a market-town and parish of the county of Berks, and in the hundred of the same name, sixty miles WAR

This portion of military science which falls to be treated under this term, may be conveniently discussed, in a work like the present, under the two main and obvious divisions of War by Land, and War by Sea. We shall accordingly view the subject with reference to these divisions.

ART I.—WARLIKE OPERATIONS BY LAND.

Referring generally to the articles Army, Artillery, Fortification, and Gunnery, for much that, in a large degree, belongs to the science of war, we shall under this division of the present head direct our attention to the great principles of war; and shall endeavour to give as full a view of their applications and combinations as our limits will allow.

Jomini has demonstrated that the art of war repose upon one governing principle, or what may be termed the fundamental maxim; by the application of which all the combinations are good, and without which they are all faulty. This maxim consists in effecting, with the greatest mass of forces, a combined operation upon the decisive point. To illustrate the subject, it may be observed, that the decisive point in war, or what has been termed the relative objective point, is obviously that in which resides the incipience of strength in an enemy; and it follows, that to be able to destroy it in the shortest and most effectual manner, must be the fundamental principle adopted by his antagonist. The mode of effecting this purpose is however the difficult part of the question, because of the infinite variety of circumstances to which it is subjected. But the story of war may nevertheless be divided into three primitive combinations; because the practice is composed of many branches, each of which depends upon particular principles; therefore, a great operation, to be perfect, ought to include the three primitive combinations; because then they produce the complete application of the fundamental maxim. The first of these relates to what is commonly termed forming the plan of a campaign, and consists, either in an offensive or defensive view, in the art of embracing the lines of operations in the most advantageous manner. The second is the art of moving the mass of forces, in the most rapid manner possible, upon the objective point of the primitive or accidental line of operations.

This is the method of execution, or strategy. The third is the art of combining the simultaneous application of the mass of forces on the most important point of a field of battle. This branch is usually designated by the term Tactics.

I.—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

A plan of campaign depends upon six essential considerations: 1st, the political situation of both parties; 2d, the situation of the moment; 3d, the relative force and military means; 4th, the location and distribution of the armies; 5th, the natural line of operations; 6th, the most advantageous line of operations. In forming the plan, it is not necessary to have regard solely to the exact balance of the relative means of war between the parties, but to view them only as they are important. Territorial and manoeuvring lines of operations are the principal object; and though they are subject to many accessory considerations, the rules of the art must nevertheless form their basis. Originality and great boldness are not incompatible with their application; such, for instance, as the plan which Napoleon, in 1800, executed in Italy. No enterprise could be more daring, none more rich in great and decisive combinations, or more prudent and cautious; since, while it menaced the enemy with ruin, no greater misfortune could occur, in case of check, than the sacrifice of the extreme rear-guard.

Before we proceed, it may be useful to fix, by definitions, several terms, upon the comprehension of which the most important military reasoning depends.

By a base or basis of operations is meant a frontier, the course of a river, a coast, a range of mountains or fortresses, or any topographical or political extent of country, upon the imaginary line of which the corps of an army assemble, offensively, to take their departure from thence into the enemy's country, and towards which, in case of failure, it is intended to retreat; defensively, to counteract all the measures which an invading force may pursue.

Lines of operations are divided into territorial and manoeuvring lines. By territorial lines are understood those which nature or art has traced for the defence or invasion of states. Frontiers covered by fortresses, or defended by nature with chains of mountains, great rivers, or Warlike other obstacles, form their constituents. **Manoeuvring Operations** lines are the dispositions of the general to traverse them by Land, offensively, or cover them defensively. Both these lines of operations are intimately connected. In offensive war, the line is an imaginary perpendicular upon the base, along which an army operates against the enemy; in defensive war, it is often the same, but still oftener parallel to the territorial line. A line of communication is either the same as that of operations, or any other by which the army receives its supplies, and communicates with the base.

Some examples will render the definitions more intelligible. France and Austria have three great lines of operations against each other; by Italy on one side, Switzerland and Tyrol in the centre, and by Germany on the other. In these the Po, the Maine, the Danube, or a principal road, constitutes the *material* of lines; which are amenable to only a few rules prescribed by their nature. Between Prussia and Austria again are three lines, through Moravia, Lusatia, and Saxony. Lines of operations are divisible into collateral or separate points. Frederick entered Bohemia by his central line, upon four points. The French invaded Germany in 1796 and 1799 upon two subdivided lines. Napoleon always operated upon one principal line, as did the duke of Wellington in Spain.

Thus far no great variety of combinations seems to perplex the view; but in the selection of the particular line, the problem becomes difficult, because a great multiplicity of circumstances, many of them not purely military, interpose. The political situation of the belligerents; their relative resources; character and situation of the fortresses; accidental strength of their forces; distance by sea; course of a considerable river; direction of a chain of mountains; nature of the country; political state of either party; jealousy of a neutral, or apprehensions of an ally; all in their turn claim consideration. In general, however, the initial application of military masses should be, when the belligerents are neighbours, upon some part of the frontier which projects into the hostile state, as Bohemia with regard to Prussia, or Silesia with regard to Austria. But it is a maxim that lines of operations have their key as well as fields of battle: in the former, the great strategical points are decisive; as, in the latter, the points which command the weak part of a position constitute the key. Where there exists a vast superiority of force on one side, the key, or great strategical point, may be sought at a considerable depth in the line of operations; but where the masses are nearly balanced, it is necessarily reduced to a relative proportion with the breadth of the base. Thus, for instance, the destruction of a French army on the frontier of the Netherlands, would not immediately produce the consequence of the victors marching to the capital, unless they had sufficient superiority to mask the principal fortresses which cover her line of defence in that quarter, or some other accidental circumstance rendered such a measure practicable. As further proofs of the relative proportion between the depth and base of a line of operations, that of Napoleon in Russia failed on both its pivots, before the summit was defeated; and those in Spain, although they were supported by intermediate fortresses, immediately contracted, when the battle of Salamanca produced consequences which endangered the western communication with the base.

Although it is absolutely necessary to move with a mass of force near the enemy, it is more advantageous to march in separate corps while still at a distance from him, if he has not a concentrated mass ready to act, and there be several roads leading concentrically towards the point intended to be occupied. It is evident that five corps, of twenty thousand men each, will move forward more rapidly towards any point, than a hundred thousand men, marching on the same road, who can only advance with the tardiness inherent in large bodies, and besides are encumbered with the immense train of their subsistence. Celerity of movement, multiplying the force of an army by enabling the mass to be carried alternately upon every point of the line, is an advantage of invaluable consequence; but this is not the only reason for recommending this method. There are two others, viz. the increased facility of subsistence, and the uncertainty into which it throws the enemy. An army of 20,000 men can find subsistence, in central Europe, on every part of their march, by merely casing the country within some leagues to contribute to their wants; and if they convey with them biscuit for eight or ten days, that is, during the first period, while corps are in position, or manoeuvring in a contracted area with other columns, they will be enabled to subsist till the magazines are formed. Thus military operations are in a great degree emancipated from the necessity of pre-arranged magazines, and the regular encumbrance of field-ovens.

The army which commences offensive operations takes the lead in all the movements, and those of the enemy are necessarily subordinate to them. If therefore it occupies with a corps each of the great avenues leading to the enemy, he will be in a state of uncertainty along his whole line of defence or operations, and remain in suspense as to the point upon which he ought to collect his masses to oppose them. Upon these facts, the following series of maxims is founded:

1. When an army undertakes an invasion, or acts offensively, it takes the lead (or, as the French term it, *initiative*) in the movements.

2. This advantage precludes the necessity of marching in mass, until near the point where the enemy is to be found and attacked. Until then it is preferable to move in several strong corps, in proportion to the collective strength of the army, and to direct them upon the communications which lead concentrically to the point.

3. The general direction can only be upon the centre, one of the extremities, or the rear, of the hostile line. An extremity will usually be found most eligible, because from that point the rear is easily attained; the centre only in the case where the enemy's line is scattered, and his corps separated by great intervals.

4. In this case the greater number of the corps should advance upon one of the isolated parts, and endeavour to surround it, while the remainder should occupy a central point to keep the rest of the hostile army in check.

5. When the principal mass of these corps is directed into the rear of an enemy, by passing one of the extremities of his line, one corps should remain upon that extremity, in order to keep open the communication with the line of operations, while the opponent is cut off from his. This corps serves likewise to attack him in flank, and to prevent him from withdrawing out of a faulty position by a secret movement.

6. These operations are most advantageous when the enemy is at a great distance from his own base. The principle may however be applied to positions less distant (two or three marches), provided the different corps have no greater distance to traverse to the point of reunion, than that which separates them from those of their own advanced posts which face the enemy. But this rule should not be understood as applying to isolated divisions upon an extended front of ninety or a hundred miles, unable to unite on a day of action, and whose movements cannot be simultaneous upon the decisive point. The difference is easily perceived between such operations and those of several corps concentrated in a position the depth of which equals the extent of front, and whose simultaneous co-operation is certain before the enemy can make an attempt upon their line.

7. By means of this system, the army, occupying a greater space, marches more rapidly, and is enabled to sub- stitute the roads. Cattle and biscuit alone will be required to follow each corps, in sufficient quantity to subsist it when in the vicinity of the enemy, where the other corps having likewise arrived, they are obliged to live within a smaller periphery. The stock of provision will be suffi- cient equal to the time required for collecting another.

Magazines are then formed in the rear as the army advances. They are collected by means of regular requis- ition made on the neighbouring provinces, and enforced by the troops; contracts are entered into with the local ad- ministrations, and precautionary convoys follow from the frontiers. Cattle, rice, and biscuit are the most useful provisions; the easiest to be transported.

In this view of the theory of initial operations, such as Jomini and other authorities consider them, no great re- gards paid to the waste of human life, by the frequent war or irregularity of the issue of provisions, or notice taken of the indiscipline which naturally arises when fa- miliar drives the soldier to marauding. A relentless con- scription system may indeed supply recruits; but they are a very inadequate instrument when compared to formed soldiers.

It remains to examine the art of forming a plan of cam- paign or operations in reference to insular expeditions. In the application of masses on the base line of operations by sea or by an insular force, much difficulty occurs, espe- cially if that base is to be obtained by force on a hostile coast; because the line of communication from the port where an expeditionary army proceeds to the point where debarcation takes place is lengthened, uncertain, and broken. The point of debarcation becomes a secondary base and unless a friendly fortress, or a naturally advan- tageous point, left unguarded by the enemy, can be occu- pied, the difficulties are nearly insurmountable. It is again difficult to despatch a large force in one fleet; it is danger- ous to keep it together, and dangerous to allow great inter- vals the elements affect the time, connection, and order of the convoy; an independent and separate service (the navy influences the primary organization and execution; debarcation absorbs much invaluable time, particularly that of the artillery, horses, and stores. From these causes, a principle has arisen of fitting out expeditions not sufficiently forlorn, with a view of ascertaining the practicability of an object, but which by that very system is often ren- dered impossible; for the first landing having been effected, the enemy's attention is no longer divided; he assembles his means of defence while the second convoy is expected, and the delay becomes decisive of the event. Yet if, in an auxiliary operation, the effect of masses simultaneously employed be of consequence, it is in those which com- mand on the sea-shore; for the troops have not only to defend and act offensively, but also to construct their means of security and retreat in case of failure. If we examine the primary operations of this class, from the wars of King William to the present period, we shall find that, with the exception of such as were favoured by chance or favourable circumstances, the success or failure was de- pendent upon one or more of the following maxims, espe- cially as applied to continental expeditions.

