something relating to a ship; whence,

NAVAL Architecture. See Ship-Building.

NAVAL Camp, in antiquity, a fortification consisting of a ditch and parapet on the land-side, or a wall built in the form of a semi-circle, and extended from one point of the sea to another. This was sometimes defended with towers, and beautified with gates, through which they issued forth to attack their enemies. Homer has left us a remarkable description of the Grecian fortifications of this fort, in the Trojan war, beginning at v. 436. Iliad n.

Then, to secure the camp and naval powers, They raised embattled walls with lofty tow'rs: From space to space were ample gates around, For passing chariots; and a trench profound,

NAVAL TACTICS;

Or, The Military Operations of Fleets.

NAVAL tactics is the art of ranging fleets in such order or disposition, as may be judged most convenient, either for attacking, defending, or retreating to the greatest advantage; and to regulate their several movements accordingly: it is not a science established on principles absolutely invariable, but founded on such reasons as the alteration, and improvement of arms must necessarily occasion in a course of time and experience; from which also will naturally result a difference in the construction of ships, in the manner of working them, and, in fine, in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons. We shall curiously run through this succession and change of arms, &c. to the present improvement of our lines of battle, in order to make us the more sensible of the reasons which have induced the moderns to prefer so advantageous a choice as they now follow in the arrangement of their ships.

The ancient galleys were so constructed as to carry several banks of oars, very differently disposed from those in our modern galleys, which, however, vary the least of any others from their ancient model. Advanced by the force of their oars, the galleys ran violently abreast of each other, and by the mutual encounter of their beaks and prows, and sometimes of their sterns, endeavoured to dash in pieces or sink their enemies.

The prow, for this purpose, was commonly armed with a brazen point or trident, nearly as low as the surface of the sea, in order to pierce the enemy's ships under the water. Some of the galleys were furnished with large turrets, and other accessions of building, either for attack or defence. The soldiers also annoyed their enemies with darts and slings, and, on their nearer approach, with swords and javelins; and in order that their missile weapons might be directed with greater force and certainty, the ships were equipped with several platforms, or elevations above the level of the deck. The sides of the ship were fortified with a thick fence of hides, which served to repel the darts of their adversaries, and to cover their own soldiers, who thereby annoyed the enemy with greater security.

As the invention of gunpowder has rendered useless many of the machines employed in the naval wars of the ancients, the great distance of time has also consigned many of them to oblivion: some few are, nevertheless, recorded in ancient authors, of which we shall endeavour to present a short description. And first,

The Διαροπις was a large and massive piece of lead or iron, cast in the form of a dolphin. This machine being suspended by blocks at their mast-heads or yardsarms, ready for a proper occasion, was let down violently from thence into the adverse ships; and either penetrated through their bottom, and opened a passage for the entering waters, or by its weight immediately sunk the vessel.

The Δερματος was an engine of iron crooked like a sickle, and fixed on the top of a long pole. It was employed to cut asunder the lines of the sail-yards, and, thereby letting the sails fall down, to disable the vessel from escaping, and incommode her greatly during the action. Similar to this was another instrument, armed at the head with a broad two-edged blade of iron, wherewith they usually cut away the ropes that fastened the rudder to the vessel.

Δοράλια ναυαγία, a sort of spears or maces of an extraordinary length, sometimes exceeding 20 cubits, as appears by the 15th Iliad of Homer, by whom they are also called μαχαίραι.

Κιγαλαι were certain machines used to throw large stones into the enemy's ships.

Vegetius mentions another engine, which was suspended to the main-mast, and resembled a battering-ram; for it consisted of a long beam and an head of iron, and was with great violence pushed against the sides of the enemy's galleys.

They had also a grappling-iron, which was usually thrown into the adverse ship by means of an engine: this instrument facilitated the entrance of the soldiers appointed to board, which was done by means of wooden bridges, that were generally kept ready for this purpose in the fore-part of the vessel. See the article Corvus.

