tion could not have been performed with safety, because it would have reduced the depth to 4, and thus deprived the formation of its peculiar characteristic of solidity. The preference given to the number 16, therefore, was on account of its divisibility, and its admitting of evolutions consistently with the nature of the phalanx, which could not have been attempted with files composed of any other number, greater or less. The best man was chosen as the head of the file, and named lochagos or protostate; the second was called epistate; the third bore the same name as the first, the fourth the same as the second, and so on to the last; so that each file was composed of protostates and epistates, ranged alternately from the lochagos to the outrago, who was also a picked man. The junction of two or more files was denominated syzygism. It was effected by placing the protostates and epistates of the one exactly opposite the protostates and epistates of the other; and one man, considered in reference to his juxtaposition with another, was called parastate. The junction of all the files formed the phalanx; of which, therefore, the lochagi, or heads of files, constituted the front rank, and the remaining perastates in alignment, as far as the outrago or serre-files, the depth.
The phalanx, thus composed, was divided into two equal parts; one called the right wing or head, and the other the left wing or rear. The point of separation or division was variously denominated the navel, the mouth, and the jointure of the phalanx. And as the principle of this formation was, that every combination should be divisible into two equal parts, so the phalanx, as finally constituted by Alexander, was composed of 16,384 heavy-armed men, the half of which number was considered sufficient for light troops, and the half of that again, or the fourth of 16,384, sufficient for cavalry; while the divisibility into equal parts afforded great facility for executing with precision all manner of evolutions, and extending or diminishing at pleasure the front of an army. The total number of the phalanx being, as already stated, 16,384, and each file consisting of 16 men, it follows that there were in all 1024 files. But each combination of files had its peculiar and appropriate denomination. Two files united formed a dilochite, under a dilochite; four files, a tetarchie, under a tetrarch; two tetrarchies, a taxiarchie, under a taxiarcho or centurion; two taxiarchies, a syntagma or xenagie, under a syntagmatarch or xenagio; two syntagmata, a pentecosiarchie, under a pentecosiarch; two pentecosiarchies, a chiliarchie; two chiliarchies, a merarchie or telarchie; and two merarchies, a phalanx of 4096 men in 256 files, which was commanded by a general, under the name of phalangarch. Again, two phalanges formed a diphalangarchie; and two diphalangarchies, a tetraphalangarchie, or the grand phalanx, which thus consisted of two wings or diphalangarchies, four phalanges, eight merarchies, 16 chiliarchies, 32 pentecosiarchies, 64 syntagmata, 128 taxiarchies, 256 tetrarchies, 512 dilochies, 1024 files, and 16,384 men. The front might be extended by simply augmenting the distance between the files; the phalanx was closed by lessening the distances between the ranks and the files, and thus diminishing both its front and its depth. Its locked order was called synopism, in which the ranks and files were so closely approximated, that the soldier could not turn. In this formation the men at the exterior of the mass held their bucklers before them; the next rank raised their bucklers over the heads of those immediately in front of them; the third rank held their bucklers over the heads of the second, and so on; thus forming a sort of roof, over which the archers in the rear sometimes passed to the front, and which, from the bucklers being joined like the scales of a crocodile, resisted and threw off the heaviest missiles discharged by the enemy. As everything depended on the steadiness of the heads of files and their epistates of the second rank, both were gens d'élite or picked men. When the phalanx was closed for action, each man occupied only three feet of ground in rank and file. The pikes or sarissae were 24 feet in length, 6 feet being behind and 18 feet before the grasp; consequently (as the ranks were three feet separate), the second rank advanced the pike 15 feet, the third 12, the fourth 9, the fifth 6, and the sixth 3 feet; thus presenting an array of points such as never bristled along the front of any other military mass or column. The soldiers of the other ranks, as they could not employ their pikes, pushed on those before them, and, by their weight, served to augment the violence of the shock. In this case everything depended on the serre-files or outragi, who were the keys of the phalanx, and, like the lochagi, picked men. Such was the Macedonian phalanx, which was destined to conquer the world, and to be, in its turn, conquered by the world's conquerors. It yielded to superior tactics and greater mobility.
The light-armed infantry were drawn up in different ways, according to the nature of the ground and the dis-
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1 Some authors designate a file stichos, others decuria. They who apply the latter epithet seem to suppose that it consisted of ten men, which is not true as respects the Macedonian file. We have followed, in the text, the nomenclature of Arrian, whose authority on this subject is decisive. With regard to the term decuria, which has so much puzzled commentators, we have already shown that it means something different from a file, or part of a file. It was a term peculiar to the military system of Sparta, whence it passed into the other systems of Greece, including the Macedonian; but no data have been given from which its precise import can be ascertained.
2 The syntagmas or xenagiae had four supernumerary men; a standard-bearer, an officer who marched behind and performed the duty of our major, an adjutant, and a crier to repeat the orders. This section, ranged in order of battle, formed a perfect square. (Arrian's Tactics.)
3 The pentecosiarchie of the Macedonians answered to the lochus of the Spartans. This must be kept in mind in the perusal of Thucydides and Xenophon, otherwise both will be unintelligible.
4 It was to this locked order that Epaminondas was indebted for the victories which he gained over the Lacedemonians at Leuctra and at Mantinea. The Theban army was formed in columns of attack, upon a front considerably less than the depth. The shock, therefore, proved too much for the Spartan phalanx, which was only eight deep. Xenophon compares it to that of a heavy vessel striking a light one amidships with her bow, and dashing her to pieces by the collision.
5 The loss of men in the day of battle, or the necessity of sending out detachments, made no change in the form and disposition of the phalanx. The sections were always kept up to their full complement of ranks and files. The effective diminution fell, not upon the ranks and files, but upon the number of the sections, which were retrenched in proportion as they filled up the void in the phalanx.
6 The Macedonian phalanx, says Arrian, was as formidable in appearance as it was in reality; and Paulus Emilius confesses, that, when he saw, for the first time, this imposing mass, with its front bristling with the terrible sarissae, he was struck with consternation. Guiscardt alleges that it was "plus terrible à l'inspect que dans l'effet;" and adds that Paulus "ne laissa pas que de la battre avec ses Romains épars et distribués en plusieurs pelotons." But if Alexander had commanded it, the Roman would have told a different tale. Guiscardt has himself demonstrated that the loss of the battle of Cynocephale was mainly, if not exclusively, owing to the stupidity of Philip in committing the phalanx upon broken ground, where its flanks were uncovered, and the principal advantages of its formation lost. Army. position of the enemy; sometimes before the phalanx, sometimes behind it, sometimes on both wings, sometimes only on one. Their formation was in all respects similar to that of the phalanx, and their files, eight deep, were combined upon analogous principles. The Macedonian cavalry was of various descriptions, as kataphracti, light horse, and acroboliste. The kataphracti or cuirassiers were completely covered with defensive armour; the man with a cuirass and cuisses of iron scales, the horse with a frontlet and mail. Their offensive arm was the Macedonian pike. The light cavalry, unencumbered with heavy armour, carried lances and missile weapons. The acroboliste had no lances, and, like the Armenian or Turkish cavalry, used only the bow and arrow. They were a species of Cossacks or irregular horse, and performed the duties of such. The usual formation of the regular cavalry for attack was the cuneiform, which had been introduced by Philip, from an idea that it was the order best calculated to pierce an enemy's line; but they were sometimes drawn up in squares, sometimes in the form of a rhombus, and sometimes also in a line.
The numerical strength of the Macedonian, like that of other ancient armies, can only be conjectured from the numbers actually brought into the field. In the time of Philip it probably never exceeded a grand phalanx, with its proportional complements of light troops and cavalry, 28,603 in all, and a few thousands of auxiliary troops. At the passage of the Granicus, Alexander's army consisted of above 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry; from which we may conclude that it was composed of one grand phalanx, with its proportional complements of light troops and cavalry, and about 6000 auxiliaries. But it was afterwards powerfully reinforced; for Alexander paid great attention to recruiting, especially in Greece, and had always generals detached from the army for the purpose of raising new levies in that country. Accordingly we find that, at the battle of Arbela, the Macedonian army consisted of two grand phalanges, or 32,768 heavy armed infantry, two corps of peliastae, each 8186 strong, and 4096 cavalry, including the Thessalian horse, besides several thousand auxiliaries, chiefly irregular troops; thus making a grand total, including auxiliaries, of at least 60,000 fighting men, or 54,000 regular and 6000 irregular troops.
It has been supposed by some that this army, like that of Carthage, was heterogeneous in its composition; that men of all nations were to be found in its ranks; and that a stern, unrelaxing discipline constituted the only vinculum or tie by which the naturally discordant mass was held together. There cannot possibly be a greater mistake. The Macedonians, it is true, formed but the nucleus, as it were, of the army; and, both in the reigns of Philip and Alexander, recruits were obtained in considerable numbers from the neighbouring states of Greece. But whatever shades of difference might have been produced by local circumstances and diversity of institutions, the inhabitants of all these states were essentially one and the same people; identical in origin, distinguished by like peculiarities physical and moral, and possessing a general national character. In what respects, then, can the Macedonian army be considered heterogeneous? None but Greeks were admitted into the ranks of the phalanx, or those of the light infantry and cavalry; no barbarians were received even as auxiliaries. It was composed exclusively of people of the same country and the same general character, who all spoke dialects of the same language, shared a common temperament, and were distinguished by their physical configuration, no less than by their intellectual and moral attributes, from the inhabitants of the surrounding nations. If ever there was an army, therefore, which discipline could render more completely homogeneous than another, it was that of Macedon during the reigns of Philip and Alexander; nor do we know of any modern army to which this epithet can with equal justice be applied. The British army is composed of English, Scotch, Irish, Welch, and Highlanders; the French, of Bretons, Normans, Gascons, Alsatians, Savoyards, and many other tribes; the Austrian, of Hungarians, Bohemians, Transylvanians, Croatians, and Germans; the Prussian, of Silesians, Saxons, Poles, Pomeranians, and Brandenburgians; and the Russian, of Muscovites, Poles, Slavonians, Tartars, Circassians, Armenians, and innumerable other races; yet all these are considered national armies, and have each, in fact, a national character. But if such assemblages are to be regarded as homogeneous, we know not upon what principle the Macedonian army, composed exclusively of Greeks, can possibly be viewed in a different light, or supposed to have had no other bond of union than what was created by discipline alone.
The only other Greek armies which seem to require The notice are those of the Thebans and of the Achaean ban and League. The Theban army, like Theban independence, Achaean may be said to have been created by Epaminondas, and to have expired when that great captain fell in the arms of victory upon the field of Mantinea. Still it is a striking example of what genius and discipline may effect, even when called to work upon the most unpromising materials. Epaminondas found it a rabble, and he left it the most formidable military force which Greece had ever yet known. He gave it that organization which rendered it victorious at Leuctra and Mantinea, and which shook to the very foundation the power of the Lacedaemonians. Aware that the Spartan phalanx was invincible by any similar formation, and that he could only hope to prevail by bringing against it a greater concentration of physical energy, he organized the Theban army in columns upon a front less than their depth, so as to enable him to direct the whole or any part against a given point of the enemy's line, and to bear it down by an irresistible superiority of force; and he adapted his tactics to this organization. At the battle of Leuctra, accordingly, Epaminondas, observing the Lacedaemonians advance their two wings before the centre, so as to form the order which the Greeks called the half-moon, instantly attacked the centre of one of these wings, and, having penetrated it, soon succeeded in throwing the whole into irretrievable confusion. Here the onset was made by one wing in column against another in comparatively open formation; and hence the Theban order of attack became the oblique, which is erroneously supposed to be a discovery of modern times. At Mantinea the Lacedaemonians carefully avoided the blunder for which they had paid so dear at Leuctra, and kept their forces more concentrated; but Epaminondas, forming the whole of his infantry in a single column, precipitated it upon a part of the enemy's line, overthrew it, and thus decided the fortune of the day. The Theban army, immediately after the battle of Leuctra, is said to have amounted to 50,000 men. This, however, is probably an exaggeration.—With regard to the army of the Achaean League, it continued insignificant for
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1 For an able and learned account of the peliaster, who sometimes formed considerable bodies, particularly in the armies of Alexander and his successors, and whose reputation almost equalled that of the phalanx itself, see Guissardt's note to his Translation of Arrian's Tactics, in the second volume of his Memoires Militaires, p. 177. the greater part of a century after that celebrated confederacy was entered into. Aratus was the first who placed it on a respectable footing, and taught it to conquer at Caphysa; and he was succeeded by Philopoemen, incomparably the most scientific commander of ancient times, who completed its organization, and led it to victory at the second battle of Mantinea, where the Spartans, under Machanidas, were completely defeated, and the tyrant himself slain by the hand of the Achaean chief. This victory was exclusively owing to the superior tactics and dispositions of Philopoemen; who, instructed by the successes of the Romans, had contrived, with infinite skill, to combine, in the formation and arrangement of his troops, the advantages of the legionary order with those of the phalanx. The invaluable fragment of Polybius, containing a description of the battle of Mantinea, gives no account of the numbers engaged. We learn, however, that Philopoemen having assembled the troops of the League, spent eight months in perfecting their discipline and organization before he ventured to commit them in the field against so experienced and warlike an enemy as the Spartans. An army is a piece of mechanism which only acts effectively when all the parts are combined and adjusted together so as to insure the most complete concert and unity of operation; and discipline is the mean by which this important result is produced. It is in fact the art of creating a new power; and so great is its efficacy that it sometimes develops in men those qualities which it only professes to direct and regulate.
This remark is strikingly exemplified in the history of the Carthaginian army. That army was almost entirely composed of mercenaries, or at least of levies drawn from countries differing in language, in manners, in customs, and in character. In its ranks were to be found Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Boians, Insubrians, Etruscans, and various other races; yet such are the fusing effects of discipline, that this apparently heterogeneous mass vanquished the Romans on the Ticino; overthrew their legions in three pitched battles, at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannae; and, if Hannibal had known how to profit by victory, might have planted the Carthaginian standards amidst the ruins of Rome. The advantages of a truly national army are great, especially in reverses: it may be beaten, but cannot easily be destroyed; and even its disasters may teach it that experience which will ultimately conduct it to victory; as happened to the Romans in ancient, and to the Russians under Peter the Great, in modern times. But, on the other hand, many instances might be produced to show, that the most effective armies may be organized out of the most discordant and unpromising materials; and that, while nothing can supply the want of discipline, discipline can almost atone for and remedy every thing. With an army composed as we have already described, Hannibal maintained, during sixteen years, the war against the Romans in Italy, without sustaining any serious reverse; nor did he withdraw, until his presence was rendered necessary for the defence of his country; which the successive defeats of the other Carthaginian commanders, both by sea and land, had uncovered, and exposed in its turn to the attacks of an invader. Finally, he was vanquished at Zama from the same cause which had rendered him so often victorious—namely, superiority of discipline: for although his military genius never shone forth more transcendentally than in his last field, and although his dispositions were in all respects worthy of his high reputation, yet the raw and undisciplined levies which formed the strength, or rather the weakness, of his army, were in no condition to contend with the Roman legions, whom sixteen years of incessant warfare had improved both in discipline and experience. In reflecting upon the issue of this decisive conflict, which terminated the long and sanguinary struggle between the rival republics of Carthage and Rome; and, above all, in considering the precarious nature of that power which is built on the uncertain foundation of military glory; the mind insensibly passes from the contemplation of the fate of the Carthaginian chief to that of a still greater commander, which in some measure resembles it—from the days when these warlike republics contended for the empire of the world, to our own times, when, in a new field of Zama, another Scipio conquered another Hannibal.
With regard to the numerical strength of the Carthaginian army, it appears to have varied at different times. The force with which Xantippus defeated Regulus, and made him prisoner, did not probably exceed 20,000 men; and we learn incidentally that the heavy-armed infantry which the Lacedemonian had formed in phalanx, conformably to the tactics of his country, amounted to between 8000 and 9000 men, and were all native troops. But when the Carthaginians afterwards invaded Spain, they recruited their armies from the population of the country, and that of the neighbouring provinces of Gaul, until the total numerical strength of these must have considerably exceeded 100,000 men. Livy assures us that Hannibal set out on his expedition to Italy at the head of 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse, but that he lost 30,000 men in crossing the Alps; so that, according to the Roman historian, he must have entered Italy with about 80,000 men. But the numbers actually brought into the field completely disprove this statement: for it is admitted by Livy himself that, at Trebia, Hannibal had only 30,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and that he vanquished at Cannae with 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. We shall be nearer the truth, therefore, if we suppose that the invasion of Italy was undertaken with little more than half the number of troops mentioned by Livy; and that the losses sustained in crossing the Alps were, in a great measure, repaired by the recruits which Hannibal drew from the Boians, Insurrians, and his other allies; a supposition which seems completely borne out by the authority of Polybius. But when the Carthaginian general set out from New Carthage for Italy he left two other armies in Spain; and, if we assume these to have been each about 30,000 strong, while the force under his own command exceeded 50,000, it will follow that, at this time, the Carthaginians had considerably more than 100,000 men of all arms in the field.—Let us now attend to the composition and organization of that strictly national force with which these well-disciplined condottieri were called to contend, and by which, after sustaining many reverses, they were ultimately overthrown.
The army of Rome, in the days of her conquests, was perhaps the most perfect, certainly the most formidable, man army, which the world had yet seen; and the superiority which it ultimately obtained over the military force of every nation to which it was opposed, seems to have been exclusively owing to the pre-eminent excellence of its discipline and organization. "Nulla enim alia re videmus populum Romanum orbem subegisse terrarum," says Vegetius, " nisi armorum exercitio, disciplina castrorum, usuque militiae. Quid enim adversus Gallorum multitudinem paucitas Ro-
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1 See Guischard's commentary on this battle, Mémoires Militaires, tom. i. p. 177. 2 We must again refer to Guischard, tom. i. p. 216, more especially as this very able military commentator exposes the misrepresentations of Polard, who seems to have been alike incapable of comprehending the narrative of Polybius, or the dispositions of Hannibal. mana valuisset? Quid adversus Germanorum proceritatem brevitas potuisset audere? Hispanos quidem non tantum numero, sed etiam viribus corporum nostris praestitisse, manifestum est. A frorum dolis atque divitiis semper impares fuimus. Graecorum artibus prudentiaque nos vinci, nemo unquam dubitavit. Sed adversus omnia profuit tyronem solertem eligere, jus (ut ita dixerim) armorum docere, quotidiano exercitio roborare, quocunque evenire in acie, atque in praeliis possint, omnia in campstrei meditatio praecognoscere, severe in desides vindicare. Scientia enim rei bellicae, dimicandi nutrit audaciae. Nemo facere metuit, quod se bene didicisse confisi. Etenim in certamine bellorem, exercitata paucitas ad victoriam promptior est; rudis et indoceta multitudo, exposta semper ad cadem."
The military age was seventeen; and, when the exigencies of the state required it, every citizen, from seventeen to forty-six, or even fifty, was obliged to enrol himself as a soldier. Except on pressing emergencies, however, the more youthful part of the population was preferred, as that which could be most effectually trained to the exercises and formed to the discipline of war. These were of the most severe description, and had for their object not merely to instruct the soldier in the use of arms, in marching, and in evolutions, but to develope and improve to the utmost his physical powers; to inure him to labour, fatigue, and hardships of all kinds; to qualify him for surmounting with ease the various obstacles and difficulties incident to a state of active warfare; to give precision and rapidity to his movements; and, above all, to create that confidence in himself, and that unbounded reliance upon the efficiency of order, subordination, and combined action, which nourish audacity, yet temper it with coolness and steadiness. Besides the use of arms, of which we shall hereafter speak, the young soldier was, accordingly, trained to the exercises of running, leaping, vaulting, wrestling, and swimming, armed as well as unarmed: he was required to perform long and frequent marches, at the rate of four miles an hour, carrying a load of sixty pounds weight: he was carefully instructed in the use of the tools necessary for throwing up all manner of field-works, particularly fortifying the camp: and, even after he had been found qualified to join the legion, he was constantly employed, while in camp, either in the practice of these manly exercises, or in acquiring greater dexterity and precision in the use of his weapons. The Roman soldier knew no intervals of idleness, and was not allowed time to indulge in dissipation. The camp was his home; war was his business; its exercises formed his amusement: its success constituted his glory. In the legion to which he belonged were concentrated all his hopes, all his thoughts, and all his affections.
In raising troops to constitute the legions, the method adopted by the Romans was that which they denominated election; because the magistrates chose from the different tribes the citizens whom they considered best fitted for the military service. The consul or the praetor assembled in the Campus Martius, or in the Capitol, all the citizens, who were bound to concur in the formation of the legions, raised every year, conformably to a decree of the senate; and this obligation included all Romans within the age above specified, who had not served twenty campaigns as foot soldiers, or ten campaigns as horsemen or knights; with the exception, however, of the lowest class, which was exempted from military service on account of its poverty. The number of legions commonly raised was four; and the first step consisted in the appointment, either by the people or the consuls, of six tribunes to each legion. The conscripts being classed according to their tribes, the magistrate, charged with the levies, then elected four successively from each tribe. Of every four thus designed the tribunes of each legion in their turn chose one, whose name was immediately inscribed in its muster roll; and this operation, which established a perfect equality in the composition of the legions, was repeated until they had received their proper complement of men. On the termination of the election each legionary individually took the sacramentum or military oath; swearing to be obedient to his general, and to execute his commands in all things to the utmost of his power and ability. Nor was this a vain ceremony; for the Romans, trained up in the fear of the gods, had a peculiar reverence for the sanctity of an oath. Roman citizens alone were admitted into the legions, until the time when the civil wars led to the subversion of the republic, and the violation of all established rules. Those, however, who had completed the prescribed period of service, or had attained their fiftieth year, were no longer obliged to take arms in defence of the state, and were only liable to be called out in the event of the city being threatened with some imminent danger. But these brave veterans, habituated to a military life, frequently inscribed themselves as volunteers, and thus served both as models and examples to the young legionaries, who seldom failed to profit by their experience, and generally showed an ambition to come up to their standard.
As soon as the military oath had been administered, the tribunes dismissed the legionaries, having first indicated the time and place where they were afterwards to assemble in order to be embodied. At the general muster, on the day fixed for this purpose, the youngest and poorest in each legion were selected as velites; the next in order were chosen as hastati; the class immediately above constituted the principes; and the triarii were formed of the oldest and richest citizens elected to serve in the legions; the different classes being thus arranged according to their arms, their fortune, and their age. The legion was commonly composed of 1200 hastati, 1200 principes, 1200 velites, 600 triarii, and 300 cavalry or knights; thus making its total
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1 Vegetius, De Re Militari, L.i. c. i. Raphengii, 1697. 2 "Adolescentes legendii sunt, scit aut Sallustius: nam primum juventus, simul ae belli patiens erat, in castris per labores usu militiae discerat. Melius enim est, ut exercitatus juvenis causetatem neandum advenisse pugnandi, quam dolent praeterisse." (Vegetius, L.i. c. 4.) 3 A consular army consisted of two legions, and of a certain number of troops furnished by the socii or allies of Rome. The infantry of the allies, according to Polybius, did not surpass in number the legionary infantry in a consular army, but their cavalry was double the number of the knights. The fifth part of their infantry and the third part of their cavalry formed a corps d'élite, called extraordinary or elect, under the immediate orders of the consul; while the remainder of the social troops were divided into two corps, one called the right and the other the left wing. Hence a consular army consisted, in Roman troops, of 6500 legionaries of the line, 2400 velites, and 600 knights; in social troops, of 6700 infantry of the wings, 1700 extraordinary infantry, 500 cavalry of the wings, and 400 extraordinary cavalry; making a total of 18,900 men. But when Rome had a difficult war to carry on, two consular armies were raised, and both the consuls took the field; which, in fact, happened almost every year. Lastly, when urgent circumstances required it, the consular armies were doubled and united in order to contend with a formidable enemy. Thus the Romans assembled at Cannae four consular armies, or nearly 90,000 men, to try the fortune of arms against Hannibal; and, in the heat of the second Punic war, they raised as many as twenty-three legions, or considerably more than 100,000 men. "Alors," says Rogniat, "les armées se multiplièrent en raison de ce grand nombre de légions; les deux consuls choisissaient celles qui leur convenaient, et le commandement des autres était confié à des préteurs, à des préconsuls, et à des propriétaires." (Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre, p. 29, 30.) strength 4500 men. The tribunes, in concert with the centurions, divided the three classes of hastati, principes, triarii, into ten ranks, manipules, or companies each; the velites were distributed in equal portions among these thirty manipules; and the cavalry were divided into ten parts, called turmae or troops. Such is the account given by Polybius, who, doubtless, describes the legion as it was constituted in his time.
The hastati, so called from the hasta or spear with which they were originally armed, commonly formed the first line in the order of battle; the principes were placed in the second line; whilst the oldest and best legionaries, classed under the name of triarii, constituted a reserve in the third line. The triarii were originally the only troops armed with the pilum, a species of heavy javelin, which will be described hereafter; and hence they are sometimes designated by the ancient historians under the name of pilani, while the principes and hastati are denominated antepilani; but these denominations necessarily ceased when the three lines adopted the same arms. The velites, distributed among the maniples, as already mentioned, were the light infantry of the legion, of which they formed about a fourth part; and known at first under the name of rorarii and accessi, they were afterwards called velites, and ultimately ferentarii. But the reader must be careful not to confound these light troops, which always formed part of the legion, with the cohorts of archers and slingers attached to the armies in the time of Caesar; since the latter were merely auxiliary troops, and had nothing whatsoever in common with the legion.
The legionary cavalry, composed of a body of 300 horse, denominated the ala or wing, and forming about the twentieth part of the legion, was divided into ten turmae, of thirty horsemen each; while the turma was again subdivided into three decuriae, of ten cavaliers each; and the whole was chosen from among the equites or knights, who formed one of the first orders at Rome.
When the classification had been completed, the tribunes of each legion proceeded to the appointment of centurions. They commenced by naming ten first centurions in each class, except that of the velites; after which they proceeded to the nomination of an equal number of second centurions; and the legionary infantry being divided into ten maniples of hastati, ten of principes, and ten of triarii, among which the velites were equally distributed, they assigned a first and a second centurion to each maniple; the first commanding the right, and the second the left of the manipule, under the orders of the first, whose place he supplied in the case of absence or death. The tribunes also named three decurions in each of the ten turmae of horse; but the decurion first named had the sole command, and the two others were only his lieutenants. Thus a legion had sixty centurions or officers of infantry, thirty decurions or officers of cavalry, and six tribunes or officers of the staff. The tribunes commanded the legion each in his turn during two months; and this continued to be the practice until the epoch of the civil wars, when, for reasons sufficiently obvious, the command was intrusted to a legatus or lieutenant-general. The tribunes on service superintended the establishment and fortification of the camp, disposed the guards necessary for insuring its safety, transmitted to the centurions the orders of the general, took care that these were duly executed, and attended to the discipline and exercise of the troops; whilst the others were placed by the legatus or the consul at the head of detachments, reconnaissances, or foraging parties, and intrusted with the command of posts, or employed on particular missions, for raising contributions of money, provisions, clothing, and arms in the conquered countries; in a word, they were staff officers disposable for all kinds of service. The centurions were divided into several grades. Besides the distinction of first and second, established with reference to the manipule, they took precedence among themselves according to the relative distribution of the classes to which they belonged; so that a centurion of the triarii ranked above a centurion of the principes, and a centurion of the principes above a centurion of the hastati. And the first centurion of each class, that is, the primus hastati centurio, the primus princeps, and the primipilus or primipili centurio, commanded the whole of his class, or one of the lines of battle of the legion; which accounts for the high consideration that these three superior officers enjoyed among the Romans. They were commonly admitted to the council of the general, along with the tribunes; and the primipilus, the chief of all the centurions, by reason of the pre-eminence of his class, commanded the whole legion in the absence of the tribunes. Further, each centurion and decurion chose for himself, or received from the tribunes, a sub-officer to aid him in the details of the service; and we learn from Vegetius, that there was moreover placed at the head of each squad or tent of ten soldiers a decanus or corporal, who performed the duties of that humble rank.
Such was the constitution of the legion in the time of Polybius, the friend and contemporary of the second Scipio. But an important, we might almost say a radical, change in its organization was afterwards introduced; a change which has been ascribed to Marius, and which appears to have commenced at the epoch of the wars against Jugurtha. The legions then ceased to be ranged in lines of hastati, principes, and triarii; for the last order of battle, according to the ancient formation, of which historians give any account, is that of Metellus against Jugurtha, as described by Sallust. From this period we always find the legions ranged by cohorts, without distinction of classes, in a double or a triple line. The classification which had been originally occasioned by difference of arms no longer served any purpose, after all the troops of the line were armed in the same manner; except to divide the legion into three large bodies of about 1600 each, including the velites, which formed part of them. But experience proving that such bodies were too numerous to be easily directed by a single commander, and too heavy and lumbering for the exigencies of Roman tactics, their place was supplied by a number of smaller and more manageable bodies, and the legion, consequently, divided into ten cohorts, each consisting of three maniples, under six officers, who preserved their denomination and command in their respective maniples. The force of the cohort was raised from 400 to 600 men, thus making the total strength of the legionary infantry 6000; and the first cohort was composed of picked men, who were intrusted with the eagle, under the orders of the primipilus. A new order of battle was also adopted, the legions being commonly drawn up in two lines of five cohorts each, leaving small intervals between each cohort. But Caesar, justly considering these lacunae dangerous, and thinking the new formation deficient in solidity, preferred a continuous alignment, and recurred to the ancient formation in three lines, placing four cohorts of each legion in the first, three in the second, and three in the third line.
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1 Erant decani, decem militibus prepositi, qui nunc capit contubernal vocantur. (Vegetius, De Re Militari, l. ii. c. 2. See also Rogniat, Considerations sur l'Art de la Guerre, p. 7, et seqq. Paris, 1820.) The civil troubles which led to the subversion of the republic produced still further changes. For a time the legionary cavalry entirely disappeared, and their place was supplied by auxiliary horse: strangers, and even slaves, were admitted into the legions, the force of which varied from 4000 to 6000 men; and the social troops disappeared by the admission of all the natives of Italy to the rank of citizens. In the imperial times, as we learn from Vegetius, the legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry. The decimal division of the infantry into cohorts remained the same. "The cavalry," says Gibbon, speaking of that attached to an imperial legion, "without which the force of the legion would have remained imperfect, was divided into ten troops or squadrons; the first, as the companion of the first cohort, consisted of 132 men, whilst each of the other nine amounted only to 66: the entire establishment formed a regiment, if we may use the modern expression, of 726 horse, naturally connected with its respective legion, but occasionally separated to act in the line, and to compose a part of the wings of an army." This is at once clear and precise. But it has, nevertheless, been supposed, and not without reason, that when the legionary cavalry was augmented, the number of turmae was proportionally increased; and that no such inequality as that mentioned by Gibbon existed between the turmae attending the first cohort and those attached to the others. In fact the turma or squadron, at this period, consisted of 32, or, including the decurion, 33 men; and as the total number of cavalry belonging to the imperial legion was 726, it follows that there were in all twenty-two turmae, of which four, or 132 men, were attached to the first cohort, and two, or 66 men, to each of the remaining nine. The result in both cases, however, is the same; while Gibbon's statement may perhaps be preferred as proceeding upon the more ancient division.