When an army is directed to make a descent upon an enemy's coast, with the object of penetrating into the coun- try, a point of debarkation should be selected, where the enemy possesses no local means to arrest the progress, such as a fortified city or a defensible peninsula. If how- ever circumstances compel the descent near or upon such a spot, immediate measures should be taken to mask or capture it, and secure the success of ulterior operations.

If the expedition is intended to be confined solely to the coast, the point of debarkation should possess the indis- pensable qualifications of facility of communication with the fleet, security of retreat and reembarkation. A point pos- sessed of these advantages is a fit spot for a temporary base of operations.

3. An expedition intended to operate ulteriorly should be ab initio superior to the probable immediate force of the enemy, so that the success of the landing and march into the country be not problematical.

4. No combinations of invasion should be made depend- ing on the co-operation of corps expected from distant or opposite quarters. It is important to have them collected, as much as possible, on or near one point of embarkation, to proceed from thence in mass to execute the enterprise.

5. In the plan of an expedition, no combinations should be admitted which include two or more lines of operations from separate bases. Armies transported by sea are, from that circumstance, not numerous; division renders them still weaker, and if on one point a misfortune occurs, the other division must reembark.

6. In colonial and insular expeditions, it is only neces- sary to combine the means in proportion to the strength of the object, and with attention to the season and climate. But on all occasions where the reduction of a fortress is in contemplation, the engineer department should possess an adequate matériel as well as the artillery.

All these maxims are in unison with the leading prin- ciples of the art of war, or constitute mere modifications to adapt them to maritime affairs. As examples of the im- portance of the first rule, may be quoted the landing of the emigrants at Quiberon: being confined to a narrow penin- sula, they were immediately blocked in by the enemy. The Helder expedition, though victorious in two battles, could not penetrate beyond the neck of the Haarlemmer Meer, which makes a peninsula of North Holland. At Aboukir, again, a peninsula, similar results would have ensued, but for the circumstance that a communication could be opened on the side of Rosetta, which rendered the position cen- tral against the two exterior lines of the enemy, namely, those of Cairo and Alexandria, and enabled the British to carry their mass alternately upon each, and ultimately, with inferior numbers, to reconquer that province.

In the second maxim, the causes are pointed out which allowed the expedition to Cherbourg, in 1758, to reembark in safety, although no regular precautions insured the mea- sure; and those which produced the disaster at St Cast, under General Bligh, notwithstanding every precaution. The Ostend expedition had the same defects, though per- haps on this occasion the object was considered of sufficient magnitude to allow a disregard of the consequences.

Inattention to the third had a preponderating influence at the Helder. The first division, having landed, was ob- liged to wait behind the intrenchments of the Zyp for the arrival of the main body. Meantime the enemy, now cer- tain of the point in danger, collected his means, and ar- ranged the plan of defence. After three battles he was only thrown back upon stronger ground, in a position where he could neither be turned nor attacked in front with prob- ability of success. In Egypt, the expeditionary force was likewise inferior to the enemy, and if the hostile commander had sacrificed the establishments and Institut at Cairo, to collect his forces on one line, he could have resisted the invasion with success. The Walcheren expedition, consid- ered in its primary combinations and preparatory mea- sures, was a model; as also that of the French for the in- vasion of Egypt. Both were wrong in the choice of the point of debarkation; but the results were different, and, from an unconquerable propensity in man, by the results they have been judged.

The expedition to the Helder again furnishes the proofs of the fourth maxim. Had the two British and the Rus- sian divisions arrived in time to act in mass, within a few hours after the first landing, the enemy could not have ma- tured an effectual plan of defence. But the combinations required easterly winds for the Russians and westerly for the British reinforcements, and both were nevertheless to arrive if possible simultaneously on the same spot. The Egyptian expedition was to be sustained by a corps from India and the Cape, by the Red Sea, which could scarcely by any chance arrive in proper time. At Copenhagen indeed the two divisions from Rugen (an island in the Baltic, where a British corps lay in transports) and from England did arrive without accident; but the successive divisions sent to the river Plate, to be successively defeated, are a further corroboration.

The fifth maxim is sufficiently obvious. Sir John Moore's division was off the coast of Portugal when the battle of Vimiera was fought; had it sailed conjointly with Sir Arthur Wellesley's, the result of that battle would have brought the British into Lisbon without a convention. If the division engaged had been defeated, a corps on board of ships could not have rendered the least assistance. In the next campaign, Sir John operated on several lines from Portugal, and Sir David Baird from a different base (Corunna), with the view of uniting at the distance of more than 200 miles on a point in possession of a formidable enemy. Such combinations produced their natural consequences; the hard pressed retreat of the army to Corunna ensued; and, as if another proof were wanting, no sooner were the troops compelled to fight a battle, than another division appeared to witness the conflict from the ships, and return to England.

To the deficiency of a proper establishment of sappers and miners, with the materiel required to enable the engineers to act with effect, many delays and failures may be ascribed. It has necessitated the severe system of bombardment, and repeatedly rendered the British arms odious, without thereby insuring success. Carcasses and rockets ruin the defenceless inhabitants, but have no decisive influence upon the defence of a regular fortress.

If we examine the wars in America by the rules of art, we find Lord Amherst operating by the line of Lake Champlain upon Montreal, and Wolfe by the St Lawrence upon Quebec, both successful, and yet two years without connection. Next appear isolated expeditions traversing a vast continent, deficient in numbers, and therefore always inferior to the local militias on the spot, terminating their career in defeat or capture; or else dispersed along the coast, occupied in landings for trivial purposes, and when reimbarked, leaving the enemy to boast of successful resistance. In the Canadas we behold the key of defensive operations left without a fortress. True indeed it is that a fortress does not defend a state, that an army must be looked to for that purpose; but an army is a frail instrument, and if armies defend nations, fortresses defend armies.

Reflecting on the miscarriages produced by dispersing the forces, it appears that in British military combinations it should be a maxim, never to act offensively on more than one point at a time. This rule, a fundamental principle of the Roman policy in her best days, should have been acted upon in the wars of the Spanish succession, when that question ought to have been decided in the Netherlands. The consequence of pursuing a multiplicity of offensive combinations at the same time, was never better exemplified than in the failures of the simultaneous expeditions to Buenos Ayres, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Rugen. It follows that small expeditions, hovering along hostile coasts, produce no beneficial effects. The local garrisons and militia of the country are generally superior; and a momentary debarkation produces in the mind of the enemy, not only national union, but also the ideas of victory. The debarkations at St Malo and St Cast, that under Sir James Pulteney at Corunna, most of those in America, were fraught with risks not counterbalanced by any prospects of real advantage. Those on the east of Spain were of a different character; they had a political object of importance, and served as a diversion which fixed a whole hostile army in that quarter.

It is a general rule, liable indeed to occasional exceptions, that the operations of the land forces should be confined to fixed important points, where the object is not only to land, but to conquer and maintain themselves. There is no instance in the history of the nation where a British mass of forces met with disaster, when that mass acted by itself, or with sufficient preponderance among its allies. From the nature of the sea-line of operations, expeditions, like other military enterprises, must be liable to miscarriage; but a right use of the forces will at least increase the chances of success. In the selection of the points, much must be left to the circumstances of the case, but their importance should always be in relation to the risk, expense, and time.

As these observations apply to great operations only, it is unnecessary to advert to flying corps, or such expeditions as are merely intended to alarm a coast or distract an enemy; because these, in most cases of problematical utility, should be very sparingly resorted to, and, at all events, never consist of more than a few frigates, with troops on board. The geographical extent and insular position of Great Britain afford equal facilities for defence and attack. Defence, however, when passive, is allowed to be the very worst that can be adopted in the military policy of a state; and when the national superiority at sea is considered, it becomes evident that British operations ought to be offensive. With a great number of garrisons stationed in every quarter of the world, the land forces form nowhere a considerable body; those in Britain being scarcely adequate to the local duties, and the relief of such as return from abroad. At the commencement of a war, although the militia is called out, the reinforcements required to place distant garrisons on the war-establishment absorb nearly all the infantry, and leave not only no disposable force, but even no sufficient elements to create new corps in an efficient manner. Hence three or four years of war pass in preparations on one side, and in conquests on the other. Millions are spent, and vast sacrifices made, to arrest the progress of the enemy; humiliating offers are made, which the opponent, blinded by success, has the imprudence to reject. Then, forced to still greater expense, other campaigns follow, to recover what was lost in the first. By a rational system of preparation, wars might be terminated in a short period, or altogether prevented; and yet long wars, the real cause of the prodigious national debt, are occasioned by an ill-judged prejudice against a standing army, backed by still weaker ideas of economy. Since regular armies have been maintained in Europe, the obvious utility of having at least some disposable force to give weight to negotiation, requires scarcely any argument. Instead of three battalions, the only applicable troops in 1792-3, which were sent to Willemstadt, had Great Britain possessed 25,000 disposable troops, the National Convention would have paused before it declared war, or this force would immediately have influenced the reconquest of Belgium. Even a year later, such a national force could have averted the consequences of the action of Hoogheide, the retreat from Dunkirk, and the final evacuation of the Netherlands. In the late war, the inability of Great Britain to act from the first with vigour, compelled her to fight twenty-one years, with incalculable waste of blood and treasure, merely to restore the balance of power; and the nation, which at first had only three battalions for service, ended, in 1814, with a mass of more than a million of men in arms.

According to authentic documents, this mass amounted to 1,116,813, including navy, East India, and local militia force, but exclusively of yeomanry and volunteers. In military point of view, the economical system has been productive of immense losses to the nation; but if, under given circumstances, in time of peace, the army must be generally reduced, care should be taken not to destroy elements of regeneration. On a war breaking out, the troops in the kingdom should be brigaded, with their regiments, staff, field train of artillery, commissariat, and medical officers, and concentrated as much as possible, for the purpose of rapidity of execution, and creating habits of large bodies, which the staff and commissariat generally begin to learn when before the enemy, at a period when all parties should be fully acquainted with them, and when mistakes may be fatal. The orders of government are thus executed as soon as issued, and that species of confusion is obviated which all who served in the beginning of the late war must have witnessed.

The beginning of the present century, plans of operation were usually arranged in the cabinet, by superannuated officers, on obsolete principles, or by ministers without professional knowledge, upon combinations entirely political. The Austrian government was particularly unfortunate in this system. Plans, calculated with the precision of summer manoeuvres, where every march, battalion, and encampment were prescribed, without adverting to the masses of the enemy, tied the hands of the generals, who were ever successful against a formidable enemy but when they disobeyed their instructions, as Eugene did at Zenta.