The arms used by the ancients rendered the disposition of their fleets very different, according to the time, place, and circumstances. They generally considered it an advantage to be to windward, and to have the sun shining directly on the front of their enemy. The order of battle chiefly depended on their power of managing the ships, or of drawing them readily into form; and on the schemes which their officers had concerted. The fleet being composed of rowing-vessels, they lowered their sails previous to the action; they presented their prows to the enemy, and advanced against each other by the force of their oars. Before they joined battle, the admirals went from ship to ship, and exhorted their soldiers to behave gallantly. All things being in readiness, the signal was displayed by hanging out of the admiral's galley a gilded shield, or a red garment or banner. During the elevation of this, the action continued; and by its depression, or inclination towards the right or left, the rest of the ships were directed how to attack or retreat from their enemies. To this was added the sound of trumpets; which began in the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole navy. The fight was also begun by the admiral's galley, by grappling, boarding, and endeavouring to over-set, sink, or destroy the adversary, as we have above described. Sometimes, for want of grappling-irons, they fixed their oars in such a manner as to hinder the enemy from retreating. If they could not manage their oars as dextrously as their antagonist, or fall alongside so as to board him, they penetrated his vessel with the brazen prow. The vessels approached each other as well as their circumstances would permit, and the soldiers were obliged to fight hand to hand, till the battle was decided: nor indeed could they fight otherwise with any certainty, since the shortest distance rendered their slings and arrows, and almost all their offensive weapons, ineffectual, if not useless.

The squadrons were sometimes ranged in two or three right lines, parallel to each other; being seldom drawn up in one line, unless when formed into an half-moon. This order indeed appears to be the most convenient for rowing vessels that engage by advancing with their prows towards the enemy. At the battle of Ecnomus, between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the fleet of the former was ranged into a triangle, or a fort of wedge in front, and towards the middle of its depth, of two right parallel lines. That of the latter was formed into a rectangle, or two sides of a square, of which one branch extended behind, and as the opening of the other prosecuted the attack, was ready to fall upon the flank of such of the Roman galleys as should attempt to break their line. Ancient history has preserved many of these orders, of which some have been followed in later times. Thus, in a battle A.D. 1340, the English fleet was formed in two lines, the first of which contained the larger ships, the second consisted of all the smaller vessels, used as a reserve to support the former whenever necessary. In 1545, the French fleet under the command of the Marechal d'Annebault, in an engagement with the English in the Channel, was arranged in the form of a crescent. The whole of it was divided into three bodies, the centre being composed of 36 ships, and each of the wings of 30. He had also many galleys; but these fell not into the line, being designed to attack the enemy occasionally. This last disposition was continued down to the reigns of James I. and Lewis XIII.

Meanwhile the invention of gunpowder, in 1330, gradually introduced the use of fire-arms into naval war, without finally superseding the ancient method of engagement. The Spaniards were armed with cannon in a sea-fight against the English and the people of Poitou abreast of Rochelle in 1372; and this battle is the first wherein mention is made of artillery in our navies. Many years elapsed before the marine armaments were sufficiently provided with fire-arms. So great a revolution in the manner of fighting, and which necessarily introduced a total change in the construction of ships, could not be fuddlenly effected. In short, the squadrons of men of war are no longer formed of rowing vessels, or composed of galleys and ships of the line; but entirely of the latter, which engage under sail, and discharge the whole force of their artillery from their sides. Accordingly, they are now disposed in no other form than that of a right line parallel to the enemy; every ship keeping close-hauled upon a wind on the same tack. Indeed, the difference between the force and manner of fighting of ships and galleys rendered their service in the same line incompatible. When we consider therefore the change introduced, both in the construction and working of ships, occasioned by the use of cannon, it necessarily follows, that squadrons of men of war must appear in the order that is now generally adopted.

The machines which owe their rise to the invention of gun-powder have now totally supplanted the others; so that there is scarce any but the sword remaining, of all the weapons used by the ancients. Our naval battles are therefore almost always decided by fire-arms, of which there are several kinds, known by the general name of artillery.

