NECESSITY, (Encycl.) Mr Hobbes, who is said to have been the first who understood and maintained the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity, gives the following account of it in his Leviathan, p. 108. Liberty and necessity are consistent; as in the water, that hath not the liberty, but a necessity of descending in the channel: so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man's will, and every desire and inclination, proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual
chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes), proceed from necessity; so that to him who could see the connection of those causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest: and therefore God that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth also, that the liberty of man, in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, and no more or less: for though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is, therefore, the author of them, yet they can have no passion, will, or appetite to any thing, of which appetite God's will is not the cause: and did not his will assure the necessity of man's will, and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God.
Mr Collins, one of the most admired writers on the subject of necessity, has stated the question concerning human liberty in the following manner. Man, he says, is a necessary agent, if all his actions are so determined by the causes preceding each action, that not one past
Necessity. action could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it hath been; nor one future action can possibly not come to pass, or be otherwise than it shall be. But he is a free agent, if he is able, at any time, under the circumstances and causes he then is, to do different things; or, in other words, if he is not unavoidably determined, in every point of time, by the circumstances he is in, and causes he is under, to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other. According to this state of the question, he undertakes to prove, that man is a necessary agent; and that there neither is nor can be such a thing as liberty.
1. He appeals to experience; alleging, that though the vulgar urge this in proof of liberty, it is not a proof of it: that many celebrated philosophers and theologians, both ancient and modern, have given definitions of liberty, that are consistent with fate or necessity: that some great patrons of liberty do, by their concessions in this matter, destroy all arguments from experience: that all the actions of men may be ranked under the four heads of perception, judging, willing, and doing as we will; and that experience does not prove any of these to be free; and that experience not only does not prove liberty, but, on the contrary, men may see by experience, that they are necessary agents. It is, says he, matter of experience, that man is ever determined in his willing: we experience perfect necessity: and they, who think liberty a matter of experience, yet allow that the will follows the judgment of the understanding; and that, when two objects are presented to a man's choice, one whereof appears better than the other, he cannot chuse the worst.
2. Man is a necessary agent, because all his actions have a beginning; for whatever has a beginning must have a cause, and every cause is a necessary cause; and if any action whatsoever can be done without a cause, then effects and causes have no necessary relation; and, consequently, we should not be necessarily determined in any case at all.
3. Liberty would not be a perfection, but an imperfection; whereas, on the contrary, necessity is an advantage and a perfection.
4. Liberty is inconsistent with the divine prescience; for if God foreknows the existence of any thing, as it depends on its own causes, that existence is no less necessary than if it were the effect of his decree: for it no less implies a contradiction, that causes should not produce their effects, than that an event should not come to pass which is decreed by God.
This last argument for necessity has been urged by a variety of writers; and the advocates for liberty have felt its force, and endeavoured to obviate it. Some have actually given up the divine prescience: some have allowed the seeming contradiction implied in the foreknowledge of a contingent event, and have acknowledged themselves incapable of removing it. Others have endeavoured to reconcile the foreknowledge of God and the liberty of man, by alleging, that there is a great difference between God's foreknowledge and his decrees, with regard to the necessity of future events; for God's prescience has no influence at all on our actions: his infallible judgment, concerning contingent truths, does no more alter the nature of the things, and cause them to be necessary, than our judging right, at any time, concerning a contingent truth,
makes it cease to be contingent; or, than our sense of a present truth is any cause of its being true or present.
In the argument, says Dr Clarke, drawn against liberty from the divine prescience, it must not first be supposed that things are in their own nature necessary; but from the divine prescience or power of judging infallibly (which power is as much more extensive and infallible than in man, as the divine nature and understanding are superior to our's) concerning free events, it must be proved, that things otherwise supposed free, will therefore unavoidably become necessary; which can no more be proved, than it can be proved that an action, supposed at this present time to be free, is yet (contrary to the supposition) at the same time necessary; because, in all past time, whether foreknown or not foreknown, it could not, upon that very supposition of its being now freely done, but be future.
