GENUS, among metaphysicians and logicians, de-
notes a number of beings which agree in certain ge-
neral properties common to them all: so that a genus
is nothing else but an abstract idea, expressed by some
general name or term. See LOGIC, n° 18, &c.
It is plain, therefore, that by a genus we do not
barely signify one particular thing, nor yet a plurality
of things; but a sort or kind of things, all agreeing
in certain general properties.
Thus animal is said to be a genus in respect of man
and brute, in regard man and brute agree in the common
nature and character of animal: so a right-lined figure
of four sides, is a genus in respect of a parallelogram
and a trapezium; and so likewise is substance, in
respect of substance extended, which is body, and
thinking substance, which is mind.
The method by which the mind advances to form
genera
* See
Commonalty