The battle of Waterloo, unquestionably the most decisive event of the late awful contest, offers so many instructive circumstances, and so much matter for deep meditation, in the position and manoeuvres, and in the exhibition of the soundest maxims of war, that it may be considered as a general illustration of the advanced state of the art of war at the present period. Without entering into details, the minutiae of which are apt to confuse, we shall content ourselves with merely pointing out the principal dispositive features which it displays. As there are many plans more or less correct, and the ground is generally known, the remarks which we are about to offer will be readily understood by those who have any elementary knowledge of war.

When Blucher had retreated from Ligny, and the duke of Wellington had fallen back from Quatre Bras, he occupied the position of Mont St Jean, determined to risk a battle with the forces he could collect on that point. Exclusively of the Prussians, whose severe loss in killed, wounded, and stragglers, could not immediately be reorganized or replaced, but by the expected arrival of the corps of Bulow, the duke's army consisted of about eighty-one battalions and eighty-seven squadrons; which, with the artillery, may have amounted to 66,700 men. Of these upwards of thirty battalions and as many squadrons had never been in action.

Fig. 20.

The letters A A A indicate the position of the British army, B B that of the Prussians, and C C C that of the French. This mass of forces was posted with the centre diagonally across and in front of the forking of the two causeways from Brussels to Charleroy and to Nivelles; the right centre behind the chateau of Goumont, and the left, considerably refused, passed in rear of La Haye Sainte, along the cross road in the direction of Ohain. Behind the right centre, Lord Hill placed his corps, en potence, in columns, prepared to manoeuvre to his right, on the small plain of Braine la Leud; or to his left, to sustain the centre. In and about Braine la Leud was a Netherland division, with the right thrown forward, and covered by the rivulet Hain, and leaving the small plain open; a kind of gorge to tempt the enemy between the two sides of the re-entering angle of the right wing. The Prussians were expected to debouche through the woods of Lasne towards Planchenois, which would form the left into another gorge, or re-entering angle. Thus the position formed a kind of open W (fig. 20, A A A A, B B) with the chateau of Goumont at the summit of the salient angle, covered by a plantation of wood and enclosures, occupied by six or eight battalions; so that the enemy could not enfilade from behind that plantation, either of the faces of the centre, nor approach on either of the causeways which passed through the centre, without presenting his flank. Besides this point, La Haye Sainte, a stone farm close to the chaussé of Charleroy, and farther on the left the farm of Papelotte and chateau of Frichermont, were occupied. The whole front offered a gentle slope towards the enemy, and in the rear the cavalry was distributed in brigades, each in two lines, covered by the rising ground; and the artillery, all the field-pieces of which were nine-pounders or twelves, formed a line of almost contiguous batteries along the front, interspersed with howitzers and rockets.

By the returns found after the battle, it appears that the enemy had debouched from Charleroy with 122,000 men, exclusive of the reinforcements that joined after the 15th of June. Of these he produced on the field of battle about 80,000 men, formed in concentrated masses on both sides of the chaussé of Charleroy, and gradually advancing the right parallel to the British left (C C C C); but as he was jealous of the woods on the right, he formed an angle to the rear, and kept his reserves far back. He had made a demonstration with a corps of cavalry beyond the British right towards Hal, where he found the corps of General Colville, and Prince Frederick of Orange, with two divisions posted at Tubise, Clabbeck, and Braine le Chateau, to cover that avenue to Brussels. Another corps, 42,000 strong, under Grouchy, was detached to his right upon Wavre, to turn the allies, pursue or arrest the Prussians, and prevent the timely junction of Bulow. Thus the dispositions of both the commanders were combined with consummate ability; Napoleon operating on the system of throwing two thirds of his masses alternately on either side, and the allies in combining manoeuvres to bring a superior mass on the decisive point. On the field however the problem was difficult to solve. The communication with France was open only by the roads of Charleroy and Nivelles, hence the enemy could not quit them in the attack; nor could he gain Brussels by any other avenue than that of Waterloo; therefore, to possess the chateau of Goumont, without which he could not arrive at the position, was the natural object of the attack. As this was sustained by the mass of the allied army, and could not be enfiladed, his attacks failed. All those directed on the road of Charleroy to the left centre were necessarily oblique, and exposed to the fire in flank before they could reach their opponents. To have risked a general onset of all his masses, before the British were thinned and exhausted, he knew, under the circumstances of the moment, to be too hazardous. The plain of Braine la Leud appeared open. He could arrive by it; but that very circumstance proved that the enemy was prepared on that side. To have turned the force thither would in the first place have caused the loss of the communication by Charleroy, and next facilitated the junction of the Prussians; and besides, the corps on the other side of the Hain flanked the advance, and could in a short time be sustained by the two divisions in its rear, and which he knew to be at hand. He would therefore have been placed between two fires, and have lost his point of retreat upon Charleroy; and the road by Nivelles might, meantime, be cut off by the troops left behind at Mons. Again, if he threw his masses towards the left, he only went to meet the Prussians, and left the British masters of the road of Nivelles, and possibly, if he advanced far, of that of Charleroy. He entangled himself in woods and defiles, where his superior cavalry could not act. The character of his opponent bespoke immediate offensive movements from the moment his right would be at liberty, therefore the chances were again in favour of the enemy; yet this was the only advantageous side, because it brought him nearer Grouchy, and in case of defeat he could take a new line of retreat by Namur. He however preferred the experiment which the enthusiastic valour of his troops might enable him to make; and this committed him so deeply, that, when at length the Prussians appeared, a retreat was no longer possible.

These observations disprove the ignorant assertion, that little skill was displayed on either side. The generals and the soldiers equally did their duty; the veteran Blucher behaved with just prudence in keeping so long back from the dangerous manoeuvre which was assigned him; and when he saw the hostile cavalry destroyed, he acted with vigour and skill. As for Grouchy, who wasted his time in forcing the position of Wavre across the Dyle, everywhere fordable, his manoeuvres show that he felt the danger of his movement, and he wisely remained on the banks. Much might be added upon the judgment which posted the corps at Wavre and another at Hal, on the several lines of retreat which the allies could take in case of defeat, on the dispositions of the artillery, the squares and lines formed and reduced repeatedly, the disposition and effect of the charges of cavalry, the counter-offensive of the Prussians, the general charge to the front, and fate of the enemy's squares; but enough has been stated to recommend the study of a battle where three of the greatest commanders and the best manoeuvring armies in Europe gloriously struggled for victory; and, let it be added, notwithstanding the assertions to the contrary, where none committed a positive fault, and where Napoleon, in particular, who has been condemned by some of his own partisans, operated with all the skill and vigour which the circumstances of the moment allowed.

This unpleasant operation in war requires as great a display of skill and firmness as any. The Austrians have often conducted theirs with sagacity; and it is perhaps owing to the persevering spirit of their retreats, that, after twenty unfortunate campaigns, the monarchy was as formidable as in the commencement. Their generals are not then controlled by cabinet orders, and therefore always operate with precision. Among the retreats which deserve the study of the soldier, are that of Schulemburg with the Saxons, the duke of York's out of Belgium, the two retreats of the Archduke Charles, that of Moreau from Bavaria to the Rhine, the Russian retreat upon Moscow and Tula, and lastly, the fine movement of Prince Eugene Beaumanois in Italy.

In the choice of a position, it is not sufficient to have a

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1 The return was dated the 13th, according to the assertion of a Prussian officer of the staff. The whole force brought over the frontier must therefore have amounted to nearly 150,000 men. by a new line, having his communications open by Wesel, Cassel, and all the fortresses of Holland; the sterile country to which the allies must have followed him could not have subsisted their vast cavalry; and the sandy roads would hardly have allowed sufficient transport of provision to maintain the troops. There were however many, and probably superior reasons, which made him reject the proposal.

If the art of war consists in applying the superior force Pursuits of a mass upon a weak point of the enemy, it follows that a defeated army should be pursued with the utmost vivacity. Never delay till to-morrow, is an ancient military maxim, applicable especially in pursuit; for the strength of an army consists in its organization, in the unity resulting from the connection of all its parts with the mainspring which makes it move. After a defeat, this unity no longer exists. The harmony between the head which combines, and the body which executes, is broken; their connection is suspended, often destroyed. To pursue and attack is to march to a certain triumph. All the late campaigns offer signal examples of this truth. Generals of mediocrity often neglect this maxim, and their victories are scarcely more than a forcible removal of troops. The direction of the pursuit, though guided by circumstances, should always however aim at gaining the hostile line of communications, and cutting off the enemy from his base; because, by so doing, he may be thrown upon such obstacles as to force him to surrender.

Sieges, according to Lloyd, should never be undertaken but with the following views: 1st, when fortresses are situated upon the passages which lead to the enemy, so as to render it impossible to penetrate without capturing them; 2d, when they intercept the communications, and the country is unable to furnish the necessary subsistence; 3d, when they are wanted to cover magazines formed in the country, and thereby to facilitate the operations; 4th, when the enemy has considerable depots within the fortress, of which he is absolutely in want; 5th, when the capture of a fortress produces the conquest of a considerable tract of country, and enables the besiegers to winter in that vicinity. To these may be added, 6th, the recapture of a fortress essential in the defence of a frontier.