The armour of the Roman infantry consisted of the demi-cylindrical buckler or shield, the cuirass or pectoral, the casque or helmet, and the orea or greave. The demi-cylindrical buckler or shield, four feet in length by two feet and a half in breadth, and constructed in the form of a tile, was composed of two or three pieces of timber fashioned and secured together in the manner of staves, covered with leather, strengthened at each extremity by a band of iron, and provided in the middle with an umbo or boss of metal, for the purpose of turning aside the missiles and pikes of the enemy. The casque, helmet, or head-piece of brass was variously formed, but generally fitted with projections at the base for protecting the neck and shoulders, and attached under the chin by mentonnières, covered with scales of brass. The cuirass or pectoral was a hollow plate of brass about a foot square, adapted to the form of the chest, and fastened with thongs of leather protected by metallic scales; but the centurions and foremost legionaries rendered themselves still more impenetrable to the steel of the enemy by using chain armour covered with brass scales. Lastly, the orea was a species of boot or greave, fortified with iron, and worn on the right leg, which the soldier advanced in striking his adversary. Their offensive arms were the javelin, the pilum or heavy dart, the pike, and the sword. The sword called Spanish was common to all the infantry of the legion. It had a short broad blade of excellent temper, which served either to cut or thrust, and was worn by the soldier on the right thigh. The javelin belonged exclusively to the light infantry or velites. It was a species of dart, with a round shaft about three feet in length and an inch in diameter, shot at one extremity with iron about four inches in length, and tapering to a very sharp point. In the day of battle the light troops had each seven of these weapons, which they launched at the enemy with much dexterity and precision. When it became necessary to have recourse to the sword before the whole or any part of the javelins were thrown, the soldier passed them to his left hand, which remained free in consequence of the buckler being attached to the left arm. The light troops were also provided with bows and arrows, and slings, which they used in skirmishing at a distance. The pilum or heavy dart, intended to serve principally as a missile, was originally borne by the triarii alone, whence the name of pilani, but was afterwards appropriated to the hastati and the principes. Its shaft was of such a thickness as to be easily grasped by the hand, and the weapon, including both wood and iron, was about seven feet in length. The iron, however, was of the same length as the wood, extending to the middle of the shaft, which was firmly inserted in it, and made fast by nails driven transversely; and it was of a square form, of an inch
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1 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. i. chap. iii. p. 13, 14, 8vo ed. 2 "The turma of the Romans," says the Count von Bismarck, "had, according to Vegetius, eight files and four ranks; ten turmae formed a legion; the distances between the turmae were equal to their front." (Cavalry Tactics, p. 275, Engl. transl.) It would be curious to learn in what edition of Vegetius the Count discovered that the turmae of the Romans had eight files and four ranks, and that ten turmae formed a legion, or brigade of infantry and cavalry united in very unequal proportions. Unless the Count has found out something to which the Romans themselves were strangers, he must have fancied that, in describing the formation of the infantry of the legion, Vegetius was speaking of the cavalry. 3 When the Roman soldiers threw their pilus or heavy darts, they had the left leg foremost; but when they engaged in close combat with the sword, they were taught to advance the right leg, which was accordingly protected by the iron-covered greave or boot above mentioned. (Vegetius, lib. ii. cap. 15 and 16; Justus Lipsius, lib. iii. dial. 2, De Mil. Rom.; Guischardt, tom. ii. p. 169.) 4 The gladius Hispaniensis is thus described by Polybius:—Αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἰππεῖναι, ἀριστεύοντας ἐν τῷ ἱππεῖναι πάντων. Εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὸν ἰππεῖναι ἰππεῖναι, ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἰππεῖναι ἰππεῖναι. The name of this weapon sufficiently indicates its origin. An unknown writer, quoted by Suidas, says that "the Celtiberians excelled all others in the manufacture of swords, strongly-pointed and double-edged; wherefore the Romans, laying aside the swords which had been in use among their ancestors, replaced them, in the time of Hannibal, with the Spanish blades." But (he adds) although they assumed the form, they were unable to imitate the temper of the steel and the beauty of the workmanship." Josephus says that, in his time, the Romans had two swords—one of considerable length, which hung at the left side, and another about a foot long, which they carried on the right thigh; in other words, a sword and a dirk, like the Scotch Highlanders. Similar changes in the arms of the soldiery may be remarked every century. 5 The Romans invariably gave the point, and derided the practice of those who depended on the cut rather than on the thrust. "Praterae non caesi," says Vegetius, "sed punctis ferire discant." Nam causim pugnantes non solum facie vicere, sed etiam de- risure Romani. Cassa enim quovis impetu veniat, non frequenter interfecti: cum et armis vitalis defendantur, et ossibus. At contra puncta, dum uncias adacta, mortalis est. Deinde dum cusa infertur, brachium dextrum latusque nudatur. Puncta autem tecto corpore infertur, et adversarium sauciat ante quem videtur." (De Re Militari, L. i. c. 12.) This, we believe, is still accounted sound doctrine of fence. 6 This seems to be the meaning of the Greek word ἀπολαμβάνειν, applied by Polybius to the shaft or helve of the pilum; for, taking it in its ordinary acceptation, the shaft of the pilum would have been four inches in diameter; a size which, considering the length of the weapon, and the weight of its iron, would have rendered it an impracticable arm. Dionysius of Halicarnassus confirms this opinion by describing the pilum as χαρακτήρες or weapons that completely fill the hand. Polybius compares this formidable arm of offence to a boar-spear. Army.
and a half at its greatest thickness, but its diameter gradually diminished to the point, which was exceedingly sharp, and near to which was placed a hook or barb, that served to retain the weapon wherever it penetrated. Besides this arm, which was necessarily heavy, the soldiers were sometimes provided with another of the same kind, but less massive both in the wood and the iron, which they held in the left hand, and discharged immediately after the former. The pilum was a weapon peculiar to the Romans. As soon as they came within a proper distance of the enemy, they began the combat by launching these heavy darts, with a force which, from their weight and the temper of the steel points, caused them frequently to penetrate both buckler and cuirass, so as to inflict the most hideous and desperate wounds. Having discharged these missiles, the legionaries instantly drew their swords and rushed upon the enemy with the utmost impetuosity, before he could recover from the effects of the volley of pila, by which his first ranks were generally overthrown. The pike of the triarii, a weapon equally adapted for attack or defence, onset or resistance, was longer, less thick, and consequently more manageable, than the pilum, which was of little use except at the moment of commencing battle. Armed with this weapon, the veteran reserve of the legion often awaited de pied ferme, the shock of cavalry as well as infantry; and Livy assures us that they seldom or never quitted their pikes in battle. "The triarii," says he, speaking of a particular occasion, "disfigured the faces of the Latins with their pikes, the points of which had been blunted in the combat." These troupes d'élite, therefore, may be considered as the pikemen of the legion; although instances are to be found where they abandoned the pike and had recourse to the sword, which was always the weapon in which the Romans placed the greatest confidence, and with which, indeed, their most celebrated feats in arms were achieved. It may be proper to add, that, although this description principally applies to the legion as constituted in the time of Polybius, and although great changes were subsequently introduced, yet the arms, offensive as well as defensive, of the legionaries, remained nearly the same; with this exception, however, that all the troops of the line were at length armed in precisely the same manner, namely, with the Spanish sword and the pilum.
The horse had very nearly the same armour as the foot, and they were latterly provided with offensive arms similar to those used by the cavalry of the Greeks; namely, with a lance, having a shaft resembling two cones joined together at their bases, and pointed at both extremities, and a long, large sword, suspended by a shoulder-belt at the right side. There was a time, indeed, when they had only slender lances, pointed at one extremity, and wore no cuirass; but experience soon showed the necessity of adopting the Greek arms and equipments. The Roman cavalry was generally composed of a superior description of men, denominated knights, who on all occasions displayed the greatest valour; but they seldom mustered in force sufficient to produce great results, and their organization appears to have been in many respects defective.
It is evident, that a man placed on the back of a horse, without a saddle, or stirrups to serve as a fulcrum for reaction, can never exert half his proper force, nor combine it effectively with the momentum acquired from the velocity and weight of his horse. "Ces cavaliers," says Rogniat, "ne pouvaient être choisis que parmi les chevaliers, qui formaient un des premiers ordres à Rome. L'état leur fournissait ordinairement des chevaux; mais, peu habitués à l'équitation, ou persuadés qu'on est plus fort à pied qu'à cheval, ils mettaient souvent pied à terre, pour prendre une part plus décisive aux combats sérieux. Telle était (he adds) l'opinion des Romains, de la supériorité de l'infanterie sur la cavalerie, que, non content de n'avoir qu'un petit nombre de cavaliers, ils les transformaient encore en fantassins dans les occasions critiques."
The Roman generals, even in the time of the consuls, do not seem to have followed any particular order of battle, but to have changed it according to circumstances, or the nature of the enemy they had to contend with. This is evinced by the various dispositions which were made at the battles of Tunis, of Cannae, of Zama, and many others that might be mentioned. But still the chequer order or quincunx was that most frequently employed in the earlier times of the republic; owing, doubtless, to the facility it afforded of forming line or column at pleasure. Leaving the velites or light troops out of view, as constituting no part of the main battle, the reader will observe that the manipules of the first line, or the hastati, were formed upon a front varying according to the depth, which was generally ten, but not unfrequently six; and that the interval between each manipule was exactly equal to its front. Thus, supposing the legion 5000 strong, a manipule of 140 men would be ranged ten deep upon a front of fourteen; and as each soldier occupied three feet, the extent of front presented by a manipule would accordingly be fourteen yards. Since the first line, therefore, consisted of ten maniples, it contained of course nine intervals of fourteen yards each; exactly opposite to which, but at a considerable distance in the rear, were stationed nine of the ten maniples of the second line, or principes, drawn up in the same manner as those of the first, upon fronts of equal extent: the tenth manipule of the latter outflanking by the whole length of its front the right or the left wing, as it might be, of the first line. The triarii, of less depth than the hastati and principes, but for the most part in continuous formation, occupied the third line. Now, it must be obvious at the first glance, that this order of battle presented several important advantages. By advancing the manipules of the principes through the above-mentioned intervals, until they dressed with those of the hastati, line was at once formed; again, by moving them fourteen yards either to the right or left, the depth of the formation was doubled; while, by placing the manipules of the triarii exactly behind those of the principes, as was done when the legions were menaced by elephants, the whole was formed into columns, separated into intervals equal to their respective fronts, through which these animals, pursued and goaded by the velites, might be driven to the rear, without doing
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1 For a particular description of the use of the pilum in commencing the attack, see Caesar's Commentaries de Bello Cæsari, lib. iii. cap. 92. The weight of this arm "ne permettait pas de le darder de loin," as Guisehardt says. It was the business of the velites to harass the enemy with their javelins and other missiles before the action became general. As the hostile lines approached, the light troops retired through the intervals or by the flanks, where they generally took their station; and when the former were within a short distance of each other, the hastati and principes darted their pilæ, and rushed on, sword in hand, to close combat. Hence the proverb employed by Vegetius to describe the proximity of two armies: Ad pilæ et spathæ ventum est.
2 Considerations sur l'Art de la Guerre, p. 10, 11. Paris, 1820.
3 The rank of the manipule being also drawn up at the distance of three feet from one another, the whole space occupied by the Roman soldier was consequently nine square feet of ground; and this open order was seldom departed from, even in the charge. It is to be observed, however, that the second rank of the manipule was so disposed as to cover the intervals of the first, the third to cover those of the second, the fourth to cover those of the third, and so on to the last; in other words, the arrangement of each manipule individually was a precise type of their collective disposition in order of battle. any mischief. Lastly, if it was desired to form the legion in three continuous lines, this was instantly effected by simply closing up the intervals between the manipules of the first and second lines; the triarii or reserve being, as we have already said, drawn up in a continuous formation, except when it became necessary to open a passage for elephants. And all these various evolutions were performed with a rapidity and precision which have seldom been equalled and never surpassed by the troops of any other nation.
At a later period, however, the Roman tacticians employed a different order of battle, distinguished for its greater compactness and solidity, as well as for the facility and rapidity with which it might be formed from the order of march, even in presence of the enemy. According to this method each manipule of the legion formed only a single rank in its order of battle; consequently the two classes of hastati and principes, ranged each upon its first manipule as a front, formed two lines ten deep. But as each man occupied three feet every way, and as the lines were separated by an interval equal to half the extent of their front, it is obvious that each line occupied a front of 120 yards, by from ten to twelve yards in depth; and that they were separated from each other by an interval of about 60 yards. Again, at an equal distance in rear of the principes, the triarii formed the reserve of the legion in the third line; and the whole, ranged in this manner in three lines, constituted a square order, as deep as it was broad; while the turmae of the cavalry covered the flanks of the lines, and the eagle or standard of the legion was intrusted to the keeping of the primipilus on the right of the line of the triarii. This order, usually denominated legio quadrata, was that adopted by all skilful generals when in presence of an enemy. But the different legions composing an army were ranged upon the same principle, with reference to one another, as the different ranks of the same legion; in other words, they were formed en echelon; each legionary line thus making one of the sections of the column, and the baggage occupying the intervals, while the velites covered the flanks. In this order of march, if the enemy threatened an attack on the front, each legion in succession formed line with that at the head of the column; the second almost in an instant, the third somewhat later, and the fourth, or the most remote, in about seven minutes, which were accounted sufficient for developing the order of battle on the front. But the order of battle on the flank was of still more rapid formation. For, the baggage withdrawing from between the sections, and assembling on the side opposite to the enemy, each legion executed what is technically called a quart de conversion on its hastati, and the whole army immediately found itself in order of battle; two minutes being sufficient for the performance of this simple evolution. It seems evident, then, that the celebrated quadratum agmen of the Romans, which has hitherto been so often treated of, and so little understood, consisted of a certain number of legiones quadratae disposed en echelon, or at least in column, as we have just described; and, from the advantages of this order of march, particularly its rapid convertibility into an order of battle either on the front or the flank, it is easy to understand the reason why the Roman historians have censured so severely the generals who neglected to adopt it in presence of the enemy. So much, then, for Roman tactics, as connected with the elementary formation of those brigades or divisions which constituted the units of Roman armies.
The distinguishing characteristic of the legion consisted in its astonishing mobility, united with its power of preserving its order of battle undisturbed, and of constantly rallying when forced to give way. It possessed a sort of flexibility which enabled it to adapt itself to every change and variety of circumstances; and no other military body, perhaps, ever executed so numerous evolutions in the presence of an enemy. Its attack was impetuous and formidable; but if that failed, it then displayed its most characteristic excellence, by fighting in retreat. In this way it vanquished the phalanx, although it was unable to withstand the direct shock of that dense body in the open field. At the battle where Flamininus defeated Philip in Thessaly, the Macedonian phalanx gained considerable ground on the legions; but the Romans, although forced to give way, preserved their order,—returned repeatedly to the charge,—and, even while in the act of retiring, extended their line so as to gain the flank of the Greeks. Philip durst neither accelerate his march, nor send out any detachment in pursuit; so that twenty manipules had time to turn his flank and fall upon his rear, which speedily decided the fate of the battle. As the phalanx acted with long pikes, and in close order, the least derangement caused by the ardour of the soldier in pursuit, or by inequality of ground in its march, necessarily exposed it to the legion; which, dividing itself into a number of separate corps with the same facility that it formed one corps and one line, possessed the power of attacking it on two or more sides at the same time. "La légion doit donc," says Guizot, "être envisagée sous deux faces. Comme infanterie en bataille contre une autre infanterie, elle eut son ordonnance particulière à rangs et files ouverts, conformément à ses armes; et alors elle n'eut rien de commun avec la phalange. Lorsqu'elle eut de la cavalerie en tête, elle cessa d'avoir son ordonnance particulière." This wise distinction rendered the legion formidable alike to every nation on which Rome chose to make war; but neither as infantry against infantry, nor as infantry prepared to resist cavalry, which duty was principally performed by the triarii, until all distinction of classes and arms merged in a homogeneous formation, had it anything in common with the phalanx; for its victories, no less than its reverses, had demonstrated the utility of deep formations, and showed that its real power depended on its distributive rather than its concentrative energies,—on its mobility and flexibility rather than on its weight or impulsion. Hence, on the day of Pharsalia, it was remarked, as an extraordinary circumstance, that Pompey had formed his legions ten deep; a novelty which, as every schoolboy knows, served no other purpose, on that occasion, except to add to the carnage.
In following the Romans in their wars under the emperors, we find their discipline and their tactics declining from age to age, in the same manner as they had advanced and improved. The spirit of change, though productive of some ameliorations, proved ultimately fatal to the legion. As long as the Romans continued faithful to the precepts and rules of the ancient masters, their infantry maintained its superiority; in proportion as these were departed from it declined; until at length, having lost all its distinctive qualities, it was constantly beaten and overthrown by the numerous cavalry of the barbarians. To ascribe the gradual declension and ultimate fall of this infantry to luxury, refinement, love of ease, corruption of Army manners, or other analogous causes, is merely to indite silly common-places, displaying the most profound ignorance of history and of human nature. Its catastrophe was occasioned by the decay of discipline alone. For experience shows that hardy and effective soldiers may be formed in the most polished as well as in the rudest and most uncivilized periods of society; and that nothing more is necessary to produce this result than an uncompromising system of discipline. Accordingly, under Vespasian, and Titus, and Trajan, and Hadrian, and Aurelian, and other warlike emperors, who enforced the precepts of the ancient masters, and restored the ancient discipline, the Roman infantry regained its reputation, and proved itself as formidable as it had ever been in the best times of the republic. The corruption was not in the soldiers, but in the men by whom they were organized; in those whom the experience of so many ages, and the conquest of the world, had failed to impress with a due conviction of the value of that system of discipline by which such prodigies had been performed. "On ne peut voir sans indignation," says Guischardt, "la mauvaise ordonnance que les Romains au temps de Végece avoient substituée aux anciens modèles. Ils étoient rangés sur six de hauteur, et même quelquefois sur trois. Chaque rang avoit des armes différentes, dont la plupart étoient des armes de jet, comme des arcs et des frondes. D'un rang à l'autre il y avoit six pieds d'intervalle, et dans les files on avoit retranché les trois pied de distance, parcequ'on ne se battoit plus avec l'épée: on avoit même oublié le véritable usage du pilum. Le troisième et le quatrième rangs dévoilent de temps en temps se détacher, et charger à la tête de la ligne, et revenir ensuite à leur poste. On ne sauroit rien imaginer de plus pitoyable. Ces deux chapitres de Végece marquent bien clairement l'ignorance de l'auteur, et la décadence de la bonne discipline chez les Romains." From innovations like these, and others still more absurd which succeeded them, what results could be anticipated except those which history has recorded; namely, disgraceful defeats, calamitous reverses and, at length, the final overthrow of the Roman power itself? The legions, degenerated into a feeble militia, sold the empire which they were incapable of defending; and having neither the courage which sometimes supplies the place of discipline, nor the discipline which supplies that of mere courage, they fell an easy prey to the swarms of Goths, Huns, and Vandals, by whom it was successively overrun, and at last completely destroyed.
The fall of the Western Empire, like that of a colossal structure, was succeeded by a thick cloud, which overspread Europe, covering it with darkness and desolation. All that remained of science or of art perished in its ruins, and the only relic of the catastrophe was the shadow of a mighty name. But the barbarians who had subverted the Roman power appear to have brought with them, from their forests and wildernesses, the elements of a system which was destined to thicken the darkness in which it originated; to bind Europe for ages in the fetters of the most abject thraldom; nay, even to maintain a long and fierce struggle against the reviving energies of the human mind, and the regenerative powers of society. Its foundations were laid in their peculiar character and habits, as affected by their position and their wants; and, as they had fought neither from the love of glory, to which they were insensible, nor from a thirst of vengeance, which nothing had contributed to stimulate, the only fruits they dreamed of reaping from victory were the spoils of the vanquished. The countries which all had conquered were considered the property of all; and each claimed a share proportionate to his services and the number of his retainers. Subsisting rights or possessions weighed as nothing in the estimation of these wild hordes, who sought for establishments in genial climates and fertile regions. They demanded a territorial division and apportionment, which was accordingly made upon some rude principle of equalization. But, as these lands were the reward of military service, so they were to be held by that tenure alone. The common interest and the common defence required that this condition should be annexed to the allotment, or, as it was afterwards called, the feu. Each great vassal of the liege lord was bound to have in constant readiness to take the field, a certain number of men, clothed, armed, and equipped at his own expense. Hence arose the feudal system, which, founded on military rather than civil principles, was an aggregation of petty sovereigns and petty principalities, under a nominal head, to whom all swore fealty, but few or none owned obedience; a military aristocracy, in short, under the mask of a monarchy. But this system, however well calculated to keep alive a spirit of ferocity, seemed to oppose a formidable barrier to the revival of the military art. Its maxims, necessarily hostile to the establishment of a standing army, by which the great barons might have been coerced, limited the force of the state to the contingents of feudal militia, which the crown vassals could bring into the field; a tumultuary mass, without coherence, which the first victory or the first reverse generally dispersed. During this period, accordingly, the wars of Europe were desultory and indecisive. An incursion constituted a campaign, and a foray an expedition. Armies were everywhere without order and without science; battles were gained by accident or by valour, never by discipline; while conquests, rapid as torrents, were generally as destructive and as transitory. The love of military glory was extinguished; petty wars, occasioned by baronial feuds, raged fiercely, preying upon the vitals of society; and the fruits of organized barbarism were general misery and desolation. The people were abject serfs, the barons ferocious brutes, the sovereign an absolute cipher. Anarchy, tyranny, ignorance, and spiritual thraldom, formed the characteristics of the first ages of feudalism.
At length, in the eleventh century, arose a monk, called Peter the Hermit, who preached with all the fervour, and more than all the success, of any known apostle, the duty of recovering the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels; and as the church lent her powerful aid to second the efforts of Peter's enthusiasm, the contagion soon spread throughout every part of Europe, and thousands of all countries rushed forward to enlist under the banner of the cross. The history of mankind affords no parallel to the madness that was thus produced, either as regards its universality or its duration. It affected all Christendom in nearly an equal degree; and, during two centuries, army after army marched for Palestine, to melt away under the sultry sun of Syria; or to be mowed down by the swords of the Saracens. But it agitated the minds of men by a new and powerful impulse; and although its essence consisted in the wildest fanaticism which had ever taken possession of the species, yet that inexplicable frenzy, combining with a spirit of enterprise and adventure, gave birth to institutions which were destined to exert a powerful influence upon the whole frame of society, and which have left a marked impression even on the manners, customs, and feelings of modern times. Viewed in a military light, the armies of the crusaders were mere tumultuary masses, impelled by fanaticism to deeds of heroic valour, but as destitute of order and discipline as their leaders and chiefs were ignorant of military science; nor had all the reverses they sustained the effect of inculcating the simplest principles of the art of war, or teaching the necessity of adopting some kind of organization. Every thing was trusted to numbers without combination, and to individual bravery exerted as chance or impulse happened to direct. And so deeply engrained in men's minds was the spirit of feudalism, and so incompatible did that spirit show itself with the slightest advancement in the military art, that the mailed chivalry of the ages immediately succeeding the crusades, although offering the finest elements that ever existed for the organization of an invincible force, appears at no time to have had any principle of effective combination, or to have been capable of acting with unity and concert in any grand operation. Yet the principal strength of armies in the middle ages consisted in their cavalry; which, composed of men of superior grade, and formidable from its bravery no less than from the armour of proof in which it was encased, easily proved itself superior to infantry without formation, and with no other discipline than that which instinct dictates even to the most barbarous tribes.
But a new epoch approached. Gunpowder was invented, or at least improved, by Berthold Schwartz, a Franciscan monk of Cologne, and was first employed in warlike operations in the early part of the fourteenth century. This discovery, as Guibert justly remarks, did not lead to any immediate improvement in the art of war: indeed a century and a half was necessary in order to make the use of fire-arms general; but it is nevertheless to be considered as the real cause of the complete reform which was at last effected in the constitution of armies, as well as in their discipline and tactics. Since the first employment of gunpowder, there have been seven principal periods in the history of the military art.
The first begins with the employment of cannon, and extends to Charles VIII.'s campaign in Italy; or from the early part of the fourteenth until towards the end of the fifteenth century. This period, during which the art of war began to revive from the state of barbarism into which it had sunk since the downfall of the Roman empire, includes the wars of the Spaniards against the Moors, of the English against the French, and finally, of the Italian republics against each other. The cavalry, composed of the nobility and gentry, still constituted the flower of armies, and formed the chief support of princes and their kingdoms. At the storming of fortresses, or when important posts were to be occupied and defended, and a bold, determined soldiery was required, the knights dismounted and fought on foot. They were the dragoons of that age. Each knight was attended by his esquire; and, besides these there were also archers, generally the vassals of the knights, who, being more lightly armed, and riding smaller horses, served as a kind of light horsemen.
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, indeed, the distinction of heavy and light horse was common in European armies. The former, consisting of tenants in capite, holding of the crown by tenure of military service, or their substitutes (servientes), were denominated men-at-arms, from their being armed cop-a-pied; the latter, composed of yeomen, were named hobblers. The knights rode what were denominated war-horses, which, like their riders, were covered either with chain or plate armour, or with both; and these men of iron carried a long and powerful lance armed with an iron head, a long sword, a short sword, a dagger, and a mace or battle-axe. Their formation for combat was exceedingly simple. They fought man to man; each armed knight singling out his opponent, and riding against him with his couched lance, in order to throw him out of his saddle, or to make him prisoner. The esquires, or armour-bearers, followed as a second rank, or at least acted as seconds to the knights, whom they assisted in battle, bringing them fresh arms and horses when required, and seeking opportunities of distinguishing themselves in order to obtain the honour of knighthood. Nothing, however, was known of scientific movements, until Charles the Bold compiled an exercise book in 1473, instructing cavalry how to attack in close and extended order, or to link the horses and fight on foot. An engagement was generally commenced by single knights riding forward and challenging opponents from the hostile army; and the result of these single combats sometimes determined the fate of the day.
The second period, from the campaign of Charles VIII. in Italy to the beginning of the wars in the Netherlands, or riod, comprises the wars of the French, Spaniards, and Germans, in Italy. During this period chivalry gradually declined, and war began to assume a new aspect. At the close of the contest with England in 1445, Charles VII. of France established the first standing army, consisting of 16,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, divided into fifteen companies d'ordonnance; he appropriated funds for the payment of these troops, and appointed officers to discipline and command them; and, although apprehensive at first as to the success of the experiment, he at length succeeded in organizing a force, which enabled his successor to repress the turbulent spirit of the feudal aristocracy, to strengthen the power of the crown, and to carry on foreign operations with a consistency and vigour hitherto unknown. The Italian campaign of Charles VIII. proved the superiority of a standing army over an assemblage of feudal militia, and consequently established its reputation. With a force of about 20,000 men, he overran the whole of Italy; and, had his ambition been equal to his success, or rather had he known how to reap the fruits of victory, he might have rendered himself permanent master of that country. Other nations imitated the example of France: a change took place in the military system of Europe; the practice of calling out knights ceased of itself; and mercenary, or at least paid troops, regularly disciplined and organized, became the only force that was trusted or employed. The characteristic of this period was deep formation, both in the cavalry and the infantry.
The third period comprehends the great war of independence, carried on by the Netherlanders, in order to emancipate themselves from the yoke of Spain; and it extends from 1568 to the general suspension of hostilities in 1609. Here fought, on one side, art, and an army formed by the experience of more than half a century of war, under Charles V. and his son Philip II.; on the other, the inhabitants of the Low Countries, living only by trade and the arts of peace. A people, consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long-continued exercise of tyranny and oppression, scrupled not
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1 Meyrick's Critical Inquiry into Ancient Armour, vol. i. p. 174. 2 Chain-armour first became covered with plates at the beginning of the fourteenth century; but entire plate-armour did not make its appearance until about a century after. 3 The only military productions of this period were the regulations of Charles the Bold, above-mentioned, with those of Louis VII. of France, and of John Ziska, general of the Hussites. 4 See Pére Daniel, vol. i. p. 155. Army. to draw the sword, in defence of their liberties, against the richest monarch of the age, the sovereign of Spain and the Indies, and master of the most numerous as well as the best-disciplined forces, commanded by generals distinguished above their contemporaries by their skill in the art of war. A more unequal contest cannot well be imagined; and never was the issue of any dispute more contrary to what the parties had reason to anticipate. But the struggle was protracted; and in proportion as the Netherlanders were formed to war, the bravery and discipline of the Spaniards relaxed. Under the skilful tuition and able conduct of Nassau, the foe which had at first appeared so contemptible to the haughty Spaniards, tore the laurels from their brows, and at length drove them, defeated and disgraced, from the country which had suffered so long under their grinding oppression and their insolent misrule.
This war was followed by great changes, both in the organization and tactics of armies. The cavalry was divided into cuirassiers and light horse; the use of the lance was discontinued, and its place supplied by the sword and pistol for the heavy, and the carbine for the light horse; and these were now trained to execute a variety of movements and manoeuvres at full speed. The infantry was also placed upon a better footing, both in respect to discipline and formation; although the prejudice in favour of columns or masses seems still to have continued, notwithstanding frequent experience of their inutility, as well as of the destruction to which they were exposed from the concentric fire of artillery.
The fourth period comprises the Thirty Years War, the pretext for which, according to Bolow, was the happiness of heaven, but the motive the goods of the earth: it extends from 1618 to 1648. The peace which had terminated the struggle for independence in the Low Countries, after a protracted contest of above half a century in duration, lasted only nine years; when a new war broke out, which can only be considered a continuation of the former. The hero of this war was Gustavus Adolphus; and he, like Prince Maurice of Nassau, was the creator of new tactics. This warlike monarch departed from the dense formation of his predecessors, and drew up his infantry six deep; which was considered an innovation that nothing but his success could justify. His opponents, Tilly and Wallenstein, formed their infantry in solid masses thirty deep; which, nevertheless, proved unable to contend with the linear formation of the Swedish troops. Until about the middle of this war, it still continued the practice to form cavalry in from four to eight ranks. But Gustavus also departed from this rule, and formed it in three ranks; although it appears from Harte, that, at the battle of Leipsic, it was drawn up four deep, probably on account of the dense formation of the imperial cavalry, which was formed in eight ranks. In the intervals he stationed platoons of infantry, fifty and upwards strong, as well as light guns; doubtless from a conviction that cavalry, unless supported, were unable to contend with infantry. His great object appears to have been, to give greater mobility to the two principal arms of a military force, and thus to gain in celerity of movement what he had lost in weight or impulsion. He knew that the momentum would remain the same, if the motion was increased proportionally to the diminution in weight.
The fifth period comprehends the wars of the French Fifth in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands, as well as period, the northern and Turkish wars, and embraces a period of ninety years; namely, from 1648 to 1738. The peace of Westphalia put a period to nearly a century of war. The results of this conflict were the secularization of ecclesiastical property, the complete establishment of the Protestant religion, the recognition of mental freedom, the decay of the Papal power throughout Europe, and the triumph of national independence. But during the long-continued struggle in Germany, two hereditary enemies appeared,—the Turks and the French. The former were expelled in a single campaign, and never again attempted any serious invasion. The latter entered upon a series of wars of which we have not yet probably seen the termination. The ambition of Louis XIV., however, and the wars to which it gave rise, rapidly developed the art of carrying on military operations, and formed generals whose names adorn military history. Opposed to a French Tur- renne, Luxembourg, and Condé, stand Montecucculi, Marlborough, and Eugene of Savoy; Louis of Baden may rank with Catinat or Vendôme; and many other generals of eminence illustrate this period, which was less remarkable for changes in the constitution and organization of armies than for the talents displayed in conducting their operations in the field. It was the era of great commanders. In the north the Swedes, Poles, Brandenburgians, and Muscovites, fought alternately on the plains of Poland and the steppes of the Ukraine. Under Charles XII. the Swedish infantry attained a high degree of perfection, and proved uniformly successful until it was so rashly committed at Pultowa; while the cavalry, without defensive armour, which the chivalrous monarch rejected, consisted almost entirely of dragoons. The principal improvements of this period, however, are chiefly due to the French, who made rapid advances in all the branches of military science.
The sixth period includes the three Silesian wars; Sixth namely, from the beginning of the first Silesian war in period. 1740, to the breaking out of the French revolutionary war in 1792. For a century previous to this, Prussia appears to have been chiefly employed in preparing herself for the brilliant part which she acted under Frederick II. To the celebrated elector, Frederick William, the Prussian military power in a great measure owed its origin. This prince grew up, as it were, in a camp, and, even in his boyish days, was present at the sieges of Breda and the Schenkenschanze. Arrived at the government, he endeavoured to infuse a new spirit into the army; and so well did he succeed, that, in 1672, he was enabled to promise the republic of Holland an auxiliary force of 20,000 men. At the period of his death the elector left behind him a well-organized army of 30,000. When Frederick the Great (or, as he
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1 Watson's History of Philip II., vol. i. p. 428. 2 "La lance," says Montecucculi, "est la reine des armes pour la cavalerie." (Mémoires, liv. i. c. 2.) And this opinion seems to be gaining ground at the present day; for experience has shown, that cavalry can never make any serious impression by means of firearms, while, with swords alone, they are wholly unfit to contend with infantry. 3 Blamark's Caract. Tactics, p. 307; Guibert, Essai Général de Tactique, p. 63. 4 Charles XII., not content with making the cavalry, without any connection with or dependence upon other arms, but from confidence in itself, charge the enemy's horse at full speed, without firing, led it equally against intrenchments and batteries, and always with success. "He knew," says Count Blamark, "that by the rapidity of motion, the natural vivacity of the majority of mankind is increased, and, often mounting to a blind fury and foolishly enthusiasm, leaves no time for consideration or calculation of danger; that at such a moment death loses its terrors, and Victory!—but with living colours—presents itself to the soul of the wildly-rushing warrior." (Caract. Tactics, p. 319, 320, 321.) At the same time Charles appears to have had a love of fighting for its own sake; and it was probably this peculiarity of temperament, as much as any calculation of results, which gave to his movements that impetuosity, which neither natural nor artificial obstacles could check or resist. Army.
is called by the Germans, der Einzige, the Unequalled) ascended the throne, he found the army about 80,000 strong, and drilled to a precision of movement, as well as a rapidity in firing, until then unknown. This was owing to the exertions of Prince Leopold of Dessau, who may be considered the founder of the modern system of tactics, having invented the iron ramrod and the equal step,—reduced the formation of the infantry from four to three ranks, thereby increasing the effect of musket fire,—and, in short, laid the foundation of the system which Frederick afterwards improved, by giving to infantry-movements greater lightness and facility. With an army thus prepared for action, Frederick took the field in 1740. But the first two wars passed quickly by; and the intervals of peace were employed in reforming whatever experience had shown to be defective in his system,—in practising a vast variety of deployments,—and, above all, in introducing that celerity of movement which had become so essential in modern armies, with reference both to their numbers and the extent of their front. When the third Silesian or Seven Years War broke out, Frederick, forsaken by his allies, and menaced on all sides by powerful enemies, seemed on the very verge of destruction. But if he stood alone, he stood unmoved, like the oak, braving the storm, and conscious of the power to weather it. Nor was he without some peculiar and decided advantages. On the one hand, his natural coup d'oeil, which was perfect; the unity and power of his will; the habit of his troops to remain firm in all situations, and to execute every movement with precision, even in the very tumult of battle; the never-shaken confidence in their leader, and the enthusiasm with which he was regarded by them: and, on the other, the division, weakness, and want of system or connection in the enemy's plans of operation; their partial and lukewarm mode of execution; together with the inferiority of their troops in organization, and of their commanders in genius,—these were the causes which enabled Frederick to retire from this bloody seven years conflict with a prodigious increase of fame, and without the loss of an acre of territory. "Depuis la guerre de la Succession," says Guibert, "on n'avait pas vu tant d'armées en campagne et réunies contre un seul prince. Sa science et leurs fautes furent le contrepoids de tant de forces. Jamais guerre ne fut plus instructive, et plus féconde en événemens. Il s'y fit des actions dignes des plus grands capitaines, et des fautes dont les Marsins auraient rougi. On y vit quelquefois le génie aux prises avec le génie, mais plus souvent avec l'ignorance. Partout où le roi de Prusse put manœuvrer il eut des succès. Presque partout où il fut réduit à se battre, il fut battu: événemens qui prouvent combien ses troupes étaient supérieures en tactique, si elles ne l'étoient pas en valeur." Such was the character of the Prussian army of this period, and such the military genius of the great monarch by whom it was commanded. Mere tactical details are foreign to the object of this article, and therefore we abstain from entering into them, excepting in as far as they may seem necessary to throw light upon the constitution and composition of armies. That of Prussia was long considered a model for imitation. Under Generals Siedlitz and Ziethen its cavalry attained a degree of perfection unequalled either before or since. "There was but one Siedlitz," says Count von Bismark. In playing the mighty game of war, its infantry was also superior to any other of that age; and if subsequent events somewhat tarnished its reputation, it has never ceased to be one of the best organized and most completely equipped bodies of foot in Europe. The Austrians, as their wont is, only improved on compulsion, and when fairly beaten out of their old system of masses and deep formations.
The armies and the science of this period, however, Seventh were destined to be far outnumbered and surpassed in period. the seventh and last, which embraces the military systems and establishments of our own times. These, accordingly, we shall now proceed to describe in detail; confining our accounts principally, if not exclusively, to their actual rather than to their former condition and strength; and commencing with the army of France, which has not only played a most conspicuous part since the commencement of the revolutionary wars, but has latterly served as a sort of model on which the other armies of Europe have been more or less formed.
From time immemorial, the Gauls were inhabited by a French race of men distinguished for their bravery. Hardy and army-enterprising under the two Brenni, obstinate and persevering in their attacks against Caesar, we find them cutting a conspicuous figure as auxiliaries in all the wars of ancient Rome. They passed through the middle ages with equal distinction; and if they were forced to yield to the irruption of the Franks, the amalgamation of the two nations had only the effect of adding to their energy. The wars of Charlemagne and the crusades; the successive invasions of Italy by Louis XII., Charles VIII., and Francis I.; and, lastly, the struggles maintained against all Europe by Louis XIV., showed what might be expected from French armies when properly commanded. But the fatal results of the Seven Years War, the wretched intrigues of the court of Louis XV., and still more the spirit of infatuation which appears to have become endemic after the disgraceful Hanoverian expeditions, eclipsed, in an instant, ages of glory, and rendered the army of France an object of ridicule to Europe. After the peace of 1762, some measures were taken with the view, as was pretended, of remedying the supposed defects in the constitution of the army, and restoring its character. But the French ministry of that day, ignorant of the real circumstances which had led to its successive defeats, and incapable of comprehending the dispositions and strategical movements by which success in war is attained, contented themselves with searching into the most minute details of discipline and instruction for the causes of failures which were solely attributable to a bad choice of generals, and a faulty direction of great operations. They imagined that the armies of Frederick had triumphed in consequence of oblique marches, the particular cut of their uniforms, and a thousand other absurdities which it would be impossible to credit, were not the amusing discussions of that period embodied in public documents of unquestionable authenticity; they disputed about ployments and deployments en tiretours, about tranchées and plessions, about a Prussian order and a French order; they formed camps in order to judge of the advantages of these different systems; and they fancied that they had discovered the sublime of the art in the mechanism of the instruction of platoons.
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1 Bismark's Cavalry Tactics, p. 323. 2 "On étoit si fort engoué de tout ce qui ressemblait à la tactique Allemande," says Jomini, "qu'il suffit à cette époque de porter un nom Tudesque pour faire une fortune militaire. Un certain capitaine Pirch, sorti des rangs de l'armée Prussienne, passa pour un émule de Frédéric, sur la simple présentation d'un mémoire dans lequel il donnait des idées pour aligner des bataillons sur les drapés; on se crut heureux qu'il daignât accepter un régiment et l'instruir suivant sa méthode." (Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution, tome i. p. 214.) Under the government which promoted Pirch, and indeed under that which succeeded it, Kléber, Moreau, and even Napoleon himself, would have been condemned to an eternal nullity. "Encore un pas retrograde," says Jomini, "et les troupes françaises se fussent trouvées au niveau des soldats du pape." But the American war gave a check to these mischievous fooleries, and revived the spirit of emulation, which is the source of the most brilliant feats in war; while the expeditions to Grenada and St Eustatius, together with the campaigns of Lafayette, Saint-Simon, and Rochambeau, in a great measure restored the reputation of the French arms, and prepared the way for still more important achievements. The staff, the government, and the faiseurs were still divided between different systems. But while the chiefs were perplexing themselves with theories, the troops improved both in discipline and manoeuvres; and had it not been for the repeated shocks which their organization experienced in consequence of frequent changes of ministry, and the introduction of certain radical innovations, which completely broke up the old battalions in order to amalgamate them with new levies, Louis XVI. would have possessed an army capable of defending the monarchy, and might have been able to restrain and resist that revolutionary frenzy to which he was destined soon to become a victim. In consequence of the disorganization thus introduced, the regiments of the line were in a wretched condition at the breaking out of the war in 1792. But a single measure saved them from destruction. The nomination officers taken from the tiers-état filled the ranks with an ambitious and warlike youth, burning to distinguish itself; while emulation, the chances of preferment, and the love of country, supplied for a time the want of discipline, and formed powerful motives for stimulating improvement.
At the end of the year 1791, the French infantry consisted of 105 regiments of two battalions each, 14 battalions of light troops, and 170 battalions of national volunteers; or 394 battalions in all. By the decree of the 5th May 1792, the number of the volunteer battalions was raised to 200, and the strength of each was increased from 226 to 800 men. The cavalry was composed of two regiments of carabiniers, consisting of four squadrons each; 24 regiments of heavy cavalry of three squadrons each; 18 regiments of dragoons of three squadrons each; 12 regiments of chasseurs of four squadrons each; and 6 regiments of hussars of three squadrons each; in all 206 squadrons. So that the total strength of the French army at this period did not exceed 160,000 infantry, 35,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery; while 20,000 men were still wanting to bring the different regiments to their full complements. But this deficit was soon supplied by the multitude of volunteers who flocked to the national standards when the duke of Brunswick invaded France at the head of the Prussian army. The revolution, however, had not yet developed its energies; nor had the world as yet any suspicion of the prodigies which the system of terror, afterwards organized, was destined to achieve. In 1793, France presented the formidable aspect of a vast camp. The decrees of the 23rd August and the 5th September 1794 had hurried the whole youth to the frontiers. Nearly 1,200,000 men were in the pay of the republic; and, after deducting those employed in accessory services, and in the navy, the number of combatants in the field cannot have amounted to less than about 700,000. The official state of the force of the French armies, as at the 5th April 1794, presents an aggregate of 794,334 men, including garrisons, but exclusive of the army of the interior, whose head-quarters were at Paris; which, allowing one fifth for those in the depôts and for the sick, would give an effective force, present under arms, of at least 650,000 men; the most formidable which Europe had ever seen assembled in the field. "Ce développement de forces, sans exemple dans les annales modernes," says Jomini, "tenait d'autant plus du prodige, que la nation se trouvait livrée à tous les déchirements d'une guerre civile, et aux persécutions d'un gouvernement odieux. Mais ce ne fut pas aux levées seulement que ces efforts se bornèrent: tout ce qui compose les éléments de la puissance nationale, avait été porté à un degré de tension inconnu dans les siècles modernes." Nor did the "prodigy" stop here. In the month of March 1795, France had ten armies in the field, the active force of which amounted to 449,930 combatants, besides 120,850 in garrisons, and 388,450 sick, prisoners, or detached; in all 959,190 soldiers. But the active force, or number present under arms, did not form the half of the effective, and scarcely a third of the complete military strength of France at that period; for, as 200,000 men were still wanting to bring the effective force up to the full establishment, and as the most active measures were in progress to make up the deficit, the total number of Frenchmen under arms in 1795 cannot have fallen much short of 1,100,000 men. It will not be denied, therefore, that the Comité du Salut Publicque possessed extraordinary energy, and that terrorism proved the salvation of France.
But this state of exertion was too violent to be of long continuance; and neither the population of the country, nor its exhausted resources, were sufficient to maintain so enormous a force in the field. Accordingly, in the succeeding years of the republic, the aggregate of the different armies seldom exceeded 480,000 effective men, and generally fell short of this number. But when Napoleon had mounted the throne, and had organized the system of conscription, he obtained an unlimited command over the whole of that part of the population capable of bearing arms; and as he acted upon the principle, first recommended by Cato, of making war support itself, he was not only able to repair the losses sustained in his various campaigns, but, on most occasions, to take the field with a predominating superiority of numbers. The establishment of the French army, in 1805, amounted to 341,412 infantry of the line, 100,130 light infantry, 77,488 cavalry, 46,489 artillery, and 5445 engineers; making a total of 650,964 men, or a force equal to that organized by the terrorists in 1794 and 1795. But this establishment was afterwards greatly increased; and it is calculated that, at the time of the Russian campaign, there were in the depôts, in the hospitals, and in the field, not less than 1,200,000 men, of whom about 850,000 might be considered as effective. Hence, we are enabled to account for the extraordinary phenomenon of Napoleon's appearance in Germany at the head of a new and formidable army, within a few months after the annihilation of his veteran masses amidst the steppes, snows, and frosts of Russia, and making head for more than a year afterwards against the utmost efforts of the allied powers.
One of the first cares of the Bourbons, on their second restoration in 1815, was to re-model the army, and place it on a footing adapted to the new order of things. The most obvious maxims of policy recommended a proceeding which alone could give stability to the restored dynasty. But such changes are necessarily the work of time; and we need not therefore wonder that nearly ten years should have elapsed before the important object was accomplished. The French army was re-organized, augmented, and placed on a new footing, in virtue of three royal ordonnances, dated the 27th February 1825; the first of which related to the infantry, the second... But, in 1830, the Bourbon dynasty was again expelled from the throne. Louis Philippe, the son of the famous Duc d'Orleans (Egalité), was proclaimed king of the French; and again the army was re-organized. The policy of the new French king led him to find employment for the army, and the conquest of Algeria soon furnished occasion for its increase, and the employment of his sons in foreign commands. Louis Philippe was elected in 1848 during a sudden and violent republican movement; and for four years France was a species of democracy, ruled by an assembly with a military president, which, in its turn, in 1852, was succeeded by an empire. The present ruler, the nephew of Napoleon I., was elected emperor by seven millions of votes; and as, from the peculiarity of his personal position and his views of foreign policy, it became necessary to augment and partially reconstruct the army, it has now been placed upon the following footing:
The état-major, or staff, consists of 700 officers, including the marshals, generals, &c., and an "intendance militaire" of 240 persons. Of the general officers there are two grades—generals of division and generals of brigade. Under Louis Philippe, the superior rank were called lieutenant-generals, and the generals of brigade were termed maréchaux-de-camp.
The British system of making general officers the nominal colonels of régiments, is utterly unknown in the French army. Every general, without exception, is either an officer or commander of the legion of honour. The corps of the état-major consists of 25 colonels, 25 lieutenant-colonels, 90 chefs-d'escadron, 140 captains of the first class, 140 captains of the second class, 100 lieutenants. These are attached to the different military divisions, and fill all the regular staff appointments. All aides-de-camp are appointed from this corps. Many of them are employed on the great military survey; and there is either a captain of the second class, or a lieutenant appointed to every regiment, both of cavalry and infantry. The civil force, connected with the état-major, called the "intendance militaire," has a certain number of its officers attached to each division. Its numbers and grades of rank are,—22 intendants militaires, 40 sous-intendants 1st class, 100 sous-intendants 2d class, 52 adjoints-a-l'intendance 1st class, 26 adjoints 2d class. The infantry of the French army consists of,—75 regiments infantry of the line, 25 regiments light infantry, 10 battalions of chasseurs-a-pied, 6 companies veteran sub-officers, 6 companies veteran fusiliers, 9 companies of fusiliers-de-discipline, 3 companies of pionniers-de-discipline, 1 regiment of Zouaves, 4 battalions of light infantry of Africa, 2 regiments foreign legion, 3 battalions native tirailleurs. Each regiment of the line consists of 3 battalions, of 8 companies each; a chef-de-bataillon, answering to our rank of major, commanding each battalion. The colonel is not a nominal officer, but actually commands the regiment, and is always present with it. The staff of each regiment consists of,—1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 chefs-de-bataillon, 1 major, 3 captains adjutants major, 1 captain treasurer, 1 sous-lieutenant assistant-treasurer, 1 captain d'habillement, 1 porte drapeau, a sous lieutenant, 1 lieutenant of the état-major, 1 surgeon-major 2d class, 2 aide majors 2d class, 24 curtains, 24 lieutenants, 24 sous-lieutenants, making, in the whole, 89 officers belonging to, and present with each regiment.
The chasseurs-a-pied (rifles) consists of ten battalions of eight companies each; there is no officer in the corps of higher rank than chef-de-bataillon, each battalion being as perfectly independent of the others as if it were a separate regiment. They existed first as the chasseurs-de-Vincennes, but were re-organized and much increased in numbers by the Duc d'Orleans in 1840 (when they were termed the chasseurs d'Orléans). At the last revolution, the name was altered to chasseurs-de-pied; and they have now resumed the title of chasseurs-de-Vincennes. The staff of each battalion consists of,—1 chef de bataillon, 1 captain acting as major, 1 captain adjutant major, 1 sous-lieutenant, instructor in firing, 1 lieutenant-treasurer, 1 surgeon aide-major, 1st class, 8 captains, 8 lieutenants, 8 sous-lieutenants. A company consists of 140, including officers, which makes the whole force, including bands, &c., to consist of about 11,500 men; this is the only ride corps in the service. The nine companies of fusiliers-de-discipline, and the three companies of pionniers-de-discipline are penal corps; and men, for various offences, are sentenced by court-martial to serve in them for limited periods; with one exception, they are in Algeria. The six companies of veteran sous-officers, and the six companies of veteran fusiliers, require no particular notice; they are quartered in various garrison towns in France. They were reduced in 1848 from eighteen companies to twelve.
The French cavalry is organized at present, pursuant to a decree, bearing date the 8th September 1841, which regulates the number of regiments. The only way in which the force has been augmented or diminished, has been by altering the number of men in each squadron, no new regiments having been formed since that period.
Considerable alterations were made previously; and to show the increasing estimation in which the lance is held as a cavalry weapon, 7 regiments of chasseurs were transferred to the corps using that arm, and are at present respectively the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th regiments of lancers, instead of being the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 13th, and 14th chasseurs. The division of regiments into troops is never practised; every regiment of French cavalry is divided into five squadrons, each having a captain commandant, a captain en second, a lieutenant en premier, a lieutenant en second, and three sous-lieutenants. The number of men is 140 in each squadron; the number of horses varies, but generally not more than half the squadron are mounted, or 70 strong.
The staff of each regiment is the same, viz., 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 chefs-d'escadron, 1 major, 1 captain instructor, 2 captains adjutants, 1 major-captain treasurer, 1 sub-lieutenant assistant-treasurer, 1 captain d'habillement, 1 porte étendard a sub-lieutenant, 1 lieutenant, or captain of the état-major, 1 surgeon-major 2d class, 1 surgeon aide-major, 1 veterinary en premier, 5 captains commandant, 5 lieutenants en premier, 15 sub-lieutenants, 5 captains en second, 5 lieutenants en second, making altogether 51 officers in every regiment; some of the subalterns, however, of each, are either officers of instruction, or pupils at the great cavalry school at Saumur. The term major is not, as with us, a grade of army rank; it is only used regimentally; the major is a chef-d'escadron in the cavalry, and a chef-de-bataillon in the infantry, and wears the same uniform. The terms used for the non-commissioned officers in the French cavalry differ much from those in use in our service; and it is very difficult to compare the two together; some of their functions being so entirely distinct. The adjutant sous-officer, is a squadron sergeant-major; maréchal-des-logis chef is a quarter-master sergeant; maréchaux-des-logis and maréchaux-des-logis-fourniers are sergeants-major; brigadier fourrier is a sergeant; brigadier is a corporal; the adjutant sous-officer is distinguished by one gold epaulette, if the officers wear silver, and vice versa; the other non-commissioned officers have the same distinctive marks as in the infantry.
The cavalry for European service consists of three divisions, cavalry of the reserve, cavalry of the line, and light cavalry. There are 12 regiments of the reserve, 2 carabiniers and 10 cuirassiers; 20 regiments of the line, 12 dragoons and 8 lancers; 22 regiments of light cavalry, 13 chasseurs and 9 hussars. There are also 5 squadrons of guides Army.
of the etat-major, and 4 companies of cavaliers veterans, making the whole cavalry force for home service about 44,000 men, supposing the regiments to be complete, and on the peace establishment. None of these troops are employed in the colonies, as there are the chasseurs d'Afrique and spahis for Algeria, and a squadron of spahis for Senegal; their other colonies require no cavalry.
The French Artillery, in its organization, differs considerably from the English; instead of being one corps, it is divided regularly, like the line, into regiments which have nothing whatever to do with each other. These regiments are all exactly on the same footing, the horse artillery not forming a separate regiment but according to the exigencies of the service; a certain number of batteries in each regiment are horse. The whole force at present consists of 15 regiments of artillery, 13 companies of artillery workmen, 6 squadrons of the Train des Pares. The artillery divisions of France do not correspond with its military divisions: there are nine altogether; eight in France itself, and the ninth comprising the three provinces of Algeria. Each division is commanded by a general of brigade, and is again divided into two or three directions, at the head of each of which is a colonel. There are a considerable number of officers on the staff, from the number of government works which are under their superintendence, there being not less than 17 establishments for making powder and refining saltpetre, and more than a dozen arsenals de construction and manufactures d'armes; most of these have foundries attached to them, and are all under the superintendence of the artillery. The Comité Consultatif de l'Artillerie is in some respects the French Board of Ordnance. As its name implies, it is more a board of advice than of practical interference, as there is a bureau belonging to the minister of war from which the actual orders emanate: the Comité Consultatif consists of 5 generals of division, and 3 generals of brigade. The whole force consists of 17 generals, 46 colonels, 46 lieutenant-colonels, 152 chefs-d'escadron, 680 captains, and 550 subalterns, including about 80 sous-lieutenants at the school; of these about 300 hold staff appointments, not interfering with the etat-major, which furnishes the army staff, but as the directors of laboratories, inspectors of forges, &c. The first 14 regiments are regular artillery, each consisting of 16 batteries, which is the term used instead of companies or troops; the establishment of a battery is very similar to that of a company of British artillery, there being a captain-commandant, a captain en second, a lieutenant en premier and a lieutenant en second; the gunners and drivers are not the same as with us, but are quite distinct from each other, there being a certain number of each to every battery according to the nature of its service. A battery may be in three positions, either a horse battery, where all the men are paid alike; a mounted foot battery, where the drivers are paid like the horse battery, but the gunners much less; or a dismounted foot battery, in which, of course, there are no drivers; as in the cavalry the corporals are termed brigadiers, and the sergeants fourriers, which is literally harbingers. The staff of a regiment of artillery consists of,—1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 7 chefs-d'escadron, 1 major, 1 riding-master, a captain, 2 adjutants-major, captains, 1 officier d'habillement, a captain, 1 treasurer, a captain, 1 assistant-treasurer, 1 sub-lieutenant, 1 lieutenant of the etat-major, 1 surgeon-major, 2 assistant-surgeons, 1 veterinary en premier, 32 captains, 32 subalterns. A horse battery consists of 4 guns, 8-pounders, and 2 howitzers, 15 centimetres in diameter, which is about \( \frac{1}{2} \) of an inch more than the English 24-pound howitzer; each gun and each waggon is drawn by six horses, which, with the two extra waggons and the spare team, make 90 harness horses for each battery. The horses are generally very good, and they pay considerable attention to their being properly matched. The mounted foot batteries consist also of four guns, either 8 or 12 pounders and two howitzers; the guns and waggons have four horses each. The 15th regiment consists of 12 companies of pontonniers, pontoon men, with a proportionate regimental staff: like our sappers and miners, the men admissible to the corps must understand some trade that is likely to be useful to the service. There is one company generally in Algeria, and the other companies with the headquarters are at Strasbourg. The uniform is the same as the artillery, and they are officered indiscriminately with the other regiments. The 13 companies of artillery workmen are employed at the different foundries and arsenals; there are 2 captains and 2 lieutenants of artillery attached to each company, and their uniform is the same; some of these companies are employed in Algeria, and the rest at home. The train des pares d'artillerie consists of 6 squadrons, of 8 companies each; a chef-d'escadron commands each squadron, and has a captain under him commanding en second; the companies are commanded by lieutenants, and have one sous-lieutenant each. There are also five companies of veteran artillery, who, like the other veteran companies, do garrison duty in various fortified places.
The Engineers form a distinct corps altogether, and are not, as with us, merged into the Ordnance; in fact they have no more to do with the artillery than they have with the cavalry and infantry; they have their comité consultatif of 8 generals, and their separate bureau in the office of the minister of war. The active force consists of 12 generals, 28 colonels, 29 lieutenant-colonels, 105 chefs-de-bataillon, 380 captains, en premier and en second, 190 subalterns, including about 50 sous-lieutenants, who are at the school of Metz.
The Troupes du Genie are the same nearly as our sappers and miners, and are officered in the same manner by the engineers. They consist of 3 regiments, each of which has 16 companies; the regiments being divided into 2 battalions: the staff of each consists of the following officers,—1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 chefs-de-bataillon, 1 major, 2 adjutants-major, captains, 1 surgeon-major, 2 assistant-surgeons, 32 captains, and 40 subalterns. The men are required to have been brought up either as smiths, carpenters, miners, quarrymen, or masons, the first company of each regiment being exclusively miners. They have also a certain proportion of drivers, sappeurs conducteurs, to each battalion. At present 12 companies are in Algeria, the rest in Europe. Attached to the corps are two companies of workmen, and one company of veterans. The engineer divisions of France are neither the same as the military nor as the artillery divisions. There are 21 districts, which are termed directions in France. Each of these is under the superintendence of a colonel, who has from 4 to 14 officers under him, either field-officers or first captains, according to the number of fortified places or towns where there are barracks in the direction. Algeria is divided into three directions, according to its provinces, and has besides an etat-major du genie; not including the officers commanding the companies of sappers, there are about 36 engineer officers in the colony at present. The engineers are the only army corps who have anything to do with the other French colonies. The Infanterie de la Marine perform all the colonial duty apart from Algeria. This they can do very well with a small force, as the colonies are few and comparatively insignificant. Those in which officers of the engineers are stationed are,—Guadaloupe and Martinique, in the West Indies; Cayenne, in Guyana, South America; Senegal, Ile de la Reunion, republicanized from the Ile de Bourbon; Nossibé, and Madagascar; Mayotta, one of the Comora Islands between Madagascar and the coast of Africa; Oceania, the Marquesas, and Tahiti. There is one other corps in the French service, not belonging either to the artillery or engineers; it is called the Troupes de l'Adminis- Army, tration, and is divided into two sections,—the first is the battalion of government workmen, consisting of 7 companies; the second section is called the corps des équipages militaire; it consists of 4 squadrons of 4 companies each, and 3 companies of workmen. This corps bears nearly the same relation to the commissariat that the sappers do to the engineers; the French government not being much in the habit of obtaining their supplies through the medium of contracts, are obliged to keep very large establishments of their own. For instance, the whole of the bread that is supplied to the troops in Paris comes from a government factory, nearly opposite to the Hôtel des Invalides. This is all done by the workmen of the first section; the qualification required of every person entering the corps is, to be either a butcher, baker, carpenter, locksmith, joiner, or mason. The 4 squadrons of the second section are employed in conveying provisions and commissariat stores from place to place, and their companies of workmen make and repair all the waggons and carts that are necessary for that purpose. At the same time, although their employment is of a civil nature, they are regular soldiers, have their own officers, and are properly armed and equipped, the workmen as infantry, the squadrons as cavalry; the uniform is gray, with red trousers, shakos like the other troops, and silver epaulettes for the officers. The badge of the corps is a star, which is on their buttons and accoutrements. The regular commissariat corps is very numerous, and is divided into three distinct branches; each comprising a separate body of officers; the ranks, however, are the same in each branch, they are:
| Officers d'administration principales | Commissary-general | |--------------------------------------|-------------------| | comptables, 1st Class | Dep.-com.-gen. | | 2nd Class | Asst.-com.-gen. | | Adjutants en premier | Dep.-asst.-com.-gen. | | en second | Com.-clerk |
The first section consists of 328 officers of different ranks, and is devoted exclusively to the management of the military hospitals, the medical officers only attending to them professionally. The second section has 78 officers in it, and manages the clothing of the army—the respective colonels of regiments not being also their tailors, as with us—and the issue of tents and all kinds of camp stores. The third section, consisting of 362 officers, manages the preparing and issuing all kinds of provisions for the whole army. The uniform is nearly the same as that of the medical staff; it is a blue coat without epaulettes, red trousers, and a cocked hat.
The French army is at present recruited partly by voluntary enrolment for a term of years, and partly by requisition; in other words, on nearly the same principle which obtained before the revolution of 1790. The system of requisition is of course subsidiary or supplementary to that of voluntary enlistment; but, in the event of another war, it would unquestionably become the principal, if not the only, resource of the army. And this applies to other nations as well as to France. Modern manners, customs, habits, and pursuits, are primarily adverse to the military service; and this opposition can only be overcome by a conscription of one kind or other. Napoleon laid it down as a principle, "que la conscription est le mode de recrutement le plus juste, le plus doux, le plus avantageux au peuple." But without being prepared to go this length, it may be admitted that it is equal in its operation; that its results are certain; and that the supplies it furnishes are of the best quality: whilst voluntary enlistment is at best a precarious resource, and sends to the ranks little else than the scum and dregs of the people. At the same time, the French army, as at present constituted, bears a much smaller proportion to the entire population of the country, and is consequently less burdensome, than that of any other nation of Europe, England only excepted. The peace establishment of Great Britain presses even more lightly upon the general mass of the population; but, in the event of a war, the proportion would, in all probability, become as unfavourable for the people as that of the French conscription under Napoleon, namely 1 in 33 or 34. Such, at least, was the case during the greater part of the last war, particularly after the rupture of the short-lived peace of Amiens.
The national character of every people is commonly developed in a very striking manner by its army. "The Frenchman," says Count Bismark, "courageous, impetuous, nay, even terrible in attack, does not possess that cold-blooded, quiet circumspection and endurance which is so indispensable in a defensive war;" and hence he concludes that a war against the French ought to be carried on offensively. "A cautious but not the less uninterrupted offensive must be the ruling principle in all projects of operation against the French." Major Beamish delivers a similar opinion. "The French," says this officer, "have, with much judgment, generally endeavoured to become the attacking party. They thus not only derived the usual advantage of that system, but adopted the mode of warfare which was peculiarly suited to their national character. The French soldiers are impetuous; but their courage requires excitement, to which motion so much contributes. Abstract motion, however, is not sufficient to impel the French soldier into action: he must be first excited by the example of his officer; and were it not for the extreme and universal gallantry displayed by the officers of the French army, few instances of impetuous courage would be recorded on the part of the men. It has been said that 'the French officers will always lead, if the men will follow;' and there have been instances where the former have nobly sacrificed their lives to produce this effect." General Foy, whose endeavours to depreciate the British are at such variance with the better points of his character, says that "to Frenchmen you must always speak," and that "the intoxication of the French is gay, sparkling, and daring; a foretaste to them of the battle and the victory." A still higher authority confirms these opinions. "Le Français, naturellement brave, actif, et impétueux," says Baron Jomini, "fait aisément des conquêtes, mais il les perd avec la même facilité. Dès qu'il cesse de marcher en avant, une sorte de dégoût s'empare de lui; il est difficile de le contenir. Depuis la révolution, surtout, cette disposition s'était accrue de plus en plus: les liens de la discipline ne retenant plus le soldat, il était devenu mutin, raisonneur, et indocile." Colonel Napier's opinion appears substantially to coincide with that of
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1 Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, p. 1850–51–52. 2 Napoleon having established "qu'un million d'âmes fournit chaque année 7000 à 8000 conscrits, et que les besoins de l'administration et des divers états n'en réclamaient que moitié," he therefore concluded, "qu'une levée annuelle de 3500 hommes n'offrait, déduction faite des morts, que 30,000 hommes en dix ans," or about a thirty-third part of the entire population. (See Rogniat, Réponse aux Notes Critiques de Napoléon. Paris, 1823.) But the draughts on the population of France were never carried to the full extent of the principle, and seldom exceeded 1 in 43 or 44. 3 Cavalry Tactics, p. 336, Engl. transl. 4 See Major Beamish's Note to the passage in the Cavalry Tactics above quoted. 5 History of the War in the Peninsula under Napoleon, vol. i. p. 168, Engl. transl. 6 Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution, tom. iii. p. 125. Army. Jomini and other competent judges. In fact, no military nation of Europe has gained so many splendid victories, and sustained so many disgraceful defeats, as the French; whose whole history, indeed, consists of an extraordinary alternation of the most brilliant successes and the most calamitous reverses, of triumphant ascendancy and abject humiliation. "Aucune nation," says Guibert, "n'a perdu de batailles aussi hontueuses, aussi décisives, que la nôtre; aucune n'en a gagné si peu de décisives et de complettées."
The Spanish army, which, under Charles V., Pescara, the Duke of Alba, and the Constable of Bourbon, had proved itself so formidable—extending the theatre of its exploits from the Pyrenees to the Po and the Adige on the one hand, and to the Elbe, the Meuse, and the Waal on the other—degenerated rapidly under the disastrous reigns of the last princes of the House of Austria. When Philip V. ascended the throne at the beginning of the last century, it scarcely amounted to 15,000 men. By that prince and his successors, however, it was gradually increased, until, in the year 1792, its establishment amounted to 116,000 infantry, 12,200 cavalry, with upwards of 10,000 artillery, and its effective force to about 120,000 men of all arms. At present its effective amounts to 90,000, and its disposable force to 75,000 combatants. It is composed of the general active staff; of the staff of the fortresses, of the household troops and royal guard, of the infantry and cavalry of the line, with artillery, engineers, and veterans. Its staff consists of 6 captain-generals, 77 lieutenant-generals, 122 major-generals, 350 brigadier-generals, with inferior officers in proportion. There are 15 capitaines, viz., 12 territorial and 3 colonial. In Spain, and its possessions contiguous to the Peninsula, there are 150 fortresses, posts, forts, citadels, or open towns where troops are in garrison. The household troops consist of six squadrons of the body guard and a company of halberdiers: of these four squadrons are Spanish, and two foreign, called Saxons, in honour of the queen. The royal guard is organized like that of France, and consists of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, and three companies of artillery, one of which is horse-artillery. The first division consists of four regiments of grenadiers, each composed of two battalions, divided into eight companies of 120 men each; and the second of two regiments of the élite of the provincial militia, divided into three battalions of four companies each. The cavalry forms a division of two brigades; and the artillery consists of three companies of 100 men, each serving a battery of six pieces mounted. The infantry of the line consists, first, of 10 regiments of three battalions each; secondly, of the Swiss regiment Wimpffen, one battalion only; thirdly, of a regiment, fixed at Ceuta, composed of four companies of 100 men each, the refuse of the army. Seven regiments, of two battalions each, of the same number and composition as those of the line, form the light infantry. The militia consists of 42 regiments of one battalion each, which is divided into eight companies. The cavalry consists of 13 regiments, of which 5 are of the line, and 8 light horse, each of four squadrons, composed like those of the royal guard; together with two companies of cuirassiers at Ceuta, one formed of native Spaniards, and the other of Moors. The royal corps of artillery is divided into the theoretical and practical. The troops of this arm consist, first, of 6 battalions of foot artillery, in garrison at Barcelona, Cartagena, Sevilla, Coruña, and Valladolid; secondly, of 4 companies of horse-artillery, in garrison at Cartagena and Sevilla; thirdly, of 5 companies of artificers; fourthly, of 5 battalions of the train; fifthly, of 3 brigades and 15 companies fixed in garrison, but exclusive of the personnel in America. This arm has a splendid museum at Madrid, besides a theoretical and practical school, directed by a brigadier-general or colonel, in the principal town or place of each province. The engineers are a corps of officers not regimented or brigaded, consisting of an engineer-general, 10 directors sub-inspectors, 17 colonels, 20 lieutenant-colonels, 34 captains, and 56 lieutenants; together with a regiment of sappers, consisting of 2 battalions of 8 companies each, viz., 5 of sappers, 1 of miners, 1 of pontooners, and 1 of workmen. The establishments of this arm are, a topographical depot-general, or collection of maps, plans, and military memoirs; a museum containing representations in relief of the fortresses, and different models of fortification; and an academy for the instruction of young officers intending to enter this branch of the service, after they have passed through the primary school of Segovia. All these establishments are situated in the capital.
The Spanish army is recruited by voluntary enrolment, and, in case of insufficiency, by ballot or conscription. The term of service is eight years for the first enrolment or ballot, and two or four for the second, when the soldier becomes entitled to an increase of pay. Before the war of independence no one could attain the rank of officer without having been a cadet; and each cadet was bound to prove his nobility. But after the return of Ferdinand these proofs were dispensed with, and sergeants now obtain a third of the sub-lieutenancies; the other two-thirds being reserved for the pupils of the military school of Segovia, who have passed the customary examinations at the end of their course of study. The dress and equipment of the Spanish army are in the worst state; the pay of the troops is exceedingly irregular; and their discipline is, in consequence, as bad as it is possible to imagine, or rather, there is scarcely such a thing known. "L'Espagnol, sobre, vigoureux, infatigable," says Jomini, "possède de grandes vertus guerrières, mais il manque d'activité soutenue. Si dans ces dernières révolutions, son caractère se soumet difficilement à la discipline, nous avons été induit à penser, en observant l'esprit du peuple, que dans les temps ordinaires, il y serait plus facilement employé. Son courage tumultueux prêtait beaucoup à une prompte désorganisation, car la déroute est toujours compagne de cette disposition naturelle des esprits chez les peuples méridionaux." In a word, the Spaniards afford a striking illustration of the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that in war the moral is to the physical force as three parts to one.
After the general peace of 1814, when all the powers of Europe had reduced their military establishment, Portugal alone did not follow their example, but fixed the peace establishment of its permanent army at 49,268 infantry and 5230 cavalry; which, with the militia, made a force of 59,325 men, or about 22 soldiers for every 100 inhabitants. Such a state of things, however, was much too violent to be dur-
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1 Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. i. p. 10. See also vol. iii. p. 329, where, in describing the attack of the British position on the crest of the Sierra de Busaco, 27th September 1810, Colonel Napier renders justice to the "astonishing efforts of valour" on the part of the French, and ably discriminates the respective characteristics of the troops engaged on that occasion. The onset of the French was truly terrible, and at one moment had very nearly succeeded.
2 État Général de Tactique, tom. i. p. 176.
3 Notice sur l'Armée Espagnole, rédigée sur El Estado Militar de 1828 et sur un manuscrit. Paris, 1829. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. v. p. 420. With regard to the present state of discipline, or rather of indiscipline, of the Spanish army, the author of the Notice observes, "La discipline n'a jamais subsisté dans l'armée Espagnole. Ce n'est pas qu'il manque de règlement; il en existe un fort étendu, rédigé avec soin d'après le nôtre (le Français) de 1792; mais c'est un frein qu'on n'a pu jusqu'ici amener l'Espagnol à supporter. Au respect près que le soldat a pour son officier, il n'y a pas l'ombre de discipline."
4 Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution, tom. i. p. 242. Army. Accordingly, one of the first cares of the constitutional government of 1821 was to reform a military system so disproportionate to the population and the financial resources of the kingdom. The armed force since that period has therefore consisted exclusively of the permanent army and the militia. The permanent army is composed of a general staff, an engineer corps, 24 infantry regiments of the line of one battalion each, 6 regiments of chasseurs-a-pied, and 12 regiments of chasseurs-a-cheval of 3 squadrons each, 4 regiments of artillery, a battalion of engineer artificers, a company of soldiers of the train, a police guard, and 30 companies of veterans. The general staff consists of an indeterminate number of lieutenant-generals, 16 major-generals, 24 brigadier-generals, 6 superior officers, 6 subalterns, 12 aides-de-camp, 12 secretaries, 10 employés, and a veterinary surgeon-in-chief; in all 100. The engineer corps (corpo de engenheiros) is composed of 4 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 8 majors, 12 captains, 12 lieutenants of the first class, and 12 of the second; in all 64. Each regiment of infantry of the line and of light troops consists of 44 officers and 780 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The effective strength of a regiment of artillery is 551 men, including 33 officers. The corps of the train of artillery (artilheros condutores), reduced to a single company by the organization of 1821, is composed of 12 officers, 30 soldiers, and 70 mules (bestas nuares). The battalion of engineer artificers consists of 201 men, including 12 officers. Each of the 30 companies of veterans is from 70 to 80 strong, including 2 officers. The police guard of Lisbon consists of a battalion of infantry of 8 companies and 980 men, including officers; together with a battalion of gens d'armerie à cheval 238 strong, divided into 4 companies. The effective force of the permanent army on the peace establishment is therefore about 29,000 foot and 4500 horse—18,000 foot are in active service, 4600 in Africa, and 4400 in the Portuguese settlements in Asia. The militia form 48 regiments of infantry, of the same strength and composition as those of the line; together with six separate corps, of which three are infantry, two cavalry, and one artillery; amounting in all to 38,542 men, and, with the army of the line, making the total of land forces 68,187 men of all kinds and arms. The ordensenzos, which formed 441 legions or capitanea mores, were abolished by the Cortez in 1822, to the great satisfaction of the nation, which justly regarded this institution as a most grievous scourge. They were a sort of levy en masse, which all individuals between the age of 16 and 60, unless serving in the regular army or in the militia, might be called upon to join at the shortest notice. The army, which is indebted for its organization to Marshal Beresford, is well disciplined and instructed. Its equipment and arms are the same with those of the English troops.
At the period when the Emperor of Germany engaged in war with revolutionary France, the Austrian army was on a very effective footing, both in regard to organization and numbers. The infantry, it is true, though well trained and disciplined, wanted vivacity, and its physical was superior to its moral force. But the cavalry, which was composed of admirable materials, rivalled the Prussian squadrons in instruction, and surpassed them in other particulars. The artillery and engineers were also good, although the mat. riel, less perfect than that of the French, was either too heavy for pieces in position, or too light for efficient service in the field. Nor was the staff deficient either in erudition or in talents; but its theories were antiquated and vague, resting partly upon the system of cordons attributed to Lasey, and partly also upon certain hypotheses, which it was gravely proposed to put to the test of experiment in the field. At the commencement of the war with France, the imperial army consisted of 232 battalions of infantry and 220 squadrons of cavalry; and as the battalions were very strong, being raised by means of reserves to 1200 men and upwards each, the whole of the Austrian force at this period may be estimated at 240,000 foot, 35,000 horse, and 10,000 artillery.
But the reverses it experienced in consequence of an obstinate adherence to a vicious system, and the exigencies of the long and protracted struggle with republican and imperial France, led to successive augmentations of the effective force, until at one time it considerably exceeded 700,000 men of all arms. At the general peace of 1814, however, Austria, exhausted by a war of five-and-twenty years, reduced her military establishments nearly one half; adjusting the scale of peace so as to render it commensurate with that which, it was conceived, France would adopt as soon as the Bourbons felt themselves in a condition to re-organize a permanent force. Several changes have since been made; but the account which follows, derived from the most authentic sources, will be found to exhibit a correct view of the actual force and organization of the Austrian army consisting of the troops of the line, and the militär-gränzen, or military of the frontiers.
The infantry, exclusive of the 17 regiments of the frontiers, is composed of 58 regiments of the line, 1 regiment of chasseurs, 12 battalions of chasseurs, and 5 garrison battalions; besides, in time of war, the infantry of the staff and the landwehr. Of these, 3 are recruited in Lower and 2 in Upper Austria, 5 in the interior and in the Illyrian provinces, 9 in Bohemia, 5 in Moravia, 11 in Galizia, 4 in the Venetian States, 4 in Lombardy, 12 in Hungary, and 3 in Transylvania. The different regiments are designated respectively by the names of their provinces, and those of the officers who are proprietors therein (inhaber). A regiment of the line consists, in time of peace, of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 21 captains, 73 subalterns, in all 99 officers, not including 5 staff-officers, 2 grenadier and 16 light infantry companies, containing 3318 men. The companies of grenadiers form separate battalions, commonly consisting of three divisions or six companies. The Hungarian and Transylvanian regiments consist, in time of war, of 4 battalions of 6 companies each; and the company contains 200 men. The force of the infantry of the line amounts, therefore, on the peace establishment, to 1044 companies of fusiliers and 116 of grenadiers, or 174 battalions of fusiliers and 20 of grenadiers, making a total of 314,912 men; and, during war, to 1134 companies of fusiliers, or 189 battalions, and the same number of companies or battalions of grenadiers, or 487,670. By the military frontiers are understood the provinces and districts conterminous with Turkey, to the east and south of the empire; which, by reason of the military service, internal as well as external, that their male population is subject to, have an organization entirely military, some districts of Transylvania alone excepted. These military provinces furnish 17 regiments of national infantry, a battalion of tschaikists or watermen of the Danube, and a regiment of hussars (szekler), who, inasmuch as they are liable to be called to join the army, really form part of it, but who
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1 Notice sur l'Armée Portugaise, extrait analytique de l'Essai Statistique sur le Royaume de Portugal et d'Algarve, par Adrien Balbi. Paris, 1827. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. iv. p. 121. 2 Jomini, Guerres de la Révolution, tom. i. p. 232. 3 The account of the Austrian army, given in the text, is derived partly from the Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung, which appeared at Leipzig and at Darmstadt in 1828, partly from the Constitution de l'Armée Autrichienne de Bergmayr, partly from the Annuaire Militaire Autrichien, and partly from Mr Edward Thompson's "Austria," published in 1849, together with a variety of papers in the Bulletin des Sciences Militaires. Army, in respect of their particular organization, may be considered, in time of peace, as constituting a distinct force. Military Croatia comprehends six districts, each of them furnishing a regiment, which bears the name of the chief place of the district, and consists of 12 companies. The service of these regiments in time of peace is confined to guarding the cordon. Similar service is rendered by the regiment of gens d'armes in Lombardy, and the military cordon in Galizia.
The light infantry is composed of the imperial regiment of Tyrolean riflemen, consisting of 4 battalions of 4 companies each; 12 battalions of chasseurs, 4 companies each in time of peace, and 6, with a depot company, in time of war; 17 national frontier infantry regiments, and 1 Illyrian Banatish battalion. A company of chasseurs consists of 195 men, including officers. The garrison battalions, composed of a sort of demi-invalids, unfit for the service of the line, are stationed, 1 in Buckowina, 1 in Esclavonia, 1 in Hungary, 1 in Dalmatia, and 1 in Lombardy, and consist each of six companies, with the same complement of officers and non-commissioned officers as the companies of the line. The divisions of infantry of the staff (stabs-infanterie-division), are composed in the same manner; and organized, in time of war, for the purpose of guarding the headquarters and the magazines of the army, and of removing the wounded from the field of battle to the nearest hospitals. The number of battalions of the landwehr is seventy. In each district of country (Hungary, Transylvania, and Italy excepted) assigned for the recruitment of a regiment, two battalions of landwehr are raised and attached to such regiment; the one containing the men who are the least necessary to their families, and the most proper for the service, and the other, the surplus of those who are obliged to form part of the landwehr. The first battalion is exercised fifteen days in the year, the second only eight hours. The commandants receive their orders from the colonel of the regiment of the line to which their battalions are respectively attached. The landwehr is principally destined for the service of the interior; but it may also be sent to an active army. In either case it is paid the same as the troops of the line.
The cavalry consists of 8 regiments of cuirassiers, 6 of dragoons, 7 of light horse, 11 of hussars (exclusive of the frontier regiment), and 4 of hulans; together with, in time of war, the dragoons of the staff (stabs-dragoner); all raised, like the infantry, in different provinces, viz., 3 regiments of cuirassiers in Bohemia, 3 in Moravia, 1 in Lower Austria, and 1 in Central Austria; 3 regiments of dragoons in Moravia, 1 in Upper and Lower Austria, and 1 in Lower and Central Austria; 1 regiment of light horse in Moravia, 4 in Bohemia, 1 in Galizia, and 1 in Italy. The hussars of the 11 regiments are all either Hungarians or Transylvanians. The regiments of hulans consist of inhabitants of Galizia and volunteers. In time of peace, the regiments of cuirassiers and dragoons consist of 6 squadrons, and the other regiments of 8; making in all 260 squadrons. Two squadrons make a division; and, in regiments which have 8 squadrons or 4 divisions, 2 are commanded by the majors. The dragoons of the staff, of which there are several divisions in time of war, have the same destination as the infantry attached to it, and are besides employed in repressing disorders committed by marauders, and in other like services.
The artillery is divided into three parts, or distinct corps, viz., the field artillery (feld artillerie); the artillery of the arsenals and magazines (feldzeugartillerie); and garrison artillery (garnison artillerie). The field-artillery consists of a corps of bombardiers, 5 regiments of field artillery, and a rocket corps. The corps of bombardiers has a staff, and 5 companies of 204 men each, including officers. It is recruited by corporals of artillery, and performs the most difficult as well as important service to the army. A regiment of field artillery is composed of a staff and 4 battalions, one of 6 companies and three others of 4 companies each; making in all 18 companies. A company serves three or four batteries of 6 pieces; and each battery is commanded by a lieutenant or major-firemaster. The train of the army furnishes the horning of the batteries, which is under the command of officers of that corps, and generally independent of the chiefs of batteries, but subordinate to them in this particular service. The rocket corps is established at Neustadt, near Vienna, where it has for some years been occupied in fabricating Congreve rockets, we believe with considerable success. The artillery of the arsenals and magazines, consisting of a staff and personnel of the necessary workmen, furnishes the field artillery, and the equipages of war, with the requisite arms and munitions, and it guards them when in magazine. The garrison artillery, charged with the service in fortresses, is divided into fourteen districts, determined by the provinces, and proportioned in numbers to these districts. The district of garrison artillery of Vienna comprehends an arsenal, containing all the equipage of sieges; and attached to it are a foundry, an establishment for boring cannon, and manufactories of saltpetre and gunpowder.
The engineer department comprehends a corps of engineers, with the sappers and miners. The pontoon train is attached to the staff, and is under the direction of an oberst-schiffmeister or chief of boats. The train of corps of military equipages (militär-fahrwesen-corps) is wholly independent. The engineer corps is composed of 4 generals, 6 colonels, 9 lieutenant-colonels, 18 majors, 42 captains, 30 captains en second, 30 lieutenants, 30 sub-lieutenants, and 12 cadets. Each command of military division embraces a district of fortification; consequently there are fourteen such districts, to each of which is attached a director, who is taken from the generals or officers of the engineer staff. In each place there is also an engineer-in-chief, who is an officer of the staff or a captain of engineers; but in Vienna, Milan, Peterwaradin, and Venice, the director performs the functions of chief engineer. The corps of miners is composed of a staff, five companies, and a garrison detachment; and the corps of sappers, of a staff like that of the miners, six companies, and a garrison detachment. The pontoon corps consists of a staff and 2 battalions of 4 companies each. In time of war the number of battalions is three, two of which have 6 companies and one 4; besides a company in depot. The train or corps of military equipages consists, in time of peace, of 12 divisions of transport (transports-division), and 20 sets of horses for field batteries (exercier-batterie-bespannung). Each division is provided with 90 horses; and all the detachments of the corps stationed in a province are under the orders of a commandant. In time of war the military equipage train consists of seven principal divisions, viz., 1. the artillery transport division; 2. that of pontoons; 3. that of flying bridges; 4. that of baking; 5. that of health for the
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1 Jomini has particularly remarked the superior composition, organization, and discipline of the Austrian cavalry, which has proved its excellence in many bloody encounters, and, when led with talent, has never failed to distinguish itself. At the battle of Württemberg, 3d September 1793, Wartenleben passed the Maine with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, attacked the French cavalry under Bonnec, overthrew it, and thus decided the victory. "This brave veteran," says the Archduke Charles, "impressed with the importance of the order which he had received, dashed into the Maine at the head of his cavalry, and swam across." "This manoeuvre," he adds, "was completely successful; the French cavalry, which had awaited the charge without stirring, was overthrown." At the battle of Lepel, the Austrian cuirassiers, commanded by Nostitz, "covered themselves with glory." On the 15th October, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Nostitz, having scarcely passed the Plaude at Großerber, attacked the lancers and dragoons of the French imperial guard, overthrew them, and then broke several squares of infantry. Other instances of a similar kind might be mentioned. transport of the wounded; 6. that of victualling; and, 7. that of general transport.
Two regiments of the same or different arms form a brigade, which is under the orders of a major-general; and two or three brigades form a division, which is commanded by a field-marshal-lieutenant. In time of war, corps d'armée are organized, each consisting of several divisions, and under the orders of a general of cavalry or artillery, or of the oldest field-marshal-lieutenant. In the Austrian army there are at present 10 field-marlshals, 18 generals of cavalry and artillery, 67 field-marshal-lieutenants, and 118 major-generals, in actual service; 9 generals of cavalry and artillery, 30 field-marshal-lieutenants, and 92 major-generals, unemployed. The guards form no part of the army. They are divided into the noble body-guard of arquebusiers, the Hungarian body-guard, the guard called trabans, and the civic guard. The military institutions of the first order consist of the company of cadets at Olmütz, that of Gratz, the military academy for cadets at Vienna, the five regimental schools of artillery, the school of bombardiers, and the academy of engineers. The total of the peace establishment of this army is 315,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry, with a reserve of 250,000; while its war establishment, which can be organized in four months, may be estimated at 488,000 infantry and from 60,000 to 65,000 cavalry.
At the death of Frederick the Great, the army of the Prussian monarchy, amounting to about 200,000 combatants, was accounted the best in Europe. Proud of a struggle without example in modern annals, and of the superiority of the genius of their king, the victors of Leuthen, Rosbach, and Torgau added to this force of opinion an instruction in great manoeuvres, which the troops of no other nation approached, much less rivalled. The successor of Frederick, to whom this superb army descended, though possessed neither of his genius nor his ambition, was at great pains to maintain the reputation which it had acquired; and some laurels that had been easily gathered in the Low Countries seem to have inspired him with the notion that it was still capable of equalling, perhaps surpassing, the brilliant achievements which had established its renown. In this spirit, and, doubtless, believing that the French nation might be reduced with the same facility as the insurrection in Holland, the Prussian monarch put himself at the head of the confederacy formed to crush a people who had risen in arms to assert their liberties and preserve the integrity of their territory. But the issue proved how much he was at fault in his calculation. For a mercenary and mechanical army, however perfect its discipline and instruction may be, can never triumph over a generous people, inspired by patriotism, endowed with high military qualities, and resolved to conquer or to die in defence of their liberties. Besides, the Prussian army of this period was not a national one, nor was it animated by a common feeling. The half of it, as at Frederick's death, was still composed of deserters from all nations, or volunteers enlisted in every circle of the empire; it was neither inspired by the genius of its chief, nor excited by any feeling calculated to improve its moral force; discipline formed the only tie by which it was held together.
Nor was it long ere its inferiority was proved, and its pride severely humbled. The affair of Valmy opened the king's eyes; and henceforth, more docile to the suggestions of prudence, he negotiated for permission to withdraw to the right bank of the Rhine the wrecks of that army the glory of which had just been eclipsed in the plains of Champagne by battalions of youthful volunteers. He had been taught a lesson by which he did not fail to profit; and after the unsuccessful campaigns on the Rhine, he crept ingloriously out of the contest which he had been so eager to commence; leaving the empire and Austria to the undivided resentment of the conquerors. But he re-established his army, while his late ally was maintaining a death-struggle. The parades and manoeuvres of Potzdam were resumed with their wonted éclat; confidence revived; and Frederick began to flatter himself that he alone could re-adjust the disturbed equilibrium of Europe. He failed, however, to observe the prodigious development which the military art had received in the course of the revolutionary war; or at least he neglected to profit by the discoveries to which it had given birth; and, as he had formerly deserted his ally at the beginning of the contest, so now he took the field just at the moment when that same ally was being overthrown at Austerlitz, and compelled to accept the terms dictated by the conqueror. And at Jena as at Auerstadt, at Halle as at Lubeck, he paid the price of his procrastinating folly. But misfortune, a rough schoolmistress, had inculcated some useful lessons. The military constitution of Prussia was changed; foreign recruitment ceased; a national army was formed; the privileges of the nobles were abridged; old institutions were reformed; discipline was improved by being simplified; the arming and equipment of the army were improved in all their branches; the best parts of the French military system were adopted; the patriotism of the nation was roused, in short, during five years, Prussia was silently but actively employed in preparing those elements of strength which, in 1812, delivered the monarchy from the yoke of the stranger, and re-established her at the head of the second-rate powers of Europe.
The armed force of the Prussian monarchy is composed, first, of a permanent army; secondly, of a war reserve or landwehr in two bans; thirdly, of a landsturm, or sedentary national guard. The permanent army is composed of young men of family who are destined to the profession of arms, and are named officers after undergoing certain examinations; of volunteers who clothe, equip, and support themselves for a year at their own charge; of persons between the ages of 17 and 40 who enlist voluntarily and receive regular pay; of a part of the youth from 20 to 25 years of age, raised by means of requisition; and, lastly, of veterans or soldiers who consent to remain in the service beyond the term prescribed by the law. The infantry consists of 40 regiments of 3 battalions and 9 regiments of 2 battalions, besides 6 battalions of chasseurs and carabiniers, forming in all 140 battalions; the cavalry, of 38 regiments of 4 squadrons each, 10 of which are cuirassiers, 5 dragoons, 13 hussars, and 10 ulans, in all 158 squadrons; the artillery, of 24 brigades, each consisting of 2 batteries, 8 field pieces; and the gens-d'armerie, of 8
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1 Guerres de la Révolution, tom. I. p. 223. Notice sur le Système Militaire de la Prusse, Bullet. des Scien. Milit., tom. III. p. 417, 461, 541, et tom. V. p. 417. See also Archiv für neuer Kriegs und Armee Geschichte, vol. I. part 1st, and Zeitschr. für Kunst, Wissenschaft, und Geschichte des Krieges, part 2d, 1817.
2 At the commencement of the French Revolution the Prussian army consisted of about 120,000 infantry, 35,000 cavalry, and from 7000 to 8000 artillery, with a most respectable corps of engineers. (Guerres de la Révolution, I. 232.) In 1806, it amounted to 260,000 men of all arms. (Etat Comparatif de l'Armée Prussienne en 1806 et en 1827. Bullet. des Scien. Milit., tom. V. p. 417.)
3 Jomini reckons the number of foreigners serving in the Prussian army at this period as only a third part of its entire strength; but we agree with the author of the Notice sur le Système Militaire de la Prusse in thinking it amounted to a half. The data on which this conclusion is founded appear amply to warrant the statement made in the text. (Hist. Crit. et Milit. I. 233.)
4 The Prussian cavalry, in the time of Frederick, was confessedly the best in Europe. "L'infanterie Prussienne," says Jomini, "quoique manœuvrière était cependant loin d'atteindre le degré de perfection auquel Seidlitz avait porté le cavalerie: cette dernière armée tenait alors le premier rang en Europe." (Hist. Crit. et Milit. I. 231.) See also Cavalry Lectures, p. 329.) Army. brigades, divided each into 2 detachments. All the youth who have not served five years in the active army or in the reserve, form part of the first ban of the landwehr, until they attain the age of 30 years complete. The second embraces those from 32 to 40 years of age; and both classes, during time of peace, remain at home, pursuing their ordinary avocations. But, in the event of war, the first ban is destined to reinforce the permanent army; and the second, to form the garrisons of strong places, and even, in case of need, to send detachments to the army in the field. The landwehr, like the permanent army, is composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. In the year 1827, the infantry of the first ban consisted of 116 battalions, and the cavalry of 104 squadrons. Hence, if we include 54 garrison companies, and 18 of invalids at Berlin, Stolpen, and Rybnik, the total of the peace establishment of the Prussian army will amount to 122,000 men, while that of war would not be less than 250,000 men of all arms; and such is the admirable military organization of the country, that two months only are necessary to raise the army to the full complement of the war establishment. In Prussia the cavalry is a preponderating arm. Of the 122,000 men composing the peace establishment, 37,000 belong to this branch of the service. The landsturm is a levy en masse of men from the age of 17 to that of 50, and in cases of imminent danger, it is called out by a royal ordinance. It is formed into urban and rural companies, and, like the French national guard, performs, if necessary, the duties of the interior; thus leaving the whole of the permanent army and the landwehr available for the service of the field. The actual constitution of the Prussian army is strictly economical in all its parts, and the number of military functionaries is reduced to the lowest possible scale consistent with the efficiency of the service. In Prussia every man who wears a uniform works hard for his money.
All Prussians, from the age of 20 to 50, are held liable to military service, but they only serve regularly from 20 to 26. The duration of service is consequently fixed at five years; but, in time of peace, the requisitionary youth remain only the first three years under their colours, after which they return to their homes, and are not called out again, except for a few weeks towards the expiry of the fifth year, when they are inscribed in the landwehr of the first ban. The population of Prussia being 11,500,000 souls, about 98,000 males will annually attain the twentieth year of their age. Hence, if we deduct 38,000 for such as are excepted from military service on account of their age or their status in society, the total number of disposable persons, between the age of 20 and 25, will amount to 395,000. And if to this we add that portion of the male population from 25 to 32 years of age who are eventually called to the service, it will follow that Prussia, without having recourse to the second ban of the landwehr, could raise 900,000 men trained to the use of arms; while France, even since 1824, when the re-organization of her army commenced, could scarcely bring into the field more than 480,000 men, of which the one-half would be nearly uninstructed in the use of arms. The annual renewal of this army by thirds renders it necessary to push, with the utmost activity, the instruction of both infantry and cavalry, and to pay little regard to that martinet precision which formerly characterized the Prussian tactics, but which is of so small use in the presence of an enemy. The showy on parade has consequently been sacrificed to the useful in the field; and the mere foppery of war has given place to movements and evolutions, which are recommended alike by their simplicity, and by the testimony which experience, the best of all instructors, has borne in their favour. So long ago as the year 1808, the degrading discipline, introduced by the father of Frederick the Great, was abolished by the kriegs-artikel or the martial law; and military punishments are now principally confined to hard drills, confinement of various degrees, retrogradation in rank, and some others of a still milder description. Finally, the first grades are the reward of merit established by examination, and as such open to all; while, from the rank of sub-lieutenant to that of general, and even beyond it, seniority, that conservative law of acquired rights, regulates the advancement of officers, and ultimately insures the veteran his reward. Thus, after sustaining the greatest disasters, the Prussian army has survived its dispersion in 1807, and risen, as it were out of its ashes, stronger and better constituted than at the period when it was so rashly opposed to the undivided power of France, wielded by the master-hand of the greatest warrior of modern times. "Heureux les gouvernemens," says a French military writer, "auxquels les malheurs servent de leçons!" Nor would their "happiness" have been much diminished had such governments remembered in victory the promises made to the people in misfortune, and shown but half as much zeal to improve their condition as to rectify the defects of their military systems.
At the period of the Emperor Alexander's death, the distribution of the Russian and Polish forces was that of an army ranged in order of battle, with its front facing the west. 1. The advanced guard of this army was formed by the Polish army and the corps d'armée of Lithuania; presenting a mass of 80,000 combatants, under the command of the Grand Duke Constantine. In point of mechanical instruction, no army in Europe could be compared to it. Disposed in cantonments of about 150 leagues in length, from Lowicz to Minsk, and 146 in breadth, between Kowno and Dubno, it could be concentrated, at Warsaw or at Brzez-Littowsky, in less than three weeks. 2. The army of the right was composed of the corps d'armée, cantoned in Courland and Livonia, of the corps of the guard, and of the first corps of the cavalry of reserve; which, united, formed also a mass of 80,000 combatants. These were perhaps the only troops which, in point of mechanical perfection, rivalled the army of the advanced guard under Constantine. Their cantonments extended from Polangen to Pleskof, about 132 leagues, and from Revel to Willkomirsz; and eighteen days at the most were sufficient for assembling them on the Niemen. 3. The army of the left, denominated the second army, was equally formed of a mass of 80,000 combatants, cantoned in the Chersonesian governments. The greatest depth of its quarters, from Choczyn on the Pruth to Czernasy on the Dnieper, was about 106 leagues; and the greatest breadth 180 leagues, between Machnowka, near the southern frontier of Volhynia and Simpherapol in the Crimea. Three weeks were necessary for concentrating it on the Pruth. 4. The army of the centre, called also the first or grand army, forming a mass equal to the three preceding armies, and consequently consisted of 240,000 combatants. Its cantonments extended on one side to more than 234 leagues, or from Kiszin, on the frontier of the government of Tver and of Jaroslaf, as far as Saratow; and, on the other, to upwards of 320 leagues, from Ostrog to Moroun, on the frontier of the government of Vladimir and of Nijei-Novgorod. It required six weeks at least for concentrating itself in the province of Volhynia. 5. Besides these four armies, consisting of 480,000 men, Russia had also several corps, of various descriptions, amounting to more than 267,000 men: viz., the corps of Finland, of Orenburg, and of Siberia, 45,000 strong; the corps of the Caucasus, 85,000;
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1 The gens-d'armerie is of three kinds: the armée gens-d'armerie, divided into detachments stationed at the headquarters of generals of corps-d'armée; the land gens-d'armerie, consisting of 80 wachtmeister and 1240 gens-d'armes, of whom 1080 are mounted; and the grande-poule-d'armerie, which assists the employés of the customs in discharging their duties on the frontiers. the military colonies, 67,000; and the troops in garrison, 70,000; thus making a grand total of 747,000 men exclusive of the Kirghises, Bashkir, and other Tartar hordes, of whom from 250,000 to 300,000 may in case of exigency be brought into the field. The whole military force of the Russian empire, at this period, may, therefore, be estimated at above a million of men, or a forty-ninth part of the entire population; while the country, as we have just seen, was organized into one vast camp, arranged upon strategic principles, so as to render the transition from a state of peace to a state of war easy and expeditious, and, with formidable means of aggression, to combine defensive resources of almost incalculable extent.
The contest with Turkey in 1828 and 1829, and Poland in 1830, produced no sensible derangement of this system, and only altered for a time the relative proportions in the numbers of the four principal armies, according as troops were moved upon the various strategic points in the theatre of war. But the lacunae created by the casualties of campaigns in Moldavia, Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Circassia, have been already filled up; and consequently the above account of the military organization and force of the Russian empire is as applicable in 1853 as it was from the death of Alexander in 1826 to the commencement of the Turkish war in 1828. A fact, however, is mentioned by M. Tolstoy, lately an officer of the Russian staff, which shows the utter groundlessness of the fears generally entertained of the aggressive powers of Russia at the commencement of the late contest with Turkey. From a variety of data, derived from authentic sources, that officer exhibits the situation and force of the Russian army at different periods of the campaign of 1828, and proves, we think to demonstration, that it never had more than 88,000 men in its first line; a force which was not calculated, certainly, to excite any very great degree of alarm in the minds of other nations. M. Tolstoy, it is true, alleges that political reasons prevented the employment of a greater force; and that if the Russians only brought forward 88,000 men in the first campaign, "c'était qu'ils ne voulaient point effrayer l'Europe et réveiller des jalousies qui sommeillaient." But closer observers will perhaps see reason to believe that the real cause why the campaign was undertaken with a force comparatively so small, did not consist in any particular respect for the "slumbering jealousies" of other nations, but in the inability of Russia to take the field with a larger army; that her physical means are out of all proportion greater than her financial resources or power of developing them in a foreign war; and that, however formidable or invincible she might prove to an enemy invading her own territory, a long period must yet elapse before she can be in a condition to occasion any serious uneasiness to the nations of the south and west of Europe. Even in the campaign of 1829, when so many losses were to be repaired, and the reputation of the Russian arms, if possible, to be freed from the tarnish they had contracted in the course of the preceding one, Count Diebitsch was compelled to attempt the passage of the Balkan with no more than 30,000 men; and, in point of fact, he appears to have arrived at Adrianople in the month of October, with less than the third of that small force; a miracle of fortune, certainly, but, at the same time, a conclusive proof of the exhausted state of the Russian finances, and of the inability of the Czar to carry on a distant and protracted war. Diebitsch owed his success to two causes: the powerful co-operation of the fleet, and the despairing fatalism, or rather infatuation, of the Turks. But the fortunate result of the enterprise cannot blind the world as to the circumstances under which it was undertaken, nor conceal the weakness which preternatural folly, on the part of the Osmanlis, at length gilded with victory.
The Russian infantry consists of 72 regiments of the line, of 7 battalions each; 12 regiments of the guards; and 12 of the grenadier corps, and amounts on paper at the peace establishment to 624,000 men, inclusive of the infantry of the independent armies of Orenburg, Siberia, the Caucasus, and Finland.
Each regiment consists of 4000 men, under a pulkhoonick or colonel, and divided into seven battalions (four of which are effective), of four companies, each under a chef-de-bataillon. The company consists of 200 men, exclusive of officers, sub-officers, and other persons attached to it, so that four companies make up a battalion of 1000 men; and it is under the command of a capitain, a paroschick or lieutenant, a putparooschick or sub-lieutenant, and a properchick or ensign. Four officers may appear a small allowance for a company; but, in the first place, Russian soldiers are much more easily managed than our dare-devil fellows, in whose blood the wild spirit of freedom revels so fiercely; and, secondly, the fundamental principle upon which the army of the Czar is organized is that of economy in every branch of the service, particularly in the number of officers.
Hence, for an effective regular force of 747,000 men, there are no more than 14,224 officers, or one for every 52 men; a proportion, we believe, considerably lower than that which obtains in any other European army, except perhaps that of Prussia. This reduced number, however, has been found to answer well enough in practice; and, indeed, a multitude of officers is only necessary for armies like that of France, which require to be encouraged and stimulated by the example, the voice, and the gestures of its officers, when in presence of an enemy.
Every company has a small green yaslich or waggon attached to it containing sixty rounds of ball cartridge for each man, in addition to those he carries in his pouch, besides the company's books and cash-chest. To each battalion there is attached one standard, beside which is kept a drum for assembling the men. There is only one band for the three battalions composing a regiment. The imperial guard, consisting of the elite of the three arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, amounts in all to 40,000 men.
The Russian regular cavalry consists of 12 regiments of the guard, divided into cuirassiers and light horse. 24 regiments of cavalry of the line, 24 regiments of cavalry of reserve, 12 regiments of cavalry of the grenadier corps, 2 regiments of Caucasian dragoons, and model regiments. Each regiment consists of 9 squadrons of 160 men per squadron, or 1440 men per regiment, giving consequently a regular cavalry force of 103,680.
The irregular cavalry is composed of more than 136,000 Cossacks, Bashkir, Kirghises, Turcomans, Kussibashes, &c., who are only called out during time of war, and on the return of peace are sent back to their steppes to resume their nomadic course of life. The cavalry is organized upon the same principle as the infantry. It is formed into corps d'armée, and two batteries of horse artillery are attached to each division, or 48 pieces to a corps d'armée. The light division of the guard is composed of a regiment of dragoons, one of hulans, one of hussars, and one of chasseurs. The division of heavy cavalry of the guard consists of the regiment of chevaliers-guards, of the regiment of horse-guards, and of
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1 État des Armées Russes et Polonaises à l'époque de la mort de l'Empereur Alexandre, ou comparaison entre ces deux armées et les autres puissances armées de l'Europe. Paris, 1826. Mauvillon, Militair Blätter für 1826, part 1st. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. iii. p. 385.
2 Répétition à la Réponse de M. Mongeau sur Observations d'un officier d'état-major Russe sur la dernière campagne de Turquie, par J. Tolstoy, ancien officier d'état-major Russe. Paris, Ledoyen, 1829. Dix chapitres sur la Guerre d'Orient. Paris, Delamay et Dupont, 1829.
3 Captain Alexander's Travels, i. 106. the cuirassiers of the emperor and empress. The last two regiments, as well as the chasseurs of the light division, belong to the young guard. The guard is recruited in the regiments of the line, from which it draws all the finest men, and to which it never fails to send back every one who has given the slightest cause for dissatisfaction. The clothing and equipments are superb; and the greatest attention is paid to the appearance of the troops, which has of late years been much improved. There are, however, many contrasts of costume in the army. Some of the regiments of guards retain uniforms which have long been obsolete, and are striking from their very antiquity.
Equitation is also anxiously cultivated, and vast pains have been taken to improve the men in this art.
The Russian, like the French artillery, is divided into horse and foot. It employs 55,000 men. The horse, or flying artillery, comprising 400 guns, is divided into brigades or battalions, of two divisions or squadrons, each serving 12 light pieces. The foot artillery of 1320 guns, is divided into brigades or regiments, each commanded by four superior officers, and divided into two companies of battery, and two light companies. The two former are destined each to serve 12 pieces in battery; the two latter, 12 light pieces each. A brigade of foot-artillery with 48 pieces of cannon is attached to each division of infantry of 6 regiments; while each division of cavalry composed of 4 regiments has a brigade of horse-artillery of 24 pieces.
There is also in each corps d'armée a general of artillery who receives the orders of the inspector-general of the artillery.
The personnel of the companies is determined and organized according to the service which the different kinds of artillery require; so that the personnel of the battery companies is considerably stronger than that of the light companies. The train is well organized, and the attelages of the different batteries and pieces are ample.
The engineer department is also on a respectable footing, though inferior in science to those of the other great military nations. The Russians have never been remarkable for skill in fortification, but their field-works have in general been judiciously executed.
The system of recruiting in Russia is exceedingly autocratic. When new levies are wanted, orders are issued to the headmen of villages; each of which is required to furnish a certain number, according to the amount of its population. The selection is made by the headman, who is perfectly absolute in the matter; and Jews are now obliged either to serve or to pay for substitutes, who are not easily procured in a country like Russia, where so few of the lower class are their own masters. Formerly, it was very difficult to prevent the men from deserting on the road to the depôts; since the circumstance of being selected as a soldier was considered as tantamount to perpetual banishment from family and friends. Hence, it was no uncommon spectacle to see numbers of these wretched serfs fastened together like a cordon of felons going to the hulks, or tied on telegas or carts, and thus conveyed to the dépôt. But since leave has been given to soldiers to visit, at intervals, their native villages, and the period of service has been limited to 20 years, the dislike to the army has begun to abate, and recruits show less disposition to desert, although the military profession is still sufficiently unpopular. When the recruit, or rather conscript, arrives at the dépôt, he is immediately stripped, washed, and shaved: If he wishes to retain any article of the dress which he brought with him, he is obliged to purchase it back. The only thing he is allowed to retain, without paying for it, is the cross of silver or brass which he wears round his neck. This superstition spares him, as the only consolation of his miserable existence; and because, however passive in other respects, the most obsequious serf would become dangerous, if deprived of an emblem which had probably been handed down from father to son for many generations, and the loss of which is considered the greatest misfortune.
The Russian soldier is docile, submissive, and brave; like all slaves, he is supple, subservient, and cunning; like all natives of the northern regions, he is hardy, patient, and enduring. He has no other thought than to do implicitly as he is desired; and there is a pertinacity in his nature which inclines him to persevere, or to stand firm, as the case may be, without troubling himself about consequences. His courage is the result of insensibility rather than of moral force of character; and hence it is commonly more of a passive than of an active character. But there is, nevertheless, an element of indomitable ferocity in his composition: amidst all the apparatus and parade of civilization he is still three parts a barbarian. Hence his most brilliant achievements have been performed under men upon whom the force of civilization had made as little impression as on himself; and whom the instinct of sympathy had taught to develop his natural barbarism. The Italian campaign of Suworoff affords a striking illustration of this remark. When that "hero-buffoon" arrived in Italy at the head of his 20,000 Russians, to take the command-in-chief of the allied forces, General Chasteler, head of the staff of the army, proposed to him to make a reconnaissance of the French, who had retired behind the Oglio. "Des reconnaissances!" exclaimed the Muscovite chief, "je n'en veux pas; elles ne servent qu'aux gens timides, et pour avertir l'ennemi qu'on arrive; on trouve toujours l'ennemi quand on veut. Des colonnes, la baionnette, l'arme blanche, attaquer, enfoncer,—voilà mes reconnaissances!" At Novi, at the Trebbia, and during his extraordinary campaign in the mountains of Switzerland, this wonderful barbarian, who had the instinct of genius, and a coup d'œil which has never been surpassed, proved that these were not empty words. By a kind of rude but infallible inspiration he discerned intuitively the true strategic points on which to move; and by the spell of his barbaric genius he rendered the Muscovite soldier invincible. In the campaign of 1812, we find another, though less striking, illustration of this peculiar characteristic of the Russian troops. Barclay de Tolly, a foreigner, in character and feeling, commanded in the early part of it; displaying a watchfulness, a prudence, and a sagacity in divining the intentions of his adversary, which proved him a great master in the art of war, and, beyond all question, saved the Russian empire. But still the army was discouraged; and Alexander felt it necessary to place at its head, as well as second in command, two of the ancient companions in arms of the conqueror of Italy. Its courage instantly revived; and the bloody day of Borodino attests how well it repaid this compliance with its wishes. The Russians have a strongly-marked national character, which foreigners can never duly appreciate; nor will its best energies be displayed in war, except under the command of men who feel its influence as powerfully as the meanest soldier in its ranks. The moral force of their army consists in a certain nondescript fanatical ferocity, which such men as Suworoff, Bagration, and Kutusoff can alone fully develop.
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1 The men ride according to a system adopted of late years in Prussia and the Netherlands, the peculiarity of which consists in throwing the legs farther backwards, so as to break the perpendicular line formed in the French riding-school by the position of the body and thigh. *Revelations of Russia.*
2 Bulletin des Scien. Milit., tom. ii, p. 493. Zeitsch, für Kriegswissenschaft, 1826, part 3d, p. 254.
3 He was of Scottish descent.
4 Lieutenant-General Baron Jomini describes the Russian soldier with that predilection in his favour which may not unnaturally be expected from the aide-de-camp général de S. M. L'Empereur de Russie, and grand croix de plusieurs ordres. But even while he paints In Sweden, union and confidence have always subsisted between the soldier and the citizen; and hence the desire of military service is so common among all classes of the nation, that sending a man to the army is not there, as elsewhere, a punishment. In 1811, when the peasantry broke out in insurrection against the conscription by ballot, they offered to take arms without exception in the event of war, to submit to be drilled together in time of peace, and to equip themselves at their own charge, provided the obnoxious innovation was abolished; tenders which were wisely accepted on the part of the government. The present military establishment of Sweden is considerably below what a nation constitutionally warlike might be supposed to maintain; but as the aim of the government is to husband the public money, and, if possible, to relieve the country from the pecuniary difficulties entailed upon it by the folly and extravagance of the ex-king, all the departments of the public service have been placed on the most economical footing. The actual standing army, accordingly, does not exceed 35,000 men of all arms. The militia, however, is more numerous; and, from the peculiar aptitude of the Swedes for military exercises, it exhibits a very soldier-like appearance, though only trained for a few weeks annually. Like the regular army, it is composed both of horse and foot, and must afford a ready resource in the event of war. The organization of the whole is excellent. The regiments of the line are recruited neither by voluntary enrolment nor by conscription, but by a kind of intermediate system; every landed proprietor furnishing a certain number of soldiers, to each of whom a house and a portion of land are allotted for his maintenance. The Swedes have been long and justly celebrated for their martial qualities; and no modern nation of so small extent has made so conspicuous a figure in history. They are brave, hardy, and naturally heroic men; of superior physical and corresponding moral power; and, as soldiers, equal to any in the world.
The Danish army consists of rather more than 30,000 men, with a reserve of about 14,000. Of this force 2157 are divided throughout the kingdom of Denmark, and 9655 stationed in the duchies; while the remainder are employed in garrison, or occupy cantonments in the vicinity of the capital. The whole is composed of a staff of 23 officers; a corps of engineers of 32; an artillery corps of 3202 men, divided into 22 companies; 6126 cavalry, divided into ten regiments, one of which is a regiment of guards; 13,412 infantry, divided into thirteen regiments of two battalions each, one of which is also a regiment of guards; 2753 chasseurs, divided into five battalions of four companies each; and, lastly, a rocket corps, amounting to 156 men. The two regiments of guards are composed of very fine men, and have a noble appearance. The artillery consists of twenty batteries of eight pieces each; besides a company of sappers and miners, one of pontoon men and pioneers, with a detachment of artificers, and a laboratory establishment.
The Danish soldier is a quiet, hard-working man, who goes about the peasant's farmyard like one of his own farm-servants, puts up with the same fare and lodging, looks after the cattle, feeds the pigs, and makes himself useful. The Danish service was notorious formerly for the barbarity of its discipline. The slightest error in observing the most absurd regulations in dress and drill incurred the most severe corporal punishment. The cane of the under-officer was incessantly at work on the shoulders of the wretched soldier. It was not uncommon sixty years ago for the men to sit up all night previous to a grand review, to tie their queues, powder their hair, and save it from being deranged by lying down; as the slightest derangement or want of uniformity in pigtails or sidelocks brought down severe punishment. Suicide was frequent; and officers as well as men were brutalized by the cruelties they had to witness, inflict, and suffer. The late king, Christian VIII., abolished entirely, and at once, the infliction of corporal punishment at the discretion of officers and under-officers. The minor military transgressions could only be punished by arrest, extra duty, and such punishments as are now adopted in our army; flogging and caning were abolished. The officers of the old school of military discipline and dress, the martinet of the parade-ground, predicted the entire ruin of their well-drilled, well-coddled little army, by these innovations. The men were no longer enlisted for life. They served only three years, after which, those who wished to become under-officers, served two years in a military school, and, three years afterwards, as under-officers; and eight years concluded their term of military service, unless they chose to re-enlist. The clothing, dress, drill, were simplified; and the Danish soldier is now scarcely distinguishable from the Prussian or other German soldiers. The Danish army is composed of peasants accustomed to hard work, from the great exertions which their climate imposes on the husbandman to get his seed into the ground in due season. Wet, and cold, and night work, hardship, and labour, are familiar to them; and the Jutlanders, in particular, are men of greater physical powers, and more roughly bred and fed, and harsher than the peasantry of Holstein, or of the south of Schleswig. The Danish soldiery, and the classes from which they are drawn, are, at this day, men of the same character as the peasantry of the feudal ages. They have the same implicit confidence in, and personal attachment to, their leaders. Their captains, lieutenants, and under-officers are to them what the baron, his standard-bearers, squires, and pages were to their
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en bous that infantry "qui avait prouvé à Pultava, à Kunersdorf, à Choczm, à Imsel, et dans mille actions contre les Turcs ou les Suédois, ce qu'on peut attendre de son inébranlable fermeté," he shows his usual discrimination of military character, and makes several observations which appear to us equally striking and original. "L'opinion généralement accréditée en Europe," says he, "que le paysan Russe, ne possédant rien, gagne beaucoup à devenir soldat, est dénuée de fondement. Un grand nombre d'entre eux, entre les champs de ses maîtres, cultive des fruits, des légumes, travaille et trafique à son compte. Beaucoup sont à leur aise; et la vie du soldat dans l'intérieur du pays, ne leur porte pas envie au point de la désirer." Mais quand un paysan, et sous les drapeaux, il s'y attache comme à une seconde patrie......Élevé de la manière la plus rude, sous un climat terrible, il est le plus robuste de l'Europe, le plus capable de soutenir les fatigues et les privations. Il ne connaît rien de plus sacré que ses devoirs; soumis à l'ordonnance comme aux préceptes de sa religion, aucune fatigue, aucune intempérie, ne peut lui faire négliger les obligations qu'elle impose. On voit dans toutes les marches et durant une campagne entière, le canonnier près de sa pièce, au poste qui lui est assigné par le règlement, et à moins d'être frappé par le fer ennemi ou autorisé par son chef, il ne la quitterait pour rien au monde. Le soldat du train cire son harnais au bivouac par 15 degrés de froid et aux jours fixes, comme il le ferait dans un bois, seulement pour aller à une parade. Cet esprit admirable d'ordre et de précision, joint à l'instinct naturel que le soldat a de se protéger au lieu de fuir quand il est enfoncé, rend les défaites extrêmement rares. Sans doute, une telle trouppe est moins facile à rallier sur le terrain qu'une armée Française, où l'intelligence du soldat suppléaient souvent au défaut d'œil; mais elle est aussi plus difficile à rompre....Cet instinct qu'aucune des troupes de l'Europe ne possède au même degré, s'est fortifiée chez les Russes par les guerres contre les Turcs. Là, tout fuyard est sabré par les nuées de cavaliers qui se répandent sur les dunes et les débris de l'armée. Ce n'est qu'en restant formées et réunies qu'on échappe à une destruction inévitable." This is a tolerably good reason for the "instinct" of which the gallant author speaks. He adds, "La plus parfaite égalité règne dans l'armée, car une fois dans la carrière des armes, aucun obstacle n'empêche de la parcourir. Pour s'en convaincre, on n'a qu'à voir les noms des généraux distingués dans l'histoire militaire de Russie; on y trouvera autant de plébéiens, ou de bas-officiers parvenus par leur mérite, que dans tout autre pays." (Guerres de la Révolution, tom. i. p. 254-256.)
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1 Alexander's Travels, vol. ii. p. 267. Army. forefathers. Their relation is preserved in the army from the men and officers growing up together in the same regiment, and becoming known to each other. Officers are rarely shifted from the regiment in which they have begun their service, and regiments are rarely removed, in time of peace, from the province in which they have been first raised or quartered. The Danish soldier, like the peasant in the days of chivalry, thinks the real battle is but beginning when, in most modern armies, it is considered ending—when the combatants come hand to hand in the charge of bayonets. The firing is considered a mere preliminary, however bloody; and at Idstedt, and again at the siege of Fredericksstadt, during the war with Prussia, regarding the duchy of Schleswig-Holstein in 1849-50, the Danish troops slackened, and even ceased their fire altogether, on command—a manoeuvre in face of the enemy, and in the heat of an engagement, which few troops of the most highly disciplined armies would have the coolness to practise, or their commanders the confidence in their men to venture upon. But the implicit confidence of the Danish soldiery in their leaders, and of the leaders in their men, and their military intelligence and submission to orders, seem innate. Their ideas of warfare are formed on the tales and ballads of the times of chivalry, when personal combats decided battles; and no country is so rich in popular songs and traditionary stories, from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Waldemar Scier (the Victorious), his good queen Dagnal, the wars in the unhappy times of his sons, and of Eric of Pomerania and his gallant queen Philippa, the sister of our Henry V., and the exploits of the knight Ebbesen, and his battles against the Holstein Count Gert, are household literature among the Danish peasantry, and, as far as literature can do so, have formed the character of the people. The Danish soldiers are men of the fifteenth century, led by officers of the nineteenth. The under-officers appear to stand on a higher footing in the Danish service than the non-commissioned in ours. They are appointed in the same way, by the recommendation of the captain of the company, and are selected from the soldiers of three years' service. On their appointment they are sent for two years to the military academy, where they are instructed in various branches of knowledge connected with military duty, which they could not be taught so well with their regiments. Outpost-duty, patrol-duty, and all that depends upon the military intelligence and eye of the under-officer, was done in a more satisfactory manner in the Danish than in the insurgent army. The latter was under great disadvantage in the field from want of experienced or instructed under-officers and officers who understood and had the confidence of the men. The defeat of the "Schleswig-Holstein" army is attributed to this want by the German officers who have written on the war. The Danish non-commissioned officers have the moral weight of a better-educated class, as well as that of their military rank, among the men. The officers are highly-educated, gentlemanly men, superior in tastes and acquirements to the majority of our officers, their education being very much superior. They are all bred from a very early age at the military academy of Copenhagen, in which the languages and literature of other countries, as well as of their own, and all the mathematical and other sciences connected with the military profession, are very carefully taught, and they undergo very strict examinations before they pass as cadets. They join a regiment as privates in the ranks, rise to be under-officers, in which rank they remain for two or three years, and are appointed second-lieutenants afterwards, and rise by seniority in regimental rank. Captains and subalterns, both in cavalry and infantry regiments, are, in general, as young men for their rank as officers in our service. The military officers are often provided for, after long and meritorious service, by offices in the customs or the forest department. The subaltern officer is not allowed to marry unless he can prove that, besides his pay, he and his proposed wife have an income of 600 dollars; and he must also insure his life to the extent that his widow may enjoy an annuity equivalent to his pay. The pay is small; about 400 dollars yearly, or about £45 sterling, is the pay of a lieutenant; but, on actual service, the officer has a field allowance, and living is extremely moderate. It is not merely the cheapness of provisions, but the simpler habits of living that make one country less expensive than another. The officer in Denmark maintains his station in society on his small pay, and is in manners, appearance, education, and all gentlemanly accomplishments and feelings, equal to the best of our own regimental officers, and very superior to the many ignorant, unformed youths who formerly joined our regiments without any preparatory education or examination. The artillery of the Danish army is said to be excellent, and ball practice with artillery is even a favourite amusement, on summer evenings, with the citizens of Copenhagen. In the Danish dominions the inhabitants of the great towns are exempt from the conscription for the landwehr, or general military service, but they furnish battalions of local militia, which do military duty in the town as part of the garrison, and which elect their own officers, up to captains inclusive, and are clothed and equipped at the expense of the corporations. They are a kind of volunteer force, but liable to serve, in the event of an invasion, like other troops, and then receive pay, subsistence, and quarters, according to their rank, like the officers and men of the regular army. The artillery of the city of Copenhagen was called out in the last war; and the "shoemaker's brigade," as it was called by the soldiers, from its captain being a respectable tradesman of that craft, an amateur artillerist, was as well served, and as effective in the field, during the three years of warfare, as any brigade of guns in the army.
The electorate of Saxony, with a superficies of 717 square miles, a population of 2,104,336 souls, and a revenue of about 780,000 thalers, maintained in 1792 an army of about 32,000 men, being a 66th part of the population; and on this footing it remained till 1800, when it was increased to 38,000 men, being a 56th part of the population. But Saxony having in 1802 gained a small increase of territory in consequence of the treaty of Luneville, though, at the same time, it lost about 1,778,000 thalers of revenue, the army was reduced to 31,000 men, of which 22,000 were infantry and 6700 cavalry. This state of things continued until 1806, when the military force was raised to 36,000; Saxony having then a population of 2,276,000 souls. In the year 1809 she furnished a contingent to France of 16,000 men, who, under the command of Bernadotte, afterwards king of Sweden, took part in the memorable campaign of that year, and fought at the battle of Wagram; but the Emperor Napoleon was so little satisfied, either with the conduct of these troops, or that of their leader, on this occasion, that he was with difficulty prevented from stigmatizing both in the orders of the day. After the peace of Vienna in 1810, the Saxon army was reorganized upon the model of the French, and its contingent of 16,000 men formed the seventh corps of the grand army which invaded Russia in 1812. It was commanded by General Reynier. On the disastrous termination of the Russian campaign, its wrecks, re-organized from the troops remaining in Saxony, entered into line in 1813, after the battle of Lutzen; and on the conclusion of the armistice with the Hessian corps and that of General Durutte, it formed again the seventh division. The defection of the Saxon divisions at Leipzig, on the 18th of October 1813, is well known.
1 Denmark and the Duchies, by Samuel Laing. The king of Saxony having lost his liberty in consequence of the result of that disastrous day, his army was dissolved and replaced by a landwehr of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, which followed in the train of the allied armies when they invaded France. In 1815, however, the army was reconstituted to the extent of a third of its former strength; and underwent various changes until 1824, when it was finally placed on the footing on which it now stands. The infantry at present consists of two companies of grenadier guards of 100 men each, four regiments of infantry of three battalions each, two battalions of light infantry, one battalion of carabiniers, and one of chasseurs; in all sixteen battalions of four companies each, or 9984 men. The cavalry, which formerly consisted of horse guards, cuirassiers, hulans, and hussars, has been transformed into four regiments of light horse, consisting of four squadrons of two companies each, or 467 men on the footing of peace; in all 1872. The artillery consists of one regiment making twelve companies, two of which are horse, amounting to 1060 sub-officers and soldiers, together with a train of 189 men and as many horses. A dozen officers without troops, and a company of sappers 67 strong, compose the engineer department. The institutions connected with the army are a school for cadets, and a military academy, both at Dresden. The reputation of the Saxon infantry is low; but the cavalry is better than the infantry, and is well qualified for the service of the advanced posts, which was its usual destination under Napoleon.
The composition of the Hanoverian army was fixed by a royal decree of the 14th July 1820. The infantry consists of twelve regiments of two battalions each, and the battalion is divided into four companies. There are two of these regiments guards; and the whole are divided into three brigades, the first consisting of five regiments, the second of four, and the third of three. Each regiment consists of 42 officers and 1284 men. There are eight regiments of cavalry, two of cuirassiers of the guard, four of hussars, and two of hulans; and each regiment is composed of four squadrons, 48 officers, 433 men, and 403 horses. The artillery consists of one regiment of two battalions, each divided into three companies, one of which is horse, and contains 70 officers, 1158 men, and 210 horses. The corps of engineers and artificers consists of 19 officers and 46 men. The artillery is of the English model and calibre, and its batteries, both horse and foot, consist of six pieces and a howitzer each. The total strength of the army, therefore, including the staff, amounts to 825 officers, 20,091 men, and 3431 horse. The period of service in the infantry of the guard is four years only, but in all the other corps six years. The cavalry and artillery are recruited as much as possible from volunteers. The Hanoverians make excellent soldiers; and it is well known that, during the Peninsular campaigns, no part of the Duke of Wellington's army more frequently distinguished itself than the King's German Legion, which was almost exclusively composed of Hanoverian volunteers.
The Bavarian is one of the largest of the third-rate armies. Its infantry consists of a regiment of grenadiers of the guard in three battalions, of 16 regiments of the line in two, and of four battalions of chasseurs; presenting an effective force of 39 battalions, or 53,420 men. Its cavalry is composed of four regiments of cuirassiers in four squadrons each, and six regiments of light horse in six squadrons; forming a total of 56 squadrons, or 6944 men, and horses in proportion. The artillery corps, commanded by a lieutenant-general, consists of one regiment of cannoniers of two battalions, one regiment of horse artillery, and one regiment of artificers, pontoneers, sappers, and miners. Each battalion of artillery is divided into six companies, one of Bavarian which consists of light troops; and the companies of pontoneers, miners, and sappers, have each an effective force of 100 men, including officers. The engineer corps is composed of a general, a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, two majors, two captains, eight lieutenants of the first class, eight of the second, and six conductors, and is divided among the five directions of Munich, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Wurtzburg, and Lindau. The Bavarian army, therefore, consists of 53,420 infantry, 6944 cavalry, 5580 artillery, 1464 train, and 150 artificers; in all 67,558. Every Bavarian, the clergy only excepted, is obliged to bear arms in defence of his country; but, in practice, students and persons necessary to their families are usually exempted; and permission is likewise granted to serve by substitute. The method of recruitment is conscription. Besides the permanent army, there is a reserve destined to reinforce it; and, in the event of war, the landwehr may be equally called upon to support the army, when reinforced by the battalions of the reserve, but only in the interior. The landwehr is divided into two classes, one of which comprehends those who are least capable of performing active service, and who cannot in any case be employed beyond the limits of their district. In time of peace it co-operates in the maintenance of public tranquillity, when put in requisition for that purpose, and when the troops of the line are deemed insufficient. The Bavarian army is well organized, and has always maintained a respectable character for discipline and bravery. The cavalry is considered superior to the infantry.
The small army of Wurtemberg requires only a brief notice. Its infantry consists of 8 regiments of 2 battalions, Wurtemberg divided each into 4 companies; its cavalry, of a squadron berg and of guards, a squadron of chasseurs, and 4 regiments of horse, Baden. each divided into 4 squadrons; its artillery, of a regiment of 6 companies, 3 horse and 3 foot, besides a garrison company; but it has no engineer corps distinct from that of the artillery. Its peace establishment is composed of 368 officers, 1504 sub-officers, and 5184 soldiers; or 6996 combatants, and 1806 horse: on a war footing it would amount to 520 officers, 2302 sub-officers, and 14,508 soldiers, or 17,330 combatants, and 5228 horse. The Wurtemberg army is recruited by voluntary enrolment and forced levies. The military age is from 18 to 30 for enrolment, and from 20 to 25 for levies; and, in both cases, the élite of the population only is taken. This little army is well officered, and enjoys some consideration. The grand duchy of Baden, the seventh state of the Germanic confederation, has a superficies of 279 square miles, with a population of 1,108,000 souls, and supports a military establishment of 12,433 men, although it is only bound to furnish a division of 10,000 men (the 2d of the third corps) as its contingent.
The organic law of the military constitution of the Germanic confederation, adopted on the 9th April 1821, in the fifteenth full sitting of the diet, and forming the basis on which the federal army has been organized, is exceedingly complex, and altogether unsusceptible of analysis within the space which the limits of this article afford. Its leading provisions, however, may be shortly stated, and are as follow:
—The army of the confederation is composed of the contingents of all the states members thereof, raised according to the formation of their particular matricule or computa-
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1 Coup d'Œil sur La Force et l'Organisation de l'Armée Saxe depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1824. Paris, 1825. Geist der Zeit, Feb. 1821. Bulletin des Scien. Milit. ii. 49. 2 Militär Blätter, vol. i. p. 183. 1821. Bulletin des Scien. Milit. ii. 55. 1825. 3 Zeitschrift für Kriegswissenschaft, No. 24, p 242. Hof und Staats Handbuch des Königreichs Bayern. Munich, 1823. 4 Allgemeine Militär Zeitung, No. 10, 1823. Bulletin des Scien. Milit. tom. vi. p. 65. Army.
The proportion of the different arms is regulated conformably to the principles of the new tactics. The federal army is formed of corps d'armée of a single nation or of combined corps, and both are subdivided into divisions, brigades, and regiments. No state of the confederation, whose contingent forms one or more corps d'armée, can combine contingents of other states with its own in the same division; and the states which have corps or divisions combined, concert together the manner of forming and organizing them, and in case of dispute the diet decides. In the organization of the federal army regard is had to the interest resulting from the particular relations of different states, in as far as can be done consistently with the general object of the confederation; and as the rights and duties of all the confederate states are the same, it is specially provided that every appearance of supremacy on the part of one state over another is to be avoided. The contingent of each state must always be completely equipped and ready to take the field as soon as it shall be called to do so; but the force and assembling of the army to be raised, as well as of the reserve, are regulated by particular dispositions of the diet.
1. The ordinary contingent of each state is one-hundredth part of its population, conformably to a table prepared and rectified from time to time by the diet. 2. The proportion of the cavalry of the federal army is fixed at one-seventh of the total of the troops; and two field-pieces are required for every 2000 men of the contingent, besides one for every 1000 of the reserve in arsenal. 3. The federal army consists of 10 corps d'armée, 7 simple and 3 combined, designed in the order of the digits or primary numbers; and every corps has at least 2 divisions, each division at least 2 brigades, each brigade at least two regiments, each regiment of infantry at least two battalions of 800 men each, and each regiment of cavalry at least 4 squadrons of 140 men each. The minimum of a contingent of cavalry is 300 horse, of infantry 400 men, and of artillery a battery of six or eight pieces. 4. As the contingent of each state must be ready to take the field in a month after it is called upon, all the matériel of armament and provisions necessary for the contingent must be deposited in the arsenals of each state, and all the contingents of the army must be kept up to their full complement even in time of peace. 5. The generalissimo of the confederation is chosen by the diet in ordinary assembly, and his functions cease when the federal army is dissolved. 6. The commanders of the corps of every nation or state have the rights which the sovereign whose troops they command may think proper to confer upon them, without deviating from the principles upon which the military constitution is founded. There is a great number of other dispositions and regulations, touching a variety of matters; but those above specified are the principal, and may serve to convey an idea of the military constitution of this great confederacy, organized in imitation of that which, while it seemed to strengthen the hands of Napoleon, proved eventually, by the defection of its members, one of the chief causes of accelerating his fall.
The military power of the United Provinces dates its commencement from the middle of the fifteenth century, when, after a long and sanguinary struggle, they succeeded in emancipating themselves from the yoke of Spain; and in the following century it received considerable development, in consequence of the wars which they had to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay upwards of 100,000 men, exclusive of 30,000 who were in the service of the Dutch East India Company. But this period may be regarded as the highest condition of the army of Holland, which subsequently declined both in number and reputation; so that in 1775 it did not exceed 30,000 men, fully one-third of whom were foreigners. In 1789, Holland, with a population of 2,340,000 souls, inhabiting a country of 625 square miles, supported an army of 36,000 men, consisting of 40 regiments of infantry and 10 of cavalry; and with this force it joined the first coalition against the French republic. In 1792 the Dutch army had been increased to 39,000 infantry, 3450 cavalry, 1560 artillery, and 260 miners and pontoniers; making a total of 44,270 combatants. But in the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 they afforded the Prince of Orange occasion for displaying considerable military talents, put his army to a decisive test, and impressed all with a conviction that its degeneracy in moral force was equalled only by the radical defects of its organization. The conquest of Holland by the French, however, was followed, in 1795, by the re-organization of the army on new bases; and so great was the effect of the changes thus introduced, that the Batavian troops, led by Dumonceau and Daendels, rivalled the French, by whose side they fought, both in discipline and valour, and at Alkmaar, on the Rednitz, and on the Danube, bravely upheld the ancient reputation of the Dutch arms. At the peace of 1815, Belgium having been united to Holland in order to form a constitutional monarchy, and England having restored the greater part of the Dutch colonies which had fallen into its hands during the republican and imperial regime, the new kingdom of the Netherlands at once, and as it were per salutum, took its place among states of the second order, with a continental superficies of 1165 square miles, and a population of 6,166,854; and lost no time in organizing a military system suited to its position and rank among the nations of Europe.
Belgian Army. But in 1830, a revolution having broken out in France, its influence extended to Brussels. The Belgian provinces were severed from the crown of Holland in August of that year. In July of the following year (Belgium having in the meanwhile assumed a republican form), the allied powers of Europe recognized the independence of the state, and it was declared a kingdom; Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg being elected to the sovereignty. A soldier himself, and aware how much the Belgian frontier was exposed to aggression, he paid great attention to the constitution of the army, and at this moment it rivals in discipline, order, and intelligence, the best armies in Europe. The force was fixed in 1836 at 42,000 men, but its numbers vary with the appearance of danger, and at this moment (June 1853) an increase of 60,000 men has been resolved upon. The force is divided into infantry of the line, horse and foot chasseurs, lancers, cuirassiers, guides, gens d'armes, and a considerable train of artillery, sappers, miners, &c. There is likewise an extensive general staff, a staff corps, a provincial staff, an administrative service, and a health establishment. The general staff comprises 9 lieutenant-generals and 18 major-generals in active service; 2 lieutenant-generals and 4 major-generals in reserve. The staff corps consists of 12 superior and 40 subaltern officers. The provincial staff comprises 5 commandants of provinces (generals or colonels), 21 commandants of fortresses and 35 fort adjutants. In the administrative service are 1 superintendent-in-chief, 1 first-class and 4 second-class superintendents, and 16 sous-intendants or inferior superintendents; 29 captains quartermasters, 61 paymasters, and 29 barrackmasters. The health service or medical department is composed of 1 inspector-general, 4 surgeons-in-chief, 7 garrison surgeons, 28 regimental surgeons, 20 surgeons of battalions of the first class, and 35 ditto of the second, 20 assistants, 1 principal physician, 30 physicians of three classes, 1 veterinary inspector, and 27 veterinary surgeons of the first, second, and third class. The infantry consists of 1 regiment of carabiniers, 2 of chasseurs, 1 of grenadiers, and 12 of the line. These regi-
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1 Bulletin des Sciences Milit., tom. ii. p. 45. Loi Organique de la Constitution Militaire de la Confédération Germanique, 1821. ments are divided into three active and two reserve battalions each, the carabiniers having four battalions of the one and two of the other. There are likewise two stationary companies (compagnies sedentaires), one disciplinary division, and one company of enfants de troupe. The staff of each regiment is composed of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 adjutant-major, and 2 paymasters. Each service battalion has 1 major and 1 adjutant; each reserve battalion 1 major and 1 paymaster; each active company contains 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, and 1 sub-lieutenant; each reserve company 1 captain and 1 lieutenant, and each depot company 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, and 1 sub-lieutenant.
The cavalry is composed of light and heavy. The former are divided into 2 regiments of dragoons and 2 of lancers, each of 6 active and 1 reserve squadron; and the latter consist of 2 regiments of cuirassiers of 4 active and 1 reserve squadron, and a regiment of guides of 6 active and 1 reserve squadron. The staff of each regiment consists of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 or 3 majors (according to the number of squadrons), 1 captain and adjutant, 1 lieutenant-adjudant, and a paymaster. The squadrons comprehend, each, 1 captain, 1 captain en second, 2 lieutenants and 2 sub-lieutenants; and the depot squadron line 1 captain instructor, 1 captain commandant, 1 lieutenant, and one sub-lieutenant.
The Artillery consists of a staff of 14 superior and 19 subaltern officers; 9 commandants of artillery, and 24 gardes d'artillerie. There is 1 regiment of horse artillery, divided into 4 field and 6 siege batteries, and 3 regiments of foot artillery, each containing 5 field and 6 siege batteries, a company of pontooners, a company of artillery artificers, one of armourer artificers, and a field train. The staff of a regiment consists of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 1 captain and adjutant, 1 lieutenant and adjutant, 1 captain instructor, and 1 paymaster. Each horse battery comprehends 1 captain commandant, 1 captain en second, 2 lieutenants and 2 sub-lieutenants; each battery of foot artillery has a captain commandant, a captain en second, and 3 lieutenants or sub-lieutenants. A siege and depot battery consists of 1 captain commandant, 1 lieutenant, and 1 sub-lieutenant. In the pontoon company are, 1 captain commandant, 1 captain en second, 2 lieutenants, 2 sub-lieutenants. Each company of artificers contains 1 captain commandant, 1 lieutenant, and 2 sub-lieutenants. The field train contains 1 captain, 1 captain en second, and 3 lieutenants or sub-lieutenants.
The Engineers are composed of a staff of 13 superior and 47 subaltern officers, and a regiment of 2 battalions; each battalion consisting of five companies. The staff of the regiment consists of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain and adjutant, 1 paymaster; each battalion has 1 major and an adjutant; and each company is composed of 1 first and 1 second captain, 1 lieutenant and 1 second lieutenant. The administration comprises 12 directors of hospitals, 12 sub-directors, 256 hospital employés, 16 directors of the bakery, and 186 employés therein.
But besides the regular army, the whole country is formed into a civic or national guard of 600,000 men. It is divided into three corps or bans, each of which is subdivided into legions, and the whole guard is raised in the different provinces in just proportions. There is no time lost in the Belgian army, a course of military instruction, of every description, of the most practical utility, being unceasingly pursued the whole year round. In winter, when the troops leave the camp, their marching out commences, and these marches are about 10 miles out and 10 miles in. They never neglect a single opportunity of bridging these regiments in the different garrisons; it being a standing order that brigade field-days should take place regularly twice a-week; even where only two regiments are quartered together. Major Harvey, on the staff of Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, who had an opportunity of seeing the Belgian army in one of its camps of instruction, says, "I personally accompanied the general in going round the line of sentries; and was permitted to put many questions as to his method of completely protecting his front and flanks. The regiment of lancers, under the command of Colonel Bester, attached to this brigade, admirably performed their part, scouring the roads in every direction, and sending in continual reports from their different patrolling parties, their videttes being posted with consummate judgment and intelligence. Nor can I pass over my astonishment at the energy and rapidity with which the column of infantry, composed of such young soldiers, pushed forward through a deep sandy 'défilé' of two miles in length; nor how thoroughly they seemed to understand and execute the principles of squeezing as large a front as possible over and through the different obstacles they met with, preserving their original extent of front up to the very last moment, by which means the tail of the column was always in its right place, and not a straggler lagged behind. In short, I never remember to have seen the spirit of General Craufurd's light division orders for the line of march more rigidly adhered to, or more admirably carried out. But whether in the mere pipeclay and parade movements in the open plain, where accuracy and uniformity of execution formed the principal features, and where General L'Olivier's remarkable skill in handling his troops was so conspicuous, or in the more essential movements of a campaign, such as passages of défilés, combined movements by various columns directed on certain points, out-post duties, &c., there was an amount of intelligence and practical confidence throughout, which impressed me with the conviction that a small 'corps d'armée,' so well in hand, and so ably commanded, would feel themselves quite a match for a far more numerous, but less practised force."
The Dutch Army.—The army of Holland is of nearly equal strength with that of Belgium, and has had the advantage of much careful drilling by Prussian officers. The militia, however, does not approach the numerical strength of that of Belgium. Holland rests her defensive strength upon her navy, and trusts to the influence of alliances for her internal tranquillity. The composition of the Dutch army corresponds with that of Belgium. The general staff consists of 10 lieutenant-generals and 16 major-generals, and the staff-corps of 7 superior and 19 subaltern officers. The staff of the provinces and strong places is composed of 10 commandants of provinces, 8 commandants of fortresses, and 29 fort-adjudants. The corps of "intendance" consists of 1 intendant-general, with the rank of general; 1 of the first and 1 of the second class; 2 sub-intendants of the first class, and 3 of the second class; 2 adjutants; 21 captains quartermasters, 51 paymasters, 21 administrators of quarters. The health department consists of 1 inspector-general, with the rank of general, 1 inspector, 6 first-class health officers, 120 health officers, 27 physicians, and 3 veterinary surgeons.
The Infantry is composed of one regiment of grenadiers and chasseurs (light infantry), divided into four battalions of 5 companies each; 8 regiments of the line, each containing 4 battalions of 5 companies, and 2 depot companies; 1 battalion of instruction, a depot of discipline, and a recruiting depot. The infantry officers are 866 in number, thus divided: 2 superior and 25 subaltern, forming the staff; 5 superior and 74 inferior in the grenadier regiment; 48 su-
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1 Journal de l'Armée Belge. Recueil d'Art, d'Histoire, et de Sciences Militaires. 2 The Camp at Beverloo. By Major H. B. Harvey, I.P., Military Secretary to Lieut.-Gen. Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, G.C.H. Commander-in-Chief at Bombay. Army.
perior and 672 subaltern in the 8 regiments of the line; 1 superior and 14 subaltern in the battalion of instruction; 1 superior and ten subaltern at the depot of discipline; 1 superior and 13 subaltern in the recruiting department.
The Cavalry consists of a staff, four regiments of dragoons of 4 squadrons each, and 2 squadrons of the Limberg chasseurs, with 155 officers.
The Artillery comprehends 3 regiments of foot, and 1 of horse, a company of pontooners, and one company of artificers. Each regiment consists of a staff, 5 horse batteries, 8 field batteries, 33 siege batteries, and 2 squadrons of a field train. The general staff comprehends 5 superior officers, 18 subalterns, and 32 gardes d'artillerie. The regimental staff of each regiment comprises 17 superior and 18 subaltern officers. Each siege battery has 1 captain and 3 lieutenants; and each field and horse battery 1 captain and 4 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants. The company of pontooners is composed of 1 major, 2 captains, and 4 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants; the company of artificers of 1 captain and 6 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants; and the field train of 1 captain and 2 lieutenants.
The Engineers comprehend a battalion of three companies with 13 officers, and the staff consists of 88 officers.
Sardinia is the Prussia of Italy. It has been from old times a military state in virtue of its geographical position between the two great military powers, France and Austria. Every Piedmontese (and this designation usually applies to the soldier of the Sardinian states) is liable to military service, and the man who has served his three years in the line remains disposable in case of war, for sixteen years to come.
Accustomed for ages past to these obligations, the Piedmontese has more military spirit than the Italian of any other district, and makes a good soldier. A nobility, numerous and brave, furnishes a body of officers worthy of command in such an army.
The science of war is much cultivated at Turin; the artillery, both as regards theory and practice, is of the first class. The composition of the army is as follows:—A brigade of guards, consisting of 4 battalions of grenadiers, and 2 of jägers; nine brigades of infantry, each brigade consisting of 2 regiments, each regiment of 3 battalions, namely, 2 infantry of the line (5 companies each), and 1 jäger battalion of 4 companies. The brigades are designated Savoy, Piedmont, Aosta, Coni, Queen's, Cosale, Pignerol, Savora, and Acqui.
The infantry battalion, on its war footing, is from 1000 to 1100 strong, which gives to the whole infantry from 6000 to 7000 men. By calling in the reserves, this force may be nearly doubled; but the greater part of these reserves exist only on paper; those forthcoming have to be trained, and a great proportion of them are fathers of families, with little inclination for actual service.
One battalion of sharp-shooters, Bersaglieri (from bersaglio, an object aimed at), forms an independent corps. This body, armed and trained after the ideas of a Piedmontese noble, at a considerable pecuniary outlay from his own means, vies with the French voltigeur in activity, and with the heavy-armed Swiss riflemen in precision of aim, and is the admiration of all experienced judges. Marine infantry can also be applied on occasions of land service.
The cavalry consists of 6 regiments, 5 squadrons each; Royal Piedmont, Genoa, Nice, Savoy, Novara, and Aosta. Each regiment has about 600 horses. Its proper number for service, indeed, is 1000, but there is a difficulty in raising this amount, for the troop horses are generally imported from North Germany. Men and horses are fine in appearance. The lance was formerly confined to each fifth squadron, but of late all have been armed with it.
The artillery consists of 2 batteries, 12 pounders; 8 batteries, 6 pounders; 2 batteries of light sixes; horse artillery, 8 pieces to each battery; making in all 96 pieces. There exists in addition a strong corps for service in the fortresses, a part of which is disposable also for siege operations with the army.
The engineer service is provided for by a battalion of sappers, to which is appended 1 company of miners.
The Neapolitan army is scarcely deserving of notice, Neapolitan either in a political or military point of view; for, next to the army, soldiers of his Holiness the Pope, those of Naples are beyond all dispute the worst in Europe. In 1792 the Neapolitan army amounted to 30,000 troops of the line, as they were called, and 15,000 militia; a force which was increased, in 1799, to 60,000 men of all arms; 40,000 of whom invaded the Roman states during the campaign of that year, and conducted themselves rather like banditti than a regular army. Formidable only to its allies, and to the country which it serves to retain in abject servitude, this army has since experienced the most violent mutations; but its number at present may be estimated at from 35,000 to 40,000 men of all arms.
The 24 cantons of Switzerland are defended in case of need by the militia, which, in fact, comprehends the whole troops of the adults who may either be actually in the country or elsewhere engaged. There are few Swiss who are not good soldiers, though no regular army is kept up; and so strong is their patriotism, that, when the fiery arrow goes forth, wherever they may be, they rally in defence of their native mountains.
The Swiss have for ages been the hirelings of Europe, either in public or private service, as soldiers, or as domestic servants. Pay has for ages been the only influence in general and constant operation on the Swiss mind, in every class of society, and has weakened the efficiency of any higher influence and feelings in affairs than self-interest—Point d'argent, point de Suisse, has extended from their military to all their social relations. A great proportion of the young men of Switzerland have small farms or houses, with portions of land, and rights to grazings in the alp of their native parishes, to succeed to upon the death of their parents; but until that event in their social position, they are supernumeraries at home, their labour not being necessary for cultivating the paternal acres, and their subsistence costing more, perhaps, than the land can afford. They have no colonies to migrate to, no labour to turn to, except labour of skill, which all cannot learn or live by, and no considerable manufacturing employment, except in two or three cantons, to absorb their numbers; and they enlist, therefore, readily for a few years in Swiss regiments in foreign service. France, after the restoration of the Bourbons, had about 17,000 men of Swiss regiments; and the disgust of the French nation at the preference shown to these mercenaries was a main cause of the expulsion of Charles X. Naples has at present 4 regiments of these mercenaries, Rome as many; and it is reckoned that from 8000 to 10,000 Swiss are in foreign service at present, embodied generally in Swiss regiments distinct from the native troops of the country. They are the condottieri of the middle ages, serving for their pay, and without any other principle or attachment, real or assumed, or any pretext of higher motive for their service. In other services the rudest soldier, the most arrant scamp, the vagabond, the deserter from other regiments, lays the flattering unction to his soul, that destiny, folly, hard necessity, wildness of youth, love of distinction, of country, of honour—something, in short, connected with principle or fate, has led him into the military service. But these Swiss have no principle, real or imaginary, but pay. They engage generally for terms of
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1 Laing's Notes of a Traveller. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires. four or six years, and receive a bounty of one napoleon for each year they engage for. This bounty is not paid to them in full upon enlistment, but a portion of it is placed to their credit in their lieret or hook, which every private has in foreign services, and is paid to them at the expiry of their engagements, to enable them to return home from the port of Genoa, to which those serving in Italy are sent free of expense, if they do not choose to re-engage for a new term of years. They receive much higher pay than the native troops. A subaltern in a Swiss regiment in the Neapolitan service has better pay than that of a captain in a Neapolitan regiment. The men receive four gran and bread, and the élite, or old soldiers who have re-enlisted, five gran per day, and their ration of eight ounces of meat costs but three gran. They are consequently well off as soldiers, are always in good quarters, and under their own Swiss officers; and both at Naples and Rome are undoubtedly fine, well-appointed troops. Scotland formerly furnished the same kind of condottieri to Holland, Sweden, and France; but the advance of industry and manufacture at home, the colonization of America, and the demand of England for labour from the poorer country, extinguished this kind of military service; nor was it at any time so devoid of all connection with principle or chivalrous motives, as the Swiss enlistments of the present day. The Scotch peasant enlisted under his clansman, or the son of his landlord, who, from attachment to the Stewart cause, or difference of religion, or from national prejudice, preferred foreign service to the British, even with inferior pay. The recruiting also for foreign service was unacknowledged and private. But the Swiss government sanctions the demoralizing system, allows the recruiting publicly, and with the same protection and regulation as for a national army; and sells, for the benefit of a few aristocratic families, principally of Bern, who officer these mercenaries, the military services of her young men to support the most arbitrary governments in Europe. The Protestant republic of Bern furnishes one regiment entirely for the service of the king of Naples, and even in the Pope's body-guards there are Protestants from Bern and other Protestant cantons. No government can set principle at defiance with impunity. These men return to their little spots of land, devoid of religious habits or feelings, or attachment to any religious faith. This service keeps up through the whole population of Switzerland principles and conduct adverse to religious character. The men who thus enlist to pass their youth in the most vicious and bigoted cities in Europe, Naples and Rome, are not the refuse of their country, but the sons of respectable peasants, who are to return to their little heritages and marry, and settle as fathers of families.
At the period when the Ottomans first became formidable to Europe, they may be said to have composed one immense army. Every Osmanli was a soldier, and from the age of sixteen to sixty held himself at the disposal of the state; whilst all were animated with a martial fanaticism, which in fact constituted the main sinew of their strength. They were brave, ardent, enterprising; and if their services in the common cause (which they could not withhold as long as they were able to bear arms) remained unpaid, they were not unrequited. A third of the conquered land was distributed amongst them, and held on the tenure of military service; the peasantry cultivated the fields thus ceded to the soldiery, and paid the rents to their military landlords; and the holders of the ziamets and timars, or greater and lesser grants, received from the fund of conquest rewards proportioned to their services. But this system, although it placed a large numerical force at the disposal of the chief, was nevertheless attended with serious inconveniences. It created a sort of feudal militia, but was incompatible with the existence of a permanent force; it supplied means for a short expedition or campaign, but a continued series of operations was constantly liable to be paralyzed by the soldiers returning to their homes while these were still in progress. To obviate this evil, it was resolved to raise a body of mercenaries, whose services should be at all times available. Accordingly, Sultan Amurath, at the suggestion of his vizier, claimed as his right the fifth part of the Christian youth captured in Bulgaria, Albania, Servia, and Bosnia; who, being instructed in the law of the prophet, and inured to arms, formed a body of soldiers totally distinct from those liable to serve in virtue of their military holdings, and unconnected with the rest of the empire by the ties either of birth or of kindred. Such was the origin of the Janissaries. Organized into a regular force, at a time when the armies of Christian powers consisted of a disorderly militia, and uniting courage and enthusiasm with a species of discipline, and a blind obedience to the will of their commanders, this powerful body swept all before them, and spread far and wide the terror of the Ottoman arms. Nor did the splendour of their achievements suffer any eclipse as long as Christian captives could be obtained to fill the vacancies in their ranks. But when the Janissaries ceased to form a class distinct from the great mass of the nation; when they were allowed to marry and enrol their children; and when the adas or regiments became encumbered with men who preferred inglorious ease in the bosom of their families to the toils and dangers of the battlefield; they at the same time ceased to be formidable to their enemies, and, like the praetorian cohorts of ancient Rome, were dreaded only by their emperors. They could raise an insurrection in the capital, demand the head of an obnoxious vizier, and depose or murder an unpopular sultan; but "the yellow-haired Giaours" had learned to despise them in the field; and, in their degeneracy, they seemed destined to accelerate the ruin of that empire which, in their better days, they had contributed so largely to extend and consolidate.
On this class of men, however, did the Porte, until recently, depend in a great measure for defence against her enemies; and although their inefficiency was daily becoming more apparent, and reform more necessary, every attempt to effect a change of system, and regenerate these Osmanli praetorians, had proved either abortive or disastrous. In vain did Selim try to remodel them, and restore discipline. The attempt cost him his life. In vain did Mahmoud, on his accession, manifest an intention to enforce the regulations of Suleiman the Magnificent. An insurrection was the consequence. During three days the streets of the capital ran with blood; and the sultan, in order to save his own life, was obliged to command the execution of his brother. But Mahmoud was not of a disposition to be daunted by this failure, although it induced him to change his mode of proceeding. He now saw that nothing less than the complete destruction of the Janissaries would enable him to improve the condition of his empire, by carrying through the reforms which he already meditated; and he waited patiently until he could strike the blow with a certainty of success. In 1826, the Janissaries, who perceived the storm gathering, again mutinied. But it was now too late. They found the sultan prepared for them; and, in raising the cry of insurrection, they only gave the signal for their own destruction. The artillery-men and other troops, faithful to Mahmoud, surrounded them in the Atmeidan; they attempted to defend themselves, but without success: 20,000 perished in the conflict: and the Janissaries as a body were from that moment annihilated. This achievement, though accomplished at a terrible sacrifice of life, was in reality an act of humanity as well as of sound policy; and, viewed in its proper light, it reflects equal honour on the wisdom and firmness of the sultan, who planned so judiciously and executed so vigorously a measure full of peril in itself, yet absolutely indispensable as a preliminary step to improvement of any kind. The suppression of the corps of Janissaries having left Mahmoud at liberty to remodel his army conformably to the principles of European science and tactics, he hastened to supply the void occasioned by the destruction of the force to which the country had hitherto trusted for its defence; and orders were immediately issued directing the enrolment of a certain number of men in every province of the empire, excepting Albania, Bosnia, and the African states. But the sultan experienced greater difficulty in raising new troops than he had probably anticipated; for, although the law which places the services of every Moslem at the disposal of the sultan existed in full force, it applied only to a state of war; and on no previous occasion had such a system of enrolment been resorted to during time of peace; a circumstance which rendered it exceedingly obnoxious to the populace. Another obstacle to the speedy reconstruction of the army consisted in the necessity of excluding from the new corps all persons suspected of what may be called Janissarism; and as it had been customary for every Moslem, on attaining the age of manhood, to inscribe his name in some oda or regiment of janissaries, the only method by which Mahmoud could hope to secure his troops from the contamination of that proscribed sect was by enrolling none but boys in his army. But the adoption of such a plan necessarily created a proportionate difficulty in filling the ranks; while, to add to the embarrassments of the Ottoman reformer, the new system had scarcely been twelve months in operation when Russia declared war against the Porte. That this was a politic proceeding on the part of the Muscovite government, no one can doubt. Mahmoud was caught in the very act of transition from a bad system to a better one; the regiments of the Ottoman army were still incomplete; and the unpopularity of the contest, with a dread of the Russian arms, acted as an additional check to enlistment, and thus aggravated the evils with which the sultan had to contend.
The new troops were, however, brought into action. They were as yet too ignorant of the advantages of discipline to benefit by the instructions they had received; their manoeuvres served but to confuse them; the officers were superior to the men only in name, and the generals were equally destitute of talent; the interior organization of the army was lamentably defective; and the troops had but little confidence either in their officers or in themselves. Yet, with all these disadvantages, the first campaign terminated favourably for the Turks; and it cannot reasonably be doubted that the second one (that of 1829), would have had a similar result, if the Osmanlis had been commanded by a man possessed even of ordinary military talents and enterprise.
The grand vizier was unquestionably a brave man; and, unlike Yusuf Pasha, he was faithful as well as brave. But, with 40,000 regular troops, superior to any that the Porte had ever sent into the field, he allowed himself to be surprised at Kiulewtscha or Kuleftscha, and, having lost more than the half of his force, was compelled to retire to Shamla with the remainder. The succeeding events of the campaign were the natural corollaries of this disastrous battle. But without dwelling upon these, which are foreign to the objects of the present article, we shall proceed to give some account of the Ottoman army as it is at present constituted.
The Ottoman army is composed of regular and irregular infantry and cavalry, a corps of artillery, and a regiment of bombardiers or miners. The Assakiri Monsurei Moha-medyes, or regular infantry, are said to amount to 50,000 men, of whom 10,000 compose the imperial guard, quartered in and around Constantinople. They are recruited from the mass of the people without distinction; and although Mahmoud did not oblige the children of his nobility to enter into the service, yet, at the beginning of the late war, many enlisted voluntarily, and even some of the Ulamas, or expounders of the law, forsook their peaceful profession and enrolled themselves. The black and white subjects of the sultan are alike received as soldiers; and in a single regiment, may be seen every shade of "the human face divine," from the jet-black complexion of the Ethiopian or Nubian, to the white-visaged inhabitant of Rumelia. Once enrolled, a soldier is obliged to serve for life; but it frequently happens that discharges are granted. The regular troops are organized on the model of the French army, and are divided into corps d'armée, divisions, brigades, and regiments. The corps d'armée is commanded by a seraskier, the division by a pasha of three tails, the brigade by a pasha of two tails, the regiment by a miri-alay or colonel, and the battalion by a bimbashsee or chef-de-bataillon. A regiment consists of a regimental staff (including the miri-alay or colonel, the caimacan miri-alay or lieutenant-colonel, and the alay-eminy or major) and three battalions, each composed of one bimbashsee or chef-de-bataillon, one sagh-cul-aghassy or adjutant-major, one sol-col-aghassy or adjutant, 8 yuzbashees or captains, 16 muazams or lieutenants, 32 tehiououches or sergeants, 48 on-hashees or corporals, and 720 men; making a total of 2484 officers and soldiers, exclusive of a drum-major, an imam or chaplain, and a kiatip or clerk. The inveterate prejudices of the Moslem against the employment of European officers in the service have prevented Mahmoud from placing any foreigners in command of his troops; and these have hitherto been disciplined, partly by officers who had served under Selim in the Nizim Djedid, partly by persons sent from the Egyptian army. The only footing on which the Turks will consent to tolerate a European officer is as an instructor; and in this capacity Signor Calosso, a ci-devant captain of dragoons in the Italian army of Prince Eugene Beauharnois, has been employed by the sultan to superintend the discipline of his cavalry. But the infantry have not been equally fortunate, and are consequently labouring under very great disadvantages. The officers, taken from the same class of society with the common soldiers, differ from them in nothing but rank and name; in the Turkish army there is no one to look up to, no natural aristocracy created by superiority of condition and of knowledge; the same ignorance and the same prejudices pervade all ranks; and, having the benefit neither of examples nor of models, their progress in discipline has been necessarily slow. The Turks seem to think that performing the manual and platoon exercises with tolerable precision, marching in companies instead of independently, and wearing a peculiar uniform, is sufficient to class them with disciplined troops. But in their anxiety to attain the end desired, they have overlooked some of the most essential means. The soldier, for example is placed in the ranks before he knows how to march; and provided he goes through the manual and platoon exercises, it mat-
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1 Trant's Narrative of a Journey through Greece in 1830, p. 364, et seqq. We take this opportunity of acknowledging our obligations to Captain Trant's work for a very considerable portion of the details respecting Sultan Mahmoud's military reforms, as well as the present condition and strength of the Ottoman army. There are many points in regard to which it could have been wished that Captain Trant had been somewhat more specific; but on a subject where exact information was not easily attainable, military men ought to be grateful for what this respectable officer has been able to collect concerning it.
2 Literally, "victorious troops of Mohamed."
3 "Ah!" said a Janissary to Captain Trant, while observing a body of troops marching past, "what kind of soldiers are these? You see every race and every colour on earth amongst them!" Granted; but martial qualities are not necessarily connected with colour; and discipline, if rigorously enforced, will in time mould even these variegated elements into a fine and formidable army. Army.
ters not whether his carriage be steady or the reverse. When in the ranks, the men talk and laugh without restraint, and even address themselves to their officers; whilst the latter, instead of checking, encourage these improprieties, by joining in or retorting the rude ribaldry of the troops. Field-officers are indeed treated with the most obsequious respect by their inferiors; but the line which has been drawn between the privates and subaltern officers is by no means sufficiently distinct; and it is easy to perceive throughout, that the hand of a master is wanting to combine all the elements of discipline, which are now but imperfectly understood, and to impress upon the higher ranks the necessity of studying their profession, in order to qualify them for discharging the duties of command, as well as to ensure the respect and obedience of the troops.
The Turkish cavalry had so long been celebrated for its gallantry and enterprise, that the policy of remodelling it seems exceedingly questionable. This, however, has been attempted, though, as it appears, with very indifferent success. Four squadrons of dragoons are attached to the guard, and compose the only regular cavalry in the empire. These are mounted and equipped in the European fashion; but the horses are small in size, ill-conditioned, and badly groomed; and the men find so great difficulty in accommodating themselves to the European method of riding with long stirrups, that their seat is loose and ungraceful, and they are not unfrequently thrown from their saddles, to their own infinite mortification. The scimitar, so effective in the hand of a Turk when mounted in the fashion of his country, has also been exchanged for the French light-dragoon sabre; a weapon so differently balanced from that which the Osmanlis have long been accustomed to handle, that they are not likely soon to acquire much dexterity in the use of it. These changes, in fact, seem the very wantonness of innovation; for whilst they have destroyed all that is national or characteristic in this description of force, they have substituted nothing effective in its stead; and it will probably be found that the Sultan sacrificed a superb light cavalry for wretched dragoons. His policy should have been, to leave to the Turks their national horsemanship and their national weapons, and to direct his attention exclusively to field tactics and manoeuvres, in order to give unity and effect to those daring charges which they are so admirably fitted to execute effectively in their own way. Without firmness in their saddles or confidence in their weapons, the new troops may make a tolerable appearance on parade; but if sent into the field, they will, in all probability, be found unable to contend with the worst description of horse to which they may be opposed.
The artillery is of two kinds, viz., foot and horse. The topejees or foot artillery are at present 6500 strong. Their new organization is of very recent date; they are now formed into distinct regiments, and quartered over the empire. The horse-artillery, though in a very inefficient state compared with ours, has made considerable progress in discipline. It is divided into two regiments of four troops each; and every troop consists of one captain, three subalterns, 180 men, 180 horse, and 10 guns; thus making the total effective strength of a regiment 786 men, 720 horses, and 40 guns, which are commonly nine-pounders and five-and-a-half-inch howitzers. The officers are supplied with horses by the government; and the forage allowed to each horse is nine pounds of barley and twelve pounds of chopped straw per diem. The corps of bombardiers and miners amounts to about 2000 men; but they are still quite undisciplined, and as ignorant of the scientific as they are negligent of the practical part of their profession; their gun carriages, platforms, and ammunition waggons, being in a shameful state, and totally unfit for service. The education of artillery-officers has hitherto been entirely neglected; but a college has recently been established for their instruction in the theory and practice of gunnery.
The irregular army may be said to comprise the whole Mahometan population of the Ottoman empire; since, as already stated, every Moslem, if required, is obliged to join the army during time of war. The irregular cavalry is raised by the Znaims and Timariots, who hold feudal grants from the Porte on tenure of military service. The irregular infantry is assembled by the pashas and inferior officers in the provinces. Eighty years ago, the irregular cavalry constituted by far the most formidable and effective force belonging to Turkey; but the country whence it was derived having been wrested from the Porte by Catherine II., her enemies now use it with great effect against her. The Khans of the Crimea were most useful tributaries of the Porte, and were at all times ready to take the field with from 40,000 to 50,000 horse of the very best description, considered as irregular troops. Brave, hardy, accustomed to support fatigue and privation, inured to riding from their infancy, and obedient to their leaders, the Crim Tartars formed the main strength of the Turkish armies; and, superior to the Timariots, who had become enervated by peaceful habits, were prepared for all kinds of service, nay even to encounter the best regular cavalry that could be brought against them. The loss of the Crimea, therefore, and of the enterprising troops it supplied, inflicted a severe, if not an irreparable, injury on the military resources of Turkey. The irregular cavalry is now principally drawn from the Asiatic provinces; but as the Mahometan population has much decreased, this force is consequently less numerous than formerly. The irregular infantry, called Seimens, is furnished by the pashas, ayans, moussellins, and voivodes; and, during the last war, some regiments so raised received pay from the Porte. The men were drawn from Rumelia and Asia; and it is not a little remarkable, that of those who distinguished themselves most in the field, the majority had belonged to the proscribed corps of Janissaries, many of whom are still to be met with in all parts of the empire, notwithstanding the severe measures adopted for their extermination. The spirit of Janissarism, indeed, is still latent in a large portion of the population. The snake has been scotched, not killed; and the utmost vigilance will be necessary to prevent its resuscitation.
The present strength of the whole Ottoman force capable of being called into the field is, according to the most recent accounts, as follows:
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1 This may seem singular, considering the ideas generally entertained of Turkish horses; but, in the first place, these are very much exaggerated; and secondly, the government was obliged to purchase horses wherever they could be found—in Asia, Rumelia, and Wallachia. The best horses belong to the irregular cavalry.
2 During the campaign against Russia in 1823, the Turks had generally bad information, frequently none at all, respecting the movements of the Russians; whilst clouds of Cossacks scoured the country in every direction, cut off the Ottoman fédéraires, explored all the routes and even bye-paths, and conveyed to headquarters prompt intelligence of the slightest movement on the part of the enemy. It was this entire command of the communications which gave Diebitsch so great a superiority during the latter part of the campaign, and enabled him to surprise the vizier at Kislevtseha, to mask the celebrated march by which he turned the barrier of the Haumas, and to acquire for himself the well-merited distinction of Zabalkansky, or Passer of the Balkan. The troops sent to intercept him in the mountain gorges arrived too late, and Zabalkansky was thus enabled, with a handful of troops, to dictate peace in the ancient capital of the empire. The military establishments of Turkey have yet, in a great measure, to be created; but the sultan is indefatigable in urging on improvement to the utmost extent of his crippled means. The only foundries for casting cannon are in Constantinople. They are three in number: one of two furnaces, attached to the military arsenal at Toplana; another, also of two furnaces, near the naval arsenal; and a third of one furnace at Hassquion, the bombardier barracks. In one of these establishments sufficient metal can be melted to cast from five to seven guns at a time; but in all, the tools are of the coarsest description, and everything is effected by manual labour, without the aid of machinery. The workmen are Turks and Armenians. The military arsenal at Toplana contains a large stock of artillery of various calibres, and some of extraordinary length.1 The field-pieces are in tolerable order, but the guns have neither sights nor scales. Schools or colleges of medicine, of the marine, of music, and of military instruction, have been for some years established at Constantinople. The medical school contains about 400 students.2 Between three and four hundred young men are instructed at the military school, which is under the superintendence of the chief bombardier, in mathematics and the principles of fortification and gunnery; and some few French works upon military subjects have been translated into Turkish for the benefit of the students. Sultan Mahmoud also established a kind of commissariat department, under the control of the Asker Nazirı or superintendent of the troops; and Turkey now boasts of good military hospitals under competent management. Great progress has been made in reforming the pay department, in which enormous abuses formerly prevailed; the troops and the sultan having been alike plundered by the knaves intrusted with this important branch of the public service. But since the management of the finance, commissariat, and general organization of the army has been vested in the Asker Nazirı, conjointly with the seraskier and other high official persons, matters have been placed on a much better footing, and the soldiers have now little to complain of.
The barrack department in Turkey is extensive. Whichever way one turns the eye at Constantinople, it is almost sure to rest upon a great barrack. These buildings are numerous, and imposing, if not in their architecture, at least in their size and spaciousness. Sultan Selim, when attempting for the first time to form a Turkish army, disciplined in the European manner, erected several extensive buildings for the accommodation of the Nizam Djedjit or new troops; but when the Janissaries got the better of him, they knocked down most of these buildings. Sultan Mahmoud was the great barrack-builder. Abdul Medjid has added only one or two to the number. Taking into account the vast barracks of Mahmoud at Daoud-Pasha outside the city, the immense barracks in the Asiatic suburb of Scutari, and the barracks and commodious guard-houses on either side of the Bosphorus, 100,000 men might be lodged here without much crowding. In the spring of 1848, several of these great barracks were entirely empty, and there were others that had but few inmates. More than one, which had cost Mahmoud immense sums in 1828, were already neglected, and showing symptoms of decadence. The artillery barracks just outside the Pera suburb, were erected by Sultan Selim, and, upon plans and designs furnished by Count Sebastiani and General Andreossy. They are well situated; they are imposing in their extent, and seem to be in all respects well suited to their purpose. The entire barracks could comfortably hold from 3000 to 4000 men. They are exceedingly well ventilated. The distribution of the apartments or wards is excellent. In each long room there are two double rows of mats, each row accommodating about 55 men. The mattresses and bed-covers are stowed away in the middle of the room, in an open wooden screen which occupies very little space; they are neat and clean, and very well arranged. At night the mattresses are spread over the matting of the floor. Bedsteads are dispensed with, except in hospitals. But hardly any Turks think as yet of using bedsteads, or of setting apart rooms merely as bed-rooms. In the best houses they sleep on the broad divans, or spread their mattresses on the floor. In the morning the servants come in, and walk away with the beds; and then the room where you have slept becomes a drawing-room or a dining-room, or both in one. During the day, bed and bedding are deposited in presses or cupboards. Mr Macfarlane, who visited Turkey three or four years since, writes,—“The artillerymen’s mattresses were at least as good as those we generally slept upon; as usual, the most slovenly feature was in the shoeing.” In the corridor, at the door of every barrack-room, there was a multitudinous array of muddy, filthy boots and shoes, through which it was not always easy to steer one’s way without tripping. The soldiers must not enter the rooms with their shoes or boots on. These are thrown off at the door; if the men have slippers, they put them on; if they have not, they must walk on the soles of their socks. But the same rule obtains everywhere: there is no walking a hundred yards without being covered with mud in winter, and dust in summer; and then the Mussulmans, with almost the strictness of a religious observance, consider their carpets and mattings as things to be trodden only by clean slippers or bare feet. At the foot of the main staircase of every much-frequented Turkish house, we invariably found a confused heap of mud-boots, dirty boots, and shoes. It was so at Ali Pasha’s. When the staircase happened to be a dark one, I never could help blundering among some such heaps. The effect was very disagreeable to other nerves besides the olfactory. A very little care and arrangement would obviate it; but it is adet, old custom.
“The officer in command at the artillery barracks—one of the many Ahmet Pashas—was civil and rather communicative. He agreed that the whole appearance of the soldiers would be much improved if they were better shod, and would make use of brushes and a little blacking. Their present process of cleaning boots and shoes (when they clean them at all) is to rub them over with birch brooms, and then wash them in cold water. Shoe-leather neither washes nor dries well; and hence many bad colds and coughs. There was not a jacket nor a pair of trousers in barracks but sadly needed beating and brushing. The best of the artillerymen look dirty and negligent in their persons. A neat old English or
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1 Near the seraglio are several enormous guns carrying stone balls like those fired at our fleet when passing the Dardanelles in 1808. But cannon of this description can only be discharged with effect when the object passes their line of fire, as they are not mounted upon carriages, but built in a wall. Some of the guns at the Dardanelles carry balls 2½ inches in diameter.
2 There was nothing in Turkey which stood more in need of reform than the healing or rather the killing art. With all their predestinarian prejudices, the Osmanlis place unbounded faith in the skill and knowledge of physicians; and although they have been at all times ready to acknowledge the superiority of Europeans in the science of medicine, they have nevertheless for the most part been obliged to intrust the welfare of their bodies to empirical adventurers, whose knowledge had been acquired much in the same manner as that of the learned hakim Yacob, so admirably described in “Anastasia.” Austrian soldier is far cleaner and more tidy in coming off a long and rough campaign, than these Turks, who are hardly ever moved from their barracks. Achmet Pasha treated us to pipes and coffee, and to the sight of some horse-artillery exercise and manoeuvres. The guns were all brass; the carriages were all painted with a very light green paint, which had a bad and very mean effect. Neither guns nor carriages were kept clean. The harness was abominably dirty. The horses were all white or very light grays; they told us that they were bred in Rumelia, in the country up above Philippopolis; I was much deceived if they were not all Transylvanian or Hungarian horses—they bore a very close family resemblance to a breed I had often admired in the Emperor of Austria's army. They were what we should consider under-sized for that service; but they were compact and strong, and not at all deficient in spirit; they were well broken into their work, were admirable in hand, and the artillery drivers drove them in good style. About a dozen light field-pieces were very well handled in an inclosed field in front of the barracks. It was by far the best specimen of military exercise we saw in Turkey; but the Pasha showed us only his very best men. The instructing officer was a German, who had been a sergeant of artillery in the Prussian service. A few young Turkish subalterns seemed both active and intelligent; but the superior officers were sitting down on stools, looking on, and smoking their tchibouques. The Mahmoud barracks over at Scutari, though wanting elevation, are truly magnificent in length and breadth, and in situation. Take them altogether, they are the finest barracks I ever saw in any country. We introduced ourselves to the commandant, Osman Pasha, who was exceedingly polite and kind. He had studied at Vienna, and was said to be a good artillery officer. He spoke very modestly of the Sultan's army, acknowledging that it was still but in its infancy, and that the officers and men have yet a great deal to learn. He dwelt with warm admiration upon the admirable qualities of the Austrian army, and the excellent military administration of that empire. He was a modest man, and so much the more likely to be a brave one. He told me that the artillery was not better paid than the infantry, but that the cavalry was of late receiving some slight additional pay.
Before the conflagration the barracks could lodge from 6000 to 7000 men. There were now in it two regiments of infantry, one regiment of artillery, and a few squadrons of cavalry. None of these men had been moved for very many months; during the winter they had hardly quitted their barracks. The cavalry were all lancers, and so indeed were all the horse-soldiers we saw of this new regular army. We heard of dragoons and of corps of heavy cavalry; but we never saw a single specimen of either. They had no horses in the country fit to mount a heavy regiment. The Pasha sent one of his officers to conduct us over the barracks. Here, where there had certainly been no preparation or previous notice, there were some few signs of slovenliness and negligence; but, on the whole, one might fairly say the barracks were in excellent order. The stables, like all the Turkish stables I ever saw, were decidedly bad. They would have thrown an English or an Austrian dragoon into a passion. Soldiers who will not beat and brush their own jackets are not likely to bestow much pains on the coats of their horses; we never saw a trooper's horse look as if it were groomed. I believe these lancers of the imperial guard were entirely innocent of the use of curry-combs and brushes. What with the natural slovenliness of the men, and the rough and dirty appearance of the horses, a regiment of lancers when united presented but a shabby picture—a picture to excite derision on any parade or drill-ground in Christendom. Some of my Frank friends argued that this outward and visible show would not affect their fighting qualities. J'en doute. A good soldier is always a clean soldier; it is by cleanliness and the care of his groom, as well as by good food, that the trooper's horse really becomes a war-horse: the fellow who is so lazy that he will not clean his own boots is the very man to be negligent of more important duties. In an excellent, open, extensive drill-ground, offering the most glorious views of Constantinople, the Propontis, the islands, the Asiatic coast, and the snow-covered summits of Olympus, we saw some infantry being drilled by Turkish officers, who, for the most part, seemed very much to stand in need of drill themselves. It was slow and slovenly work, but conducted with great calmness and good-humour. The Sultan insists that there shall be no beating, no cruelty, or harshness. There certainly was none here, nor did I ever see any at Constantinople, except once, when a hideous-looking Nubian officer was drilling some white Turkish recruits in the broad galata moat, and soundly thrashing the dull ones with a country riding-whip made of buffalo's hide. Part of a regiment which had fulfilled its term of service, but which was kept together, and very incorrectly called a militia regiment, marched across the drill-ground, and went to perform some light infantry movements on the gently sloping hills between the barracks and the grand cemetery of Scutari. These men were neater and cleaner than the infantry in the barracks, from whom they were distinguished by wearing the black cross-belts instead of white. They trod over the ground with a good light step and their evolutions en tirailleurs were quick and good. But here again was the alloy, the canker of Turkish indolence: half of the officers, instead of marching at double quick time over the hills with their men, remained behind on the drill-ground to gossip and smoke pipes with the officers there. Several of the smaller barracks we visited were deserving of all praise for order and cleanliness; this was particularly the case with those on the Bosphorus at Armutkéni, Bebek, and Rumeli Hissar. To the spacious barracks in Constantinople Proper, which stand round the Seraskier's Tower, I was refused admittance. I believe that this refusal was owing to my having expressed a too eager wish to see the Seraskier's prison, which stands within the same great inclosure of lofty walls. Externally the barracks looked neat and clean; they are very extensive, and admirably situated on the summit of one of the seven hills of Constantinople. Nearly every recent writer of travels in Turkey has dwelt upon the magnificence of the views from the top of the lofty tower of the Seraskeriat. We rather frequently passed the great inclosed square of the Seraskeriat; but although here were the headquarters of the army, we seldom saw the soldiers doing anything. But one afternoon, in the month of March, when the French revolution of 1848 had started the Porte out of an easy slumber, we witnessed a great show of activity in the square. About 1500 men were exercising under the eye of a fat pasha (name unknown to us), and the great Seraskier himself was looking on from a distant window, with a tchibouque in one hand and an eye-glass in the other. The majority of these men were not young recruits, but soldiers of some standing; yet their performance was rather loose and slovenly. When they formed in line, their line was far from being a right one: their formations into squares, hollow and solid, were but poor exhibitions. The men all looked slip-shod, and dreadfully dirty about the feet. With such shoes as they wear it is scarcely possible for them to march well: they might as well try it in their old unheeled paprashes. Many of the men would have been, in better hands, excellent materials for soldiers, being broad-chested and altogether well-made fellows.
From this time exercise and military evolutions became rather frequent at the foot of the tower of the Seraskier. At first the Turks chuckled over the troubles and disturbances of Christendom, but it was not long before they became apprehensive that these convulsions might bring about consequences and political changes that would be very fatal to their empire. If they rejoiced when the revolutionary principle reached Vienna, and when Kossuth and anarchy raised their heads in Hungary, it was but for a moment, and only out of the souvenir that the Austrians had been old enemies of the Osmanlis; and very soon they seemed to feel instinctively that should any power be gained by the Czar, and any very serious injury be inflicted on the Austrian Empire, the Ottoman Empire would lose one of the best props upon which it leaned. Some of them talked big; but misgivings and fear were in their hearts. In their ignorance, or very insufficient information, they went on rather rapidly to the conclusion that it was all up with Austria; that Russia would soon have the entire command of the Danube, and would thence recommence war upon Turkey. The panic was, of course, increased when insurrection broke out in their Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and when Russia, claiming her indisputable right to interfere—a right recognized in successive treaties—began to march troops towards Jassy and Bucharest. In the months of May and June they had exercises à feu two or three times a-week at the Seraskeriat. If not decidedly bad, the firing was certainly not good. The Dadian's powder was detestable; the muskets were very bad, with the old flint locks. Hardly any of the regiments had percussion locks. The bursting of musket-barrels, with the catastrophes attendant thereon, were alarmingly frequent. Before long it may be very important that England should have a correct notion of the value of this army. I would not underrate it, but I feel confident that, alone, it could never stand in the field against the veteran troops of Russia; and that unless Christian officers were put in the command (as we placed British officers over the Portuguese), they would be very inefficient and troublesome auxiliaries. A French officer who had studied them well, who had lived long in the East, and who was also perfectly well acquainted with the Russian army, said that it was the most idle of dreams to fancy that this imperfectly disciplined army of Abdul Medjid could meet the troops of the Emperor Nicholas in the field. He considered that the degree of discipline to which they had attained did not compensate for the loss of the fanaticism and enthusiasm which animated their undisciplined predecessors; that they might make a stand, and fight pretty well behind stone walls; but that en rase campagne they would fall like wheat before the reaper's sickle, or go off like chaff before the wind. 'Ils n'ont point d'officialité,' they have hardly any competent officers. As you ascend the scale of rank, instead of finding more science and experience, you usually find more ignorance and inexperience. Generally the great pasha, placed by court intrigue at the head of an army, has never been a soldier, and is in military affairs about the most ignorant man in that army. He takes some officer into his favour, and relies for some time on his judgment and advice; then he changes and takes another adviser; or if his difficulties become at all complicated, he will seek advice of a dozen men, who may very probably entertain twelve different opinions and plans. Fancy then the jumble of every operation! In their intolerance or their pride, unless a Frank officer turn renegade they will not allow him to exercise any command—they will not even permit him to wear a sword—he can be only a despised instructor, little more than a good drill-serjeant—he may or may not be well paid, but he cannot take real rank as an officer, or in fact be a part of the army. Here and there you may find a Polish, German, or Italian renegade, usually a deserter and a scoundrel. Hardly one of these fellows has ever been more than a non-commissioned officer in his own country. Here they suddenly became captains, majors, colonels. These are the men the great pashas prefer. Low-born and low-bred, they can submit to Turkish arrogance, and to treatment which no gentleman can possibly tolerate. One may conceive how competent are these renegades to the conduct of an army in the field. Then, who would answer a single hour for the honour or common honesty of such a canaille? They have deserted their colours; they have deserted their religion. Let Russia, or any other assailant of Turkey, tempt them with a good bribe, and they will desert the Sultan and sacrifice his troops."
The reforms effected by Sultan Mahmoud in the military organization of the Turks rendered it expedient for the army Greeks to attempt to form regular corps, in order to keep on a level with their enemy in point of discipline and tactics. Accordingly, on the 27th February 1827, the president ordered a military force to be organized in regiments (chiliarchies) of two battalions (pentacosarchies), divided into five companies (hecatontarchies) each; a regiment to consist of a colonel (chiliarch), two chefs-de-battalion (pentacosarch), 10 captains (hecatontarch), 20 lieutenants (pentacontarch), 40 sub-lieutenants (ekosipentarch), 80 sergeants (dodecarche), 160 corporals (pentarch), and 800 soldiers; in all 1122 men. Another decree of the 17th October ordains the formation of a battalion of artillery of six companies, with a suitable cortège of officers; and embodied in it a sort of provisional code of military law. Since Greece has become a monarchy under European protection, a small standing army has been organized, consisting of 8600 men and officers.
The American armies require only a very cursory notice. That of the United States, exclusive of militia, does not amount to 10,000 men. It consists of eight regiments of infantry, four of artillery, one corps of engineers, 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 of horse fusiliers, and a sort of general staff; and it is formed into three divisions, each under the command of a general officer. The republicans of the West have a great aversion to a standing army, and only maintain a sort of skeleton, to be filled up, in case of need, from the militia force. The militia of the United States in 1852, consisted of 1,850,284 men, and 72,938 officers. The troops of the United States excel in bush-fighting; but they have neither organization nor discipline, and on any other soil than their own would be anything but formidable.—The Mexican army has been much reduced since its reorganization under the law passed on the 4th of November 1848, numbering in 1849 not more than 5200 rank and file in actual service. The black army of Hayti consists of the emperor's guard, with the infantry and artillery of the line. The guard, which ranks at the head of the army, consists of two regiments of infantry, one grenadiers and the other chasseurs, and three regiments of cavalry, one of carabiniers, one of grenadiers, and one of claqueurs. There are 33 regiments of infantry of two battalions each, and every battalion has six companies, viz., one of grenadiers 80 strong, one of chasseurs 50, and four of fusiliers 44 men each. Attached to this infantry, and distinct from the guard, are two regiments of dragoons of two squadrons, divided into two companies of 70 men each. The artillery consists of five regiments of two battalions, divided into nine companies of 50 men each, including officers. There is also an engineer corps, with 26 companies of 50 men each of artificers and pioneers. The whole of the Haytian force, therefore, including the staff and
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1 Macfarlane's Travels in Turkey, 2 vols. 8vo. London, 1847-48. 2 Fraser's Resources of all Nations. 3 Mayer's Mexico, vol. ii. ch. x.; Hartford, 1852. the president's guard, amounts to about 26,000 or 27,000 men. We are not in possession of any accurate details respecting the composition and force of the various South American armies. The Brazilian is estimated at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, including militia; the Colombian or Venezuelan at from 15,000 to 20,000; the Peruvian at 20,000; and the Chilian at from 10,000 to 12,000 men of all arms. But these numbers are in a great measure conjectural. The military force of the Argentine republic is probably not greater than that of Chili or Venezuela; while that of Paraguay amounts to about 5000 regulars and 20,000 militia.
From time immemorial the inhabitants of the British Islands have been distinguished for a determined bravery, united with a degree of physical power, which belongs to the people of no other nation; and hence, as soldiers, they have never yet, when properly commanded, found their match in the field of battle. "L'Angleterre," says Count Turpin, in his commentaries on Montecucculi's Mémoires, "est elle peut-être la nation où la bravoure se soutient depuis le plus long temps." "Our nation," observes Dr Johnson, "may boast, beyond any other people in the world, of a kind of epidemic bravery, diffused equally through all its ranks; we can show a peasantry of heroes, and fill our armies with clowns whose courage may vie with that of the general." The valour of a Briton is innate. It is a national instinct, co-existent with and inseparable from the man himself, and requiring no artificial excitement to bring it into action; and it is as powerful at the present moment as it was in the chivalrous days of Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt. Hence, although the fortune of our arms may have varied, the character of the soldier has always remained the same; and at Waterloo as at Blenheim, and Ramilies, and Malplaquet, he established his superiority in all those high military qualities which render a nation invincible. But, from various causes, the reputation of the British army, which the campaigns of Marlborough had raised to the highest pitch, and which the various actions of the Seven Years War had gloriously sustained, began subsequently to decline; while the disastrous results of American revolutionary war created an opinion, which succeeding events appeared to confirm, of its total unfitness for prosecuting a lengthened series of operations, or contending with any prospect of success against the armies of other nations, particularly those of the Continent. It was conceived to be little better than a body of marines, well qualified to cooperate with the navy in partial expeditions, or in making descents on the sea-coasts of any country with which Great Britain happened to be at war, but incapable of maintaining itself in the field, or of engaging in regular campaigns; and, to say the truth, there were not wanting plausible reasons which might be alleged in support of such an opinion. For, as if they had been determined, not merely to countenance this impression, but really to render the army as inefficient and as utterly destitute of consistence and energy as it was generally believed to be, the British ministry persisted for a series of years in wasting its strength in paltry expeditions, or in effecting partial descents upon this or that country, instead of combining one great effort calculated to influence the general result of the contest. Yet, in 1795, the regular army, including the force under the Duke of York in North Holland, exhibited a total of 119,000 men, besides about 42,000 employed in the colonies, in Corsica, in Gibraltar, and in Portugal; a force which, directed with skill and judgment, might have saved the country from many humiliations, prevented an enormous accumulation of debt, and accelerated the termination of a sanguinary and ruinous contest, from the effects of which the nation is still suffering. The campaign of Egypt, in 1801, showed, it is true, some small degree of energy, and, above all, afforded the army an opportunity of proving its undiminished excellence. But, unfortunately, on the renewal of the war in 1803, the old system was resorted to, and all the prejudices which had previously existed against the army were revived with tenfold force;—prejudices which outlasted the first successes of the Peninsular campaigns, and which were only at length overcome by an unexampled series of victories, obtained over the ablest general and the best troops of which France could boast.
