A Fleet to the very entrance of their port: he took, burnt, and Windward destroyed, 22 ships of the line, 20 of which were from 50 to 80 guns; and gained over them the most glorious victory that was ever obtained at sea. The whole action cost him but one man of war, with the loss of 300 or 400 men.
III. Before we enter into action, or form the line of battle, we must consider first the advantages or disadvantages of being to windward or to leeward.
Advantages of being to Windward.
1. The fleet to windward can edge down to the enemy, when and as near as it shall think convenient: consequently regulates the time and distance most advantageous to come to action.
2. If the fleet to windward is more in number, it may easily detach some ships to send after the rear of the enemy, which must undoubtedly throw them into confusion. Thus, the fleet AB being more in number than the fleet CD, may easily detach the ships EF to double upon the rear D, which cannot long resist such superior fire; therefore must give them an opportunity (with the rest of the ships that will of course join them) to range along the whole length of the enemy's line. This is an advantage the fleet to leeward cannot have, let it be ever so numerous; for the rear of its line will be in a manner useless.
Example. The advantage of the wind could never be more favourable than it was in an action off Aguuta, the 22d of April 1676, when the combined fleets of Spain and Holland avoided a total defeat by having the advantage of the wind. The French fleet, commanded by Monf. Du Queine, consisted of 27 ships of the line. The marquis of Almira, lieutenant-general, commanded the van-guard; and Monf. Gabare, chef d'escadre (commodore), the rear. The enemy's fleet consisted of about the same number of ships, but had besides 9 galleys; De Ruyter commanded the van-guard, the Spanish admiral was in the centre, and the Dutch vice-admiral commanded the rear. The two fleets met off Aguuta early in the morning; but the enemy kept their wind till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when de Ruyter bore down upon the French rear in good order, where they received him in the same manner with equal intrepidity: there were many ships disabled on both sides. The marquis d'Almira was carried off by a cannon-ball, and de Ruyter was mortally wounded. These two accidents caused some disorder in the van of the fleet; but the chevalier de Vallballe, chef d'escadre, supplying the place of the marquis d'Almira, behaved so remarkably gallant, that he was just upon the point of taking and destroying a part of the enemy's fleet, had not his galleys most opportunely taken their disabled ships in tow, and saved them from falling into his hands. The action began later in the centre, and had scarcely reached the rear guard: the enemy having the wind, had availed themselves so well of that advantage, that they continued the engagement no longer than was necessary to save their honour; waiting for the approaching night to retire from the pursuit of the victors.
3. If any of the ships of the fleet to leeward should be disabled, whether in the van or rear, or even in the centre, the fleet to windward may with the greater ease send down their fire-ships upon them, or send a detachment after any part of the flying enemy.
4. We must likewise attribute, amidst other advantages of being to windward, that of being sooner freed from the inconvenience of the smoke of the enemy as well as of our own. 1. The wind repelling back again the smoke of the cannon into the ship, so greatly commodifies those quartered at the guns, as totally to deprive them for some time of the sight of the enemy. 2. The same smoke must likewise much embarrass the sailors in working the ship; as it is often found by experience, that the sails and rigging are set on fire by the combustible matter and fiery particles incorporated with the smoke; besides many other fatal accidents incident to ships in that unhappy situation.
Advantages of being to Leeward.
It must be acknowledged, that a fleet to leeward has likewise great advantages; and there are who maintain, that the advantage of being to leeward is at least equal to that of being to windward. But when they consider all circumstances more attentively, they will find the advantage of being to windward the greatest a fleet can possibly have, whether superior or inferior to the enemy: though we must allow at the same time, that, on some extraordinary occasions, it may be more advisable to get to leeward if we can, that is, when it blows hard, and the sea runs so high, that the weather fleet cannot open its lower tier, when obliged to engage a greater number of ships, or in an action between two single ships. But still, in an engagement between two fleets, in moderate, proper weather for engaging, that which has the weather-gage has greatly the advantage.
1. The fleet to leeward fire to windward, and consequently the ships may make use of their lower tier, without being under any apprehensions that a sudden squall of wind should overpower them, by the water rushing in irresistibly between decks: an advantage (in some measure) the English fleet under Sir Edward Hawke, had over the French fleet commanded by Monf. Conflans, in that ever-glorious and memorable action off Belleisle, the 20th of November 1759, where they fatally experienced the difference of our superior skill, undaunted resolution, and seamanship. This circumstance is certainly the greatest advantage a fleet to leeward can have, especially when it blows hard, with a great sea. One can hardly conceive the confusion and disorder sudden gusts of wind occasion between the men between decks, when the waves come pouring in, and lay a ship upon her broad-side, so as often to endanger her upsetting, or going to the bottom before the ports can be secured.
2. The fleet to leeward can easier cover any of their ships that should be disabled in action, which must greatly embarrass the fleet to windward to effect, without running the risk of being destroyed by the enemy in attempting it; however, these are difficulties which both are equally subject to.
3. The fleet to leeward may easier make a retreat if beaten; whereas the fleet to windward cannot so well escape, without being reduced to the necessity of forcing its way through the enemy's line, which must be attended with the most fatal consequences.
It must be acknowledged, that a fleet which puts A Fleet to before the wind runs a great risk, if the enemy is in Leeward, a condition to pursue it; but then there are some circumstances wherein the fleet to leeward may boldly venture to crowd away before the wind; that is to say, when night approaches, the wind freshens, the sea rises, or the enemy is embarrassed with a convoy, which may prevent their pursuing them.