1. As victory is best secured by taking the lead in an operation, an army covering a siege should never wait to be attacked by the enemy, but endeavour to anticipate him; for, by defeating the forces which aim at raising the siege, the place is sure to fall.

2. If the enemy approach the covering army with an imposing mass, the siege should be raised, all the forces united, and an attack in force directed against him.

3. When the relieving army is defeated, the siege should be resumed, while the pursuit continues, and the enemy is not in a condition to return before the capture of the place.

4. When an army besieges a place, in consequence of offensive movements and anterior success, the covering army should not remain in a position near the place, but drive the enemy as far as possible forward; for the relieving army will find the difficulty of raising the siege increased with the distance it is removed from the place; but if at length that army should arrive so near as to furnish the probability of raising the siege, the besieging corps should then rapidly join the covering army, and make a united effort to defeat it.

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1. Jomini, Traité de Grande Tactique. Guerres de la Révolution. Lloyd's History of the seven years' War. Tempelhöhe des sieben jährigen Kriegs. Frédéric, Histoire de mon Temps. Instructions à ses Généraux. Instructions Secrètes. Art de Guerre de Main de Maître. Rognat, Considerations sur l'Art de la Guerre. Gouverneur du Général Warnery. Venturi, Anzeige der Taktik. Die Bellona. Die Minerva. Scharnhorst, Militärisches Taschenbuch. Militärisches Journal. Nähere Beleuchtung eines ausgeschriebenen Operations Plan. Bulow, Betrachtung über die Kriegs Kunst. Geist des neun Kriegs System. Le Prince des Principes de la Stratégie, traduit par Jomini. Campagne de 1799. Vaudoncourt, Campagnes d'Italie en 1813 et 1814. Dumas, Vol. XXI. PART II.—WARLIKE OPERATIONS AT SEA.

Referring generally to the articles Admiral and Admiralty, Docks, Navigation, Navy, Seamanship, Ship-Building, Signals, and Telegraph, for much that pertains to naval war, we shall here direct our attention to that branch of the subject which is commonly designated Naval Tactics. By this term is understood the art of arranging fleets or squadrons in such an order or disposition as may be most convenient for attacking the enemy, defending themselves, or of retreating with the greatest advantage. Naval tactics are founded on those principles which time and experience have enabled us to deduce from the improved state of modern naval warfare, which has occasioned, not only a difference in the mode of constructing and working ships, but even in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons. We have propose to lay down the general principles of naval tactics, and to describe, as briefly as is consistent with perspicuity, the most improved systems which have been adopted in modern times.

Fleets are generally divided into three squadrons, the van, centre, and rear, each under the command of a flag-officer. The admiral of the fleet, or chief in command, leads the centre division, while the van is usually commanded by a vice-admiral, and the rear by a rear-admiral. Each squadron is distinguished by the position of the colours in the ships of which it is composed. Thus, the ships of the centre squadron carry their pendants at the main-top-gallant mast head, while those of the van division have their pendants at the fore-top-gallant mast head, and those of the rear at the mizen-top-mast head. Each squadron, as far as possible, consists of the same number of ships, and as nearly as may be of the same force. In large fleets, the squadrons are sometimes again divided in a similar manner; the van and rear of the squadron being headed by rear-admirals, or senior captains, called commodores. In the usual mode of forming the lines, each commanding admiral arranges his ship in the centre of his own squadron, and thus the admiral of the fleet is in the centre of the line. When no enemy is in sight, the sloops, store-ships, fire-ships, and other small vessels, are dispersed to windward of the fleet, that they may be more easily supported, and more readily answer signals. The frigates lie to windward of the van and rear of the convoy, thus keeping a good look-out, and keeping the small vessels in their proper station. When the fleet sails in three columns, the centre still keeps in the middle, while the van and rear form the starboard or the larboard column, according to circumstances. These arrangements are called orders of sailing, and will be better understood from the following definitions.

The starboard line of bearing is that line on which the arranged ships of a fleet bear from each other on a close-hauled line, whatever course they may be steering, so that when the ships haul their wind, or tack together, they may be on a line close hauled upon the starboard tack. The larboard line of bearing is that line on which the ships, when hauling their wind, or tacking together, may be formed on a line close hauled on the larboard tack. The ships of a fleet are said to be on a line abreast when their keels are parallel to each other, and their main-masts lie in the same straight line. Ships are said to be in a line on the bow or quarter when they are arranged in a straight line cutting their keels obliquely in the same angle, so that, reckoning from any intermediate ship, the ships towards one extremity of the line will be on the bow of that ship, while those towards the other extremity will be on her quarter. When several ships in the same line steer the same course, while that course is different from the line of sailing, they are said to sail chequerwise.

When the ships of a fleet arranged in any of the orders of sailing, and on the same line, perform successively the same manoeuvre, as each gets into the wake of the ship that leads the van of the line or squadron, tacking or veering, bearing away or coming to the wind in the same point of the wake of the leading ship, they are said to manoeuvre in succession.

There are usually reckoned five orders of sailing, exclusive of the line of battle, the order of retreat, &c. In the first order (see figs. 1 and 2), the fleet is arranged on the starboard or larboard line of bearing, all the ships steering the same course. In these cases the fleet, by hauling the wind when in the starboard line, as in fig. 1, will be ready to form the line on the starboard tack; and when ranged on the larboard line of bearing, as in fig. 2, it will, by tacking, be ready to form the line on the larboard tack. The arrows annexed to the diagrams mark the direction of the wind, as in ordinary charts.

This first order of sailing is now seldom employed except in passing through a narrow strait. In the second order of sailing, the fleet steering any proper course, is ranged in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, as in fig. 3. This second order, besides being equally defective with the former, is subject to the additional disadvantage of rendering it extremely difficult for the ships to tack, without each ship falling on board that next astern.

In the third order of sailing, the whole fleet is close hauled, and ranged on the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of twelve points, having the admiral's ship (A, fig. 4) in the angular point, and the whole fleet steering the same course. Thus, supposing, as in the figure, the wind at north, the starboard division of the fleet will bear W. N. W. of the admiral, and the larboard E. N. E. This order in small fleets or squadrons is superior to either of the former; but when the fleet is numerous, the line will be too much extended.

In the fourth order, the fleet is divided into six or more columns, and is thus more concentrated. The commanders, ranged on the two lines of bearing, have their squadrons astern of them, on two lines parallel to the direction of the wind; the first ships of each column being, with respect to the commander of the squadron, the one on his starboard and the other on his larboard quarter. The distance between the columns should be such that the fleet may... Though any other direction may be taken, the two lines still form the same angle.

The order of convoy is that in which the ships are all in each other's wake, steering in the same point of the compass, and forming a right line. If the fleet is numerous, it may be divided into three columns, which are to be ranged parallel to each other, that of the admiral occupying the centre, and all steering the same course.

Having thus described the ordinary positions of a fleet, we must explain the manoeuvres by which they are produced, and we shall begin with the orders of sailing.

To form a fleet in the first order of sailing, supposing the Method of ships to be in no particular order, that ship which is to lead forms the on the proposed line of bearing for the order of sailing, runs to leeward of the greater part of the fleet, and then hauls her wind under an easy sail. Each of the other ships then proceeds to take the proper station, by chasing the ship which is to be ahead of her, and when in the wake of the leading ship, adjusts her quantity of canvass so as to preserve the proper distance. The ships thus arranged astern of each other are in the line of battle; and from this the first order of sailing is formed, by each ship bearing away at the same time, and all steering the proposed course.

In forming the second order of sailing, the leading ship runs to leeward of so many of the fleet that each ship may readily fetch her wake, and then steers a course eight points from the wind, under an easy sail. The line is formed by each ship in the same manner as in the first order, except that, before bearing away, the line is perpendicular to the direction of the wind, or each ship has the wind on her beam.

As, in the third order of sailing, the admiral's ship is in the centre, to produce this position, the fleet being formed der. in a line on one of the lines of bearing, and the ships steering in each other's wake, ten points from the wind, the leading or leewardmost ship first hauls her wind. The second ship does the same as soon as she gets into the wake of the former; and this is done by each ship till the admiral's ships haul their wind, when they reach the wake of the leading ship. At the same time that the admiral's ship hauls her wind, the sternmost half of the fleet does the same. The ships are now in the third order of sailing, from which the fleet can be formed in the line of battle on either tack.

To form the fourth order of sailing, the commanding admirals range themselves on the two lines of bearing, at a proper distance from each other, steering the proposed course; and the ships of the several columns take their respective places, parallel to each other, and forming lines in the direction of the wind.

To form the fifth order, the three leading ships of the divisions take their posts abreast and to leeward of each other, keeping their wind under an easy sail; then the ships of each squadron make sail, and take their respective stations at the proper distance astern of their leaders, while the commanders of each division, and the corresponding ships of each, keep mutually abreast of each other.

