in its original sense, is a word of the same import with scudder; but in its usual and more appropriate signification it denotes "an effect contrary to the established constitution and course of things, or a sensible deviation from the known laws of nature."

That the visible world is governed by stated general rules, or that there is an order of causes and effects established in every part of the system of nature which falls under our observation, is a fact which cannot be controverted. If the Supreme Being, as some have supposed, be the only real agent in the universe, we have the evidence of experience, that, in the particular system to which we belong, he acts by stated rules. If he employs inferior agents to conduct the various motions from which the phenomena result, we have the same evidence that he has subjected those agents to certain fixed laws, commonly called the laws of nature. Upon either hypothesis, effects which are produced by the regular operation of these laws, or which are conformable to the established course of events, are properly called natural; and every contradiction to this constitution of the natural system, and the corresponding course of events in it, is called a miracle.

If this definition of a miracle be just, no event can be deemed miraculous merely because it is strange, or even to us unaccountable; since it may be nothing more than a regular effect of some unknown law of nature. In this country earthquakes are rare; and for monstrous births perhaps no particular and satisfactory account can be given; yet an earthquake is as regular an effect of the established laws of nature as any of those with which we are most intimately acquainted; and, under circumstances in which there would always be the same kind of production, the monster is nature's genuine issue. It is therefore necessary, before we can pronounce any effect to be a true miracle, that the circumstances under which it is produced be known, and that the common course of nature be in some degree understood; for in all those cases in which we are totally ignorant of nature, it is impossible to determine what is, or what is not, a deviation from its course. Miracles, therefore, are not, as some have represented them, appeals to our ignorance. They suppose some antecedent knowledge of the course of nature, without which a proper judgment cannot be formed concerning them, though with it their reality may be so apparent as to prevent all possibility of a dispute.

Thus, were a physician to cure a blind man of a cataclyst by anointing his eyes with a chemical preparation which we had never before seen, and to the nature and effects of which we were absolute strangers, the cure would undoubtedly be wonderful; but we could not pronounce it miraculous, because, for any thing known to us, it might be the natural effect of the operation of the unguent upon the eye. But were he to recover his patient merely by commanding him to see, or by anointing his eyes with spittle, we should with the utmost confidence pronounce the cure to be a miracle, because we know perfectly that neither the human voice nor human spittle have, by the established constitution of things, any such power over the diseases of the eye. No one is now ignorant, that persons apparently dead are often restored to their families and friends by being treated in the manner recommended by the Humane Society. To the vulgar, and sometimes even to men of science, these effects appear very wonderful; but as they are known to be produced by physical agency, they can never be considered as miraculous deviations from the laws of nature. On the other hand, no one could doubt of his having witnessed a real miracle who had seen a person that had been four days dead come alive out of his grave at the call of another, or who had even beheld a person exhibiting all the symptoms of death instantly resuscitated merely by being desired to live. So easy is it, in all cases in which the course of nature is understood, to determine whether any particular event be really a miracle; whilst in circumstances where we know nothing of nature and its course, even a true miracle, were it performed, could not be admitted as such, nor carry any conviction to the mind of a philosopher.

If miracles be effects contrary to the established constitution of things, we are certain that they will never be performed on trivial occasions. The constitution of things was established by the creator and governor of the universe, and is undoubtedly the offspring of infinite wisdom pursuing a plan for the best of purposes. From this plan no deviation can be made but by God himself, or by some powerful being acting with his permission. The plans devised by wisdom are steady in proportion to their perfection, and the plans of infinite wisdom must be absolutely perfect. From this consideration some men have ventured to conclude that no miracle was ever wrought, nor can rationally be expected; but maturer reflection must soon satisfy us that all such conclusions are hasty.

Man is unquestionably the principal creature in this world, and apparently the only one in it who is capable of being made acquainted with the relation in which he stands to his Creator. We cannot, therefore, doubt but that such of the laws of nature as extend not their operation beyond the limits of this earth were established chiefly, if not solely, for the good of mankind; and if, in any particular circumstances, that good can be more effectually promoted by an occasional deviation from those laws, such a deviation may reasonably be expected. Were man, in the exercise of his mental and corporeal powers, subjected to the laws of physical necessity, the circumstances supposed would indeed never occur, and of course no miracle could be admitted. But such is not the nature of man.