In a ship of war, fire-arms are distinguished into cannon mounted on carriages, swivel-cannon, grenadoes, and musquetry. See Cannon, &c.

Besides these machines, there are several other used in merchant-ships and privateers, as coehorns, carbines, fire-arrows, organs, stink-pots, &c. See Coehorn, &c.

Chap. I. Of Lines or Orders.

By orders are meant the different methods of ranging or drawing up a fleet in the several lines and forms for which it may be designed: in which two things are to be considered, 1. The position of each ship with regard to the wind: 2. The position of each ship with respect to the fleet. We cannot make any alteration in either of these circumstances, without changing the whole position of the line, which will otherwise remain complete.

The different expeditions an admiral may be ordered upon, as well as the various circumstances that occur in conducting a fleet, first gave rise to the several lines or orders into which it is formed.

When a fleet engages, it ought to be drawn up in a different form from that in which it sails. A fleet that fails in fight of an enemy must alter its position, from that which it would maintain were there none in view, or none to be expected. When a fleet fails before the wind, it has likewise its particular form of failing; as it has also when it chases the enemy, makes a retreat, guards a freight or passage, or is obliged to force through one; or whether at anchor in a road or harbour, or going into either to insult or attack an enemy. In this variety of circumstances, proper regard must be had to the most advantageous position or form into which the fleet can be ranged before it enters upon action.

Chap. II. Of dividing a Fleet, and of the Form of Sailing.

1. How to divide a fleet. When a fleet consists of 60 sail of the line, the admiral divides it first into three quadrants, each of which has its divisions; and three general officers, viz. admiral, vice-admiral, and rear-admiral. Each squadron has its proper colours, and each division its proper mark: for example, the white flag is proper to the first squadron of France, the white and blue for the second, and the blue for the third. In Britain, the first admiral of the fleet carries the union-flag at the main-top-mast head; next, the admiral of the white; and then the admiral of the blue. The particular ships carry pendants of the same colour with their squadrons, and at the masts of their respective divisions; so that the last ship in the division of the blue squadron wears a blue pendant at the mizen top-mast head.

The general officers, or commanders of divisions, place themselves in the centre of their divisions. We must except the three commanding admirals, who in a failing position lead their respective squadrons.

2. The sailing form of a Fleet. The following is judged the best, and is that which is put in practice upon most occasions, whether upon expeditions, looking out for an enemy, &c. It consists in dividing the fleet into three columns, or parallel lines, either upon a wind or large, as the admiral may think most expedient. Thus will the course and distance of the columns, as well as each ship's station, be determined and regulated; observing at the same time that they keep abreast of each other as near as possible.

By this manner of sailing, the fleet is closed as much as possible, can better observe the proper signals, and is ready to be ranged or formed into any position or line that the admiral shall judge proper. In sailing, care must be taken to preserve the just distance between the columns; in order to which, it will be best for the ships in general to regulate themselves by some of the centre ships of the column to windward, rather than the sternmost, as they are often too far in their rear to follow their motions.

The most natural course in this order of sailing is to go nearest upon a wind on either tack, or to go away large three or four points: however, the fleet may steer away more or less from the wind, or even right before it, as may be judged most expedient.

In all forms of sailing, the transports, tenders, &c. are ordered to keep to windward, for the following reasons. 1. They are by such a situation more out of danger from the enemy, as they can the readier bear down into the body of the fleet to avoid them. 2. They can more expeditiously execute the admiral's orders, when necessary. 3. They do not delay the fleet by waiting for them, being fitter to make sail before than upon a wind.

This kind of ships ought not to keep farther than half a league, for the same reasons that they are ordered to keep to windward; but we must observe, that when the fleet is not drawn up in a line or three columns, the fire-ships, &c. ought not to be farther distant from the men of war than they are from one another.