Example. The allies availed themselves of these advantages, in the year 1689, off Bantry. The count de Chateau-Renaud commanded the French fleet of 24 ships of the line, and convoyed 3000 men to Ireland, with a great quantity of stores, provisions, and ammunition. My lord Herbert, who commanded a squadron of much the same force, having intelligence that the French landed their troops in Bantry-bay, resolved to go and attack them there, not doubting but he should find them in some disorder; but the count had taken his measures so prudently, and was so well prepared, that he advanced in good order to receive the English, and attacked them with so much bravery, that he soon obliged them to crowd away all the sail they could make before the wind; pursuing them till night put an end to the chase: and the count, having thus happily landed his troops, returned to Brest, where he received the just applause due to his successful expedition; having in eleven days carried succours into Ireland, beat the enemy, took a considerable convoy, and reconducted back again his fleet to Brest in good order and condition.
IV. But to return to the explanation of the line of battle: We have already observed, that fleets in action ought to be ranged on two parallel lines; for, if formed otherwise, by inclining in the van and rear, the headmost and sternmost ships will be engaged, whilst the ships in the centre will be out of the reach of each other's guns: a consequence too obvious to need any demonstration.
The ships ought to keep at a cable's length from each other, or closer, if judged convenient or necessary: otherwise, if too far asunder, one ship of such line will be exposed to the fire of two ships at a time, from the closer and more regular line of the enemy.
The size of the ships is likewise too important a point not to be properly considered in a line of battle, as it contributes more to its strength than the number of the fleet; for two reasons. 1. A large ship carries more guns, and heavier metal: so that a fleet consisting of such ships is of greater force than a more numerous fleet of smaller ships, though drawn up in a closer line; because they engage the enemy with more, as well as heavier artillery, in the same space. 2. The great ships are stronger timbered, and consequently better able to resist the shot of the enemy; therefore of greater service in action than a fleet of smaller ships, notwithstanding the advantage of a closer line; because that each ship of the former is attacked only by a less number of guns of the latter that can do her any damage.
V. To form a line of battle from the order of retreat. Suppose the fleet AGF in a retreating form, to change it into a line of battle, the headmost ship A must haul up upon a wind, and the rest of the fleet, running large four points on the same tack, will form To dispute itself in her wake, or the line IH.
This evolution is so regular, so simple, and short, that it makes this order of retreat preferable to any other; for a fleet that retreats may be often obliged to come to action: it would be then greatly embarrassed, if it could not immediately resume the line again by so easy and regular a method as this. In effect, by way of illustration, let us suppose, that the enemy LLM press the fleet so close in its pursuit, as to force it to come to an engagement; then the ships that were sailing large, haul upon a wind all together, as soon as possible, on the larboard tack, the head A hauling up at the same time. This manoeuvre (method of working) can cause no confusion in the fleet: on the contrary, it then presents its sides with greater advantage to the enemy; and the ships that range themselves upon a wind in the wake of the ship A, will force between two fires the enemy's ships M.
We suppose that the enemy attack only one side; for they will find it difficult in effect to attack both, without running the risk at the same time of being separated: but admit that the enemy did attack on both sides, you may still perform the evolution equally the same; and the ships GF would present their sides to the enemy, as well as when they were sailing large or before the wind.
CHAP. VI. Some necessary Maneuvers before an Engagement.
§ 1. To dispute the Wind with the Enemy.
1. The fleet to leeward should avoid extending itself the length of the enemy's line, in order to oblige them to edge down upon theirs, if they intend to attack them; which will be a means, if they still persist in doing so, of losing the advantage of the wind.
It is impossible for a fleet to leeward to gain to windward so long as the enemy keep their wind, without a change happens in their favour. Therefore all that a fleet to leeward can do, must be to wait with patience for such a happy change, which they will undoubtedly avail themselves of, as well as any mistake or inadvertency the enemy may commit in the mean time. And as long as the fleet to leeward does not extend its line the length of the enemy's, it will be impossible for the latter to bring them to action, without running the hazard, by bearing down, of losing the advantage of the wind, which both fleets will be so desirous of preserving.
2. In fine, that an admiral may benefit by the shifts of wind that frequently happen, he must in a manner foresee them; which will not appear so extraordinary to officers of any experience, who know what winds reign most on the coast, or off the head-lands where they may expect an enemy: and though an admiral may be sometimes out in his conjecture, he also as often succeeds so happily as to gain the advantage of his enemy.
Mons. du Quefne, the French admiral, by his superior skill in these particulars, gained a considerable advantage over the Dutch fleet, when he engaged them off Strombolo in the year 1676. He waited till the next day for a shift of wind; which happened in his favour as he foresaw, and gave him an opportunity ty of tacking to windward of the enemy, and bearing down upon them in good order; an advantage they neglected the day before; which fatal oversight they could never afterwards recover.
3. The disposition or projecting of head-lands, of currents in the Mediterranean, and tides in the ocean, contribute greatly towards gaining the wind of the enemy; for sometimes you may only range a coast along, or keep out in the offing, to gain a few leagues upon a tack; and we may say, we think with justice, that the knowledge of these advantages is as essential to an admiral at sea, as the geography of the several countries, with their woods, roads, course of rivers, &c. he is obliged to march through, is to a general of an army on shore.
4. The fleet to windward ought to keep the enemy as much as possible always a breast of it; because, by doing so, they will preserve the advantage they may have, unless the wind greatly changes against them. They should force them likewise to keep their wind, unless they think it more prudent not to engage; but when that is the case, they should keep entirely out of sight of the enemy.
§ 2. To avoid an Action.