Without repeating what has been said elsewhere (see Metaphysics, part iii. chap. 5) of necessity and liberty, we shall here take it for granted that the relation between motives and actions is different from that between cause and effect in physics; and that mankind have such a command over themselves as that by their voluntary conduct they can make themselves in a great degree either happy or miserable. We know likewise from history, that, by some means or other, almost all mankind were once sunk in the grossest ignorance of the most important truths; that they knew not the Being by whom they were created and supported; that they paid divine adoration to stocks, stones, and the vilest reptiles; and that they were slaves to the most impious, cruel, and degrading superstitions. From this depraved state it was surely not unworthy of the common Father of all to rescue his helpless creatures, to enlighten their understandings that they might perceive what is right, and to present to them motives of sufficient force to engage them in the practice of it. But the understandings of ignorant barbarians cannot be enlightened by arguments, because of the force of such arguments as regard moral science they are not qualified to judge. The philosophers of Athens and Rome inculcated, indeed, many excellent moral precepts, and they sometimes ventured to expose the absurdities of the reigning superstition; but their lectures had no influence upon the multitude; and they had themselves imbibed such erroneous notions respecting the attributes of the Supreme Being, and the nature of the human soul, and converted these notions into first principles, of which they would not permit an examination, that even amongst them a thorough reformation was not to be expected from the powers of reasoning. It is likewise to be observed, that there are many truths of the utmost importance to mankind which unassisted reason could never have discovered. Amongst these we may confidently reckon the immortality of the soul, the terms upon which God will be reconciled to sinners, and the manner in which that all-perfect Being may be acceptably worshipped; about all of which philosophers were in such uncertainty, that, according to Plato, "whatever is set right, and as it should be, in the present evil state of the world, can be so only by the particular interposition of God."

An immediate revelation from heaven seemed, therefore, the only method by which infinite wisdom and perfect goodness could reform a bewildered and vicious race. But this revelation, at whatever time we suppose it given, must have been made directly either to some chosen individuals commissioned to instruct others, or to every man and woman for whose benefit it was ultimately intended. Were every person instructed in the knowledge of his duty by immediate inspiration, and were the motives to practise it brought home to his mind by God himself, human nature would be wholly changed: Men would not be masters of their own actions; they would not be moral agents, nor by consequence be capable either of reward or of punishment. It remains, therefore, that if God has been graciously pleased to enlighten and reform mankind, without destroying that moral nature which is essential to virtue, he can have done it only by revealing his truth to certain chosen instruments, who were the immediate instructors of their contemporaries, and through them have been the instructors of succeeding ages.

Let us suppose this to have been actually the case, and consider how those inspired teachers could communicate to others every truth which had been revealed to themselves. They might easily, if it was part of their duty, deliver a sublime system of natural and moral science, and establish it upon the common basis of experiment and demonstration; but what foundation could they lay for those truths which unassisted reason cannot discover, and which, when they are revealed, appear to have no necessary relation to any thing previously known? To a bare affirmation that they had been immediately received from God, no rational being could be expected to assent. The teachers might be men of known veracity, whose simple assertion would be admitted as sufficient evidence for any fact in conformity with the laws of nature; but as every man has the evidence of his own consciousness and experience that revelations from heaven are deviations from these laws, an assertion so apparently extravagant would be rejected as false, unless supported by some better proof than the mere affirmation of the teacher. In this state of things, we cannot conceive any evidence sufficient to make such doctrines be received as the truths of God, except the power of working miracles committed to him who taught them. This would, indeed, be fully adequate to the purpose. For if there were nothing in the doctrines themselves impious, immoral, or contrary to the truths already known, the only thing which could render the teacher's assertion incredible, would be its implying such an intimate communion with God as is contrary to the established course of things, by which men are left to acquire all their knowledge by the exercise of their own faculties.

Let us now suppose one of those inspired teachers to tell his countrymen that he did not desire them, upon his ipse dixit, to believe that he had any preternatural communion with the Deity, but that for the truth of his assertion he would give them the evidence of their own senses; and after this declaration, let us suppose him immediately to raise a person from the dead in their presence, merely by calling upon him to come forth out of his grave. Would not the only possible objection to the man's veracity be removed by this miracle? and would not his assertions that he had received such and such doctrines from God be as fully credited as if it had related to the most common occurrence? Undoubtedly it would; for when so much preternatural power was visibly communicated to this person, no one could possibly have reason to question his having received an equal portion of preternatural knowledge. A palpable deviation from the known laws of nature in one instance, is a sensible proof that such a deviation is possible in another; and in such a case as this, it is the witness of God to the truth of a man.

