or arrest his progress. The landing being effected, should the enemy direct his march towards one of our maritime fortresses, the volunteers, and other available forces of the district, will be concentrated within its defences, whilst an army will be assembled at the intrenched camps most convenient to it, ready to act upon the rear of the enemy. Unless the fleet had been entirely crippled, and we cannot believe that such could be the case without, at least, a corresponding destruction on the part of the enemy, reinforcements would, by its aid, be thrown into the besieged fortress; and the invading army, thus placed in an extended line between two forces, every day increasing, would soon be utterly destroyed, or else, abandoning the siege, be obliged to attempt a forward movement in a hostile country, cut off from its communication with its own base.

Possessing for a moment, as it were, a superiority in the Channel would be of very little avail; for, though an army might be landed, its destruction would be unavoidable, unless the enemy's fleet could maintain that superiority sufficiently long to enable its army to obtain possession of one of the maritime fortresses, and thus secure a base of operations. Supposing, however, the enemy advance at once towards the metropolis by the aid of railways, &c., the troops should be immediately concentrated in those intrenched camps which command the line of his march, when, if he attempted to turn them, he would be subject to attack in flank, and doubly so if he attempted to pass between them. If, however, the enemy succeed in passing these obstacles, without having received any material check, all the forces should be concentrated on the central pivot, the great intrenched camp either surrounding, or in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. This great internal line of defence should include Woolwich arsenal, and be formed of a circle of detached forts, and within the great area they encircle should be assembled all the available troops, whether regulars, militia, or volunteers within reach, not with a view to remain passive, but to harass incessantly the enemy by throwing a concentrated force on any part of his army which appeared weakened by its necessary extension.

It is not to be supposed, that in a country like England, an enemy would be allowed to pass beyond the intermediate fortresses or intrenched camps, such as Chatham, without being brought to a stand; but, if it were possible, he ought certainly to be not only stopped but destroyed before London. Lord Cathcart proposed, in 1803, a continued enceinte; but of late years the more general opinion has been to adopt detached forts, the active defence of the army within being more effectual when it can move readily to the attack of the investing force, which it could not do were it shut up within the walls of a fortress. Coast defences, in the ordinary sense of the word, as understood in this country, would only be a source of weakness, by disseminating over a vast frontier a large mass of valuable troops. The intermediate fortresses, or intrenched camps, would become training-camps for troops during peace, points d'appui on which to concentrate armies of defence in time of war, the intrenched capital, or the highly developed works in its vicinity, the final point on which the whole energies of the nation should be directed. If, with the external aid of its navy, and the activity and energy of its brave inhabitants, England cannot be secured from the attacks of an enemy, it is in vain to seek for that security in inert masses of earth or stone. Fortresses are useful for gaining time; but no country was ever secured by them from conquest when its army was unable to face the invader in the field, and its population was neither inclined nor prepared to co-operate with that army. The annexed woodcut explains the views of Vandeveld, or his reticulated type of arrangement.

Referring now to war in a more general sense, and more especially viewing it as offensive in its design, and therefore intended to pass beyond the limits of the country which engages in it, it is necessary more particularly to define the terms adopted in military science; following Jomini, as the best guide in so doing, and bearing in mind his observation, "As to me, I am persuaded that good definition leads to clear conceptions."

1. Strategy is the art of rightly directing the masses of troops towards the objective of the campaign.

2. Logistique is the science of the Quarter-master-general's department, one of the most important of all departments of an army about to enter on a campaign. It comprises the preparation of all the materials required for the army when about to move or open the campaign; drawing up of all orders, instructions, and routes necessary for guiding its movements; also taking the orders of the generals-in-chief on the projects of attack; the determination, in conjunction with the commanding officers of Artillery and of Engineers, of the measures required for placing in security the necessary depots, and the posts which it is desirable to fortify, in order to facilitate operations; making reconnaissances, and taking every other measure necessary for obtaining exact information of the position, strength, and movements of the enemy; concerting with the several heads of departments what posts or guards it is necessary to establish, what depots to form, and the best manner of placing them in security; to receive the orders of the commander-in-chief; and then so to arrange the movements of the several columns that they shall all, at the prescribed moment, arrive at the place of rendezvous; to provide in the same manner for all the casualties of retreat; to establish cantonments, and to indicate to every corps the place of assembly; in short, the Quarter-master-general, or, in more general terms, the Staff, have to act as the eyes and the ears of the Commander-in-chief; or, likening the latter to a voltaic battery, the Quarter-master-general and the Staff represent the conducting wires, which carry his wishes and orders onwards, and put in motion the whole army tactics.

3. Tactics.—As strategy may be considered the science, so tactics constitute the art of war. Whilst the strategist weighs all the considerations which influence the determination of the decisive points in the field of operations, calculates all the chances in favour of success, whether by battle or otherwise, and prescribes all the measures which are likely to ensure that success, the tactician directs and superintends those combinations of troops, and those details of their movements, which are best calculated to carry into effect the leading principle of military science, that the main body of troops should be brought to bear on that part of the enemy's army, and on that point of his position, where it is likely, taking into due consideration the fitness of the ground for the effective action of the most powerful arm of his troops, that his attack will produce the greatest results. It is usual to subdivide tactics into grand or greater, and petty or lesser; but this is merely a question of degree, the first referring to the greater movements or operations of war, the second to those of drill and of the parade, or in other words, to those of preparation for war. The latter involves a multitude of details, which, when incorporated in a soldier's habits, render him fit to perform, with precision and with confidence, the more important movements of actual warfare.

Before quitting this part of the subject, it is well to dwell for a moment on a question which has been often agitated, namely, whether the chief command of a great army would be best safely confided to an officer of great experience in regimental affairs, and in the ordinary command of troops, or to a general taken from the staff, or from the scientific corps, but who has previously been little accustomed to the management of troops. This question would not, until lately, have been applicable to the British army, as commanding officers, whether they had previously served in the staff, or had been taken immediately from the body of regimental officers, were equally without any previous training for the duties of high command. It is true that some generals had been previously students of the senior department of Sandhurst; but the scheme of study there adopted was imperfect, in not including a sufficient proportion of instruction in the science and art of war. It was sufficient to stimulate the intellect, and even sufficiently practical to turn out many able staff officers, but it fell short of the requirements of an officer destined to high command, by not accustoming the students to read and analyse the accounts of preceding wars, and to discover the causes which led to the success, and even the occasional failures, of great generals. This defect is now remedied by the Staff college, in which preparatory studies are blended with lectures on military history and military art; just as is the case in the Ecole d'Etat Major of France and other countries; whilst the British system has this advantage, that the students have all served at least three years, and come, therefore, to the college fully acquainted with regimental affairs and with the lesser tactics. Jomini has named, in the order of their relative importance, the essential qualification of a general—1. Moral courage, which enables him to form great resolutions, the reverse of nervousness; 2. Sang froid, or coolness amidst dangers; 3. Knowledge, which, though not vast, must be sound; 4. Bravery, justice, freedom from jealousy of the merits of others, more especially of the merits of his subordinates. Touching one of these qualities, knowledge, which is presumed to include an accurate acquaintance with the leading principles of war, the opinion of Warnery has been already quoted, and Jomini seems, in some degree, to hold a similar opinion, for he observes—"It is un- doubted that war is a peculiar science, and that a man may very well direct the operations of an army although he may never have commanded a regiment; and he quotes as examples, Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon, to whom may be added the present Emperor of the French. Whilst, however, admitting the probable superiority for command of a general who has come from the Staff corps, the Artillery, or the Engineers, under similar circumstances, over one who is only acquainted with the service of a particular arm, he rightly adds, that a General selected from the infantry, who has studied the art of war, will be equally fitted for command. In some cases genius may compensate for deficiencies, but as a rule it may be asserted, that the great captain will combine knowledge of his science with the other qualities which have been enumerated. Without, therefore, going to the same length as Warnery, who declares that "he has never known a general arrive at the highest command, and acquire himself creditably, who had served only with the line," we may safely assume that the system of our Staff college, which provides that an officer should first possess a knowledge of regimental details, and then study the higher branches of military science, is more likely than any hitherto devised to curb patronage, and to furnish our armies with able staff officers, and with equally able generals.

Every preliminary arrangement having been completed, and the army being in all respects prepared for action, it must first be determined whether an offensive or a defensive war will be the most prudent. If it be intended to carry the war into the enemy's country, it will commence offensive, and should be so maintained as long as possible; every relaxation will be attended with difficulties, as it must be the result of at least temporary weakness. If, on the contrary, it is intended to be restricted to the boundaries of the country attacked, and to be therefore primarily defensive, no opportunity ought to be lost of assuming the offensive, and taking the initiative in the operations. An active defence is, indeed, as productive of important results in a war, as it is in a fortress.

**Base of Operations.**—The theatre of war, or the field of operations, having been determined on the principle before stated, that it shall strike at the enemy's most vulnerable point, a Base must be selected, as the preliminary measure antecedent to any further act or movement. A Base may consist of one fortress only, understanding by that term such an extensively developed work as will afford shelter to an army, as in the case of Sevastopol, or Verona in its present state; of two or more points strategically connected together, so as to afford security for supplies of all kinds to the army when put in motion, or for affording shelter to that army if obliged to retreat. The word points here used means strategical points, or those capable of being made defensible either in themselves, or as parts of a position or line of defence. The extent of ground to be taken up by a base-line, and the number and importance of the strategical points to be embraced by it, must depend on the force which can be applied to its permanent defence, on the mode and direction in which the supplies for the army are to be obtained, and on the manner in which it is intended that the campaign shall be carried on. If the communications with the sources of supplies all tend to one point, that point should be made a fortress of large development, capable of affording cover to the army intended to commence operations, and to secure from attack the magazines of all kinds. Subsidiary points should be also taken up, to secure the principal basal point in flank. Where, however, there are several roads, each leading from a productive source of supply to the intended front of operations, a defensible point should be established at each, and a transverse communication maintained between all the points which thus constitute the base of opera-

There is, indeed, an advantage in thus spreading the depots of provisions and material amongst several fortified posts, as the loss of any one would not leave the army deprived entirely of its resources; or should it be obliged to retire, not expose it so much to the chance of being cut off from its supplies. As a general rule, also, the base ought to be proportioned to the expected length of the line of operations, or to the distance the army would have to march into the enemy's country.

If the base be very short, an army must be very restricted as to the choice of its line of operations, as the slightest deviation to one side or the other must expose it to the danger of being cut off from the base; and in case of discomfiture, it is reduced to one line of retreat. If the base be too long, it will absorb too many troops in the defence of the posts of which it consists. These considerations demonstrate, that the disposable force of the army, ought to be in proportion to the distance required to be passed over before arriving at the objective of the campaign, as the base must either be proportionately lengthened, or detachments left by the advancing army to secure important points on the line of march, either to serve as links of connection with the base, or to form intermediate or secondary bases. Bulow has endeavoured to reduce this question to one of geometry, and has laid down as a rule, that lines drawn from the extremities of a base to the objective should meet in a right angle, or, in other words, that the line of operations, that is to say, the total length of march to be effected, ought not to exceed one-half the length of the base; but this is evidently a vain attempt to introduce mathematical precision into the art of war.

The maxim itself, that a base should be proportioned to the length of the line of operations intended to spring from it, is one of reason, and indeed of common sense; but the exact proportion must vary in every particular case, as no general confident of his own powers, and of the activity, zeal, and bravery of his troops, and at the same time thoroughly acquainted with the physical geography of the country to be invaded, the dispositions of its inhabitants, and the nature of the enemy's troops, ought to allow himself to be tramelled by any fixed rules. Napoleon has afforded striking illustration, both of the wisdom of sometimes deviating from strict rule, and of the danger which may be the result of so doing. Sponzilli, an ingenious writer, thus notices two great acts of his life, the one ending in glorious success, the other in ruin. "In 1805, after he had destroyed the Austrian army at Ulm by his bold and brilliant movements, he ought probably, in conformity with the rules of science, to have established a new base in Bavaria before directing his march on Vienna; but genius counselled differently; for, observing that the Russians and the army of Vienna were likely to effect a junction with the Archduke Charles, and thus to render the victory of Ulm useless, Bonaparte hastened at once towards Vienna, had the luck to find that the bridge over the Danube had not been destroyed, passed the river, advanced against the Russians in Moldavia, defeated them, together with the Austrians, at Austerlitz, before the junction with the Archduke had been effected, and concluded peace." Here it is evident a great risk was run in order to insure a still greater advantage; and yet how much of the success depended on want of precaution in the Austrians.

The next example is drawn from the result of the celebrated campaign of 1812, in which "The French, retiring on Smolensko as their secondary base, had scarcely abandoned Moscow before they saw their communications threatened by the movement of the Russians towards Kalovga; and finding the line of their retreat cut off after the battle of Maloareslavetz, were forced to make a disastrous retrograde movement in order to regain the road to Smolensko." Bold as the first forward movement was, it would, in all probability, have been attended with success, had not the Russians wisely determined to tempt the enemy on by continued retreat, and then to deprive him of all chances of subsistence by burning the capital and ravaging the country; but when retreat became necessary, then the evil of being so distant from even the secondary base became palpable, and ended in the ruin of the most remarkable general of these times. It is, indeed, in case of failure in attaining the object of advance, that an army will assuredly suffer most from a neglect of the principles which regulate the establishment of bases of operations. One man may, conscious of his powers, leap without hesitation over a yawning chasm; another, without those powers, may attempt the same leap, but precipitate himself to destruction. In defensive war, it may be possible in some countries, which are only accessible in one or two directions, to establish a first base of operations in connection with frontier fortresses, providing, however, secondary bases in the interior, to be used in case of the enemy overpowering the first resistance, and obliging the defenders to retreat. In this case, it is manifest that the retreating army will, by its continued concentration, become stronger as it retires, and hence require for their reception highly developed fortresses. In respect to England, where the accessible frontier is so extensive, the rules which have been suggested and explained above appear to be best fitted for its defence. Maritime fortresses for the security of dockyards and arsenals; minor works for purposes of watching or look-out, combined with a naval police; largely developed fortresses or fortified positions, to serve as bases or points d'appui at which to make a firm stand, and, in case of success, to assume the offensive; and, finally, a central fortified station, at which the final stand should be made—a fight for victory or ruin.

Lines of operation.—It is well to form in the mind a conception of this term, distinct from that of all others; and it is to the facility of describing and understanding military events, that the precise language of Jomini and other great military writers owes its principal recommendation. Thus, for example, the general theatre of war may embrace a large space, including several objectives: a zone of operations refers to a section of that theatre relating to one objective, although there may be several lines of operation directed upon it. Lines of operation mean simply those lines of march or of movement which represent the direction, either of advance or of retreat, springing at the one extremity from the base or bases of operations, and terminating on the other at the objective.

The meaning thus attached to a zone of operations is well explained by Jomini, who observes, in the plan of campaign for 1796, Italy was the zone of operations for the army of the right, Bavaria the zone for that of the centre, and Franconia that for the army of the left. The general theatre of war embraced all three. Lines of communication may, in a secondary sense, be applied to the road or roads along which the several divisions of an army may move; but in the general sense in which it is here understood, it implies simply the line of direction, and therefore includes within its range every road or path by which all the columns or sections of the same army, or division of an army, make their way from the same base towards the same objective. It is only necessary that all these columns, moving in the same, or rather in nearly parallel directions, shall be able at any moment to unite into one body, to establish that they are operating on the same line. If, however, they are prevented by any natural obstacle—such as a river not affording means of communication by bridges—from uniting, they are no longer moving on one line of operations, but upon two, just as much as if the leading direction were not the same. It will be observed, that the distinction between territorial lines and lines of operation is not here dwelt upon, as too much refinement in terms leads to confusion. Any detachments from the main body, which move in lines diverging from the principal line, in order to effect some subsidiary object, may be considered as moving in auxiliary manoeuvring lines, which become independent when they pass beyond the range of support from the principal line.