1. In forming from the first order of sailing, if the ships are running large on the tack that answers to the line of bearing on which they sail, and if the line is to be formed on battle, the same tack, all the ships haul their wind at once, or as quickly as possible after the next to windward; but if they be on the other tack with respect to the line of bearing, they all haul their wind and tack or veer together.

If the line of battle is to be formed on the other line of bearing, the ship most to leewards veers or tacks, and hauls her wind, while Warlike the rest of the fleet veer or tack at the same time, and Operations steer with the wind four points free, and each ship hauls her wind as soon as she gets within the wake of the leader. See figs. 10 and 11.

Fig. 11.

Suppose the fleet running before the wind in the second order of sailing. To form the line from this position, all the ships haul up together on the proper tack, presenting their heads eight points from the wind at the line on which they are arranged; the leading ship then hauls her wind, immediately making sail or shortening sail, so as to close or open the order, and the same is done successively by all the rest. See fig. 12.

Fig. 12.

In a fleet running large in the third order, the line of battle is formed by the wing which is in the line of bearing corresponding to the tack on which the line is to be formed, and the ship at the angle, hauling their wind together, while the ships of the other wing haul up together eight points from the wind; each ship moving in this direction till she reach the wake of the other wing, when she hauls close up. See fig. 13.

Fig. 13.

In forming the line of battle on the same tack from the fifth order of sailing (as the fourth is not calculated for forming a line of battle), the centre brings to, so as only to keep steerage way; the weather column bears away two points, and when it gets ahead of the centre, hauls its wind, while the ships of the lee column tack together, and crowd sail to gain the wake of the centre, when they re-tack together, and complete the line (see fig. 14); or the weather column brings to, while the centre and lee tack together, and bear away two points free. When the ships of the centre column have gained the wake of the van, they re-tack together, and bring to; and when those of the lee have gained the rear line, they re-tack together, and all stand on; or, lastly, the lee column brings to, the centre runs under easy sail two points free, to get ahead of the rear squadron, while the rear bears away under a press of sail two points free, to get ahead of the centre division.

2. Suppose the weather and centre columns to interchange. To form the lee under these circumstances, the centre stands on, while the weather column bears away eight points, and having reached the wake of the centre, which now forms the van, hauls up; the ships of the lee column tack together, and run under a press of sail, within two points free, so as just to gain the rear of the line when they retack together (see fig. 15); or the lee column brings to,

Fig. 15.

while the centre squadron bears away three points under easy sail, and having reached the wake of the van, hauls up to form the centre division.

3. Suppose the centre and lee columns to interchange. The lee column stands on close hauled under an easy sail; the weather column bears away two points under a press of sail, till it reach the head of the line, when it hauls up; and the centre bears away eight points, and when in the wake of the lee, now the centre, hauls its wind. See fig. 16.

Fig. 16.

4. If the weather and lee columns interchange, the lee column stands on under a press of sail close hauled, while the centre, under easy sail, bears away two points, and when it reaches the wake of the new van squadron, hauls its wind; and the weather column bears away eight points, hauling up when in the wake of the centre. See fig. 17.

Fig. 17.

5. Suppose the centre column to form the van, and the weather the rear division. Here the lee column brings to, while the centre bears away two points, forming the line ahead of the former, now the centre; and the weather column veers away seven points on the other tack, forming the rear squadron. See fig. 18.

6. To form the line so that the lee column may form the van, and the centre the rear, the lee column is to stand on order a press of sail, while the weather bears away three points under easy sail, and the centre bears away eight points, the ships of each column hauling their wind when in the wake of the now van division. See fig. 19.

If the line of battle is to be formed on the other tack, so that the weather shall form the van division, as in the first case, the ships of the weather column first tack successively, while those of the centre and lee stand on, the former under easy sail and the latter shrouding sail, the leading ships tacking when in the wake of the now van, taking great care that the ship of the centre and lee are not too near to the sternmost ships of the van, or to each other. See fig. 20.

To form the line on the other tack, when the centre and weather columns interchange, the weather column brings to, while the centre column stands on, till the leading ship be fully able to bear the weather column, when the ships of the centre tack successively as they reach the wake of the van. The lee column stands on, tacking successively as the ships go into the wake of the van, under moderate sail. See fig. 21.

In forming the line on the other tack, when the centre and lee interchange, the centre brings to, while the ships of the weather tack under shortened sail, and the lee under less sail stands on; the leading ship having gained the rear of the line, tacks, and is followed in succession by her division. The centre column fills and stands on, when the first ship of that column, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a direction perpendicular to that of the wind. See fig. 22.

To form on this same tack, so that the weather and lee may interchange, the weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail till it can pass ahead of the weather column, when the ships tack in succession. As soon as the leading ship of the centre, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a line perpendicular to the wind, the centre fills, and tacks in succession when in the wake of the now van; and the ships of the weather column do the same when their leading ship and the last of the centre are under similar circumstances. See fig. 23.

Suppose the centre is to form the van, and the weather the rear, in forming the line on the other tack. The weather brings to, while the other columns make sail till they can pass ahead of the former on the other tack, when they tack successively. The weather column, when the others have passed it, fills, and tacks to form the rear. See fig. 24.

Suppose now the lee column is to form the van. The weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail, and tacks when it can pass ahead of the weather column. When the last ship of the now van has passed to windward of the former weather column, the van shortens sail, to give time for the other columns to form, and the weather and centre fill at the same time, to gain the wake of the van, when they tack in succession. See fig. 25. We must now show how a fleet may be disposed in the principal orders of sailing from the line of battle; and here, as before, we have several varieties.

1. To form the first order of sailing from the line of battle on the same tack, all the ships are to bear away together as many points as the admiral may direct, keeping in the line of bearing for the proper tack. The sternmost first bears away, and the others follow in quick succession, to avoid running foul of each other.

2. If they are to form on the other tack, the leading ship bears away four points to leeward, and the rest follow in succession. The sternmost ship having bore away, the whole haul up, and will be in bearing for the line on the other tack. See fig. 26.

3. To form the second order of sailing from the line of battle, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, so that when the headmost ship, which first presses sail, shall come abreast of the second ship, the second ship must adapt her sail to keep in this bearing, and so in succession, each taking care to keep the preceding ship in a line with herself, perpendicular to the direction of the wind. The whole fleet will now be before the wind. See fig. 27.

4. To form the third order, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, the headmost half, including the centre ship, carrying a degree of sail to preserve their line of bearing, while each of the remaining ships is successively to shorten sail, so as to form the other line of bearing with respect to that on which they were before arranged. See fig. 28.

5. To change from the line of battle to the fifth order on the same tack. Of this evolution there are several varieties, but we shall mention only two; first, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, and the fleet to keep as much as possible to windward. In this case the van and centre tack together, and run close hauled in bow and quarter line, while the rear proceeds in its former course under easy sail. When each ship of the centre is abreast of the corresponding ship of the rear, the centre retacks, while the van stands on till the centre and rear come up, when it also retacks, and all the columns regulate their distances. Secondly, when the van is to form the lee, and the rear the weather column, the van bears away under easy sail, and goes at right angles with the line ahead, while the centre runs two points free, each ship steering for that ship of the van which is to be abreast of her when in column. The distance must be determined by the leader of the van, who is not to haul up with her division till she and the sternmost ship of the centre column are in a line at right angles with the wind, when both stand on under easy sail, while the rear crowds sail to pass to windward of both.

6. To form the fifth order of sailing from the line of battle on the other tack. Of this there are also several varieties, but we shall confine ourselves to two. First, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, the van tacks in succession, while the leading ship of the centre is to tack when the leader of the van passes him exactly to windward, in which she is followed by her division, and the rear manoeuvres in the same manner with respect to the centre. Secondly, when the rear is to form the weather and the van the lee column, the van tacks in succession, and when about, either shortens sail or brings to, to allow the other columns time to form. The centre and rear then crowd sail, and tack in succession; the former tacking when its leader has the centre of the lee column in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre passes astern of the lee column. When the centre has tacked, it regulates its rate of sailing by the lee, and both wait for the rear to pass to windward. The rear tacks when the leader has the first ship of the lee in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre ship passes astern of the centre column.

There are various evolutions or manoeuvres performed by a fleet when in line of battle, some of which we must here describe.

Sometimes the fleet has to form the line on the other tack, by tacking in succession. To do this, the leading ship of the fleet tacks first, after making more sail, or after the second has shortened sail, to increase the interval between them. When the first ship is about, either the second makes more sail, or the third shortens sail, and as soon as the second gets into the wake of the leader, she tacks, putting down the helm just as she opens the weather quarter of the first ship, already on the other tack. In the same manner, each of the other ships tacks when in the wake of the leader; and the ships already about must preserve their proper distances, by shortening sail, if necessary, till the whole fleet be on the other tack. If a ship should miss stays, she must immediately fill again on the same tack, and make sail with all possible expedition, taking care not to fall to leeward. Thus she will get ahead and to windward of the following ships, which will successively perform their evolutions in the wake of the ships that are already on the other tack, standing on rather farther than if the ship ahead had not missed stays.