When Frederick traced his own plans of campaign, although he was not fully sensible of the laws which regulate territorial and manoeuvring lines of operations, still circumstances and superior tact soon led him to a true system. Jomini blames, with sagacity, some of his initial operations; but he does not sufficiently consider all circumstances and his era. He compares the operations of Napoleon, with all the resources, fortresses, positions, and revolutionary excitation of France, together with the adventurous gambling of his hero, to the conduct of a sovereign who had his native throne to defend, without any frontier, with a scanty population, a barren soil, and pecuniary means but such as arose from his economy; yet he rose superior to all the difficulties of his situation, though under circumstances more unpromising than those which ultimately hurled Napoleon from his throne.

II.—MANCEUVRING LINES OF OPERATIONS.

The connection between manoeuvring lines and those manoeuvre has marked out, and the views of the general-in-chief, form separate classes, each named after the nature of the connection.

1. Simple lines of operations are those when an army moves in a single direction from a frontier, without forming detached corps.

2. Double and multiplied lines, when an army acts upon the same frontier with two or three isolated corps, towards several objects.

3. Interior lines of operations are formed to oppose several hostile lines, and are so directed as to possess internal connection, and enabled to move and approach each other, without allowing the enemy to oppose a superior mass to them.

4. Exterior lines, on the contrary, possess the opposite qualities. They are such as an army may form at the same time upon the two extremities of one or several hostile lines.

5. Lines upon an extended front are those which are arranged upon a great contiguous development by isolated divisions, but still belonging to the same mass of forces, and operating upon the same object. Under this head are comprehended, likewise, lines formed by two separate corps upon one given extent. They are then double lines upon a great front.

6. Deep or lengthened lines are those which, commencing at their base, pass over a great extent of country before they can attain their object.

7. Concentric lines of operations are either several or a single line subdivided, moving from distant points in order to arrive at the same object, in front or in rear of their base.

8. Eccentric lines designate a single mass starting from one point, and dividing itself in order to form several diverging lines upon isolated objects.

9. Secondary lines are those in the great combinations of two armies, which designate their relative connection while operating upon the development of the same frontier.

10. Accidental lines are produced in the original plan of campaign, when unexpected events necessitate a new direction for the operations. They are of the highest importance, and rarely adopted but by generals of the first abilities.

Formerly lines of operations were considered only as they affected the matériel of armies; it was even advanced, that armies encamped near their magazines had no lines of operations; but an example will prove the fallacy of this opinion. Supposing two French armies encamped, one on the Upper Rhine in front of Brisac, and the other on the Lower Rhine in front of Dusseldorf, with both their magazines in the safest place, that is, behind the river. These armies must have either an offensive or defensive object, and therefore have territorial as well as manoeuvring lines of operations. 1st, The territorial defensive line will extend from the point of their position to the point which they are to cover; therefore they would both be cut off if the enemy occupied that point before them. If Melas, with his army, could have subsisted near Alessandria in Lombardy after the battle of Marengo, he was no less cut off from his line of operations as long as his victorious opponents occupied the line of the Po. 2d, Their manoeuvring lines would be a double against a simple one, if the enemy concentrated his masses to crush one of the armies: it would be a double external line against a double internal, if the enemy formed also two corps, but so directed that they could be united most readily.

The article in the Edinburgh Review on the work of Jomini makes the following able remarks on lines of operations. "Among all these lines, the simple and interior are the best, particularly when combined, as being most congenial to the great principle of carrying a mass of troops upon the decisive point. A few remarks will make the truth of this apparent. If an army advances from its base of operations upon one line, it is clear that the general commanding will have but two important dangers to provide against; first, that of his troops being attacked unawares; and, secondly, that of being turned and cut off from his communications with his base. The most effectual method of guarding against either is, to attack the opposing enemy first, or, as the author calls it, prendre l'initiative; and if, in so doing, the assailants can place themselves in such a position that a victory will give them the means of utterly destroying their adversary, while a defeat will not be of material detriment to themselves, the manoeuvre must be considered as a perfect one. Now, a single and interior line has a manifest advantage over every other in aiding such an operation. An army which moves upon double, exterior, or multiplied lines, must be weakened in proportion to the number of its divisions. The general has many combinations to attend, and many dangers to guard against; his columns being on many roads, and unconnected, must also be dependent upon many persons and many orders. Obstacles will be multiplied at every step; and errors cannot be known or corrected without much loss of Warlike time. The success of his plan must depend upon the exactness and concert between the different divisions; a misfortune attending any one vitiates or destroys the whole project, and yet each column, separately, will be too weak to strike an important blow if a favourable opportunity should occur. They will suffer severely from mishaps, and they cannot well take advantage of misfortunes.

An army that manoeuvres upon simple and interior lines gets rid of all these incubrations; the troops will be together and well in hand, with the general upon the spot, ready to rectify errors, and to superintend every movement; and upon whichever road he marches against an enemy acting upon double or multiplied lines, his combinations must be more simple, and his numbers must be superior; he will have the power of overwhelming whatever division of his adversary he may meet with, and, by thus disorganizing his opponent's plan of campaign, enable himself to cut off their communications, or to attack their columns in detail. We will suppose however that, finding their line penetrated, they might, by great exertions, unite the remainder of their scattered corps by a retrograde movement; but they will hardly be able to cover their communications, which must be nearly as numerous as their divisions, and the attacking army will give battle in the execution of a preconcerted plan, while they will be in the confusion of a baffled one. If the great principle, however, of carrying a mass upon the decisive point has governed the general who advances upon the simple line, he will, by a victory, deprive his foe of retreat, and utterly destroy him; while, if he fail, his communications are still open, and, from want of a plan, the pursuit cannot be very vigorous."

These remarks upon manoeuvring lines are well illustrated in modern military history. In the seven years' war, Frederick had the choice of attacking Austria, on his left by Silesia into Moravia, in the centre through Lusatia, and on the right by Saxony, both into Bohemia. His natural territorial line was undoubtedly the first of these three; because, while his own flank was covered by the fortresses of Silesia, he could penetrate at once into the vitals of the Austrian dominions, and masking Olmütz, threaten Vienna. He did not feel the advantage of this line until the third campaign, when he was everywhere outnumbered by the enemy; and yet even then he might have had signal success, if his besieging train, &c. had been in more efficient order and better applied. From this period he became sensible of the superior utility of central lines, and from 1758 he operated successively, with his principal mass in Saxony, Silesia, and Brandenburg; the same troops were victorious in all these quarters, by alternately reinforcing each corps so as to attain a superiority. Having missed the opportunity in 1757, of deciding the war by a successful invasion, he at last gloriously saved his kingdom by this new system. All these successes belong to the three first classes of simple, double, and interior lines of operations. Those of his adversaries, on the contrary, were always of the fourth and fifth exterior lines, and lines upon an extended front. For, on looking at the map of the seat of war, it will be readily observed that he operated within the triangle formed by Dresden, Breslau, and Custrin, while the enemy manoeuvred outside of that figure. After the battle of Hochkirch, indeed, when this area was broken in, he made a master-stroke, by uniting his three armies in Saxony, and thus wresting from Daun the advantages of his victory. The operations of that crisis belong to the tenth or accidental lines, in which Frederick has never been surpassed. To this class belong, likewise, his invasion of Bohemia, after raising the siege of Olmütz; his march into Silesia, and manoeuvres before and after the battle of Liegnitz, in 1760; and his central position at Bantzelwitz, by which he kept the enemy divided, in 1762.

The French operations in Hanover were not more successful. In 1758 they formed two lines of operations, in Hesse and on the Weger, upon a development of 300 miles. Prince Ferdinand, manoeuvring upon their extreme left, had only isolated corps to contend with, and drove them across the Rhine. Marshal Contades, after the battle of Crevelt, felt the advantage of the line of the Rhine, all the fortresses being in his hands; but while he acted without vivacity on his right, Prince Ferdinand took a central direction, and broke the concert between the two hostile armies, who, at the end of the campaign, lost nearly all they had gained, having spent their time in disjointed marches, and in writing projets and counter projets. After the battle of Bergen in 1759, the French, grown wiser, united all their forces in Hesse; they made conquests, which even the defeat of Minden did not wholly repair. In 1760, Marshal Broglie, persisting in operations in mass, made a respectable campaign; but in the next two, armies were again formed at a great distance; Prince Ferdinand again was beforehand with them everywhere. At length they approached each other to attack, but, for want of concert, were defeated at Fellinghausen.

In comparing the constant difference of the lines of operations which the Austrians, Russians, and French adopted, with those of the Prussians and Hanoverians, their opposite results are at once discovered.

During the wars of the revolution, the duke of Brunswick's march into Champagne was a simple line, but wanted corps to cover the flanks, and activity in the execution. The recovery of Belgium by the Austrians was also effected by operating in mass; but on the French frontier they wasted their time in sieges, and acted upon exterior and eccentric lines. The French operated in a similar manner, but having a line of fortresses and numerical superiority, they were at last successful, and expelled the allies from Belgium. This worthless system was then cried up, and denominated Carnot's. Accordingly, in 1795, the French persisted in acting on double lines. They manoeuvred on the Rhine, by Dusseldorf and Mainzheim. Centrally operating, carried his masses alternately from right to left, gained the decisive victories of Mainzheim and the lines of Mayence, and threw the French army of the Sambre and Meuse back across the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and Pichegru under the cannon of Landau.

In 1796, the French, in their lines of operations on the Rhine, still copying Frederick's faulty system of 1757, and their own of 1794 and 1795, were not more successful than in the preceding campaign. The armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, moved from the extremities of their base to take a concentric direction on the Danube. As in 1794, they formed two exterior lines. The Archduke Charles opposed his own in an interior direction, to be more readily concentrated, and seized the critical moment, while the corps of Count Latour was covered by the Danube, to steal some marches unperceived by Moreau, and to throw his mass upon Jourdan, who was routed at Würzburg. This decided the fortune of the campaign in Germany, and compelled Moreau's deep lines to retreat into France.

Meanwhile Napoleon commenced his extraordinary career in Italy, as Frederick had recommended half a century before. His system was to divide the enemy, and force the Austrians and Piedmontese to take two exterior lines. They fell into the snare, and he defeated them separately at Mondovi and Lodi. An army had assembled in the Tyrol to relieve Mantua; it was led on in two lines, separated by a lake (Guards). The French general, raising the siege, hurried with the mass of his forces to meet the first column at Brescia, and routed it; the second column arrived soon after on the same ground, and was likewise driven back upon the Tyrol. Wurmser determined to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon, which that victory would not have relieved him, but for the pusillanimous feelings which signed the peace.