Double lines of operation are those which two armies follow when acting independently, and at a considerable distance from each other, even though they are acting under the primary orders of the same general-in-chief, and are directed towards the same objective. They are Interior when the two armies have the power of rapidly combining together, and concentrating their attack on either one or the other division of the enemy's army, which is presumed to be moving in separate and exterior lines—one on one side, one on the other side of their direct line. This definition explains that the position might be central, and yet the lines not interior; by which it is meant, that should two lines be unable to maintain communication with each other, or to concentrate their force, so that their respective armies may act together, they cease to be interior lines, as the army on the right is then moving on a simple line, parallel to that of the enemy's army next to it; and the same in respect to the army on the left. The important difference between these two conditions may be readily understood from the following simple cut:

On the left of the figure A₁ A₂ are moving on interior lines; E₁ E₂ on exterior lines. Now it is evident that the distance between E₁ and E₂ being so much greater than between A₁ and A₂, and the communication between the two latter being always possible, they are able to combine and make a conjoint attack upon E₁ E₂ before the other can come to its support; and then having destroyed one army, is free to act against the second. On the right of the figure, B₁ B₂ represents a range of obstacles—either an impassable river, a line of impenetrable swamp, or a mountain-ridge—which cuts off communication between A₁ and A₂, and obliges each army to act independently and alone,—one against E₁ on the left, and the other against E₂ on the right; the conflict being in each case on equal terms.

Exterior lines are the opposite of interior, or those in which two armies are so arranged that one acts on the right extremity of one or more of the enemy's armies, and the other on the left extremity. E₁ and E₂ in Fig. 1 of the above cut are acting on exterior lines; E₁ and E₂ in Fig. 2, though exterior in locality to $A^1$ and $A^2$, are each strategically acting in simple parallel lines to them; the disadvantages of exterior and the advantages of interior lines being here neutralized.

The terms converging and diverging, when applied to lines of operation, explain themselves.

Deep lines are those which have to pass through a large extent of country between the base line and the objective to which they are directed. Other terms, such as secondary and accidental, seem a useless refinement; for though one army may be acting in support of another, it must still have a special objective and a special line of operations; and in the same manner, whenever a general finds it necessary to change the direction of operations, though the change is accidental, or consequent on a change of circumstances since the plan of campaign was decided upon, the new line is then the true line of operations.

From what has been said it appears that the leading maxims of war might have been derived from common sense alone, and are almost capable of mathematical demonstration. To trace them in their application to war, the student must, of course, refer to military history, and more especially to the campaigns of Frederick the Great, Marlborough and Eugene, Napoleon and Wellington, as being those in which the leading principles of war have been most fully illustrated, though an analytical investigation of almost any campaign cannot fail to be of use in discovering the cause of success or of failure, which has often been more due to the observance or to the neglect of sound principles, than to superior bravery and discipline.

No one can doubt the wisdom of the first great principle—that the greatest force should be brought to bear against the most decisive point, either in a campaign or in a battle; nor, in carrying out that principle to the necessity of a right consideration of the lines of operations. It is manifest that double interior lines, which may be more clearly defined as double interior connected lines, must enable a stronger force to be brought to act against a weaker, when the enemy has either voluntarily or by compulsion divided his forces and is acting on exterior lines. The other case might be with equal propriety called double interior disconnected lines, and has been the source of many discomfits. Bonaparte's campaign in Italy has been often quoted in illustration of these great maxims. He commenced his glorious career in that country, and his object was first to isolate the Austrian and Piedmontese armies, which he effected by the battle of Millesimo, as they were then thrown upon exterior lines and successively beaten at Mondovi and at Lodi. A formidable army was assembled in the Tyrol with a view of relieving Mantua, then besieged by Bonaparte, but the imprudence was committed of marching by double unconnected lines, the Lake Guarda separating them. Bonaparte at once abandoned the siege, advanced with the greater portion of his forces against the first column which debouched by Brescia, defeated and drove it back to the mountains, then was ready to receive the second column as it came to the same ground, defeated it in turn, and forced it to retire into the Tyrol, and there seek to regain the right division.

Three causes co-operated here towards the success of Bonaparte: first, the Allies marching two armies on the opposite sides of a lake which intercepted all communication between them; secondly, defective calculation, which, in strategy, is a most serious evil, by which it happened that these converging lines did not come to the desired point of union at the same time; and, thirdly, the more accurate calculation and greater celerity of Bonaparte, who was enabled thereby to anticipate the junction of the two armies, and defeat them in succession.

Jomini has deduced certain rules or maxims of war, which, at the risk of some repetition, it appears desirable to cite, with some few modifications, as a summary of the preceding remarks.

The art of war consisting in bringing as large a force as possible to act on the most decisive point, the base line has to be so established as to ensure to the army during its advance a regular supply of all the muniments of war, and a place of refuge in case of retreat; and in doing so, the general's skill and judgment in determining the lines of operation are put to the test.

The direction to be adopted depends partly on the geographical peculiarities or physical features of the country to be traversed, partly on the political relations of the adjacent countries, and partly on the manner in which the enemy's forces are posted. If the enemy has disseminated his forces over an extensive space, and thereby left considerable intervals between his forces, it is manifestly most advantageous to direct a single, or a double connected line, upon his centre, as he will be thereby broken and forced to move in exterior lines. If, however, the enemy's forces are well concentrated, the line of operations should be directed on one of his flanks, so that the main body of the army may be brought not only to bear on a portion of that of the enemy, but also to threaten his rear. It is only in the case of a greatly preponderating force, that a conjoint attack on the front and on the extremities can be attempted at the same time.

In endeavouring to gain the flank of the enemy's front, with the view of turning it and attacking him in rear, care must be taken so to direct the line of operations, both geographically and strategically, as to keep open a safe line of retreat, and prevent the enemy, through any oversight, being able to intercept the communication of the attacking army with its own base.

It is unwise to act with two independent armies in the same zone of operations, unless the available forces are so large, or the physical conditions of the country such, that the attempt to combine their movements in one line of operations would cramp and interfere with their progress, and lead to confusion.

As a consequence of the preceding, it is evident that, as a rule, the opposing forces being equal, a simple line of operations is far preferable to two; but it will often happen, from the configuration of the ground, and from the fact that the enemy has already divided his forces, and shown an intention of moving in two lines, that it becomes necessary to adopt a double line, in order to hold each of the masses of the enemy in check. In this case, the lines should be interior, but connected, so that by a combined movement they may act against and overthrow either one or the other of the enemy's masses before the enemy can possibly effect a junction of his forces. A general having determined which of the two divisions of the enemy it will be most desirable to attack first, he will place a sufficient force as a corps of observation to watch the other, with orders not to risk an action, but merely to hold the enemy in check, taking advantage of every favourable position to make a momentary stand, but instantly retiring upon the principal army. When, however, the preponderance of force is so great on the one side that it would be possible to carry on operations with a reasonable chance of success on more lines than one, it is desirable to adopt double lines; and though, as a general rule, they ought to be interior, it may sometimes be advantageous that they should be exterior, so as to force the enemy into a space inadequate to the efficient manoeuvring of his troops. This is also a contingency to be avoided when moving on internal lines, and a general should take care to effect the union of the two lines, and to make his decisive attack on one of the enemy's divisions before he has been driven into a position in which all his forces cannot be brought into action with effect. These remarks prove how essential a knowledge of the country in his front is to a general conducting offensive operations.

Converging are more consistent with true principles than diverging lines, as they cover the communications with the base line; but they ought to be so arranged that their union may take place before the enemy can fall on either of the armies moving upon them. When a battle has been gained, the victorious army may move with advantage in diverging lines, so as to follow the dispersed troops of the enemy and complete their destruction,—but this of course, implies that the lines are internal though diverging, and afford, therefore, more facility than the enemy possesses for effecting a junction.

It may be necessary to change the line of operations, and to establish a new base, but this can only happen from some failure, or from unforeseen circumstances, and is therefore very precarious. Some generals have anticipated such a casualty and provided for it. For example, it is said that Bonaparte had, prior to the Battle of Austerlitz, determined, in the event of partial failure, to move by Bohemia, on Passau, or Ratisbon, so as to have before him a country new and full of resources, rather than to resume his march upon Vienna, the country contiguous to which had been ravaged, and where the Archduke Charles would also have resisted his progress.

In a similar manner Sir John Moore, intending to intercept the communications of the French, proceeded from Portugal, adopting a line of operations from Salamanca across the Douro and the Tagus towards Burgos, but at the same time kept in view a way of retreat in case of failure, an accidental line from Villa Franca to Corunna. His bold project appeared to progress well, and he would have come in contact with Soult on the Carrion, had he not learnt that Bonaparte had left Madrid and already passed the Sierra Guadarama, so as to cut off his own communication with Portugal, and threaten that with Galicia; on the receipt of such alarming news he commenced the rapid retreat to Corunna, and thus to Moore's forethought was the British army indebted for its preservation.

Such lines as these should rather be called contingent than accidental, as they are planned beforehand in the event of certain contingencies. Purely accidental lines, taken up at the spur of the moment, must necessarily call into play not only the most accurate knowledge in planning, but also the greatest skill in execution,—qualities, in fact, of the highest generalship.

It is evident that the territorial boundaries and the physical geography of a country must have a material influence in both determining the line of direction to be given to operations, and the results to be expected from them. If the frontier of one country be projected far into another, forming a natural salient, the sides of which have been strengthened, if necessary, by art, it is favourably situated for commencing offensive warfare, as it leads naturally to the adoption of internal lines.

Where no such central position is afforded by the natural projecting character of the territorial boundary, the same effect may be arrived at by the relative direction given to the manoeuvring lines of operation, herewith exemplified (fig 3). CD, manoeuvring on the right flank of the army AB, and HI upon the left flank of FG, form two interior lines, CK and IK, upon the extremities of each of the exterior lines AB and FG, both of which may be destroyed by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon them. This combination represents the effect of the French campaigns of 1796, 1800, and 1809, as it also does the spirit of the Duke of Wellington's defence of Portugal.

The configuration of the country, and especially its physical geography, may materially modify the form of the zone of possible operations, thereby at once affecting the position of the base of operations and direction to be given to the lines of operation. In general, the actual theatre of war, may be studied in reference to a square or rectangular figure (see fig. 4). Now, if we consider the theatre of war to be that of Westphalia, 1757 to 1762, AB will be the line of the North Sea, BD the line of the Weser and base of the army of Duke Ferdinand; the side CD will represent the line of the Maine and base of the French army, and the side AC that of the Rhine also guarded by the French armies. Now, the French armies, acting offensively, have here the advantage of possessing two sides, whilst the third is also in their favour, being occupied by the North Sea. Their object was therefore to gain by manoeuvring the fourth side, or, in other words, to cut off the enemy from it. Leaving the base CD, the French army E gained the front of operations FGH, thus cutting off the allied army J from their base line BD, and forcing it into the angle LAM formed towards Emblen by the Rhine, the Ems, and the Black Sea; the French army retaining a ready communication with CD and AC, its bases of the Maine and Rhine.

The manoeuvre on the Saale in 1806, may be considered in connection with the same military formula and diagram. Napoleon succeeded in occupying at Jena and Naumbourg a line corresponding to FGH, and then, proceeding by Halle and Dessau, forced back the Prussian army J on the sea, or on the line AB. The result is well known to military readers to have been most disastrous to the Prussians.

Simple as these diagrams and reasonings are, they are sufficient to exhibit the great leading principle of war, that in a campaign the object should be to place the enemy in such a position that a battle lost will be decisive. To do this whilst keeping open his own communications, every effort should be made to cut the enemy off from his, and to bring him to action, without a chance of retreat in case of defeat. It may not always happen that the sea, or some other impenetrable boundary, presents itself for this purpose, but in many cases the territory of a great neutral power may afford, not indeed a barrier equally insurmountable as the sea, but yet one which, by checking the retreat of the enemy, may produce very similar results. The territory of a small neutral state is not likely to be respected, and the war, therefore, would sweep over it, and be stopped only by meeting the obstacle beyond it.

Sometimes the theatre of war would be better represented by a trapezium, as in fig. 5, but in the latter case the advantages of being able to establish a double base on two of the longer sides would be still more palpable, as it would be so much the easier to cut off the enemy's communication with his base when so restricted. It is not, however, to be supposed that the possession of a base occupying two sides of the diagram, or, in other words, where one base or part of a base is perpendicular to the other, implies that they should both be occupied in force; it is sufficient that the one from which it is not intended that the leading line of operations should proceed be fortified in its principal points, and occupied by a small observing corps. By such an arrangement the principles of fortification are extended to the operations of war, and part of the theatre of war is, as it were, exposed to a reverse fire. The base of the Rhine will exemplify what is here meant; as at Basle it exhibits almost a right angle, viz., from Basle to Constance on the one side, and from Basle to Kehl on the other. Moreau, taking advantage of this natural condition of the base, first attracted the attention of the enemy by pushing two divisions on the one side towards Kehl, whilst he advanced with his other nine divisions on the side of Schaffhausen, and arrived in a few marches at the gates of Augsburg; the two detached divisions having in the meantime joined the main body. It is evident that in these manoeuvring expedients much of the skill of a general is exhibited, and that manoeuvring lines must be frequently adopted which are not strictly in accordance with the leading line of operations. Sometimes such manoeuvring lines may be adopted in order to throw the enemy off the true scent, and induce him to abandon some enterprise which would be advantageous to him; sometimes to cut him off from his base line by intercepting his communications; and sometimes so to influence his movements, and to place him in such a position, that when it may be deemed expedient to try the chance of a battle, the battle, if gained, should be decisive. Battles may be lost or won without producing any material result on the chances of ultimate success, as may be seen in the life of the Great Frederick, for he always appeared to rise with fresh vigour from defeat; and, great general as he was, he did not escape from that chance of war; and as in the history of the late war in Italy, it cannot be said that any one of the battles then fought was attended with a decisive result. The last one, Solferino, which closed the war, certainly left the Austrian army in a condition to continue the struggle, even with success; and it may be fairly said, that peace was at that moment more anxiously sought by the successful than by the unsuccessful emperor, and that political rather than military reasons led to its conclusion.

Defensive operations, already examined in the preceding remarks, require, nevertheless, some further notice. Passive defence offers no security to a state, nor fortresses without an army; it is confining in a shield without a sword. Reason and experience alike prove that the defensive system which provides the greatest number of facilities for offensive operations is the best; interior and simple lines so directed as to anticipate or counteract the designs of the enemy should be adopted. But as defensive measures imply inferiority of forces, they must in a considerable degree depend upon local means to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy, and to afford time for bringing as large a force as possible to act against him. Rivers and chains of mountains are the natural obstacles; fortresses, intrenched camps, and well selected positions upon the most advantageous lines of defence, the artificial means. Fortresses, with têtes de pont upon a river parallel to the frontier, are very advantageous; but upon a river perpendicular to the frontier they are still more useful, particularly if fortified upon both banks, or en cheval. In the former case an army acting on the offensive crosses the river only once, but in the latter it must cross as often as the defender thinks proper; for, placing his camp under protection of one of these fortresses, the enemy cannot pass him without being taken in flank or rear, nor besiege the place without dislodging him. Hence intrenched camps, covering and covered by a fortress, add considerably to the defence of a state; as, at the present moment, Verona does to the Venetian province of the Austrian kingdom. Fortifications are also eminently useful in the defence of passes in chains of mountains. The insignificant fort of Bard, with 600 men, arrested the progress of the principal column of Napoleon, when descending the Great St Bernard into the valley of Aosta in 1800. Again, the French emperor having constructed the fine roads into Italy, but not secured them by any fortifications, the first military use that was made of them was by the Austrians in the two successful invasions of the French, where the old fort of L'Ecluse, near Geneva, alone retarded them some days.

Fortresses likewise secure the magazines, stores, and hospitals of an army, and save the matériel and broken troops after a defeat. But in order to make them capable of producing the share of security to a state which can reasonably be expected from them, fortresses should not be too numerous, because they absorb too great a proportion of troops for garrisons, and cost immense sums; nor small, for then they are easily invested and overpowered by artillery, or may be passed without notice; nor all on the frontiers, for if the enemy penetrate beyond them, the great arsenals, depôts, foundries, &c., of the nation are no longer within reach of the defensive army, which is also left without a final point d'appui, or position which may cover the capital, and enable them to turn the flank of the invader. Intrenched positions are often eminently useful, provided they intersect or flank the most direct lines of operations; but they are imperfect, if without arsenals or unconnected with fortresses, whilst the selection of their site is difficult. Those of Torres Vedras saved a kingdom; but then it must be remembered, that they had free communication with the maritime base of the English. To conclude, defensive war does not consist in covering every part of a state, but in so retarding the progress of an enemy, that any advantage which he may obtain may be constantly neutralized, until losing his temporary superiority, he finally fails in accomplishing his object.