In another place, he acknowledges, that, though it is impossible for us to explain distinctly the manner how God can foresee future events without a chain of necessary causes, yet we may form some general notion of it. For, as a man, who has no influence over another person's actions, and yet often perceives before hand what that other will do; and a wiser and more experienced man will still, with greater probability, foresee what another, whose disposition he is perfectly acquainted with, will in certain circumstances do; and an angel, with still much less degree of error, may have a farther prospect into mens future actions: so it is very reasonable to apprehend, that God, without influencing mens wills by his power, yet by his foresight cannot but have as much more certain a knowledge of future free events than either men or angels can possibly have, as the perfection of his nature is greater than that of their's. The certainty of foreknowledge, says this excellent writer, does not cause the certainty of things, but is itself founded on the reality of their existence; nor does it imply any other certainty than such as would be equally in things, tho' there was no foreknowledge; nor again does this certainty of event, in any sort, imply necessity. To the same purpose Origen has long ago observed, that prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God's prescience that they will be.
It cannot reasonably be disputed, that there is an essential difference between the foreknowledge and permission of events, and the preordination and production of them: and the scheme of necessity seems directly to charge God with being the efficient cause or author of those vices and evils which arise from circumstances and connections of his previous and absolute appointment. Indeed, many of the advocates of this scheme will not admit the consequence that seems to be fairly deducible from their opinion: however, Dr Priestley very candidly allows it. It certainly (says he) sounds harsh to vulgar ears to say, that in all those crimes that men charge themselves with, and reproach themselves for, God is the agent; and that, in such cases, they are in reality no more agents, than a sword is an agent when employed to commit a murder. It does require strength of mind not to startle at such a conclusion; but then it requires nothing but strength of mind; i. e. such a
Necessity. view of things as shall carry us beyond first and fallacious appearances.
5. Another argument in favour of necessity is the following: if man was not a necessary agent, determined by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation of rewards and punishments, which are the essential supports of society. These would be useless, because if men were free or indifferent to pleasure and pain, they could be no motives to a man to do or forbear any action.
6. Another argument of the same kind is deduced from the nature of morality: for if man was not a necessary agent, determined by pleasure and pain, he would have no notion of morality, or motive to practise it; and if he were indifferent to pleasure and pain, he would have no rule to go by, and might never judge, will, and practise right. Every act of the will, it is said, is excited by some motive, which motive is the cause of that act: and if volitions are properly the effects of motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives: whence it is inferred, that volition is necessary, and doth not proceed from any self-determining power in the will. This argument has been illustrated and urged in all its force by many modern writers, from M. Leibnitz to Dr Priestley, the last and most zealous advocate for necessity: and it has often been answered by Dr Clarke and others, who have strenuously maintained, that liberty is perfectly consistent with mens acting from a regard to motives.
Supposing, says Dr Price, a power of self-determination to exist, it is by no means necessary that it should be exerted without a regard to any end or rule: on the contrary, it can never be exerted without some view or design. Whoever acts, means to do somewhat. The power of determining ourselves, by the very nature of it, wants an end or rule to guide it; and no probability or certainty of its being exerted agreeably to a rule can have the least tendency to infringe or diminish it. All that should be avoided here is the intolerable absurdity of making our reasons and ends, in acting, the physical causes or efficient of action. This is the same with ascribing the action of walking, not to the feet, or the power which moves the feet, but to the eye, which only sees the way. The perception of a reason for acting, or the judgment of the understanding, is no more than seeing the way; it is the eye of the mind which informs and directs; and whatever certainty there may be that a particular determination will follow, such determination will be the self-determination of the mind; and not any change of its state stamped upon it, over which it has no power, and in receiving which, instead of being an agent, it is merely a passive subject of agency. Although the views and ideas of beings may be the occasions of their acting; yet it is a contradiction to make them the mechanical efficient of their actions: so necessary and important is the distinction insisted upon by Dr Clarke, between the operation of physical causes and the influence of moral reasons.