Miracles, then, under which we also include prophecy, are the only direct evidence which can be given of divine inspiration. When a religion, or any religious truth, is to be revealed from heaven, they appear to be absolutely necessary to enforce its reception amongst men; and this is the only case in which we can suppose them necessary, or believe for a moment that they ever have been or will be performed.

The history of almost every religion abounds with relations of prodigies and wonders, and of the intercourse of men with the gods; but we know of no religious system, those of the Jews and the Christians excepted, which appealed to miracles as the sole evidence of its truth and divinity. The pretended miracles mentioned by Pagan historians and poets are not said to have been publicly wrought in order to enforce the truth of a new religion contrary to the reigning idolatry. Many of them may be clearly shown to have been mere natural events; others of them are represented as having been performed in secret, upon the most trivial occasions, and in obscure and fabulous ages long prior to the era of the writers by whom they are recorded; and such of them as at first view appear to be best attested, are evidently tricks contrived for interested purposes, to flatter power, or to promote the prevailing superstitions. For these reasons, as well as on account of the immoral character of the divinities by whom they are said to have been wrought, they are altogether unworthy of examination, and carry in the very nature of them the completest proofs of falsehood and imposture.

But the miracles recorded of Moses and of Christ bear a very different character. None of them is represented as wrought upon trivial occasions. The writers who mention them were eye-witnesses of the facts, which they affirm to have been performed publicly, in attestation of the truth of their respective systems. They are, indeed, so incorporated with these systems, that the miracles cannot be separated from the doctrines; and if the miracles were not really performed, the doctrines cannot possibly be true. Besides all this, they were wrought in support of revelations which opposed all the religious systems, superstitions, and prejudices of the age in which they were given; a circumstance which of itself sets them, in point of authority, It is indeed, we believe, universally admitted, that the miracles mentioned in the book of Exodus and in the four Gospels might, to those who saw them performed, be sufficient evidence of the divine inspiration of Moses and of Christ; but to us it may be thought that they are no evidence whatever, as we must believe in the miracles themselves, if we believe in them at all, upon the bare authority of human testimony. Why, it has been sometimes asked, are not miracles wrought in all ages and countries? If the religion of Christ was to be of perpetual duration, every generation of men ought to have complete evidence of its truth and divinity.

To the performance of miracles in every age and in every country, perhaps the same objections would lie as to the immediate inspiration of every individual. Were those miracles universally received as such, men would be so overwhelmed with the number rather than with the force of their authority, as hardly to remain masters of their own conduct; and in that case the very end of all miracles would be defeated by their frequency. The truth, however, seems to be, that miracles so frequently repeated would not be received as such, and of course would have no authority; because it would be difficult, and in many cases impossible, to distinguish them from natural events. If they recurred regularly at certain intervals, we could not prove them to be deviations from the known laws of nature, because we should have the same experience for the one series of events as we have for the other; for the regular succession of preternatural effects, as for the established constitution and course of things.

Be this, however, as it may, we shall take the liberty to affirm, that, for the reality of the Gospel miracles, we have evidence as convincing to the reflecting mind, though not so striking to vulgar apprehension, as those had who were contemporary with Christ and his apostles, and actually saw the mighty works which he performed. To the admirers of Mr Hume's philosophy this assertion will appear an extravagant paradox; but we hope to demonstrate its truths from principles which, consistently with himself, that author could not have denied. He has indeed endeavoured to prove, that "no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle;" and the reasoning employed for this purpose is, that "a miracle being a violation of the laws of nature which a firm and unalterable experience has established, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can be; whereas our experience of human veracity, which (according to him) is the sole foundation of the evidence of testimony, is far from being uniform, and can therefore never preponderate against that experience which admits of no exception." This boasted and plausible argument has been examined by Dr Campbell, who justly observes, that so far is experience from being the sole foundation of the evidence of testimony, that, on the contrary, testimony is the sole foundation of by far the greater part of what Mr Hume calls firm and unalterable experience; and that if in certain circumstances we did not give an implicit faith to testimony, our knowledge of events would be confined to those which had fallen under the immediate observation of our own senses.