Between a battle won and a battle lost there is an immense distance, said Napoleon, the day before the conflict at Leipzig—empires lie between them; and indeed the plan of campaign, and the strategical movements, are only so many preparatory dispositions to arrive at the great crisis of a battle. The rules applicable to battles, therefore, form a most important branch of the science of war. In many respects this branch is less capable of being reduced to fixed principles than the others; but the chance of success will be increased or diminished by the due application of certain general rules. The first of these is that of operating with a superior mass upon the decisive point, because the physical force of organized numbers in arms furnishes the unerring means of victory, when the moral qualities in both armies are equal. The mode of bringing this force to bear in the most advantageous manner depends on the art of tactics; consequently, courage and fortune being nearly balanced, that general who can operate with the largest mass upon the most decisive point will be successful. But to effect this purpose, the combinations must be such as to produce a unity and precision of movements conducing simultaneously to the same object.

The following maxims are of general application:—1. No opportunity should be left till the morrow. 2. No battle should be fought but for an important object, unless the position should render it unavoidable. 3. After a victory, the enemy should not be allowed to recover—the pursuit should be incessant.

As in lines of operations, so on fields of battle, it is necessary to avoid dispositions which have generally proved fatal; such as, 1st, forming isolated divisions; 2d, ordering extended movements, which deprive the army of a part of its strength, and enable the enemy to ruin either the main body or the detachment; 3d, positions with too great an extent of front; 4th, allowing the connection of the wings or the columns to be interrupted by obstacles, and thereby exposing them to separate defeats.

The finest combinations are those which produce an oblique order of battle, those with a wing reinforced, those which outflank the enemy, and those which act perpendicularly upon a flank, or upon the centre of a scattered force. These are almost always successful, because they bring the whole or a greater mass to act on a part or a smaller. Thus the fundamental principle of all military combinations, namely, to effect with the greatest mass of forces a combined attack upon the decisive point, is applied; and it is easy to understand how a general of ability, with 60,000 men, may be able to defeat 100,000, if he can bring 50,000 into action upon a single part of his enemy's line; for battles are decided, not by troops upon the muster-rolls, nor even by those present, but by those who can be brought into action. Numerical superiority of troops not engaged, so far from being useful, only produces disorder.

The following rules are applicable to the working out of this great principle. The lead should be taken in the movements, for the general who has this advantage can employ his forces wherever he thinks them applicable; while, on the contrary, he who is obliged to await the enemy, is no longer master of a single combination, because his movements must be subordinate to those of his adversary, which it is often too late to counteract when actually commenced. The general who takes the lead knows what he intends to perform; he conceals his march, surprises or overpowers the extremity or other weak part of the hostile line, while the waiting army learns his intentions probably only from the attack. This applies, however, more strongly to strategical operations than to those of tactics, for in the latter case, when waiting in a position, prepared for receiving battle, as the operations are not spread over so large a space, the army taking the initiative cannot entirely conceal his intentions from the enemy, who, the moment he discovers, may counteract them by bringing up good reserves. The army marching to the attack has also to overcome all the difficulties of the intervening ground, and to support the fire of the waiting army, ready to receive the assailants when more or less thrown into disorder. In this respect, then, the chances of success from being the attacking force or the defending force, are in great measure balanced.

The second consists in directing the movements against a weak point of the enemy, when that point is decisive, and therefore offers the greatest advantages. An attack to the front, when the conflicting armies are equal in strength, is to be avoided, if a concentrated effort can possibly be made upon the extremity of an enemy's line, in which case simple demonstrations on the front are sufficient in order to hold it in check.

Against an enemy whose adopted line of battle is extended, it is preferable to direct the attacks upon the central point; for the central division having been ruined, the corps to the right and left can no longer operate in unison, and are forced to retreat eccentrically; as was proved in the disasters of Wurmser, Mack, and the Duke of Brunswick. Where the line of battle is not extended, the weak points are the flanks, because they are liable to be crushed before they can be sustained. Albuera offers, however, an example to the contrary; for here the right wing of the allies was turned and routed, and yet the battle gained by the centre forming an echelon to the rear. As a general rule, it must indeed be manifest, that an attack upon the centre of a widely extended force separates the right and left divisions from each other, and renders each liable to destruction in succession; but that the attack should be made on a more concentrated force, as far as possible from the centre, as the flank attacked can be only succoured by degrees.

A deep column being attacked on the head, is in a similar condition to the extremity of a line; both the one and the other are engaged in succession and defeated, or what is termed rolled up. This was proved at Roshach and Auerstadt. It is however more practicable to make a fresh disposition from a column than with the extremity of a line, when attacked by the enemy.

In executing a general movement against an extremity of an enemy's position, a mass is not only brought to bear against a weak point, but also, from that extremity, the rear may be gained, and communication, either with his base or with his secondary line, intercepted. Napoleon's manoeuvre in 1805, by Donauwerth and the line of the Lech, turned the line of communication of Mack with Vienna, which was his base; and, at the same time, it intercepted his connection with Bohemia, from which he expected, as his secondary resource, the assistance of the Russians. Such were also the views of Soult when he turned the allies at Albuera, and of Junot in his attack upon the flank and rear of the British at Vimiera. Napoleon performed the same manoeuvre against the Prussians in 1806 by Saalfeld and Gera, Kutusoff in 1812 by Kaluga and Krasnoi, the grand allied army in 1813 when it debouched from Bohemia upon Dresden and Leipzig, and Napoleon finally attempted it in 1815 by Wavre.

Whilst the preceding truths prove that it is better to attack the extremity of a line, yet it is undesirable to manoeuvre with a view to attack both extremities at the same time, unless there be a very great superiority on the part of the assailant. An army of 60,000 men forming two corps of 30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking an enemy equally numerous, is deprived of the power of striking a decisive blow; because it enables the adversary to adopt similar measures, or even, if the movement of attack be not sufficiently co-operative, to bring a mass to act against one of the divisions, and destroy it by his momentary superiority. But when there is a very great superiority of force on the side of the assailant, then indeed both the extremities of the hostile line should be attacked, because a greater number of troops is then brought to act against both wings; whereas, if the whole were kept in one mass and made to act against a single point, the adversary might deploy as many as the other party could bring into action, and thus engage with equal number, the greatest mass being collected where the attack was to be expected. Daun manoeuvred in this way at Hochkirch and the whole allied forces at Leipzig.

The result of the combined manoeuvring of two armies intending to act simultaneously against the two wings or the two flank divisions of an enemy, depends so much on accurate knowledge of the country, and in precision of movements, that even an army superior in numbers, say 50,000, attacking in this manner an army of 40,000, would still incur great risks; and if the inferior force, after leaving a corps to meet one attack, should rapidly take the offensive, and overtake the enemy in his preparatory dispositions, which would necessarily be calculated upon the principle of finding the opponent in his position, the heads of his columns might be turned and completely routed; and if the two hostile bodies should have between them some difficult object, a wood or river, they might each in turn be destroyed. Examples of this kind occurred at Lonato, Castiglione, Abendsberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbon.

When, however, the attacking army is double the force of the enemy, the principle no longer holds as stated in the cases of Hochkirch and Leipzig; but, to avoid the danger of divided forces, it is requisite to have the lead, and to conceal the movements in such a manner that both attacks may commence nearly at the same moment. Thus, an army intending to attack another of equal or superior force cannot insure success but by a concentrated effort upon a single point of a weakened line, which is not in a condition to be timely supported. But when a superior army attacks one much weaker, two or three divisions should be formed, in order to bring all its masses into action against the inferior masses opposed; for if the attack were confined to a single point, the whole of the forces could not be brought into line, and the enemy might deploy an equal number; but it is necessary that the whole combinations should be so concerted as to arrive at the same instant, produce unity of execution, and avoid partial and successive defeat. It may appear that in these ideas the main stress of the argument rests upon the local superiority of numbers; but it is nevertheless true, that combination is the chief object; for 30,000 men may be defeated by half their number, if, in the disposition adopted, and in the choice of the ground, some vicious arrangement takes place which produces a division of the force; such as La Motte experienced from Webb at Wynendael, Chevert from Imhoff at Meer, and the Austrians from Moreau in the defiles of Hohenlinden.

To insure a favourable result, a general of ability will seize the proper moment to force the decisive point of the field of battle, and so combine the attack that all his forces may be brought into action, with the exception always of the reserve. But if his endeavours fail of the desired success, he should make a simultaneous general onset, in which the reserve is to be brought forward, to make a last and decisive effort.

In the strategical movement of a great mass in a combined effort upon one point, it is advisable to keep the forces concentrated, so as to have them perfectly disposable; or, in other words, that the depth of the disposition be nearly equal to the front, enabling the battalions to arrive with promptitude from all quarters towards the point attacked. Extensive fronts militate as much against good principles, as great detachments and isolated divisions deprived of the means of being sustained. The inattention of Napoleon and Ney to this maxim gave Benningsen an advantage at Eylau; whilst the allies in 1815, notwithstanding the difficulty of guarding an open frontier, were enabled to concentrate their masses at Waterloo.

One of the most efficacious means of applying the foregoing principles, is to induce the enemy to take measures which will facilitate it. By means of small corps of light troops, alarms may be excited for some important points of his communications. If he can be thereby tempted to detach strong divisions against them, and scatter his forces, he will be disabled from acting with vigour himself; and be exposed to an attack from superior forces. Operations by detachments have nevertheless been in fashion. To divide and subdivide, till the main army was reduced to the secondary character of a corps of observation, was considered as the highest strategical science. In the Hanoverian campaigns, the French, with two great armies, acted upon this system; nor were they undeceived, although Prince Ferdinand, with less than half their force, contrived not only to reconquer the country, but afterwards to keep them constantly at bay, and even to attack them with superior numbers. The Austrians, and the army of the empire, operated similarly in Saxony, and reaped similar fruits. Mack, trained in the Turkish wars, was the great patron of cordon, scattered posts, and inert positions; the Austrians had, however, little reason to exult in the success of that system. They fought on accessory points, while the main armies, reduced in strength, were unable to do more than menace the principal objectives of the campaign, wasting their time until they were attacked by superior forces.

Hostile armies are not destroyed by the mere act of taking up positions upon their communications, and then remaining inactive. Had Napoleon halted upon the Lech in 1805, or on the Saale in 1806, he could neither have prevented the escape of Mack by Donauwerth, nor the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick to the Elbe. The art of war does not consist in mere incursions upon communications, but in placing a force upon them sufficiently large to attack the enemy with decided advantage. Detachments upon the communications of an adversary are generally of secondary utility; though they may sometimes alarm and embarrass a timid enemy.

When the lead is taken in a decisive movement against the enemy, great importance is attached to an exact knowledge of the positions and movements which he may undertake. Spies are then of the utmost consequence, but light troops or even irregulars thoroughly versed in the tactics of watching the enemy, are of still greater utility. For this purpose the general should scatter small parties in all directions with as much prodigality as he would exhibit caution in great operations. Some divisions of light cavalry, expressly organized for this service, and not included in the order of battle, are the most efficient. To operate without such precautions is to walk in the dark, and to be exposed to the disastrous consequences which may be produced by a secret march of the enemy. Generally speaking, these measures are too much neglected. The espionage is not sufficiently organized beforehand; and the officers of light troops have not always the requisite experience to conduct their detachments. The Cossacks under Platoff, Chernicheff, Tettenborn, &c., in Russia and Poland; those, with the Prussians under Lutzow, in Germany and France; and the Guerillas of Mina, the Empecinado, and others, in Spain and Portugal, have shown the immense advantages to be derived from the services of such troops. While they were few in number, their real importance was not fully understood; but when 15,000 or 20,000 of them appeared in the field, they became a most formidable enemy, with respect to the combinations which a general could encounter, because they were always liable to be baffled by the interception of orders. Every convoy demanded a numerous and well-conducted escort, and every march was imperilled by the want of real information relative to the hostile positions. The duties greatly multiplied, exhausted a great part of the army; and the regular cavalry was soon rendered unserviceable by their excessive fatigue.

In all which has hitherto been said, the greatest stress has been laid upon the necessity of concentrating forces and avoiding their too great dissemination; but it must not be hence imagined that detachments can be always avoided. The object of all manoeuvring is to induce an enemy to make movements in some particular direction which may throw him into a position favourable for a decisive attack, and for this purpose it may be absolutely necessary to detach a force to make a demonstration which will divert the attention of the enemy in the desired direction. Again, it may be necessary to cover important points, to secure a secondary base, protect a line of operations, or even undertake a siege. It may even be done in direct face of the enemy, so as to engage his attention whilst the operations are mainly carried on in another direction. In all cases, however, care must be taken that all the operations are linked together and calculated to support each other; that a detachment is always equal in strength to the duty confided to it, and that it is never so isolated as to allow an active enemy to cut it off. In fact, whilst prudence enjoins that an army should be kept together, necessity may require its partial separation, and in this case the general must be fully acquainted with all the peculiarities of ground, and be prepared by promptitude of action to anticipate the enemy in counter-movements.

When it is incumbent on an army to occupy a greater extent of line than is actually proportionate to its strength, redoubts should be placed at intervals, so as to keep up the connection of the several posts without absorbing any great number of troops; and, in the contrary case, a large reserve should be formed and kept well out of the way, allowing at once freedom of action to the troops actually in position, and retaining full power to afford aid when required. Other considerations require to be taken into account: the openings or passages by which the defending army may, if able to assume the offensive, advance and fall upon the enemy, ought to afford greater facilities of movement than are possessed by the army advancing to the attack; the artillery should be so placed as to fire with the greatest effect; the ground should be of such a character as to screen from the observation of the enemy the movements of the troops from one flank to the other, and at the same time to facilitate the observation of the enemy's movements; the flanks should rest on some obstacle, either natural or artificial, which, by securing them from being turned, would oblige the enemy to attack in front. These points are rather named as desiderata than as always attainable; as, for example, it may be impossible to secure the flanks by obstacles, and then crochets, or returns to the rear, may be adopted; but this would expose the army at the angle thus formed to great loss if exposed to a powerful and well directed artillery, and a double reserve, drawn up in deep order behind the flank to be strengthened, might be adopted as a safer expedient. In the same manner, a position may be so chosen as to bring an obstacle so to bear on the movements of the enemy as to force him to attack either on the centre, or on some other point which has been expressly strengthened to receive him. The troops of those portions of the line which are more or less sheltered by natural or artificial obstacles ought to be kept available, to take part in the action, wherever their assistance may be desirable. Every possible advantage having been secured, either to render most efficient the passive defence, or to facilitate the assumption of active defence, which ought always to be the object of an army, the next great consideration is to secure the means of retreat; for though it may be said that an army ought not to anticipate defeat, provision should always be made against it. A battle becomes decisive if the defeated army be cut off from retreat; but many a battle may be fought and lost without producing a decisive effect upon a campaign, as is evident in the military history of the great Frederick of Prussia, provided that the beaten army can be drawn off to a fitting rallying-place. This was strikingly illustrated by Blucher, who, defeated at Ligny, rallied at Gembloux, and boldly adopting an interior line directed towards the English army, came up in time to complete the victory of Waterloo.

Assuming that the army which intends to act primarily on the defensive has taken up its position, it now remains to consider in what manner the troops of the attacking army should be disposed, or, in other words, what order of battle should be adopted. Bearing in mind that the great object of strategy should be to produce a separation of the enemy's forces, and thus to bring a powerful mass to act upon a weaker one, as was the case with Bonaparte, who by the battle of Millesimo, induced the Austrians and Piedmontese to move upon exterior lines, whereby he was enabled to defeat them in succession at Mondovi and at Lodi,—a system which he followed up, combining, however, with the utmost accuracy of combination the greatest promptitude of movement.