The same reasons which prevail in placing the fire-ships, &c. to windward of a fleet in a sailing posture, will equally hold good to place them to leeward when obliged to make a retreat. 1. They are there in less danger from the pursuit of an enemy, because they are fur- Of Chacing, surrounded by the fleet to guard them, in the form of a half-moon, from any attack that may be made upon them. 2. The fleet going large in this form, these small ships may shorten sail to wait for orders. 3. If the fleet should be obliged to resume the line of battle again to engage the enemy, they will still be in the best position to fail in.

In the order of retreat, the store-ships, &c. keep themselves at a greater distance than in any other form, 1. That they may not retard the progress of the fleet. 2. When the fleet forms again into a line of battle, they may keep better the proper distance required.

The fire-ships, &c. of the fleet to leeward ought to keep themselves a little ahead of those ships whose orders they are to follow; to the end that they may be the readier to join them upon occasion.

**CHAP. III. Of Chacing.**

1. To chace with the greatest advantage. If the ship that chaces is a great way to leeward of the chace, she should continue on the same board, till she can tack upon her: that is to say, arriving at the point E, she will find the chace at the point F; so that the angle FED will make four points, or 45°.

The above method is thought to be the best by the most experienced seamen; because by working in this manner you keep nigher the chace, and by making two tacks you will fetch her wake.

2. The ship D may continue on the same tack, till she entirely cuts off the chace C; but then she runs the risk of losing sight of her, by continuing too long upon the same tack: a fog, a shift of wind, a headland, night coming on, and many other incidents that frequently happen at sea, may give the chace an opportunity of escaping, by altering her course, &c. therefore we should never put this method in practice, but when very near her, or when we chase a friend in order to join him.

3. If the ship A chasing the ship B to windward, is at a very great distance, she must continue on the same tack till she gets upon her beam; then the ship A will tack, and stand on again the same with the chace, till she brings the ship B abreast of her. She must continue on in the same manner, tacking every time she gets abreast of the chace, till she is no longer apprehensive of losing sight of her. Note, This is to be understood when the ship A is at a very great distance from the chace, because that then she would run too great a length from her, were she to continue on the same tack till she could fetch the ship B: but then again, when the ship A is but at a small distance from the ship B, she would loofer too much time if she were to tack always when she got abreast of the chace.

4. We have already observed, that if the ship B is to leeward of the ship A which she chases, and under no apprehension of losing sight of her; or because she might not be at any great distance from her, or chaces her large, in proper settled weather, when the days are long; or that she might be a friend, whom you would willingly join: then the ship B ought to continue on the same tack with the ship A, till she can cut her off upon the other tack.

Now we must know how to determine if the ship B in tacking will fetch the ship A. 1. It is evident, that if the ship B, which is supposed to be a better sailer than the chace A, continues still on the same board of chacing, till she gets as far to windward as the ship A, she may easily intercept her by tacking upon her: this appears, at first sight, as if we should reject this method, because it makes the ship B continue on one tack longer than is necessary: but still good judges think it should not be entirely rejected, because the ship B may thoroughly make up for her loss of time in continuing on so long a-board; for she may then bear down upon the ship A as much as she thinks proper, at the same time obliging her not to alter her course, as was remarked above.

2. The ship B will exactly know when she ought to tack upon the chace A, if she calculates the time from her being abreast of her till she thinks proper to tack upon her again: for continuing on the same length of time, she may be certain she cannot fail of intercepting her.

5. When the admiral would have the whole fleet to chace, or a particular squadron only, he will make known the same accordingly by hoisting the usual signal for making sail, whether his intention be to chace or join some ships that appear in sight, or stretch out a-head, and make the land. In the first case, the ships should prepare themselves immediately, that no time may be lost in wearing or tacking, if occasion for either. In the second, the headmost ships should bring to, to sound, if the coast is not thoroughly known to the fleet.