1. The fleet to windward can never be forced to engage; because it can always continue on that tack, which keeps the enemy at the greatest distance from it, by stretching out upon one tack whilst they continue upon the other.
If the wind was not so subject to change, it would be very easy for the fleet to windward to keep in sight of the enemy, without being under any apprehensions of being forced to come to action; but the instability of the wind obliges the most experienced admirals to avoid meeting the enemy, when they think it improper to engage them. The reason of this maxim is founded upon the impossibility of an inferior fleet's avoiding an action, when in presence for any time of a superior fleet.
2. If the fleet that endeavours to avoid coming to action be to leeward, they will edge away the same as the enemy; but, at the same time, they should not go away right afore the wind, without making their retreat in a half-moon, if in sight of the enemy. So that the fleet to leeward, which is not for engaging, seeing the enemy still persist in chancing them, will bear away as they do, in order to keep them at the same distance.
There are some circumstances in which the fleet to leeward may put afore the wind, without ranging it into the order of a retreat; that is, when it only designs to prolong the engagement, or is resolved to engage the enemy, if they still continue to pursue them to bring them to action. But, except on such extraordinary occasions, the form of a retreat puts the fleet into the best posture of defence, and with the least hazard and danger.
§ 3. To force the Enemy to Action.
Axiom I. We may look upon it as a general maxim: "When two fleets of equal force remain long in sight, they may alternately force each other to bring on an action." The following reasons support this maxim.
If the fleet that wants to bring on an engagement is to leeward, they must endeavour to keep on that tack which forereaches most upon the enemy, that they may keep them better in view, till the wind may happen to change in their favour.
The least experience at sea will serve to convince us, that it is almost impossible for a fleet that once discovers itself to the enemy, ever to retire or escape, unless it secures itself in some port or harbour; for fleets are generally at sea at a season of the year when the nights are very short, and the days long; so that any stratagems or false courses they may use, will avail them but little to escape the pursuit of a watchful enemy: besides, a fleet would not run the hazard of crowding too much sail by night, for fear of being separated, which may be attended with fatal consequences. A recent example of such conduct happened with Mons. de la Clue in 1759, who, by crowding away too much sail at night, to push through the gut of Gibraltar with a strong easterly wind, before morning lost sight of half his fleet, and subjected himself of course, by such imprudence, to fall much the easier victim to admiral Boscawen, who was in close pursuit of him with his whole squadron, and engaged him the next day with a superior force; which obliged the French admiral to make a running fight, though it availed him but little, as five out of his squadron were burnt or taken on the coast of Portugal.
Axiom II. It is scarcely possible for a much inferior fleet to remain long in presence of an enemy, without being forced to an action. 1. A fleet that is superior in number may send a detachment of its best cruisers after the flying squadron, and soon bring it to action. 2. It may divide itself into three squadrons, leaving a considerable interval between each; then, whatever course the enemy may take to escape, one or other will be always ready to intercept it.
The only resource an inferior squadron can have in such circumstances is, to bear away in the form of a half-moon: though even then, it can have no great hopes of avoiding an engagement, if the enemy persists in chancing it to bring it to action, unless they steer for some harbour or friendly asylum to secure themselves in.
Corollary. We may from all this draw the following conclusive inference, that it is almost impossible for an inferior fleet, under any pretext whatever, to continue long in the presence of one greatly superior to it, without being forced to action.
§ 4. To double an Enemy.
To facilitate this, the superior fleet must endeavour to stretch out the length of the enemy's line, and at the same time, leaving ships astern, to close and double upon that of the enemy's, and force them between two fires.
1. If the superior fleet is to windward, it may so much the easier double its rear upon that of the enemy's, and force it between two fires; and even if it should be to leeward, it should likewise leave some ships astern of it, because of the wind's often changing during the action; besides, the fleet to leeward may insensibly edge away in the heat of the engagement, to give its rear an opportunity of doubling upon the enemy, by immediately luffing up close to the wind.
To avoid wind again.
2. There are who maintain, that the enemy's line should be doubled a-head rather than a stern: because, say they, if the enemy's van is once put into disorder, it will of course fall a-stern upon the rest of the line, and throw it into confusion. But, on the contrary, it seems plain, that the ships will be less exposed, and find it safer to double upon the enemy's line a-stern: for if a ship should be disabled a-head, it does not appear how she can recover her own line again; whereas if a ship should be disabled in attempting the same in the enemy's rear, she cannot be attacked by any of their line, without exposing themselves at the same time to the fire of two ships; therefore may remain a-stern out of danger, till she has repaired her damages again.
3. It seems equally clear, that if the ships E, M, of the fleet CD, had doubled the head A, they would run a great hazard of being destroyed: for if the ship E should be disabled, how can she recover her own line again? how easy might the enemy destroy her? On the contrary, if the ships LN, of the fleet FG, have doubled the rear I of the enemy, and the ship L should be disabled, she may remain a-stern, without being under any apprehension from the rear I, which is already hard pressed by the ships G, N.
Nothing can illustrate this method of working a fleet better than the famous engagement off la Hogue in the year 1692, between the count de Tourville and admiral Russell. The French, having the wind, bore down in good order upon the English; but, being at the same time so much inferior in number, it was impossible for them to extend their line the length of the enemy's; therefore could not prevent the English from extending their rear a great way a-stern of the French, which made their line so much the longer in attempting it, and consequently the ships wider aunder, (a great disadvantage against a close line): The wind, which was at first S.W. changing to the N.W., gave the rear of the English an opportunity of still closing its line more, and doubling upon the French; so that the count de Tourville with his division soon found himself surrounded by his enemies on all sides; in which unlucky situation he distinguished himself with the greatest bravery and resolution imaginable, tho' overpowered by numbers, whose great superiority of force could be no longer resisted.