Upon the whole, the question concerning liberty is not, whether the views or ideas of beings influence their actions; but, What is the nature of that influence. If we say, that it is some kind of mechanical or physical efficiency; or, with Dr Priestley, after Hobbes
and Leibnitz, that man has no other liberty, in following motives, than water has in running down hill, or than the arms of a scale, pressed by weights, have in rising and falling; then it must follow, that man never acts, and it must be folly to applaud or reprove ourselves for our conduct, and there is an end of all moral obligation and accountability.
However, the necessitarians do not allow these consequences; but, on the contrary, maintain, that the doctrine of the necessary influence of motives upon the mind of man, makes him the proper subject of discipline, reward, and punishment, praise and blame, both in the common and the philosophical use of the words; and that the doctrine of self-determination, independently of the influence of motives, entirely disqualifies a man from being the proper subject of them.
Mr Edwards, an acute writer on this subject, has endeavoured to prove, that liberty of indifference is not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and that all habits and inclinations, whether virtuous or vicious, are inconsistent with the Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency. And Dr Priestley observes, that the sense of self-reproach and shame is excited by our finding that we have a disposition of mind leading to vice, and on which motives to virtue, in particular cases, have had no influence. If we ask, whence proceeds that disposition, and how it comes to pass that motives to virtue had not a greater influence, we must ultimately ascribe the inefficacy of the one, and the evil tendency of the other, to God, who made us what we are, and placed us in the situation which we occupy. Dr Priestley overcomes this difficulty by alleging, that the distinction between things natural and moral entirely ceases in the scheme of necessity; that the vices of men come under the class of common evils, producing misery for a time, but, like all other evils, in the same great system, ultimately subservient to greater good. In this light, he says, every thing without distinction may be ascribed to God. However, he acknowledges, that this is a view of moral evil, which, though innocent, and even useful, in speculation, no wise man can or would choose to act upon himself, because our understandings are too limited for the application of such a means of good; though a Being of infinite knowledge may introduce it with the greatest advantage. If there be any foundation for the doctrine of necessity, i. e. if all events arise from preceding situations, and the original situations of all things, together with the laws by which all changes of situation take place, were fixed by the Divine Being, there can be no difference whatever with respect to his causation of one thing more than another; and even whatever takes place in consequence of his withholding his special and extraordinary influence, is as much agreeable to his will as what comes to pass in consequence of the general laws of nature. But our supposing that God is the author of sin, (as by the scheme of necessity he must in fact be the author of all things), by no means implies that he is a sinful being; for it is the disposition of mind and the design which constitute the sinfulness of an action. If therefore his disposition and design be good, what he does is morally good. To the same purpose he observes, that the proper foundation, or rather the
ultimate object, of virtue, is general utility; since it consists of such conduct as tends to make intelligent creatures the most truly happy in the whole of their existence; though, with respect to the agent, no action is denominated virtuous that is not voluntary, or that does not proceed from some good motive. And this reasoning he applies to the Deity, who pursues the happiness of his creatures by such means as are best calculated to secure that end, and which are sanctified by it. And he further adds, that the Deity may adopt some things which he would not have chosen on their own account, but for the sake of other things with which they were necessarily connected.
The scriptures, according to this last writer, are favourable to the doctrine of necessity; though he does not think that the sacred writers were, strictly speaking, necessarians, for they were not philosophers: but their habitual devotion led them to refer all things to God, without reflecting on the rigorous meaning of their language: and very probably, had they been interrogated on the subject, they would have appeared not to be apprised of the proper extent of the necessarian scheme, and would have answered in a manner unfavourable to it.
The reader, who is desirous of being farther acquainted with the reasoning of different writers on this subject, may consult the collection of papers between Leibnitz and Clarke, 1717. Collins's Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, 1735, 3d Ed. with Clarke's Answer. Edwards on the Freedom of the Will, 8vo. 1775, 4th edit. Priestley's Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, 8vo, 1777. Correspondence between Dr Price and Dr Priestley, 8vo, 1778. Hartley's Observations on Man, 8vo, 1749. See LIBERTY, (Append.)