Similar manoeuvres towards the sources of the Saale produced the disasters of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstedt. But in this war Napoleon became still more enamoured of deep and baseless lines of operations, the baneful effect of which he was not destined to feel till the campaign of 1812, when he invaded Russia without a true base nearer than the Rhine. His secondary base on the Vistula bore no relation to the depth of his line of operations, intersected by the Niemen, the Dvina, and a solitary waste of endless woods and heaths. Although he operated on a simple line, the immense distance from his base left him without communications. The extremes or pivots of the secondary base were already turned and broken, when Kutusoff moved to the rear of his flank upon Kaluga, towards the Berezina, and destroyed the greatest army recorded in modern history. The next year, though his lines were shorter, circumstances were totally altered; he operated with ability in mass; but being greatly inferior in horse, and the allies manoeuvring likewise in mass, the first battles were indecisive, till his adversaries, operating upon double exterior lines,—on this occasion applicable from their great superiority in numbers and in cavalry,—moved again round the flank, and decided the question at Leipzig.

Meantime, the duke of Wellington, in the peninsula, cunctando restituit rem. Opposing a single line against a single line, he saved Portugal by his masterly position of Torres Vedras, without a battle. Next he drove the enemy from the frontier fortresses, by alternately carrying his masses across the Tagus. His line was shorter from north to south than that of the enemy, and he caused them to increase theirs by the destruction of the bridge of Almeyras. Thus he forced his opponents to operate exteriorly. After the victory of Salamanca, his march into Spain was by two interior lines; and though this operation has been blamed, because it ended in a retreat, we forget that the enemy was obliged to abandon the south, or one half of Spain, to produce it. The next operation was upon a single and decisive line. The enemy was encountered at Vittoria before he could concentrate his forces, cut off from his base, and driven headlong into Pamplona.

This comparison of the combinations and results of the most celebrated campaigns shows, that all the lines of operations that have been crowned with success depended on general principles, of which the following are the principal heads.

1. A double line of operations is advantageous if the enemy has likewise a double line, provided theirs be exterior, and at a greater distance than yours, and unable to unite without first risking a battle.

2. An army possessing interior lines more connected than those of the enemy, can, by strategical movements, destroy them successively, by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon each point; as was exemplified in the campaign of 1758, and subsequently at Manheim and the lines of Mayence, at Würzburg and Emmendingen, at Lonato and Castiglione, Trente and Bassano, at Stockach and Zürich, Abendsberg and Eckmühl, &c.

3. In order to effect this movement, a corps should be left before the army which it is intended to keep in check, with orders not to engage, but merely to retard the march, by taking posts behind defiles or rivers, and retreating towards the army.

4. From the above premises, it follows that a double line of operations against an enemy whose corps are in closer connection, will always be unfortunate with equal numbers, if the enemy profits by the advantages of his situation, and manoeuvres with rapidity within it.

Army of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, were names given to French armies, although they were not always on these rivers. 5. A double line of operations becomes still more dangerous when its parts are separated by several days' march.

6. Simple and interior lines, on the contrary, are always most safe; because they admit the action of the mass of forces against the isolated divisions of the enemy, if he be so imprudent as to venture an action.

7. A double line of operations, however, may be adopted with success, if the forces employed are so much greater, that superior masses can be presented to the opponents on both its parts.

8. Two anterior lines, mutually sustaining each other, and facing two exterior lines at a certain distance, must avoid being compressed into a small area; for the exterior hostile lines might thereby act simultaneously.

9. Again, they should not operate at too great intervals; for the enemy might have time to crush one of these divisions, while it is weakened by detaching to the other, and thus gain a decisive advantage.

10. It being the interest of a commander to divide and isolate the opponent's forces, his manoeuvring lines should never have the object of drawing the whole hostile forces upon him; as Tempelhoff boasts Frederick to have done in the campaign of 1760.

By reference to the preceding sketch of the operations in late wars, the value of these rules is everywhere observable. When the details in history are examined, such as they are presented by authors acquainted with the art of war, they form a key, which opens an unerring way into all the causes of success and misfortune. Thus, in what has been said on accidental lines of operation, it might have been added, that Napoleon did not know how to avail himself of them, when he was advised to operate by the right bank of the Elbe, and change his direction upon the pivot of Magdeburg, instead of risking the battle of Leipzig, and suffering, in violation of the eighth rule, the enemy to place him between two fires; nor in Champagne in 1814, when he operated at too great a distance, overlooking the ninth rule, which gave the allies time to force the gates of Paris, thus employing the just system of throwing the mass of their forces upon the most important point. The duke of Wellington's defensive campaign in Portugal hinged upon a prudent application of the second rule; and Napoleon, in 1814, could not have resisted so long as he did in France, but by the same system. Although the allies at that moment conducted their operations on the seventh rule, perfectly applicable under the then existing circumstances, yet the vast superiority of internal lines remained evident. But when his eccentric movement placed him out of the sphere of real operations, the allies applied the third rule with perfect success, and effected his fall.

In order to complete the view of territorial and manoeuvring lines, it is requisite to consider them as they are affected by the configuration of frontiers.

1. In order to operate with advantage, there should not be two different armies upon the same frontier; because,

2. Double lines will always fail, with equal chances, against a single line, as has already been shown.

3. Interior lines resist with advantage against exterior lines, either upon the same or upon two different frontiers. The objection that Pichegru proved successful in 1794 is not valid; because Prince Coburg did not avail himself of his interior line, but acted by detachments, while he remained inactive with his mass, inferior in strength, and unsupported by fortresses on the flanks.

4. When the hostile fortresses are scattered upon a line of great extent, the most advantageous manoeuvring line is upon their centre; as the Russians experienced to their cost in the beginning of the campaign of 1812; but on all other occasions, the best direction is upon one of the extremities, and from thence on the rear; as exemplified in 1800 in Italy, in 1805 in Bavaria, and the next year at the sources of the Maine and Saale, &c. When central masses are moved with ability against scattered corps, all other things being equal, they must always be successful, often even without a battle; as when Moreau, making demonstrations against the left of Kray, near Huningen, moved rapidly into Switzerland, whereby the greater part of Swabia fell into his hands without an action. The march of the duke of Wellington upon Madrid and Burgos produced the immediate evacuation of the south of Spain; and the movement of Kutusoff upon Kaluga forced the French from Moscow and out of Russia.

5. The configuration of a frontier may have important influence on the direction of lines of operation. Central positions, forming salient angles towards the enemy, such as Bohemia forms towards Prussia, Switzerland towards Austria or Saxony, as it was circumstanced in 1814, are the most advantageous; because they are naturally inferior, and lead to the flanks and rear of the opponent's defensive line. The sides of these salient angles are therefore so important, that all the resources of art should be added to those of nature to render them impregnable. Switzerland and Bohemia are sufficiently proved to possess these natural advantages; but Saxony appears more doubtful, because Napoleon was at length defeated at Leipzig. Yet it was his conviction of these central advantages that made him neglect to change the line of his operations upon the pivot of Magdeburg; and if we examine the character of the operations, though the allies were numerically, and especially in excellent cavalry, superior, we discover that when his defensive manoeuvres were confined to a moderate distance from the Elbe, and the ridge of the mountains of Bohemia, no impression could be made upon him; but his system was solely that of attack, and his impatience sought the Prussians deep in Silesia, the grand army beyond the defiles of Bohemia, and the northern army in the sands of Berlin, not successively, but all at the same moment. He was thus on all sides inferior, but not dislodged, till, by his own indecision, he allowed the enemy to turn both his flanks simultaneously, and to bring him to action between two fires at Leipzig. We may take occasion to revert once more to the double exterior lines of the allies here, and in 1814 in Champagne. When each of the armies operating exteriorly amounts to 120,000 or 150,000 men, they possess a consistency which obviates all need of co-operation; for, admitting the enemy to be even stronger, there is not a great disparity of force between the parties which can be deployed and brought into action on the same field of battle; hence the weaker army can decline a battle, and in both these cases, where the allies had great superiority of cavalry, they could begin and break off a battle at their pleasure; as they proved at the first battle of Leipzig or Lützen, and at Bautzen.

6. Where no such central position or territorial projection exists, the same effect may be produced by the relative direction of the manoeuvring lines, as exemplified in

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**Fig. 1.**

\[ \text{CD, manoeuvring on the right flank of the army AB, and HI moving upon the left flank of FG, form two interior lines, CK and IK, upon the extremities of each of the exterior lines AB and FG, both of which may be destroyed by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon them. This combination presents the effect of the French campaigns of 1800 and 1809. It is also the spirit of the duke of Wellington's defence of Portugal;} \] To give a still more convincing proof of the justness of the preceding ideas, let us examine the scene of the campaign of 1806-7 in Poland. The Baltic and the frontier of Austrian Galicia formed the two sides AB and CD of the above square. It was of great consequence to both parties to avoid being driven upon either of these obstacles. The configuration of the frontiers may modify the sides of the square, and convert them into a parallelogram, or a trapezium, as in fig. 4.

In this case, the army GH, being in possession of the sides AC and CD, would be still more favourably situated, because the base of the opponent being contracted at BD, would be more difficult to keep open. The front of the base BD having less extent, offers fewer resources for manoeuvring, and affords to the army GH the means of operating with more success; because the direction of the line CD naturally leads upon the communications of the enemy, and because the space to be occupied in order to cut him off is shorter, and therefore more easily held with concentrated forces.

The theatre of war in Prussia and Poland, previously mentioned, was precisely of this figure. The frontiers of Austrian Galicia, extending to the Narew, formed, by the line of the Vistula, the contracted side BD; and the manner in which Napoleon embraced that line at Pultusk and Eylau was similar to the figure here shown. This operation had however its unfavourable chances; the first depending upon the doubtful trust to be reposed in the neutrality of Austria, and the second upon the great distance from the base of operations, which exposed the communications of the armies with the Oder to the mercy of the cabinet of Vienna. It depended even then upon Austria (as indeed it had the year before depended on Prussia) to put a stop to these endless invasions. The manoeuvre of the French general was good, but the operation of the statesman was only daring. These examples are sufficient to demonstrate that the manner of embracing a theatre of war is amenable to the two following principles.

1. To direct the masses upon the decisive points of the line of operations, that is, upon the centre if the enemy has been so imprudent as to scatter his forces, or upon an extremity if he is in a contiguous line.

2. To make the great effort in the latter case upon that extremity which has its back against an insurmountable obstacle, or which leads upon the communications of the enemy without sacrificing our own.

Defensive operations, in a great measure already examined in the preceding discussions, require, nevertheless, operations some further remarks. Passive defence offers no security to a state, nor fortresses without an army; it is confiding in a shield without a sword. Reason and experience alike prove that defensive system to be the best, which embraces the greatest number of offensive facilities; for these we refer, in particular, to interior and simple lines, and those directions of lines which best anticipate or counteract the most effectual offensive ones. But as defensive measures imply inferiority of forces, they must in a considerable degree depend upon local means to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy. Rivers and chains of mountains are the natural obstacles; fortresses, entrenched camps, and well selected positions upon the most advantageous lines of defence, the artificial means in a territorial front. Fortresses, with échelles de pont upon a river parallel to the frontier, are very advantageous; but upon a river perpendicular to the fron- Warlike Operations by Land.