§ 5. To avoid being doubled.
To prevent any of the enemy's line from doubling upon yours, you must not suffer them to extend any of their ships beyond your rear; in order to which, there are several methods to be taken when your fleet is inferior in number.
1. If you are to windward, you need not extend your line the length of the enemy's van, but attack their second division F with your van A; by which means their first division FG will be in a manner useless; and if they should stretch out a-head to tack upon you, they will lose too much time, and run the risk of being separated by the calm which generally happens in the course of a sea-engagement, occasioned by the continual discharge of cannon on both sides; you may even leave a great opening in the centre E, provided you take the necessary precautions to prevent your van-guard from being cut off: and thus, however inferior you may be in number, you will have it in your power to interrupt the enemy's line from extending itself beyond, or a-stern of, your rear.
Example. Admiral Herbert's method of ranging his fleet, when he engaged the French off Beachyhead, in the year 1690, was generally approved of. He had some few ships less than the enemy, and was resolved to use his utmost efforts against their rear; to effect which, he ordered the first division of the Dutch to bear down upon the second division of the French, at the same time opening his fleet in the centre, leaving a great space a-breast of the main body of the enemy. He then closes his rear, which he opposes to theirs, keeping himself with his division at some distance abreast of the centre: then closing his ships as much as possible, he opposes them to the enemy's rear, at the same time referring his own division to attack the French, if they should attempt to push through the opening in the middle, in order to double upon the Dutch. By this method (which showed great forethought and experience) he rendered the enemy's first division almost useless, because of its being obliged to stretch out a long way a-head to tack upon his van: and the calm which afterwards came on had in a great measure deprived it of partaking of the danger and glory of the action.
2. If the inferior fleet is to leeward, you might leave a greater interval in the centre and less in the van; but then you should have a small corps de reserve of capital ships and fire-ships, that the enemy may not take the advantage of the intervals in your fleet to cut off your line.
3. There are some again for giving it as a general rule, that the commanding officers of the inferior fleet should oppose themselves to the respective general officers of the enemy; by this means several of their ships will remain useless in the intervals, and will be rendered incapable of doubling upon you.
This method has its inconveniences, because the van and rear of each division is exposed to the fire of two ships at a time, and does not secure the last division from the hazard of being doubled by the enemy's rear; but, to remedy this, you may place the larger ships in the van and rear of each division, and order it so that the last division may not have it in its power to extend its rear a-stern of yours.
4. Again, others will have it, that the three squadrons of the inferior fleet should attack each a squadron of the superior fleet; observing at the same time, that each squadron extends its line far enough to prevent the opposite line from leaving any ships a-stern of it, but rather a-head.
5. In fine, there are who rather choose, that the inferior fleet should stretch its line so long, as to leave a great distance between the ships, that it may extend its line the length of the enemy's. But this seems to be the worst method that can be taken; because it gives the enemy's fleet all the advantage it can desire of exerting its whole force upon the inferior line; tho' it must be allowed, upon certain occasions, this method would be very proper to follow; such as, when the enemy's ships, though more in number, are not of such force and weight of metal as the ships of the inferior fleet. § 6 To receive a Fleet that bears down upon you.
The fleet to leeward feeling the enemy bear down upon it, will of course range itself, as expeditiously as possible, into a line of battle, by edging away a little, to gain as much time as may be necessary to form the line without confusion. They should not omit at the same time leaving some small intervals between the divisions, that the fleet may be the better able to distinguish, and have more room for action; then each commander will exert his utmost to keep his ship abreast of any ship of the enemy's that happens to fall to his lot; either by making more or less sail, or even tacking, (if absolutely necessary), to preserve his station with regard to the enemy.
§ 7. To force through the Enemy's Line.
1. We find in the several relations of the wars between the English and Dutch, that they had often alternately traversed and charged through each other's fleets; that is to say, the fleet to leeward CHD, having stretched out a little ahead, tacked upon the enemy AB, and forced through their line at E, then re-tacking upon them immediately at C, on the other side, gained the wind of them; but then again, the others, in their turn, regained the same advantage of them, and cut them off from their line. Thus they mutually traversed each other, cutting off and destroying one another's ships, with an invincible obstinacy and bravery not to be described.
This manner of fighting and working a fleet is equally daring and hazardous, and requires the most consummate ability as well as experience to succeed in it so happily as the count d'Etrecs did in an engagement with the Dutch in the Texel in the year 1673. He traversed and charged through the squadron of Zealand, gained the wind of them, and threw them into such disorder, that the victory, which was before doubtful, now manifestly declared in his favour.
2. It should seem easy for the fleet to windward to hinder the enemy to leeward from forcing through their line; which, whenever they attempted, the other fleet may tack at the same time all together, and thereby effectually prevent them from succeeding.
3. It does not therefore appear why we should be under any apprehension from a fleet that attempts to force through our line. It even seems that it should never be put in practice but in the following circumstances: Such as being sometimes obliged to it, to avoid a greater evil; if the enemy should leave a great opening in the centre, and render part of your fleet useless; or if a number of ships should be disabled, &c.
4. You are sometimes obliged to traverse the enemy's line to disengage some of your own ships which may happen to be cut off; in that case, you must boldly risk something, at the same time not forget the necessary precautions. 1. To close your ships as much as possible. 2. To make all the sail you can, without waiting to attack the enemy as you force through their line. 3. As soon as you have got through, you should tack again without loss of time, lest the enemy should stand on upon the same tack with the ships that had broke through their line.