But suppose the ships are not to tack in succession. To form the line on the other tack, the whole fleet veers together; the rear ship hauls her wind on the other tack, and stands on, while the rest go two points free on the other tack, and haul up as they successively gain the wake of the leading ship.

If the line is to veer in succession, the van ship veers, and stands four points free on the other tack, hauling her wind when clear of the sternmost ship, and the rest follow and haul up in succession.

Sometimes the fleet has to turn to windward while in line The best way to do this, when there is good weather and lee lie to, or only keep steerage way. The centre column tacks together, and forming a bow and quarter line, goes close hauled to gain the wake of the weather column; it then tacks together, and stands on, while the weather column bears away to its new station in the centre, and the lee column fills.

When the weather and lee columns are to interchange, the centre column must bring to, while the lee stands on under a press of sail; and when its sternmost ship can pass to windward of the van of the centre column, that is, when the centre ship of the lee is in a perpendicular line to the direction of the wind with the van of the centre column, the lee column then tacks together, and stands on close hauled till it comes in a line with the centre column, when it goes large two points to get into the situation which the weather column left; and then veers together, hauling the wind for the other tack. At the beginning of the evolution the weather column bears away together under little sail, and goes large six points on the other tack, to get into the wake of the centre column; it then hauls to the former tack, going two points large, till it comes abreast of the centre column, when it brings to, and waits for the now weather column.

Suppose the weather column is to pass to leeward. The weather column is to stand on under easy sail, while the centre and lee tack together, carrying a press of sail till they reach the wake of the weather column, when they retack, and crowd sail till they come up with it. The weather column, when the others have gained its wake, bears away two points to gain its station to leeward, when it brings to till the other columns, now the weather and centre, come up.

Suppose the lee column is to pass to windward. The weather and centre columns bring to, while the lee column carries sail and tacks in succession as soon as the leading ship can weather the headmost ship of the weather column; and when arrived on the line on which the weather column is formed, it retacks in succession, forms on the same line, and either brings to or stands on under easy sail. If it brings to, the other two columns bear away together two points, to put themselves abreast of the column now to windward; but if the now weather column stood on under easy sail, they may bear away only one point, to gain their proper stations.

It is of the greatest importance that each ship of a fleet or squadron preserve her proper station and distance with respect to the rest. These may be regulated in two ways, either by observation with the quadrant, or by what is called the naval square. This square is usually constructed in the following manner.

On some convenient place in the middle of the quarter-deck is described the square ABCD, fig. 29, having the sides AD and BC parallel to the keel of the ship. Through the centre G, the line EF is drawn parallel to AD or BC, and the diagonals AC and BD are drawn. The angles EGD, EGC are bisected by the straight lines GH, GI, and thus the naval square is completed. Now the angles FGD, FGC are = four points each, being each half a right angle, therefore the angles EGD, EGC, the complements of these angles, are each = twelve points, and consequently the angles EGH, EGI are each = six points, being each half of the last angles. Now, if a ship be running close hauled on the starboard tack, in the direction FE, the direction of the wind will be IG, and her close-hauled course on the other tack will be GC; but if she be running close hauled on the larboard tack in the same direction, her direction when close hauled on the starboard tack will be GD.

Now, to apply the naval square to the keeping of ships in their respective stations, suppose the fleet formed on the fifth order of sailing, close hauled, the corresponding ships... of the columns coinciding with the direction of the wind, in order to run to windward with greater facility. The corresponding ships in the column must be kept in the direction of GH or GI, according to the direction of the wind and the tack they are on, while all the ships of the same column must be in the direction of EF. (See fig. 30.)

Again, suppose the ships arranged in three columns on one of the lines of bearing, and close hauled on the other tack. The ships of each column will be in the direction of one of the diagonals, while the corresponding ships of the other columns will be in the direction of the other diagonal.

Sometimes the line of battle is disordered on the wind's shifting, and requires to be restored. Of this there are several cases, a few of which we shall notice.

1. When the wind comes forward less than six points. In this case the whole fleet except the leader brings to. The leading ship, that the same distances between the ships may be preserved on restoring the line, steers a course as \(a b\) (fig. 31), so as to be at right angles with the middle point between the former and present direction of the wind. His required course may be known by adding half the number of points the wind has shifted to eight points, and applying this sum to the former close-hauled course. When the leader has arrived at the new close-hauled line with respect to the second ship ahead, this ship immediately fills and bears away as many points as the leader; and when both these have reached the close-hauled line with respect to the third ship, she also fills and bears away; and thus with the rest in succession; and when they have got into the close-hauled line \(b c\) with the sternmost ship, they all haul their wind together, and the sternmost ship fills and stands on close hauled.

This may be expeditiously performed if the whole fleet fall off as soon as the wind shifts the same number of points, and the leader bear away eight points from the middle between the former and present directions of the wind; or when the wind shifts nearly six points, if the leader bear away eight points from the present direction of the wind, and hauls her wind as soon as the sternmost ship bears from her in the close-hauled line, while the second ship bears away when she reaches the wake of the leader, and hauls her wind when she has again gained his wake. The third, fourth, &c., ships bear away, and also haul their wind in succession, till the sternmost and the whole line be formed again.

2. Suppose the wind comes forward less than six points, and the order of battle is to be re-formed on the other tack. In this case all the ships are to veer round till their heads come to the requisite point with respect to their former course, when the rear ship, now become the van, hauls close by the wind, followed successively by the other ships. Should the wind come ahead more than six points, but less than twelve, the fleet is to manoeuvre as before; but if it shift exactly twelve points ahead, the tack must be changed.

3. Lastly, suppose the wind to shift off; if less than two points, the leader hauls her wind, while the fleet stands on as before, each successively hauling her wind as she gains the wake of her leader. If the tack is to be changed, the whole fleet tack together, and the sternmost ship, now the leader, hauls up, while the rest bear down and haul up in succession.

Should the wind change sixteen points, all the ships immediately brace about for the other tack, by which means the fleet will be going four points large; then the ships instantly tacking or veering together, the order of battle will be restored or formed again on the same tack as before the wind changed.

Having described and illustrated the principal evolutions which are performed by fleets or squadrons under ordinary circumstances, we are prepared to consider the nature and consequences of a naval engagement.

In forming a fleet for battle, it is proper to consider the size and number of the ships of which it is to consist, and the distance at which they are to be placed with respect to each other. In the present system of naval warfare, it is generally deemed of advantage to have the ships that are to form the principal line as large as possible; for though large ships are not so easily and expeditiously worked as those of a smaller size, they are most serviceable during the action, both as carrying a greater weight of metal, and as being less exposed to material injury, either from the enemy's shot or from the weather. In boarding, too, a large ship must have greatly the superiority over a smaller, both from her greater height, and from the number of hands which she contains. With respect to the number of ships, it is of advantage that they be not too numerous, as, if the line be too extensive, the signals from the centre are with difficulty observed.

In arranging a fleet in line of battle, it is proper to regulate the distance so that the ships shall be sufficiently near to support each other, but not so close that a disabled ship may not readily be got out of the line without disturbing the rest of the fleet.

It has long been deemed a point of great consequence with the commander of a fleet to gain the weather gage, or to get to windward of the enemy, before coming to action. In deciding on the propriety of this, much will depend on the relative strength of each fleet, and on the state of the weather at the time. We shall state the advantages and disadvantages of the weather gage, as they are commonly laid down by writers on naval tactics, though we may observe by the way, that if a fleet be much superior to its opponent, it is seldom of consequence whether it engages to windward or to leeward.

A fleet to windward of the enemy is thought to possess the following advantages. It may approach the leeward fleet at pleasure, and can of course accelerate or delay the beginning of the engagement. If more numerous, it may send down a detachment on the rear of the enemy, and thus throw him into confusion. It may also readily send down fire-ships on the enemy's fleet, when thrown into confusion or disabled. It may board at any time, and is scarcely incumbered by the smoke of the enemy. The reverse of these circumstances of course acts against a leeward fleet.

The disadvantages of being to windward of the enemy respect chiefly the circumstances attending a retreat, should this be necessary. The windward fleet can seldom retire without passing through the enemy's line; and if, in attempting to retreat, the windward ships tack together, those of the leeward fleet may do the same, rake the weather ships in stays, and follow them on the other tack, having now the advantage of the wind. In stormy weather, the windward ships can seldom open their lower deck ports, and the lee guns are not easily managed after firing. Again, any disabled ships cannot easily quit the line without disordering the rest of the fleet, and exposing either that or themselves A leeward fleet has the advantage of serving their lower-deck guns in all situations; of being able to retreat at pleasure; of drawing without difficulty their disabled ships; or of forming with more readiness the order of retreat, or of continuing the actions long as convenient; of having it in their power, whenever superior in number, to double the enemy; and of cannonading with great effect the windward ships as they bear toward the attack.