It has been shown that the object of strategy is so to manoeuvre as to place the enemy in a position where he may be decisively attacked. In this case the enemy, finding his case hopeless, may give up the struggle, and the campaign be closed without a battle; superior strategy being in this case equivalent to a victory. But in most instances the battle will require to be fought; and passing from strategy we come to the technical operations necessary for leading the troops into action. The army acting on the defensive must be aware that in taking up a position as preparatory to a battle, it is not sufficient that it should be difficult of access, such as was the position of the Russian army on the left or scarped bank of the Alma, but that the obstacles of ground should interfere with the advance of the enemy, and render it difficult for him to deploy into line, whilst at the same time the scarped bank should be flanked, if possible, and the artillery so arranged that its fire should act upon the advancing columns. Nor can any position be deemed good which is not well suited to the particular arm of the service in which the strength of the army principally consists. Again, in selecting a position for giving a wasting battle, it ought to be accurately proportional to the number of troops at command; for whilst, as a rule, the disposable forces should be kept as much as possible together, and not disseminated over an extent of line which would reduce an army into fractions, every one of which would be so weak as to be easily attacked and overpowered; on the other hand, they ought not to be crowded into so small a space as would cripple their movements.

In the attack the first step is to reconnoitre the enemy, and ascertain whether the arrangement of his troops has been made in due conformity with the configuration of the ground, and then to determine the most promising or decisive point of attack. In this estimate of the advantages or disadvantages of the several points of attack, it is manifest that not only the features of the ground occupied by the enemy should be considered, but also those of the ground over which the troops have to advance to the attack. If, for example, a flank of the wing of the enemy rest against heights from which his line may be enfiladed by artillery, it would, at first sight, appear that to gain these heights would be to prepare the way for a decisive blow; but then they might be of difficult access, nay even impracticable for artillery; and, further that, if actually gained, although leading to the defeat of the enemy, they might allow him to effect a retreat in good order, so that the battle would not strategically prove decisive; the tactical not always being the strategical decisive point; with a powerful army it may be desirable to attack on the strategical, even though it may not be on the tactical decisive point. At all times the disposition of the enemy's troops must materially affect a decision upon this point.

Whilst not representing an army as moving in some definite line, which from the irregularity of ground is scarcely possible, Jomini's views on the various orders of battle ought to be studied, considering them as directions to which some kind of approximation may be made in practice. First, then, the order may be simply parallel, the two lines exactly facing each other, and preserving an equal distance at all points of the line. Second, The parallel line may be combined with a crochet, defensive or offensive (fig 6). See, however, above, the objection to this arrangement.

Third, A parallel order, reinforced on the centre or on one or both wings, so that the attack may be directed against the portion of the enemy's line opposite either; the other portion of the army remaining for the moment in the attitude of observation. This arrangement must, however, materially depend on the manner in which the artillery of the enemy is placed; for it may happen that, whilst the reinforced portions of one army are moved to the attack, the artillery of the enemy might act with such effect upon the observing portion as to throw it into confusion, and allow a counter attack to be made with advantage. In the battle of the Alma the two armies were arranged in parallel order, and the attack was made on both flanks, the French effecting a turning movement on the Russian left, and the English attacking successfully on the Russian right.

Fourth, Orders either convex or concave, or echeloned approximatively into these forms. The concave order in defence, and the convex order in attack, have obtained a historical celebrity, because the great battle of Cannae was lost by the Romans, who crowded their forces into the concave line of the Carthaginians; but this must not be interpreted as any proof of the merit of the concave order in defence, as it is evident that, had the Romans directed their attack against the flanks of the Carthaginian line, instead of penetrating into the curve, they must have gained the battle. The concave order of attack fig. 8, is formed by echelon, which it would necessarily be, as a true concave curved line is merely imaginary. The convex form (fig. 9), or saillant to the centre, is applicable to an army after passing a river, when the centre naturally moves forward and still keeps up a connection with the river by its wings. In a similar manner, when making a stand against an approaching army, and being backed by a river which it is intended to pass, it is manifest that an attack made in force on the centre of such an order of battle, projecting so far in front of the wings, must be successful. This order is formed by echelon.

The oblique order is that which has been long recognised as the most fitting for an army of inferior or of just equal force, as it enables a large body of troops, the line being reinforced at the end approaching the enemy, to be brought to act against either wing, whilst it retains the rest of the line out of action, and ready to move at any moment either in front or laterally in support of the wing engaged (fig. 10). Military writers including Colonel Macbougall, the commandant of the Staff College, have said, that the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea were won by Epaminondas through this disposition of his army. The oblique order was adopted by the Great Frederick at the battle of Leuthen; and Warnery observes, "I have known three instances in which the Prussians fought in a preconcerted true oblique order, namely, at Colin, Lissa, and at Finck, a combat in Saxony." Of these instances, Colin was unsuccessful, as Frederick was there defeated; but notwithstanding this contretemps, owing principally to neglect of his orders, it is generally admitted that the plan of attack was skilfully and judiciously formed, and affords therefore a warning against the too hasty condemnation of even an unsuccessful general. Bonaparte affected to speak contemptuously of the oblique order of battle, but yet he applied it to practice, whether intentionally or accidentally, as at Marengo. In fact, when an army directs an attack in force upon one wing, and holds back the other, it must necessarily assume an oblique order, whether it does so by arranging the troops in echelons from left to right or the reverse, or by an inclined direction of the line itself. In this case the oblique order is formed, not by retiring the flank to be held back, but by advancing the reinforced flank by which the attack is to be made, in an oblique direction.

As a general rule, it may be stated, that a combined attack on the centre and on one wing, as represented (fig. 11), is the most advantageous, the enemy's line being contiguous, as the attack on the wing prevents it from taking the troops engaged in the central attack in flank, whilst the wing attacked will be unsided in resisting the powerful attack made upon it; and should it give way in consequence, will enable the assailants to turn and attack in its rear the centre.

This was nearly the order of attack adopted at Wagram, the central attacking force being there aided by a powerful mass of artillery, and the division under Davoust which attacked the flank becoming a turning force, and materially contributing to the victory. The defensive line assumed in that case a slightly concave form, and thus afforded an example of the manner in which such an order of attack should be received. These rules accustom soldiers to ideas which may prove to them most valuable in the field, although the very best arrangements may be defeated by the promptitude with which an enemy may act in resisting them. An enemy, for example, acting on the defence, directs his reserve, the moment he discovers the design of the attacking army, on the required point of resistance. The attacking army should therefore conceal its movements as long as possible, and then act with the utmost promptitude, so as to anticipate the enemy in his movement of relief. In like manner, the army acting in defence should lose not a moment in assuming, when possible, the offen- Battles; military history will indeed prove that inactivity has caused the ruin of many a defensive army, and promptitude of action, combined with accuracy of combination, has more conduced to success than even the most systematic arrangements. Great generals judge accurately, but also act promptly; and in the late Italian campaign, the great battle of Solferino was in great measure gained by the rapidity of the French movements, in taking advantage of the somewhat extended order of the Austrian army, whilst the persevering bravery of the division of Niel prevented the Austrians from overcoming the right wing of the French.

A military question has given rise to considerable difference of opinion. Guibert has stated that an able general and good tactician would not expose his scheme of defence until the enemy had shown in what point he intended to make his attack; but retaining his men drawn up in columns on the field of battle, would cause them to develop into line conformably to the movements of the enemy. This arrangement, at first sight, appears to be prudent, yet it has been urged against it, that, as a rule, the attacking army will direct its efforts against decisive points, considered either in a strategical or in a tactical point of view, taking into account the manner in which the defending army may best apply its most powerful arm in certain particular directions, and hence that he would gain by finding that, at the moment of attack, the defenders had not completed their development, or at least had not recovered from the confusion consequent upon it. The probable points of attack ought to be foreseen, and the troops arranged accordingly, the reserves affording occasional reinforcements, or a change of front, or any alteration required by an unexpected or exceptional movement of the enemy. It was once recommended, in a similar manner, that the attack should be made in column, but it is now generally admitted that, whilst the column formation is the best for advancing over ground often too irregular to allow the unbroken march of an army in line, the troops ought to be developed into line as soon as possible, both to avoid the destructive fire on the advancing columns and to oppose an equal front to the enemy.

All these observations point to one conclusion, which has been amply verified in practice, that a superior army looks forward to an offensive campaign, and to a battle on the active principle; that a weaker army may be obliged to act partly on the defensive, but even then it should be prepared to assume the offensive at the first favourable opportunity. In such a case a field of battle will be carefully reconnoitred beforehand, and its strategical and tactical advantages noted; and the enemy's attack will be then waited for, and the proper moment of passing from defensive into offensive measures with the best chances of success seized upon. The combinations of Napoleon at Rivoli and Austerlitz, of Blucher at the Katsbach and Lion, and of Wellington at Salamanca and Waterloo, are instructive examples.

It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules by which the choice of any of these systems should be guided. The circumstances of the moment, the moral character of the troops, considered in respect to their courage, discipline, and national temperament, and the conformation of the ground, must be taken into account.

A superior army should never wait to be attacked, nor should it wholly deploy into line if compelled by circumstances to remain in position. No more troops should be formed in line than are necessary to check the enemy. The remainder, formed into three or four columns, should be held in reserve ready to strike a decisive blow upon the most important point. A great army wholly deployed cannot manoeuvre with the same facility as columns; and to render troops not engaged immovable, is the same as to deduct them from the strength of the army.

The manoeuvres of two armies opposed to each other must mainly depend on the nature of the country both as regards its communications and its resources; on the information obtained by espionage or by cross-questioning the inhabitants; on that procured by reconnaissances made by the staff or by light troops; on an accurate appreciation of the most vulnerable points open to attack on either side. A general should be prepared for contingencies; and though military science will give him a general clue to an enemy's movements, he should be always ready to vary his movements so as to correspond with any accidental change of those of the enemy. In the late Italian war, the Austrians found such difficulty in obtaining correct information of the positions and intended movements of the French and Sardinian armies, that they were induced to try the desperate or at least dangerous expedient of making what they called reconnaissances in force, or, in other words, advancing with a small army intended to draw out the enemy from their position, and induce them to show their real strength. Such a system brought about its natural result. The French did show themselves, but, though at first in some degree taken by surprise, they, at the celebrated battle of Montebello, assembled in such rapidity as to overpower and drive back the Austrians with great loss. This engagement was a real trial of strength, and there can be no doubt the Austrians should have either retired without fighting, or have advanced in sufficient strength to overpower all resistance. Vandevelde thus comments upon this action, in which each army maintained that it had gained advantage. "It is true that this reconnaissance had as its object to oblige the allies to exhibit their strength, but did it do so, as Count Giulay affirms? We think not, and even believe that it exercised a fatal influence on all the subsequent operations of the Austrian army. By the published despatches, there could be no doubt that the mass of the French army, namely, the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps d'armée and the guard, were posted behind the Scrivia and around Alessandria; and what did the reconnaissance effect but bring into action one single division, or one-eighth part of the whole force which succeeded in driving back the two Austrian divisions engaged. Urbain has been blamed for being too impetuous in his first attack; it may be replied, that had Stadion, instead of dividing the rest of his forces, and thus making them act on a front of more than two leagues, supported d'Urbain by the whole division of Baumgarten, the result might have been different. Nothing is more difficult than to conduct well such reconnaissances; and they ought never to be undertaken except from pure necessity, as they are always bloody, and rarely, if ever, attain any satisfactory object. Giulay drew from the result of this affair a reason for drawing the mass of his troops towards Plaisance and Pavia, and thereby extended his front out of all proportion." A reconnaissance in force can only hope for success by surprising the enemy and driving in his advanced posts on the main body. This was done at Montebello; but the French were allowed to recover from their confusion, and to become the aggressors, by the too methodical and cautious movements of the Austrians. In all military affairs a bold and vigorous advance should be seconded by an equally bold and vigorous support. If the reserve creep whilst the front gallops, the advantage gained by the activity of the one will be lost by the tardiness of the other.

The following general remarks refer both to defence and attack. An army posted behind villages will obtain cover for its front by occupying inclosures, &c., with some battalions of infantry, and the outlets with cannon. The first line should be sufficiently near to support these advanced posts, and also to secure the evacuation of the place, in case the enemy should have gained so much ground on other points as to be able to take them in reverse. Villages, being liable to be turned, should not be held by considerable corps of infantry, unless their topographical situation renders them the key of a position, as was the case at Vimiera. The battle of Blenheim deserves attention on account of the consequences produced by the neglect of these rules.

When an army occupies a position perpendicular to a river, with one wing resting on the bank, that wing should not be attacked, because, if the enemy changes front towards the river, the attacking corps might be driven into it. On the contrary, if the onset is directed against the other wing with the principal mass of forces, chances are in favour of the assailants; because the wing being turned, the whole line will be pressed towards the stream, and incur the risk of being destroyed. This would have been the case with Hiller's corps at Wagram, if a prompt retreat had not saved it. Similar would have been the fate of the united French army at Talavera de la Reyna had they persisted in an attack upon the Spaniards; but they acted with great judgment in directing their efforts solely towards Lord Wellington's left.

In the successful defence of a position, an attack not manifestly intended to be decisive, should not be followed up by pursuit when repulsed; because its object might have been merely to draw the defenders out of advantageous ground. An untimely pursuit by the Austrian right lost the battle of Prague, and by the Saxons that of Kesselsdorf, and again by the Austrian centre, that of Jemmapes.

As it is a maxim to operate against a weak part of the enemy's line, no position should be attacked upon its strongest point, as the Austrians did at Breslau, unless that point, though tactically the strongest, is strategically the decisive point; but if the hostile position be prolonged by a detached corps, the principal effort should be directed against that corps, even though posted on strong ground; because, if defeated, the main body may be turned, and thereby worsted.

Armies may sometimes be posted behind a ridge of hills with defensive points upon their summits. These should not be attacked without an exact knowledge of the position behind, and precautions being taken against a counter movement. The events of Austerlitz and on the Katsbach prove the necessity of this precaution.

When an army remains inactive in a position, manoeuvring may be made with a view to turn its flanks, which should be opposed by others of a similar character, as was done at Albuera. These counter-maneuvers are not difficult to execute, because the army attempting to turn a flank moves upon an arc, and its opponent on the chord; consequently the one is enabled to bring into action a greater mass than the other in less time, even though both parties are equal in forces. Rosbach, Vimiera, and Salamanca, are examples, where the enemy moved in open day (it is both difficult and dangerous to do so in the night), and thereby rendered the counter-offensive both prompt and decisive.

There are positions which cannot be turned, nor attacked obliquely. If the stratagem to draw the enemy out of them does not take effect, a parallel attack with the centre reinforced is likely to be the best in such circumstances. The dispositions of Marlborough at Blenheim were of this class, and deserve the study of military men.

If two allied armies or great corps take up positions forming a re-entering angle with a space between them, and some considerable obstacle masks that space, they expose themselves to be attacked and defeated separately: the danger increasing with the increase of the distance between them. The corps AD being separated from BE by a wood, lake, or other considerable obstacle at G, the enemy FH, being covered by that obstacle, may attack and defeat one, before the other can come up to sustain it.

This is a case of interior against exterior lines of operations. Such positions were occupied by Prince Henry and Hulsen, at Freyberg and Katzenhausen; the Tharand forest, and, what was worse, the Mulde, being between them; yet the army of the empire, superior in force, remained for three months without taking advantage of them, when Prince Henry moved forward and defeated it at Freyberg.

Taking advantage of the rapid manner in which Frederick developed his columns into line, the oblique order of attack may be combined with a turning movement, as shown in fig. 13. The brigade to the extreme right is formed into column of divisions, and marches forward to the left wing of the enemy, the brigade to the left of it keeping up its fire; the moment the right brigade comes into action, it rapidly develops itself to the right, and thus outflanks the enemy. The next brigade than advances to the attack, whilst the third fires, and so on in succession, until all that portion of the army intended to take immediate part in the conflict has come into action. When the army, thus pushing forward, has come into the position HI, shown by the dotted line, it will have effected the turning movement, commenced by attacking in column.

An army AB (fig. 14) instead of forming two lines, as in the former figure, may draw up the first line only, and keep the second in columns at half distances behind the right, centre, and left, prepared to manoeuvre or strike the decisive blow. These columns will be more moveable, and not being intended for the first attack, they will nevertheless cover it against counter-movements of the enemy. The battle of Salamanca offers a memorable lesson of this description, where the troops were concealed by the ground, and then suddenly brought in mass upon the enemy's left wing. That of the Katsbach, almost the counterpart, was equally grounded upon these principles; both, however, with the difference, that the adversary had the lead of the manoeuvres. Jomini, habituated to the brisk character of French soldiers, lays too much stress on the value of the lead in manoeuvres. and does not fully appreciate the counter-maneuvers which the cool firmness of British and German soldiers are likely to develop.