Admiral de Ruyter put this sort of traverses in practice to the greatest advantage, when he beat the English fleet under general Monk in the year 1666, three days successively, on the north of England.
Chap. VII. Of a general Action between two Fleets.
§ 1. General Observations.
The engagement will not begin before the admiral makes the signal, unless an action is infensibly brought on by some unavoidable circumstances in the line or position of the van or rear of both fleets, in forming or approaching each other: the admiral, in such case, will make the proper signal for the van or rear, by the distinguishing flag of either of these divisions; which will undoubtedly regulate the necessary manoeuvres of the rest of the fleet through the whole line.
The admiral in action carries but little fail; in which, however, he must conduct himself by the motions of the enemy; the ships always observing to keep close in the line; and wherever they do not, the ships which immediately follow, should pay no regard to those that precede them, if they should unguardedly leave too great an opening from the rear, unless ordered so to do by signal from the admiral.
The ships ought to be particularly careful not to fire till they find themselves nigh enough for the line to do effectual execution; otherwise it will be but expending a quantity of ammunition to very little purpose. They ought principally to level well their guns, without that hurry or confusion too often practised in firing broadsides; and from which so little advantage in general is derived, to answer the end proposed, that of defeating the enemy, which may be much sooner accomplished by a more regular and steady fire, constantly kept up without intermission, the better to embarrass their line, and divert their attention, more than broad-side and broad-side, with some intervals between (as must naturally happen), will ever effect. We ought to be convinced of this general truth, That of all actions, a sea-fight (except in the article of boarding) should be conducted with the least hurry or precipitation in order to succeed.
A captain must not quit his post in the line upon any pretence whatever, unless his ship should be so greatly inconvenienced as to render her incapable of continuing the action: the little fail a fleet is under at such time, in general, may give the ships, though damaged in their rigging, &c. time enough to repair their defects, without causing an unnecessary interruption in the line, by withdrawing out of action, when their service might perhaps be of the utmost importance to the rest of the fleet.
A captain, through too impetuous a desire of distinguishing himself, ought never to break the order of the line, however inviting the advantage of an attack might then appear to him to secure success: he must wait with patience the signal from the admiral or commanding officer of his division, because it is always more essential to preserve and support a close line in action, as it constitutes the principal strength of a fleet in general, than to attend to a particular attack between two ships, which commonly decides but little with regard to the whole; however glorious in appearance, unless with a view at the same time of taking or destroying a flag-ship of the enemy's, and where success alone, even then, can justify the attempt. The two immediate seconds to the admiral ought to direct part of their fire against the enemy's flag-ship, or any other that may attack their admiral; so that their chief attention should be employed more in his defence than in that of their own proper ships, as they must sacrifice every other consideration to the honour of their flag.
The same attention must likewise be paid to any other ship that may find herself engaged with one of the enemy's flag-ships; the next to her a-head and a-tern should serve in that respect as seconds, by dividing part of their fire against such flag-officer, in order to make him strike the sooner.
If any flag-officer stand in need of being succoured, he will of course make a signal for the corps-de-reserve; or if there should be none, he will signify the same to his division; on which his two seconds, with those nearest him, will close in to cover him, and continue on the action: the frigates of his squadron will likewise be ready to give him the necessary assistance; and, if he should still continue the attack, he will be in a particular manner supported by his whole division.
Those ships that happen to be most exposed to danger, will naturally make the ordinary signals upon the occasion, if they should receive any hurt or damage, in order to be supported by such in the line as are within reach of them.
§ 2. To detach from the Line a Corps-de-reserve.
When a fleet is so far superior in number as to be able to extend itself both a-head and a-tern considerably beyond the enemy's line, if then the admiral should think it expedient, that such ships as may not be a-breadth of the enemy, should detach themselves from the line, and form to windward or to leeward into a body of reserve; those of the second division of the van-guard, or those of the second in the rear, will immediately detach themselves from the body of the fleet, after the repetition of the signal from the commanding officers of their divisions, and place themselves in a line with the frigates nighest a-breadth of the centre of the fleet, if to windward; or if to leeward, somewhat a-head of the same; being careful at the same time to keep within reach of observing distinctly all the signals and motions of the fleet, to be the readier at hand to replace such of the ships as may happen to be dismasted or drove out of the line, where all intervals must be properly strengthened and carefully filled up again without loss of time.
The oldest captain, after the senior officer who commands the reserve, ought to relieve the first, or close that part of the line where the disabled ship has been obliged to quit; and so on successively of the rest.
The commanding officer of the body of reserve will not be detached with the whole corps, unless on some pressing occasion to fortify the line, where such reinforcement is immediately necessary; if to defend one of the flag-officers of the three squadrons, he will be followed by the next senior officer of the reserve, who was not before detached, in order to place themselves as seconds, the first a-head and the other a-tern of the flag they are to support, without any diminution of the honour of his own proper seconds at the same time, as they are only called in thro' necessity on that emergency, being not engaged before, and consequently better able to assist and support the admiral; Of their duty being likewise to exert their utmost efforts in attacking or boarding (if possible) the enemy's flag-ship to force him to yield, except they are particularly ordered off to some other quarter or part of the line.
The admiral will sometimes order the whole body of reserve to reinforce one of the three squadrons of the fleet, as he may see occasion; which when he does, the corps must make all the sail it can, that each ship may place herself, successively, the first in the first interval, the second in the second, and so on throughout; but if the admiral should want only part of that body, he will make the signal accordingly.