6. The squadron that chaces, or the cruisers detached from the fleet, should be very careful not to engage too far in the chace, for fear of being overpowered; however, not to omit, at the same time, thoroughly satisfying themselves with regard to the object of their chace, if possible. They must pay great attention to the admiral's signals at all times, to prevent separation; in order to which, they should collect themselves before night, especially if there be any appearance of thick or foggy weather coming on, and endeavour to join the fleet again.

7. If the admiral would have the whole fleet to chace, without observing any particular form, he will, to avoid confusion, prepare them accordingly for it by signal to look out and watch his motions; to which he will join the general signal to chace at large: then the ships are immediately to get ready to make sail, as soon as the admiral shall think proper to signify his orders to chace in any particular quarter, or for any other movement he would have them execute: thus he will be able to inform himself (as the signal might perhaps be for that purpose only) which are the best sailing ships, and which the most experienced and skilful officers in his fleet; all which, with their several methods of working and sailing, will give him an opportunity of knowing them more thoroughly, that he may employ them accordingly, whenever the service should require the exertion of their respective abilities and experience.

When the admiral would have only a particular squadron to chace at pleasure, he will make a preparatory signal for that squadron to look out and watch his motions with its distinguishing flags, and that of chacing at large; but the ships are not to begin the chace before the signal for the execution of the particular motion is hoisted at the mast-head which denotes the said squadron. The ships are diligently to observe when the admiral makes the signal to give over chase, that each, regarding the admiral's ship as a fixed point, is to work back, or make fall into her station, to form the order or line again, as expeditiously as the nature of the chase and distance will permit.

8. After the ship has signified to the admiral that she expects to come up with the chase, and that, if an enemy, she can attack her to advantage, she must be then very attentive to the admiral's signs in return, whether of approbation or disapprobation, which no doubt he will make upon the occasion, lest she should unwarily engage too far, and against the admiral's orders. On the signal of disapprobation, she must absolutely quit the chase, and return again into the fleet at all events.

9. The same signal that the admiral makes to give over the engagement, will serve at the same time for the ships to rally or return again to their respective stations; the commanders of squadrons will repeat it, that the ships may work properly and with expedition, to form their line as before; each commanding officer with respect to the commander in chief, and the rest of the ships with regard to the chiefs of their divisions or commanders of squadrons.

If the action continue till night, the admiral will make the general signal for rallying, when each commander of a squadron is to make the same for his particular ships.

Sometimes the signal for discontinuing the action might regard only a particular part of the fleet, which will be signified accordingly by the proper distinguishing flag of that body or division.

10. To avoid the chase. If the ship that is chased be to windward, she must keep on the tack on which she finds she gains most on the enemy, to keep him at the greatest distance; if to leeward, she will go right before the wind, or more or less large, according as she finds either most to her advantage, and more agreeable to her particular properties in sailing or working.

**Chap. IV. Of Anchoring.**

When a fleet comes to an anchor, there are five circumstances to be considered: 1. That the ground be good and holding. 2. That the place be well sheltered against the reigning winds that blow on the coast where you anchor. 3. That you may easily get under sail with the same wind that may serve an enemy, and at the same time be able to dispute the advantage of the wind with them. 4. That you can readily form the line as soon as you get under sail. 5. That the ships may have room to keep clear of each other in getting under way: in order to which we should give the ships a good birth when we come to anchor, making one or many lines, about three cables length astern, and 120 fathom between each ship.