Another important maxim may be deduced from the battle of Leuthen, namely, that an army with a flank resting upon an obstacle, such as the great pond of Gohlau, which covered the angle of Nadasti, may still be outflanked by an oblique attack. For this purpose, it is only necessary to mask the first brigade of the enemy by the nearest of the attacking corps, and move obliquely with the next, so as to direct the principal effort upon the second. The line being broken, the obstacle is no longer of use; and the masked brigade is in danger of being cut off, if not promptly withdrawn.

Marches, for the purpose of attack, in columns to the front, flank, or rear, which must be followed by deployment or by echelon formations, are useful as parts of elementary tactics; but not safely applicable near the enemy on a great scale, if at all complicated by the construction of the columns, or by the nature of the ground. Templehoff has described the nature of Frederick's columns, by means of which his dispositions were executed with so much simplicity and precision. Although the present system of moving by corps has in a great measure superseded the old method of organization, and consequently rendered the march-maneuvers, which triumphed at Rosbach, Leuthen, and Zornedorff, less applicable, they are still the best for such corps as are obliged to manoeuvre in the presence of the enemy, whether it be to engage in front or to turn a flank.

It will be perceived that at Kollin, Leuthen, &c., Frederick's army, having broken into open columns by a mere wheel of divisions, right or left in front, was enabled to execute all its movements without danger of being attacked in detail, because the columns of lines were at no farther distance than was required for actual engagement. The enemy could neither cut them off nor penetrate between them. In taking the direction of the intended line, the army, when come to the ground, is formed in a few minutes, that is, in the space of time required for the word of command, "wheel into line," to pass down the column. In this method, it was only necessary to send an advanced guard to protect the march, and at the same time to keep the enemy in suspense. As the army requires only two or three hundred paces between the columns, and the divisions no more than their respective distances, to form into two lines, the manoeuvre is easily executed with precision. The army having unnoticed reached the flank of the enemy, wheels into line, not allowing the enemy time to form an angle, or to change front; consequently he will be overpowered in succession along his line.

If two columns of the length of the line of battle be not advisable, the ground requiring a modification, four columns may be formed, by doubling up the lines, or by marching by wings, without increasing the difficulty of forming. The four columns being constructed of the two lines doubled, when arrived near the point where they are to form, the second and fourth halt until the first and third have proceeded so far as to disengage from each other. While halted, they protect the march of the others, and when cleared by them, they follow in their rear, and thus are prepared to wheel into line with them.

If the columns are formed by wings, they will again fall into two lines by a simple change of direction, executed by all the heads of columns of each line at the same time to the right or left, and then leading into the rear of the preceding. But this transition of columns of wings into columns of line should take place at some distance from the enemy. At Leuthen, this manoeuvre introduced the battle: (fig. 15.) A, the advanced guard masking the march of the army in four columns; B B B B, the heads of the four columns which form the first line; and C C C C, the heads of the second line (now in the rear of the first), all changing direction by a wheel to the right at the same instant, and consequently forming two open columns ready to wheel into line. The advance meantime either halts in position to alarm the enemy on another point, or continues to open the march by preceding and covering it.

It is however evident that these kinds of marches must be made on open ground; for in countries deeply intersected, great movements are impracticable; and it thus becomes necessary to take advantage of known openings, and engage more or less in columns. By Guibert's and the regulation systems, the army being broken into several columns, they move with their heads often out of sight of each other at the distance of more than a mile, and yet being expected to keep their alignments and relative distances. When ordered to form, they either close and deploy, or march by echelons to fit into an exact alignment. All this is evidently impossible before the enemy, who seeing the tedious manoeuvre, has time to act as he pleases while its probable errors are rectifying; and if the centre divisions should be chosen for the points of deployment, half the columns must turn their backs upon his fire to perform it. Frederick, during the whole seven years' war, attempted these movements only twice, and in both instances failed from accidental circumstances. At Minden the French manoeuvred in the same manner, and were a great part of the night and the next morning employed in rectifying errors, which gave Prince Ferdinand time to arrive; and though he also moved in columns, he had previously sent all the generals to reconnoitre their routes and points of formation, and cut openings and fix marks to insure the exact direction. Such precautions resemble the contrivances adopted in aid of the manoeuvres in a camp of instruction; and the necessity of recurring to them shows the difficulty of the manoeuvre, which not even the new organization of corps, and the use of swarms of skirmishers, entirely remove.

Lehwald's manoeuvre at Jägerndorf is worthy of notice, as particularly applicable in intersected ground. His infantry advanced in a double column from the centre, and formed to right and left without risk of confusion; the cavalry, moving at some distance, easily took up the alignment.

Frederick's order of march should however be considered only as a manoeuvre, and not be applied to marches in great operations. As this order of march is best calculated for attacks against lines, so is it also for the attack upon columns in march.

An attack upon an army while on the march is advantageous, for the same reasons as an attack upon the extremity of a line; because the army attacked on the heads of its columns is precisely in the same situation, relatively to the enemy, as one assaulted in flank. The battle of Rosbach furnishes an illustration. AB, fig. 16, represents the army of the king, CD that of the French.

Supposing them both in line, CD would still be attacked perpendicularly, and out-flanked on one of its wings, exactly Battles.

as it was on the head of its columns. The advantage of both these manoeuvres lies in the necessity to which the enemy is reduced of bringing his battalions in succession to the front, while the opponent, acting with vigour, defeats them, one after another, by the superior pressure of his mass, provided his march be onward in an appropriate direction; horizontally if the column moves perpendicularly, and perpendicularly if the march is horizontal. The object for assuming, as nearly as possible, an opposite direction, is to present a whole line to the head of a column, or to the extremity of a line; because, if such a direction were adopted that the heads of columns should meet, both armies would be obliged to deploy, and a parallel order would be the consequence, without tactical advantage to either. In fig. 17, the columns AB meeting those of the enemy CD in the same order, both fearing to be attacked, will immediately deploy; AB will therefore form the line FG, and CD the line HI, which gives no advantage to either party.

The battle of Roshbach offers a further illustration. As an angle must necessarily be formed when the heads of columns are attacked, to check the first efforts of the enemy, the advanced guard or leading brigade should deploy, while the rest of the army, should take a new direction of march, clear of the enemy's flank, in order to protect the retreat of the advance already engaged, and to gain a station for acting offensively, fig. 18.

If the advanced guard or leading brigades AB of the columns HI be attacked, a deployment must take place according to the direction of the attack CD. This manoeuvre having checked the enemy FG, the army in the rear being thus momentarily protected, should immediately change direction exteriorly, by filing the divisions into a new alignment KL; or by altering the direction of the columns in a similar manner, so as to produce a prolongation KK beyond the enemy's flank. It is, however, clear, that if the columns are left in front, the operation is according to rule; but if the right be in front, a direction to the left would present the reverse flanks to the enemy. There would be no time for a countermarch, and still less for wheeling up in succession. It therefore appears that the columns should change the pivots of divisions, and wheel to the right into line; for though this manoeuvre would be against the letter of the regulations, no disorder would ensue, and it is actually practised, at least by cavalry, in some of the continental armies. There is no want of proofs of the occasional necessity of this manoeuvre in every campaign; but the battle of Laswaree will suffice for an illustration. The British infantry advanced in a single column by the right, and after crossing the Mahmus Nye, a deep sunken rivulet, found itself opposite the enemy's right. To have prolonged the movement, was to produce a parallel order of battle; advantage was therefore taken of a ravine which led to the hostile right flank, and could conceal the movement. The head of the column turned to the left, and gained the flank; but when ordered to wheel into line, the pivots being reversed, some of the Sepoy troops, adhering to the letter of the rules and regulations, wheeled with their backs to the enemy.

This method of converting a probable defeat into an offensive movement and oblique attack, will probably intimidate the enemy, and check his attack on AB, from the moment he perceives that his own flank is menaced. As a manoeuvre it is also more rapid and simple than a change of front, which would only tend to a parallel formation. Although the existing modifications in the structure of armies, as already observed, renders this kind of attack more rare, and the organisation by corps and divisions is advantageous to prevent them, it is nevertheless true, that the Prussians lost the battle of Auersturtz, and the French were placed in the most critical situations at Marengo, Eylau, and Lützen, because they were attacked on the march before they expected a general action.

In considering the actual organization of troops, it should be remembered that the heavy formation of the Greek phalanx and Roman legion were in conformity with the use of the spear or the pilum; and that it was partly preserved, in modern times, by the habit of mixing spearmen with the musketeers, the imperfection of firearms still rendering the absolute shock of a charge necessary for the decision of a battle. By degrees, however, it went on diminishing until the "thin formation," being by three ranks in foreign armies, and by two ranks in the British army, had become the military rule. The full benefit of fire can only be gained by the double rank, although even Jomini, whilst admitting that such is the fact, considers that no other than a British army could secure stability by a formation so shallow; lately, however, it has been adopted in the French army. In arranging an army in the line of battle, the primitive organization, so far as concerns the principal parts, remains nearly unaltered,—namely, it should consist of two wings; a centre and a reserve.

As a necessary measure towards the accuracy and rapidity of military movements, it is expedient that troops should be organised upon some definite principles, calculated to facilitate both the giving and the performance of orders. For this purpose a company has been considered as the unit of formation of infantry, a troop as that of cavalry, and a battery as that of artillery; and on the various combinations of these units has been founded the whole system of drill. In looking merely at manoeuvring on a small scale, this selection of units is sufficient and judicious, as a battalion or a brigade of artillery (the old formation by battalions having in the artillery been abandoned) can be best manoeuvred on the parade by the multiplying or subdividing the unit adopted. But in war a formation on a larger basis is required, and it may be then said that the battalion becomes the unit; but as the brigade of artillery does not correspond in magnitude or importance with that force, there is a certain degree of incongruity in the application of the term to that arm. The guns of a complete field-brigade of artillery would be a sufficient proportion for a small force of between 15,000 and 20,000 men; and it is evident, therefore, that some confusion is created in the due appreciation of the term as so applied, and that some other term should Battles. be adopted for the greater unit of artillery. The term brigade may be considered as usually applied to a combination of four battalions, or about 4000 men (assuming 1000 as the average strength of a battalion), to which proportion at least three batteries ought to be allotted, and that number ought to have some special designation. The division is the next term adopted, and this may consist of four or more brigades; 14,000 or 16,000 men, however, seeming a good normal number. The third and greatest division is the corps d’armée, which may consist of either two or four divisions, being either 32,000 or 64,000 men. The first is the best proportion for a moderate army, the latter for a very large army.

A division being assumed to consist of four brigades, or 16,000 men, the artillery would be six batteries still being less than a brigade; and in like manner, the artillery for a corps d’armée or two divisions would be twelve batteries, being more than a brigade. So far, then, as concerns the convenience of field organisation, the designation “artillery brigades” is imperfect. In this arrangement, the combining multiple in the two first denominations being four, a brigade may be considered as drawn up with one battalion in each wing, one in the centre, and one in reserve; a division as drawn up with a brigade in each wing, a brigade in the centre, and one in reserve. But as it ought to be possible to reinforce the wing exposed to attack, it seems desirable that one battalion or one brigade should in either case be available for that purpose, which would raise the number to five. Two divisions, or two brigades, would enable the troops to be drawn up in double line on the same principle. Jomini observes, “that whatever may be the subdivisions or fractions of an army, the organisation by corps d’armée will probably continue as a normal type in all the great continental powers.”

Considering the imperfect means of propelling offensive weapons possessed by the ancients, the legionary force of the Romans, consisting of about 6000 men of all arms, or double that number, including the combined Italian legion, possessed great advantages, as it may be considered to have contained some of each class of combatants, and was therefore closely assimilated in principle to the modern division in that respect. In respect to light cavalry, as its duties are of vital importance, and, further, as no battle can be decisive, unless, in case of success, there is a possibility of pursuing the vanquished enemy, breaking up any of his troops still maintaining their organisation, and preventing him from rallying—this arm ought not to be restricted in number in any country where it is able to act with effect. As a rule, therefore, one battalion of cavalry may be allotted to each brigade of infantry, which, estimating the strength of a battalion of cavalry at 600 men, would make the proportion of cavalry to infantry as about one to six, which would allow two brigades of cavalry, of four battalions each, to a small corps d’armée, and four to a large; but, of course, these proportions should be varied to correspond with the nature of the country. In respect to artillery, it must be remembered, that guns were not only inferior in scientific construction, but also in mobility, at the time when they were distributed throughout the whole line, each battalion having its own guns. To produce the greatest effect, it is evidently necessary that they should act in masses, although it is not probable that many instances will occur in which it may be desirable, or even possible, to bring together in one battery 100 pieces of cannon, for the mere purpose of making an opening in the enemy’s line, as was done with such success by Bonaparte at Wagram. It has been usual to allow four guns to 1000 men; but with the improved range and powers of the modern artillery, and more especially from their greater mobility, they will doubtless perform in war more extended service than hitherto. If, then, one battery be allowed, or six guns, to 1000 men, it would be at the rate of about three of the present brigades to an army of 32,000 men on the field, and in the proportion of four batteries to a brigade of infantry. In all cases, the strength of an army ought to be estimated by its infantry, and the proportions of cavalry and artillery estimated in relation to the infantry, and more particularly to the peculiarities of country and of service in which they are to be employed. The horse artillery should bear a similar proportion to the cavalry; and heavy or reserve artillery and heavy cavalry should be estimated separately, in reference to the probability of their being useful in special services, such as the defence of positions, &c. In posting artillery—the most powerful auxiliary in modern warfare—horse artillery, like cavalry, ought to be always so placed that the ground will permit them to move freely in any required direction; foot artillery should be covered as much as possible from the fire of the destructive rifle, and secured from a sudden charge of cavalry; and where no natural protection can be found, it is absolutely necessary that security should be obtained from artificial intrenchments, or from other obstacles. Emhinences so high as to produce a plunging fire are unfavourable for the action of artillery. A moderate height, sloping off towards the enemy like a glacis, is the most favourable, as it produces a grazing fire, and affords no cover; whilst a precipitous bank not only renders the fire plunging, but actually prevents its fire from being of any use when the enemy approaches very closely. Horse artillery are not only valuable when acting with cavalry, but they become most valuable when acting with cavalry, but they become most valuable when acting with cavalry, but they become most valuable when acting with cavalry,

There are several modes of drawing up troops for advance to action which Jomini details, and it is well to notice. Light infantry or skirmishers should cover the line properly so called, take advantage of the features of the ground so as to conceal themselves, protect the march of columns, fill up the intervals between them, and defend the outskirts of posts. Of modes of formation, he observes, there are four, considering that all others may be reduced to them — 1st, The shallow, or deployment in two ranks, according to the English system, or three ranks as in foreign armies; 2d, A half-deep formation, consisting of a line of battalions, arranged in columns of attack on the centre, or in small squares; 3d, The mixed formation, the battalions being partly deployed and partly in columns; 4th, The deep order, consisting of large columns of battalions, each deployed, but one formed behind the other.

Some examples of the different modes of marshalling troops in order of battle may be represented by the aid of Jomini's figures. First, then, a line in which each battalion of the line is formed into a column of attack by divisions on the centre, with light infantry in the intervals. On such an arrangement as this (see fig. 19), it may be ob-

Fig. 15. columns becomes excessive, or twelve ranks in depth, which would render the number of non-combatants too great, and expose so large a mass to the artillery fire of the enemy, he proposes to adopt the two-rank arrangement of the English, and to spread one of the divisions as riflemen in front of the line (fig. 20). This would

Fig. 20.

doubtless improve the formation, as its absolute depth would be reduced to six ranks; but the present perfection of the British musket renders any complication unnecessary. In all cases whilst moving to the attack, the columns should not halt to fire, but reserve their fire for a critical moment. When arrived at the point where the columns deploy into line, firing should steadily commence. If advancing with a probability of being attacked by cavalry, it may be necessary to move in such a manner as will enable the battalions to be thrown into hollow squares (fig. 21).

Fig. 21.

In this it will be observed that the formation by three ranks is represented; but the English squares, formed on a double rank, were found to resist effectually the attacks of cavalry at Waterloo; such a formation is, indeed, the fitting one for an English army. In squares it insures that every combatant shall act to advantage—the front rank in resisting the attack, the second by its cool and effective fire. As Jomini says that such a shallow formation may be trusted with the English, they are right in availing themselves of an advantage which has been awarded to them on the score of their superior stability as soldiers.

