in law, the removal of a cause from an inferior to a superior court or judge, when a person thinks himself aggrieved by the sentence of the inferior judge. Appeals lie from all the ordinary courts of justice to the House of Lords. In ecclesiastical cases, if an appeal is brought before a bishop, it may be removed to the archbishop; if before an archdeacon to the court of arches, and thence to the archbishop; and from the archbishop's court to the king in chancery.

in common law, denotes an accusation by a private subject against another, for some heinous crime; demanding punishment on account of the particular injury suffered, rather than for the offence against the public.

This private process, for the punishment of public crimes, had probably its original in those times, when a private pecuniary satisfaction, called a weregild, was constantly constantly paid to the party injured, or his relations, to expiate enormous offences. This was a custom derived to the English, in common with other northern nations, from their ancestors the ancient Germans; among whom, according to Tacitus, "utur homicidium certo armentorum ac pecarum numero; recipitque satisfactionem universa domus." In the same manner, by the Irish Breton law, in case of murder, the brehon or judge was used to compound between the murderer and the friends of the deceased who prosecuted him, by causing the malefactor to give unto them, or to the child or wife of him that was slain, a recompense which they called an eriac. And thus we find in the Anglo-Saxon laws (particularly those of king Athelstan) the several wergilds for homicide established in progressive order, from the death of the ceorl or peasant, up to that of the king himself. And in the laws of Henry I., we have an account of what other offences were redeemable by wergild, and what were not so. As therefore, during the continuance of this custom, a process was certainly given for recovering the wergild by the party to whom it was due; it seems that, when these offences by degrees grew no longer redeemable, the private process was still continued, in order to insure the infliction of punishment upon the offender, though the party injured was allowed no pecuniary compensation for the offence.

But though appeals were thus, in the nature of prosecutions for some atrocious injury, committed more immediately against an individual, yet it also was anciently permitted, that any subject might appeal another subject of high-treason, either in the courts of common law, or in parliament, or (for treasons committed beyond the seas) in the court of the high constable and marshal. The cognizance of appeals in the latter still continues in force; and so late as 1627, there was a trial by battle awarded in the court of chivalry, on such an appeal of treason: but that in the first was virtually abolished by the statutes 5 Edw. III. c. 9. and 2 Edw. III. c. 24, and in the second expressly by statute 1 Hen. IV. c. 14. So that the only appeals now in force for things done within the realm, are appeals of felony and mayhem.

An appeal of felony may be brought for crimes committed either against the parties themselves or their relations. The crimes against the parties themselves are larceny, rape, and arson. And for these, as well as for mayhem, the persons robbed, ravished, maimed, or whose houses are burnt, may institute this private process. The only crime against one's relation, for which an appeal can be brought, is that of killing him, by either murder or manslaughter. But this cannot be brought by every relation; but only by the wife for the death of her husband, or by the heir-male for the death of his ancestor; which heirship was also confined by an ordinance of Henry I. to the four nearest degrees of blood. It is given to the wife on account of the loss of her husband; therefore, if she marries again, before or pending her appeal, it is lost and gone; or, if she marries after judgment, she shall not demand execution. The heir, as was said, must also be heir-male, and such a one as was the next heir by the course of the common law at the time of the killing of the ancestor. But this rule has three exceptions: 1. If the person killed leaves an innocent wife, the only, and not the heir, shall have the appeal; 2. If there be no wife, and the heir be accused of the murder, the person, who next to him would have been heir-male, shall bring the appeal; 3. If the wife kills her husband, the heir may appeal her of the death. And, by the statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I. c. 9., all appeals of death must be sued within a year and a day after the completion of the felony by the death of the party: which seems to be only declaratory of the old common law; for in the Gothic constitutions we find the same "preceptio annalis, quae currit adversus altorem, si de homicidia ei non constat intra annum e cade facta, nec quinquaginta interea annos et accuset."

Thele appeals may be brought previous to any indictment; and, if the appellee be acquitted thereon, he cannot be afterwards indicted for the same offence. In like manner as by the old Gothic constitution, if any offender gained a verdict in his favour, when prosecuted by the party injured, he was also understood to be acquitted of any crown-prosecution for the same offence; but, on the contrary, if he made his peace with the king, still he might be prosecuted at the suit of the party. And so, in England, if a man be acquitted on an indictment of murder, or found guilty, and pardoned by the king, still he ought not (in strictness) to go at large, but be imprisoned or let to bail till the year and day be past, by virtue of the statute 3 Hen. VIII. c. 1. in order to be forthcoming to answer any appeal for the same felony, not having as yet been punished for it; though, if he hath been found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment, and hath had the benefit of clergy, and suffered the judgment of the law, he cannot afterwards be appealed; for it is a maxim in law, "that nemo bis punitur pro eodem delitto." Before this statute was made, it was not usual to indict a man for homicide within the time limited for appeals; which produced very great inconvenience.

If the appellee be acquitted, the appellant (by virtue of the statute of Westm. 2. 13. Edw. I. c. 12.) shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and pay a fine to the king, besides restitution of damages to the party for the imprisonment and infamy which he has sustained: and, if the appellant be incapable to make restitution, his abettors shall do it for him, and also be liable to imprisonment. This provision, as was foreseen by the author of Fleta, proved a great discouragement to appeals; so that thenceforward they ceased to be in common use.

If the appellee be found guilty, he shall suffer the same judgment, as if he had been convicted by indictment; but with this remarkable difference, that on an indictment, which is at the suit of the king, the king may pardon and remit the execution; on an appeal, which is at the suit of a private subject, to make an atonement for the private wrong, the king can no more pardon it, than he can remit the damages recovered on an action of battery. In like manner as, while the wergild continued to be paid as a fine for homicide, it could not be remitted by the king's authority. And the ancient usage was, so late as Henry IV.'s time, that all the relations of the slain should drag the appellee to the place of execution: a custom, founded upon that savage spirit of family-repentment which prevailed universally through Europe after the irruption of the northern nations, and is peculiarly attended to in their several codes of law; and which prevails even now among the wild and untutored inhabitants of America: as if the finger of nature had pointed it out to mankind, in their rude and uncultivated state. However, the punishment of the offender may be remitted and discharged by the concurrence of all parties interested; and as the king by his pardon may frustrate an indictment, so the appellant by his release may discharge an appeal: "nam quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto."