a seaport town of the United Provinces, in the island of Walcheren, formerly very flourishing, but now inconsiderable. Pop. 1340. Long. 3. 40. E. Lat. 51. 30. N. An army, says Dr Johnson, is "a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man." This definition, however, has little else than its brevity to recommend it. An army, it is true, is "a collection of armed men," and such a "collection" is generally "obliged to obey one man," that is to say, it is commonly placed under the exclusive control and direction of an individual chief or leader. But it does not follow that "a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man" is the distinguishing or principal characteristic of an army, since a gang of robbers or banditti would equally answer this description. To be at all applicable, therefore, the definition of army must be at once more comprehensive and more precise; in other words, it must include the specification of those peculiar circumstances or attributes, the aggregate of which constitutes the complex idea sought to be resolved. Hence an army may, we think, be more accurately defined, a certain portion of the community selected, raised, or assembled, for the defence of the state, by means of conscription, voluntary enrolment, tenure of military service, or otherwise; armed, disciplined, and organized, conformably to a given system, which is considered best calculated for giving full development and efficacy to its collective force; and commanded by a chief or leader, with subordinate officers in regular gradation, to carry his orders into effect, and move the living machine, thus constructed, as he shall think proper to direct. It is an artificial or scientific combination of a great number of powers, individually small or insignificant, so as, by their union and concentration, to accomplish mighty and important deeds; a force which states and nations create out of the elements of their strength, as mechanicians form engines by taking advantage of and skilfully combining the action of the primary mechanical powers; an instrument, in short, so contrived as, though originally intended for the best, to be equally available for the worst purposes, being alike fitted for defense or aggression, for protection or conquest, for restraining and punishing the dishonest ambition of others, or affording the means of gratifying our own. An army, therefore, may be considered a species of movable engine, composed of a vast number of individual parts or powers, so arranged and organized as not only to act in concert, but to exert their whole aggregate force in any direction and upon any point which may be ordered or required.
At the present day this denomination is applied to any given number of soldiers, consisting of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, of various descriptions, all completely armed and provided with engineers, a train of artillery, ammunition, magazines, commissariat, and other necessary adjuncts, subject to the command of a general, having under him lieutenant-generals, major-generals, brigadier-generals, colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns. And an army is now composed of battalions or squadrons, regiments, brigades, divisions, and sometimes corps d'armée; two or more battalions or squadrons forming a regiment, two or more regiments a brigade, two or more brigades a division, and two or more divisions a corps d'armée. So much for definition and description.
Were we called upon to trace to its origin the history of war, we should find it necessary to ascend through every form and gradation of society to the very cradle of the human race. Admitted on all hands to be one of the greatest evils, war is also, unhappily, one of the oldest. "Il est triste d'imaginer," says a celebrated military writer, "que le premier art qu'aient inventé les hommes, ait été celui de se nuire, et que, depuis le commencement des siècles, on ait combiné plus de moyens pour détruire l'humanité que pour la rendre heureuse." This is a truth which cannot be disputed. The passions of rivalry, jealousy, hatred, revenge, cupidity, thirst of power or ambition, were born with the world; and these, in their turn, gave birth to war, which again produced the desire of conquering or combating with success. But, in proportion as this desire came to prevail, men would naturally be led to reflect as to the means best fitted to insure its gratification; and as experience must soon have convinced them that the battle was not always to the strong, nor the race to the swift,—or, in other words, that mere brute force, openly applied, was in many cases insufficient to secure the victory, and, in most productive of a loss that countervailed it,—they must early have discovered that some degree of combination was requisite, and certain extrinsic qualities necessary, to render it effectual; that violence might find an auxiliary in cunning, and resistance be paralysed by stratagem and surprise. Such, accordingly, is the state of things which generally obtains amongst savage tribes, however warlike and enterprising. They seldom go down to battle openly and boldly; nor do they consider victory, when dearly purchased, as either honourable or desirable. Artifice is their main resource. The first principle of their simple tactics is to steal unperceived upon the enemy, and overwhelm him, while unsuspicious of attack and unprepared for resistance. In this and similar principles, however, we discover the origin and primary development of the military art. Its source is in the forest or the wilderness. But as war is the first art which men invented, so it is also that which was soonest cultivated and improved. It kept pace with the progress of society—as mankind multiplied, and communities extended themselves, it received a corresponding expansion;—more means were combined, and a greater number of men were assembled. This was the second stage of the art, where it remained long stationary, and in nearly the same state in which we find it at the present day among some of the Asiatic nations. Science had not digested nor systematized the rude and shapeless mass of knowledge which experience had supplied, or suggested new combinations of existing means. But ambition at length gave a fresh stimulus to improvement, by opening up a new theatre for its expansive energies; and successive conquerors contributed largely to the cultivation of an art which became the instrument of their glory. In their hands, accordingly, it determined the destiny of nations;—it raised up or destroyed empires;—it produced mighty revolutions;—it overthrew old dynasties, and created new ones in their stead;—and, amidst all the havoc and desolation occasioned by the pursuit of false glory, it contributed, upon the whole, to the cultivation of those sciences and arts which have a tendency to mitigate the natural ferocity of man, and ultimately to render conquest itself less destructive, and war less sanguinary.
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1 Dictionary, voce Army. 2 James's Military Dictionary, voce Army. 3 Essai Général de Tactique, par Guibert, vol. i. p. 59, Disc. Prélim. Paris, 1803. Results so vast leave no doubt whatever, that the art which was principally instrumental in producing them, must have made considerable progress at a very remote period of the world. It is in fact in the early and semi-barbarous stage of society that the military virtues are found in the greatest perfection. The mind is then fierce, ardent, energetic, and daring; peculiarly accessible to the illusion of warlike renown, and undistracted by any of those influences or impressions which act so powerfully upon man in civilized life; while the body, unspared by luxury, unenfeebled by indulgence, is a fit companion for such a spirit, and capable of enduring, without difficulty, the fatigues and privations incident to war. Add to this that, at the period of which we speak, the only law generally recognised and respected is the law of the strongest; that the necessity of self-defence, of protecting person and property from violence and spoliation, keeps men continually prepared to repel force by force, or to retaliate one aggression by another; that, consequently, the disorders which distract society re-act upon and foster the turbulent spirit in which they have their origin; that war thus becomes a trade which all are either disposed or compelled to pursue; that, to bold and adventurous spirits, it opens up the only path which leads to fortune and to fame, and thus holds out irresistible temptations to embark in military enterprises. At such a period all men are soldiers, and war is their natural employment; in it they live and move and have their being.
But necessity is the parent of invention, and the mother of arts; and to it the science of war was indebted for its first improvements. Armies are unwieldy machines, which cannot be moved without some degree of organization, nor supported without considerable care and foresight, nor led into action with an enemy without a certain knowledge of tactical combinations. It is obvious, therefore, that wherever we read of such masses of men having been assembled, whether for purposes of aggression or defence, we may safely consider this fact as of itself conclusive, that the military art had there reached the second stage of its progress, or, in other words, had made considerable advances. History may be silent as to the precise extent to which improvement had been carried, and the records of the past may afford no clue to direct our inquiries concerning the composition and organization of the armies of remote antiquity; but if it be once admitted that such armies existed, and that they defended some countries and overran or conquered others, this admission will imply no inconsiderable knowledge of the art of war on the part of those by whom they were organized and directed.
Discipline of some kind or other is the bond which keeps together large bodies of men: without it they are a mere mob or rabble, incapable alike of action or direction, and formidable to none save the people of the country where they happen to have congregated. Even the Tartar hordes of Genghis Khan and Timour had an organization and discipline of their own, by means of which these barbarian conquerors were enabled to impel their fierce and warlike masses against the enfeebled and effeminate soldiery of countries advanced in wealth and in civilization; and the same observation applies still more forcibly to the Asiatic and Turkish armies of our own time. In a word, we may adopt with some qualification the remark of Guibert, when speaking of the progress of the military art:
"Il précéda," says he, "chez tous les peuples, les arts et les sciences, et y pérît à mesure que celles-ci s'étendent."
The details into which we are about to enter will fully illustrate the truth of these general observations.
The earliest military establishment of which history has preserved any record is that of Egypt under the reign of Egyptian Sesostris, or, as he is denominated in the monumental sculptures of that wonderful country, Rhamses, who was considered the greatest of the Egyptian kings after Osiris, and has generally been supposed by chronologists to have flourished about seventeen centuries before our era. But Osiris was an ideal being, the offspring of mythology, and the hero of fable, adored by the Egyptians sometimes as a deified mortal, sometimes as a personification of the Nile, and sometimes as the symbolical representative of the solar orb. Sesostris, on the contrary, is claimed by history as a real personage; and although the accounts which have been preserved of the reign of this prince, chiefly by the Greek historians, are dashed with a considerable admixture of exaggeration and romance, we cannot reasonably doubt the existence of the monarch, however we may be inclined to question the exploits of the hero and the achievements of the conqueror. The substance of these accounts, indeed, when considered in connection with the corroborative evidence supplied by the Egyptian monuments, and the traces of his expedition which remained even in the age of Herodotus, may be regarded as the more deserving of credit that, while scepticism has little to oppose to them except its own incredulity, the statements of the Greek historians are not only consistent with one another, but in strict accordance with the uniform tradition and belief, as well as with the records, of that country, the mother of arts and civilization, which, under this renowned
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1 Timour or Tamerlane, of whom unfortunately we know so little, has left an institutional or elementary treatise on war and the art of conducting armies, each page of which affords proof of a natural genius for commanding men, as well as of tact and skill in employing them to the best advantage. See *Instituts de Timour*, par Langlès; also *Jomini, Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires*, tome viii., p. 678., Paris, 1616.
2 *Esai Général de Tactique*, vol. i., p. 60.
3 One of the difficulties which occur in our inquiries concerning Sesostris arises from the different names by which he has been designated by ancient writers. He has been variously called Sesostris, Sesoscois, Setochois, Sethoos, Sethos, Sethos, Rameses, Rameses, Ramesses, Ramses, Ramees, Ramees, Ramees, and Egyptos. But most of these appellations were probably titular. Thus, Sesostris may be *Sesostris-t-R-E*, which signifies, *floris domini, domini salis*; Sesoscois may, in like manner, be a corruption for *Sesostris-t-R-E*, *floris domini dominorum*; and Rameses or Ramees, derived from RE, set, and MRS, *signare*, may signify *Begotten by the Sun*. But it is not always possible to render ancient Egyptian names according to the grammatical rules established in the Coptic language, and, therefore, such etymologies as these now proposed are to be received as purely conjectural. The common designation of this monarch on the monuments is *Ramees-t-R-E*, *Ramees begotten by Ammon*, or, adopting the etymology of Ramees just proposed, *Begotten by the Sun*.
4 Beloved of Amun; in which case both appellations would be merely titular. Vide Sir W. Drummond's *Origines*, book iv., chap. 13, and Champollion's *Praeface au Systeme Hieroglyphique*, p. 225., Paris, 1824.
5 Manetho apud Euseb. Chron. lib. i., in *Manetho apud Josephum contra Appioniens*, lib. i., p. 1053, this monarch is indifferently called Ramees and Ramees.
6 Chronologists have been unable to fix the precise date of the reign of Sesostris. Larcher, the celebrated translator of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, adopts and defends with much warmth the chronography of Herodotus; while others, rejecting the authority of the father of history, endeavour to determine the era of the Egyptian monarch from the scanty data furnished by Diodorus and Strabo. The objections to the conclusions of Larcher, stated by Sir William Drummond in his *Origines*, book iv., chap. 13, appear to be perfectly unanswerable. Sesostris, however, did not create the military spirit to which he appears afterwards to have given such ample development. This was in a great measure the work of his father, Amenophis III., who, shortly after the birth of his son, is said to have assembled all the male children born on the same day, and to have given them the same education. No distinction was made between the young prince and his companions. They were alike engaged in the same studies; trained to the same exercises, insured to the same hardships, and instructed in the use of the same arms. A rigid discipline prescribed unremitting exertion, while daily privations and fatigue hardened and prepared them for the duties of war. In establishing this military seminary, Amenophis appears to have intended placing around his son a faithful band of soldiers, attached to him by the associations of early friendship, and the ties of brotherhood in arms. Nor did the result disappoint his expectations. Arrived at manhood, the prince and his companions soon evinced how much they had profited by their education,—how well they merited the confidence reposed in them. With bodies rendered vigorous and athletic by labour and exercise, and with minds cultivated by the best studies, they were already fitted to act both as soldiers and as generals, to serve with energy, or to command with skill. Sent by his father at an early age to command an expedition against the Arabians, the prince, accustomed, as well as his companions, to suffer long both from hunger and from thirst, could meet upon equal terms the wandering and yet unconquered tribes, who chiefly trusted for their defence to the barrenness of their inhospitable deserts. Arabia was subdued and annexed to the Egyptian monarchy. He afterwards directed his march to the west, and his father lived to see the greater part of Libya conquered by his victorious son.
When Sesostris mounted the throne, therefore, his military fame was established. The qualities of his mind, his dauntless courage, and his daring ambition, seemed to be announced by his personal appearance; and the people, no doubt, easily associated the character of the hero with the robust frame and gigantic stature of their new monarch. But it is more material to state, that the success of his arms, in his wars with the Arabians and Libyans, had inspired him with the hopes of making yet more extensive conquests; and, if we may credit the Greek historians, the perilous project of subjugating the world must have been already familiar to the mind of Sesostris when he succeeded to the crown. Amidst the burning sands of Libya, and in the depth of the Arabian deserts, the phantom of universal empire showed itself; and he vowed to pursue it.
His resolution being thus taken, no time appears to have been lost by the new sovereign in preparing his subjects for an enterprise, which could not be undertaken but in defiance of all the counsels of prudence. He caused various reports to be spread abroad, artfully attributing his project to other causes than his own ambition. His daughter Athyrts, famed for her wisdom, as a sort of Egyptian Cassandra, proclaimed the facility with which her father would conquer the earth: the success of the enterprise was prognosticated by omens, by sortilege, and by divination: and the people were reminded that, at the birth of Sesostris, Phtha had appeared to his father in a dream, and had predicted to Amenophis that the newborn boy should one day become master of the world.
Nor did the Egyptian king content himself with influencing opinion in his favour by means of prophecies, prodigies, and visions. His natural sense taught him that other and more rational precautions were necessary; that a king who is not popular at home, should not think of making conquests abroad. His first object, therefore, was to secure the affections of the Egyptians; and for this purpose he employed all those arts which, exercised by sovereigns, are so powerful in conciliating popular favour. Some he won by his munificence, others by his clemency; the selfish were secured by his liberality, the vain were flattered by his condescension and affability; even traitors to the royal authority were allowed to escape with impunity, and public debtors were liberated from the prisons in which they were confined.
On the other hand, that he might provide for the tranquillity of his kingdom, and leave none behind him who either would or could attempt a revolution in his absence, he made a partition of power among the chief men of the nation, dividing the whole territory of Egypt into thirty-six nomes or prefectures, over which he appointed as many governors, each of whom was charged with the collection of the royal revenues, and the administration of the laws within his own particular district. He at the same time elevated his brother Armais to the rank of regent of the kingdom; and, except that this prince might not wear the royal diadem, he was permitted to assume all the pomp of a monarch; an indulgence which he so far abused as to usurp the crown in the king's absence, and to attempt his life on his return home from his long and perilous expedition.
Having completed these and other necessary arrangements, Sesostris next proceeded to raise an army. The peace establishment of the kingdom, as previously organized by this prince, appears to have consisted of a numerous militia, divided into two classes, denominated kalasiries and harmatopoi, and amounting, according to Herodotus, to 410,000 men, distributed throughout the different provinces as a species of military colonists, each man being allowed a portion of land adequate to the maintenance of himself and family. This formed the nucleus of the mighty force which Sesostris now raised for the conquest of the world, consisting, if we may believe Diodorus Siculus, of 600,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 27,000 war chariots; a force certainly equal to the magnitude of the enterprise in which he was about to engage, though it is difficult to conceive how the population of a small country like Egypt, supposing it ever so dense, could have supplied so vast a body of men, exceeding, by more than 200,000, the numerical strength of the army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia, and which was by far the largest ever assembled in modern times. No precise information has reached us as to the composition, organization, and discipline of this expeditionary army. We only learn, incidentally as it were, that the king chose as the leaders of his less experienced troops, the companions of his youth, trained, like himself, to the use of arms, and exceeding 1700 in number; that disgrace or infamy was attached to disobedience of orders and neglect of duty, and that meritorious or valorous deeds were liberally rewarded; circumstances which, taken in connection with the particulars above stated, seem to warrant the conclusion, that the military system of Egypt had reached no small degree of improvement, and that the science of war, in all its branches, had made considerable advances. With
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1 Sesostris was four cubits and four palms, or about seven feet in height, and seemed formed by nature to sustain all the toils and fatigues to which his active life was afterwards exposed. Diodorus, lib. i. sect. 55. 2 Drummond's Origines, book iv. c. 13. 3 Diodor. Sic. lib. i. sect. 53. 4 Diodor. Sic. lib. i. sect. 54. 5 Drummond's Origines, loc. cit. a view to the ulterior objects of the expedition, Sesostris also collected or fitted out a fleet of 400 sail; and the ships are said to have been of large dimensions, adapted to the purposes both of war and transport.
With these immense preparations the warlike monarch at length commenced his perilous enterprise. He invaded Ethiopia, and compelled the inhabitants to pay him a tribute in ebony, gold, and ivory. Even the ferocious Troglodytes yielded to the conqueror. Advancing farther to the southward, he passed the frontiers of Ethiopia, and entered the country extending beyond Semasar to the Mountains of the Moon, where he left various monuments both of his power and of his piety. In the Straits of Dira or Babelmandeb he joined his fleet, consisting, as above stated, of 400 sail, which had already compelled the inhabitants of the islands in the Erythrean Sea, and of the adjacent continent, to acknowledge his authority. The victorious monarch next proceeded to India, which he completely overran, extending his conquests beyond the Ganges, and subduing some of the countries which lie between that river and the Eastern Ocean. He then directed his course towards the country of the five rivers or Punjab; crossed the immense reticulation of streams, which ultimately unite their waters with the Indus; and ascended the table-land of central Asia. Nor were the Scythian nations able to resist the torrent as it rolled westward through Tartary, behind the mountains of Imaus, and north of the Caspian, to the river Tanais and the Palus Mocotis. Having entered Europe, Sesostris passed through Sarmatia, Dacia, and Mæcia, nor halted until he arrived in Thrace, where he erected columns to perpetuate the memory of his victories, and to prove the extent of his conquests. From Thrace he crossed over into Asia Minor, and advanced into the plains of Colchis (rendered so famous in Grecian story by the expedition of the Argonauts and the fable of the golden fleece), where he founded a colony on the banks of the Phasis, and erected monuments, some of which were in existence in the age of Herodotus. He then marched against the Assyrian empire, which he conquered, and thus seated himself on the throne which had been occupied by Ninus and Semiramis. Finally, surrounded with the trophies of victory, and enriched with the spoils of nations, Sesostris returned to Egypt in triumph, after having been thirty years engaged in an expedition, undertaken in defiance of all the dictates of prudence, yet, if we believe the concurrent testimony of historians, terminated without a single reverse of fortune. Such is the military story of the renowned Rhamses. That it involves many improbabilities is obvious; but what portion of ancient history is free of them? Mankind, in every age of the world, have taken delight in the marvellous; and if the ancients appear to have been pleased with reading romances in history, the moderns seem equally disposed to read history in romances. The great difficulty in forming an accurate judgment as to the story of the Egyptian monarch arises from the total want of details. We hear nothing of the generals to whom he was opposed, of the cities which he besieged, nor even of the battles which he fought. Historians relate his triumphs, but are silent respecting the skill which obtained them. At the same time, it cannot reasonably be doubted, we think, that there is a large substratum of truth in the narratives which have reached us respecting this extraordinary personage. By the concurrent testimony of the ancient authors, confirmed by the evidence derived from the Egyptian monuments, he is represented as a great warrior and conqueror; as the first, and, we may almost add, the last, of the Pharaohs who pursued the phantom of military renown, and sought for glory in distant expeditions; nor are there wanting circumstances which warrant the conclusion, that he overran some countries, conquered others, and left traces of his progress in many parts both of Asia and Europe. That he established a regular army, and provided a fleet to co-operate with it in his expedition against the countries of the East, are facts which seem to be as well attested as any in ancient history.
"C'est chez les peuples d'Asie, chez les Perses sur-Persan tout," says Guibert, "que l'art de la guerre commença à armes prendre quelque consistence;" but he adds, "après la mort de Cyrus, le luxe lui fit quitter la Perse, et il passa chez les Grecs." This remark, however, must be taken with some important qualifications. As a general proposition, it is doubtless true that the military art first assumed consistence among the Asiatic nations, particularly the Persians; for the warlike spirit of Egypt seems to have expired with its first and only conqueror. But it is utterly absurd to maintain that the death of Cyrus was productive of any change in the military system of Persia, or that this event led to the transference which Guibert has so gratuitously supposed. Cyrus, in as far as we are able to distinguish his character, and form a judgment
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1 Origines, ubi supra. 2 Diodorus, lib. i. sect. 54 and 55; Strabo, lib. xvi.; Herodotus, lib. ii. c. 163 and 110; Manetho apud Joseph. contr. Apion.; Julius Africanus apud Symmachum. In all the countries through which he passed, Sesostris left monuments behind him; and where he encountered serious resistance, the columns he erected bore this inscription: "Sesostris, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, has subdued this region by force of arms." Diodorus, ibid. 3 The information given to Germanicus when he visited the ruins of Thebes, by some of the elder Egyptian priests, relative to this monument, and the military establishment he had created, is thus recorded by Tacitus in the second book of his Annals: "Max (Germanicus) visit veterum Thebae magnum vestigia; et manebant structis melibus litterae Ægyptiae, praecore opulentiam complecti; jussumque e senioribus sacrorum patriae sermone interpretari referentem habuisse quaedam septaginta edificia statui militari, atque eo cum exercitu regem Rhamsen Libyæ, Æthiopiam, Medique et Persiam, Bactriam ac Scytham potuisse; quaque terras Suri, Armeneque et contiguæ Cappadociæ colunt, inde Bithyniam, hinc Lydiam ad mare imperio teneant," &c. The strength of the army of Sesostris, as here stated, very nearly coincides with the amount given in the text, on the authority of Diodorus. According to the latter, this army consisted of 600,000 infantry, 24,000 horse, and 27,000 armed chariots; which, as at least three men fought in one chariot, would make a total of 693,000 men, or only 5000 less than the number reported by the priests to Germanicus on the faith of the monuments. 4 Origines, ubi supra. "It would be in vain," says Sir William Drummond, "to deny to the traditions of ages, to the records of history, and to the authority of monuments, that Sesostris must have been one of the greatest princes that ever lived; while we may fairly confess our doubts of the extent of his conquests, and acknowledge that we cannot ascertain at what period he flourished. The existence of the monarch we may consider as certain; and some of the achievements of the conqueror we may admit to be probable, though we cannot fail to perceive, that the number of his triumphs has been amplified by exaggeration, and the history of his reign crowded with fictions. It is known that the great Ramesses or Rameses created at least one obelisk, on which he announced himself to be loved and gifted by all the gods of Egypt; but it may be questioned whether he had a right to call himself the master of the whole habitable world. We may believe that Sesostris obtained many victories, and subdued many regions; while we may still aver that we are unable to tell when this mighty monarch reigned, where were the limits of his empire, what humbled nations bowed down before his throne, or what captive kings were yoked to his triumphal car." 5 Essai Général de Tactique, vol. i. p. 61. of his achievements, appears to have been a wise prince, a warlike monarch, and a great conqueror; while the victories achieved by the Persians under his command, contrasted with the fatal reverses which they afterwards experienced, may induce superficial observers to imagine that the knowledge of the art declined after the hero's death. No opinion, however, can possibly be more erroneous; except, indeed, it be that which represents the Greek tactics as having been primarily derived from the Persian, to which, as will appear in the sequel, they bore not the slightest resemblance. The qualities of the Persian troops may, perhaps, have deteriorated, and, under the influence of luxury and refinement, the military character of the nation may have declined; but the system of organising armies and making war continued, in a great measure, unchanged: nor, as far as the military art is concerned, would it be easy to discover any material difference between the tactics of Cyrus, who was uniformly victorious, and those of Xerxes, Mardonius, and Darius, who experienced the most disastrous defeats. It should also be remembered, that the former led Asiatics against Asiatics, and that the nations he subdued were among the most effeminate and voluptuous of the ancient world: whilst the latter were called to contend with the Greeks in their best days, when their bodies were robust, their hearts strong, and their discipline admirable; and when their armies were commanded by men fired alike with the love of liberty and of glory, and not only conversant with the science of war, theoretically considered, but eminently skilful in all those resources which neutralize superiority of numbers, and enable handfuls of men to snatch the victory from masses apparently overwhelming and invincible.
The strength of the Persian army consisted in its cavalry, which was always of excellent quality, and capable of achieving great things had it been properly commanded. This was emphatically evinced at the passage of the Granicus, where its gallant conduct attracted the admiration of every officer in the Macedonian army, from the king to the humblest dilochite in the ranks. Notwithstanding the absurd principle upon which it was formed, and the total want of support, owing to the treachery or terror of the Greeks in the pay of Darius, who had been brought forward to sustain it, this cavalry bravely disputed the passage; drove Ptolemy, who commanded the vanguard of the Macedonian army, back into the river; charged the heads of the columns as they successively ascended the bank in order to deploy, with the utmost impetuosity; and maintained the combat until it was attacked by the formidable phalanx in front, and by the light infantry on both flanks, when it was at length forced to retire. The Persian infantry had none of the qualities for which the cavalry was distinguished, and seems, in fact, to have been little better than a military mob, without coherence or solidity; while the vast numbers of this arm which were commonly brought into the field impeded the action of the cavalry, which they were incapable of supporting, and served only to create confusion, and supply food for the slaughter, when opposed to disciplined armies commanded by men conversant with military combinations.
Marathon, Platæa, and Mycale, all bear witness to the truth of this observation. The war-chariots formed another source of disorder and weakness. Their number, like that of the infantry, was excessive; and as these vehicles could only act upon level ground, they were altogether useless and unavailable in a broken country, or against a skilful commander. With regard to the numerical strength of the Persian armies, we have no precise information, and can only form a conjecture from the statements, almost always exaggerated, of the Greek historians as to the numbers actually brought into the field. Xerxes, who had taken by descent a hereditary hatred of the Greeks, invaded Europe, it is said, and entered Greece at the head of an army, which, with its retinue of servants, eunuchs, and women, amounted to upwards of 5,000,000 of souls; a statement which, if true, would imply that the Persian nation had risen en masse to overrun the countries of the West. Yet this vast multitude, or rather horde, was arrested in its progress by 300 Spartans at the pass of Thermopylae; and that mountain gorge would have become the scene of its total defeat and destruction, had not a base Trachinian betrayed this devoted band of heroes, and enabled the Persians to attack it at once in the front, the flank, and the rear. At Marathon, Datis and Artaphernes, lieutenants of the Great King, brought into the field 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse, which were beaten by 10,000 Athenian infantry and 1000 Platean auxiliaries, commanded by Miltiades. At Platæa, the Persian force, consisting in all of 300,000 men, was again defeated with great loss by a handful of Lacedemonians and Athenians under Pausanias. And at the battle of Mycale, fought on the same day with that of Platæa (22d September 479 B.C.), 100,000 men, the wrecks of that portion of the army more immediately under the command of Xerxes, which had just returned from the unsuccessful expedition to Greece, were completely overthrown and dispersed by a small body of Greeks, who stormed their entrenched camp, slaughtered several thousands, and carried off an immense booty. On comparing these various numbers, and making due allowance for casualties, it would appear that the Persian monarch must have entered Greece with about 600,000 fighting men; an enormous force numerically considered, but not too great to provoke incredulity, when we reflect on the mode in which the eastern nations have always made war, and further take into account the circumstance, that nearly the whole of one reign and part of another were consumed in making preparations for this ill-fated expedition.
Of the state of the Persian army in the reign of Alexander, Arrian has furnished us with many important particulars, especially in his account of the battle of Arbela, which is the more interesting, as it gives us some insight respecting the Persian tactics under the last Darius. According to this writer, who had consulted the memoirs of Ptolemy, one of Alexander's generals, but who, nevertheless, seems to have possessed the Greek talent for exaggerating numbers, the army which Darius brought into
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1 The achievements of Cyrus, like those of Sesostris, have been so exaggerated by historians, and embellished by fabulists, that almost every grain of truth has to be separated from a bushel of fiction. The Cyropaedia is merely a philosophical romance, with no more of truth or fact in it than is sufficient to give verisimilitude to the story.
2 The Persian cavalry, 30,000 strong, was, on this occasion, commanded by Memnon, who drew it up in a single line of equal extent with that occupied by the Macedonian army on the other bank of the river. The ground on which it was posted sloped gradually towards the bank of the Granicus, which was here steep and difficult, and hence no position could have been chosen more favourable for the effective action of such a force. But its energies were paralysed, or, which comes nearly to the same thing, its full capabilities were never brought into play, in consequence of its linear formation, which admitted only of detached efforts, without ensemble or support. (Guizot, Memoires Militaires sur les Grecs et les Romains, tom. i. p. 251-258. Lyons, 1760.)
3 Guizot, ubi supra.
4 The total number of Persians engaged at Marathon was, according to Valerius Maximus (l.v. c. 4), 300,000; according to Justin (l. ii. c. 9), double this amount, or 600,000 men. No attention whatever is due to such extravagant exaggerations. the field on this occasion consisted of 1,000,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 chariots armed with scythes, and 15 elephants; a statement which appears equally incredible, whether we regard the absolute amount here assigned, or attend to the glaring disproportion between the relative numerical strength of the different arms. Quintus Curtius, who reduces the infantry to 600,000, and raises the cavalry to 145,000, exaggerates at least with method, and thus avoids an objection fatal to the numerical accuracy of the military historian. The disposition of this enormous force, as described by Arrian, shows the incongruous elements of which it was composed. According to the custom of the Persians, the king placed himself in the centre, having around him his relations and the officers of his court, with his ordinary guards, foot and horse, which sometimes amounted to 15,000 men. These he supported by a body of Greeks in his pay, upon whom he placed great reliance, and by other corps d'élite furnished by the native army. The Persians, the Susans, and the Candusians composed the left; on the right were the Syrians, the Assyrians, and other nations, subjects or allies of Persia; and the whole was formed into squares or masses of prodigious depth, evidently with the intention of resisting the compact formation of the Macedonian phalanx, of which the Persians had already had woeful experience. These different nations were variously armed, some with missile weapons, others with pikes, hatchets, maces, &c.; and cavalry were stationed in the intervals between the squares. The reserve was composed of those for whom no place could be found in the first line; and being drawn up too close to it, served only to augment the confusion. The infantry of the left was flanked by the main body of the Persian cavalry, and part of that of the Bactrians; together with two corps, one Scythian and the other Bactrian, a little in advance. On the right, the Armenian and the Cappadocian cavalry were posted in a similar manner, though not in equal force. Two hundred armed chariots were drawn up before the left, and fifty before the right of the infantry, while the elephants and fifty more chariots were placed in advance of the centre. Such was the disposition of the army of Darius on this memorable and decisive day. It was doubtless bad in many respects, particularly in the disproportionate crowding of all arms on the centre and left; while the right was left comparatively weak and uncovered; but its greatest defect, inseparable, perhaps, from the heterogeneous composition of the army, consisted in this, that the defeat of any one part of the line was certain to throw the whole into irretrievable disorder, and to end in a complete rout. Still it showed very considerable knowledge of the military art; while the battle which followed, and which was bravely contested, is even yet considered a study for tacticians.
From the earliest times, the genius of the Greeks, adventurous and free, inclined them to war. This, at first a consequence of their position, became in time an attribute of the national character, and gave rise to institutions which, in their turn, served to diffuse and confirm the spirit in which they had originated. Divided into a number of petty states, which were separated often by imaginary boundaries, and naturally jealous of one another, Greece was a scene of never-ending contention, and the theatre of almost continual war. New causes of difference, in the shape of injuries, encroachments, or insults, real or imaginary, were incessantly arising; and as each state was alike proud of itself, suspicious of its neighbours or rivals, and, above all, watchful of its independence, the wrong done, or believed to have been done, was promptly followed by retaliation, which again provoked a repetition of the offence, and thus led ultimately to war. Such a state of things naturally fostered a warlike spirit, and gave birth to military institutions; while the necessity of self-defence, still more than the love of conquest or of glory, rendered it imperative that every citizen capable of bearing arms should be ready to appear in the field at the call of his country. But experience soon taught the important lesson that numbers did not constitute strength, and that a small body of men prepared by early training for the duties of war, and subjected to a system of regular discipline, were capable of contending, on equal terms, with great numerical odds. When this discovery was first made, we have no means of ascertaining precisely; but it is one which must early have occurred to the rulers and governors of small states like those of Greece, the scanty population of which imposed upon them the necessity of devising the best means for rendering its disposable strength effective and available. Hence we find, that one great object of the early statesmen and legislators of this country was to organize a system of physical and moral education adapted to its peculiar position and circumstances; to engrain the military spirit on those institutions which were destined to form the general character of their countrymen; and, amidst the pursuits of peace, to prepare the minds and bodies of their citizens for encountering the fatigues, privations, and perils of war. Nor did their labours prove fruitless or vain; for the institutions thus prepared being suited alike to the genius and condition of the people, soon struck their roots, as it were, into the soil, and ere long produced those fruits which have for ages been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But less perhaps of this wonder and admiration is due to the bravery of the Greeks, eminent as it always was, than to their discipline, organization, and conduct in the field. Among them all the branches of the military art were simultaneously cultivated, and received the most important improvements. Their formation was rendered compact and formidable; combining solidity and the power of resistance, with a mobility which made these qualities available on different points, even in action. Their tactics were singularly adapted to the peculiar character of their troops, and were founded on the most certain principles of the art. And, in later times, we find strategy recognised and taught as a science in the schools; while, in the field, it received, in several respects, a development which no other nation, ancient or modern, has yet been able to surpass. Lastly, we may observe, that until the reign of Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, Greece had no standing army. Her strength consisted in her militia; and to this description of force she was indebted for the imperishable glories of Marathon, Platrea, and Mycale, when the myriads of the Persian invader were successively overthrown. But, from the causes above indicated, and the incessant contests in which the different states were engaged with each other, this militia had acquired the principal characteristics of a regular force, both as regards
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1 Guiscard, Mémoires Militaires sur les Grecs et les Romains, tom. I. p. 260-61. 2 Guibert, in his Discours Préaliminaire, part second, underrates the tactics of the Greeks. "Je compare les guerres des Grecs," says he, "et la plupart des guerres des anciens, à celles de nos colonies dans l'autre continent. J'y vois cinq ou six mille hommes les uns contre les autres, des champs de bataille étroits, où l'œil du général peut tout embrasser, tout diriger, tout réparer. Un bon major conduirait aujourd'hui la manœuvre de Leucate et de Mantinea, comme Epaminondas," p. 82. It will be fortunate for modern armies when their "good majors" are as skilful and as brave as Epaminondas. 3 Guiscard, Mémoires Militaires, tom. II. p. 155. organization and discipline, and consequently was of nearly equal avail against an enemy in the field.
To the institutions of Lycurgus Sparta was indebted for her military pre-eminence among the states of Greece. To exclude all refinement and luxury, to cultivate the sterner virtues of abstinence and self-denial, to inure the body to hardships and the mind to suffering, to inculcate self-sacrificing patriotism, and to form great characters, appear to have been the principal objects of this iron-hearted legislator; who accordingly laid the foundations of his institutions in a system of primary education, intended and calculated to convert the free male population of the state into a military community, and to develop to the utmost all those physical and moral qualities which render men invincible in war. Nor did the results disappoint the calculations upon which this system had been founded. Trained from their earliest years to suffer the extremes of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, to endure pain with unflinching fortitude, and to despise danger and death; habituated to the most implicit and unquestioning obedience to all placed in authority over them; and continually exercised in running, wrestling, swimming, ball-playing, and martial games of all sorts, as well as in stratagems, surprises, and ambuscades; the Spartan youth, when called to take the field, were prepared at once to enter upon the duties of war with alacrity and vigour, and to regard with indifference all the privations and fatigues of the severest campaign. Nor were their discipline and organization inferior to their military qualities. The Spartan phalanx, which formed the basis of the Macedonian, consisted of eight files in depth. The files were placed at intervals of six feet from one another when disposed in open order; in close order the distance was three feet; in locked order one foot and a half; the intervals being thus diminished one-half at each approximation. The open order was that observed on the march, and in evolutions or manoeuvres; the close order was for the attack; and the locked order was that in which an attack was received. The front rank consisted of picked men; the rear rank was also select; while those upon whom least dependence could be placed had their station in the centre, in order to give impetus and momentum to the column by their weight and physical power. The different parts of the phalanx were classed according to a regular system, and, in particular, the covering file was matched in quality as nearly as possible with the file in front; so that if the whole or any part of the front rank failed, the vacancies were supplied by the second files, without disordering the line. The arms, offensive and defensive, of the soldier, consisted of a spear or pike, a short sword or dagger, and a shield or buckler of an oval form, which was fastened round the neck and at the left shoulder by means of straps. But latterly Cleomenes changed this clumsy encumbrance for the Macedonian shield, originally invented by the Carians, which was fastened on the left arm by a ring or belt, so as to leave the soldier free to employ both hands in giving force and direction to the pike. The Spartans were also familiar with the most approved evolutions, which they performed with equal celerity and precision. The rear of the phalanx became the front, or the front the rear, by the shortest and simplest operation; while, by redoubling its formation, it became a solid square, bristling on every side with pikes, and, in locked order, wholly impenetrable to attack, except upon broken ground. Rapid changes of front even in the presence of an enemy, refusing or advancing a wing at a critical moment, turning an enemy's flank, and many other manoeuvres, which are still considered equally delicate and difficult, were frequently executed with the most complete success by the commanders of these formidable columns. In a word, the Spartans may be regarded as the founders and first improvers of that military system, which attained its perfection under Alexander, and placed the crowns of Asia at his feet.
The Athenian military force consisted of three classes; the first, the heavy troops, armed with a spear, a dagger, a cuirass or corslet, and an oval shield, and reserved for the phalanx or main battle; secondly, the light troops, armed with a light spear, a javelin, and a target, and destined for skirmishing, seizing or maintaining positions, and covering the movements of the phalanx; thirdly, irregular troops, without defensive armour, but provided with missile weapons, such as javelins, bows and arrows, and slings, for harassing an enemy on his march, or performing the duties of light troops in the field. The phalanx or main battle consisted entirely
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1 There is some confusion among the ancient writers on the subject of the division of the Spartan force. Thucydides, describing the arrangement and proportions of the Spartan army at Mantinea, informs us that a battalion or lochus consisted of four pentecostics or companies, a pentecostic of four enomoties or platoons, and each enomoty of 32 men; thus making the whole strength of the battalion 512 men. But he makes no mention of the number of battalions in a regiment, and indeed acknowledges that the subject was obscure, and his information imperfect. According to Xenophon, the Spartan enomoty or regiment consisted of four lochus, each of two pentecostics, and the pentecostic of two enomoties. The number included in the last denomination is not given; but, if we assume that it consisted of 32 men, as stated by the historian first named, the regiment of Xenophon would amount to 572 men, or 50 more than the battalion of Thucydides. How are these discrepancies to be reconciled? It is scarcely probable that the division of the Spartan forces underwent any change in the interval between the time of Thucydides and that of Xenophon; but it is very probable that neither may be correct, considering that the Spartans studiously concealed from the observation of foreigners the internal organization and strength of their armies.
2 The Spartan phalanx advanced to meet the enemy's at a regular step, in accord with the cadence of military music, and, even when beaten, generally retired from the field in perfect order, however reduced in number. After battle, every soldier was obliged to produce his shield, as a proof that he had fought, or retired, as a soldier ought to do, bravely and steadily. If he had lost or thrown away his shield he was disgraced for ever; the brand of indelible infamy was fixed upon him. But this was of rare occurrence; for the love of military glory was the only passion which the Spartan people were allowed to cherish; and both education and discipline had combined to eradicate fear from their bosoms. It was a word unknown in their vocabulary. In this singular country all passions merged in one. The Spartan mother and the Spartan wife rejoiced when a son or a husband had fallen honourably in the field of battle, and sometimes refused to recognise as of kindred with themselves such of their relatives as had survived a defeat. The only mourners on account of the disaster at Leuctra were those whose friends and kinsmen had escaped the slaughter of that bloody day.
3 These classes may be considered as analogous, the first to the grenadiers, the second to the light infantry, and the third to the riflemen or sharpshooters of modern armies. Their armour, however, was different at different times; for the Greeks, like the Romans, made several changes in this respect; and hence the apparent discrepancies which we meet with in the accounts of historians. For example, when Arran mentions the militia of the ancient Greeks, he speaks of the times which preceded the constitution and organization which Philip and Alexander the Great gave to their troops. The oval buckler, larger than common, and the long pike or sariss, were introduced by these sovereigns, and found to add incalculably both to the defensive and offensive power of the phalanx. Some of the Greeks, however, pleased themselves on not adopting the changes of Alexander; but Philoponens at length persuaded the Achaeans to lay aside their ancient arms, and assume those of the Macedonians. of natives of Attica, and was drawn up according to tribes or communities, probably with the view of exciting a generous rivalry in deeds of arms. The light armed troops were partly native and partly foreign; the slingers and archers were wholly foreign. The cavalry, like the heavy-armed infantry, consisted of natives alone, and were of a good description, being remarkably alert, intelligent, and enterprising. Thus composed, the Athenian army was prepared for every species of warfare, and equal to the most arduous achievements. The intelligence, activity, quick perception, and daring spirit of enterprise for which the native of Attica, the Frenchman of Greece, was distinguished, rendered him formidable in desultory warfare, alert in his movements, and prompt in taking advantage of every favourable circumstance; insomuch that the Athenian light troops foiled, and on some occasions even discomfited, the renowned Spartan phalanx. The Athenian phalanx was less compact than that of Sparta, and, owing to the character of the people, as much perhaps as to its formation, less adapted to receive and repel an attack; but in the charge it was perfectly irresistible. Its onset was terrible, and overthrew all before it. The cause of this must be sought in the difference of national character. The Spartan was chiefly celebrated for his passive, the Athenian for his active courage. Hence the one was powerful in resistance; the other formidable in attack. The Spartan was steady, devoted, and firm; the Athenian bold, enterprising, intelligent, and full of address and dexterity. If the one was less capable of resistance, the other was more ardent and impetuous; their military qualities were as opposite as their natural characters, but both were admirable of their kind; and if it had been possible to combine them together in equal proportions, perfect soldiers might have been formed, and a perfect army organized. The Athenians, we may observe, were the first of the Greeks who advanced upon the enemy at an accelerated pace corresponding to what is now called double-quick time. This innovation was first introduced by Miltiades at Marathon, in order to give increased momentum to the charge which he directed against the Persian masses; and it was consecrated in Athenian tactics by the glorious result of that ever memorable day.
But the very principles which had saved the states of Greece from foreign invasion, and enabled them to maintain their independence, were destined to form the basis of a military establishment, more formidable, because more complete in all its parts, than any which that or other countries had yet produced, and organized for the express purpose of serving as an instrument for subverting Grecian liberty. We allude of course to the Macedonian army in the reigns of Philip and his son Alexander the Great. The founder of this establishment, Philip of Macedon, was a man of unquestionable talents, of convenient principles, and of boundless ambition. Having improved his natural parts by associating with the scholars, statesmen, and philosophers of his age; and having been initiated into the scientific principles of the art of war under Epaminondas, the most celebrated master of the time; he was early fired with a love of military glory, and a lust of conquest and dominion. But although the brilliant period in the annals of the Greek states was past when Philip made his appearance, and these communities had already begun to show symptoms of decline, enough of the ancient spirit still remained to convince him, that, without creating new means, and organizing a force different from any which had yet existed, he could never hope to realise his ambitious projects, by rendering himself the master of Greece. The sagacity of Philip was fully on a level with his ambition. He saw that in the rude shepherds and hunters of Macedonia might be found the raw material of an army; that discipline and organization were alone wanting to convert this material into an invincible force; and that to render a military force completely effective, or, in other words, to derive from it the utmost benefit it was capable of affording, it was indispensably necessary to depart from the militia system which had hitherto prevailed, and to start from the principle that no army could be good which was not permanent. He was thus the first who fully comprehended the importance of a standing army, both as regards the efficiency of a military body itself, and also with reference to projects of conquest or ambition; and he may further claim the distinction of having been the first to organize a permanent force. In prosecuting this design he showed a skill, and a knowledge of the principles of military organization, equal to the sagacity evinced by its conception. Adopting the Spartan phalanx as the basis of his system, he gave it greater depth and solidity, so as to render it irresistible in the attack, and impenetrable when drawn up in position. He changed or improved its armour both for offence and defence; and, in particular, introduced the large oblong buckler, and the sarissa or Macedonian pike, the most formidable weapon of ancient times. The light-armed troops were also placed on a better footing than they had ever before been among the Greeks, being formed in demi-phalanges, which, without materially lessening their mobility, rendered them capable of combining their efforts in an effective manner with those of the heavy-armed infantry. The equipments, arms, and discipline of his cavalry were in like manner improved, and their organization perfected, with the utmost care and diligence. In a word, all that was excellent in the different Greek systems was combined in the Macedonian; while their defects were avoided, and improvements introduced wherever these seemed to be either expedient or necessary. Such was the general character of the military establishment which Philip created for enabling him to trample on the liberties of Greece, and which Alexander employed in subjugating the world. We shall now speak of its different parts in detail.
The phalanx was composed of files of a certain depth, and of regular combinations of those files. The lochus or file was a number of soldiers ranged in line, one behind the other, from the head to the serre-file or outragus. The file consisted at different times of different numbers of men, as eight, ten, twelve, and sixteen. Alexander chose the last, because it formed the best proportion relative to the extent and depth of the phalanx; nor did it prevent the archers and slingers, stationed behind, from launching their missiles at the enemy, over the heads of the phalanxites. If the phalanx was doubled to form a solid column, or reduced to one half in order to extend its front, the respective depths of 32 and 8 still remained proportional; but if the original depth of the file had been only 8, as in the Spartan phalanx, the latter evolu-
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1 It is very much to be regretted that no military or scientific description has been preserved of the battle of Marathon. The accounts which have reached us, being written by men ignorant of military affairs, are meagre, confused, and unsatisfactory; containing details, indeed, of the numbers engaged, and the amount of the slain, but giving little or no information respecting the combinations and manoeuvres which decided the fortune of the day. One thing only is certain,—the victory was the result of consummate generalship on the part of the commander, and of heroic valour on that of the soldier.