But although Dr Campbell has exposed the sophistry of his opponent's reasoning, and overturned the principles from which he reasons, we are persuaded that he might safely have joined issue with him upon those very principles. To us, at least, it appears that the testimony upon which we receive the Gospel miracles is precisely of that kind which Mr Hume has acknowledged sufficient to establish even a miracle. "No testimony," says he, "is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish. When one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle." In this passage every reader may remark, what did not escape the perspicacious eye of Dr Campbell, a strange confusion of terms; but as all miracles are equally easy to the Almighty, and as Mr Hume has elsewhere observed, that "the raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle as the raising of a house or a ship into the air," candour obliges us to suppose, that by talking of greater and less miracles, and of always rejecting the greater, he meant nothing more but that, of two deviations from the known laws of nature, he always rejects that which in itself is least probable.

If, then, it can be shown that the testimony given by the apostles and other first preachers of Christianity to the miracles of their Master, would, upon their supposition that those miracles were not really performed, have been as great a deviation from the known laws of nature as the miracles themselves, the balance must be considered as equally poised by opposite miracles; and whilst it continues so, the judgment must remain in a state of suspense. But if it shall appear, that in this case the false testimony would have been a deviation from the laws of nature less probable in itself than the miracles recorded in the Gospels, the balance will instantly be destroyed; and, by Mr Hume's maxim, we shall be obliged to reject the supposition of falsehood in the testimony of the apostles, and admit the miracles of Christ to have been really performed.

In this argument we need not waste time in proving that those miracles, as they are represented in the writings of the New Testament, were of such a nature, and performed before so many witnesses, that no imposition could possibly be practised upon the senses of those who affirm that they were present. From every page of the Gospels this is so evident, that the philosophical adversaries of the Christian faith never suppose the apostles to have been themselves deceived, but boldly accuse them of bearing false witness. But if this accusation be well founded, their testimony itself is as great a miracle as any which they record of themselves or of their Master.

It has been shown elsewhere (see the article Metaphysics), that by the law of association, which is one of the laws of nature, mankind, in the very process of learning to speak, necessarily learn to speak the truth; that ideas and relations are in the mind of every man so closely associated with the words by which they are expressed in his native tongue, and in every other language of which he is master, that the one cannot be entirely separated from the other; that therefore no man can on any occasion speak falsehood without some effort; that by no effort can a man give consistency to an unpremeditated detail of falsehood, if it be of any length, and include a number of particulars; and that it is still less possible for several men to agree in such a detail, when at a distance from each other, and cross-questioned by their enemies.

This being the case, it follows, if the testimony of the apostles to their own and their Master's miracles be false, either that they must have concerted a consistent scheme of falsehood, and agreed to publish it at every hazard; or that God, or some powerful agent appointed by him, must have dissolved all the associations formed in their minds between ideas of sense and the words of language, and arbitrarily formed new associations, all in exact conformity to each other, but all, at the same time, in direct contradiction to truth. One or other of these events must have taken place, because, upon the supposition of falsehood, there is no other alternative. But such a dissolution and formation of associations as the latter implies must, to every man who shall attentively consider it, appear to be as real a miracle, and to require as great an exertion of power, as the resurrection of the dead. Nor is the supposed voluntary agreement of the apostles in a scheme of falsehood an event less miraculous. When they sat down to fabricate their pretended revelation, and to contrive a series of miracles to which they were unanimously to appeal for its truth, it is plain, since they proved successful in their daring enterprise, that they must have clearly foreseen every possible circumstance in which they could be placed, and have prepared consistent answers to every question which could be put to them by their most inveterate and most enlightened enemies; by the statesman, the lawyer, the philosopher, and the priest. That such foreknowledge as this would have been miraculous, will not surely be denied; since it forms the very attribute which we find it most difficult to allow even to God himself. It is not, however, the only miracle which this supposition would compel us to swallow. The very resolution of the apostles to propagate the belief of false miracles in support of such a religion as that which is taught in the New Testament, is about as great a miracle as human imagination can easily conceive.