If the admiral, commanding an equal or superior number of ships to the enemy, should judge it necessary to have a small reserve of one or two ships for each of the three squadrons of the fleet, the ships for that purpose in each of the three bodies are made known by signal for the reserve; they will immediately draw out of the line upon hoisting the same, and form themselves on the line with the frigates, at a convenient distance from their commanding officer; that is to say, the first a-breadth, and under cover of the headmost second; and the other a-breadth, and under cover of the admiral, to be in readiness to run in between him and one of his seconds, to enable him the better to continue on the action with fresh vigour, and press the enemy with unremitting ardour to strike as soon as possible.
The corps-de-reserve is generally formed at the same time with the line, to prevent any irregularity that may happen on leaving any intervals or openings; tho' the admiral may, if he thinks proper, draw ships out of the line during the action, to form a body of reserve, according to the time or circumstances of his situation, &c.
When the admiral finds he has no further occasion for his body of reserve, he will make proper signals for such ships to resume their respective posts in the line again; the corps-de-reserve will always repeat the signals which regard themselves particularly.
§ 3. Of Boarding.
When the admiral shall judge it necessary or convenient to prepare the fleet for action, he will make the signal proper for the occasion, and the fleet will at the same time make the necessary disposition for boarding. If the admiral design to board any of the enemy's ships, he will undoubtedly make the proper signal for the whole fleet, a particular squadron, or, in fine, for a particular ship, by the different position of the signal, and the distinguishing mark of such squadron or division, or particular pennant of such ship.
If any captain in the fleet think he can board with success one of the enemy's ships, he will signify the same to the admiral by hoisting the boarding flag, together with his particular pendant, to be more plainly distinguished; the admiral, in return, will make the proper signal of approbation, or otherwise, if he disapprove the attempt, by letting fly at the same time that ship's particular pennant, that she may observe the signal the better.
When a captain seems to express an ardent desire of distinguishing himself by boarding one of the enemy's ships, he ought to consider well the ill consequences that § 4. The Fire-ships to prepare.
When the admiral makes the signal for his fleet to prepare for action, the fire-ships will at the same time get ready their grappling-irons, fire-engines, &c., for boarding, and will likewise dispose all their combustibles into their proper channels of communication, &c., as soon as possible after the action begins; all which, when ready, they will take care to make known by signal to the particular division or squadron they belong to, and they of course will repeat the same to the admirals.
The fire-ships must be particularly careful in placing themselves out of the reach of enemy's guns, which they may do a-breathe, and under shelter of their own ships in the line, and not in the openings between the ships, unless to prevent any of the enemy's ships that should attempt to force through their line; when they must, in such case, use their utmost efforts to prevent them. They ought always to be very attentive to the admiral's signals, as well as those of the commanding officer of the particular squadrons they belong to, that they may lose no time when the signal is made for them to act, which they must quickly answer by a signal in return.
Although no ship in the line might be particularly appointed to lead down or protect the fire-ships, besides the frigates already ordered by especial appointment to attend that service; yet notwithstanding, the ship a-head of which the fire-ship passes in her way to the enemy is to escort her, whatever division she may belong to, and must assist her with a boat well-manned and armed, as well as any other succour she may stand in need of: the two next ships to her must likewise give her all necessary assistance. The captain of a fire-ship is to consider, in short, that he is answerable for the event, in proportion as he expects to be honourably rewarded, if he succeed in so daring and hazardous an enterprise.
§ 5. Particular Description of the Economy of a naval Engagement.
Since a general engagement of fleets or squadrons of men of war is nothing else than a variety of particular actions of single ships with each other, in a line of battle; it may not be improper to begin by describing the latter, and then proceed to represent the usual manner of conducting the former.
I. The whole economy of a naval engagement may be arranged under the following heads, viz. the preparation, the action, and the repair, or refitting for the purposes of navigation.
1. The preparation is begun by issuing the order to clear the ship for action, which is repeated by the boatswain and his mates at all the hatchways, or stair-cases, leading to the different batteries. As the management of the artillery in a vessel of war requires a considerable number of men, it is evident that the officers and sailors must be restrained to a narrow space in their usual habitations, in order to preserve the internal regularity of the ship. Hence the hammocks, or hanging-beds, of the latter are crowded together as close as possible between the decks, each of them being limited to the breadth of fourteen inches. They are hung parallel to each other, in rows stretching from one side of the ship to the other, nearly throughout her whole length, so as to admit of no passage but by stooping under them. As the cannon therefore cannot be worked while the hammocks are suspended in this situation, it becomes necessary to remove them as quick as possible. By this circumstance a double advantage is obtained: the batteries of cannon are immediately cleared of an encumbrance, and the hammocks are converted into a fort of parapet, to prevent the execution of small-shot on the quarter-deck, tops, and forecastle. At the summons of the boatswain,
Up all hammocks! every sailor repairs to his own, and, having stowed his bedding properly, he cords it up firmly with a lashing or line provided for that purpose. He then carries it to the quarter-deck, poop, or forecastle, or wherever it may be necessary. As each side of the quarter-deck and poop is furnished with a double net-work, supported by iron cranes fixed immediately above the gunnel or top of the ship's side, the hammocks thus corded are firmly stowed by the quarter-master between the two parts of the netting, so as to form an excellent barrier. The tops, waist, and forecastle, are then fenced in the same manner.