An engagement between two adverse ships is in some measure an epitome of an engagement between two fleets; we shall first briefly describe the former, as it takes place under ordinary circumstances, and shall then notice the manner of conducting a general engagement.

A naval engagement may be divided into three stages, the preparation, the action, and the repair.

When an enemy's ship heaves in sight, and it is thought advisable to bring her to an engagement, orders are first given clear for action, which is begun by the boatswain and mates piping up the hammocks, in order to clear the space between decks, for the more easy management of the guns as well as to afford the men on the quarter-deck, &c., better protection against the enemy's shot, the hammocks being stowed in the nettings above the gunwale and bulkhead. After this the boatswain's mates go to work to secure yards, which is done by fastening them with strong shrouds or ropes in addition to those by which they are suspended. They likewise get ready such materials as may be necessary for repairing the rigging, if it should be cut or otherwise damaged, by the enemy's shot. In the meantime the carpenter and his mates prepare shot plugs and bulks, to stop any dangerous shot-holes that may be made in the hull near the surface of the water, and provide the necessary iron-work for refitting the chain-pumps, if the machinery should be injured during the engagement; while the gunner and his mates, and the quarter gunners, examine the guns to see that their charges are dry, and remove everything that may be required for supplying the great guns and small arms with ammunition. The master and his mates see that the sails are properly trimmed, according to the situation of the ship, and increase or reduce them as may be found necessary; and the lieutenant visits different decks to see that all is clear, and to take care that the inferior officers do their duty.

When the hostile ships have approached within a proper distance of each other, the drums beat to arms; the boatswain and his mates pipe all hands to quarters. All the hammocks are to manage the great guns repair immediately to their respective stations. The crows, handsprings, runners, sponges, powder-horns, matches, and train-tackles, are placed in order by the side of the guns; the hatches are immediately closed, to prevent sculkers from getting below; the irons are drawn up on the quarter-deck, &c., the lashings of the guns are cast loose, and the tampions withdrawn. The hole artillery above and below is run out at the ports, and levelled to the point-blank range, ready for firing.

When these necessary preparations are completed, and the officers and crew ready at their respective stations, and when the two ships are sufficiently near each other, in a proper relative situation for the shot to take full effect, the action commences with a vigorous cannonade from the great guns, accompanied by the whole efforts of the swivels and small arms. The firing is seldom performed in volleys, as it would shake the ship too much; but the guns are loaded and fired one after another, with as much despatch as possible, care being taken to fire every gun as soon as possible, directed to its object. During the firing, the lieutenants traverse the decks, to see that the battle is prosecuted with vivacity, and that the men do their duty; while the midshipmen second their injunctions and give the necessary assistance where required, at the guns committed to their charge. The youngest of these inferior officers are generally employed to carry orders from the captain. The gunners are all this time employed in the magazines, filling cartridges, which are carried along the decks in boxes by the boys of the ship. When the action has continued so long, or has produced such an effect, that one of the ships must yield or retreat, if the vanquished ship cannot get off, she acknowledges her inferiority by striking or hauling down her colours, when she is, as soon as possible, taken possession of by the victor, the commander of which sends a part of his own crew into the captured ship, and brings away most of her officers and men on board his own ship, as prisoners of war.

The engagement being concluded, they begin to repair. The guns are secured by their breechings and tackles, with all convenient expedition. Whatever sails have been rendered unserviceable are unbent, and the wounded masts and yards struck upon deck, to be fished or replaced by others. The standing rigging is knotted, and the running rigging spliced where necessary. Proper sails are bent in the room of those which have been displaced as useless. The carpenter and his mates are employed in repairing the breaches made in the ship's hull, by shot-plugs, pieces of plank, and sheet-lead. The gunner and his assistants are busied in replenishing the allotted number of charged cartridges, to supply the place of those which have been expended, and in refitting whatever furniture of the guns may have been damaged by the action.

A general engagement between two adverse fleets obviously involves a greater variety of circumstances, and requires greater judgment and more comprehensive skill in the commanding officer.

When the commander of a fleet has discovered an enemy's fleet, his principal object, if he be sufficiently strong, is to bring it to action as soon as possible. Every inferior consideration gives way to this important object, and all necessary preparations are immediately made to prepare for such an event. The state of the wind and situation of the enemy will in general regulate his conduct with regard to the disposition of his ships on that occasion. To facilitate the execution of the admiral's orders, the whole fleet is disposed in three squadrons, and each of these classed into three divisions, under the command of different officers. Before the action begins, the adverse fleets are drawn up in two lines, as formerly described. As soon as the admiral displays the signal for the line of battle, the several divisions separate from the columns in which they were disposed in the usual order in sailing, and every ship crowds sail to get into its station in the wake of the next ahead; and a proper distance from each other is regularly observed from the van to the rear. The admiral however occasionally contracts or extends his line, so as to regulate the length of his line by that of his adversary. This is more particularly necessary, to prevent his being doubled, by which his van and rear would be thrown into disorder. When the hostile fleets approach each other, the courses are commonly hauled upon the brails, and the top-gallant sails and stay-sails furled. The movement of each ship is regulated chiefly by the main and fore-top sails and the jib; the mizen-top sail being reserved to hasten or retard the course of the ship, and, by filling or backing, hoisting or lowering it, to determine her velocity. The signal for a general engagement is usually displayed when the fleets are sufficiently near each other to be within the range of point-blank shot, so that the guns may be levelled with some certainty of execution. After the battle has commenced, it is carried on much in the same manner as between two ships, except that each vessel of the fleet, besides attending to her own movements, has to observe the signals made by the commanding officer, and repeated by the frigates on the van and rear. The chief object of the admiral is to keep his line as complete as possible, by ordering ships from those in reserve to supply the place of such as may have been disabled, and to annoy the enemy as much as possible, both by strengthening the feeble parts of his own line, and, if circumstances admit of it, by sending down fire-ships upon that of the enemy. When the engagement draws near a close, either by the defeat of the enemy, or by the disabled state of either fleet, signals are made from the admiral to take possession of such of the enemy's ships as have struck, to tow his own disabled ships into a place of security, and either to chase the remainder of the enemy's squadron, or, if that be impracticable, to draw off his own ships to be refitted.

Such are the general incidents attending an engagement at sea, modified of course by numerous circumstances, of which a general description can convey no idea. There are however various movements and evolutions connected with a naval engagement, which it will be necessary for us to notice.

Where the weather-gage is deemed of sufficient importance, it is often an object with two fleets to dispute it with each other. When the enemy is to windward, and it is wished to gain the weather-gage of him, the fleet to leeward should avoid extending itself the length of the enemy's line, in order to oblige them to edge down upon theirs, if they intend to attack them; which will be the means, if they still persist in doing so, of losing the advantage of the wind. It is impossible for a fleet to leeward to gain to windward, so long as the enemy keep the wind, unless a change happens in their favour; and therefore all that a fleet to leeward can do must be to wait with patience for such a change, of which they will undoubtedly avail themselves, as well as of any inadvertency the enemy may commit in the mean time. And as long as the fleet to leeward does not extend its line the length of the enemy's, it will be impossible for the latter to bring them to action without running the hazard, by bearing down, of losing the advantage of the wind, which both fleets will be so desirous of preserving. That an admiral may take advantage of such shifts of wind as occasionally happen, he must endeavour to get his ships into situations where these shifts most frequently take place. It is well known to experienced naval officers, that particular winds reign most on certain coasts, or off certain headlands. Here therefore the admiral should await the approach of the enemy; and though by this plan he may sometimes be unsuccessful, he will more frequently gain a material advantage. The disposition of projecting headlands, and the setting of tides and currents, often contribute materially towards gaining the wind of the enemy. The fleet to windward should keep that to leeward as much as possible abreast of it; and thus, unless the wind changes considerably, they will preserve the advantage which they have gained. They should also force them to keep their wind, unless they think it prudent not to engage, in which case it would be better to keep altogether out of sight.

When the enemy appears desirous of avoiding an action, there are various methods of attempting to force him to engage; as, first, when he has the weather-gage. In this case the lee fleet, which is desirous of bringing on an engagement, must keep always on the same tack with the enemy to windward, taking care to keep their own ships so exactly abreast of the enemy as to prevent losing sight of them; and hence be ready to take advantage of the first favourable shift of wind to make the attack. An alteration of the course may be best attempted in the night. The lee fleet must have frigates on the look-out, and these must continually give notice by signal of the manoeuvres and course of the retreating fleet to windward. Thus the weather fleet is always exposed to pursuit, without being able to escape unseen; and hence must sooner or later be compelled to engage, unless they can get into some friendly port, or should be favoured by a gale of wind sufficient to disperse both fleets, and thus prevent the possibility of a general engagement.

