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DIVISIBILITY

Volume 6 · 815 words · 1797 Edition

that property by which the particles of matter in all bodies are capable of a separation or diffusion from each other.

The Peripatetics and Cartesians hold divisibility to be an affection of all matter. The Epicureans, again, allow it to agree to every physical continuum; but they deny that this affection agrees to all bodies, for the primary corporeal or atoms they maintain to be perfectly infecable and indivisible.

As it is evident that body is extended, so it is no less evident that it is divisible; for since no two particles of matter can exist in the same place, it follows, that they are really distinct from each other; which is all that is meant by being divisible. In this sense the least conceivable particle must still be divisible, since it will consist of parts which will be really distinct. To illustrate this by a familiar instance. Let the least imaginable piece of matter be conceived lying on a smooth plain surface, it is evident the surface will not touch it everywhere: those parts therefore which it does not touch may be supposed separable from the others, and so on as far as we please; and this is all that is meant when we say matter is infinitely divisible.

The infinite divisibility of mathematical quantity is demonstrated thus geometrically. Suppose the line AC perpendicular to BF; and another, as GH, at a small distance from it, also perpendicular to the same line: with the centres CCC, &c. describe circles cutting the line GH in the points, &c., &c. Now the greater the radius AC is, the less is the part eH. But Divisibility, the radius may be augmented in infinitum; so long, therefore, the part eH may be divided into still less portions; consequently it may be divided in infinitum.

All that is supposed in strict geometry (says Mr MacLaurin) concerning the divisibility of magnitude, amounts to no more than that a given magnitude may be conceived to be divided into a number of parts equal to any given or proposed number. It is true, that the number of parts into which a given magnitude may be conceived to be divided, is not to be fixed or limited, because no given number is so great but a greater may be conceived and assigned: but there is not, therefore, any necessity of supposing the number of parts actually infinite; and if some have drawn very abstruse consequences from such a supposition, yet geometry ought not to be loaded with them.

How far matter may actually be divided, may in some measure be conceived from hence, that a piece of wire gilt with so small a quantity as eight grains of gold, may be drawn out to a length of 13,000 feet, the whole surface of it still remaining covered with gold. We have also a surprising instance of the minuteness of some parts of matter from the nature of light and vision. Let a candle be lighted, and placed in an open plain, it will then be visible two miles round; and consequently was it placed two miles above the surface of the earth, it would fill with luminous particles a sphere whose diameter was four miles, and that before it had lost any sensible part of its weight. A quantity of vitriol being dissolved, and mixed with 9000 times as much water, will tinge the whole; consequently will be divided into as many parts as there are visible portions of matter in that quantity of water.

There are perfumes, which, without a sensible diminution of their quantity, shall fill a very large space with their odoriferous particles; which must therefore be of an inconceivable fineness, since there will be a sufficient number in every part of that space sensibly to affect the organ of smelling. Dr Keill demonstrates, that any particle of matter, how small soever, and any finite space, how large soever, being given, it is possible for that small particle of matter to be diffused through all that space, and to fill it in such a manner, as that there shall be no pore in it whose diameter shall exceed any given line.

The chief objections against the divisibility of matter in infinitum are, That an infinite cannot be contained by a finite; and that it follows from a divisibility in infinitum, either that all bodies are equal, or that one infinite is greater than another. But the answer to these is easy; for the properties of a determined quantity are not to be attributed to an infinite considered in a general sense; and who has ever proved that there could not be an infinite number of infinitely small parts in a finite quantity, or that all infinites are equal? The contrary is demonstrated by mathematicians in innumerable instances. See the article Infinite, and 'S Gravesande Elem. Mathem. l. i. c. 4.