In the former case an offensive army must cross the river only once, but in the latter it must cross as often as the adversary thinks proper; for, placing his camp under protection of one of these fortresses, the enemy cannot pass him without being taken in flank or rear, nor besiege the place without dislodging the enemy. Hence intrenched camps, covering and covered by a fortress, add considerably to the defence of a state. The Austrians felt severely the want of these precautions on the Danube in the late wars. Thus the operation of Mack upon Ulm would have been good had he moved in time to attack from thence either on the right or left of the river; but to have rendered it secure, there should have been fortified positions on the Schellenberg at Donauwerth, Ingolstadt, and Ratisbon: for then he could always place the river between him and the enemy; and if the latter operated on both banks, he could attack with his whole mass that part which was most convenient, before the other could cross to assist it. Fortifications are also eminently useful in the defence of passes in chains of mountains. The insignificant fort of Bard, with 600 men, arrested the progress of the principal column of Napoleon, when descending the Great St Bernard into the valley of Aoste in 1800; and if the fort had been better secured, the whole plan of campaign would have failed, for Melas would have had time to arrive and defeat the enemy in detail. Again, the French emperor having constructed the fine roads into Italy, neglected to secure them by any fortifications, and the first military use that was made of them was by the Austrians in the two successful invasions of France, where the old fort of L'Ecluse, near Geneva, was the only point that could, and actually did, retard them some days.

Fortresses likewise secure the magazines, stores, and hospitals of an army, and save the matériel and broken troops after a defeat. Pampeluna saved what did escape of the French after the battle of Vittoria, as Prague did the Austrians in 1757. But in order to make them capable of producing the share of security to a state which reason can expect from them, fortresses should not be too numerous, because they absorb too great a proportion of troops for garrisons, and cost immense sums; nor small, for then they are easily embraced and overpowered by artillery; nor all on the frontiers, for if the enemy penetrate beyond them, the great arsenals, depots, foundries, &c. of the nation are no longer within reach of the defensive army, which is also deprived of the appui for a position to cover the capital, and turn the flank of the invader. In the last campaigns, France felt the want of intermediate fortresses. If such had existed about Soissons, on the Marne, and about the junction of the Seine and Aube, the avenues to Paris would have been more easily defended. Intrenched positions are often eminently useful, provided they intersect or flank the most direct lines of operations; but as they do not contain arsenals, &c. they are less so than fortresses, and the selection of their site is extremely difficult. Those of the Russians at Drissa, upon the line of Moscow, were abandoned. The intrenchments of the French on the frontiers of Spain and at Toulouse were forced; but those on the Isla near Cadiz, and at Torres Vedras, both saved kingdoms. A position ably chosen has sometimes the same effect. That of Dumouriez, near the wood of Argonne, arrested the advance of the duke of Brunswick in 1792; and that of Kutusoff at Malojaroslaf, near Tula, forced the French to retire by the road they came. Both were on the flank, and menaced the rear of the enemy. Dumouriez, in the northeast corner of the French frontier, presented a salient angle upon a simple line of operations towards the German and the Netherland fronts of defence, and was near the fortresses of Lorraine. Napoleon, in 1814, endeavoured to recover a similar line after the battle of Brienne; but it was then beyond the sphere of operations, and his march occasioned him the loss of his empire. To conclude, defensive war does not consist in covering every part of a state, but in preventing an enemy from obtaining any advantage which may enable him to accomplish his main object.

III.—BATTLES.

Between a battle won and a battle lost there is an immense distance, said Napoleon, the day before the conflict at Leipzig—empires lie between them; and indeed the plan of campaign, and the strategical movements, are only so many preparatory dispositions to arrive at the great crisis of a battle. The rules applicable to battles, therefore, form the most important branch of the science of war; because, unless they are well understood, all other knowledge will be comparatively useless. In many respects this branch is less capable of being reduced to fixed principles than the others. There are however certain general rules which should govern the dispositions, and the chance of success will be increased or diminished in the ratio of their application. Among these, the first is that of operating with a superior mass upon the decisive point, because the physical force of organized numbers in arms furnishes the warring means of victory, when the moral qualities in both armies are equal. The means of bringing this force to bear in the most advantageous manner is the art of fighting; consequently, courage and fortune being nearly balanced, that general who can operate with the largest mass upon the most decisive point must be successful. But to effect this purpose, the combinations must be such as to produce a unity of movements, conducing simultaneously to the same object.

The following maxims are of general application: 1. No opportunity should be left till the morrow. 2. No battle should be given, but for an important object, unless the position should render it unavoidable. 3. After a victory, the enemy should not be allowed to recover—the pursuit should be incessant.

As in lines of operations, so on fields of battle, it is necessary to avoid dispositions which have generally proved fatal; such as, 1st, forming isolated divisions; 2d, entering extended movements, which deprive the army of a part of its strength, and enable the enemy to ruin either the main body or the detachment; 3d, positions with too great an extent of front; 4th, allowing obstacles to separate the wings, or obstacles which prevent the connection of columns, and expose them to separate defeats.

The finest combinations are those which produce an oblique order of battle, those with a wing reinforced, those which out-flank the enemy, and those which form a perpendicular upon a hostile extremity, or upon a scattered centre. These are almost always successful, because they present a whole line to an extremity, and therefore a greater mass than the enemy. Thus the fundamental principle of all military combinations, namely, to effect with the greatest mass of forces a combined attack upon the decisive point, is applied; and it is easy to understand how a general of ability, with 60,000 men, may be able to defeat 100,000, if he can bring 50,000 into action upon a single part of his enemy's line; for battles are decided, not by troops upon the muster-rolls, nor even by those present, but by those alone who are simultaneously engaged. Numerical superiority of troops not engaged, so far from being useful, only increases the disorder, as was fully exemplified at Leuthen.

There is not a great variety of measures applicable to this maxim.

I. The first is evidently that of taking the lead in the movements. The general who is enabled to have this advantage, can employ his forces wherever he thinks them WAR

1813 when it debouched from Bohemia upon Dresden and Leipzig, and Napoleon finally attempted it in 1815 by Operations on Land.

I. But if it be intended to remedy the deficiency of numbers, by acting with all the forces upon a single point of the enemy's line, that line being contiguous, the point selected should be as far as possible from the centre, because the centre can be sustained immediately from both the wings; while, on the contrary, an extremity can only receive succours by degrees from the divisions nearest at hand.

2. An attack upon the centre is never advisable excepting when the hostile line is very extensive, and scattered into separate divisions; then indeed the result must be successful from the same causes, and the consequences even more brilliant, because the enemy's corps will thereby be totally separated, and disabled from re-uniting; whereas an attack upon the flank can produce similar success only under particular circumstances.

III. The result of the preceding truths leads to the maxim, that as it is better to attack the extremity of a line, yet that both the extremities should not be attacked at the same time, unless there be a very great superiority on the part of the assailant. An army of 60,000 men forming two corps of 30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking an enemy equally numerous, is deprived of the power of striking a decisive blow; because it enables the adversary to take equal measures, or even, if the movement be extended and unconnected, to assemble his mass against one of the divisions, and destroy it by his momentary superiority. Multiplied attacks by means of a greater number of columns are still more dangerous, more repugnant to the best principles of war, particularly when they cannot commence acting at the same moment and upon the same point. But when there is a very great superiority of force on the side of the assailant, then indeed both the extremities of the hostile line should be attacked, because thus a greater number of troops is brought into action on both his wings; whereas if this great superiority were kept in one mass upon a single point, the adversary might deploy as many as the other party could bring into action, and thus engage with equal numbers. In this case it is only requisite to collect the greatest mass upon that wing where the greatest success is expected. Dahn manoeuvred in this way at Hochkirch, and the whole allied forces at Leipzig.

To illustrate this maxim more fully, it is necessary to enter into some detail, and fix a few particular principles. If 50,000 men, intending to attack 60,000, should form two corps of nearly equal force, and, with a view to embrace both the extremities of their line, should extend and isolate the attacks, it is clear that the 60,000 will have the facility of moving more rapidly within the interior of their line, than the assailant's corps with such a mass between them, as fig. 5 demonstrates. The two corps B and C might gain momentarily some ground, but the enemy A, leaving a corps to check C upon the most advantageous ground for defence which its position might offer, could throw the remaining mass of forces on the front, flank, and rear of B, which must consequently be destroyed. If B and C should have a third detachment on the centre, the result would be still more disastrous, for then separate corps would attack without union a force everywhere imposing, which could not fail to overpower them. This took place at Kollin, from inattention to the orders of the king; at Neerwinden in 1793; and at Stoclaich in 1799, where Dumouriez and Jourdan were defeated by Prince Coburg and the Archduke Charles. At Kreveld a similar result would have occurred if the French army had been ably commanded, and exercised in great maneuvers. At Blenheim, all Eugene's efforts were unavailing, even when he had gained the flank, until Marlborough's success decided the victory.

The truth of these observations is so manifest, that it may be applied to an army superior in numbers: 50,000 attacking in this manner an army of 40,000, would still incur all the same risks; and if the inferior force, after leaving a corps to mask one attack, should take a rapid offensive measure, and overtake the enemy in his preparatory dispositions, which would necessarily be calculated upon the principle of finding the opponent in his position, the heads of his columns might be turned and completely routed. But if the two hostile attacks should have between them some difficult object, a wood or river, they might each in their turn be destroyed. Examples of this kind occurred at Lonato, Castiglione, Abendsberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbon.

When however the attacking army is double the force of the enemy, the principle no longer holds as stated in the cases of Hochkirch and Leipzig; but, to avoid the danger of divided forces, it is requisite to have the lead, and to conceal it in such a manner that both attacks may commence nearly at the same moment. Thus two maxims, in appearance contradictory, are derived from the same principle.

1. An army intending to attack another of equal or superior force cannot insure success but by a concentrated effort upon a single point of a weakened line, which is not in a condition to be timely supported.

2. But when a superior army attacks one much weaker, two or three divisions should be formed, in order to bring all its masses into action against the inferior masses opposed; for if the attack were confined to a single point, the whole of the forces could not be brought into line, and the enemy might deploy an equal number; but it is necessary that the whole combinations centre on the same ground, and at the same instant, to produce unity of execution, and avoid partial and successive defeat.

3. As every front of operations and each position of battle contains a decisive point, it is important that the repartition of forces insure not only a general superiority over the enemy, but also that a strong reserve be appropriated to support the attack upon that principal point.

These maxims are more especially applicable to battles than to strategical operations; for with these no necessity demands that corps acting at the distance of several marches from each other should engage exactly at the same hour, and it would be impossible to do so on the same ground. But if the principle is to be enforced differently, it is still of full efficacy. It may appear that in these ideas the main stress of the argument rests upon the local superiority of numbers; but it is nevertheless true, that their combination is the chief object; for 30,000 men may be defeated by half their numbers, if, in the disposition and in the choice of the ground, some vicious arrangement take place, which produces a real disadvantage; such as La Motte experienced from Webb at Wynendacl, Chevert from Imhoff at Meer, and the Austrians from Moreau in the defiles of Hohenlinden.