**Example.** It was no doubt by such wise precautions that the duke of York saved his fleet in Solebay in the year 1672; it was composed of 60 English and 30 French ships. His royal highness kept the sea a long time to draw out the Dutch to a decisive action: but seeing they still persisted to secure themselves amidst the banks and shoals of their own coast, and could not by any means force them to a battle, he took the resolution of returning to Solebay, to refresh and recruit his men with proper necessaries. Admiral de Ruyter, who commanded the Dutch fleet, thought proper not to let slip so happy a conjuncture, as he imagined, of surprising the English as they lay at an anchor in the road: he accordingly set sail with all his fleet, which was equal to the duke of York's, on the 6th of June, and stretched over on the English coast, with the wind at N. E. for Solebay, where he did not doubt but he should meet with the enemy in some disorder and confusion. But the duke, like an experienced officer, ordered the count d'Estrées, vice-admiral, and afterwards marshal of France, who commanded the van, to anchor out in the offing; placing himself, with the rest of his fleet, in such a manner as to enable him to receive the Dutch admiral in a proper position, whenever he should be informed of his coming. Upon his appearance, the count d'Estrées formed the line with incredible alertness, kept close to the wind, and having stretched out the length of the squadron of Zealand, commanded by vice-admiral Barker, begun the action the 7th of June at eight in the morning, and fought the enemy with such bravery, that several of their ships were disabled: he had even made the proper disposition to re-tack, and charge through Barker's squadron, if the calm which came on had not prevented his glorious design. The duke of York was engaged at the same time with de Ruyter, whilst the earl of Sandwich in the rear attacked the Dutch rear-admiral Van Ghent: but the clouds of smoke being dispersed, and the ships no longer under command in the calm, the two fleets found themselves so intermixed and embarrassed with each other, as greatly heightened the horror of the action, and made it the bloodiest that ever was fought. The gallant earl of Sandwich perished with his ship, that was set on fire by a Dutch fire-ship: soon after which, his death was revenged by that of the admiral of the Amsterdam squadron, and by the loss of two Dutch line-of-battle ships, one of which was taken, and the other sunk. The duke of York shifted his flag twice. In fine, the battle lasted with incredible obstinacy on both sides till night, which favoured the retreat of the Dutch: the duke pursued them next day home to their very banks; where, having sheltered themselves, they escaped a total defeat from the hands of a victorious enemy.

We see by the preceding example, how important and necessary it is to be always in readiness to get under sail to receive an enemy; and we may learn by the following example how dangerous it is to wait for an enemy at anchor.

The marshal duke de Vivonne, viceroy of Sicily for the king of France, having intelligence that the enemy, after the engagement off Aguila, had retired to the port of Palermo, resolved to go and attack them in the road. He accordingly embarked on board the Sceptre, commanded by M. de Tourville as commodore, who hoisted an admiral's flag, and arrived the 2d of June 1676 in sight of Palermo, having 27 ships of the line and 25 galleys. He sent his cruisers to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, who brought him intelligence that they consisted of 27 ships and 29 galleys; that they lay at anchor in a line, fronting the fort of Castel-del-Mar, and under its cannon; and were defended on the right by the grand tower and the artillery of the ramparts of the city, and on the left by the batteries of the mole. The marquis de Priuli, chef d'escadre (commodore), was detached with nine ships and five fireships, and the chevaliers de Bretévil and Bethomas with seven galleys, to bear down upon the enemy to the left; all which was executed with so much bravery and resolution, that the vanguard of the enemy were obliged to cut and slip, and run ashore under the batteries of the town, where the fireships burnt three of their ships to the water's-edge: the whole was destroyed by the French with very little loss.

**Chap. V. Line of Battle.**

I. The ancients, as already observed, ranged their ships or galleys so as to present them in front to their enemy; because the machines they then made use of were fixed in the heads or prows of their vessels: the same reason now prevails with regard to the galleys, (see the article Galley), which are drawn up in the form of a crescent or half-moon, whose ends or horns are opposed to the enemy; in the middle of which is the admiral, from whence he the more distinctly observes the motions of his fleet throughout. The two fleets being thus drawn up, approach each other to a convenient distance; when the engagement beginning at the ends of the half-moon, they extend themselves insensibly till the whole fleet is engaged, and each partakes of the danger and glory of the action. See fig. 4.