Secondly, when the enemy is to leeward. If the lee fleet keep close to the wind in the order of battle, the fleet to windward is to stand on in the same manner till it be abreast of the enemy, ship to ship, and at the same time to bear away, and steer so as to bring their respective opponents on the same point of the compass with themselves. Thus the adverse fleets will be sufficiently near each other to begin the action, by each ship's presenting her bow to the ship abreast of her in the order of sailing, which may be easily changed for the order of battle, by all the ships hailing together close to the wind in the moment which precedes the action. If the fleet appear inclined to engage, it may bring to, to prevent losing time, and after this they will fill as soon as the action commences, because it is of advantage to a lee line to be advancing ahead. As the lee fleet fills and stands in close by the wind, the weather line should keep abreast before it bears away, to come within the requisite distance, that the van ship of the weather fleet may always keep to windward of the leading ship of the lee line, and be guarded against any shift of wind ahead.

If the lee fleet bear away four points to move their order of battle on the other tack, and avoid the action, filling off in succession in the wake of the van ship, the weather line, by bearing away all together eight points, cannot fail, as both fleets are supposed to sail equally, to pass through the middle of their line, and force them to fight with disadvantage, if their extent be double the distance between the two fleets. If the extent of the fleet be less than the above limitation, then the weather fleet will divide the lee fleet more unequally; and if the distance between the fleets be considerable, the weather fleet will be able to break through the line. If the lee fleet bear away four points all together, being of equal extent with the fleet to windward, and their distance from each other equal to that of the length of one of the lines, should the weather fleet bear away at the same time eight points, they will approach very near the sternmost of the retreating fleet, but they will not have it in their power to cut off any part of that fleet, even with an equality of sailing; so that the only advantage gained by this manoeuvre will be an ability of attacking the rear, and bringing it to action.

If the van ship and the rest of the weather fleet had a sufficient velocity to keep the centre ship of the lee line on the same point of bearing, in that case the leading ship may break through the enemy's line about the middle ship of the centre division; for, supposing the fleets in the order of battle, on the starboard tack, steering east, with the wind at south-south-east, being at two leagues distance from each other, both the lines being four leagues in extent, then the lee line bearing away all together four points, will run north-east, while the fleet to windward, bearing away all together eight points, will steer north, the van ship of which will keep the centre division of the lee line in the point of bearing north-west. As she is supposed to be able to continue in this position, it follows that the van of the weather line must close the centre of the flying line to leeward after having run four leagues. The time and distance necessary to cut off a retreating fleet may always be known according to the last supposition. If the lee fleet should get on the other tack, and run large, still in the order of battle, they will be sooner forced to action by the weather fleet, who have only to bear away eight or nine points on the same tack, or run right before the wind.

As in forcing a fleet to action, there are two principal cases in which a fleet may avoid an action, where circumstances are not sufficiently favourable; first, when the enemy is to windward, and, secondly, when he is to leeward. In the former case, the lee fleet should form the order of When one fleet attempts to double another, this latter will of course do all in their power to avoid the impending danger; and this they will the more readily do, according to their number or their situation. If the fleet thus threatened be to windward, one of the methods proposed to avoid being doubled, is to extend the line towards the point threatened, so as to leave a greater space between the ships; but in doing this there is a risk of having the line broken by the superior enemy. Another method suggested is, for the flag-ships of the windward fleet to oppose themselves to those of the lee line, which is supposed to render several of the enemy's ships in the intervals of little use; but one great inconvenience of this manoeuvre is, that it leaves the van and rear most exposed to the enemy's fire, and that the rear division in particular is in great danger of being doubled. To remedy these defects, the largest ships should be placed in the van and rear of each division, and the fleet must regulate its sailing in such a manner that its rear shall never be astern of the rest of the enemy.

When the enemy is to leeward, the weather fleet is to keep astern of the enemy, so that the van of the weather fleet may be opposed to and attack the enemy's centre. Hence the enemy's van will become useless for some time; and should it attempt to tack and double on the weather fleet, much time will be lost in performing that evolution; and it also runs the risk of being separated by the calm which often happens in the course of an engagement, occasioned by the discharge of the guns. A considerable interval might also be left between the centre and the van, if necessary precautions be taken to prevent the van from being cut off.

There are several circumstances of importance to be considered in the subject of chasing, i.e., when one ship or fleet pursues another, called the chase, either to bring her or them to action, or to oblige them to surrender.

When a single ship chases another, it is to be presumed in general that one of them is the better sailer, though this is not always the case, and still by proper manoeuvring the chasing ship, or chaser, may gain on the chase. In the following observations however we shall suppose the chaser to sail faster than the chase. The manoeuvres of the chaser will depend on her being to windward or leeward of the chase.

When the chase is to windward, it is evident, that as soon as she perceives a strange ship which she takes for an enemy, she will haul her wind, in order to prolong the chase, as otherwise her retreat would soon be cut off. The chaser then stands on nearly close hauled, till she has the chase on her beam; she then tacks, and stands on close hauled till the chase is again on her beam, and then retacks. In this manner she continues tacking every time she brings the chase perpendicular to her course on either board; and by thus manoeuvring, it is certain that the chaser will, by the superiority only of her sailing, join the other in the shortest time. For since the chaser tacks always as soon as the chase is perpendicular to her course, she is then at the shortest distance possible on that board; and since the chaser is supposed to be the faster sailer, these shortest distances will decrease every time the chaser tacks. It is therefore of advantage to the chase to keep constantly on the same course, without losing her time in going about, as tacking cannot be so favourable to her as to her adversary, whose sailing is superior. If the captain of the chaser should so little understand his profession as to stand on a long way, and tack in the wake of the chase, the best thing she can do is to heave in stays, and pass to windward of him on the other tack, except she should find herself likely to gain advantage by going large; for if the chaser persists in tacking in the wake of the other ship, the pursuit will be very much prolonged.

When the chase is to leeward, the chaser is to steer that course by which she thinks she will gain most on the chase. If, after having run a short time, the chase is found to draw more aft, the chaser should then bear away a little more; but if the chase draw ahead, the chaser should haul up a little, and thus the course may be so regulated that the chase may always bear on the same point, and then the chaser will get up with the chase in the shortest time possible; for if any other course were steered, the chaser would either be too far ahead or too far astern, and hence the pursuit would be prolonged. The chase should run on that course which will carry her directly from the chaser, and should consider which is her best trim with respect to the wind, that she may move with the greatest possible rapidity from the chaser; for some ships have more advantage in going large, others with the wind right aft, and others when close hauled.

Another method has been proposed for chasing a ship to leeward; that is, by constantly steering directly for the chase. In this case, the tract described by the chaser is called the line or curve of pursuit. To illustrate this, let

Fig. 32.

A (fig. 32) represent the chaser, and B the chase directly to leeward of her, and running with less velocity than the pursuer, in the direction BC, perpendicular to that of the wind. Now, to construct this curve, let Bb be the distance run by the chase in any short interval of time; join Ab, and make A1 equal the distance run by the chaser in the same time. Again, make bc, cd, de, ef, &c., each equal to Bb; join 1c, and make 12 = A1; join 2d, and make 23 equal to A1; proceed in like manner till the two distances carried forward meet as at C, and a curve described through the points A, 1, 2, 3, &c. will represent nearly the curve of pursuit; and the less the interval A1 is taken, the more accurately will the curve be formed. In this particular case, the length of the distance BC may be found as follows, provided the distance AB and the proportional velocities of the two ships be known.

Let the velocity of the chase be denoted by a fraction, that of the chaser being unity. Multiply the given distance AB by this fraction, and divide the product by the complement of the square of the same fraction, and the quotient will be the distance run by the chase B. Suppose AB, the distance of the chase directly to leeward of the chaser, be taken at twelve miles, and suppose the velocity of the chase three fourths of that of the chaser, what will be the distance run by the chase before she is overtaken? Now \( \frac{12 \times \frac{3}{4}}{1 - \frac{3}{4}^2} = \frac{9}{\frac{7}{16}} = 9 \times \frac{16}{7} = 20 \frac{4}{7} \) miles; and since the velocity of the chaser to that of the chase is as 4 to 3, hence the distance run by the chaser will be \( \frac{9}{7} \times \frac{3}{4} = 27 \frac{3}{7} \) miles. As the chaser alters her course at every point, and probably sails better with the wind in one direction with respect to her course than when the wind is in another direction, her velocity will be different at different points of the course. Thus, suppose her to sail faster when the wind is on the quarter, her velocity will constantly increase to a certain point, and will then diminish. Hence in real practice the curve of pursuit will not be exactly what is laid down in the above problem, and of course the measure of BC will differ a little from what we have there laid down. See Resistance of Fluids, and Seamanship.