IV. In the strategical movement of a great mass in a combined effort upon one point, it is advisable to keep the forces concentrated within a space approaching to square, so as to have them perfectly disposable; or, in other words, that the depth of the disposition be nearly equal to the front, enabling the battalions to arrive with promptitude from all quarters towards the point attacked. Extensive fronts militate as much against good principles, as great detachments and isolated divisions deprived of the means of being sustained. The inattention of Napoleon and Ney to this maxim gave Benningsen the advantage at Eylau; and the care of the allies in 1815, notwithstanding the difficulty of guarding an open frontier, enabled them to concentrate their masses at Waterloo.

V. One of the most efficacious means of applying the above general principles, is to induce the enemy to take contrary measures. By means of small corps of light troops, jealousies may be created for some important points of his communications. If he can be persuaded that they are formidable, he will be tempted to detach strong divisions against them, and, scattering his forces, be disabled from acting with vigour himself, and be exposed to an attack from superior forces. Operations by detachments have nevertheless been in fashion. To divide and subdivide, till the main army was reduced to the secondary character of mere observing, was considered as the very summit of strategical science. In the Hanoverian campaigns, the French, with two great armies, acted upon this system; nor could they ever be undeceived, although Prince Ferdinand, with less than half their force, contrived not only to reconquer the country, but afterwards to keep them constantly at bay, and even to attack them with superior numbers. The Austrians, and the army of the empire, operated similarly in Saxony, and reaped similar fruits. But Mack, trained in the Turkish wars, was the great patron of cordons and scattered posts, with inert positions to sustain them. The Austrians have however little reason to exult in the success of their system. The least mischief which they have derived from it was, that they fought on accessory points, while the main armies, reduced in strength, were unable to do more than menace the principal objects of the campaign, wasting their time until they were attacked by superior forces.

Nor are hostile armies destroyed by merely taking positions upon their communications, and remaining inactive within them. Had Napoleon halted upon the Lech in 1805, or on the Saale in 1806, he could neither have prevented the escape of Mack by Donauwerth, nor the retreat of the duke of Brunswick to the Elbe. The art of war does not consist in incursions upon communications, but in placing the mass upon them, in order to attack the enemy with decided advantage. Detachments upon the communications of the adversary are only accessories of secondary utility.

VI. When the lead is taken in a decisive movement against the enemy, great importance is attached to an exact knowledge of the positions and movements which he may undertake. Spies are then of the utmost consequence, but partisans, thoroughly versed in watching the enemy, are of still greater utility. For this purpose the general should scatter small parties in all directions, and multiply them with as much care as he would show to restrain them in great operations. Some divisions of light cavalry, expressly organized for this service, and not included in the order of battle, are the most efficient. To operate without such precautions is to walk in the dark, and so be exposed to the disastrous consequences which may be produced by a secret march of the enemy. Generally speaking, these measures are too much neglected. The espionnage is not sufficiently organized beforehand; and the officers of light troops have not always the requisite experience to conduct their detachments.

The Cossacks under Platoff, Chernicheff, Tetteborn, &c. in Russia and Poland; these, with the Prussians under Lutzow, in Germany and France; and the Guerrillas of Mina, the Empecinado, and others, in Spain and Portugal, have shown the immense advantages to be derived from such services. While they were few in number, their real importance was not fully understood; but when 15,000 or 20,000 of them appeared in the field, especially in a friendly country, they became the most formidable enemy, with re- VI. It is not sufficient for a good operation of war to convey with ability the mass of forces upon the most important points; they require moreover to be brought into action. If they remain inactive when arrived upon those points, the principle is forgotten, for the enemy may make counter-movements to defeat the project; and it is therefore indispensable that, from the moment his communications or his flank are gained, the mass of forces must march up him and attack. This is the moment when a simultaneous employment of the troops must take place. Masses of troops present do not decide battles, but the acting masses alone have effect; the former indeed produce that consequence in strategical movements, but the latter determine the success of the action.

To insure this result, a general of ability will seize the proper moment to force the decisive point of the field of battle, and combine the attack in such a manner that all his forces will be brought into action, with the exception always of the reserve. But if the efforts emanating from this principle fail of the desired success, no other combination remains than a simultaneous general onset, in which the reserve is to be brought forward, to make a last and decisive effort.

VII. We now come to battles proper, all the combinations of which are reducible to three systems.

The first includes defensive battles, where the enemy is expected in a strong position, with the simple object of maintaining the ground. Such were the positions of Talavera, Blenheim, Villeroy at Ramillies, Marsin at Turin, Davout at Torgau; and the events are sufficient to show their general disadvantage.

The second is the opposite system, wholly offensive. It consists in manoeuvres of attack wherever the enemy may be found, such as those of Marlborough at Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde; Frederick at Leuthen, Zorndorf, and Jena; Napoleon at Jena and Ratisbon; Wellington at Waterloo, and the allies at Leipzig.

The third, in some measure, the middle term between the other two. It consists in selecting a field of battle, carefully reconnoitred beforehand in its strategical possibilities and advantages of ground; then to wait the enemy's attack, and to fix upon the proper moment of passing from the defensive into offensive measures with the best chances of success. In this class must be reckoned the combinations of Napoleon at Rivoli and Austerlitz, of Blucher at the Katsbach and Laon, and of Wellington at Salamanca and Waterloo.

It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules by which the choice of these systems should be guided. The circumstances of the moment, the moral character of the troops, considered as affecting their courage, discipline, and inclination to their national temper, and the conformation of the ground, must be taken into account.

Under these general considerations, it may be fixed, that the best mode is to act offensively on all occasions, the troops are inured to war, and the ground presents extraordinary features.

Where the locality of the field of battle is difficult access, either from natural or artificial causes, and the troops of different nations not having the same unity of feeling and of discipline, it will be preferable to receive the attack in a position previously selected, with the determination of assuming the offensive when the enemy shall be exhausted by the first efforts.

3. When the strategical circumstances of the parties are such, that one is obliged to attack the other without considering localities; as, for instance, to prevent the junction of two hostile armies, or to crush an isolated corps, &c.

4. When particular circumstances, as the extreme inferiority of numbers, forbid any other than strictly defensive measures; such as Eugene took at Chiari, Abercromby on the Zyp, and Moore at Corunna.

Battles in general, whether offensive or defensive, notwithstanding all the varieties of ground and changes of position, may be classed into three systems of disposition, or what are termed orders, each subject to some modifications.

First, the simple parallel order, or that in which hostile armies are drawn up in parallel lines, to advance or receive the attack. Jomini justly observes, that accident or superior valour alone decides the contest in this class of orders, and that the soldier is entitled to all the credit; because such a disposition being the fruit of ignorance and incapacity, the general can have no part in it. Notwithstanding this censure, it is somewhat singular that the only battle in which a considerable British corps was severely handled was of this description, when Berwick defeated Lord Galloway at Almanza. Accident, it must be owned, had a great share in this battle; for it is asserted that the statue of St Antonio, the nominal commander-in-chief, was shattered by a cannon ball, which instantly caused the Portuguese to retreat, and leave the British and Dutch to their fate.

The second order is the parallel, reinforced upon one or several parts of the line. In this class, especially if dispositions with an angle to the front or rear are included, most of the great victories of ancient and modern times may be reckoned. For although it is not the most perfect in theory, it is the most constantly applicable in practice, under almost every possible character of ground, or counter-disposition of the enemy.

The oblique order of battle is the third and the best class of tactical dispositions; but in the application, great simplicity of combination is necessary, and great prudence in the execution. Against a manoeuvring army ably commanded, it will always be very difficult to apply it; but when produced, the effect is instantaneous and decisive: it is the triumph of discipline and of grand manoeuvre.

IX. Orders of battle, or the most appropriate disposition for leading troops into action, should possess the inherent qualities of mobility and solidity. To attain these two objects, troops which are to remain on the defensive should be partly deployed and partly in columns, as the allied army was at Waterloo, or the Russians at Eylau; but the corps destined to attack a decisive point should be disposed into two lines of battalions, formed into columns of more or less density. Jomini proposes columns of grand divisions (according to the French formation of a battalion of six companies, making three grand divisions).

| Battalion | |-----------| | 6 5 4 3 2 1 |

| Battalion | |-----------| | 12 11 10 9 8 7 |

Three grand divisions would thus form three lines, and the second line three more. This order, according to his view, offers much more solidity than a deployed line, which wastes too much, retards the impulse necessary for attack, and prevents the officers from managing their men. In order to facilitate the march, obviate the great density of the mass, and procure a greater front, the divisions should be formed only two deep; for thus the battalions will be more moveable. The march in front, three deep, is always fatiguing to the centre rank, which, being pressed between the first and third, produces fluctuation, and consequent faintness in the onset. In this manner all the desired strength will be produced; the three grand divisions giving a depth of six ranks, which is more than sufficient; and the front being one third longer, augments the quantity of fire, if it should become necessary to use it. The enemy likewise will be awed by a display of greater numbers, and the artillery will have less effect than upon more solid masses.

If the proposal of Jomini were applied to the British system of battalion, the same effect would be obtained by fronts of wings of battalion, each three deep. What is said of fluctuation in the march is indeed true; but the lock-step is never, and cannot be, observed, in a charge or rapid advance to the front in action. The ranks open in those cases sufficiently to allow freedom of step. Firing three deep, though practised at drill, is, in truth, when applied in battle, not more efficient, perhaps less, than in two ranks. If therefore the expedient of forming battalions only in two ranks be resorted to, still the fronts of wings covering each other, and producing only a depth of four men, would be sufficient for troops so eminently qualified for battle as the British. This proposal of Jomini is an avowal of the inefficiency of dense columns, as they are usually formed by the French and other continental armies, in attacks and charges. If that general had been engaged against the British, he would have been still more convinced of this. During the late wars, not an instance occurred where a hostile column, au pas de charge, broke through a British line. And the charge at Maida by a brigade of light infantry, at Barossa by the 87th and three companies of the guards, at Vimiera by the 50th, and at Waterloo by the whole line, all in deployed order, two deep only, against lines or columns, demonstrates the error of supposing that a mass of human beings, possessed of individual will and feelings, can be subjected to the laws of mechanical action.

Rogniat, general of engineers, in the dispositions of the legion which he proposes, instead of battalions, contends for three ranks deployed, and the second line in columns, at quarter distance, ready to form squares when required; but both lie and Jomini agree in the unprofitableness of fire from a third rank, in which they only maintain opinions that were long ago held by Folard, Saxe, and Lloyd.

Another system may be suggested, which would obviate many inconveniences under which the present labours. The present system of the infantry might be left such as habit, founded on experience, has framed it; with the exception of arming a third rank with rifled fusils, and spears about ten feet six inches in length: the fusil, when not used, to be slung on the shoulder in the manner of riflemen; and the spear with a spike to fix in the ground, and a hook about four and a half feet from the bottom, to serve for a rest in firing. As light infantry now form nearly one third of the foot in armies, this species of troops should perform all their duties, and be exercised accordingly. When scattered in front, their fire from a rest would be more destructive; the spear would give them more confidence and security against light cavalry. When called back into line, they would give it solidity; and in a charge, their spears, reaching beyond the bayonets of the first rank, would render it doubly formidable. Being drilled to form in front or rear, they would be the first rank when the battalion forms square to resist cavalry. In pursuits, they alone should be let loose upon the enemy. By their insufficiency, every battalion, every detachment, would have its proportion of light infantry. Intrenchments would be more obstinately defended, and breaches more easily stormed. If a rivulet were to be forded, their spears would sound for a passage on a whole line in a moment. On the outposts, three spears and two great-coats would form a tent. The idea is not new, for the Austrian militia in Hungary have a corps (Granitzer Schutzen) thus armed. Should the cuirassiers in the armies again resume the lance,—an event of some probability, since it is asserted that the Polish hussars of the guard of Napoleon, now in the Russian service, changed their small Ukraine horses for a larger breed about two years ago, with the intention of being converted into cuirassier lancers,—it may be foreseen that the spear will again be resumed in the infantry.