When they formed this design, either they must have hoped to succeed, or they must have foreseen that they would fail in their undertaking; and, in either case, they chose evil for its own sake. They could not, if they foresaw that they would fail, look for anything but that contempt, disgrace, and persecution, which were then the inevitable consequences of an unsuccessful endeavour to overthrow the established religion. Nor could their prospects be brighter upon the supposition of their success. As they knew themselves to be false witnesses and impious deceivers, they could have no hopes beyond the grave; and by determining to oppose all the religious systems, superstitions, and prejudices of the age in which they lived, they wilfully exposed themselves to inevitable misery in the present life, to insult and imprisonment, to stripes and death. Nor can it be said that they might look forward to power and influence when they should, through sufferings, have converted their countrymen; for so desirous were they of obtaining nothing but misery as the end of their mission, that they made their own persecution a test of the truth of their doctrines. They introduced the Master from whom they pretended to have received these doctrines, as telling them, "that they were sent forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; that they should be delivered up to councils, and scourged in synagogues; that they should be hated of all men for his name's sake; that the brother should deliver up the brother to death, and the father the child; and that he who took not up his cross and followed after him was not worthy of him." The very system of religion, therefore, which they invented and resolved to impose upon mankind, was so contrived, that the worldly prosperity of its first preachers, and even their exemption from persecution, was incompatible with its success. Had these clear predictions of the Author of that religion, under whom the apostles acted only as ministers, not been verified, all mankind must have instantly perceived that their pretence to inspiration was false, and that Christianity was a scandalous and impudent imposture. All this the apostles could not but foresee when they formed their plan for deluding the world. Hence it follows, that when they had resolved to support their pretended revelation by an appeal to forged miracles, they wilfully, and with their eyes open, exposed themselves to inevitable misery, whether they should succeed or fail in their enterprise; and that they concerted their measures so as not to admit of a possibility of recompense to themselves, either in this life or in that which is to come. But if there be a law of nature, for the reality of which we have better evidence than we have for that of others, it is, that "no man can choose misery for its own sake," or make the acquisition of it the ultimate end of his pursuit. The existence of other laws of nature we know by testimony and our own observation of the regularity of their effects. The existence of this law is made known to us not only by these means, but also by the still clearer and more conclusive evidence of our own consciousness.

Thus, then, do miracles force themselves upon our assent in every possible view which we can take of this interesting subject. If the testimony of the first preachers of Christianity was true, the miracles recorded in the Gospels were certainly performed, and the doctrines of our religion are derived from heaven. On the other hand, if that testimony was false, either God must have miraculously effaced from the minds of those by whom it was given all the associations formed between their sensible ideas and the words of language, or he must have endowed those men with the gift of prescience, and have compelled them to fabricate a pretended revelation for the purpose of deceiving the world, and involving themselves in certain and foreseen destruction.

The power necessary to perform the one series of these miracles may, for any thing known to us, be as great as that which would be requisite for the performance of the other; and, considered merely as exertions of preternatural power, they may seem to balance each other, and to hold the mind in a state of suspense. But when we take into consideration the different purposes for which these opposite and contending miracles were wrought, the balance is instantly destroyed. The miracles recorded in the Gospels, if real, were wrought in support of a revelation which, in the opinion of all by whom it is received, has brought to light many important truths which could not otherwise have been made known to men; and which, by the confession of its adversaries, contains the purest moral precepts by which the conduct of mankind was ever directed. The opposite series of miracles, if real, was performed to enable, and even to compel, a company of Jews, of the lowest rank and of the narrowest education, to fabricate, with the view of inevitable destruction to themselves, a consistent scheme of falsehood, and, by an appeal to forged miracles, to impose it upon the world as a revelation from heaven. The object of the former miracles is worthy of a God of infinite wisdom, goodness, and power. The object of the latter is absolutely inconsistent with wisdom and goodness, which are demonstrably the attributes of that Being by whom alone miracles can be performed. Hence it follows, that the supposition of the apostles bearing false testimony to the miracles of their Master, implies a series of deviations from the laws of nature infinitely less probable in themselves than those miracles; and therefore, by Mr Hume's maxim, we must necessarily reject the supposition of falsehood in the testimony, and admit the reality of the miracles. So true it is, that for the reality of the Gospel miracles we have evidence as convincing to the reflecting mind, as those had who were contemporary with Christ and his apostles, and witnesses to their mighty works.