If the whole fleet is to give chase, the admiral will make the proper signal, and then each ship will instantly make all the sail possible. If the retreating fleet is not much inferior to the other, a few of the fastest sailing vessels only are to be detached from the superior fleet, in order to pick up any stragglers, or those ships which may have fallen astern; and the remaining part of the fleet will keep in the same line or order of sailing as the retreating fleet, so that they may, if possible, force them to action. But if the retreating fleet is much inferior, the admiral of the superior fleet will make the signal for a general chase, and then each ship will immediately crowd all the sail possible after the retreating fleet; or, if the chase be still less numerous, the admiral will detach one of the squadrons of his fleet, by hoisting the proper signal for that purpose, and he will follow with the remainder of the fleet. The squadron that chases should be very careful not to engage too far in the chase, for fear of being overpowered; but at the same time to endeavour to satisfy themselves with regard to the object of their chase. They must pay great attention to the admiral's signals at all times; and in order to prevent separation, they should collect themselves before night, especially if there be any appearance of foggy weather coming on, and endeavour to join the fleet again. The ships are diligently to observe when the admiral makes the signal to give over chase; and each regarding the admiral's ship as a fixed point, is to work back into her station, so as to form the order of line again as quickly as the nature of the chase and the distance will permit.

When a fleet is obliged to run from an enemy who is in sight, it is usual to draw up the ships in that form or order called the order of retreat; and the admiral, when hard pursued, without any probability of escaping, such as practicable, to run his ships ashore, rather than suffer them to be taken afloat, and thereby give additional strength to the enemy. In short, nothing should be neglected that may contribute to the preservation of his fleet, or prevent any part of it from falling into the hands of the conqueror.

We have now gone through the principal evolutions of fleets and squadrons nearly as they are described in the "Elements of Rigging, Seamanship, and Naval Tactics," and other approved publications on similar subjects. We have indeed omitted the method of forcing an enemy's line, and of avoiding being forced, because the former will be readily understood from what we have to add on the improved method of tactics of M. Grenier, and Mr Clerk of Eldin.

Various defects have been observed in the tactics usually employed at sea, especially in a line of battle, and in the mode of bringing an enemy to action. The usual order of battle first introduced by the duke of York, afterwards James II. of England, is defective from its length. Its great extent makes it difficult for the admiral to judge what orders are proper to be issued to the ships stationed at the extremities, while his signals, however distinctly made, are liable to be mistaken by the commanders of these ships. Besides, the extremities of a long line, especially if it be to leeward, are necessarily defenceless, as the enemy may him; and a third, when on an extensive cruise, disposed so that it cannot be easily surprised or broken. Of these three orders, only the second and third differ from the usual orders of sailing. The former of these is represented by fig. 34, where the columns, \(a\), \(b\), \(c\), \(d\), \(e\), \(f\), are disposed on three sides of a regular lozenge, on the two close-hauled lines. The ships of the two divisions \(c\), \(d\), \(e\), \(f\), sometimes to windward, as in fig. 35, and sometimes to leeward as in fig. 34, of the third division \(a\), \(b\), are to be formed on two parallels of one of the close-hauled lines in the wakes of their respective headmost ships; while the third division \(a\), \(b\) is to be ranged ahead or astern of the others on the other close-hauled line, steering chequerwise the same course as the other divisions.

When \(a\), \(b\) is to windward of \(c\), \(d\), and \(e\), \(f\) (fig. 34), De Grenier calls that the windward primitive order of sailing; and when to leeward (fig. 35), the fleet is said to be in the leeward primitive order of sailing. These are the two principal positions in almost every case, and, with very little variety, may become the order of battle, of chasing, &c.

His third order is illustrated by fig. 36, where the divisions \(a\), \(b\) and \(e\), \(f\) are supposed at the distance of about six leagues from each other; \(c\), \(d\) and \(e\), \(f\) resting on the extremities of the base of a triangle STV, while the centre ship of the division \(a\), \(b\) rests on its summit T: none of the divisions could be cut off by an enemy, however formidable, seen from its centre ship at the distance of six leagues. For if, on the proper signal, the division \(a\), \(b\) should steer from T toward X, on the course opposite to the close-hauled line it steered before, and the two divisions \(c\), \(d\) and \(e\), \(f\) steer from V and S towards X likewise, it is plain that each of these divisions would have only three leagues to run in order to join the other two, while the enemy, which was first perceived at the distance of six leagues, must run nine before he can come up with the nearest of these squadrons.

To form De Grenier's order of battle, represented in fig. His order 37 and 38, it will be sufficient for the ships of the three divisions ranged in the windward primitive order of sailing, to heave in stays all together, and get on the other tack on the opposite line of bearing (fig. 37); or for the ships in the leeward primitive order at once to haul the wind on the same tack as they steer; and they will find themselves in order of battle, fig. 38. When the two columns \(c\), \(d\) and \(e\), \(f\) are to leeward of the third division \(a\), \(b\), ranged in order of battle, this is called the *natural order of battle*; and when operations \( e \) and \( f \) are to windward of \( a \), this is called the *inverted order of battle*. The former of these is calculated for a fleet combating to leeward, and the latter for a fleet which must fight to windward.

To explain the advantages of these dispositions, let us suppose the line \( AB, CD, EF \), fig. 39, to repre- sent an enemy's fleet to windward in the usual order of battle, on the close-hauled line, and on the starboard tack; and let \( ab \) be one of the divisions of a fleet disposed according to the new natural order, on the starboard tack, while the lines \( cd, ef \) represent the other two divisions standing on chequerwise on the same tack, but formed on the opposite close-hauled line. When the enemy comes to attack this latter fleet on a supposition that it is inferior to their own, their divisions \( AB \) and \( EF \) in order to attack the ships \( a \) or \( b \), must bear away. Now, to prevent the attack, each of the divisions \( cd, ef \) must make the following evolutions, according to their respective situa- tions and the manoeuvres of the enemy.

1. The ships of the division \( ab \) are to slacken as much as possible their headway, and form a very close line, till the enemy makes a movement to attack the headmost or sternmost ship of that division.

2. The ships of the division \( cd \) are to make sail till they come under the second or third ship of the rear of the line of battle \( ab \), when they will take the same sail as the ships of that division, to preserve that position until the hostile ships make their evolution to attack the rear ships of that division. In this situation the ships of the di- vision \( cd \) will be able to observe the manoeuvres of the enemy, in order to change tack, and form themselves in or- der of battle on the opposite board as soon as the hostile ships shall have run over a certain space; because the ships of the division \( cd \), steering afterwards close hauled in the wake of the sternmost ship of the division \( ab \), will be able to cover the rear ships of that division, and get the wea- ther-gage of the hostile divisions which are bearing away; rake their ships; run alongside of them; double their rear- guard, and put it between two fires, if those hostile ships are following in the wake of each other; divide it if they bear away chequerwise; or gain to windward, and put be- tween two fires the enemy's division \( CD \), while engaged with the division \( ab \).

3. The division \( ef \) may abandon their post, and run chequerwise under a press of sail, as soon as the enemy falls ahead of \( ab \); that if the enemy's divi- sion \( AB \) attempts to fall on \( ef \), or on the van of \( ab \), they may, by going about, steer in order of battle close hauled on the opposite line, and cover the ship \( a \), double the hos- tile division \( CD \) ahead, or divide \( AB \), which is running chequerwise on the opposite tack.

Fig. 40 marks another method of manoeuvring by the divisions \( cd, ef \), when the enemy's ships are arranged in a single line not well formed.

Figs. 41 and 42 illustrate De Grenier's method of placing the admiral's ship, and the frigates and transports at- tached to a fleet. \( A \), fig. 41, is the admiral placed a- head of the fleet, at a short distance from the headmost of the second division, and in the same di- rection of the wind as the headmost ship of the first divi- sion; \( ff \) are two frigates observing the same rule and posi- tion with respect to the van ship of the third, and rear of the first division. When the fleet is in order of battle, as in fig. 42, the admiral's ship \( A \) is in the centre of the lozenge, and two of the frigates, \( ff \), are on the fourth side of the lozenge. The transports and store-ships, when the fleet is in order of sail- ing or convoy, occupy the space circumscribed by the lo- zenge, but in order of battle they are disposed in a line opposite to that of the enemy.

For a full exposition of this system, we must refer to the original work, entitled *L'Art de Guerre en Mer, ou Tacti- que Navale*, &c., par M. le Viscomte de Grenier, or the extracts from it contained in the *Elements and Practice of Rigging and Seamanship*.

We must now turn our attention to the improvements in tactics suggested by our countryman Mr Clerk; improve- ments which have received the approbation of several dis- tinguished officers of the navy, and to hints derived from which we are in a great measure indebted for some of the most signal victories which have reflected new honour on the naval power of Britain.

Before entering on an explanation of Mr Clerk's tactics, we must briefly state his objections to the usual method of bringing ships to action, by the weather ship or fleet steer- ing directly down upon the enemy. By doing this, the enemy to leeward often has an opportunity of completely disabling the ships making the attack, as the former can use all their guns on one side, while the latter can only use their bow chases. Suppose \( B \), fig. 43, to re- present a ship of eighty guns to wind- ward, in sight of an enemy's ship of equal force \( F \) to leeward. Now, if \( B \) bears down directly upon \( F \), the latter, by lying to, as in fig. 44, will present a broadside of forty guns, all bearing for a considerable time on \( B \), while the latter Fig. 44. coming down headwise, can only bring the two light guns of her forecastle to bear on \( F \), not to mention that \( F \), by lying broadside to, will have her masts and rigging little exposed to the ene- my's shot, while \( B \), standing head on, is ex- posed to be raked by every shot from \( F \), and in particular her rigging is in the utmost dan- ger.