X. On the extensive subject of position we can only give some particulars.

1. The best military positions cannot cover a state merely by being occupied and maintained.

2. Every position has its key or decisive point, as before observed; but this point is not difficult to find. In a scattered line, it is in the centre; in a contiguous line, it will be found on that point where the nearest connection lies with the base of operations.

3. When an army occupies a position upon a height, or any other ground fit for a field of battle, it is important to have the front and flanks most carefully reconnoitred and watched, to prevent the enemy gaining either extremity of the line by a secret movement.

4. But as it is admitted, that to employ strong corps for that purpose, causes a useless waste of force, attracts the attention of the enemy, and does not, after all, secure the army from surprise, it is preferable to place small posts of observation in all the sinuosities of the ground, with orders to communicate with each other and with the army, or the nearest intermediate corps. These two latter rules were demonstrated by the surprise and attack of the Prussian army at Hochkirchen, of Korsakoff at Zurich, and Murat at Tarutina, but especially on the first-mentioned occasion; for, next to the battle of Leuthen, no instance produces more ample proof of the terrible effects of an army being surprised and taken in flank. The whole mass of Dan's forces was actually upon both flanks before they were discovered.

5. On ground of difficult access, such as vineyards, enclosures, gardens, steep heights, &c., the defensive order of battle should be in lines deployed two deep, covered by swarms of skirmishers. But the corps destined for attacks and the reserves, are best in columns, formed on their centres, in the manner above described (IX.); for the reserves, being destined to fall upon the enemy at the critical moment, must advance with resolution and rapidity, that is, in column. If however it be desired to awe the enemy by a greater display of forces, the reserve may be deployed until the moment of attack.

6. A superior army should never wait to be attacked, still less wholly deploy into line, if compelled by circumstances to remain in its post. In this case no more troops should form line than are necessary to check the enemy. The remainder, formed into three or four heavy columns, should be placed ready to strike a decisive blow upon the most important point. A great army wholly deployed can no longer manoeuvre with the same facility as columns; and

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1 As these troops would have no bayonet, they might be furnished with pontooner swords, and saws and hatchets; both instruments of great utility in securing posts, clearing obstacles, and opening roads, and a thousand other daily wants. It is not meant that they should not have a drill of their own, and modes of formation independent of the battalion; but merely that, in giving or receiving charges in line or square, they should then constitute a third rank. to render troops not engaged immoveable, is repugnant to the best principles of tactics.

An army posted behind villages should cover the front with them, by occupying the enclosures, &c. with some battalions of infantry, and the outlets with cannon. The first line should be sufficiently near to sustain and be sustained by them, and also to provide the means of securing the evacuation of the place, in case the enemy should have gained so much ground on other points as to be able to assail them. Villages, being liable to be turned, should not be held by considerable corps of infantry, unless their topographical situation should constitute them the key of the position, as was the case at Vimiera. The battle of Blenheim deserves attention on account of the consequences produced by the neglect of the principles applicable to villages.

When an army occupies a position perpendicular to a river, with a wing resting on the border, that wing should not be attacked, because, if the enemy changed front in that direction towards the river, the attacking corps might be driven into it. On the contrary, if the onset is directed against the rear wing with the principal mass of forces, that chance is in favour of the assailants; because the wing being turned, its whole line will be pressed towards the stream, and increase the risk of being destroyed. This would have been the case with Hiller's corps at Wagram, if a prompt retreat had saved it. Similar would have been the fate of the French army at Talavera de la Reyna, had they persisted in an attack upon the Spaniards; and they acted with great judgment in directing their efforts solely towards Lord Wellington's left.

In the successful defence of a position, a repulsed attack should not be pursued, unless that attack had been decisive; because it might have been combined by the enemy for the purpose of drawing the defensive force out of its advantageous ground. An untimely pursuit by the Austrians lost the battle of Prague, and by the Saxons that of Kesselsdorf; and again by the Austrian centre that of Jemmapes.

Positions may sometimes be so arranged, that although they be scattered, they still possess the faculty of timely reunion. Several are indicated in Frederick's secret strategical instructions, and one occurs when he besieged Olmütz. Being greatly inferior to the enemy, who menaced him from several quarters, he posted a corps at Littau, where he remained in person with the covering army at Prenzlau; and in order to connect the two masses at will, a small corps occupied the hill of Hrad, between Namiest and Laskow, to serve as an intermediate point. Orders were given to the corps at Littau, in case of attack, to retire towards him, and if a superior attack were made upon the covering army, he would retire towards the other; but if timely information were received, all were to unite in the position of Gross Jenitz.

As it is a maxim to operate against a weak part of the enemy's line, no position should be attacked upon its strongest point, as the Austrians did at Breslau; but if the hostile position be prolonged by a detached corps, the principal effort should be directed against it; because, if that be defeated, the main body is turned, and thereby weakened.

Armies may sometimes be posted behind a ridge of hills with defensive points upon their summits. These should not be attacked without an exact knowledge of the position behind, and precautions to resist a counter movement. The events of Austerlitz and on the Katzbach prove the necessity of this precaution.

No position or disposition of attack should be made while the line is intersected perpendicularly by a difficult obstacle, such as a river or morass; because the enemy can act defensively on one side, and throw his whole mass on the other; as happened at Dresden, where the left wing of the allies was separated from the main body by the ravine of Plauen, and severely handled.

14. When an army remains immoveable in its position, both its flanks are liable to be turned. To obviate such manoeuvres, others of a similar character should be opposed to them, as was done at Albuera. These counter-maneuvres are not difficult to execute, because the army turning a flank moves upon the arc, while the opponent takes the chord; consequently he is enabled to move a greater mass in less time, even when both parties are equal in forces. Rosbach, Vimiera, and Salamanca, are decisive examples, where the enemy moved in open day (which it is both difficult and dangerous to do in the night), and thereby rendered the counter-offensive both prompt and decisive.

15. There are positions which cannot be turned nor attacked obliquely. If the stratagem to draw the enemy out of them does not take effect, a parallel attack with the centre reinforced is likely to be the best adapted to such circumstances. The dispositions of Marlborough at Blenheim were of this class, and deserve the study of military men.

1. Between two armies equally capable of manoeuvring, the defensive one may form an angle with advantage to secure a flank from attack; but to render this precaution efficacious, the angle alone is not sufficient, because its utility is only momentary; the mass therefore should change front in the same direction, and present a whole line to the enemy.

2. If the army be sufficiently strong to assume the offensive against the assailant, a change of front, which is merely defensive, should be followed as soon as the angle is formed and the enemy checked, by placing the line in columns of divisions to the flank, and prolonging the direction from the position first occupied to gain the hostile flank. Thus taken in front by the angle, and in flank and rear by the new direction, the enemy will be defeated.

In fig. 6, A is the army endeavouring to turn the left flank of B, which forms the angle C, and under the protection of this corps prolongs its line in the direction EE, by means of which the extremity of the hostile flank is gained. A cannot well oppose the execution of this movement in the presence of the angle C and of the line E, which, though it be in column, can form in an instant; hence A must fall back and change front also.

3. An angle to the front of the line or potence, such as the Austrians formed at Prague and Kollin, is not so serviceable as one thrown back to the rear; because the enemy can readily outflank its extremity from his position, while that extremity can be sustained but by slow degrees. Thus at Kollin, the Prussian cavalry turned it at the beginning of the action; and at Eylau, Benningsen repulsed the corps of Davout on his left, and Ney on his right.

4. If a defensive position has an angle to the rear, the front will be weakened in proportion as that angle becomes more acute; but if there be a considerable interval on the summit, where the two lines should meet, the danger will be still greater; for if the enemy can establish himself on the point A, it is clear that the two wings, A C and A B, will be enfiladed, and forced to retreat; if not rolled up in confusion by an actual charge on either or both of these extremities. This caused the defeat of the Austrians at Prague, and of the Prussians at Breslau. Fig. 7.

5. If two allied armies or great corps take up positions forming a re-entering angle with a space between them, and some considerable obstacle masks that space, they expose themselves to be attacked and defeated separately; this danger increases with the increase of the distance between them. The corps A D being separated from B E by a wood, lake, or other considerable obstacle at G, the enemy F H, being covered by that obstacle, may attack and defeat one before the other can arrive to sustain it. Fig. 8. This principle results from the maxims of interior against exterior lines of operations. Such positions as these were occupied by Prince Henry and Hulsen, at Freyberg and Katzenhausen, with the Tharandt forest, and, what was worse (at the distance of more than six leagues), with the Mulde, between them; yet the army of the empire, superior in force, remained three months before them, until Prince Henry moved and defeated it at Freyberg.

1. To insure the success of an attack, properly combined and reinforced on the essential point, it is necessary to refuse the weaker wing. This precaution is obvious, not only for the purpose of keeping a weaker part out of reach, but also because reinforcements are readily drawn from it to the point where the effort is making. Thus, instead of exposing it to be repulsed by superior forces, there is a real advantage in keeping it reserved to secure the victory. Leuthen affords a proof of the wisdom of such a disposition; Kollin and Jögerndorf of the consequences when it is disregarded.

2. If it be admitted that the most advantageous attacks are those which emanate from a concentrated effort upon an extremity of the hostile line, it becomes indispensable to gain that extremity by measures which mask the movement; for by neglecting this precaution, the enemy may follow the march of the columns in their endeavours to turn him, present constantly a front, or even anticipate and take them in flank, as happened at Roßbach.

3. The march may be concealed by the darkness of the night, by the conformation of the ground, or by means of a false attack on the front of the enemy. The two last mentioned are to be preferred, because night marches are uncertain and even dangerous, slower and always more irregular, than those by day. For this purpose it is not necessary to march by lines, if the movement be masked by an attack of the advanced guard, while the mass advances towards the extremity desired, in columns of battalions at half distances. This will render it difficult to be discovered by the enemy in time to be counteracted.

4. In order to molest a greater space of front, instead of an advanced guard making a regular attack, it is preferable to employ a corps of light troops formed in parties, having points for re-assembling light cavalry, and some artillery to sustain them. This method is sure to distract the enemy's attention, and keep his whole line in check.