"The French army," says Sir William Napier, "was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, discipline, skill, and bravery; but, contrary to the general opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force will suffer. With the latter the military, not the moral crimes, can be punished; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the constant restraints of petty though unwholesome rules they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nations under whose colours they serve. Great, indeed, is that genius that can keep men of different nations firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon's military system was, from this cause, inferior to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly underrated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French; but the individual soldier was (and is still) most falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical. The English are a people very subject to receive and to cherish false impressions. Proud of their credulity, as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained before the ill success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by the Duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was, in 1808, scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive fortresses, at least two hundred thousand of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe, together with an immense recruiting establishment, and through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. It is true, that of this number
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1 Almanach National pour 1827. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. v. p. 473. 2 Essai Historique sur la Révolution du Paraguay, par MM. Rengger et Leanchamp. Paris, 1827. 3 At the period in question the British army consisted of 30,000 cavalry, 6000 foot-guards, 170,000 infantry of the line, and 14,000 artillery; in all 220,000 men. Of these between 50,000 and 60,000 were employed in the colonies and in India; but the remainder were disposable, because from 80,000 to 100,000 militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add 30,000 marines, the military power of Great Britain, at the time referred to, must have exceeded 400,000 men, exclusive of local militia and volunteers. many were necessarily employed in the defence of the colonies; but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible; and that intellectual power that distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations, in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger.
It is almost needless to add how conspicuously this brave and unequalled army disproved the calumnious prognostications of its contemners and revilers; how gloriously it established, in seven campaigns and more than twenty pitched battles, its superiority over the veterans of France, crowned with the laurels of a hundred victories, and accounted invincible till called to contend with the men of our soil. Let us now direct our attention to its composition and organization.
By the constitution of this country, the king (or queen, if the sovereign be a female) is the supreme head and captain-general of the army, which can receive no orders except such as emanate from him, and is bound to obey all his orders, unless at variance with the fundamental laws of the land; in which case submission to his authority would be declared rebellion against the constitution of the state and the nation at large. To him belongs the power of declaring war and concluding peace, of granting subsidies to his allies and indemnities to his enemies: but no treaty is valid or binding unless it be signed by a responsible minister; and without the authority of parliament he cannot touch a sixpence of his subjects' money for this or any other purpose. Further, it is expressly declared in the bill of rights, and annually repeated in the preamble to the mutiny-act, which forms the martial law of the British army, "that the raising or keeping a standing army in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of parliament, is against law;" in other words, no military force can be raised or maintained in this country, except with the consent of the three estates composing the legislature, by which, in their collective capacity, the sovereign power of the state is exercised. But in regard to the existing army, all measures and all acts deemed necessary for its regulation, direction, and employment, are decided upon by the king in council; and it is the duty of the commander-in-chief of the forces for the time being to direct the execution of such measures or acts, in all those operations which are executed within the United Kingdom, as well as to superintend the organization, instruction, and discipline of the troops belonging to the different branches of the service. The secretary at war is, by the terms of his commission or appointment, bound to give effect to the orders of the commander-in-chief, issued with the approbation and consent of the sovereign; excepting in as far as these shall appear to be contrary to the rules of the service, or to make any alteration in the expenditure of the army; in which cases it is his duty to make reference to the lords of the treasury, and to act in strict conformity to their instructions. This minister, in fact, who is not a member of the cabinet, is specially charged with the administration of the war department in all its branches. He is the organ of communication between government and the army on the one hand, and between the army and the government on the other; and he acts as a check upon the commander-in-chief, while he is in his turn restrained by his responsibility to parliament, to the country, and to the laws.
In the year 1795 a secretary of state for the war department was created, and it was not until the year 1801 that the colonial correspondence was transferred to the office. In the first instance, and during the whole course of the war, the principal business of the colonial department was to exercise a general control over all the military departments, the secretary at war, the ordnance, and the commander-in-chief; it was one head which directed all their operations to one common end; and as long as the secretary of state made this his principal duty, which was really and substantially the war department, that arrangement was good. The secretary at war was then, in point of fact, a sort of subordinate to the secretary of state for the war department. But at the end of the war, the mere military business diminished in importance; and, on the other hand, the civil business of the colonial office was rapidly increased in importance, because it was found that during the war attention was very much turned away from the civil affairs of the colonies, and that everything yielded to the superior importance of military business. The consequence of that change after the peace was, that gradually the secretary of state for the war and colonial departments came to exercise less and less control over any details of military arrangements, and his attention came to be more and more occupied in the civil affairs of the colonies. As the extent of correspondence increased, that augmented; and the result has been, that for the last 30 years the military affairs of the country have been transacted by three or four different departments, and virtually without any one effective head to direct their measures to one common end. At this moment, in the colonial office it is absolutely impossible to execute what the theory of that office implies, namely, to exercise a constant superintendence over all arrangements with regard to the military force of the country.
The departments exclusively military are those of the adjutant-general, the quartermaster-general, the commissary-general, the paymaster-general, and the Board of Ordnance.
The adjutant-general's department consists of the adjutant-general himself; the deputy-adjutant-general, the assistant-adjutant-general, and the deputy-assistant-adjutant-general, with ten or eleven clerks, three messengers, and a keeper. The adjutant-general belongs to the personal staff of the king, and accompanies his majesty and the commander-in-chief in all their reviews and military inspections. He is named directly by the king, on the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, and has the rank of lieutenant-general, though for the most part only a major-general. The deputy-adjutant-general is also appointed by his majesty; but the secondary offices of the department are filled by persons nominated by the adjutant-general himself. This officer may be considered as the director of the personnel of the British army. Everything relating to the effective or non-effective state of the troops; to formation, instruction, and discipline; to the direction and inspection of the clothing and accoutrements of the army; to recruitment, leaves of absence, or bounties to soldiers; to the employment of officers of the staff; and to ordinary or extraordinary and official returns relative to these different matters, whether required by His Majesty, by the ministry, by the secretary-at-war, or by parliament, falls within the province of the department over which the adjutant-general presides. He is the regular channel through which commanders of corps communicate with the commander-in-chief; and all orders, special instructions, and general regulations issued by the commander-in-chief, relative to the organization, discipline, or instruction of the army, are prepared, addressed
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1 History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814. By W. F. P. Napier, C.B. Lieutenant-Colonel, H. P., 434 Regiment.
Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1851-52. to the commanders of corps, and published by the adjutant-general, conformably to the direction of the commander-in-chief of the forces, acting in the name and on behalf of his majesty. The troops stationed in Scotland, however, instead of communicating directly with the adjutant-general's office in London, address themselves to the deputy-adju tant-general who resides at Edinburgh; and Ireland has an adjutant-general of its own. It is also the duty of the adjutant-general to prepare, weekly, for the commander-in-chief and the king, returns of the troops stationed in Great Britain and Ireland; and, monthly, for the commander-in-chief, the ministers, and the king, a general statement of all the forces both at home and abroad.
The quartermaster-general holds the same rank, and is appointed in the same manner, as the adjutant-general. His principal duties are to prescribe routes and marches, to regulate the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, to provide quarters for them, to mark out ground proper for encampment, to execute military surveys, and to prepare plans and arrange dispositions for the defence of a territory, whether such defence is to be operated by the troops alone or by means of field-works. Every British army on service has a quartermaster-general, with assistants, who perform functions altogether analogous to those which are discharged in the department of quartermaster-general of the British forces; and it is admitted on all hands that, during the Peninsular campaigns, this branch of service was, under the very able direction of Sir George Murray, carried to a high degree of perfection. Whenever the army, established for the time in any position whatever, had to move in advance and in a given direction, all the officers of the quartermaster-general's staff, charged with the reconnaissances, immediately set out and spread themselves over the ground, each individual taking the direction indicated to him, and pushing his reconnaissances to the extent of a day's march of the army. About five in the afternoon these officers returned to headquarters; and by combining their different partial sketches, a general plan was prepared, according to which the quartermaster-general and the commander-in-chief traced the routes to be followed, and the positions to be taken up, by the troops who were to march on the morrow. This was the duty of every day while the army was in motion; and no better evidence can be produced of the ability with which it was performed, than the circumstance that, during the whole of the Peninsular campaigns, the army never once took up a position in which it could be assailed by the enemy, however superior in numbers, with the remotest chance of success. Attached to the office of quartermaster-general of the forces is a Board of Topography, with a depot of maps, plans, and military memoirs, and a library containing the best military works that have been published in different countries.
The barrack department is a numerous one, consisting of ninety functionaries in London, and eight in Edinburgh, exclusive of barrack-masters, store-keepers, hospital store-keepers, barrack-serjeants, and clerks. Their principal duty is to take care of the barracks for the reception of the troops; and generally see that the troops are properly accommodated, both as to room and otherwise. There are 118 barracks in Great Britain, of which 102 are permanent, and 16 temporary. In Ireland there are 109 barracks, of which 98 are permanent; and in the colonies there are 367 barracks. The number of persons which can be thus accommodated is 150,728 non-commissioned officers and men, and 6218 officers.
The commissariat department consists of a commissary-general, 16 deputy commissaries-general, and 154 assistant and deputy assistant commissaries, all of whom are employed in the colonies and the Mediterranean stations.
Their duties consist in supplying provisions, forage, and camp as well as barrack equipage to the troops; in providing the materials of the medical department of the service. Every army on active service has its own commissariat, under the orders of a commissary-general, who is responsible, in the first instance, to the general-in-chief, for the regular supply of the troops under his command. In Portugal and Spain, the provisioning of the army was effected by commissaries stationed at different places, or attached to brigades, and paid from funds supplied by the commissary-general of the army, consisting partly in cash and partly in bills or debentures on the English government. Immense abuses appeared to have prevailed in the commissariat department during the early part of the Peninsular campaigns. This is evident from the repeated orders of the day issued by the Duke of Wellington against malversations on the part of subordinates in this department; and not less so from the fact, that notwithstanding all the care and vigilance exercised by his Grace, many of these functionaries managed to realize fortunes.
The paymaster-general is the head of the army pay-office, whence the issues for the payment of every description of military service are made. This office consists of the paymaster-general himself; two deputies, an accountant-general, a cashier, book-keepers, clerks, and other subordinates; and there are several deputy-paymasters abroad subordinate to the general department at home. The paymaster-general has no active control over the expenditure of the public money. His duty is merely to make payments ministerially and without discretion, in pursuance of the warrants directed to him by the secretary at war, the treasury, or both, as the case may be; or in honour of the drafts of the deputy paymasters abroad, for the ordinary services of the army. The pay-office must, therefore, be looked upon as an office of account merely, and as affecting the public expenditure only in as far as it performs the duties of an office of accounts with regularity and expedition. The materials and documents, which compose a considerable part of the account of the paymaster-general, originate with persons over whose conduct he exercises no manner of control. Indeed, there is a regular succession in preparing them, from the regimental paymaster to the agent, and from the agent to the secretary at war, who finally delivers them at the pay-office. Different classes of accounts and documents are delivered in at certain periods prescribed by the pay-office act. But large balances of the public money are not now, as formerly, allowed to remain in the hands of the paymaster-general, or at his credit at the bank; nor can he derive any profit from the custody of the public money, the balances being confined within the narrowest possible limits. The establishment of a regiment, with the royal regulations and warrants, is in fact the instrument which regulates the pay of the army, and is consequently the basis of all the documents which enter or go out of the pay-office under that head of the service.
The ordnance department, which comprehends the artillery and engineers, is administered and commanded by a master-general, assisted by a council or board, composed of the surveyor-general, the clerk of the ordnance, the inspector-general, who, with his agents, has the control of the munition and stores, as well as of the accounts, and the principal store-keeper, who is responsible for the existence and conservation of the whole matériel. The secretary of the ordnance also attends the board. The written orders of the master-general are, of course, executory in all the branches of this department; but he commonly entrusts to the board
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1 Dupin, Force Militaire de la Grande Bretagne, I. ii. p. 54. 2 Ibid. I. ii. p. 59. the administration of the materiel and of the expenditure. In case of absence or vacancy, and when the master-general does not of himself exercise any part of his authority, the board in like manner officiates in his stead. The ordinance has a special paymaster or treasurer, who advances the funds necessary for the department, on orders or drafts, signed by at least three members of the council. Almost all the officers of the board are at the same time members of the House of Commons. The sums voted for the support of this department proceed upon estimates of the ordinary and extraordinary service, and of services unprovided for. The ordinary service comprehends the provision for the ordinary establishments, civil and military, for the year ensuing; the extraordinary includes every service known beforehand of a temporary and contingent nature, during the currency of the year; and the services unprovided for consist of services which have either been actually paid for in the course of the past year, or which are supposed to have been paid, but which were not foreseen when the estimates of the preceding year were prepared. Among these unforeseen expenses are included various additions which may have occurred in the individual services voted in the ordinance estimates of the previous year, to which are commonly added such sums as may be considered necessary to make up the deficiency of the sum allotted to the ordinance for the use of the naval service. So much for the military departments. Let us now attend to the composition of the army itself.
The British army consists at present of 12,056 cavalry and 119,976 infantry; but of this force 2103 cavalry and 29,749 infantry are employed in the East India Company's territories; leaving an available force, probable for in the estimates of the year 1853, of 9953 cavalry and 90,227 infantry, or 102,283 men of all arms, including officers. This force is altogether exclusive of the artillery and engineers, &c.
The cavalry on home service consists of the first and second regiments of life-guards, and the royal regiment of horse-guards (blue) each of 344 rank and file and 274 horses, with 19 other regiments of dragoon-guards and dragoons; namely, 7 of dragoon-guards, 3 of dragoons, and 9 of light dragoons, including lancers and hussars, amounting to 5897 rank and file, with 4892 horses; or, including the regiments of life-guards, 6919 rank and file, and 5714 horses. In this enumeration, however, the cavalry serving in India, the field train, and the Cape corps of mounted riflemen are not included. The first regiment of dragoon-guards consists at present of 438 rank and file, and 361 horses; but the remaining regiments of the cavalry of the line have only 328 rank and file and 271 horses each. The officers and non-commissioned officers of a regiment of life-guards, on its present establishment, amount to 85; of a regiment of the cavalry of the line, to between 60 and 70. Thus, supposing the latter to consist of 368 privates, divided into 8 companies or squadrons, such a regiment would have 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 8 captains, 8 lieutenants, 8 cornets, 1 paymaster, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 surgeon, 1 assistant surgeon, and 1 veterinary surgeon, or 35 officers in all; besides 28 sergeants and 8 trumpeters; making a total of 71 officers and non-commissioned officers, and raising the entire strength of the regiment to 439 men. And the same relative proportion obtains, whatever be the footing, in point of effective force, on which the regiment is placed.
Since the peace of 1815, various changes have been made in the arms and equipments of our cavalry. In the first place, armour was given to the life-guards, immediately after they had proved its total inefficiency in the field of battle, and torn the laurels of Waterloo from the redoubted cuirassiers of France. That armour must prove a decided impediment to the efficacy of a dragoon on service, is what no one can for a moment doubt. Its weight, the constant cleaning which it requires, the pain which its inflexibility must occasion under fatigue, and the obstacles it opposes to the free and full action of the muscular powers of the human body, greatly detract from its advantages. These, moreover, have been over-rated; and we are much mistaken if it will not one day be shown that the life-guards, encumbered with the cuirasses, are immeasurably less formidable than they were when their natural strength, weight, and activity, had full freedom of action allowed them. In the next place, four of our regiments of light horse have been converted into lancers. We agree in opinion with Montecuculi, that the lance "est la reine des armes pour la cavalerie;" and we also think, with Major Beamish, that lancers should constitute the standard cavalry of England. But we do not the less object to the particular kind of lance introduced into our service, and the description of cavalry to whom it has been assigned. No nation possesses such materials as Britain for the formation of redoubtable lancers; no nation has the command of such means of bringing them to perfection: and if solid squares of infantry are ever to be penetrated by cavalry, it must be performed by cavalry armed with the lance. But this will never be achieved by such a weapon as that at present in use. It must be effected by a lance of sufficient length to overcome the infantry bayonet, which, thus opposed, would no longer be formidable; and this lance must be put into the hands of our heavy cavalry, particularly the household troops, which, thus armed, would be able to contend on equal terms with the best infantry in the world, and would unquestionably be capable of penetrating its closest formation.
The British infantry on home service is composed of 3 regiments of guards, viz., the 1st or grenadier regiment, the Coldstream regiment, and the 3d regiment, amounting together to 5260 rank and file; of 99 regiments of the line, consisting of 1 battalion each, 850; of one rifle regiment (the 60th foot) and the rifle brigade, 2 battalions each; of 3 West India regiments, the field train, 3 Newfoundland and 3 royal veteran companies, the Gold Coast corps, the Ceylon regiment, the Malta fencibles, the Canadian rifle regiment, the St Helena regiment, and the Cape corps of mounted riflemen; making a total of 66,240 men, exclusive of the guards. The regiments of infantry of the line have only 1 battalion as a constant nucleus. When additional battalions are raised, they are employed separately, and commanded each by a lieutenant-colonel. With regard to the colonelcy of a regiment, it is in a great measure a sinecure.
The ordinary staff of a battalion of 850 men rank and file, consists of 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 10 captains, 12 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 paymaster, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, and 1 surgeon with 2 assistants; in all 39 officers. The petty staff is composed of a sergeant-major, a quartermaster-sergeant, a paymaster-sergeant, an armourer-sergeant, a schoolmaster-sergeant, 10 colour-sergeants, 30 sergeants, a drum-major, and 21 drummers; in all 106 men. Hence the total strength of such a battalion would consist of 39 officers, 106 non-commissioned officers, 40 corporals, and 760 soldiers, or 906 men in all.
The force at present serving in India consists of 4 regiments of light dragoons, and 21 battalions of infantry, or, including supernumeraries and others, 29,749 men and officers.
The royal artillery forms only one corps, which is absurdly denominated a regiment, since, in the time of war, it is increased to more than 24,000 men. The master-general of the ordnance has the title and powers of colonel of the re-
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1 The largest-sized cuirass worn by the life-guards weighs about 12 pounds. These cuirasses are as ugly as they are weighty, and give to the really fine men who are compelled to wear them an appearance of being hump-backed. The men do not regard them as defensive. They prefer such cover as the dexterous use of the sword can give them.
2 Army Estimates for 1853-54. Army. giment of artillery; and a general officer, with the title of deputy-adjutant-general, performs the functions of head of the artillery staff, but is in no way dependent upon the adjutant-general of the British forces. The office of the deputy-adjutant-general of artillery is at Woolwich, which may be considered the headquarters of the ordnance. The royal artillery corps consists of the brigade of horse-artillery, and of the artillery serving on foot. The horse-artillery is subdivided into companies called troops, 7 in number. It is under the orders of 1 colonel-commandant, 2 colonels on second, 4 lieutenant-colonels, while each troop is commanded by a captain of the first rank, a captain of the second, and 3 lieutenants. The foot artillery is divided into 96 companies, under the orders of 12 colonels-commandant, 24 colonels, 36 lieutenant-colonels, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, and a surgeon, with 2 assistants in time of war, and 1 during peace.
In the year 1792, there were 4 battalions of foot artillery of 820 men each, with one of invalids containing 483; making 3707 in all. In 1814 there were 16,157 artillery men, forming 11 battalions of 1459 men each. The rocket corps is attached to and forms part of the artillery; and the same holds true of the royal artificers, the field train, and the artillery drivers.
In the war which preceded the peace of Amiens, and even in the early campaigns in Portugal, the engineer department was in a very ineffective condition; particularly from the want of the necessary means of transport, and partly also from a deficiency both in the number and quality of military artificers. In order to remedy these inconveniences, the Duke of Wellington, in 1814, caused a brigade of engineers, consisting of a company of sappers and miners, with horses, cars, and drivers, to be attached to each division of the army, and to be regularly trained and exercised in field duties, as well as in those which might be required of them in sieges.
A captain and a certain number of subalterns were specially attached to each brigade, and were held responsible for the effective condition both of the men and the horses.
Thus the remainder of the engineers, free from any embarrassments relative to the material and personnel of that department of the service, were enabled to give their undivided attention to important military operations, and to contribute, in a most essential manner, towards the success of the succeeding campaigns. Five companies of sappers and miners also served with the pontoon train, which consisted of 80 pontoons, besides forges, waggons, &c., drawn by about 800 horses; the whole under the orders of a major of the brigade of engineers. Since the peace, great attention has been paid both to the instruction and organization of this important branch of the service; which, in the event of another war, will be found on a very different footing, in point of efficiency, from that on which it stood during the greater part of the Peninsular campaigns. Experience taught important lessons, which have been suitably and effectually improved.
The portion of the British army presently serving in India amounts, as we have already seen, to about 30,000 men.
In addition to the regular force, a militia is enrolled in England, numbering 80,000 men, divided into 85 regiments. These are kept in a state of preparation for any emergent home-service by occasional training. The nucleus of an Irish and a Scotch militia is likewise preserved, the staff of no less than 54 regiments being constantly entertained; 15 of the regiments are Scotch—the residue Irish. In the Channel Islands, also, are 10 regiments of militia infantry, and 3 of artillery; and in all the dockyards of England (Portsmouth, Devonport, Sheerness, Chatham, Woolwich, Deptford, Pembroke, &c.) the artificers and labourers are formed into brigades, properly commanded, equipped, and drilled. Thirty-five yeomanry corps, the honourable artillery company, which has its headquarters in the precincts of the city of London, and the enrolled out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, complete the defensive force of the United Kingdom. It is mainly due to the energetic remonstrances of the late illustrious Duke of Wellington, that England is now in a condition vigorously to oppose hostile attempts from abroad, and to preserve domestic peace intact.
The following is the total expenditure of the military establishments of the United Kingdom for the year ending March 31, 1852:
| Army and militia services | L.6,142,576 | |--------------------------|-------------| | Ordnance department | 2,318,820 | | Commissariat department | 854,087 |
Total: L.9,315,485
But there is an army belonging to the East India Company consisting of no fewer than 250,000 men, chiefly natives of the country, who are for the most part trained and clothed after the fashion of the British army. First enrolled in the days of Clive and Laurence, 100 years ago, the sepoys have at all times proved "faithful to their salt," exhibiting courage and endurance unsurpassed by the finest European soldiery. In every corner of the continent of India, in Burmah, China, Afghanistan, the shores of Persia and Arabia, in Egypt, and even at Mauritius, in the presence of French disciplined troops, the sepoys have distinguished themselves alike by their bravery, their fidelity, and discipline. And the result has been the entire subjugation of the country, from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya chain—from Nepaul to the Arabian Sea.
The army of the East India Company consists of 5 brigades of horse artillery, or 17 European and 5 native troops; 18 battalions of foot artillery, or 24 European and 18 native companies; 22 regiments of regular native cavalry; 6 regiments of European infantry; 155 regiments of regular native infantry; 23 regiments of irregular native cavalry; 30 regiments of irregular native infantry; 5 contingent brigades of all arms, and a native legion. These troops are officered by Europeans, holding commissions from the Crown and the East India Company, and expressly educated for the service. The staff, and all officers in the ordnance, commissariat, military account, survey, and pay departments are held by commissioned officers in the service. The pay and Indian allowances are upon a liberal scale, and handsome pensions for life are granted to all classes after a stipulated period of service.
The condition of the British soldier has been amazingly improved of late years, producing a decidedly favourable effect upon his morale, and creating a popularity for the service which it did not enjoy previous to 1830. The practice of employing the agency of fear as a stimulus to good conduct, has been superseded by the wholesome policy of encouraging merit by offering rewards for continued steadiness. Corporal punishment has been all but abolished—50 lashes now constituting the acmé of punishment. Good conduct externally honoured by medals and badges, is now recompensed by a progressive increase to a soldier's daily pay; the sum of L.2250 is annually appropriated to annuities varying from L.10 to L.20, for which all non-commissioned officers of a certain amount of service are eligible; schools have been established under the auspices of young men especially trained to the duty of teaching; libraries are formed in all the great barracks; medals have been freely granted for good service in the Peninsula, India, Egypt, &c.; provision is made for enabling a certain number of married soldiers to reside away from the barracks, and savings banks offer to the soldiery both the temptation to save and the means of securing their property.
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1 Dupin, Force Milit. de la Grande Bretagne, l. v., c. 4, p. 196. important changes have of late years taken place in the arms and equipment of the soldiers; and there cannot be a doubt that in all future wars long marches will be executed with greater facility, and campaigns brought to rapid termination. The construction of the knapsack, and the method of attaching it to the person, have been much improved, and even at this moment further amendments are discussed. The old musket, which seldom carried a ball above 180 yards, and was so irregular in its progress to the object aimed at, that the proportion of the enemy killed to the number of bullets propelled was 1 in 3000,—is gradually being superseded by firelocks of an improved construction which will carry a ball 800 yards.
The character of the British army has been earned in battle and attested by victory. Wherever it has been even tolerably led, it has conquered; nor is there any army in the world which has sustained so few serious reverses. The elements of which it is composed are such as, if fairly developed in action, must, on anything like equal terms, insure victory: for not only are the soldiers more robust, and possessed of greater physical power (or, as it is technically called, bottom), than those of any other nation, but they are also distinguished by an unflinching, indomitable courage, which may be safely reckoned upon at all times and in all circumstances; which it is often difficult to restrain, but never necessary to excite; and which always rises to a pitch of sublime elevation at the prospect of the charge and the close combat. They are the only troops in the world who look with indifference on naked points, and who are constantly impelled by a powerful instinct to close with their enemy; who maintain the distant battle with unyielding steadfastness, yet rejoice when the moment arrives that is to rest the issue of the conflict on the bayonet's point, and a struggle hand to hand with the enemy. Hence their fire is close, steady, and destructive; their charge, where it can be given, irresistible.
"Les troupes Anglaises," says General Jomini, "se distinguent par leur bonne discipline et leur sang-froid; le soldat s'y enroûle pour la vie [this is a mistake; soldiers may enlist for any period], ce qui est bien extraordinaire chez un peuple si jaloux de sa liberté, mais ce qui ne surprend pas moins, c'est qu'il est docile et soumis: ces qualités essentielles qui constituent une armée solide, sont peut-être préférables à une valeur brillante mais passagère. Les unes sont permanentes; l'autre, justifiant le proverbe Espagnol, dépend de tel jour et de telle circonstance. La résignation et la discipline unies au courage froid, ont des résultats invariables et sûrs; elles produisent l'ensemble sans lequel il n'est point de véritable force."
M. Dupin, in that part of his able work in which he treats of the military force of Great Britain, delivers an opinion somewhat similar to that expressed by Jomini, though shaded by certain qualifications and abatements.
"It faut de dire," says he, "après les Français, tels qu'ils ont été pendant vingt-quatre ans dans nos armées, les Anglais sont les militaires les plus actifs de tout l'Europe; ils le sont d'une manière qui leur est propre. Leur activité n'a pas les élans prodigieux dont nous avons tant fois offert de méritoires exemples; mais elle n'a jamais d'intermittence, et se montre toujours la même. Cela lui fait produire, au bout d'un temps donné, une somme de résultats plus grande qu'on n'aurait pu le prévoir, d'après la vue d'une action isolée même la plus brillante. Le soldat Breton a généralement moins d'esprit naturel et de pénétration que le soldat Français; mais l'immobilité de son imagination rend ses actions plus mesurées. Moins distrait par la vue des objets extérieurs, par les souvenirs du passé, par les espérances ou les terreurs de l'avenir, il est toujours tout entier au moment présent. Plus attentif au commandement actuel, il compense ainsi l'inferiorité de son intelligence. Incapable de juger les grands mouvements qui s'exécutent, et surtout ceux qui vont s'exécuter, pour ou contre lui, le danger futur ne se peint pas même à sa pensée. Il va donc à la mort présente sans s'inquiéter de la mort à venir. Voilà pourquoi le moral de l'armée Britannique est presque impossible à détruire par la mauvaise fortune."
In this passage there is some truth, mixed up with much nonsense and misrepresentation. The British soldier, it seems, is inferior to the French soldier in intelligence. And why? Because he does not concern himself about "grand movements executed and to be executed;" and because he is more attentive to command, and goes to present death without disturbing himself about death to come. These appear strange grounds upon which to rest the alleged superiority of the French or the inferiority of the British soldier in point of intelligence. That a native of this country, admitted on all hands to be at least one of the most intellectual on the face of the earth, should be at once metamorphosed by a red coat into a mere automaton or lump of living but impassible matter, would indeed be an extraordinary phenomenon; nor must it appear less singular that the French armies, with all their intellectual superiority, and all their attention to "grand movements," should have been constantly overthrown by our animated machines. But the plain fact is, that the assertion is wholly erroneous. The English soldier is inferior to no other that ever existed in point of intelligence; and even the late General Foy, whose book appears to have been written chiefly for the purpose of calumniating our army, makes admissions which show that such was his own real opinion, while maintaining a contrary one. This officer repeatedly says that the non-commissioned officers of the British army are superior in activity, intelligence, and zeal, to those of the same rank in any other army, not excepting the French; and that this superiority was conspicuously evinced throughout the whole of the Peninsular campaigns. But these persons are taken almost indiscriminately from the ranks, and of course must represent the average amount of intelligence and activity diffused amongst the private soldiers; a circumstance which General Foy had not adverted to when he made the admission in question; for he was too good a Frenchman to allow British soldiers any merit which he could decently and with any show of probability deny them.
But the best answer to all his captious and querulous strictures is to be found in his own description of the conduct of the British regiments at Waterloo. "The cavalry which supported them," says he, "was cut to pieces [this is not true]; the fire of their artillery completely silenced. The general and staff officers were galloping from one square to another, not knowing where to find shelter. Carriages, wounded men, parks of reserve, and auxiliary troops, were all flying in disorder towards Brussels. Death was before them, and in their ranks; disgrace in their rear. In this terrible situation, neither the bullets of the imperial guard, discharged almost point-blank, nor the victorious cavalry of France, could make the least impression on the immovable British infantry. One might have been almost tempted to fancy that it had rooted itself in the ground, but for the majestic movements which its battalions commenced some minutes after sunset, at the moment when the approach of the Prussian army apprised Wellington that—thanks to numbers, thanks to the force of inert resistance, and as a reward for having contrived to draw up brave fellows in battle—he had just achieved the most decisive victory of our age." The British army can desire no better panegyric than this, pronounced by a beaten enemy; and if the French shall continue to comfort themselves with the idea that the British soldier is deficient in intelligence, because he possesses that strength of mind which no danger can appal, and that tenacity which carries off the prey by sticking to it to the last, it would certainly be a pity to deprive them of any slender consolation which they may derive from cherishing such a delusion. But instead of adding anything farther of our own, we shall conclude by citing an authority which, on this as on all other military subjects, is universally admitted to be of the highest order.
"That the British infantry soldier," says Sir William Napier, "is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat, with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined—and three years are required to accomplish this—his port is lofty, and his movements free: the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing; nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not indeed possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.
"It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution, uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered. Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory; but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy: no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauds of his countrymen; his life of danger was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surprising fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with incredible energy, overthrow every opponent; at all times proving that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him?
"The result of a hundred battles, and the united testimony of impartial writers, of different nations, have given the first place amongst the European infantry to the British; but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world."
(J.B.—E.) (J.H.S.)