The troops may also move by echelons; and if these represent battalions, it is manifest they may be formed into squares if attacked on the march. On such an arrangement a flank may be first attacked, every battalion coming into action as it nears the enemy, thus producing the effect of an oblique line of attack.

The battle of Waterloo, unquestionably the most decisive event of the late awful contest, offers so many instructive circumstances, and so much matter for deep meditation, in the position and manoeuvres, and in the exhibition of the soundest maxims of war, that it may be considered as a general illustration of the advanced state of the art of war at the present period. Without entering into details, the minutiae of which are apt to confuse, the principal features only which it displays will be pointed out. As there are many plans, more or less correct, and the ground is generally known, the remarks about to be made will be readily understood by those who have any elementary knowledge of war. When Blucher had retreated from Ligny, and the Duke of Wellington had fallen back from Quare Bras, he occupied the position of Mont St Jean, determined to risk a battle with the forces he could collect on that point. Exclusive of the Prussians, whose severe loss in killed, wounded, and stragglers, could be only replaced at the time by the expected arrival of the corps of Bulow, the duke's army consisted of about eighty-one battalions and eighty-seven squadrons; which, with the artillery, may have amounted to 65,700 men. Of these upwards of thirty battalions and as many squadrons had never been in action. This mass of forces was posted (see fig. 22) with the centre diagonally across and in front of the forking of the two causeways from Brussels to Charleroy and to Nouvelles; the right centre behind the chateau of Hougoumont, and the left, much held back, passed in rear of La Haye Sainte, along the cross-road in the direction of Obain. Behind the right centre, Lord Hill placed his corps, en potence, in columns, prepared to manoeuvre to his right, on the small plain of Braine la Leud; or to his left, to sustain the centre. In and about Braine la Leud was a Netherland division, with the right thrown forward, and covered by the rivulet Hain, and leaving the small plain open; a kind of gorge to tempt the enemy between the two sides of the re-entering angle of the right wing. The Prussians were expected to debouch through the woods of Lasne towards Plancheois, which would form the left into another gorge, or re-entering angle. Thus

Fig. 22.

The letters A A A indicate the position of the British army, B B that of the Prussians, and C C C that of the French.

the position formed a kind of open W (fig. 22, A A A A B B) with the chateau of Hougoumont at the summit of the salient angles, covered by a plantation of wood and enclosures, occupied by six or eight battalions; so that the enemy could not enfilade either of the faces of the centre, from behind that plantation, nor approach on either of the causeways which passed through the centre without presenting its flank. Besides this point, La Haye Sainte, a stone farm close to the chaussé of Charleroy, and farther on the left the farm of Papelotte and chateau of Frichermont, were occupied. The whole front sloped gently towards the enemy, and in the rear the cavalry was distributed in brigades, each in two lines, covered by the rising ground; and the artillery, all the field-pieces of which were nine-pounders or twelves, formed a line of almost contiguous batteries along the front, interspersed with howitzers and rockets.

By the returns found after the battle, it appears that the enemy had debouched from Charleroy with 122,000 men, exclusive of the reinforcements that joined after the 15th of June. Of these he produced on the field of battle about 80,000 men, formed in concentrated masses on both sides of the chaussé of Charleroy, and gradually advancing the right parallel to the British left (C C C C); but as he was jealous of the woods on the right, he formed an angle to the rear, and kept his reserves far back. He had made a demonstration with a corps of cavalry beyond the British right towards Hal, where he found the corps of General Colville and Prince Frederick of Orange, with two divisions posted at Tubise, Clabbeck, and Braine le Chateau, to cover that

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1 The return was dated the 13th, according to the assertion of a Prussian officer of the staff. The whole force brought over the frontier must therefore have amounted to nearly 150,000 men. avenue to Brussels. Another corps, 42,000 strong, under Grouchy, was detached to his right upon Wavre, to turn the allies, pursue or arrest the Prussians, and prevent the timely junction of Bulow. Thus the dispositions of both the commanders were combined with consummate ability; Napoleon operating on the system of throwing two-thirds of his masses alternately on either side, and the allies in manoeuvring so as to bring a superior mass on the decisive point. The problem, however, was difficult of solution. The communication with France was open only by the roads of Charleroy and Nivelles; hence the enemy could not quit them in the attack, nor could he gain Brussels by any other avenue than that of Waterloo; therefore, to possess the chateau of Hougomont, without which he could not arrive at the position, was the natural object of the attack. As this was sustained by the mass of the allied army, and could not be enfiladed, his attack failed. All those directed on the road of Charleroy to the left centre were necessarily oblique, and exposed to the fire in flank before they could reach their opponents. To have risked a general onset of all his masses, before the British were thinned and exhausted, he knew, under the circumstances of the moment, to be too hazardous. The plain of Braine la Leud appeared open to him; but that very circumstance proved that opposition was prepared on that side. To have turned the force thither would in the first place have caused the loss of the communication by Charleroy, and next facilitated the junction of the Prussians; and, besides, the corps on the other side of the Hain flanked the advance, and could in a short time be sustained by the two divisions in its rear, and which he knew to be at hand. He would therefore have been placed between two fires, and have lost his point of retreat upon Charleroy; and the road by Nivelles might, meantime, be cut off by the troops left behind at Mons. Again, if he threw his masses towards the left, he only went to meet the Prussians, and left the British masters of the road of Nivelles, and possibly, if he advanced far, of that of Charleroy. He entangled himself in woods and defiles, where his superior cavalry could not act. The character of his opponent bespoke immediate offensive movements from the moment his right would be at liberty; therefore the chances were in favour of Wellington: yet this was the only advantageous side, because it brought him nearer Grouchy, and in case of defeat he could take a new line of retreat by Namur. He, however, preferred the experiment, depending on the enthusiastic valour of his troops; and committed himself so deeply, that, when at length the Prussians appeared, a retreat was no longer possible.

These observations disprove the assertion, that little skill was displayed on either side. The generals and the soldiers equally did their duty: the veteran Blucher behaved with proper prudence in keeping so long back from the dangerous manoeuvre which was assigned him; and when he saw the hostile cavalry destroyed, he acted with vigour and skill. As for Grouchy, who wasted his time in forcing the position of Wavre across the Dyle, everywhere fordable, his manoeuvres show that he felt the danger of his movement, and prudently remained on the banks. Much might be added on the details of this great battle up to the general charge to the front, and fate of the enemy's squares; but enough has been stated to recommend the study of a battle where three of the greatest commanders and the best manoeuvring armies in Europe gloriously struggled for victory; and, let it be added, notwithstanding the assertions to the contrary, where none committed a positive fault, and where Napoleon, in particular, who has been condemned by some of his own partisans, operated with all the skill and vigour which the circumstances of the moment allowed. Both generals, Napoleon and Wellington, exhibited great abilities in all the combinations of this great battle. Had Grouchy's defeat of Blucher at Ligny caused Blucher to assume an exterior line, the position of Wellington would have been one of great danger; whilst the rapidity and precision of all Wellington's movements seemed to anticipate and frustrate the judicious plans of Napoleon, which were further somewhat neutralized by the misconceptions of some of his own generals.

This unpleasant operation in war requires even greater skill and firmness than an advance. The Austrians have often conducted theirs with sagacity; and it is perhaps owing to the persevering spirit of their retreats, that, after twenty unfortunate campaigns, the monarchy was as formidable as in the commencement. Their generals are not then controlled by cabinet orders, and therefore always operate with precision. Among the retreats which deserve the study of the soldier, are that of Schulemburg with the Saxons, the Duke of York's out of Belgium, the two retreats of the Archduke Charles, that of Moreau from Bavaria to the Rhine, the Russian retreat upon Moscow and Tula, and, lastly, the final movement of Prince Eugene Beauharnois in Italy.

In the choice of a position, it is not sufficient to have a strong front and to secure the flanks; the means of retreating must also be considered in case of defeat. Lloyd, in his Reflections on the Battle of Kolin, observes that a defeated army retires with greater facility by dividing itself into as many corps as the nature of the country will allow; because, 1st, if the enemy form an equal number of divisions, he cannot operate vigorously upon any, and the retiring army having the facility of reuniting, may totally defeat one of the hostile corps; 2d, if the enemy operates en masse against one, the others fall back unmolested, whilst that division, covered by a strong rear-guard, avoids serious actions, and being able to move more rapidly, because less numerous, can escape without great loss. Bulow maintains that the columns should move outwards or eccentrically; Jomini combats both these opinions. He observes that Lloyd states that by dividing the pursuing forces they are exposed to defeat, but he omits to consider that the manoeuvre he recommends to a retreating army, which must be already inferior to the enemy, exposes each division to the same result. He quotes the fine concentric retreat of the Archduke Charles, and might have added the Russian and both Lord Wellington's. But in examining the mechanism of these movements, it appears that none of them was the consequence of a defeat, and especially such defeats as the modern system of attack inflicts; they were merely armies manoeuvring back towards their base upon their own lines of operations, watching a favourable opportunity to resume the offensive; or retreats after battles where both parties had claims to the victory, as Benningsen's after Eylau, and Kutusoff's after Borodino. The difference between Lloyd and Jomini is merely in words; for the former points out the facility of uniting two corps, which, if he meant the eccentricity suggested by Bulow, would be impossible.

But an army completely defeated is no longer in the hands of the general, whether he be the Duke of Brunswick or Napoleon. A check, such as the Austrians suffered at Fleurus, and the allies at Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden, does not prevent the commander from executing the best measures that circumstances will allow. Thus, in the three former, the armies retired in mass; in the latter, they divided into several columns, and thereby not only covered themselves by the mountains of Bohemia, but also applied Lloyd's maxim in uniting two corps to destroy one of the pursuer's at Kulm. Hence circumstances must govern the measure; and if, after a real defeat, a broad river, chain of mountains, or range of fortresses, can be gained in two or three marches, a routed army may be safely divided. A retiring army is not always obliged to fall back upon its own frontier; it may sometimes change the direction of its operations, as Frederick did after the siege of Olmutz in 1758, when, instead of returning into Silesia, he changed his line and marched into Bohemia. This measure was also proposed to Napoleon before the battle of Leipzig. He was advised to approach the Elbe, call in the corps of St Cyr from Dresden, cross the river about Wittemberg, and descend by the right bank towards Magdeburg. The Prussian and northern armies, being on the left of the Elbe, could not have prevented the destruction of Berlin, Potsdam, and Brandenburg. And from Magdeburg, reinforced with its vast garrison, and connected with the Danes and the corps of Davoust at Hamburg, he could have operated by a new line, having his communications open by Wesel, Cassel, and all the fortresses of Holland; the allies must have followed him into a sterile country which would not have subsisted their vast cavalry, whilst the sandy roads would have prevented the transport of provisions. There were probably superior reasons, which led him to reject the proposal.

If the art of war consists in applying the superior force of a mass upon a weak point of the enemy, and in case of success to render the defeat decisive, it follows that a defeated army should be pursued with the utmost vivacity. "Never delay till to-morrow" is an ancient military maxim, applicable especially in pursuit; for the strength of an army consists in its organisation, in the unity resulting from the connection of all its parts with the mainspring which makes it move. After a defeat, this unity no longer exists. The harmony between the head which combines and the body which executes is broken; their connection is suspended, often destroyed. To pursue after a successful attack is to march to a certain triumph. All the late campaigns offer signal examples of this truth. Generals of mediocrity often neglect this maxim, and their victories are scarcely more than a forcible removal of their opponents. The direction of the pursuit, though guided by circumstances, should always aim at gaining the hostile line of communications, and thereby cutting off the enemy from his base; because, by so doing, he may be thrown upon such obstacles as to force him to surrender. It may be added, in opposition to what has been said respecting retreats, that the object of the pursuer should be to assume an interior line, and force the enemy to adopt exterior lines, as by separating he is liable to be defeated in detail.

Sieges, according to Lloyd, should never be undertaken but with the following views:—1st, When fortresses are situate upon the passages which lead to the enemy, so as to render it impossible to penetrate without capturing them; 2d, when they intercept the communications, and the country is unable to furnish the necessary subsistence; 3d, when they are wanted to cover magazines formed in the country, and thereby to facilitate the operations; 4th, when the enemy has considerable depots within the fortress of which he is absolutely in want; 5th, when the capture of a fortress produces the conquest of a considerable tract of country, and enables the besiegers to winter in that vicinity. To these may be added, 6th, the recapture of a fortress essential in the defence of a frontier.

As victory is best secured by taking the lead in an operation, an army covering a siege should never wait to be attacked by the enemy, but endeavour to anticipate him; for, by defeating the forces which aim at raising the siege, the place is sure to fall. If the enemy approach the covering army with an imposing mass, the siege should be raised, all the forces united, and an attack in force directed against him. When the relieving army is defeated, the siege should be resumed, while the pursuit continues, and the enemy is not in a condition to return before the capture of the place. When an army besieges a place, in consequence of offensive movements and anterior success, the covering army should not remain in a position near the place, but drive the enemy as far as possible forward; for the relieving army will find the difficulty of raising the siege increase with the distance it is removed from the place.

PART II.—WARLIKE OPERATIONS AT SEA.

Referring generally to the articles Admiral and Admiralty, Docks, Navigation, Navy, Seamanship, and operations Ship-Building, for much that appertains to naval war at sea, we shall here direct our attention to that branch of the subject which is commonly designated Naval Tactics; and notwithstanding the great alteration which the introduction of steam has produced, and which will be noticed hereafter, it seems desirable to give such an insight into this subject as will enable the results of the change to be better understood. By this term is understood the art of arranging fleets or squadrons in such an order or disposition as may be most convenient for attacking the enemy, defending themselves, or of retreating with the greatest advantage. Naval tactics are founded on those principles which time and experience have enabled us to deduce from the improved state of modern naval warfare, which has occasioned not only a difference in the mode of constructing and working ships, but even in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons. We here propose to lay down the general principles of naval tactics, and to describe, as briefly as is consistent with perspicuity, the most improved systems which have been adopted in modern times.

Fleets are generally divided into three squadrons, the Ordinary van, centre, and rear, each under the command of a flag-officer. The admiral of the fleet, or chief in command, leads the centre division, while the van is usually commanded by a vice-admiral, and the rear by a rear-admiral. Each squadron is distinguished by the position of the colours in the ships of which it is composed. Thus, the ships of the centre squadron carry their pendants at the main-top-gallant mast head, while those of the van division have their pendants at the fore-top-gallant mast head, and those of the rear at the mizen-top mast head. Each squadron, as far as possible, consists of the same number of ships, and as nearly as may be of the same force. In large fleets, the squadrons are sometimes again divided in a similar manner; the van and rear of the squadron being headed by rear-admirals, or senior captains, called commodores. In the usual mode of forming the lines, each commanding admiral arranges his ship in the centre of his own squadron, and thus the admiral of the fleet is in the centre of the line. When no enemy is in sight, the sloops, store-ships, fire-ships, and other small vessels, are dispersed to windward of the fleet, that they may be more easily supported, and more readily answer signals. The frigates lie to windward of the van and rear of the convoy, thus keeping a good look-out, and keeping the small vessels in their proper station. When the fleet sails in three columns, the centre still keeps in the middle, while the van and rear form the starboard or the larboard column, according to circumstances. These arrangements are called orders of sailing, and will be better understood from the following definitions.

The starboard line of bearing is that line on which the arranged ships of a fleet bear from each other on a close-hauled line, whatever course they may be steering, so that

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1 The able article in the last edition by Colonel Hamilton Smith has been freely used in the present. 2 This is adapted from the article in the former edition. Warlike when the ships haul their wind, or tack together, they may be on a line close hauled upon the starboard tack. The larboard line of bearing is that line on which the ships, when hauling their wind, or tacking together, may be formed on a line close hauled on the larboard tack. The ships of a fleet are said to be on a line abreast when their keels are parallel to each other, and their main-masts lie in the same straight line. Ships are said to be in a line on the bow or quarter when they are arranged in a straight line cutting their keels obliquely in the same angle, so that, reckoning from any intermediate ship, the ships towards one extremity of the line will be on the bow of that ship, while those towards the other extremity will be on her quarter. When several ships in the same line steer the same course, while that course is different from the line of sailing, they are said to sail chequerwise.