**Example.** The famous battle of Lepanto is the most remarkable action of this kind that ever happened. It was fought between the Turks and Christians in the gulph of Lepanto, the 7th of October 1571. The Christian fleet of galleys consisted of 205, large and small; the Turks had near 260: both formed two long lines, each inclining towards the end, where they began the engagement. Don John of Austria, generalissimo of the Christian forces, had placed himself in the centre of his fleet, and gave the command of his right wing (van) to the famous admiral Doria, and his left (rear) to Michael Barbarigo. The bashaw Pertau, general of the Turks, had likewise placed himself, together with the bashaw Ali, in the centre of his fleet; and gave the command of his right wing to the bashaws of Alexandria, Mehemet and Siroco, and his left to Uluchiali, governor of Algier. The action began at two o'clock in the afternoon; which was first brought on by rowing towards each other with all their might, accompanied all the time with the most alarming shouts and outcries. The left wing of the Christians performed wonders: Barbarigo attacked the Turks with such incredible fury, that the barbarians could no longer resist the incessant fire of the Christians, but precipitately ran themselves ashore on the neighbouring coast, some plunging into the sea, others leaving their galleys to the bravery and mercy of the conquerors. The defeat was so general, that the Turks escaped with only 30 galleys. There perished in this day's bloody action 25,000 Turks; 3,500 prisoners were taken, and 130 galleys; the Christians lost on their side 10,000 men, and 15 galleys: they might have then destroyed the whole Ottoman power, had they known how to have made the greatest advantage of so glorious a victory.

II. In an engagement of men of war, the fleets are drawn up in a line of battle on two parallel lines upon a wind. The ships keep close to the wind on the line they are formed in, and are commonly at a cable's length distant one from the other, the fir ships, transports, tenders, &c., keeping at half a league's distance on the opposite side of the enemy. Thus the fleets AB, CD, (fig. 5.) that are engaged, are ranged under an easy sail with their larboard tacks on board; and the fireships EE of the fleet AB are to windward, the fireships FF are to leeward of their fleet CD.

**Example.** This form was observed, for the first time, in the famous battle of the Texel, where the duke of York defeated the Dutch on the 13th of June 1665.

We, as well as the French, owe the entire perfection of this order to his royal highness. The English fleet consisted of 100 ships of the line; that of Holland was more numerous, though not in three-deck ships: the two fleets found themselves nigh each other early in the morning, the wind being at S. W. they ranging themselves in two lines at S. S. E. each extending itself about five leagues in length, the English having the advantage of the wind. The duke of York, commander in chief of the English fleet, had placed himself in the centre, and gave the command of the van-guard to prince Rupert, and the rear to lord Sandwich. The Dutch admiral Opdam had opposed himself in the centre of his fleet to the duke of York, and vice-admiral Tromp against prince Rupert. They cannonaded each other from 3 o'clock in the morning till 11, with great fury and intrepidity, the victory still declaring for neither side. The Dutch took one English ship, which too rashly attempted to force through their line: but they falling off to S. E., found the English fire greatly annoyed them. About 11 o'clock the duke of York bore down with his whole line upon the enemy, he himself bearing down at the same time upon Opdam: this disposition and resolution of his royal highness elevated the courage and spirit of both parties to an almost invincible obstinacy. The terrible roaring of the cannon, wrecks of ships, fall of masts, together with a thick smoke intermixed with flashes of fire from the ships that blew up, heightened the horror of this action beyond the power of imagination. It is related of admiral Opdam, that, amidst all this scene of carnage and destruction, he sat with the greatest composure on his poop, viewing, and giving orders to repair as much as possible the damage and disorder he sustained from the duke of York; animating his men all the time both by his words and actions. At two o'clock in the afternoon, his royal highness made the signal for the whole line to bear down together upon the enemy; which obliged the Dutch to alter their disposition of keeping close to the wind any longer. Opdam only, with one of his ships, called the Prince of Orange, of three decks, still kept his station; but soon after, Opdam having received a whole broadside from the duke of York, his ship blew up, without its being ever known by what accident, though five of the men were saved. The Dutch, having already lost many of their ships, and seeing their admiral blow up, put before the wind for the Texel; the duke of York pursuing them with great resolution and bravery to