Instead of this objectionable mode of attack, Mr Clerk proposes that \( B \), having the wind, should run down astern as in the dotted line at fig. 45, till she gets into the course of \( F \), near her wake, or in such a position

Fig. 46.

Fig. 47.

Fig. 48.

Fig. 49.

Fig. 50.

Fig. 51.

Fig. 52.

Fig. 53.

number and force, also drawn up in line of battle three or four miles to windward, wishes to make an attack, and come to close quarters on equal terms. The fleets being thus disposed, should the fleet at B attempt running down to attack the fleet at F, each ship standing head on to the opposite ship in the leeward line, it is to be expected, from what we have already stated, that the attacking ships will be disabled at least in their rigging before they can come to close action; but suppose that the commander of the weather fleet, though his ships have been disabled in their rigging during their course a a a to leeward, fig. 50, has made them bring to at a great distance, but sufficiently near to injure F, this latter fleet, which has been endeavouring to avoid an action, will now bear away with little injury to a new station, as G, and there remain out of the reach of B's shot, and this fleet must repair its rigging before it can make another attack.

Again, suppose that the fleet B, instead of standing head on, were to run down in an angular course, as in fig. 51. It is plain that if any ship in this angular line should be crippled, her defect in sailing will occasion a confusion of several of the other ships in that line. It may be said that the stoppage of one ship ahead will not necessarily produce a stoppage of every ship astern of her, because they may run to leeward of the disabled ship; but we must observe that by this time the ships ahead in the van A may be engaged, and consequently, not having much headway, are nearly stationary, so that each ship astern, in attempting to bear down as at D, D, may be confined to a certain course, and must run the risk of being raked in coming down before the wind, and consequently of being disabled before coming up with the enemy.

Thirdly, the van of the fleet B having attained their station at A, abreast of the van of F, fig. 52, and having begun the action, the van ships of F, with a view to retreat, may throw in a broadside on the van of B, and then bear away in succession, as at H, followed by the rest of the fleet F, which, after exchanging broadsides with the van of B, may draw up in a new line two or three miles to leeward at I I, fig. 53.

Suppose, again, for further illustration, that B, fig. 54, Warlike Operations at Sea.

Fig. 54.

represents a fleet putting before the wind, each ship intending, when brought to at a determined distance at A, to take up her particular antagonist in the line of the enemy F to leeward; and let F be supposed at rest, without any motion ahead. It is easy to conceive, that while the alternate ships of F's line, under cover of the smoke, withdraw from battle to GGG, the intermediate ships left behind them in the line will be sufficient to amuse even the whole of B's fleet, till the ships G shall form a new line H as a support from the leeward. In such case B, after being disabled, and not having foreseen the manoeuvre, will neither be able to prevent the intermediate ships with which he is engaged from bearing away to join their friends, nor, were he able, would it be advisable to follow them; for the same manoeuvre, with equal success, can again and again be repeated.

To explain the relative motion of these two fleets, let F, fig. 55, represent a fleet of twelve ships in line of battle, a cable's length asunder, and suppose the length of each ship from the end of the jib-boom to the stern to be 363 fathoms. The whole fleet will occupy a space of two English miles; and if it be supposed to sail in the direction FG, at the rate of four knots an hour, it will in an hour have moved to G, four miles from its former position.

Now let there be an opposite fleet B, also twelve ships, situated four miles to windward, and let the point A be a quarter of a mile right to windward of the point G. Then, if B, by bearing away in the direction BA, gain the point A at the same time that the leeward fleet F has arrived at G, B will have moved nearly at the rate of 5½ miles an hour, and the angle contained between the direction of its line of bearing and its present course will be nearly four points.

Secondly, in fig. 56, if F, by carrying more sail, move at the rate of six miles an hour from F to G, then B, with a more slanting course, will have more difficulty in keeping the line abreast while coming down to the attack, owing to the additional obstruction which will attend each succeeding ship in such a slanting course. Again, if the leeward fleet shall lie up one point higher, as FG, fig. 57, the rears of the two fleets will be removed to a much greater distance, and the van A must be sooner up with the enemy's van, and of course so much farther from support, while F, bringing up his ships in succession, may disable the van of A, and afterwards bear away at pleasure with little injury, as at H. Now B being supposed disabled, and having his rear D distracted, will be unable to prevent F from escaping.

From these considerations, it appears that a fleet to windward, by extending its line of battle with a view to stop and attack the whole line of an enemy's fleet to leeward, must labour under considerable disadvantages, and will scarcely succeed in the attempt.

On these principles Mr Clerk explains the reason why the French fleets so repeatedly escaped from the British, without any serious defeat or loss, viz., by avoiding a general engagement, and disabling the British van as it bore down to attack them. He therefore recommends a different mode of attack from the windward, which we shall proceed to illustrate by proper diagrams.

Let F (fig. 58) represent a fleet in line of battle, under easy sail, willing to avoid an action, but ready to receive an attack, in the usual way, from another fleet B, three or four miles to windward, arranged in three columns. How shall B make the attack on F, so as, without aiming at the improbable advantage of taking or destroying the greater part of this fleet, they may secure three or four of the sternest ships? Mr Clerk advises that a sufficient strength be detached to secure these ships, while the admiral keeps close with the rest of his fleet, disposed as in the figure, ready to make the necessary observations, and give the requisite support to the detached ships. If F continues to avoid an action by standing on in line, the detachment, coming into the position BA, will secure the three ships at I; and if the headmost ships of F were to tack, and be followed by the rest in succession, as at fig. 59, not only the three ships at I will be left at the mercy of the ships detached from B, but two more, as G, will be exposed to an attack from another squadron of B at C. If all the ships of F tack together, as in fig. 60, the delay, and probably the confusion, consequent on this manoeuvre, will still more endanger the sternmost ships, or will bring on a general and close action. Again, if F attempts to haul off, beginning with his sternmost ship G, and then runs to leeward, as at fig. 61, he will expose his ship to a raking fire from B, and endanger his sternmost ship by getting too far to leeward for their support; or if the headmost ships at H, fig. 62, veer first, these followed by those astern, the danger would be still greater. Thus it appears that, in every assignable case, a fleet to leeward, avoiding an attack from an equal or superior to windward, as here advised, by preserving the line will risk the loss of three or more of their sternmost ships.

Now, let us suppose that F, while standing on a line on the larboard tack, when threatened with an attack occurs rear from B, veers on opposite tacks to windward (see fig. 63). The consequence of this will be, that his headmost ships will be forced to leeward by B, and compelled to engage under disadvantageous circumstances; and the disadvantage to F will be much the same, whether he veers and resumes his former position, as at G, fig. 64, or stands to windward, as P, fig. 65.

I have hitherto supposed that the wind has been fixed in one point; but let us suppose it to shift, and let us inquire what will be the effect of such a circumstance on the two lines F and B. While the fleets are in their former positions, F in line, and B in four divisions, B, B, B, A, steering east, with the wind north, fig. 66, let the wind shift to the west. The only consequence of this will be, that F will be thrown still farther to leeward, to its greater disadvantage. But let the wind shift to east, so as to be ahead, as in figs. 67 and 68; still, if the admiral of B manages properly, and carefully watches the motions of F, this change will produce no advantage to the latter. For B has nothing to do but veer as the wind comes round, so as to bring his ships to windward of the three sternmost ships of F, and to leeward of the rest of his line, so as to cut off the three sternmost ships.

If the wind should be supposed to veer from point to point all round the compass, so that the fleet F, maintaining the weather-gage of B, shall make a circuit round B to leeward; still, if B act cautiously, F will lose the three threatened ships.

Lastly, suppose the wind should instantly shift to a point opposite to what it was at the commencement of the attack, as from north to south. Before it can be ascertained whether such a change will be to the advantage or disadvantage of F, the relative situations of the two fleets must be considered. Suppose that the van and centre be separated at some distance from his rear, and that in consequence this fleet shall have taken such a position as is shown at fig. 69. Though in this case he will have got to windward, his three ships can never be regained or preserved from the attack of B. The most favourable situation for F would be when the fleets were in the position denoted by fig. 66, as then he could not only support his three ships with advantage, but even threaten and cut off a part of B's detachment. In attempting this, however, he incurs the risk of coming to a close engagement, which we have supposed him to be sedulously avoiding.

Besides this method of attack from the windward by detachments from the main fleet, Mr Clerk shows how a successful attack may be made by a fleet to leeward, by its breaking the enemy's line, and this either near the rear, near the centre, or not far from the van, of which cases the two former will be most likely to prove successful. The enemy's line can only be cut when the two hostile fleets veer on opposite tacks. The most simple method of effecting this is for the van ship of the attacking squadron, instead of ranging parallel to that of the enemy, and to lee-