An oblique attack, according to Guibert and the Journal Topographique, is a disposition by which a part, or the choice of the forces, is advanced towards the enemy, and the other kept out of his reach. This definition is not quite correct, as figs. 9, 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate. An army may be out of reach of the enemy, and therefore refused in a line nearly parallel, and strongly reinforced on a wing without being oblique. (Fig. 9.) It may also be in an inclined line on the head of the attacks, and form a positive diagonal, without being reinforced (fig. 10); or perpendicular upon a flank, as at Kunersdorf, with a wing reinforced (fig. 11); or horizontal upon the head of the columns without being oblique. (Fig. 12.) There are several modifications of these four orders (among others fig. 11); as, for example, a perpendicular angle to the front, as formed by the Austrians at Prague, Kollin, and Hochkirchen (fig. 13); the angle AC being perpendicular to the army DE, reinforces the right wing of the line AB without being oblique; so also an angle to the rear would reinforce the line without obliquity.

A parallel line, considerably reinforced upon the most important point, is no doubt good, and even very generally applicable; for it is conformable to the principle which forms the basis of all operations; but it has several inconveniences. The weak part of the line, being near the enemy, may be engaged, contrary to the intention, and be defeated; which event would balance and arrest the advantages gained on the other wing; as happened to both armies at Wagram. The reinforced wing having defeated its opponent, cannot take it in flank and rear without a considerable movement, which would separate it from the other, if already engaged. But admitting the weaker wing not to be engaged, the other cannot even then turn the flank without drawing it circularly along the hostile front, which the enemy must necessarily anticipate by being on the chord of the movement, and consequently give him the advantage of the offensive by reaching the decisive point first with the mass of his forces.

With the oblique order of Frederick, as applied at Leuthen, the effect is quite different; the extremity of the wing attacked is not only overpowered by a whole line, but the end of that wing is constantly outflanked, and the line turned, without manoeuvre, or prolongation of direction, simply by a direct advance of the oblique line. The distance of the divisions which are not intended for the principal attack, places them out of the danger of being engaged by a superior force, and yet sustains the wing in action. These effects of the open oblique attack, although known, cannot be too often presented to the reflections of military men. They offer, besides, another advantage still more decisive, in bringing the half of the army constantly into action against the extremity, probably of only two brigades, of the hostile army, which has no counter-manoeuvre to stop its progress. What troops can stand against such odds, when, besides, they are constantly outflanked and taken Is it possible that confusion and dismay should not allow in a whole line, whose flank is overthrown, and merged with total destruction, by the progressive advance in a direction upon the rear?

Yes, such must be the infallible result of an oblique attack when once it has reached the flank of the opponent uncovered, as indicated in the preceding maxim; and when the lines are rapidly formed, according to the method of Frederick, as will be seen in the observations on marches.

Fig. 14 demonstrates the mechanism more clearly. The

Fig. 14.

leaving BC, of the army AC, will receive the fire of the second brigade of the army DKL, while the first brigade, or extreme right, formed in column of divisions, will turn it decide the first attack with rapidity. The second brigade, in the oblique direction of its march, will soon be joined by the third; and when that has passed the extremity, which must constantly recoil before a contiguous force, the fourth brigade opens its fire; and in this manner, supposing the army DF, KL, arrived at the dotted line HI, the whole will have been engaged in succession with a forth or a third of the enemy's line, the battalions of which, being crushed one after another, will be nearly surrounded.

This demonstration is sufficient to show the great advantage of an open oblique order of attack. It is called open, because the disposition, such as that of Leuthen, was nearly at right angles with the line of the Austrians, and different in every respect from a parallel order. All these advantages are equally applicable to masses concentrated upon the extremity which it is intended to crush. The army AB, fig. 15, instead of forming two lines, as in the former figure,

Fig. 15.

draw up the first line only, and keep the second in columns at half distances behind the right, centre, and left, prepared to manoeuvre or strike the decisive blow. These columns will be more moveable, and not being intended for the first attack, they will nevertheless cover it against counter-movements of the enemy. The battle of Salamanca offers a memorable lesson of this description, where the troops were concealed by the ground, and then suddenly brought in mass upon the enemy's left wing. That of the Korbach, almost the counterpart, was equally grounded on these principles; both however with the difference, that the lead of the manoeuvres was on the side of the adversary. Jomini, habituated to the lively national character of France, lays too much stress on the value of the lead in manoeuvres, and therefore does not fully appreciate the powers of well-conducted counter-manoeuvres, which the cool firmness of British and German soldiers can develop.

The battle of Leuthen furnishes another maxim equally important, namely, that an army with the flank resting upon an obstacle, such as the great pond of Gohlau, which covered the angle of Nadasti, may still be outflanked by an oblique attack. For this purpose, it is only necessary to mask the first brigade of the enemy by the nearest of the attacking corps, and move obliquely with the next, so as to press the principal effort upon the second. For the line being broken, the obstacle is no longer of any use; and the masked brigade is even in danger of being taken if not promptly withdrawn. But the manoeuvre is not so advantageous as when the flank is still supported and easily turned.

Marches in columns to the front, flank, or rear, which must be followed by deployment or echelon formations, are useful as parts of the elementary tactics; but never safely applicable near the enemy on a great scale, if they are at all complicated in the construction of the columns, or in the nature of the ground. Guibert devoted several volumes to their mechanism; but Tempelhoff alone has described the nature of Frederick's columns, by means of which his dispositions were executed with so much simplicity and precision. Although the present system of moving by corps has in a great measure superseded the old method of organization by lines, and consequently rendered the march-maneuvers, which triumphed at Rosbach, Leuthen, and Zornendorf, less applicable, they are still the best for such corps as are obliged to manoeuvre in the presence of the enemy, whether it be to engage in front or to turn his flank.

On examining the mechanism of his columns at Kollin, Leuthen, &c., it will be perceived that his army, having broken into open columns, each line forming one by a mere wheel of divisions, right or left in front, by this method the army could:

1. Execute all the movements united without danger of being attacked in detail, because the columns of lines were at no farther distance than was required for actual engagement.

2. The enemy could neither cut them off nor penetrate between them.

3. In taking the direction of the intended line, the army, when moved to the ground, is formed in a few minutes, that is, in the space of time required for the word of command to pass down the column to wheel into line. In this method, the only precaution required was to send an advanced guard to protect the march, and at the same time to keep the enemy in suspense.

4. As the army requires only two or three hundred paces between the columns, and the divisions no more than their respective distances, to form into two lines, the manoeuvre is easily executed with precision.

5. The army having reached the flank of the enemy by concealing the movement, as before noticed, and wheeling into line, will not allow the enemy time to form an angle, or to change front; consequently he will be overpowered in succession along his line.

6. To conclude, if two columns of the length of the line of battle are not immediately desired, or the ground requires a modification, four columns may be formed, by doubling up the lines, or by marching by wings, without increasing the difficulty of forming. The four columns being constructed of the two lines doubled, when arrived near the point where they are to form, the second and fourth halt until the first and third have proceeded so far. Warlike as to disengage from each other. While halted, they protect Operations the march of the others, and when cleared by them, they by Land follow in their rear, and thus are prepared to wheel into line with them.

If the columns are formed by wings, they will again fall into two lines by a simple change of direction, executed by all the heads of columns of each line at the same time to the right or left, and then leading into the rear of the preceding. But this transition of columns of wings into columns of line should take place at some distance from the enemy. At Leuthen, this manoeuvre introduced the battle: fig. 16. A, the advanced guard masking the march

Fig. 16.

of the army in four columns; B B B B, the heads of the four columns forming the first line; and C C C C, the heads of the second line (now in rear of the first), all changing direction by a wheel to the right at the same instant, and consequently forming two open columns ready to wheel into line. The advance mean time either halts in position to alarm the enemy on another point, or continues to open the march by preceding and covering it.

It is however evident that these kinds of marches must be made on open ground; for in countries deeply intersected, great movements are impracticable; and it thus becomes necessary to arrive by the openings which are known, and engage more or less in columns. By Guibert's and the regulation systems, the army being broken into several columns, they move with their heads often out of sight of each other at the distance of more than a mile, and yet they are expected to keep their alignments and relative distances. When ordered to form, they either close and deploy, or march by echelons to fit into an exact alignment. All this is evidently impossible before the enemy, who must discover the tedious manoeuvre, and have time to act as he pleases while the numerous errors are rectifying; and if the centre divisions should be chosen for the points of deployment, half the columns must turn their backs upon his fire to perform it. Frederick, during the whole seven years' war, attempted these movements only twice; first in a combination with Bevern to attack Loudolm, which failed by the premature arrival of one column; and, secondly, at Torgau, which, as far as that manoeuvre was concerned, failed also; for Zieten's column came too late, and was isolated.

At Minden the French manoeuvred in the same manner, and were a great part of the night and the next morning employed in rectifying the errors, which gave Prince Ferdinand time to arrive. It is true, he moved likewise in columns, but he had previously sent all the generals to reconnoitre their routes and points of formation, and cut openings and fix marks to insure the exact direction. Such precautions surpass even the underhand tricks to help the manoeuvres in a camp of instruction; and the very precautions prove the impossibility of applying them in ordinary cases. During the revolutionary wars of France, all the belligerents met with failures from vain endeavours to apply them, notwithstanding that the new organization of corps and the use of swarms of skirmishers greatly facilitated their execution.

Lehwald's manoeuvre at Jögerndorf is worthy of notice, as particularly applicable in intersected ground. His infantry advanced in a double column from the centre, and formed to right and left without risk of confusion; the cavalry moving at some distance, easily took up the alignment.

The order of march on Frederick's system must however be considered only as a manoeuvre, and not to be applied to marches in great operations.

As this order of march is best calculated for attacks against lines, so is it also upon columns in march. An attack upon an army while on the march is advantageous, for the same reasons as an attack upon an extremity of a line; because the army attacked on the heads of its columns is precisely in the same situation, relatively to the enemy, as one assailed in flank. The battle of Rosbach furnishes an illustration. A B, fig. 17, represents the army of the king CD that of the French.

Supposing them both in line, CD would still be attacked perpendicularly, and outflanked on one of its wings, exactly as it was on the head of its columns. The advantage of both these manoeuvres lies in the necessity to which the enemy is reduced of bringing his battalions in succession to the front, while the opponent, acting with vigour, defeats them, one after another, by the superior pressure of his mass, provided its march be onward in an inappropriate direction; horizontally if the column moves perpendicularly, and perpendicularly if the march is horizontal. The object for producing, as nearly as possible, an opposite direction, is to present a whole line to a head of a column, or to an extremity of a line; because, if both moved in a direction to meet with the heads of their columns, both would be obliged to deploy, and a parallel order would be the consequence, without tactical advantage to either army. In fig. 18, the columns AB meeting those of the enemy CD in the same order, both, fearing to be attacked, will immediately deploy; A B will therefore form the line FG, and CD the line HI, which gives no advantage to either party.

The battle of Rosbach offers a further illustration. As an angle must necessarily be formed when the heads of columns are attacked, to check the first efforts of the enemy, the advanced guard or leading brigade should deploy, while the rest of the army should take a new direction of march, clear of the enemy's flank, in order to protect the retreat of the advance already engaged, and to gain a station for acting offensively. See fig. 19. If the advanced guard or leading

Fig. 19.