When the ships of a fleet arranged in any of the orders of sailing, and on the same line, perform successively the same manoeuvre, as each gets into the wake of the ship that leads the van of the line or squadron, tacking or veering, bearing away or coming to the wind in the same point of the wake of the leading ship, they are said to manoeuvre in succession.

There are usually reckoned five orders of sailing, exclusive of the line of battle, the order of retreat, &c. In the first order (see figs. 23 and 24), the fleet is arranged on the starboard or larboard line of bearing, all the ships steering the same course. In these cases the fleet, by hauling the wind when in the starboard line, as in fig. 23, will be ready to form the line on the starboard tack; and when ranged on the larboard line of bearing, as in fig. 24, it will, by tacking, be ready to form the line on the larboard tack. The arrows annexed to the diagrams mark the direction of the wind, as in ordinary charts.

This first order of sailing is now seldom employed, except in passing through a narrow strait. In the second order of sailing, the fleet steering any proper course, is ranged in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, as in fig. 25.

This second order, besides being equally defective with the former, is subject to the additional disadvantage of rendering it extremely difficult for the ships to tack, without each ship falling on board that next astern.

In the third order of sailing, the whole fleet is close hauled, and ranged on the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of twelve points, having the admiral's ship (A, fig. 26) in the angular point, and the whole fleet steering the same course.

Thus, supposing, as in the figure, the wind at north, the starboard division of the fleet will bear W.N.W. of the admiral, and the larboard E.N.E. This order in small fleets or squadrons is superior to either of the former; but when the fleet is numerous, the line will be too much extended.

In the fourth order, the fleet is divided into six or more columns, and is thus more concentrated. The commandants, ranged on the two lines of bearing, have their squadrons astern of them, on two lines parallel to the direction of the wind; the first ships of each column being, with respect to the commander of the squadron, the one on his starboard and the other on his larboard quarter. The distance between the columns should be such that the fleet may readily be reduced to the third order of sailing, and from that to the order of battle. This order is adapted for fleets or convoys crossing the ocean, and is represented in fig. 27. But as it requires much time to reduce a fleet from this order to that of battle, it is defective when in presence of an enemy.

In the fifth order, the fleet, close hauled, is arranged in three columns parallel to each other, the van commonly forming the weather, and the rear the lee column. See fig. 28. Fig. 29 represents the same order, except that each column is here subdivided into two, with the ship bearing the commander of each squadron in the centre of each subdivision.

In forming the order or line of battle, the ships of the fleet are drawn up in a line nearly close hauled, standing battle under easy sail, so that each ship may be at a certain distance from the ship immediately ahead, as a cable's length, or half that distance. The fireships and frigates ahead and astern form a line parallel to the former, and to the windward of it if the enemy be to the leeward, but to the leeward if the enemy be to windward. This order is denoted by fig. 30, where the fleet is sailing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north.

When a fleet is compelled to retreat before a superior force, it is usually arranged in an order the reverse of the retreat third order of sailing; the divisions of the fleet being ranged in the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of 135° or twelve points, the admiral's ship being in the angular point, and the frigates, transports, &c., included within the wings to leeward. See fig. 31, where the fleet is sailing right before the wind. Though any other direction may be taken, the two lines still form the same angle. The order of convoy is that in which the ships are all in operations each other's wake, steering in the same point of the compass, and forming a right line. If the fleet is numerous, it may be divided into three columns, which are to be ranged parallel to each other, that of the admiral occupying the centre, and all steering the same course.

Having thus described the ordinary positions of a fleet, we must explain the manoeuvres by which they are produced, and beginning with the orders of sailing.

To form a fleet in the first order of sailing, supposing the ships to be in no particular order, that ship which is to lead on the proposed line of bearing for the order of sailing runs to leeward of the greater part of the fleet, and then hauls her wind under an easy sail. Each of the other ships then proceeds to take the proper station by chasing the ship which is to be ahead of her, and when in the wake of the leading ship, adjusts her quantity of canvass so as to preserve the proper distance. The ships thus arranged astern of each other are in the line of battle; and from this the first order of sailing is formed, by each ship bearing away at the same time, and all steering the proposed course.

In forming the second order of sailing, the leading ship runs to leeward of so many of the fleet that each ship may readily fetch her wake, and then steers a course eight points from the wind, under an easy sail. The line is formed by each ship in the same manner as in the first order, except that, before bearing away, the line is perpendicular to the direction of the wind, or each ship has the wind on her beam.

As, in the third order of sailing, the admiral's ship is in the centre, to produce this position, the fleet being formed in a line on one of the lines of bearing, and the ships steering in each other's wake, ten points from the wind, the leading or leewardmost ship first hauls her wind. The second ship does the same as soon as she gets into the wake of the former; and this is done by each ship till the admirals' ships haul their wind, when they reach the wake of the leading ship. At the same time that the admiral's ship hauls her wind, the sternmost half of the fleet does the same. The ships are now in the third order of sailing, from which the fleet can be formed in the line of battle on either tack.

To form the fourth order of sailing, the commanding admirals range themselves on the two lines of bearing, at a proper distance from each other, steering the proposed course; and the ships of the several columns take their respective places, parallel to each other, and forming lines in the direction of the wind.

To form the fifth order, the three leading ships of the divisions take their posts abreast and to leeward of each other, keeping their wind under an easy sail; then the ships of each squadron make sail, and take their respective stations at the proper distance astern of their leaders, while the commanders of each division, and the corresponding ships of each, keep mutually abreast of each other.

In forming from the first order of sailing, if the ships are running large on the tack that answers to the line of bearing on which they sail, and if the line is to be formed on the same tack, all the ships haul their wind at once, or as quickly as possible after the next to windward; but if they be on the other tack with respect to the line of bearing, they all haul their wind and tack or veer together. If the line of battle is to be formed on the other line of bearing, the ship most to leeward veers or tacks, and hauls her wind, while the rest of the fleet veer or tack at the same time, and steer with the wind four points free, and each ship hauls her wind as soon as she gets within the wake of the leader. See figs. 32 and 33.

Suppose the fleet running before the wind in the second order of sailing. To form the line from this position, all the ships haul up together on the proper tack, presenting their heads eight points from the wind at the line on which they are arranged; the leading ship then hauls her wind, immediately making sail or shortening sail, so as to close or open the order, and the same is done successively by all the rest. See fig. 34.

In a fleet running large in the third order, the line of battle is formed by the wing which is in the line of bearing corresponding to the tack on which the line is to be formed, and the ship at the angle, hauling their wind together, while the ships of the other wing haul up together eight points from the wind; each ship moving in this direction till she reach the wake of the other wing, when she hauls close up. See fig. 35.

In forming the line of battle on the same tack from the fifth order of sailing (as the fourth is not calculated for forming a line of battle) the centre brings to, so as only to keep steerage way; the weather column bears away two points, and when it gets ahead of the centre, hauls its wind, while the ships of the lee column tack together, and crowd sail to gain the wake of the centre, when they re-tack together, and complete the line. (See fig. 36); or the weather column brings to, while the centre and lee tack together, and bear away two points free. When the ships of the centre column have gained the wake of the van, they re-tack together, and bring to; and when those of the lee have gained the rear line, they re-tack together, and all stand on; or, lastly, the lee column brings to, the centre runs under easy sail two points free, to get ahead of the rear squadron, while the rear bears away under a press of sail two points free, to get ahead of the centre division. Suppose the weather and centre columns to interchange. To form the lee under these circumstances, the column veers away seven points on the other tack, forming the rear squadron. See fig. 40.

To form the line so that the lee column may form the van, and the centre the rear, the lee column is to stand on under a press of sail, while the weather bears away three points under easy sail, and the centre bears away eight points, the ships of each column hauling their wind when in the wake of the now van division. See fig. 41.

While the centre squadron bears away three points under easy sail, and having reached the wake of the van, hauls up to form the centre division.

Suppose the centre and lee columns to interchange. The lee column stands on close hauled under an easy sail; the weather column bears away two points under a press of sail, till it reach the head of the line, when it hauls up; and the centre bears away eight points, and when in the wake of the lee, now the centre, hauls its wind. See fig. 38.

If the weather and lee columns interchange, the lee column stands on under a press of sail close hauled, while the centre, under easy sail, bears away two points, and when it reaches the wake of the now van squadron, hauls its wind; and the weather column bears away eight points, hauling up when in the wake of the centre. See fig. 39.

Suppose the centre column to form the van, and the weather the rear division. Here the lee column brings to, while the centre bears away two points, forming the line ahead of the former, now the centre; and the weather

If the line of battle is to be formed on the other tack, so that the weather shall form the van division, as in the first case, the ships of the weather column first tack successively, while those of the centre and lee stand on, the former under easy sail, and the latter shortening sail, the leading ships tacking when in the wake of the now van, taking great care that the ships of the centre and lee draw not too near to the sternmost ships of the van, or to each other. See fig. 42.

To form the line on the other tack, when the centre and weather columns interchange, the weather column brings to, while the centre column stands on, till the leading ship be fully able to clear the weather column, when the ships of the centre tack successively as they reach the wake of the van. The lee column stands on, tacking successively as the ships get into the wake of the van, under moderate sail. See fig. 43.

In forming the line on the other tack, when the centre and lee interchange, the centre brings to, while the ships of the weather tack under shortened sail, and the lee under a press of sail stands on; the leading ship having gained the wake of the line, tacks, and is followed in succession by Warlike her division. The centre column fills and stands on, when Operations the first ship of that column, and the last of the lee, bear at Sea from each other in a direction perpendicular to that of the wind. See fig. 44.

To form on this same tack, so that the weather and lee may interchange, the weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail till it can pass ahead of the weather column, when the ships tack in succession. As soon as the leading ship of the centre, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a line perpendicular to the wind, the centre fills, and tacks in succession when in the wake of the now van; and the ships of the weather column do the same when their leading ship and the last of the centre are under similar circumstances. See fig. 45.

Suppose the centre is to form the van, and the weather the rear, in forming the line on the other tack. The weather brings to, while the other columns make sail till they can pass ahead of the former on the other tack, when they tack successively. The weather column, when the others have passed it, fills and tacks to form the rear. See fig. 46.

Suppose now the lee column is to form the van. The weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail, and tacks when it can pass ahead of the weather column. When the last ship of the new van has passed to windward of the former weather column, the van shortens sail, to give time for the other columns to form, and the weather and centre fill at the same time, to gain the wake of the van, when they tack in succession. See fig. 47.

It may now be shown how a fleet may be disposed in the principal orders of sailing from the line of battle; and here, as before, we have several varieties.

1. To form the first order of sailing from the line of battle on the same tack, all the ships are to bear away together as many points as the admiral may direct, keeping in the line of bearing for the proper tack. The sternmost first bears away, and the others follow in quick succession, to avoid running foul of each other.

2. If they are to form on the other tack, the leading ship bears away four points to leeward, and the rest follow in succession. The sternmost ship having bore away, the whole haul up, and will be in bearing for the line on the other tack. See fig. 48.

3. To form the second order of sailing from the line of battle, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, so that when the headmost ship, which first presses sail, shall come abreast of the second ship, the second ship must adapt her sail to keep in this bearing, and so in succession, each taking care to keep the preceding ship in a line with herself, perpendicular to the direction of the wind. The whole fleet will now be before the wind. See fig. 49.

4. To form the third order, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, the headmost half, including the centre ship, carrying a degree of sail to preserve their line of bearing, while each of the remaining ships is successively to shorten sail, so as to form the other line of bearing with respect to that on which they were before arranged. See fig. 50.

5. To change from the line of battle to the fifth order on the same tack. Of this evolution there are several varieties, but we shall mention only two; first, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, and the fleet to keep as much as possible to windward. In this case the van and centre tack together, and run close hauled in Warlike bow and quarter line, while the rear proceeds in its former course under easy sail. When each ship of the centre is abreast of the corresponding ship of the rear, the centre retacks, while the van stands on till the centre and rear come up, when it also retacks, and all the columns regulate their distances. Secondly, when the van is to form the lee, and the rear the weather column, the van bears away under easy sail, and goes at right angles with the line ahead, while the centre runs two points free, each ship steering for that ship of the van which is to be abreast of her when in column. The distance must be determined by the leader of the van, who is not to haul up with her division till she and the sternmost ship of the centre column are in a line at right angles with the wind, when both stand on under easy sail, while the rear crowds sail to pass to windward of both.

6. To form the fifth order of sailing from the line of battle on the other tack. Of this there are also several varieties, but two only will be noticed. First, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, the van tacks in succession, while the leading ship of the centre is to tack when the leader of the van passes him exactly to windward, in which she is followed by her division, and the rear manoeuvres in the same manner with respect to the centre. Secondly, when the rear is to form the weather and the van the lee column, the van tacks in succession, and when about, either shortens sail or brings to, to allow the other columns time to form. The centre and rear then crowd sail, and tack in succession; the former tacking when its leader has the centre of the lee column in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre passes astern of the lee column. When the centre has tacked, it regulates its rate of sailing by the lee, and both wait for the rear to pass to windward. The rear tacks when the leader has the first ship of the lee in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre ship passes astern of the centre column.

The preceding descriptions of the several evolutions of a fleet, principally derived from the works of Mr. Clerk, are sufficient to explain the nature of naval tactics. At the time they were originally drawn up, every movement of a ship was dependent on the wind, and hence it was the great object of a fleet to get to windward of the enemy, so as to be able to select the most fitting point of attack, and to bear down upon the hostile fleet in the required direction, having in the wind a power at command. If, however, the advantage of a fair wind enabled the one fleet to make choice of the point where it was presumed the most decisive blow could be struck in respect to the action itself; the fleet attacked possessed the same in respect to retreat, and a battle could scarcely be rendered decisive unless fought under circumstances or in a position which rendered defeat decisive by cutting off the possibility of retreat. In these particulars naval warfare closely resembled warfare on land, as facility of retreat enables a defeated army to retire, and, falling back on its reserves to rally, and, when sufficiently reinforced, to resume the conflict. As, then, with a land army, it is necessary in order to obtain a decisive result either to intercept the communication of the enemy with his base of operations, or to bring him to action in a position where retreat, in case of defeat, is cut off by natural obstacles; so also a fleet should, if defeated, be unable to return into port, be forced to separate so as to fall an easy prey to detachments sent in pursuit, or by the very nature of the position obliged to surrender, or to run either ashore or on the rocks. Whilst, therefore, there was always a certain similarity in the principles of war, whether carried on at sea or on land, even when the necessity of having the wind, as a moving power, crippled or restricted most of the movements, it may be now said, that the principles of land and maritime war will be still more assimilated, since steam, having replaced wind, both parties have nearly an equal facility in moving, though even now the wind, when it rises beyond a very moderate limit, will prove a source of advantage or disadvantage to one or other of the parties, and equality will only exist when in a perfect calm there is an absence of all disturbing influences. This change, combined with the wonderful improvement of artillery, will doubtless encourage the use of smaller vessels, which will now be able to act at a distance against large ships, just as batteries do against a fortress. The use of ships as battering-rams, the casing of ships with iron plates so as to resist shot, are amongst the natural results of the introduction of steam as a motive power, and of the great improvement of artillery. Clerk explained well the general principles of naval tactics as suited to the then powers of locomotion, and Nelson carried them out to perfection. The French claim for the gallant Suffren the merit of adopting a similar bold system of naval tactics in the East Indies, and there can be no doubt that he there displayed great nautical skill; but it was reserved for Nelson at Trafalgar to carry naval renown, whether founded on superior seamanship or the characteristic bravery and personal fitness of English sailors, to the highest pitch. The French and Spanish fleet was drawn up in one extensive line, and the English fleet bore down upon it in two columns, one led by Nelson in the Victory, and the other by Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign, and whilst the enemy's line was, almost by compulsion, nearly immovable, the advancing columns, regardless of the enfilade fire of the enemy, came down upon the line, breaking it into distinct sections, and, engaging the ships marked out for attack as each column came up, had the manifest advantage of bringing an overpowering force to bear on the ships engaged, placing them often between two fires, and cutting them off from assistance or support. The glorious victory which followed was dearly purchased by the loss of the unparalleled naval hero Nelson, to whose surpassing merit, as a sailor of genius as well as of valour Rear-Admiral Comte E. Bouet Willamez does ample justice, even whilst paying a just tribute to the valour of his own countrymen.