Whilst these offices are performed below, the boatswain and his mates are employed in securing the sails, yards, to prevent them from tumbling down when the ship is cannonaded, as she might thereby be disabled, and rendered incapable of attack, retreat, or pursuit. The yards are now likewise secured by strong chains or ropes, additional to those by which they are usually suspended. The boatswain also provides the necessary materials to repair the rigging, wherever it may be damaged by the shot of the enemy, and to supply whatever parts of it may be entirely destroyed. The carpenter and his crew in the mean while prepare his shot-plugs and mauls, to close up any dangerous breaches that may be made near the surface of the water; and provide the iron-work necessary to refit the chain-pumps, in case their machinery should be wounded in the engagement. The gunner with his mates and quarter-gunners is busied in examining the cannon of the different batteries, to see that their charges are thoroughly dry and fit for execution; to have everything ready for furnishing the great guns and small arms with powder, as soon as the action begins; and to keep a sufficient number of cartridges continually filled, to supply the place of those expended in battle. The master and his mates are attentive to have the sails properly trimmed, according to the situation of the ship; and to reduce or multiply them, as occasion requires, with all possible expedition. The lieutenants visit the different decks, to see that they are effectually cleared of all encumbrance, so that nothing may retard the execution of the artillery; and to enjoin the other officers to diligence and alertness, in making the necessary dispositions for the expected engagement, so that everything may be in readiness at a moment's warning.
When the hostile ships have approached each other to a competent distance, the drums beat to arms. The boatswain and his mates pipe, "All hands to quarters!" at every hatchway. All the persons appointed to manage the great guns immediately repair to their respective stations. The crows, handspikes, rammers, sponges, powder-horns, matches, and train tackles, are placed in order by the side of every cannon. The hatches are immediately laid, to prevent any one from defecting his post by escaping into the lower apartments. The marines are drawn up in rank and file on the quarter-deck, poop, and forecastle. The lashings of the great guns are cast loose, and the tompions withdrawn. The whole artillery, above and below, is run out at the ports, and levelled to the point-blank range ready for firing.
2. The necessary preparations being completed, and the officers and crew ready at their respective stations to obey the order, the commencement of the action is determined by the mutual distance and situation of the adverse ships, or by the signal from the commander in chief of the fleet or squadron. The cannon being levelled in parallel rows, projecting from the ship's side, the most natural order of battle is evidently to range the ships abreast of each other, especially if the engagement is general. The most convenient distance is properly within the point-blank range of a musket, so that all the artillery may do effectual execution.
The combat usually begins by a vigorous cannonade, accompanied with the whole efforts of the swivel-guns and the small arms. The method of firing in platoons, or volleys of cannon at once, appears inconvenient in the sea-service, and perhaps should never be attempted unless in the battering of a fortification. The sides and decks of the ship, although sufficiently strong for all the purposes of war, would be too much shaken by so violent an explosion and recoil. The general rule observed on this occasion throughout the ship, is to load, fire, and sponge, the guns with all possible expedition, yet without confusion or precipitation. The captain of each gun is particularly enjoined to fire only when the piece is properly directed to its object, that the shot may not be fruitlessly expended. The lieutenants, who command the different batteries, traverse the deck to see that the battle is prosecuted with vivacity; and to exhort and animate the men to their duty. The midshipmen second these injunctions, and give the necessary assistance wherever it may be required, at the guns committed to their charge. The gunner should be particularly attentive that all the artillery is sufficiently supplied with powder, and that the cartridges are carefully conveyed along the decks in covered boxes. The havoc produced by a continuation of this mutual assault may be readily conjectured by the reader's imagination: battering, penetrating, and splintering the sides and decks; shattering or dismounting the cannon; mangling and destroying the rigging; cutting asunder or carrying away the masts and yards; piercing and tearing the sails so as to render them useless; and wounding, disabling, or killing the ship's company! The comparative vigour and resolution of the assailants to effect these pernicious consequences in each other, generally determine their success or defeat: we say generally, because the fate of the combat may sometimes be decided by an unforeseen incident, equally fortunate for the one and fatal to the other. The defeated ship having acknowledged the victory, by striking her colours, is immediately taken possession of by the conqueror, who secures her officers and crew as prisoners in his own ship; and invests his principal officer with the command of the prize until a captain is appointed by the commander in chief.
3. The engagement being concluded, they begin to repair: the cannon are secured by their breechings and tackles, with all convenient expedition. Whatever fails have been rendered unserviceable are unbent; and the wounded masts and yards struck upon deck, and fixed, or replaced by others. The standing rigging is knotted, and the running-rigging spliced wherever necessary. Proper sails are bent in the room of those which have been displaced as useless. The carpenter and his crew are employed in repairing the breaches made in the ship's hull, by shot-plugs, pieces of plank, and sheet-lead. The gunner and his assistants are busied in replenishing the allotted number of charged cartridges, to supply the place of those which have been expended, and in refitting whatever furniture of the cannon may have been damaged by the late action.
Such is the usual process and consequences of an engagement between two ships of war, which may be considered as an epitome of a general battle between fleets or squadrons. The latter, however, involves a greater variety of incidents, and necessarily requires more comprehensive skill and judgment in the commanding officer.
II. When the admiral, or commander in chief, of a naval armament has discovered an enemy's fleet, his principal concern is usually to approach it, and endeavour to come to action as soon as possible. Every inferior consideration must be sacrificed to this important object; and every rule of action should tend to hasten and prepare for so material an event. The state of the wind, and the situation of his adversary, will in some measure dictate the conduct necessary to be pursued with regard to the disposition of his ships on this occasion. To facilitate the execution of the admiral's orders, the whole fleet is ranged into three squadrons, each of which is divided into three divisions, under the command of different officers. Before the action begins, the adverse fleets are drawn up in two lines, as above described. As soon as the admiral displays the signal for the line of battle, the several divisions separate from the columns, in which they were disposed in the usual order of sailing, and every ship crowds into its station in the wake of the next ahead; and a proper distance from each other, which is generally about 50 fathom, is regularly observed from the van to the rear. The admiral, however, will occasionally contract or extend his line, so as to conform to the length of that of his adversary, whose neglect or inferior skill on this occasion he will naturally convert to his own advantage, as well as to prevent his own line from being doubled, a circumstance which might throw his van and rear into confusion.