Nelson is gone, and some successor to him in fame will doubtless mark out a system of naval tactics more suited to the wants of the present day. It is believed that the superiority of English sailors remains unchanged, and therefore will have its weight in any future engagement, for to be at ease on board ship, a man must be a real sailor; but new systems are necessary for the most efficient application of a new motive power and improved weapons of war. A reference to fig. 61, and a full consideration of the nature of the movements on the great day of Trafalgar will satisfy every one that naval victories cannot now be won, even by British fleets, in the manner they were formerly gained. It is manifest that the success of the bold manoeuvre of Nelson was mainly due to the comparative immovability of the French and Spanish fleet. Had the ships of the French line been steamers, they would have changed their position, and not only brought a heavy fire to bear on the advancing columns, but have formed lines exterior to those of the British fleet, so as to have placed the latter between two fires. Naval history records an example of a single ship placing herself between two Spanish ships, and when the engagement had fairly commenced, running ahead and leaving the two Spanish ships to continue firing into each other, unconscious, in the smoke, that the hostile ship was not between them. Such a skilful manoeuvre was exceptional, and not likely to be applicable to more than single ships. Indeed, a conversion of the main line such as that suggested would rather lead to the formation of two lines, meeting at an angle in the centre, and embracing the two advancing columns, than to that of two way, and that the immense advantage which steam and the improvement of artillery have conferred on small ships, which will now represent in naval warfare the light troops or ridersmen of the land service, cannot be overlooked. In any new scheme of naval tactics, the movements of small ships in approaching large must be taken into consideration, as well as the best mode of combining the action of large and small ships—both in attack and defence, in advance and in retreat. Admiral Comte Bouet Willamenez has sketched such a scheme of naval tactics, suitable, in his opinion, to steam-ships, and it in principle assimilates the combinations and movements of naval to those of land warfare, a result which was to be expected, now that the power of moving at will, and in any direction, has been conferred by the application of steam. He justly concludes his description by this remark: "A new system of tactics, designed for a new description of fleet, can only be the work of time and of experience; but in order that any work should come to maturity it is necessary that it should have a beginning. Nobody has as yet undertaken the solution of this difficult problem, since the screw steamer has threatened to exclude the sailing vessel from the arena of war, and I have therefore taken the initiative. Eight simple or compound orders, and the numerous operations which flow from them, have been described, but it must not be supposed that all will be in general or even in frequent use, though the sailor should accustom himself to study and to know all the cases which may occur in the conduct of a fleet under all conditions."

No remarks on the general operation of war can be considered at the present time complete, unless they include some notice of the probable effects upon the art of war of the great improvement in firearms. With the ancients, as the means of projection were inferior, the chief reliance was upon the arms used in close conflict, either the sword or the spear; but even then the sling, the bow, the catapulta, &c., in the hands of cool and skilful men, were capable of producing most important results. Coming to more modern times, the yew-bow of the English archer, and the crossbow of the Genoese, were recognised as most important weapons, often throwing troops into confusion, and preparing the way for more close attack. It might have been expected that the invention of gunpowder, by supplying a more perfect projecting power, would have given pre-eminence to the weapon invented for firing over that used in the charge; or, when the musket had, by the addition of a bayonet, combined the advantages of a pike with those of a firearm, the former would seldom be resorted to, and that the success of battles would depend almost entirely on the fire of both artillery and musketry, and little on the charge by the bayonet. The imperfect construction of the first firearms, the rude manufacture of the gunpowder, did much to counterbalance the advantages gained by the use of firearms; and though the attention paid to artillery soon made that arm formidable in war, the little instruction given in the art of musket-firing rendered it in practice comparatively so harmless, that Marshal Saxe considered it illusory, and Suwarrow accustomed his soldiers to look upon it as a mere folly, and to trust only to the bayonet. General Warnery strongly complained of the little attention paid to the musketry training of soldiers;

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**Battle of Trafalgar**

| French and Spanish Ships | English Ships | |--------------------------|---------------| | A V G. Advanced Guard of the Franco-Spanish Fleet | |

**English Fleet**

| N. Victory (Nelson) | E. Britannia | |---------------------|-------------| | S.W. Royal Sovereign (Collingwood) | F. Agamemnon | | A. Temeraire | G. Ajax | | B. Neptune | H. Orion | | C. Conqueror | I. Minotaur | | D. Leviathan | J. Spartiate | | K. Africa | |

**Franco-Spanish Fleets**

(F. marks the French Ships, S. the Spanish.)

| 1. Bucentaure, F. | 10. Monarca, S. | |-------------------|----------------| | 2. Santissima-Trinidada, S. | 11. Pluton, F. | | 3. Redoutable, F. | 12. Algeires, F. | | 4. Neptune, F. | 13. Bahama, S. | | 5. San-Leandro, S. | 14. Aigle, F. | | 6. San-Justo, S. | 15. Swiftsure, F. | | 7. Indomptable, F. | 16. Argonauta, F. | | 8. Santa-Anna, S. | 17. Montanez, S. | | 9. Fouguesx, F. | |

| Z. Prince | Q. Achilles | |-----------|------------| | V. Dreadnought | R. Polyphemus | | L. Belle-Isle | S. Swiftsure | | M. Mars | T. Revenge | | N. Tonnant | U. Defiance | | O. Bellerophon | X. Thunderer | | P. Colossus | Y. Defence |

| 25. Neptuno, S. | 37. Intrépide, F. | |-----------------|------------------| | 26. Rayo, S. | 29. Dagney-Trouin, F. | | 30. Mont-Blanc, F. | 31. San-Francisco, S. | | 32. San-Augustino, S. | 33. Nérée, F. | Warlike but even had the attention now bestowed on this subject Operations in our schools of musketry been then displayed, the imperfection of the weapon would have rendered its performances unsatisfactory. M. Léon Marès states, that by experiments at St Omer, in 1846-1849, it was found that at 100 mètres (110 yards) 47 per cent. of the balls fired struck a target 6 feet high and 22 inches wide, at 192 yards 20 per cent., whilst at 440 yards only 7 per cent., struck a target 6½ feet high and 13 feet wide, so that the common musket was not sufficiently precise to turn to the best account even the skill of a good marksman; and taking into account the probable disturbance of the equanimity of a soldier in the field of battle, the interference of smoke, and the uncertainty as to distance, it was quite unequal to the wants of the soldier; although it cannot be doubted that the fire even of old Brown Bess at 110 yards, in the hands of men whose nerves were unshaken by the sight of an advancing enemy, was and would be very destructive.

The introduction generally into our service of the rifle, or as it is called by the French, an arm of precision, has totally altered the properties of the musket; for whilst with its bayonet it retains its merits as an admirable weapon for close quarters, it has acquired the power of being used with advantage and certainty at distances which would formerly have appeared incredible. The rifle was indeed used with great success in the chase, so far back as the end of the fifteenth century; but it is only recently that the tedious mode of forcing the ball into the barrel by the aid of a mallet and of an iron ramrod, has given way to the ingenious use of the principle of expansion, as applied to a bullet under the influence of the gases produced by the explosion of the charge. The same principle has been applied to cannon; and although the greater weight of the projectiles had before enabled the skilful gunner to attain a high degree of accuracy, the rifling of guns, and the saving of windage consequent on the expansion of the material used as a coating to the ball, have together conferred on cannon an accuracy and an extension of range quite proportionate to that gained by the musket. It might have been supposed that such improvements would have raised the musket in the estimation of soldiers, and so, it is believed, it really has, though some military men still speak disparagingly of it as compared with the bayonet; and the celebrated words of the present Emperor of the French have without doubt tended much to strengthen this delusion. "The new arms of precision are dangerous only at a distance; they will not prevent the bayonet from being, as formerly, the terrible arm of the French infantry."

Let us merely consider what ought to be the conduct of an army waiting in line whilst an enemy is advancing to the attack. Now, supposing the infantry, not at the moment harassed by the fire of artillery, observe the enemy halt and prepare to fire; soldiers selected as being skilful judges of distances, then give the word "sight," and they then calmly fire and reload. This may be repeated at intervals, and in every case with deadly effect. Or the men may be lying down with their muskets sighted to a particular distance, and, warned by the men on look-out, rise and fire at the exact moment. If troops are to fire whilst advancing, they should do so in the same manner, look-out-men giving the order to fire at the exact moment, the muskets being then at once loaded and sighted to a new distance, say 100 or some definite number of yards in advance. All this being made a portion of ordinary drill, it is evident that success in defence, or even in attack, would greatly depend on accuracy of judgment as to distance, and perfect coolness as to action. Much of the effect of the bayonet is moral; and there can be no doubt that if soldiers lose their coolness when they see an enemy advancing to the charge, their last fire, which ought to be decisive, will fail in accuracy and do little harm, whilst they will turn tail, and not wait the enemy to cross with hayonets with them. M. Marès rightly observes, that French soldiers ought not to rely on the permanence of this state of things, but should expect that the time may come when they will meet an enemy acting in defence with the same calmness and firmness, as they display boldness in the attack. Doubtless he had English soldiers in his mind when he penned these words.

By many it is supposed that the improvement of artillery has maintained its superiority to musketry; but there can be little doubt that skilful riflemen, hovering in front of uncovered guns, will find the means of picking off the men and shooting the horses, so as still to do, what they have on other occasions done, hold a battery in check. Reserve guns may indeed act at a distance; but unless they keep light troops in front of them, it cannot be expected that they will be allowed to continue long undisturbed. Napoleon III. would indeed have been right in saying that the new arms of precision would not materially affect the system of war, had he simply meant that the bravest and most skilful soldiers would still be the most successful.

The effect of rifled cannon on naval warfare has been already noticed, in assimilating ships to fortresses, but with this difference, that the ship is totally exposed, whilst the fortress on land is so covered that the fire of guns at a great distance is nearly as harmless as they would have been even when unimproved. In defence, the fortress on land evidently gains by the increased power of guns and accuracy of fire; and there will doubtless be in consequence much modification of the science of fortification. But the really great question is, how far the improvement of firearms conduces to the safety of Great Britain; and that deserves especial consideration. In the first place, it may be considered as demonstrated that the principal force of infantry consists in its fire; and that, however valuable ordinary drill may be to the soldier in accustoming him to move with regularity, and thus to place himself in every required position almost by instinct, the importance of accurate firing has increased with the improvement of the musket, and now far outweighs that of drill. In fact, it may be said that pliability of muscle, flexibility of body, and skill in firing, will tell in the field, when the stiffness and niceties of equipment so rigorously enforced on the parade in the English army, have been, as a matter of necessity, laid aside. It is, however, equally certain that the bayonet exercise ought to be practised diligently by our soldiers as it is by the French, the command of that weapon giving confidence, and enabling a soldier to contemplate the advance of an enemy with composure, if not with contempt.

To render irregular troops or volunteers expert with the bayonet will probably be impossible; but to render them skilful marksmen, just as their ancestors were skilful archers, will be a comparatively easy matter; and there can be no doubt that rifle firing will now become the national pastime. The light infantry movements which are suited to this class of soldiers, require indeed much practice and great intelligence and quickness; but such qualities are just those which may be expected in the volunteers; and there can be no doubt that manoeuvres suited to them are, in their character, more independent and less revolting than the stiff and restrained tactics of the line soldier. Should the volunteers be ever required to stand firm on the advance of regular troops, it is by the use of a pistol rather than of a bayonet that they should rely in repelling them. A double-barrelled pistol in his girdle on one side, and a dagger on the other, a brave, collected man, however little drilled, might, after firing his last close discharge with effect, wait coolly the attack of his enemy with a certainty of destroying him. We have already commented on the difficulty of artillery, unless covered, maintaining their ground against skilful marksmen, taking advantage of the features of the ground, and creeping up within 800 or 1000 yards of a battery. If artillery be simply obliged to keep their distance, much will be gained, as the eye will be required to aid itself by telescopic sights to ensure that accuracy of which the gun is capable. The fire of cannister has hitherto been the most destructive; but artillery can hardly expect to be brought so near as is necessary for the effective fire of that description of missile; and although the Armstrong projectile has been so contrived as in part to supply the place of the Shrapnell shell, the effect of those fearful discharges of cannister, which were so conducive to the success of many of Napoleon's battles, are far less likely to be witnessed with modern artillery under the altered contingencies of war. It may indeed be said, that the fire of well-trained infantry, armed with the rifled musket, will partake of much of the character of cannister; cavalry will be unable to approach such infantry with any chance of success; and though for foraging, reconnaissances, and especially for pursuit, cavalry must be retained, they will doubtless be made as light, both as regards men and horses, as possible.

M. Léon Marès has concluded his observations on "Des Nouvelles Armes Rayées" (Paris, 1860), in terms so sensible, that, although not those of a military man, they are deserving the attention of both soldiers and statesmen:

"From all which has been stated, it may be concluded, that infantry have acquired, from the use of the new arms, an additional importance in fields of battle, more particularly when acting as independent riflemen, provided only that their discipline is sufficient to enable them to act correctly under command, or rather to be under the influence of a guiding authority. Hence it is that militia, volunteers, or national guards, if duly trained to fire well, are a force which will henceforth throw a great weight into the scale of war, and ought therefore to be most carefully organised. Since, indeed, the least accident of ground, or the most simple intrenchment, is sufficient to afford cover to infantry, the rifled musket acquires in action the utmost value, since a small number of discharges, or even a single discharge, well directed, will be sufficient to destroy or cripple an advancing force. Under such an influence, the value of light cavalry will increase, whilst that of heavy cavalry will diminish; and even artillery, whatever may be the precision and increased range of its fire, will never, when uncovered, be able to defend itself against riflemen, unless supported by infantry equally skilled in musketry fire. At greater distances, the fire of artillery against masses of troops will be more formidable than ever, and hence the ground best calculated to shelter the troops, and to facilitate the approach of riflemen intended to hold it in check, should be selected.

Lastly, it may be asked, what effect this great improvement of the weapons of destruction has had on the moral advancement of mankind? When it is reflected how great must be the advantage in defence of an accurate knowledge of the ground, it may be fairly said that the new arm, when wielded by a skilful hand, confers strength on weakness, and powerfully assists the attacked against the aggressor. The arm which permits infantry to fight with advantage against cavalry and artillery is that expressly fitted for poorer people when contending against richer, for it is the latter who may best incur the cost of the most expensive armaments. The arm which requires more especially for its construction a knowledge of mechanical processes, and for its successful manipulation, contempt of danger, coolness, and intelligence, is the arm of intelligence; and again, the arm which permits the mass of the people, if properly trained, to take an active and effective part in war is the arm of a free people, for it is only the citizens of a free country who can be allowed to remain armed without danger to themselves or their neighbours. It is well, therefore, that weakness should be protected against strength, liberty and independence against despotism."

Such sentiments as these from a Frenchman, unprejudiced by mere military feeling, are most gratifying; and it may be fairly deduced from the maxims of common sense, that though steam has facilitated the transport of troops, and thereby the invasion of our country, the general improvement of the weapons of war has been entirely in favour of the preservation of our liberties and independence. In landing on our coast, boats must be used, and a cloud of small steamers, issuing from all the small ports, and constructed, as many of the ancient galleys were, to run into and sink both small vessels and boats, would either render landing impossible, or throw the troops endeavouring to land into such disorder as to render them easy of conquest after landing. Even, however, presuming that they have landed, can it be doubted that a comparatively small number of highly trained soldiers, prepared either to make a stand, or to attack at any moment, and covered on all sides by a cloud of skilled marksmen, would restrain the ardour, and stop the progress of the invading army. The great Napoleon anticipated, as Jomini informs us, that the transports in which troops intended for invasion were embarked, would have been convoyed by a fleet of 60 sail. One of two courses must certainly be adopted in such an enterprise; either the ships of war must precede the transports and fight a battle to clear the way for their advance, or must act as a convoy in the manner supposed by Napoleon, but in either case can we imagine that our channel fleet, even if inferior in number, could fight such a battle without destroying and crippling a large portion of the enemy's ships; and thus, even if not entirely victorious, they would leave the transports and boats open to the attack of gun-boats, and the smaller steamers which have been alluded to, with very little help or support from their larger ships. Such a naval battle could not be fought without calling the attention of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, both regular and volunteer, to the threatened point of landing, where they would be ready to make a first determined effort of resistance, of which the consequences upon the army would be nearly the same as those of the great conflict on the sea upon the enemy's fleet. (C.H.S.) (J.E.P.)