When the adverse fleets approach each other, the courses are commonly hauled up in the brails, and the top-gallant sails and staysails furled. The movement of each ship is chiefly regulated by the main and foretop sails, and the jib; the mizen-top sail being refer- The frigates, tenders, and fire-ships, being also hauled upon a wind, lie at some distance, ready to execute the admiral's orders or those of his seconds, leaving the line of battle between them and the enemy. If there are any transports and store-ships attendant on the fleet, these are disposed still further distant from the action. If the fleet is superior in number to that of the enemy, the admiral usually selects a body of reserve from the different squadrons, which will always be of use to cover the fire-ships, bomb-vessels, &c., and may fall into the line in any case of necessity; these also are stationed at a convenient distance from the line, and should evidently be opposite to the weakest parts thereof.
And here it may not be improper to observe, with an ingenious French author (M. de Morogues), that order and discipline give additional strength and activity to a fleet. If thus a double advantage is acquired by every fleet, it is certainly more favourable to the inferior, which may thereby change its disposition with greater facility and dispatch than one more numerous, yet without being separated. When courage is equal to both, good order is then the only resource of the smaller number. Hence we may infer, that a smaller squadron of men of war, whose officers are perfectly disciplined in working their ships, may, by its superior dexterity, vanquish a more powerful one, even at the commencement of the fight; because the latter, being less expert in the order of battle, will, by its separation, suffer many of the ships to remain useless, or not sufficiently near, to protect each other.
The signal for a general engagement is usually displayed when the opposite fleets are sufficiently within the range of point-blank shot, so that they may level the artillery with certainty of execution, which is near enough for a line of battle. The action is begun and carried on throughout the fleet in the manner we have already described between single ships; at which time the admiral carries little sail, observing, however, to regulate his own motions by those of the enemy. The ships of the line meanwhile keep close in their stations, none of which should hesitate to advance in their order, although interrupted by the situation of some ship ahead, which has negligently fallen astern of her station.
The various exigencies of the combat call forth the skill and resources of the admiral, to keep his line as complete as possible when it has been unequally attacked; by ordering ships from those in reserve to supply the place of others which have suffered greatly by the action; by directing his fire-ships at a convenient time to fall aboard the enemy; by detaching ships from one part of the line or wing which is stronger, to another which is greatly pressed by superior force, and requires assistance. His vigilance is ever necessary to review the situation of the enemy from van to rear; every motion of whom he should, if possible, anticipate and frustrate. He should seize the favourable moments of occasion, which are rapid in their progress, and never return. Far from being disconcerted by any unforeseen incident, he should endeavour, if possible, to make it subservient to his design. His experience and reflection will naturally furnish him with every method of intelligence to discover the state of his different squadrons and divisions. Signals of inquiry and answers, of request and assent, of command and obedience, will be displayed and repeated on this occasion. Tenders and boats will also continually be detached between the admiral and the commanders of the several squadrons or divisions.
As the danger presses on him, he ought to be fortified by resolution and presence of mind; because the whole fleet is committed to his charge, and the conduct of his officers may, in a great degree, be influenced by his intrepidity and perseverance. In short, his renown or infamy may depend on the fate of the day.
If he conquers in battle, he ought to prosecute his victory as much as possible, by seizing, burning, or destroying the enemy's ships. If he is defeated, he should endeavour, by every resource his experience can suggest, to save as many of his fleet as possible, by employing his tenders, &c., to take out the wounded and put fresh men in their places; by towing the disabled ships to a competent distance; and by preventing the execution of the enemy's fire-ships.
By what we have observed, the real force or superiority of a fleet consists less in the number of vessels, and the vivacity of the action, than in good order, dexterity in working the ships, presence of mind, and skilful conduct in the captains.
**CHAP. VIII. Of Retreat and Chase.**
I. When a fleet is obliged to retreat in sight of an enemy, the best way to effect it securely will be by sailing in a kind of half-moon, the admiral making the obtuse angle A, and to windward in the form Plate CC. BAC; one part of his fleet to fall on the star-board, whilst the other goes away on the larboard tack: keeping the fire-ships, transports, &c., in the middle.
This manner of ranging a fleet seems the most advisable, because the enemy can never approach those that endeavour to escape, without exposing themselves at the same time to the fire of the ships to windward: thus the enemy's ships D can never approach the ships E without exposing themselves at the same time to the fire of the admiral A, as likewise to that of his seconds. If the admiral thinks this form gives too great an extent to his fleet, he may easily close his wings or quarters, and make the half-moon more complete; in the midst of which he may place his convoy in safety.
**Example.** This order of retreat was exactly followed by the Dutch admiral Van Tromp, in his engagement with the English off Portland, in the year 1653. The English fleet consisted of 70 sail, under the command of admiral Blake; and the Dutch were as strong, convoying about 200 rich merchant-ships. The two fleets met off Portland, where the English used their utmost efforts to bring on an action. The Dutch had the advantage of the wind, and endeavoured to avoid an engagement to preserve their convoy; but Van Tromp, considering rightly, that if the wind should happen to change, he must be under the necessity of fighting with less advantage, determined upon bearing down to the enemy, making his signal...